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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE WASHINGTON POST
28' June 1969 .
By Harry Trimborn
Los Angeles Times
SAIGON-Teachers I a r,e',
,murdered by Vietcong terror
fists or killed by the crossfire'
of soldiers. Students are torn
from their studies to join it,
stream of refugees.
Schools become military
barracks or shelter for the
homeless. Classrooms, text-
books and libraries vanish in,
Such is the impact of war on
being taught by more teachers,
in more classrooms than at'
any other time in the short,`
turbulent history of the 'na-'
tion.
In 1954, the year Vietnam,
was split into a northern and
southern zone, the number of
children attending elementary
numbered 500,000. This year
11 year age group.
Hopes for Future
The Ministry of Education
,hopes to increase the figure to,
85 per cent by 1970.
In the last four years more;
than 700 classrooms were de-'
stroyed in the fighting. Yet in'
the past two years alone,
nearly 14,000 new classrooms
'Pave been built throughout
he country.
Since 1967, about 15,000 ele,
mentary schoolteachers have
been trained, to bring the
total number of teachers in
the nation to over 35,000..
There Avvr(q dlfW.
znentary achers in 1854.
makes up for the numerical
logs of teachers due to the
war. According to government
figures, 289 teachers were kid-
iiapped and 107 were killed by
the Vietcong between 1960 and
1967. During the 1968 Commu-
Kist offensives, another 31
teachers were killed.
Desire for Education
The relatively healthy state!
of education in the midst of a
.war is due largely to the de-
sire of the people to have
:their children educated.
"This . is the most thrilling
aspect of the whole educa-
tional program in this coun-
'try," said Harold Winer, who
as assistant director for educa-
tion for the U.S. AID program
here is the chief American co-
ordinator for joint U.S.-Viet-
namese educational programs.
"I have never seen a people
of any country in which I have
worked over the years respond
so willingly and so unselfishly
to the needs of education.
They will do anything, they
will give their last piaster to
get a school going in their
community."
It is this zeal, according to
'Winer, that keeps the Viet-
cong from mounting any
large-scale, concerted, efforts
to disrupt governmental edu-
cational programs.
Early in War
"In the early days of the
war, the VC made strenuous
efforts to disrupt educational
programs," Winer said. "They
would destroy schools, kill and
Intimidate teachers."
The terrorism against teach-
ets was part of the Vietcong
policy of rooting out pro-gov-
ernment leaders in hamlets
,and villages. And teachers, by
? virtue of their positions, were
at least potential community
leaders.
Where there was no direct
violence against teachers, the
Vietcong would often force
them to witness the executions:
of other Communist victims.
The terror tactics were
largely limited to the elemen-
tary schools in rural communi-
lease 19?
ere
generally spared acts of ter-,
rrorism.
1 Unlike elementary schools
in remote and vulner ble i
areas, high schools and of-1
,leges are located in c ies
which generally remain in
firm control of govern ent
forces...
Fallen Off
Yet violence against sell ols
and teachers in the re ote
areas has fallen off in the ast
few years because, according
to Winer, the Vietcong as
learned that such action is
"counter-productive."
"I know of nothing that as
aroused the hatred of the co-
pie 'toward VC activity as e
destruction of a classroom or
the killing of a teach r,"
Winer said. "The people ill.
sometimes gloss over of er
disruptive activity, but of
when it comes to educat on
and the opportunities it off rs
for a better life for their c il-
dren."
While teachers may no
longer be singled out or
death by the Vietcong, he
fear remains. Winer said it
was difficult to induce tea h-
ers from the cities to take as-
signments in remote haml is
because of Vietcong activity
No VC ? Program
Winer insisted that contr ry
to published reports there is i
no evidence that the Vietco g
has established an educatio al
program for the people, o it-
side the purely political find c-
trination courses.
"We have yet to find a y-
place where: the VC have r-
ganized a fully operati gI
school program,"? he said. ` n
contested areas there is gen r-
ally nothing going on at 11.
However, in some of the ar s
where the government s
control by day and the VC y
night, we do conduct clas s
during the daytime."
In the secondary scho is
and in the colleges and u i
versities, the Vietcong mak s
some attempt to infiltrate t e
student body for propagan a
01194A(' ql9 lu~tlkly s s
pressed, Winer said.
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THE WASHINGTON POST,
20 July 1969
CPYRGHT
inistates A-p aise
hat , Oualifies as a C
Abdul Sattar doubles as rep- 'kpeace - loving." Theoretically
By Robert H. Estabrook
weehlnston Post Forelrn 8er,fee
UNITED NATIONS-What
is the definition of a nation?
That, essentially, Is what the
United States has asked the Se-
curity Council to decide by pro-
posing that it take up the ad-
mission of ministates to the
United Nations-without arous-
ing any detectable enthusiasm
for the question on the part of
the other 14 council members.
The United States has in
mind suggesting in closed ses-
sion to the Council membership
committee an as yet undis-
closed checklist based on popu-
lation, area and economic re-
sources by which the suitability
of potential applicants might be
judged.
At the root of the problem
is that some of the smaller
among the 126 present U.N.
members can barely afford the
$50,000 minimum annual cost
of representation. There 'are
vast differences in population,
area and resources among cur-
rent members-Yet under the
doctrine of sovereign equality
each has an equal vote in the
General Assembly.
For example, India, popula.
tion around 480 million, has
nearly 4700 times as many peo-
ple as the Maldive Islands,
population 103,000. The Mal-
dives now operate an embassy
in Washington and Ambassador
resentative to the U.N. But for
a time business with both the
U.S. and U.N. was conducted
from the Maldives' philatelic
agency in New York.
Yet there is a strong possi-
bility that 25 or more additional
states, some of even smaller
population, may soon seek full
U.N. membership unless some
other-status is devised.
This was one of the con?I
siderations behind the July 14
letter from U.S. Ambassador
William B Buffum to Secur
ity Council President Ibra
hima Boye of Senegal. Buffum
noted that former U.S. am-
bassador Arthur J. Goldberg
had raised the issue in Decem-
ber, 1957, and that Secretary
General U Thant had taken
it up on several occasions.
The letter endorsed Thant's
call for a "study of the cri-
teria for membership with a
view to laying down the neces-
sary limitations on full mem-
bership for the emerging
states which are exception-
ally small in area, population
and human and economic re-
sources, while also defining
other forms of association
which would benefit both the
'micro-states' and the United
Nations."
Under the U.N. Charter no
membership diterion is estab-
lished except that a state be
Pacific dependency of "Mu-
tiny on the Bounty" fame
with a population of about 90
persons, is eligible for mem?
bership. The General As-
sembly's colonialism commit-
tee appears to urge full In-
dependence for Pitcairn in a
resolution annually submitted
to the Assembly.
No one seriously expects
this. Some smaller independ-
ent entities have deliberately
decided not to take on the
obligations of U.N. member-
ship -- among them Andorra,
Llechstensteln, Monaco, Auru,
San Marino and Western Sa-
moa.
Moreover, size is not neces.
sarily an index to usefulness
and influence. Malta, with
only twice the area and far
less than half the population
of the District of Columbia,
proposed the study of the sea-
bed that now occupies the
world's g r e a t nations at
Geneva.
But there are rumblings that
less qualified applicants may
be in the offing-for example,
in the West Indies, where the
British-sponsored associations
are encountering some of the
strains of other recent federa-
tions. Grenada, with only
about 90,000 -population, has
inquired about observer status
111- * " 201d"
LIVA
ratry?
at the U.N. Anguilla, the Ca-
ribbean Island of 7000 where
British troops intervened this
spring, had spoken similarly.
From the American stand-
point, a potential worry is the
Pacific Trust Territory of Mi-
cronesia, where several en-
tities might seek separate
status without an inducement
to association. The colonialI re
committee already claims
jurisdiction over the Virgin
Islands, Guam and America
Samoa.
What accounts for the lac
of enthusiasm In the Security
Council about taking up the
question ds that some new
countries, jealous of their pre-
rogatives, fear that an attempt
may be made to institute
system of weighted voting i
the Assembly.
There is little chance. an
such change would be ap
proved on its face.
But big powers have bee
reluctant to risk offendin
smaller delegations who s
votes they may need on obhe
Issues by seeming to propos
a limitation.
A genuine problem exists
but it is hard to find diplo
mats from other countries wh
believe that the current U.S
move stands much greate
chance of success than pre
vious stillborn efforts.
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CPWRI ITTE, Paris
29 ;6y -;969
According to a Poll Taken by COFREMCA
According to an opinion poll taken by COFREMCA from 15 April to 15 May at
the request of the French Association for NATO (1), 74.3% of all Frenchmen
polled believe that France should stay in the Atlantic Alliance, 11.5% believe
she should get out, and 14.2% had no opinion.
This poll, which covered 2,250,000 people also revealed that 25.3% of
Frenchmen believe that France is still a full NATO member, 21.5% of those
questioned failed to answer on this point, and 46.9% of those questioned were
in agreement with the statement. "France must remain in the Alliance because,
in case of conflict, France has need of the United States."
In reply to the question: "Can the military force actually at the disposal
of France assure her an adequate defence?" 59.7% of the answers were negative,
29.2% said yes, and 11.1% had no opinion.
51.7% of those questioned believe that it is in the best interests of
France to maintain relations with the United States; 37.1% said they were
"pretty much in agreement" with the statement and only 3.1% "disagreed com-
pletely."
The COFREMCA poll also brought out some interesting results on opinions
about Franco-German relations. To the question: "Is there at this moment a
country that is likely to develop into an adversary of France?" 29.8% of the
people answered yes, 7.4% named Germany as the country, which trailed after
China (9.5%). This tendency was stronger in the north and east of France
where 10.7% of all those questioned feared Germany. Elsewhere 57.2% of French
opinion, reflected in the poll, estimate that a foreign country represents an
"economic danger" to France and among them, 28.4% believe that Germany is the
danger.
(l r Rho Ti'ronCl' ~SSGiCZH+Z(.Lf,G17' *hc n~iR in C,~ymmiini+ (4 r r t
_185, rue de la Pompe, Paris 16:e.
SELON UN SONDAGE DE LA COFREMCA
es trois quarts des Francais sont.pour le maintien
de la France daps IIalliance atlantique
r Selon un sondage d'opinion realise par Is, COFREMCA entre
le 15 avril et le 15 mai a ]a demande' de 1'Association frangaise
pour la Communaute atlantique (1),~ 74,3 % des Frangais estiment
que la France doit rester dans l'alliance, atlantique, 11,5 % pen-
sent qu'elle devrait s'en retiree, 14,2 ,% ;n'ont pas d'opinion.
N Cc Bondage, qui Porte sur
N
eux it
nauante
personnel n errog es, r vele
d'autre part que 25,3 S% des
Francais croient que la France
fait encore pantie de I'OTAN,
21,5 % des personnes interro-
gdes ignorant la rdponse a cette
question. 46,9 % des personnes
interrogees sont d'accord avec
l'affirmation,: ((II Taut que la
France reste dans l'alliance, car
on a besoin des Etats-Unis en
cal de conflit.>
A la question : e La force mi-
litaire dont In. France dispose
actuellement peut-elle assurer
efficacement an defense ?v, les
reponges donnent 59,7 % non,
29,2 % out et 11,1 % sans opi-
nion.
51,7 % des personnes interro-
gdes estiment que Pinter@t de
la France lui commande de
rester en relations avec lea
." t
s< plutot d'a.ccord> avec crt
opinion ; 3,1 ' seulemenl
disent ((pas du tout d'accord .
Le sonrlage do la COFREI'C
fait encore a.pparai.tre des r
sultats in.te>ressan.ts a pt o
des relations franco-allr ma.- tip t.
A la quest ion : s Y a t-il
moment un pays susrcpti! d )
devenir no adversaice I
France ? > , .Sur 29,8 9. e'
sonnes a y a n. t repondr on
7,4 % estinrrnt que ce ,
l'Allemo0;'. qui vient airy, i
aprds in .:tinc (9.5 %). c.?tt
tendonce est encore plea accu
see dans le nord et l'c de I
France, oit 10,70 % >l> . person
nes interrogdes craignent l'Al
lemagne. D'autre part, 57.2 ?
des Frangais, scion ce sondag
estiment qu'un pays etrange
reprdsente un a danger econ.o
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIAI QRZ "-~1j A#A, i 0 a la France
185, 'rue as to Pompe, Paris-18'. , l'Allemagne constitue ce danpe
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BOGOTA DOMESTIC SERVICE
3 July 1969 CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
PRE?IDENT CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO'S FIRESIDE CHAT
(Excerpts) I wish-:to devote tonight's.chat to two. principal subjects.
,First, to comment on my visit to the United States, and second,;
to refer to my meeting with the members of the..political.:directorates
and the committees which were formed to prepare parliamentary work.
I will merely emphasize some of the chief aspects of Colombia's
position, with which I believe the opinion of-my countrymen is identif
but which I hope will become firmer in the consciences of all, because
I believe that they constitute a good path for the future.
I have not felt it convenient for Latin America, particularly not
for Colombia, to weaken the inter-American system, but on the contrary
to strengthen it. The truth is that within this inter-American system
there is a large power--the United States--highly superior because
of its resources, population,- and means, to all the other members
of the Pan American community. But we are playing within certain
rules of the group which recognize the juridical equality of states.
Experience has shown that there have been deviations and that the
principles-of the inter-American system have not always been followed
faithfully. Within this system the deviations can be corrected,
seeking perfection, and this is what we must do.
The consequences of an economic policy of continental complementation
would be extraordinary, because it is not the same to join poor
markets through economic integration as it is to have en.sy access
to a market of the immense buying capacity of the United States.
I fail to see why, when there are protests against international
injustices, against the wide gaps between highly industrialized
nations and those undergoing development, these protests are directed
against the United States, as if there were no other industrialized
nations with different political ((word indistinct)). Our problem-
-the gap--does not only exist with the United States, it also exists
with the USSR, France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and with all
highly industrialized nations.
Naturally, the constant increase of open-end latent unemployment
gradually created a vast social problem. It increases this gap,
this inequality, it causes--as I said in the United States--prosperity
to be divided, making a sector of the world very prosperous and
making another poorer and more backward. What can we do to reduce
this gap? Attack the United States, or cooperate within the inter-
American system to seek the development of a better policy? On this,
I wish to say something which seems elemental, but which people
do not consider. When the United States is mentioned. people tend
to personify the United States as if it involved one individual- -
the old image of Uncle Sam with his striped trousers, high hat,
ed,
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CPYRGHT
,:
it the price of coffee, the granting of loans, tariffs, the conditions
imposed on navigation, and so forth.
We must abandon this simple idea and convince ourselves that in
our relations with the United States we must start out with the
idea that we are facing a country of extreme complexity. There is
not a single will deciding all things. There is an executive branch
which is quite strong, there is a Presidential regime, but there
is also a Congress which has special powers and whose will is decisive
in many cases-and which naturally is influenced by the different
sectors and interests of the U.S. people. The United States is like
everywhere else; there are capital, labor, and regional interests
,which make themselves heard, which pressure their representatives,
the members of the House of Representatives and the senators. There
are pressure groups such as those'existing among us and in.other
nations. Therefore, we must work to change our situation, not by
saying "the United States simply does not want to give us this or
that," but on finding out what we can do in each case, what we can
change with the executive branch, and what we must do to create
a good public image in the United States.
I have proposed a congress of U.S. and Latin American unions to
study the problem of unemployment. The gravity of unemployment
in Latin-America is a reality which the U.S. workers and union leaders
should clearly understand, because their understanding will contribute
to the forming of public opinion. I have proposed this congress
because I am confident in the generosity of criteria of the U.S.
union leaders. Today I agreed with the labor minister to meet him
on Saturday and with the Confederation of Workers of Colombia (CTC)
and the Union of Workers of Colombia (UTC) to see if we can arrange
to hold this Pan American congress of labor unions in Bogota this
December.
This idea has been met favorably by Colombia workers and I'think
it will be met favorably by the workers of Latin America. I think
that to oppose this-.-a policy seeking to open more markets in the
nation with the largest buying capacity--is a chauvinistic foolishness
((This opposition would come)) out of hatred for the United States,
because it is said that we-"will depend more on the United States
if we sell them ore. Why are we complaining? We want to sell more,
we want to export more. We must seek, through every means, an easy
access to U.S. markets, because one has to sell to he who can buy,
not to he who cannot afford to buy. It is foolish to think that
to create a climate of solidarity to gain more markets means iricreasi
our dependence, that it is sacrificing national. autonomy. The internat
economic policy of Colombia cannot be oriented along those liners
and, I repeat, we want to conduct it not only through embassies
and foreign ministries, but by contacting the U.S. public and its
different sectors and explaining the problem-of the nations undergoing
development in the continent.
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August 1969
August 16-23 Helsinki Youth and Student Conference on Vietnam,
sponsored by the (Communist) International
Union of Students and the World Federation
of Democratic Youth.
August 18-28 Liege, 7th General Assembly of the (non-Communist)
Belgium World Assembly of Youth.
August 20-21 Czechoslovakia lst Anniversary of the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia by Soviet, East German, Hungarian,
Polish and Bulgarian forces of the Warsaw
Pact.
August 24 NATO 20th Anniversary, NATO Treaty (signed April
4) which went into effect in 1949.
August 24 Soviet Union 30th Anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Non-
Aggression Pact.
August 25 France 25th Anniversary of the Liberation of Paris
by French and U.S. forces, 1944.
August 28 Czechoslovakia 25th Anniversary of the Slovak uprising
against the Nazi German occupation, 1944.
September 1 30th Anniversary of the beginning of World
War. II -- Germany invaded Poland from the
West September 1; USSR invaded Poland from
the East, September 17, 1939.
October 1 China 20th Anniversary, Chinese Peoples' Republic
which wasl proclaimed 21 September 1949
and has since been celebrated 1 October.
October 10-12 Vienna Conference on European Security sponsored
by (Communist) World Council of Peace.
October 17-31 Budapest 7th Congress of (Communist) World Federation
of Trade Unions -- the front. that publicly
protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia
last year (and has since avoided the issue).
October 23 Budapest Anniversary of 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
November 4
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IST- London
No Partnership with HIM
It is pretty clear that we are. getting close to the limits-of coexistence
with.Mr Brezhnev's Russia
This paper said in November, 1965, that President Johnson
ought to -take a calculated risk :
It is a choice between an old priority and a new one-
to put it bluntly, between picking the Germans as the main
people to do business with, and picking the Russians. . . .
This paper thinks that on balance the best and most adven-
4urous course for President Johnson to follow in 1966 will
be to try to do business with the Soviet Union.
We therefore agreed with his decision to drop the' idea of
putting German sailors. aboard a fleet of missile=carrying
ships. We welcomed the speech in October, 1966, in which
Mr Johnson oficred in effect to accept the existing division
of Europe in the hope of encouraging a reconciliation with
the Soviet Union. That policy has borne some fruit : it has
produced, among other things, the non-proliferation trcacy.
But it seems clear that, for the time being at least, it is
now approaching the end of its usefulness.
The Soviet Union has changed a great deal since 1965.
'it has decided that it is not going to tolerate---as it then
appeared it might-the hesitant experiments with reform
that were beginning to take shape in parts.of eastern Eoro fee.
It has dropped the lid on its own intellectuals. It w
reasonable to hope in 1965 that the tide of events in Russia
and therefore in the countries Russia controls, was movin
in the direction of a more liberal form of communism tha
could work in partnership with the capitalist democracie
of the west. It has turned out that it was not. The issue
let it be emphasised, is not primarily a moral one. It i
not the unpleasantness of the way things are run in M
Brezhnev's world that makes-it hard for the west to co-operas
with Russia. It is the fact that the policy of repression t
which Mr Brezhnev has committed himself at home inevitabi
affects the course of action he follows abroad. That shows
itself in Czechoslovakia last August. It will presumably sho
itself just as clearly in the other causes he supports an
opposes around the world. If Mr Brczhnev's chief aim i
life is to perpetuate the existing power-system in the corn
munist world-and that is surely the explanation of h'
insistence in calling this month's conference to Moscow-h
is unlikely to be an amenable man for the rest of us t
deal with.
So long. as this state or things continues-and that mean
until Mr Brezhnev changes Russian policy, or is replace
by somebody who will-it is bound to be reflected in th
way the west handles its relations with the Soviet, Union,
There 'are only two sorts of subject on which, in these circun
stances, it will quite certainly be right to go on negotiatin
with the Russians. The first is the sort in which no gre
issue of ideology is involved.. That means, above all, th
Russian-American talks about missiles ;. since the aim
IA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
It is time we made our minds up about Mr Brezhnev's
Russia. The idea that the Soviet Union under Mr Brezhnev
is till basically the same country as it was under Mr Khrush-
ch v is no longer. tenable. This week the Russian ambassador
in London has apparently been pursuing his government's
at .mpt to get two Russian spies out of a British prison
by one of the most blatant pieces of blackmail a major
po ver has resorted to this century. Back in Moscow Mr
Br zhuev has got most of the world's communist parties
to sign a document which, though it does not specifically
m ntion the invasion of Czechoslovakia, may yet be used
by the Russians to justify doing to other people what they
di to the Czechs in the name of the " international duty
of communists " as laid' down in part two of Tuesday's
do laration. It is too simple to say that the post-Khrushchev
rc ime in Rumia has reverted to the habits of stalinism. The
r,wnans, after their relative relaxation under Claudius, did
Mr
n get a return to tiberianism. They got Nero ionic:
Br .zhnev's Russia has much in common with Nero's n least in the fact that the dominant interest of its ruler
ha ~ become the preservation of an impossibly inflexible
po rer-structure.
The handful of men in the western world who chiefly have
to deal with this phenomenon can no longer escape the
qu tion of what their policy towards Russia really is. To
so c of them this may seem a puzzling question. President
Ni on will point out that the United States is already involved
in an attempt to work out a joint Russian-American policy
fo the T%Iiddle.East, and that it has just told the Russians
it will be ready to start negotiating by the end of next month
abut the number of nuclear missiles the two great powers
should allow each other to have. Herr Kiesinger will say
th t his coalition in Bonn, whatever else it has failed to do,
h finally dropped Dr Adenauer's old intransigence about
c tern Europe. President Pompidou is probably calculating
fight now the extent to which he, like General de Gaulle
be ore him, will have to buy the quiescence of the French
co munist party. by tailoring his foreign policy to Russian
in rests.. Don't all these things add up to a policy ?
he answer is that they do not, because they are based
on an assessment of what is happening in Russia that is
no w out of date. No doubt many of the things that the
w stern powers are doing at the moment in their relationship
wi h Russia are desirable. Some of them are essential. But
it no longer possible to believe, as it was in Mr Khrushchev's
lw t years in power and in'the brief period when Mr Brezhnev
an I Mr Kosygin seemed to be continuing his policies, that
th process of negotiation will create its own momentum :
th it a deal here, and an 'understanding there, will broaden
ou into a general programme of east-west co-operation., The
m mentum juSuior Release-1999/09/02
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CPYRGHT
diem talks is to prevent' another round of the arms race,
nd to encourage the non-nuclear countries, to stick by the
on-.proliferation treaty, it is in both sides' interest that
t c meeting both of them have now agreed to should take
lace as soon as possible. The second sort of negotiation
orth going on with is that which is designed to stop a
1 cat . quarrel turning into a superpowers' war. The one
lace where there is any real chance of bringing this off at
e moment is the Middle East. It is. remarkably hard to
c how the United States can bring Israel-or Russia the
rabs-to accept any proposals they might draw up between
cm. But the mere fact of having worked out their ideas
gether might help the great powers to stay out of a war
one came ; and the fact that the local preponderance
f power, which would then settle the issue, seems to belong
Israel is no skin off Mr Nixon's nose.
But that is about it. The recent conduct of the Soviet
pion has made it fair to say that, even in these two fields,
r Nixon should tread pretty warily. Of course, it would
an excellent thing if the missile talks produced an agree-
ent, to be enforced by inspection, that neither Russia nor
lmcrica will build an anti-missile system or fit multiple
vanccads into its rockets. But that is not the same as to
rgue, as some of Mr Nixon's critics are arguing, that the
nitcd States should unilaterally stop the development of
hese two sorts of weapon without some means of checking
hat Russia has stopped work too. Not long ago that might
ave looked a risk worth taking. Mr Nixon is likely to
e more captious now. He will be equally cautious, on
he Middle East. The Americans will not want to give their
pproval to any formula that did not offer the Israelis effec-
ive protection against guerrilla attacks after their hypothe-
ical withdrawal from the Suez canal and the Jordan.
It will be necessary to handle even these two essential
ets of negotiations with considerable care. And when - one
ooks at some of the other things the Russians have said
hey want to talk about it is even harder to see why the west
hould accommodate them. They are still putting an extra-
rdinary lot of back-scratching into the attempt to organise
hat they call a European security conference. The objection
o this is not that they are still trying, as they once were,
o stop the United States from attending. They have given
hat one. up. It is that the only apparent point of such a
amboree would be to extract from the western countries.
hat turned up a formal and explicit recognition of the present
ivision of Europe, Odcr-liFisseline, Walter Ulbricht and all.
ne can we why the Rus cans would. like this they, want
o have their east European dependencies wrapped 'up apd
aid on the shelf so that 'they-cm, deal,.with China:, it
might even be worth taking them up on the idea if they
were willing to extend to the west the same degree of
co-operation in Asia that they are asking from it in Europe.
But there is very little evidence that they are. Their help
in bringing the Vietnam war to an end seems, to have been,
to - put it generously, marginal. And the suggestion of a
" collective security system in Asia "'against China, which Mr
Brezhnev threw out last week, is apparently designed to
exclude the western powers. The article by Mr Matveyev in
Izvestia on May 28th, which first produced the idea, men-
tioned only six Asian countries as Russia's possible partners.
Unless Mr Brezhnev explains that his ideas about Asia
are broader-ranging than that, it will be possible to draw
.only one conclusion. The conclusion is that the Soviet Union
wants ' to pursue its own policy. in Asia, for its own ends,
while it invites the western world to underwrite its failure
in eastern Europe. There is not ,to there to attract the
west's negotiators. It reinforces the impression created by
almost everything else the Russians have. done in the past
year. The Brezhnev regime has let itself be frozen into a
preoccupation with the salvaging of its own authority. It
is motionless at home, repressive where it has the power to
be abroad,.and narrowly self-interested in its diplomacy. From
such a government. it is unrealistic 'to expect the imagination
.that would be needed to: revive . the hopes of real cast-West'
co-operation.' So long as it stays in power Mr .Nixon and
the, rest of .us will probably,: have' to beckon that we"are
pretty ' cloie to the limits bf coexietena:
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 Approved For Release 1.999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
er .; to pursue the reformist goals of the nalistic experience but with
students-and the Party's lower echo- to pay off [lie. $400,000 debt incu
lons"Pur'tfie liberals in a mood of red after government support w
despair.'he feeling was widespread !cut on.
ear I :I - I
ij 21, 1968, invasion were finally being meanwhile, has proved much hard
er felt; that all the maneuvering in the . to deal with. First the unions ci
months between had been diver culated the defiant speech of Frai
Lat fh. . t. I .
~ clans. from both Central :ommittee a
12T) 1,1 D S'h
R
ona
anor
y
. But of late the reformers have Party last May for opposing ti
i I PRAGUE
S THE FIRST anniversary of the
Soviet Invasion approaches, it
as become increasingly apparent
at Dr. Gustav Husak's attempt to
acify Czechoslovakia with a policy
f Reafisrnus is beginning to yield.
14 iminishing returns. The question
} ow is whether he will respond to
pposition from the unions, intellec-
als and liberal Communists with
onciliation or with an even tougher
l ne.
Last April, when Husak replaced
Icxandcr Dubcek as First Secre-
ry of the Communist party, his
stem for restoring order seemed'
simple and effective that some
topic wondered why the Russians
ad not thought of it sooner. Where
is popular predecessor had wav-
red and compromised in an attempt
save what he could of the pro-
ressivc platform, Husak began at
nce to apply "realism" in every
cid.
That, the 56-year-old lawyer and
arty veteran had demonstrated in
is eight months as Slovak Party 41.
hief, meant realizing the Soviets
ave five or six troop divisions in
his small country and it would not
1 e wise to oppose them too vigor-
usly. Once law and order is re-
tored and criticism silenced, it was
been cheering up. Husak's repressive Husak line. Kriegel had been chaff
actions, they now realize, were man of the National Front befo
taken in situations where it was easy . the invasion and was one of t
for him to overcome opposition. The negotiators of the Moscow agred-
battles he has yet to win involve. ment in August. His resistance
much more. complex power rela- the Soviets was so open and fran
tions, and there are even some In- though, that he was not permitte
stitutional safeguards on the side of to sign that document. Soon after
the progressives. ! ward, his picture disappeared fro
It was simple, for example, to 'the. capital, the Party ouster bei
systematically purge those regional.; merely the delayed end of his carte .
Party secretaries and presidium Typewritten copies of Kriegel a
members who were too strongly. .,speech were subsequently read t
identified with Dubcek and refused? meetings in the big plants in 0
to recant after 1HTusak came to; ' 'trava and around Prague, howevcf,
power, In the space of a few weeks, :and packed its much anti Husa
no less than 37 presidium members' punch as his original delivery. Th
were ousted, including the powerful -regime branded these gatherin
Moravian chief, Josef Spacck, who. "anarchistic" and said they wer
along with Josef Smrkovsky lost his , based on false Information.
post on the national presidium in It was at " this point that Husa
the same plenum that demoted Dub- . acted against the students. Unio
cek. members in five plants In the Pragu
There was a parallel weeding out area reacted with 15-minute strikes
at the regional Party newspapers. Again there' were recriminations
Over the May Day holiday I called but no decisive action .by the gov
on the editors of Nova Svobuda, the :crnment.
Party journal in the grimy industrial' Husak can oust regional leaders
city of Ostrava in Northern Morn- change entire editorial staffs, an
via. All the editors, I was told, were cut off student subsidies, but h
enjoying the long weekend. When knows he cannot jail or expel Ili
the nation returned to work, neither: tens of thousands of defiant worker
. liberal editor in chief' Ladislav Bub- who have taken part in these meet
lik nor his leading staff members ings. A skilled politician, he has in
were at their desks. They had been cludcd the chairman of the nationa
mplicd, thAppMvediff irle F asVA19911/0` Oilht &A [9W'T9t01 1494? 1M0a80 -8olacek
halcyon period. The contradiction . political views.
main objectives of the progressives , tractable. Nevertheless, when t
1 i e , 11' was freedom to dissent from 'official' 13ohcmian and Moravian Studcn
"icism openly in free speech and a. I Front and thus submit to Party di
e ;cN ry free press. ?cipline, it was declared illegal at
Husak's initial success in impos- replaced by a new rump orgnniz
 CPYRGHT
?f coritroll#pPWMiFi R a n aseo& i i'iQ~~iQ~af~ t 4 5 1 19 Q~Q Q~Q-~= too :
f opposition gets worse, the labor
adcr and his lieutenants can be
red.
But a purge cannot reach down to
he local level without causing grave
olitical damage to Husak and the
ussians. For in the nine months
twecn the advent of the Dubcek
cforms and the Soviet invasion, al-
ost every factory in, the country
ook advantage of tl~e: new free.
om and replaced its entire union
eadcrship. In public meeting after'
ublic meeting, the old bureaucrats
were voted out of office. and new:
lates put in.
The effect of this was immediately
oticcablc at the trade-union con-'
ress held early this spring. The as-
embled delegates demanded not
my an economic but a political role
or labor, and refused to subordin
tc the movement's power to the
ommunist party. Adraft bill giving
he workers (fir-reaching control in
anagement and production dcci
ons ' wns,,;passed. - It "is still 'being
ushed hack and forth in the gov-
rnmcnt and will probably be either
ejected or weakened beyond recog-
ition.
Whatever the ultimate outcome,
he congress showed labor's power
is well ati its dctcrmination to quit
laying the traditional role of trans-
nission belt for official policy. The
atcr Kricgcl meetings and the soli-
arity strikes with the students fur-
her confirmed this change.
It Husak wants meek and com-
laccnt- unions again, there are
plenty of unemployed former union
leaders who would be glad to get
their old posts back. Yet the change
would involve another series of pub-,
lie meetings and an open vote, and
it is likely that most of the progres-
sives would be confirmed in their
present jobs--or that if they were
forced to bow to government pres-
sure, the popular outcry would be
worse for Husak than the present
opposition.
Still, the regime has not been
stripped of all its weapons. A union
outskirts of Prague discussed one
type of action it could take against
the labor reformers:
"They're going to have to make a
couple of arrests in the factories.
There's no atmosphere of fear like
there used to be. No one is afraid to
speak out. Of course, this would
mean an end to Husak's promises
of not returning to the methods of
the '50s. But it may be his only way
of dealing with the unions."
One indication that the use of fear
as a weapon is under consideration
was the arrest ,of 19 persons, most.
of them youths, in, the North Do-
hcmian city of Tcplice, in connec-
tion with the anti-Soviet rioting that
followed the Czechoslovak hockey
victory over the Russians at the end
of March. The fact that 150 wit-
nesses are scheduled to he called at
the trial or trials points to maximum
publicity and may mean that the
fate of the defendants is intended to
serve as an example to other unruly
elements.
Another possible straw in the
wind was a recent tough statement
by Interior Minister Jan Pclnar
against liberals, which evoked mem-
ories of the days when the Party
leaderships equated any form of
criticism with treason. He charged
that progressives who have left the
country, including Professor Ivan
Svitak, now at Columbia, "keep in
touch with persons having the same
objectives and who remained in
Czechoslovakia." In Pelnar's view,
the designs of native anti-Party
forces are "almost identical" to
Western intelligence plans "to dis-
integrate the. unity of 'the Socialist
camp."
It is but a short step from such
accusations to charges of treason,
as many thousands of Czechs and
Slovaks can testify from their own
experiences at the trials of the late
'40s and '50s. More than 5,000 vic-
tims of that period have applied for
rehabilitation proceedings, and
every week the press has a few lines
noting the annulment of a sentence
"in memoriam"-to have been )a
volved in yet another rigged trial.
Tna FACT that Husak has chosen
to allow the rehabilitations to
continue-one of the very few of
the Dubcek programs he has kept-
is considered a good sign by those
who think he will deal with his op-
position without the use or threat of
terror. Another good omen, they
feel, is Husak's own record as a po-
litical prisoner in the 'S0s and his
struggle to obtain rehabilitation. A
long letter he wrote to former Presi-
dent Antonin Novotny in those days
had much the same rebellious sig-
nificance as the current Kriegel
speech. It, too, was circulated in.
typescript in the factories. If he has
forgotten this, which is unlikely,
sonic of his aides have not.
Both the pessimists and the op-
timists felt that Husak's performance
at the recent Moscow meeting of
world Communist leaders proved
their, point. The pessimists pointed
to his lavish and frequent praise of
the USSR as "the main pillar of the
Socialist camp and of the interna-
tional Communist movement." The
optimists' argument was more sub-
tic, being based on what the Party
Secretary did not say, Despite what
must have been considerable pros-1
sure, he did not justify the invasion;
and even went so far as to tell the'
forum that the Soviet action was)
based in part on faulty informationf
about conditions in the other Par
tics.
"We are often asked the ques-
tion: Did we have sufficient inner'
strength to defend Socialist achieve.'
ments?" Husak observed. "Yes, we
had enough strength!" .
Justification of the Soviet action
would have had the most serious
consequences here. It would have
given the Russians the proof they
want: branding those who were run-,
ning the government at the time,
along with the editors of the `clan-
destine newspapers and the broad-
casters at the secret radio statioas,'
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2
 CPYRGH'pproved For Release 1.999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79.-01194A000500080001-
sidcrations must have had an I
fluence on Husak's decision. Aft r
all, he was one of the most impo -
rant speakers on the rebel Bratisla a
stations, and, as newly elected St
vak Party chief, one of the mo t'
'quoted officials In the clandesti c
press. Indeed, he used the media n
his power struggle against the
laborationist former Slovak lead r
Vasil Bilak.
Of course, there are many e
amples in the Communist mov -'
ment of men who repudiated the r
earlier positions and allies to than e,
their course. The pessimists use s
their example Poland's Wiadysla
Gomulka, who changed from t
reformer of 1956-;to the ortho'd
Party chieftain of ~ 1969. The' opt -
mists like to cite the case of Hu
gary's Janos Kadar; who was put i
office by the Soviets but has give
his people a more liberal regi
than any-'other outside
Slovakia ;
NEW YORK TIME
'
CPYROKY 1969 ? ,.
13 July 1969
Czech
0-.r'kU1_.
CPYRGH
Czechoslovakia
tt"
yost A C&Ck on.,
PRAGUE,-July 12 - Work+
rs at Czechoslovakia's biggest1
teel mill posted a letter from.'
hess champion Ludvik Pach-,
an. that "rudely attacked"
ommunist Party chief Gus-'
av Husak, the Party daily,
uric Pravo reported today. -1
The paper said some work-
rs at the Ostrava mill, 1701
riles east of here, stopped
ork for two hours to discuss
he letter and vote in support
f it.
Energetic steps would be
aken against the factory
nion leadership for. this "pro-
ocative attempt to affect the
fforts of the Party,?' said
ude Pravo.
Pachman, a reformist who
as suspended from the, Com-'
unist Party recently for crit?
cizing Its current leaders,
to the letter to the union
after the factory invited hi
and other reformists to
forum at the plant.
His letter, in which he d
fended himself, was pinned
the factory bulletin boar ,
Rude Pravo said. _
The paper accused "rightforces" within the unions attempts. "to push the. trail
unions Into a unitbd fro t
against socialism and irien -
ship with the Soviet Union."
Rude Pravo also reporte
that a group of conscrvati
Czechoslovak Communists in
t..
.in Brno yesterday and agre '
to enthusiastic applause
send a letter to the Soviet ga ?~
rison at nearby Olomou ,
thanking the Russian army f
its help in "liquidating t
danger of counterrevolutio =
aryoverthrow." ., ; . ~,.,,:a
The 'Workers :`Vote' With a Slowdown
helpers in some farming coopers-
' PRAGUE-- 17ie next act of the The extent of dissatisfaction fives and factories in Slovakia.
Czechoslovakia drama is likely in the party was shown last The official explanation is that
to unroll in the coat mines and week when it- was announced the need of many Soviet soldiers
that the ruling Presidiutn had
foundries of Ostrava and the for training or retraining in civil-' machine shops of Vlsen: replaced the director of its staff ion fobs and Czechoslovakia's
and suburban Prague. The -A!, 9- college. The announcement said
' "fort ign centers of anti-Commu- manpower shortages provide a
onists are, on the one hand, the splendid opportunity for or fr frater
hard line actio- that is at the. nism" had made deep Inroads real cooperation between Social-
in the country in 1968 and 1969. 1st nations.
r
party ontroltus and on the "About one half of all the, The regime seems still hesitant
other,. th.i sullen masses of party members In our workshop aboutorening the factory doors
workers. have openly let the Communist
o
factory c0!.-,." a foreman in an tto the hated and despised
sart
The r,:'w Communist party engineering plant on the outskirts pants. Also in the western part
chl^.f, L:. Gustav Husak, and his of the capital reported the other of the country, Bohemia and
ultracaiservative allies, who, day:. "Most of the others don't Moravia, industry is far more ad-
with Soviet backing seized power, attend party meetings. We hold vonced than in Slovakia and Is-
In April, a, talking now in wor- bor s more militant.
ried toocs about carrying "rho our own informal meetings In the "If plant morale and discipline
struggle against right-wing oppor- canteen, discussing the days news. The crunch will come sink yet a little lower, the [Com-
tunist . and anti-Socialist forces when they send us Soviet Sol monist party] leadership may ay de-
Into the factories." diers disguised as workers." cide that every workshop needs
The workers say little. The . "Volunteer" members of the its platoon of Soviet 'volunteers'
trouhle,'.for the regime, is that Soviet forces stationed through- and anything might happen'
they work even less. They have out the. country have ahead then," the assistant manager of
stopped iA r+ rid t;tRelease 1 8i19~/u& rOIA -0119VIVR '! $?f" no in
many plants a d have started re- a is a
turning or tearing up Communist hard core Communist but likes
n*rty mamharahtn cards. i ?
 CPYRGHT
to define hi AR P4QiVPr i pr R
ler4 grin "let's say & techn rat
rather ti,n2. a. dop atist
Angry Retort
When the technocrat -as
asked for comment on the f re-
man's t~-ie (r names were n .ra-
tioned) nP became angry nd
said: "Yuu have sot been id
the whole story. Tfi6ir cant cr
discussions are fine-but t ey
hold them when they sh Id
stand at their lathes. Our tv k-
ern are busy only on Saturd ys
and Sundays when they b ild
their weekend houses, tic er
with'their motorcycles or ino n.
light. We are losing a let of X_
port business because we at
don't work hard enough and e
work lesq and less. Sure, we n me
no strike at the plant. But whit's.
happening now is-[ hate to se
the word--sabotage."
Reports reachlok Prague f in
many Industrial areas agree it,-
deed that production has imp es-
sively slowed down since ay.,
No figures are yet availabie, but
Premier OldrichCc, nik ind other
spokesmen of,-the regimes %Va
already warned that the dro in
productivity has reached ale m-
,ing proportions.
Doctrinaire: Communists hive
been' in charge of the C ,e '-
slovak economy longer the in
many other Socialist Count ies
and incentives for labor have ic.
mained few and weak. Hewing,
is insufficient and bad, and m ny
consumer goods are scarce or
shoddy. The liberal refo ers
who tried last year to free he
economy of the worst constra nts
were all too soon replaced by
conservatives.
The Soviet-led Invasion nd
the fall from power of Alexa def'
Dubcek and other popular Ii or-
als have demonstrably sa ed
working morale, increased sib: en-
teeism, loosened plant disCl ine
and voided the prestige of the
trade unions. Each one of Cz ch-
oslovakia's 60 or so unions ar-
ries the word "revolutions y In
its official title, but they i-r, as
revolutionary as the buregtic ats
who run the economy. The t de
unions are not allowed to organ-
ize strikes and expected to re-
press wildcat stoppages.
Nobody has yet been ahl to
prove that the nreseot go-slow
strategy i!i the factories has en
planned by clandestine Ica rs.
It may be the expression f a
mood or the re:.ult of an un er-
ground movement. Whatever the
reason, the pro-Soviet re me
CPYRGHT
apparatus, and, among ]uur
ists, writers, students and In
ectuals seems at a loss ho
make the disaffected factory
na
IA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
THE ECONOMIST, London
28 June 1969
Czechoslovakia
CPYRGHT
Where the workers
like the students
CORRESPONDENT
Student. power -is, in its infancy i
Czechoslovakia but the students are learn
ing fast. If the Husak regime tries t
force student bodies into politic?
neutrality, it will discover it has a toug
job on its hands. The experience of th
past two years has obliged universit
students to recognise that political activit
cannot be lightly set aside it has becom
an integral part of everyday life and, i
the words of a student leader, " the quail
tative content has been improved."
The Czech students' union was out
]awed on June loth because it ha
allegedly violated laws protecting the star
and made statements, at home and abroa
which were " at variance with the polic
of the National Front and the Czech
slovak government." The ban was th
culmination of a running feud whic
began last April when the. students' con
gress -in Olomouc, attended by represen
tatives of 6o,ooo students in' 65 faculties
voted against membership of the Nation
Front, an umbrella body through whic
the party tries to control everything froboy scouts to the non-communist parties
The congress left it to the indivjua
faculties to decide for themselves whpfhe
or not to join the National Front '#n
only about half a dozen opted to dq so
Economic retaliation followed. The sub
sidies to student bodies, which amount a
more than 7 million crowns a year
were summarily halted after only
million had been spent.
This week Mr Toman, chairman of thi
metalworkers' union,, interceded on thi
students' . behalf and tried to- discove
more precise reasons for the ban on' their
union. He was given four reasons : tha
the union refused to join the Nations
CPYRGHT
Front ; ''that 'it had contacts " with the
American agent Siulc" (Tad Szulc,
former New York Times correspondent) ;
that it had made untrue statements to,the
western press; and, lastly, that the students
were running commercial enterprises with-
out paying taxes. This last charge is cer-
tainly true,. although 'the students claim
that as a social welfare body they are ex-
empt. Before the August invasion, Czech
youth was not slow to. recognise the
potentials of flourishing profit-making
businesses-eight separate enterprises to
`be precise-ranging from an employment
bureau and the production of souvenirs to
a profitable bar and restaurant and a
printing plant.
As Mr Tonian's attempted mediation
shows, the students have continued to
maintain liaison with the trade unions in
spite of official disapproval. A meeting
of Prague locomotive workers has
demanded that the ban on the students'
union should be rescinded ; and the metal-
workers' union was talked out of full-
scale strike action only when Mr Toman
persuaded them that other methods would
be more effective. The presidium of the
students' union has condemned the ban as
the act of '.' the bureaucratic power centre
which has temporarily seized, control in
Czechoslovakia' ; and an appea! against it
has been filed both in the courts and
direct to the Czech minister of the interior.'
In that characteristically Czech foot-
dragging manner the union continues to.
function normally-it is vacation time
until the appeal is heard.
The party, meanwhile, has announced
the formation of the preparatory com-
mittee of a new student movement for
the party faithful. Of eight members of
this committee, six are from military
officers' academies and the other two
are known party stalwarts. Its aim is to
" overcome the deficiencies of, the former
student organisation." It seems improbable
that this splinter organisation will enjoy
any more popular support than the
orthodox journalists' union which went
straight to the bottom of the creek when
it was launched 'over two months ago.
'Much, however, depends on the degrce to
which the majority of students place
material benefits above the political
independence of their dissident organisa.
tion ; for the government has wen fit to
hit where it is likely Ve hurt most.
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 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011 -
CPYFRAM
19 Jul
3_-,
efi~nt resolve b
Czech , students'
By. RICHARD DAVY
The' full text of the defiant
resolution passed by the Czech
student parliament on July 2 has
now reached, London. It shows
that the Union of University Stu-
dents of Bohemia and Moravia
(S.V.S.) intends to continue work
in spite of the ban imposed by the
Czech. Ministry of the Interior on
June 20. The union has appealed
against the ban, which means that.
its activities are not officially
illegal until the appeal is rejected4
which it almost certainly will be. .
A striking point about the
document is that it gives full:
support to the elected leadership
of the union, a -fairly radical
group headed by the president,
Mr. Karel Kovanda, which did,'
not enjoy such solid backing until'
it; *A as subjected to clumsy gov
ernmcntal pressures and attempts
to set up a rival leadership with
official backing. These pressures
rallied students who were begin- '
ning to drift back into apathy, of
who were succumbing - to the
financial and other temptations of
official approval.,
The resolution calls on the
students .to boycott the officially
?sponsored rival leadership, des.,
,cribed as a preparatory commit-
tee, and "in' the event of the
S.V.S. being liquidated to main-,
tain the continuity of the existing
organization on the lines of its
adopted and generally respected
views and organizational struc-s
ture, and to discuss forms' and
procedures for further action'
after the school year reopens ".'
The resolution rejects the ofli-i
cial . party line adopted by the
Central Committee in May, saying;
that it negates " the national pro-I
ccss of democratization andi
humanization of" our society
.started after January, 1968, and
forcibly interrupted by the inter-' vention of the, Warsaw Pact
armies in August, 1968
"
It appeals to the trade unions
to express their views on the
,attempts to abolish the S.V.S. and
to cancel its various agreements
with the unions,' signed since
August last year. (These agree.
meats have been regarded as very
significant by students and work-
ers. and as very dangerous by tho'
party leadership,)
over the resolution's call for ape
ial meetings to be held in school
on International Students' Day
November 17, and. for "pion
manifestations and meetings i
chools" on January 19, the
anniversary of the death of Jan
alach, the student who set fire t
imself in the Wenceslas Square
' protest against the abandon-
ment of last year's reforms.
The preamble to the resolution
ongly emphasizes the socialist
nvictionS of the students and
heir desire to "engage them-
elves through their work in'real-
zing the humanistic goals of
ocialism" as expressed ? in the
arty policy of last year.
In a particularly powerful pas-
age the resolution condemns pre.
ent policies : " Vast purges and
he return of discredited personal-
ties into responsible positions,
he attacks on. culture, including
rsonal attacks, the banning of
agazines, absurd censorship.
c., attacks on the most clemen-
ary rights of the working class.
anning workers' councils in fac-
ories and preparing the abolition,
f those already . in existences
analysing independent trade
nion policy, violating basic civil
ights, restricting the right of-
ssembly, postponing , elections,
ttempting. to replace law with
olitical statements, the speechest
f 'leading politicia'ns=?all . thi
I orces us to reject the present
anner of , policy-making, the
ain feature of, which As the
xciusion of' the working-class
rom the making of ' decision
rning society as '& whole." ;
Cf RISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 July 1969
Disaffection:7 rife In Czech 7 va
ny.Lric'nourne :1 -; ?uerc Ae a,av aa. cnwa.o..c ...
\-. , 'withhold party does. 4n-em- , aree
?
Special correspondent of
zations this involves up' to 30 percent of th
iatianseteneeMonitor ` ~
members. Dr. Husak has admitted to po
f ,Widespread disaffection exists within the, !and to make the personnel changes re-;
ommunist Party here over the hard course; quired to eliminate "liberal" influence.
f events since Gustav Husak took over the4 r There have been refusals to "take aj
adership. This is 'officially'admitted,here.] stand" on the leadership's efforts to imple?
ment the stern measures sanctioned by the:
Party recruitment In the' fir'st! Newly painted slogans ap-l
pear on walls in provincial
towns and villages: "Dubcek,
Smrkovsky, we believed what
you" NodwlleUs. We Sun trust
re. in bearly.1000
If political and economic
order is not soon restored, pole
itical experts believe, the con-
servative leadership, at pres-
ent a minority force, will bed
obligated to resort to harsher
methods. If replacement of
key persons by their own Cho-
sen supporters does not bring
a change of attitude, they will'
be forced into "adm pistrative,
measures" a euphe im for
Jailing.
Strougal this week tools an
obvious step in this direction
by taking over complete con-
trol of the People's Militia and
coordination of military and
,secret police services.
He also explicitly stated
there would have to be
greater powers for state prose-
cutors, 'adding darkly, "The
ranks of, our supporters will
grow, but not without certain
measures which we may be
orced to use,"
Strougal's reference to his
growing number of supporters
can be seen on the repeated
television accounts of -Party
meetings in provincial centers.
The missionary zeal of these
audiences is written large on
their glowing faces-the tana-
tacism of a minority group
seeing the prospect of It taste
of power.
t
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not here we would airOdy
havt done some serious d>1thk-
!ng"
Liquid Egquipment
0 WAl't4 iving
reporter see a single portrait
or slogan supporting Husak or`
Strougal, who assumed power!
after the reformers had been
worn down by the effects of
ion.
"Administrative Measures"
Bottles of vodka, ellv0vitz,1
.wine and brandy have now be,
': come essential equipment for
the majority of offices and
factories. One union member
t meal caned, In the morning and
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79.-6T4b&6500080001-3
28 June 1969 '
{rag
I :gip so
erebe1s'caJ1
rday of,
ournin
From MICHAEL HORNSBY-Prague, June' 27
A remarkable document now
circulating in Prague and signed
by "students and workers" calls
on Czechoslovak ? citizens to
observe a 10-point plan' to
turn August 21, the first
anniversary of the Soviet in-
vasion, into a "day of mourn-
ing ". It advises against general
strikes on the ground that "the
treasonous clique" now in power
" would make use of them for the
further limitation of our free-
doms " and recommends instead
" boundless scorn for the Moscow
overlords, and the . Husak lack-
eys
It is impossible to say how
widely the document is circulating
and how much support it has.
Many clandestine leaflets of a
similar kind have been passing
from hand to hand in recent
weeks containing speeches of
rebel politicians and resolutions
of disgruntled workers' organiza-
tions. This form of underground
information system is the classic
Czechoslovak response to times
of censorship and was prevalent
during the Nazi occupation.
DAY OF SHAME
The student-worker appeal
says : "There are also other-ways
of drawing the attention of the
world to the fact that we are,
fighting still for socialism with a
human face. We have agreed on
the issuing of directives whose
observation will amply demon-
strate to the world that we have
not forgotten the day of shame
and that we shall never reconcile
ourselves to such visits [of the
Soviet troops].".
It is the duty of all "'loyal
citizens of our nations to obser ve
the following' directives' " on
August 21 :
" Do not use transportation
r' means even to go to work., An
a' exception is made for working,,
people who have to, -use the)
?= train to go to work. it, is;
',- necessary to walk demonstra
tively to work. The old and the i
sick should avoid unnecessary
,, trips.
D onot go to. cinemas and
1,,theatres. In this way we shall
,:,relieve the actors of the need to
q act in comedy pieces on-this
s day of mourning. ?-,r
Refrain from all purchases in
A Shops. Buy all the necessary
t 'foodstuffs the day before.' ,
.""Decorate where possible the
"graves of all the victims of the
r"shameful occupation.
Buy no daily newspaper or,
magazine.
Visit no coffeehouse or res-
?; taurant. Coffeehouses where
rf, there is dancing must remain
-!:empty so that bands are not
obliged to play gay music.
" Decorate the memorials of all
"Exactly at 12 a.m. cease alb
activity at machines and every
.other place of work for five
minutes to honour the victims
of the occupation and the,new
r,. terror.
Cars should conic to 'a halt
r. and put on their lights. Other
transport vehicles .should also
r'?,be at a standstill.
1' "Inform your friends and rela-
tive abroad about the actions
o, which are being prepared and
.-ask ask them to propagate' similar
actions throughout'the. world.
"it is necessary to appeal to
world institutions ro proclaim
August 21 as'. the day,, of
shame." ? .
' The signatories of the appear
ask everyone who receives .a copy
of it to },ass these directives on
to at least five of his true
friends ". We believe that you will
not fail, just as you did not fail in
the August days ", it says.
The appeal praises Dr. Kriegel,
the former Praesidium member
recently expelled from the party
for denouncing the invasiion, and
l other '" modem heroes ' of " our
nation" for defending the "liuth
eoncerninp the real intentions of
the,uninvuted guests", '
We are nearing the sad anniversary of the contemptible occupation of our
'country by the armed forces of our so-called friends. 'Quislings, led by HUSAK,
INDRA, KOLDER, and others of their ilk, are trying to pull the wool over the
.eyes of the Czech people and to legalize the occupation of August-21 as a
fully justified and necessary action by "our friends,," For this reason it has
been found necessary first of all to eliminate from the leadership of the state
and of public life those individuals who have until now prevented such crassness,
even at the price of personal freedom, safety and material security.
This new g-:ieration of heroes of our people, led by Dr. KRIEGEL, PACHMAN,
ZATOPEK, 1?,'.TF11L, and many others, have proudly and fearlessly taken their place
in the front rank of resistance against the mercenaries of the STROUGAL-AUERSBERG!
clique, and Ire bravely defending'the holy truth about the real intention of
our uninvit-11. guests.
Our peoples w l.1 never forget the sacrifice of our dear sons Jan PAIACH and Jan
ZAJIC. Their self-sacrifice cannot be in i e
firml.A 9ioi d Fiat' Reim*
'Ic toG~
to remain in firm fraternal alliance, in order together to inform the public of
the actual sva-re of er'r'o rs.
 in vain to bring the Czech and Slovak peoples. The .Hisakovites have been
abandoned by our fourteen million citizens who have deep scorn in their hearts.
The history of the world has firmly shown that treason will not remain unavenged.
On the day of the sad anniversary of the occupation of August 21, 1968, we must
once more show and remind the world of the shameful deed perpetrated upon us by
the Soviet Union. We are not able to defend ourselves with5a weapon in hand.
Let us defend ourselves, therefore, with hate, with unbounded contempt for the
Soviet overlords and their HusakovitA lackeys. We are not in favor of proclaiming
a general strike. The traitors' clique would use the strike for further measures
and limitations upon our freedom. We must, however, let the world know that we
are continuing our fight for socialism with a human face. We have agreed on
a number of measures, which will sufficiently prove to the world that we have
not forgotten the DAY of SHAME and that we will never agree to similar visits.
It is the duty of all faithful comrades, citizens of our rations, to be guided
,on August 21 by the following rules:
1. On the way to and from work, do not use vehicular transport; the
exception is those who have to come to work by train. As a demonstration,
the journey to work should be on foot. Old and sick people should forego
unnecessary travel on this day.
2. Do not visit cinemas and theatres. In this way, actors will not be
forced to perform in comedies on the day of mourning.
3. Do not do any shopping. Necessary groceries can be bought in advance.
4. As far as possible, we.will decorate the graves of all victims of the
occupation.
Do not buy newspapers or magazines.
6. Do not visit restaurants or cafes.
We shall decorate monuments of all famous historical personages.
8. At the stroke of noon, we shall cease work at machines and in all places
of work for a period of five m4.nutes to honor the memory of the victims
of the occupation and of the new terror.
Passenger cars will also stop and turn on their lights (at noon - trans.).
Other transport will also stop.
10. As far as we are able, we shall bring the, planned actions to the attention
of friends and acquaintances abroad,. and call on them to propagate similar
actions throughout the world. It is necessary to call on world public
institutions to use their influence that August 21 be proclaimed at the
DAY OF SHAME.
In order to make this action effective, the guidelines above must be
distributed so that they may reach all the people. Censorship and
control of the press prevent such action, and therefore it is the
national duty of every individual to transmit the guidelines to five
real friends. We believe that you will be up to this task, just as you
Together toward victory
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were up to it in the days o August.-
 Approved For Release 1999/09/0.2_; CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
Karel Kynci's Statement at the June 2 Plenum of the Central Committee of the
Prague Municipal Committee of the Communist Party.
The essential purpose of the recent Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS)
ni
M
i
l
u
c
pa
Committee meeting in Prague was merely to approve resolutions
supporting the decisions of the CPCS sessions. At our April meeting, we passed
a resolution declaring our "complete agreement" with the decision of the A
ril
p
Plenum. At that time,.I voted against the resolution. One of the main reasons
for my stand was the formulation "complete agreement." As a member .of this
body, I was expected to express my complete agreement with something of which I
had only very superficial information and with something that I. in. fact, did
not know.
I did not become a party member yesterday. There were times when I
enthusiastically voted for similar formulations without the slightest hesitation.
I shall never stop blaming myself for that -- and I shall never do it again.
The situation last Saturday was very different indeed. Comrade Simon
gave us some facts about the May session of the CPCS CC; how we-are to interpret
these facts was very eloquently explained to us by the First Secretary of the
CPCS CC on Saturday afternoon, at the meeting of the AKTIV of party officials
in Prague 9, at the CKD works in Prague, which took place on the same premises
-where, nine months ago, the allegedly illegal party congress was held.
On Saturday, I could not say that I did not possess enough information to
decide on how to vote. This made my decision much easier: whether I should
raise my hand or not; while, on the other hand, awareness of the fact that I
was, as a Communist functionary, co-responsible for the future of our party
made things much more difficult for me. On Saturday morning, Comrade Husak
used "the language of the May Plenum" -- to repeat Comrade Matejka's words
when the latter thanked Comrade Husak for his speech. What was the language
of the May Plenum, as reflected in the speech of the Comrade First Secretary?
At. Prague's CKD works, Comrade Husak analyzed the causes of the critical
situation, or to be more precise, situations, through which our party has passed
in recent years and especially in recent months. I listened and I could not
believe my own ears. I was horrified that a highly educated Marxist -- as
Comrade Cernik characterized Comrade Husak in the eulogistic part of his xi.
address -- could describe in such shallow, superficial, and cheap words an
enormously complicated, and since August clearly. distorted, development. It
was unbelievable to me that a highly educated Marxist -- and Comrade Husak is
one, despite every-thing -- could so calmly and without blinking an eye pass
over such details as, for example, the answer given by our party to the well-
known Warsaw Letter of last July. An answer for which he. himself, in fact,
voted. I could not believe that, only 10 months later and without the slightest
reservation, he could back the content of that letter, with which he had so
fundamentally disagreed 10 months earlier.
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 Ap o e k# ~ ~ s~ /0 :~3IAa 9 9 ~( ~~1-3
this with merely a brief remark that he had misunderstoo the orce
intervention in August of last year, when every child knows that it is one
of the fundamental reasons for the crisis in this country and in this party.
I was horrified when I heard the highest party representative, who
himself went through a bad personal experience in the fifties, compare the
weeklies Reporter and Listy with Radio Free Europe.
I was horrified to hear from his lips gross invectives against the best
representative of our learning and culture while saying at the same time that
the CPCS must not isolate itself from our intelligentsia.
I was horrified when I heard how Comrade Husak described, in haughty
and arrogant terms, the life-long work in the party of Comrades Kriegel,
Vodslon, and Sik -- and I literally shuddered when Comrade Husak debased
himself by indulging in a tasteless play on words -- "Kraglovani-Krieglovani" (1)
doesn't Comrade Husak realize that his own second name lends itself so well to
'a similar play on words. (2)
However, form is a matter of personal taste, tact, and civilized behavior.
Much graver is the essence of what Comrade Husak said about the work of these
Comrades who, in his words, which I do not consider witty, were sent on vacation
by the Central Committee. All he had to say about their work, and, I would
.like to repeat, specialized work for the party to which they have devoted
their lives, was arrogant jokes. I know some of the expelled Comrades well.
Permit me to say here, at the Plenum of the Party Municipal Committee, that, in
my view, the time will come when these expelled Comrades will be considered to
represent one of the few assets which our party will be able to claim before
a discriminating public opinion which will be passing judgment on the period in
which we now live. Unfortunately, this will not be the first'time. And only
last year, after January, Comrade Husak himself represented such a positive
asset, after years of persecution.
What I have just said is also a recollection of the fifties -- a reminder
which, according to Comrade Husak, one of those who have now been sent on
"vacation" made at the May Plenum. With an enviable disregard for the facts,
Comrade Husak described it on Saturday afternoon as mere panic. He declared
that not a single person has been arrested in this country or transferred to
another job for political-reasons. It is true that nobody has been arrested thus
far, but if Comrade Husak says that nobody has been transferred to another job
for political reasons, this is not only a disregard for the facts, it is clearly
not true.
Each one of us gathered here could present a shorter or longer list of
people who have been transferred to another job for clearly political reasons,
not for reasons of specialization. The list could be headed, for example, by
Professor Jiri Hajek or Josef Smrkovsky, who could be following by a number of
people from the Ministry of the Interior, and dozens of journalists from the
party and other periodicals could bring up the rear.
(1) Kraglovat, odkraglovat -- get rid of, assassinate Commnunist character
assassination.
(2) Huss, -- goose; Husak -- gander
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
Are, therefore, the fears that there might be some form of a return to
the fifties mere panic, or do they have some foundation?
When I listened on Saturday afternoon to the broadcast transmission of
the meeting of the AKTIV in Prague 9, I was also reminded of the fifties by
something else. When the announcement of the purge in the Central Committee
was greeted with wild applause and the chanting of "long live the CPCS," I
remembered similar reactions with which many Communists welcomed the reports
on the just punishment of the "traitors, conspirators, and bourgeois national-
ists," one of whom was also Comrade Husak. Obviously he did not remember this,
probably because he did not hear the applause. and the chanting in his prison
cell. I should like to-remind him that, at that time, other Party representatives-
positively appraised the mood of the party masses, as he did on 'Saturady after-
noon. In short, I listened on Saturday afternoon to Comrade Husak's speech
and I recalled the Marxist rule that the ends and the means must be dialectically
closely linked. The thought of what the ends must be if the means used in
his speech are in dialectical unity with them, gave me the shivers.
Comrades, the date of my joining the Party is recorded as 1 June 1945
on my membership card. This means that yesterday I have an anniversary:
the 24th anniversary of my enrollment in the Party. This is three years
more than half my whole life. I realize that my membership in the Party
will not outlast this jubilee by much if the speech delivered by Comrade Husak
on Saturday really represents the language of the May Plenum, as Comrade Matejka
has described it. The reason for this will not be that I shall tear up my
membership card in some theatrical gesture. I shall not do this, because I
value this card too much. I shall not voluntarily give up my card; rather,
those -- as Comrade Husak has described them == "genuine Marxists" will have
to take it away from me, those who are now likely to enter the fray with
high-flying banners, after this May Plenum. I shall defend my membership card
against them -- although I am not so naive as to believe that I am likely to
succeed in this. The fray, which they are now apparently about to enter with
flying banners, will not be a conflict of ideas and opinions; it will not be
a debate in which he will-emerge as the victor. who can defend his views on the
grounds of Marxism-Leninism. It will be a normal brawl in which whoever has
the most power and wields the biggest stick will gain the upper hand. For
these so-called genuine Marxists who talk of nothing else but Leninism are
not even able to answer the simplest questions, such as, for instance, how the
supposed limited sovereignty of a state and the events of August 21 can be
reconciled with the first,constitution?of the USSR, which expressly guaranteed
the right of the union republics to self-determination and even to secession.
Incidentally, I am not at all surprised about our one-and-only Marxists..
There is no answer to these and similar questions. And it is much simpler
to answer them by a punch in the nose.
Lastly, I have to reply to an argument which now daily appears in Rude
Pravo and which Comrade Husak also used on Saturday afternoon. This is the
argument that, before a Party office adopts a decision, a Party member may
freely and democratically discuss the problem concerned and express a. differing
.opinion, but that once the decision has been made, it becomes as binding as
the law itself on a Party member.'
The first thing I miss in our Party today is precisely a free and:
democratic discussion. Nowadays, decisions are adopted after a parody of
free and democratic discussion. 1
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 And as f r as the bindin nature of such decisions is concerned, may I
ask `q w9ieog 159rGRI S~[u $/09IG2 hc1 79eQ44S 059008 3Df
the Party -- as a model who, despite all facts proving the contrary, regarded
him fusak, as a traitor and bourgeois nationalist until he was rehabilitated
for the sole reason that this was the opinion of the Party leadership and of
First Secretary, Comrade Novotny? If he does regard such a man as a model,
I am sorry; I would regard such a Party member as an unthinking member of a
herd!
And another small incident. When I was working as a foreign correspondent
I once interviewed a young American who had refused to obey the order to go
to Vietnam. He refused-to do the duty of a citizen of the U.S. In his
defense, he quoted a part of the judgment of the International Tribunal at
Nuremberg which had tried the Nazi war criminals soon after the end of the war.
All of the defendants there had said that they were not criminals, since thay
had merely carried out the orders of their superiors and acted in accordance with
the then valid laws of the Third Reich. The Nuremberg Tribunal, in 'which a
Soviet judge also sat, rejected this defense and declared in its verdict that a
person who carries out an order that is contrary to the most fundamental
principles of humanity, sound reasons, and morality, is Tully responsible fo3~his
her
a hi
ff t
t
g
o
y o
actions and does not have the right to push responsibili
authority. Well -- this young American referred to this judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, but the American court rejected this defense and handed
down the maximum penalty.
At that time, I expressed great indignation about this in a commentary I
broadcast, and I was highly commended by the then highest Party, authorities
because of this indignation.
My indignation was not meant as a gesture and I have maintained it to
this day. Therefore, from the position of this indignation and from the
position of Marxism, today I shall vote against any resolution of the Municipal
Committee of the CPCS which approves the results of the May Plenum of the CPCS
CC.
I regard these results as.a tragedy for our Partyan
is in power -- as a tragedy for this state.
POST
WASHINGTON
y 1
CPYRGHT
Czech journalist
.who last month attacked
'Czech news agency CTK re.
~? +ool-ies. were etreu~a ,
since our Party
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 Approve Ir ,o ~~g,,~,999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
C RQW9
"Come on, be serious now-the imperialists fear our unity l-
er aps sa . .
 I"QP1KRdR DAILY NEWS Tokyo
6 duty a:09
e
as to compete for thsup,
of like-minded people.
proved n i hy as}~1.194A W(}i~ar tacks
(, o usly than they have attacked
both fascists and capitalists,
e
th
a
because they knew
er presented the greater
danger to them.
Despite
Disaster form
In the future, the Kremlin ;
'-will have to attack the Italian-
compeof
wle In order to
r the a r the alle egiance of
d ith it ritfo
w
Kremlin's Pr~testatiQfls
"Western Communists to ? the
By Victor Zorza one and only true faith.
s
us to stress its
Italian party'
i
th
o
e
ways anx
For
But it is precisely the So- loyalty to the Soviet Union, gravest objection to the dec-
LONDON (NANA)-It viet claim to act as the power. announced that the draft of laration is that is "contrary
ould?be unfair to ignore 'center of the World Commu-, the declaration to be present- to the type of socialist socle-
e Kremlin's insistent nist Movement that has been ed to the conference gave ty which we are asking the
laims that the World firmly rejected by the Moscow, clear recognition to the "deci- working class of our own
declaration, in common with sive role" of the Soviet Union. country to fight for."
ommunist Conference a number of other Soviet perhaps it did, but by the
as a striking success. 'claims, thus making it clear time the conference had fin
here 'is nothing left, that the final conference docu? 'ed with it, the ' declaration Basic Issue
ment comes nowhere near the made no mention of the "decl-., No disagreement could be,
herefore, but to acknowi- version that the Kremlin had sine" role of the Soviet more basic .than this. The:
age that the estimate been pressing so' long on the, Union, but, Instead, announc- Kremlin already hardly both
iven by this, columnist other parties. ed quite n unequiv g ace tern of ere to conceal Its view that
eeently of the confer- That Moscow wanted to be "the type of socialist society"i
the International Communist that the Italian party proposes
ence's prospects was explicitly recognized as the Movement:' Is no better than capitalism.,'
wrong. Rome of the Communist The struggle over' this And the Italian party sees the,
movement Is' clear, first of net-Stalinist trend in the So-'
I had said that whatever all, from the pre-conference formula illustrates the Kreml. viet Union as a betrayal of.
at the Moscow meet- warnings by such "opposition" lin's long retreat, durin gCt
happened what it regards as true social
ing, the Kremlin could not parties as the Romanian and series f of pfie~eaxposed post,,, These are grounds for a'
win. If the meeting agreed to the Italian that no Communist ings, political and ideological struck,
a joint declaration of prin- party or state could now, Lions which it had chosen so
little , this would contain so claim to act as the center for, to get lany declaration at all, gist as alittcommunl m`n the
little of what ngg as to Kremlin con- the others. the Kremlin accepted during
It-
'thebeen Kremlin demanding for it. And If The debate continued even the prepsamt ddments from the sellf., therthe doflthetIt lian
the Kremlin lin d did get the sort during the confer ferenece Itself, dreds.of ,. rties, so that 'party, Luleader igi Longo, id evert
of declaration it wanted, 1, when Janos Hadar sought ato, t "opposition pa before the conferencseathat it
argued, then a number of IM- convince the "opposition" that not only the Soviet Union'$ was so vague as to be virtual-
parties would refuse the proper acknowledgement:.: "role" but many other So-
1.4 meaningless.
ns had
tl
i
t
l
'
e
o
a
viet.inspired?formu
to endorse it, thus producing of the role of the Sov
The further search for com?
a formal split in the World tlnioh was "not merely a ques to be abandoned.
During the conference pro- promise at the Moscow Con-
Lion of sentiment," but yvasf
ade It even more
ent
gerence m
Communist Movem
. crucial to the. success of the per, a further 30 amendments
vague. As another Itallai
p
m
li
i
7fi
.
a
s
ted, out of the
But the only sense in which struggle against imper
. ere this analysis was wrong was In order to' succeed in this w accepted, Communist leader said,
ts submitted by various delega- declaration reveals "an opt
.,_ ~.......a
s
exclusive, posslbtllttes - that needed unity, he argues, a?u Kremlin to secure a unani- ?? -
mous vote on the declaration., principle and concrete facts'
a "correct relationship" with,
either the declaration would which shows an inability 01
be unsatisfactory to the the Soviet Union-the recognl
rote--was' Had it not been for these' the part of the Communls
At
' the
p
ng
I lea
ve
Kremlin, or that it would be Lion of its oncession, there would ha
movervent to adapt Itself t
satisfactory to it but some the necessary basis of such c--&-t-l- 1?.ppn more than 14? new mndltions. He had ii
'
ind
and, the invasion o
It. What happened in the end
Hadar was quite right In chief objective was' to bring Ignty
.was that the declaration was saying that this was not It the Italians back into the, : Czechoslovakia, . and man;
both profoundly unsatisfactory sentimental Issue-it is, indeed, fold, and its failure to achievei other such inconsistencies, Ii
to the Kremlin, and that a a basic issue of the power this Is a measure of the discs both foreign and doinestl
number of parties refused to relationship in 'the Commu- ter which has befallen the policies of Communist coup
r
t
ht
For
.
e
- Communist movemen
: tries.
sign It., nist world. In the JLUVV I
The refusal to sign by such national Communist t D Declare= the Italian party, in opposing' The Spanish Communi t
!
parties as the Italian, the ion,. all the parties acknowl- the idea of a single centers art declared before
long played with the' p y
d that the Soviet Union h
the I Is
a
t if the a
C
as
ge
ge
British, and others, an ca signing "with reservations" by was "the universally recogniz- notion of 'many centers" of coferenbre etwc tha
or
is a matter of vanguard of the Worid which Rome -the true R l ome, `ghat appears to threality
e declar
ed
thers
ll
'
,
o
sti
and the Krem- 'Communist Movement, and ,,,-,might perhaps even- Y.
Bon, then this document w I
? ublic record
h
,
p apologists can do nothing this gave, the Kremlin t
Q ;become one. be compromised from 0 11,
to
to disprove It. basis for its frequent attempts This would lead to a forrn'1 start." will o the other i Fourteen out of the seventy- to impose its wan fern there for e, { "Polyeentrism'! - in which the'
And so, Indeed; It Is,
meeting comprise this new that this , dAnent could return to the 8??-1 -
right, and itlon." this mainly from the terly disputed during the pre- cial democratic tradltionsI lio~ clalm that as a great suoce:
right, leaves out of Aerations for ' the Moscow ,from which it had sprung. As' ~t are welcome to it. J
ade
o
account the Chinese and other . conference. Communists have always m
: well-wtah ought to
parties on the extreme left.. The challengers seemed to clear, they fear social demos" this ma-wisher In
'se 6
Ideologically the Russl&m M ve lost much ground when cy more than any other po% a oete. s 17; $
, main at applo red Forte s 9~~9 0~?. b~~bOv 0 3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
NEW STATESMAN, London
,a~6g- was a piece of propaganua mat coot.
A be taken seriously. Finally, he said th
wn a c at oscow Twas preparcu to sign only Me section 77
proclaimed the need for a struggle ,gains
{imierialism; in other words, he took th
K. S. KAROL stance of the proverbial preacher who wa
`against sin'.
Fortwelve days, the delegates of 75 com? foreign comrades to abandon their reticent So, at a glance, the conference ended u
muc is parties debated in the Kremlin's St posture, and the conference machinery began' pretty badly for the Soviet leaders. The
George's Hall behind open - or nearly open to grind once more. But the preparatory came away neither with a condemnation o
China
?- door. Accredited Moscow correspondents, meetings in Budapest and Moscow were norwith silence on Czechoslovakia
all they got was the publication in their prey
used t4 ~ the monolithic mystery of preceding laborious to,say the least, and time passed of a number of 'subversive' ideas, contain
confer nces, were staggered by this change 1,without a date being fixed. By last summer, in summaries of speeches from rcbclliou
in the customary habits of (he Communist however, they seemed on the verge of agree. delegates. However, Mr Brezhnev must hav
world. They learnt that several parties had ment: and then Soviet troops invaded
dared publicly to announce that they dis- ''Czechoslovakia. The idea of a conference figured out the risks he was taking i
agree with the Russians, and that the fires once more seemed hopeless; but the Russians assembling this conference, and probably h
of cx ommunication did not descend on were committed to it, and offered a new is less disappointed than most people think
He knows that the Soviet people have shot
their f cads. The like had not been seen in compromise. The meeting would not con. memories. Togliatti's famous memorantlu
Moscow for 40 years; it was a striking,, demn anyone; not the Chinese, nor the
Indeed a spectacular, advance. But never, in Albanians, nor the Yugoslavs. It would not pre published in Pravda, but this did no
tall th se 40 years, has the communist even he asked to approve the Warsaw Pact's prevent Brezhnev from driving all those wh
move ent been shaken by so profound a 'fraternal assistance' to Czechoslovakia. This backed the Italian - viewpoint out of Eas
crisis. With all due respect for the new compromise appeared to close the on goer was holding forth in Moscow, the
metho Is it is, above all, the content of the any discussion whatever, reducing the confer-- were hard at work in Prague expelling me
dcbatc which must concern us. once to a kind of formal demonstration of like Frantisck Kriegel and many others wh
The ixe of the crisis was illustrated by the unity by
arties whi
h
ill
ill
i
d
p
c
were w
y-H
y t
e
were saying no more than the Italian dde
compo ition of the conference. In 1960, at to Moscow.
. _ . -
(
the
o ed
t O th
d
p
n
e secon
. ----1 ?.,,. ,... n cow, nonconformist intellectuals are in jai
that ill re were 36 million communists in the day an illustrious unknown, Mr Macielle for the same offence. When the Sovic
world. n 1969, parties representing at least (in the name of a party which is not exactly leaders called the conference, they had
20 mi ion members - from China, Viet- famous for its vigorous approach to theoreti-
nam, orca, Japan, and Indonesia (since cal questions, the Paraguayan CP) spoke of ' precise purpose: they wanted to get wort
then, course, decimated) - were missing, 'the great Chinese problem'. Later the same .communists to swallow their pill, and in thi
The at ern had spent five long years arguing day, the Australian delegate, Aarons, equally ,they succeeded - though on conditions
wheth it was worth meeting at all. It all rashly raised the Czechoslovak question. Mr ,terms. In the friturc, they will be able t
started in fact, in February, 1964, when Ceausescu's appeals to the comrades to keep, invoke 'scientific Marxism' to justify thei
,Mikha Suslov presented his party's Central to the rules went unheard. Mr Brezhnev then repressive internal measures and their anti
Comm ttce with a long 'theoretical' report Fred 9 series of red bullets against the Chinese crusade. After all, nobody at th
on the aoist heresy. Krushchcv sent copies -Chinese - 'who want war' - and his Warsaw conference queried their credentials as com
to all he communist parties, including the Pace allies could hardly do less. Tongues monists. Nobody protested when they takee
Chines , and invited them to attend a confer- were loosened at last, and by the end of the about the struggle against imperialism whit
once in Moscow on 15 December of the same conference cvco the San Marino delegate. throughout acting' as watchmen of the status qu
year. he Chinese replied that he was not Gasperoni, speaking In the name of a big throthe world,
empow red to call conferences, and made a party in a very small country', was arguing '+. floe we have a glaring insight into Ill(
few u ricndly comments on the tiresome openly with the faithful Latin-American poverty of all the speeches made during lies
cgs days of free dcbatc. Logically, th
Soviet habit of handing out decrees to cohorts who, as we all know, are very small , dozctt
foreign communists. The other Asian parties 'parties in big countries. In the end, paying delegates in St George's Hall should hav
reacted in similar fashion. Togliatti?s mem? homage to 'great socialist China', he refused concentrated on the condition of the Sovic
orandu on the subject, published after his to sign three-quarters of the final document, bloc, since they agree to link their fate wk
death i 1964, said squarely that the confer-. The delegate from the Dominican Republic it and to undergo the vicissitudes of it
enco could not hope to resolve internal went even further, announcing that ho career. Now, ever since 1960 the' bloc his
diffcrc es, but would only aggravate them, would sign nothing and that the communi- consolidated itself. by abandoning thi
weaken ng the anti-imperialist movement 'qud was'fit for priests and social democrats'. promises of the period of de?Staiinisation
which ceded Chinese participation- more There was not much respect. and no re- Nobody talks any more about the age o
than ev r. Two months later, Krushchcv fell ligion, left in St George's Hall. It was the affluence which' was supposed to usher in
a
and his plan seemed to have been shelved, Italian CP that inflicted the most grievous communist society by 1980, nor about the
e
It w , however, resuscitated by his suc- wound on Mr Brezhnev. This, after all, advent of democratisation. As a friend from
censors n March 1965, since c when the parties Is a big party in a big country, and askg Mr
said to e Brczhnev to npublshwthe uJght
have exchanged, literally, tons of comes-
lkra
ponden c. It was not until January 1965 that, its intellectual prestige among communists which he presented to the Czechoslovak CP
the plan took on a more concrete form. This. everywhere has been enormous since the last August, for it tells us far more than all
was the moment when Red y ds were be. ' days of Antonio Gr.imsci. Now its delegate, the speeches on polycentrism about where G sieging he Soviet
Embass n Rely in Peking and Enrico Berlinguer, demolished stone by stone' the USSR stands today. One might also have
thu R signs, outraged, called on their the ideological edifice so carefully built up asked Mr Ceausescu about the hours of
ir by the earlier conferences. He pointed out anguish through which he lived while Soviet
foreign comrades for Assistance. They ein.
listed o a choice between these 'hooligans: with regret that there had been no mention troops were massed on his frontiers. But
who, ha lost all sense of-respect. and li the of contradictions within socialist society. nobody talked about that. The dissidents
mother) nd of - the October Revolution. that no concern had been shown over the were cool about the final document, dirt.
Chinese d manners helped to persuade the principles outraged by the invasion of claimed responsibility for' any future Soviet
Approved For Releas4 t 1dWU `.1't~I -~'t'E3~?fl '0'~1 J+ AO ~-0~01at . :- n~, ~. t
 LAS ANGELES TIMES
22 Jurl 3.96
`as a vicious class ~enemyr parties. The unifying
'
GHT
anti-i
would be
"but implied that meanin theme
. . 10.41 4,0.341
!, ' L.Ub L U Ga t l i +G corned. f perialism is the bogcyR
Forced to Concede .mainly the United States.
~~ d~y" k z : Faced with growing poi But if the - s t r u g g l e '
own camp, the Kremlin
Moscow Summit Showed Above All That; leaders, if nothing else,
were forced to concede'
World Parties Are Going Their Owrt Wag' that Communist parties
must now resolve their
I3Y. RICHARD RESTON own problems in different
y
ways. All parties have
is staff writer
Tim
MOSCOW-Reformation, ries of communism and, requal rights and "there is
the tiresome attacks. on ,no leading center of the;
brought religious revolu? . 'international Communist=the tion to the Church in the Moscow summoned this movement; states the So-;
16th century and political' conference to demonstrate. viet-inspired view to the,.
revolution to the Commu a Communist movement future. "A
' united behind a strong For the Kremlin, that is
mist movement in the lat.: and inspiring Soviet lead- quite a concession, a re-
ter part of the 20th centu-; ership. i markable change in Soviet :
yy. attitudes since the ,last ?
If medieval Christendom Opposition Voiced international conference a
-m But ' in , the end" the' little less . than a: decade,
,had its heretics, reformers
eetin g demonstrated= ago. It is change, evgri
and dissidents, so too does just the opposite.. - 1 though Moscow some-.,
`the Communist world of :Five, of ,.the World's 14, times chooses not to up-1
today. ruling parties were not. hold the principle, as was'-
If the names of that even here to participate in, the case during the Soviet?.',
earlier period were Martin the discussions. These in-~ led invasion and occupa
J.uther John Calvin and eluded China, seemingly, tion of Czechoslovakia last.
more preoccupied these, August.
John Knox, today for com days with a Sino-Soviet ? Nevertheless, the Soviet
munism, according to the .dispute which has turned leadership in effect has
lead-
gospel of Moscow, they are 'to bloodshed along its admitted that other lead.
common border- with ; the' ers are competing for cen.,
'Mao T s c-tang in China. Soviet Union. ter stage in the Commu.
iV'icolao Ceausoscu' in no. Of the parties attending. nist world, or what stu?.
Mania, Marshal Tito in the. conference, 14 of .the"dents of Soviet affairs.
Yugoslavia, Enrico Berlin 75 voiced opposition in'one;,-would call the trend to
goer in Italy, Fidel Castro Form or another .to.'' thet,,~polycentrism..
fan Cuba and many others. Kremlin view of the fu-!,:. ' puzzling question j
?lliessa a of Summit ture asset forth. in 'they. One of the. most, -swill
g *main working document .,+=
AR the Vatican lost the It 1s estimated'that'the 6I`, d e r i n g questions about,
}battle against reform, and parties signing the dood,this summit conference is,
,stew centers of . Christiania ament represent in sum= . why the Kremlin insisted
y o it t s t d e Rome, the ' hers only, about one-third . meeti the wit fuill blo vn
Kremlin likewise is losing Y,
'the struggle against alien of the world's total party, political reformation now
Ideological d o g m a a n d ,membership. under way in the Commu?
new centers of comma-. As a guideline to' the'' ,nist world. Beneath all the
.nism outside Moscow, ideological clatter, the on-
That Is the message of, future, the position paper !ewer' seems' to 'be that
these past two weeks and provides sometlang less;'%vithout the meeting the
n o t It i n g illustrates the. than Inspiration, let alone.. ,move toward diversity, to-
point better than the re-, a clear understanding of':`ward.a further dilution of
cently concluded world where this movement is .'Soviet influence;' would-
it lbave.,grown worse.
Communist party summit he this
conference Moscow has going, even timent. Accordingly, the confer-
.had Its meeting, the first wants to go. It Is a, rence constituted -a major
one in nine years. It has, document which means all Kremlin move to. stem a
put forward communism's' ' things to all men, to be political 'tide that Is splin-'
blueprint for the future. Interpreted in, any way tering the movement from,
The real question now is within. Whatever the,
what did it all mean-the any party chooses. momentum of this confer-
endless speeches, the poll. , Cuba welcomed the pas- ence. 'the Soviet leaders
tical self-massage, the mist. sage on peaceful coexis- -hope to continue it-
sing parties.' 'the agree- . tence as a?license for.the ; through a series of con-
ments and disagreements,- free export of violent revo- g
the`>oaatmApprove6lott"?enlease9y8b2'9 and
4A
11'
CPYR
M.
against imperialism seems-
the only unifying thread,
Communists have these
days, it . Is noteworthy,'
then,., to record divisions-.
even on' this question.
Romania argued, for ex
'ample, that -the cntlre~
!'emphasis of this latest'
,Communist encyclical is`
!out, of step with presentt
day realities. And the;
,Soviet leadership cannot;
really expect to be taken?
, seriously when it argues.
on the one- hand the evils'
of Western imperialism'
and on the other the spiriti
of East-West detente. A
No knowledgeable's
,\Vestern :expert here Ile-'
lleves that this confcrence1
,can do anything morel
than temporarily sloe the,
jmove toward greater Coma
Fmunist diversity and away.
from strictures of Soviets
..flnflueace.
What this 'conference,
?has produced Is a catalog.
of what the movement;
'hates - imperialism. The'
. main document talks
,about the unity of Com+
lmunists. But if there i
such unity, it also should'
have contained something
about the goals and obj'ee?
:t i v e s, specifically what
this' movement should and
'
,should not, be. ;
. 9
However, it was felt that
the Soviet leaders probalr
.ly are relieved with the
-way these past two weeks.
,have' gone. No parties
,walked out of the meeting'
as did Romania at' one of
.t h e earlier preparatory
'sessions. Perhaps m o r e
Important, there was; a
minimum of ' embarrass-
ment to the Kremlin on it%
two most serious crises,
China and Czechoslovakia.!
While there may be
relief on this, it can also be
said that the Kremlin hasp
'failed to'resolve any of the'
really critical 'problems
now confrohting.thcXoni?
unbs)w
ppferefCt?..
` a..A~L44-:
,
 Approved For Release 1999109/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
HINDUSTAN TIMES
'CPYRGHTI9 June 1969
Moscow
the idea of patching up with China, and it
was not until the fury of the Chinese cultural
revolution had convinced them that the
schism between Moscow and Peking, was
final that they set about holding the prepa-
ratory meeting at Budapest in February
1988. Rumania had walked out of It when It
was criticised for not toeing the Soviet
denunciation of Israel. The World Conference
Initially acheduled for last November seemed
to be much of a gamble after the Soviet
Intervention in Czechoslovakia in August had
been roundly condemned by the West Euro-
. pean Communist parties and others further
afield. Even within the East European bloo
the world, communist conference of 75 par-
T
ties in Moscow is that it ' met at all. Mr.
Khruschev had planned It in 1962 to ? get
the better of China which was disputing Moscow's primacy and denouncing his policy
of "peaceful co-existence," but he was unable ?_
to go ahead with it. After his ouster In 1964,
Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin had toyed with"
HOME-TRUTHS
The one indisputable achievement . of
ference without further loss of face, but by
postponing it till now it has not succeeded in
muting the criticism.
Moscow could not very well shelve the con-
Rumania had openly criticised the invasion.
.1 g p
the first step is to call an anti-imperialist It is possible that this appeal was addressed
Congress. This is the only tangible gain for to fraternal parties, such as the Rumanian,
Moscow. But this is of little worth when with which the CPM has reasonably good
several members of the conference decried relations. Nevertheless, it does seem strange
Soviet imperialism in Czechoslovakia, despite that differences between Indian political
the plea of Dr Gustav Husak, who replaced . parties should be sought to be resolved not
Mr Dubcek as First Secretary of thq Czech. in Delhi or Bombay "or elsewhere in the
Communist Party, that the Soviet interven- country but through third party later ii .+
tion Is ail internal matter and should not be , .op abroad. ? ~ , , :; ;, rx`,.~
The world conference was made possible
only by Moscow agreeing at Budapest to
drop its claim to leadership of the world
communist movement and any critical refe-
rence to China from the working document
for the conference. Though it was recognised
that unquestioned obedience to Moscow was
a thing of the past, the Soviet leaders had
billed the conference as having the objec-
tives of forging the unity of Communist
parties and reinforcing the anti-imperialist
struggle. On this latter point all participants
appear to have agreed, even though only 70
of the 75 have signed the main document
ttin out a rogramme of action of which
raised. More, Rumania among them, were
angered by the attack on China at the con-
ference in contravention of the basic under-
standing and Mr Brezhnev, who joined in the
attack, finally thought the better of backing
the East Pakistan party's kiteflying of a
resolution condemning China. Czechoslova-
kia and China have been the ghosts at the
conference, one present and the other hover-
ing across the Soviet border.
The Moscow conference has only under-
lined how the world Communist movement
is riven by the ideological clash between
Moscow and Peking and their national inte-
rests as in their border conflict. No less
significant is it that the Soviet-backed pros-
cription for relations between Communist
parties, with Its hint of the Brezhnev Doctrine
of limited sovereignty and the right to inter-
fere in the affairs of another country, has
been rejected by some of those subscribing
to the main Moscow anti-imperialist docu-
ment. Rumania remains a protestant in the
East European bloc, having appended its
signature with reservations and not wanting
to walk out of the conference for fear of
consequences. Against this disarray in the
Communist world, the one good thing to be
said for the conference is that the differences
have not only been aired but publicised as
well in the record of the proceedings to be
issued. If Moscow has not secured a vote
of confidence in? Kremlin's leadership, It has
at least countenanced democratic stirrings
at the conference:
The conference was attended by some
interesting delegations. These included those
from East Pakistan, Nepal and the Philip-
pines. The Communist Party of India was
well represented but its leader, Mr Dange,
appears to have stirred a hornet's nest at
home by appealing to the World Communist
parties to mediate between the CPI and the
CPM and promote Communist unity in India.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500800'b1-3
CPYRGHT
MAINICHI DAILY ISIS, Tokyo
19 June 1969
~~~TORIL~L
Role Of World Red Summif
IT IIE recent World Communist Conference which:
closed on June 17 apparently proved not soo
productive as the Soviet Union confidentlyc
anticipated at its opening.
For instance, the number of participating parties`.
this time was fewer than In the previous meeting:
in 19G0. In addition, while the previous conference
adopted the Moscow declaration which might be
regarded as a joint platform for international Com-,
munist campaigns, no such active character was:
seen In the four-part document adopted at this year's'
meeting concerning communism's basic aims.
Furthermore, the document was signed by. only. 66
,,of the 75 participating parties.
It can be easily concluded from these facts that
the International Communist movement has already.
'lost its past Iron-clad solidarity and begun showing
a trend to diversity. Such a trend was clearly ob-
served In the course of the conference. For example,'
Romania definitely opposed any denunciation of Red
China; and Italy made a frontal criticism of the
Soviet armed Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
It might be said that the Soviet Union's attitude
toward their criticism was always compromising'
throughout the conference. This is reflected In the.
difference between the basic document and its-
original draft reported earlier.
The censure of Red China which was indirectly
mentioned in the original draft, and the assertion
on limited sovereignty which was emphatically ex-
plained In the draft, were omitted from the formal
document. Instead, only the anti-imperialist drives
were stressed In the document as the sole batiner,
of the Red bloc. Tills Indicates that' the Soviet
'Union had to make a concession by taking Into con-'
sideration that a consedsus can hardly be gained,
among the participating parties. should It stick to
the problems connected with Red China and limited'
sovereignty.
It Is worthy to note, however, that the above
-outcome had been predicted even before the opening
if the conference. It may safely be said that they
Soviet Union opened the conferencd although fully
aware that the number of participants would be,
fewer, and that the convention would be thrown;
Into confusion If the problems of Red China and.
limited sovereignty were taken up.
If so, what was the true Intention of the Soviet.:
Union In deliberately opening the conference under
such a "disadvantageous" situation? -
We think that the key to this riddle lies In the
statement of Leonid I. Brezhnev, secretary general'
of the Soviet Communist Party. In his speech on-
June 7, he sharply condemned Red China as attempt
Ing to split the anti-imperialist forces.
The fact that Brezhnev openly hit Red China
before the world Communist leaders might be inter-
preted as suggesting that the Soviet Union Intended'
to utilize the conference as a preliminary step to.
deal with the Red Chinese Issue.
At the same time, It might be said that the Issue,
was one of the incentives to the trend of diversity
In views among the other. Red parties.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3'
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02.; CIA-R[)RT9-01194 A00,05000800Q'l-3
.
DIVERGENCIES AT THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE.
Parties Present and Absent Page 1
Parties which Attacked Peking Page 3
C. Mentions of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia Page 3
D. Reservations on the Main Document, Page 6
1
Approved For Release 19.99/09/02; CIA-_RDP79-01194A00050008000
-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
A. PARTIES PRESENT AND ABSENT
Western news. sources have identified the two "clandestine" parties
Guyana--as well as two unnamed "clandestine"_ parties.
Thirteen parties which had attended the 81-member world communist
meeting in 1960 were absent from the roster of parties contained
in the final conference communique. carried by Soviet media on
17 June. They, included, along with the Chinese and Albanian
parties, those of the DPRK, DRV, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, and Iceland. The
deficit was partially made up at the latest meeting, at which 75
parties were represented, by the attendance of five parties newly
recognized by Moscow as.CP's in the years since 1960--the West
Berlin SED and the parties of Lesotho, Puerto Rico, Nigeria,. and
as those from the Philippines and from Nepal. The latter was. also
identified by Western press sources as the "illegal" party mentioned
in the final communique of the Budapest consultative meeting in
February-March 1968.
.JC V.SA VNG
conference.
I The following is the list of participating parties provided in the
final communique on the conference, the full participants arranged
in Russian-alphabetical order with the.. two observer parties at the
,The communist parties of Cuba and Sweden, full participants in 1960,
._ _ , , if , of . . _
Communist Party of Australia
Communist Party of Austria
Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria
Communist Party of Argentina
Communist Party of Belgium
Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
Bulgarian Communist Party
Communist Party of Bolivia
Brazilian Communist Party
Communist Party of Great Britain
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
Communist Party of Venezuela
United Party of Haitian Communists
People's Progressive Party of Gana
Communist Party of Guadeloupe
Guatemalan Party of Labor
Communist Party of Germany
Socialist Unity Party of Germany
Communist Party of Honduras
Communist Party of Greece
Communist Party of Denmark
Dominican Communist Party
Communist Party of Israel
Communist Party of India
Ap'OM a t4e Yl999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080061-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
People's Party of Iran
Communist Party of Northern Ireland
Irish Workers Party
Communist Party of Spain
Italian Communist Party
Communist Party of Canada
Progressive Party of Working People--Cyprus
Communist Party of Colombia
People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica
Communist Party of Lesotho
Lebanese Communist Party
Communist Party of Luxembourg
Party of Liberation and Socialism (Morocco)
Martinique Communist Party
Mexican Communist Party
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.
Nigerian Marxist-Leninists
Nicaraguan Socialist Party.
Communist Party of Norway
Communist Party of East Pakistan
People's Party of Panama
Paraguayan Communist Party
Peruvian Communist Party
Polish United Workers Party
Portuguese Communist Party
Puerto Rican Communist Party
Reunion Communist Party
Romanian Communist Party
Communist Party of Salvador
San Marino Communist Party
Syrian Communist Party
h_.
Communist party of the Soviet Union
Communist party of the United States of America
Sudanese Communist Party
Tunisian Communist Party
Communist Party of Turkey
Communist Party of Uruguay
Communist Party of Finland
French Communist Party
Communist Party of Ceylon
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Communist Party of Chile
Swiss Party of Labor
Communist Party of Ecuador
South African Communist Party
"Two underground partiesy9?
unnamed for "treasons of
security"
Communist Party of Cuba (observer)
Left Party-Cists of Sweden (observer)
2
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B e PARTIES WHICH ATTACKED PEKING .
The following is a listing of the 50 parties, in the order in which:;
their delegates spoke, which'according to Soviet accounts leveled
explicit attacks at the present Chinese Communist Party leadership.
At least some of the six parties whose delegates spoke on the
;first day of the conference--those of Venezuela, Finland, Lebanon,
Haiti, Jordan, and Ecuador--could'have been expected to join in
attacking the Chinese-if their delegates' turn to speak had followed
.
'
the Paraguayan CP
s initial attack during the second day`s session.
Paraguay
Poland
France
Salvador.
USSR
West German KPD
Denmark
Uruguay
West Berlin BED
East Germany
Chile
Ceylon
Bulgaria
East Pakistan
Iraq
Hungary
Argentina
Switzerland
Canada
Brazil
Italy
Portugal
Czechoslovakia
Peru
United States
C. MENTIONS OF THE
Sudan
Belgium
Costa Rica
India
Guadeloupe
Luxembourg
Mongoli a
Nigeria
Great Britain
South Africa
Honduras
Guyana
Turkey
San Marino
Lesotho
Guatemala
Bolivia
Puerto Ricb.
Panama
Dominican Republic:
Greece
Nicaragua.
Syria
Iran
INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The following is a breakdown of the 14 parties whose spokesmen men-
tioned the August intervention-in-Czechoslovakia, divided according
to the anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet tenor of their statements on the
issue.* The listings in each category follow the order in which the.
delegates spoke. TASS sources are identified; PRAVDA's versions
were substantially the same in all cases except, as indicated, in
coverage of the Belgian CP speaker's remarks.
While the conference speech by French CP Secretary General Waldeck
Roehet on 7 June did not mention Czechoslovakia, AFP reported another
member of the delegation, Secretary Marchais, as telling reporters
at the Moscow press center on the 10th that his party "continues to
disapprove" of the August intervention but refrained from bringing up
the subject at the conference in deference to the Czechoslovak
e
arg
s on eleae319~ 'b i ~ ~7 ~~9 ?~~ v id I
3
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ANTI-SOVIET (8)
CPYRGHT
Australia [Anrnna] "alan aail1 that when the Australian delega-
Switzerland
Spain
Italy-
Sweden
Belgium
tion openly says that the introduction of troops into
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was wrong, it does so
not because it wants to interfere in the internal
affairs of parties that had taken that position."
(TASS, 7 June)
"During the preparations for the conference, the
Communist Party of Austria agreed that the events
in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will not be
on the agenda, since it is now impossible to overcome
differences on this question . . . .f? (TABS, 10 June)'
"Proceeding from the same principles [rejection-of
CCP splitting activities], we cannot also approve
of the actions of five Warsaw Treaty member countries
in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.." (TASS,
11 June)
"We Marxist-Leninists must also take a critical
position if we believe that negative phenomena exist
in some socialist country. This happened when five
Warsaw treaty countries took action in Czechoslovakia
last year. Our disagreement with this is known."
(TASS, 11 June) .
"Precisely this concept [the independence of each
party] prompted Italian Communists to take a
position on the Czechoslovak events: from solidarity
with the new course started in January 1968 to
disagreement with the entry of troops of five Warsaw
Treaty countries into Czechoslovakia." (TASS,
11 June)
"We believe [autonomy,of each party] to be the main
principled question, particularly against the back-
ground of the critical discussion which followed
the movement of troops into Czechoslovakia in August
last year, from which we dissociated ourselves, like
some other communist parties.'.' (TABS, 12 June)
The peace movement in Belgium "was injured by such
negative factors as sabotage of the struggle for
peaceful coexistence carried out by the Chinese
Communist Party and anti-Sovietism both from the
left and the right. After the military action in
Czechoslovakia, these trends were able to carry out
their propaganda on an even wider scale." (TASS,
12 June; the reference to Czechoslovakia was omitted
from the report of the speech in the 16 dune PRAVDA)
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Great Britain
PRO-SOVIET (6)
Hungary
Czechoslovakia
"Touching in this connection
on the events in Czechoslovakia, the speaker said:
We do not want to interfere in anybody's internal
affairs, but there is no doubt' that the important
decision of five'socialist countries to bring troops
into Czechoslovakia had profoundly influenced every
communist party. We have stated our disagreement
with that." (TASS, 13 June)
"Comrade S.C. Carpio expressed disagreement with
the appraisal of the developments in Czechoslovakia
given by the representative of the Communist-Party
of Australia. Our party, he said, which is directly:
fighting against imperialism and knows-from its own
experience the insidious nature of its methods,'
qualifies the assistance given by five socialist
countries to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia.-
as necessary and timely." (TASS, 7 June)
The Hungarian party and Government "have never said
that they could remain indifferent to events in
Czechoslovakia." They "were guided in all their
activities by the principles of internationalism',
by the sense of solidarity, and by nothing else,
at every stage of the events in Czechoslovakia. We
are interested in one thing only: we want the pro-
blems in Czechoslovak society to be settled in a
socialist way." (TASS, 11 June)
"The leadership of the. communist -parties of neigh-
boring allied states, Husak went on, gradually lost
faith in the ability of the leadership of our party
in the situation to stop that crisis development
[the rise of "right opportunist"'forces]. Then came
the well-known events in August. In these conditions
the leadership of the Communist' Party of Czechoslovakia
found the way out in the signing of the [26 August 1968]1-
Moscow protocol, which is logically connected with the
well-known Bratislava statement of 3 August 1968."
(TASS, 12 June)
[After attacking the speeches of the Australian,
Spanish, and Italian CP delegates, Manuel Mora said:]
"Imperialism . . . cunningly conducts subversive work
in secret from the masses, as a rule. In this
".'situation,abstract application of principles is
impermissible, since in this case they might turn
into an obstacle for our cause. We bore this in
mind when the events in Czechoslovakia took place. .
.The socialist world has not broken any of our principle ,
since it was forced to take measures to defend I
lea'2`OI~"9-OAdfO~v80001-3
5
 CPYRGHT
Aj avetFor Re sod9 10 106,ejGlAgRDFU-A11l 9 flOMQ@8P0 1-3
or their own policy, the world parties "also hav
nternational obligations, because they are respo
ible to the workers' movement as well. . . .
Urbani stressed further that the Communist P
f Luxembourg had fully and unconditionally suppo bed
he measures of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw
reaty countries last August in Czechoslovakia."
(TABS, 13 June)
Guyana
'Speaking about the question of the movement of
coops of .socialist countries into Czechoslovakia
hich was raised by some of the delegates, the
peaker turned down the assertion that this step
as a violation of sovereignty or rejection of .the
ight to democratic development.' . . C. Jagan_
upported the point contained in the speech" of
ustav Husak, "the point about the class content
overeignty, about the fact that the rights and'd iea
if socialist countries are linked inseparably,"
(TABS, 15 June)
D. RESERVATIONS ON THE MAIN DOCU ENT
The CPSU's Boris Ponomarev, presenting the main document tb the con-
ference on 16 June in behalf of the editorial commission, declared
that the commission had received "more than 70" proposals for
CPYRG HT
amendments from 24 parties and adopted "fully or partially about
30," according t TRZ)O. AIT MM , ,
thoroughly discu sed." TABS' and PRAVDA's daily diaries of the
proceedings and le-eeun ig ef *he spee -9- aama at, -- -on
troversy over the document, but were vague at times in indicating the
nature of the objections raised. In the final session the dissenting
parties took actions ranging from refusal to sign all'or part of the
document, to deferral of action, to agreement to sign despite their
reservations.
CPYRGHT
CPYRG
While the conference issue no list of signers of the main document,
the final communiq a carried by TABS on the 17th isted five parties-
the Dominican, Aus , d Reunion CP's--as
failing to sign the full document, stating that the Dominican party
did not support any of it while the other four signed only the third
section outlining the program of anti-imperialist struggle. But TABS'
presentation left the impression that all the rest signed, and the
picture was in fact more complicated.
I The 18 June PRAVDA account of th
final discussion session on the
evening of the 16th reported-statements by the Norwegian and
British CP delegates that they would defer final decisions on
signing any part of the document until the next sessions of their
parties' leading bodies. The British party, following an executive
committee session, subsequently made known its decision not to sign,
6
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of. he Norwegian delegation was apparently absent at the windup of
the conference; Copenhagen radio on the 13th reported that delegation
chairman Larsen ha , i
CPYRGHT
bhecb
such charge was ref acted Iu 1A28 r,%UartofIrl0 TkS
criticism of China at the gathering constituted "a breach of promise."'
Delegation member Pettersen spoke for the Norwegian party in the
final discussion of the document. ? .
The Reunion delegate apparently shifted his position twice during
the proceedings: He served notice on the 14th that his party, like
the British and Norwegian, would defer a decision until after the con-CPYRGHT
ference was over; on the lTth the final communique listed Reunion
e.
as signing only Part III; bu PRAVDA's account the next day listed
Reunion delegate as signing the entire ocume , VIAFLI .
The small Reunion party has a history of assertiveness: at the
February-March 1968 consultative meeting in Budapest the Reunion
delegate opposed making public the espisode that led to the Romanian
walkout, and TASS reported his "abstention" on that meeting's
adoption of its final communique. ,
In sum, available information indicates that at the windup of the
Moscow conference three parties--the Dominican, Norwegian, and
British--in addition to the Cuban and Swedish observer parties had
not signed the document; of the three that declined to-sign, one
announced a final decision and the other two deferred decisions. Three
.parties had signed only Part III--the Australian, Italian, and San
Marino CP's.
Of the 67 parties that sl ned`the full document, at least 14 had expressed
substantial reservatio PRAVDA s 8 June account of the evening session
on the 16th, at which a number of parties explained their final positions,'
names the Moroccan, Reunion, Romanian, Spanish, Sudanese, and Swiss parties
as stating a decision to sign while registering reservations. The Soviet
record, partially filled out, by scattered materials from other communist
sources thus far available, identifies eight more that had expressed
substantial complaints about the document--the Austrian, Belgian, Chilean,
Costa Rican, Guatemalan, Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Northern Ireland parties.
The objections ranged from the Italian party's view that the document was
too "exhortative and propagandistic" and the Romanian view that it over-
estimated the threat from "imperialism," through specialized complaints
relating to Latin America and the Middle East, to the hardlining Costa
Rican complaint that the draft did not condemn the Chinese and the
Nicaraguan view that it should have condemned "splinter actions."
A definitive compilation.of the objections to the document as finally
adopted is not possible at this juncture because of the haziness of
Soviet reporting on some of the debates, the incompleteness of available
material from other communist sources, and the fact that some objections
raised in the course of the debates were presumably accommodated in
amendments or withdrawn. The listing below records identifiable sub-
stantive expressions of reservations, gleaned from the public record.
The parties are grouped according to their actions on the final day--the
single party that announced a final decision not to sign, the two that
deferred decisions,the three that signed only Part III, 14+ that signed
6deF **Wasttt9ft*WOVttmr4 pp#4"9gp14db gWee "d-3
.A)
the two observers and hence nonsigners.
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Party Nature of Reservation Final Action
NONSIGNER: FINAL DECISION
Dominican Sanchez "opposed the formulation of
Republic the road of revolution contained in.
the document under consideration,
and first of all the formulation
about the peaceful road." (TASS,-
'14 June)
"The document conceals real attitudes
within the socialist camp and
canonizes the national policies
of a number of communist parties
CPYRGHT F =licies w we do not share."
(PRAVDA, 18 Jun )
`NONSIGNERS: DEFERRED DECISIONS
Britain
"Concerning the draft main docu-
ment," Gollan said, "the confer-
ence delegates undoubtedly know
that our executive committee will
make final decisions on our attitude.
CPYRGHT the document after our return."
(PRAVDA, 17 June) The document was
he 13 June TABS
report of Gollan's speech.
CPYRGHT
"Would not si i"
TABS, 1 June)
CPYRGHT
"Would not sign"
"Final decision"
would be made at
"next regular CPYRGHT
session" of party
executive committee.
F PRAVIDA, 18 June)
"unable to give its
assent to the docu-
ment as a whole."
(British Communist.
PYRGHT
by Prague radio
but omitted in
TABS report of
executive committee
statement, both on
the 30th.
Norway Larsen stated that his party'p dele
gation "agrees with some of the
amendments proposed for the
documents discussed at the conference
and that it has a number of sugges-
tions dealing chiefly with the main.
document. Attention must be'concen-
trated on it third d fourth
sections." TABS, l0 June)
Decision at "next
plenum" of party.
Pettersen said "we
have no power to
sign or approve this
'
document.
18 June)
CPYRGHT
CPYRGH-
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Part Nature of Reservation Final Action
PARTIAL SIGNERS
CI R ' PTart IIT
Australia Aarons said his party "cannot sign
Italy
the document as a whole, since it PRAVDA9 une
disagrees with some of the principles
set forth in the document and since
there are no substantial theses and
principles in it." The document
"disregards certain important
phenomena in relations between
socialist countries which negatively
influence our entire movement." (TASS,
7 June)
. CPYRGHT
Berlinguer said "the document's style
in the wbRI `-I ement and fails to
examine
12 Junecryags nn ?,11a lith and PRAVDA
is often more exhortative and
propagandistic than analytical" and
underestimates the difficulties,
failings, and rifts which have
occurred t socialist camp and
reported only that
criticized" the main
confined his support
stgued per b 941
(PRAVDA, 18 June)
to Part III..
UP F\%j"1T
Gasperoni "stated that his delega
tion approved only that part of (PRAVDA, 18 June)
program of our common at
against imperialism."
18 June)
SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS
Austria, Muhri said his party "agrees jith Signed
the draft of the main document but
at the same time is in favor of
improving it further taking into
racialism, a phrase aireczea
trip nFal for the struggle against
the discussion." The Austrian CP
"suggests including, in the part
10, June}`
*.....: C-PY(GHT
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I [ TA88 r l
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art Nature of Reservation ion
SIGt'ERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)
Belgium "The Belgian delegation's opinion is
.that the conference is more the
beginning than the end.- Despite
the imperfection of the documents,
which are the fruit of long dis-
s,,it will adopt them."
CPYRGHT FTABS, 12' June)
Signed
"Despite the many positive sides of the
main document, we are not completely
CPYRGHT
satisfied with it. However, it is an
acceptable basis for discussion. It
cannot in any way hamper the political
work or cause harm to the independence
of any party." ( RAVD , e)=.
Chile Corvalan said his party would not insist ' Signed
that. all its amendments be accepted, but
"there are some statements we would have
wished expressed another way." Chile
would have preferred substituting "armed CPYRGHT
or nonarmed road" for "peaceful o
nonpeaceful." (EL SIGLO, 11 June) PRAVDA's
account omitted this specific obi
Costa Rica Mora said he would prefer the document to Signed
"contain less hesitations in the approach
to great problems of the present-day revo-
lutionary movement. We cannot understand
why we must keep ad-1 - out abo the policy
of the present le ders. of th Communist
Party of China." (TABS, 12 une) CPYRGHT
.Guatemala Martinez wanted "more precise formulas to Signed
express the dialectic correlation between
peaceful coexistence and the revolution-
14 ary proce ." s "not completely
n Lati
ith
n
Nile 'poi donna o
sa isfied w
America. (PRAVDAa 9 June) CPYRGHT
Mexico Verdugo approved the document's "main Signed
orientation," but "we continue to believe
it is necessary and possible to improve
it by adopting certain amendments which
were submitted during the preparatory
commission's work and at the conference
itse q une)
CPYRGHT
10
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Part Nature of Reservation- Final Action
SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)
,Morocco "We have expressed ourselves in
Northern Murphy "said the delegation of the Signed
Signed
from the spirit of the unity and coopera-
tion of all fraternal parties--both those
present and those absent--and from our
unwavering faithf etarian CPYRGHT
internationalism." (PRAVDA, 8 June)
We believe, Comrade All Yata said, that
this inalienable right,one which is not
subject to any doubt, has all the same
not found sufficient reflection in the'
main document. This has also compelled
the delegation to make certain reserva-
tions. However, fully recognizing our.
responsibility, Ali Yata concluded,
we are signing this document proceeding
favor of stressing the national rights
of the Arab-people of Palestine.
Santos "noted that it was the opinion Santos "spoke about
expose and condemn all splinter documents discussed.
principled provisions on the need to Committee of the
the draft main document should incluc'le''by the party Central
of his party's Central Committee that the unanimous approval
the rightwing de a on t as the
?leftwin v one " (TABS 4 June)
actions within the communist move-
ment, whatever their origin, on the
attitude of communist and workers
parties to the CPSU and the Soviet
Union . , on the duty to condemn
at -tie,
(TASS9
conference. vv
14 June)
CPYRGHT
a more concise form, since the main
struggle both in northern and southern
{ Ireland is directed against imperial-.
ism. Nevertheless, the Communist
Party expressed readiness to support
the conclusions contained in the
document and to apply them whenever
possible in thp itions of its CPYRGHT
country. (TASS, 1 June)
Ireland Communist Party of Northern Ireland
would have drafted this document in
Party "would adopt
a decision" on the
main document "after, CPYRGHT
the end of the
conference. o.
14 June)
areas of 'the world where the
Verges "expressed a reservation in
respect to the main document of the
conference. -He said the document
contained a certain understatement
of the possibility of rapid and at
times decisive changes in those
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SIGtRS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)
CPYRGHT
nation tion movement
acts." (TAS_S 4 June)
"It contains insufficiently pre-
cise formulations" on "relations
between the socialist countries
and the communist parties, and this
allows them to be interpreted
arbitrarily. The delegation
CPYRGHT subscribes to reservations
regarding the characteristics of
the situation in the Near East."
PRAVDA, 118 June)
CPYRGHT
-~ "
(TASS 17 June)
"Empowered to sign
the main document
on condition that
the reservations set
forth be noted and
made publio."
(PRAVDA,.18
CPYRGHT
Romania "Our party conceives of international Ceausescu said his
reunions of communist and workers party "adopts the
parties not as forums called on to document in its CPYRGHT
draw up programmatic documents which present form."
are compulsory for all parties and , 15 une .
to establish directives and norm-
setting lines." (Ceausescu, Radio
Bucharest, 9 June)
"We cannot refrain from referring
to the fact that in the document,
especially in chapters one and two,
wordings have remained which are
not clear enough and may create
confusion. . . . As an example in
this respect, we refer to the way in
which in some paragraphs the problem
of the divergencies existing among
socialist countries as well as among
the communist and workers parties is
dealt with. Consequently, the
impression can be created that these
divergencies are due to the activity
of imperialism--and this in our
opinion is not realistic--and that
the possibilities for imperialism
to divide the international working
class movement are overrated." At
the same time, the impression can
be Lreated of a certain underrating
of the capability of the socialist
countries, of. the communist and
workers parties, to repel any action
of imperialism and-its propaganda
directed against the unity of the
socialist countries and the unity of
the communists and the working .class
PRAVDA, 18 June)
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Nature of. Reservation
.SIGNERS WITH RESERVATIONS (Continued)
IRomania
1(Continued)
CPYRGHT
Spain:
Final Action
"As to the Middle East, we have set
forth our standpoint and do not dwell
on it now, although we consider that
it would have been well for the
document to deal more clearly with
this problem, too. (Ceausescu,
AGERPRES, 16 June) The 18 June
o E
PRAVDA summarized the Substance
Ceausescu's remarks, but muted his
reservations on the Middle East.
Carillo said his party "expressed
serious reservations about certain
points which it would like to be
more in accord with reality. The
document, he specified, is not some
'program charter' outlining a
'general line.' It is the result
of.an extensive discussion con-
taining a number of important new
elements. At the same time, the
draft has ambiguities and obvious
omissions. These and other causes.
make the conference different in
character from the conferences of
1957 and 1960." ( ASS, 1 June)
The party "has decided
,.to sign the document
so as not to leave
room for doubt regard-
ing its firm adherence
ld movement.
(PRAVDA, 1 June)
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT'
tional.character@ decisions ar
out of specific conditions. (PRAVDA,
18' June)
on behalf of the ultimate interests
of our peoples and must reveal de-
fects in decisions of an interna-.
1967 on the Middle East, because
the resolution contains serious
defects particularly with respect
to the Palestine problem. We, as
communists," Suridzh said, "act
"The delegation expresses a reser- "Supports and will-
vation on one sentence where sign the main docu-
reference is made to 'full' ' merit." (RAVA ,.
implementation of the Security " 18 June)
Council resolution (of 22 November
13
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
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pa~r Nature of Reservation
SIGNERS WI`fi RESERVATIONS (Continued)
Switzerland Lechleiter said "the fact that some
_- __ ___ __4. ,....-+? 4., +U-
number of wordings of the document
which are too general and
inaccurate,, so as to avoid
different interpretations. A
number of such wordings idealize
.relations between parties of
work of the conference indicates
that it is not yet possible to
work out?a single document which
could become the common,
scientifically founded political
and ideological platform for all
the parties. . . . We believe it
is necessary to make specific a
" CPYRGHT which is not in
I accord with the resent situation."
'OBSERVERS
(TASS, 11 June)
Latin American communist parties."
Insufficient stress had been placed
on the role of "bourgeois reformism"
Rodriguez argued that the document -Status precluded
should have given greater stress to signing
"self-criticism" and should have
pointed out "the weaknesses of the
workers' movement in the developed
capitalist countries." He disputed
the statement that the Latin
American communist parties "head the
democratic forces and . . . fight
courageously . . . for the attain-
ment of revolutionary changes," a
description which "does not corre-
spond to reality with regard to certain
in U.S. strategy in Latin America.
14
Final Action
"Approves the docu-
ment with the.afore
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Party Nature of Reservation
OBSERVERS (Continued)
Cuba
(Continued)
While Cuba backed the document's
concept of peaceful coexistence.'
it-held that the defense of peace
should not be the main aim of the
anti-imperialist movement: "the
anti-imperialist forces must
establish as the essential aim
of their actions the defeat and
elimination of imperialism."
treaty] GRANMA, 12 Irune) Soviet-,
accounts the substance'
of Rodriguez' objections, including
his swipe at the orthodox Latin
American communist parties.
as object nproliferation CPYRGHT
Although the Cuban party favors out-
lawing nuclear weapons, so long as
this is not achieved "our view--.
which is very well known to those
attending the conference--on the
problem of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons will remain un-
changed." (Cuba is on record
shortcomings from the point of view
of coverage and analysis of the
situation in the world. Omitted
are important questions concerning
evaluation of revolutionary strategy,
in the 'third world.' . The thesis
reading that each party itself should
have the decisive say in the affairs
document circulated has substantial.- ? signing
Werner said "we believe that the Status precluded;
main document."
PRAVDA.says only that Werner "made
y
y p
report of the speech in the 18 June'
of its own peopl rmulated CPYRGHT
ve recisel
" (TASS 12 June) A
r
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
T?HE.'WASHINGTON fx9YVGHT
1T 'July 1969 Vr-
CPYRG?HT
~ou
an
1a
-co
ppo
on
`m
ob
It
`'si
or
or
:w,
wo _ ay's ot otng to We III oon
e launch of Apollo 11, like the launches of the
er Apollo spacecraft before it, was beautiful,
they say on television. It was so precise, so
or-free, that you could not -entirely appreciate
technical prowess that went into it. And be-
se It got off to such a magnificent start, It is
easy to overlook the quiet, cool courage 'and
fidence of the men in the capsule and the men
charge on the ground. On hand were a Vice
sident, a former President, quite probably a
rum of both houses of Congress, a huge turn-
of foreign envoys and no, end of dignitaries
expert observers, not to mention representa-
of the press of this country and 54 foreign
ds. It was, in short, a wide open affair-and,
ordingly, wide open to embarrassment, or worse,
nything had gone wrong. And this is not only
ribute to NASA and to our whole space effort
a commentary of some consequence on the
trasting ways In which the two great space
ers of this planet approach the great adventure
or there are now two spacecraft racing across
natural for the Russians to try to steal some of ou
thunder if they can.
That is not the point about the Russian pe
formance that'augurs in for the long pull. Wh j
is disappointing Is the Soviet continuing insisten
on secrecy, whether it stems from national securi
concerns or a lack of confidence in its own abilitie
In any case, not even Col. Frank Borman, Co
mander of this country's first.circumlunar missio
was given a hint of the plan for Luna 15 In h
otherwise friendly conversations with Soviet spa*,'
officials.
So we ? do not know what the Russian spacecra 1
Is up to, except for the fact .that it will real h t
moon while Apollo 11 is still on its way. Accordin
to the best guesses of space experts here, it m
land, scoop up some lunar soil and return'to eart.
If it does, the Russians will have upstaged Apoll
11 to some extent and won some part of the ra
they and we embarked upon less than a deco ;
ago.
But that isn't the point, either. The world caj-
judge, if it feels the need,- whether Apollo 11
sky toward the moon. One was launched on a - Luna 15 was the more spectacular affair, the m
sion with the whole world looking on and the,' difficult and the more. scientifically useful of
ective explicitly set forth In advance. The other,
yet unknown, and it is this contrast, rather
n any qualitative comparison between what we'
setting out to.achieve and what the Russians
setting out to achieve, that is significant. It
ld be childish to fault the Russians for trying
slip their moon shot in ahead of ours, as if the
on was somehow ours this week. It was largely
decision to make a race of this and just as we
ld very much like to win this race, so it is
THE WASHINGTON POST
15 July 1969
unuffluld! 80011zes ha W1
ow said yesterday that the
unmanned Soviet space he
heading for the moon proba-
bly will go into lunar orbit,
end a robot capsule to the
urface and rejoin the parent
hip for a flight back to earth
with samples of moon rocks
and soil.
Westerners in Moscow and
elsewhere have speculated in
ecent weeks that such a teat
ould be attempted In an ef-
ort to upstage the Apollo 11
light, but there was still no
fficial confirmation of any
etails of the Luna 15 flight,
yond ' the announcemeenntt
atthe %mv 6B~
two. Over the long haul, as man presses on In
t
exploration of the universe, this judgmen may
I
n,
matter much, for mankind, with all the probl
confronting it and `drawing upon its resources,
be the loser unless the spirit of contest gives
to open collaboration among all those with a
tribution to make to the unlocking of the secre
of space. In the meantime, Apollo 11 will stars
as a symbol of a nation that dares to operate open
and is willing to share its successes, its failures anti,
its knowledge with every man. ,
]oscowSthys fial1ySili
n
.6 -te
? Mission Qi Lunar Probe
Sir; Bernard Lovell, director
of the. Jordell Bank Observa-
tory in England, does not be.
Bevel that, Luna 15. will bring
back soil from the moon.
Lovell, whose observatory
has picked up signals from
Luna 15, said he expected the
Soviets to eventually recover
rocks, with such uhmanned
spacecraft, but "It Is unlikely
the Russians can do this by
I the testing of systems in one
exercise."
'I think this is the begin.
nIn of a new series of Rus-
Re eaeorl #0.9108 I
going to lead up to the recov-
_-- -~ wnnlrw without the
GHT
intervention of man," he said The terse Soviet announce
A West German space scion- ment of the Luna 15 High
fist suggested that Luna 15 is said only that the probe woul
probably a test for an even- continue studies of the moo
tual direct moon landing with- and of space close to the lung
out the help of a landing mod- surface..
ule. The Soviet Union has never
Heinz Kaminski, director of before put a craft In orbs
around the moon and returned
Institute, based his deduction it to earth, nor has. it per.
two articles that appeared! formed any capsule uncou
June 13 in the Soviet maga? ,' piing and recoupling opera.
tions in the vicinity
zlne Cosmic Analysis, pub- of the
fished by the Moscow Acad. moon.
emy of Science. But the unofficial sources i
Moscow aa1A .-A-6.
ith
w
11390 10d+ u psuie, the un-
the Apollo 11 capsule blasts aient- of the
Into ~+rhit from Cape Kennedy. Apollo moanbug, flare been
carried but on oartls..._ ...
 !:,1,J YORK TL,,::S
14 July 1969
r-1pp"~- Release 1
CRAFT
1. TOWARD THE MOON
bservers Believe Attemp
May Be Made to Land '
and Return to Earth
5TH IN LUNA PROGRAM
!estern Sources Doubt Th
Russia Has Capability to
Achieve Such a Feat
By BERNARD GWERTZ
Spectal to The New `lark Tinter
MOSCOW, July 13-The S -
let Union launched an u -
anned spaceship toward ti 0
noon today, just three days
ore the scheduled blastoff f
merica's Apollo 11 on
anned lunar landing missio -
The launching of the Lu
5 mission appeared to obse
rs here as a deliberate effo
y the Soviet Union to ste I
ome of" the moon publics
way from the United Stat
nd demonstrate that it is s
uch in the space business.
As usual, few details we
eleased on the latest Sovi t
pace venture.
Tass, the official Soviet pre s
agency, said that at 5:55 A.
Moscow time (10:55 P.M., S -
urday, Eastern daylight tim )
rocket carrier carrying L a
15 was launched.
it said that Luna 15 "Was,
aunched to the moon from 0
rbit of an artificial earth s -.
lilte."
The Alm of the Fllglu'
"The aim of the flight is
check -the systems on board t e
-
automatic station and to co,
uct further scientific explo -
ion of. . the moon and spa
ear the .moon.' the announc
neat said.
The announcement's wor )
ng was vague enough to lea e'
rn for any possible specul -
with all varieties tonight.
~~jjso~~meeppobserrl1verss believed u
tfrtAYdwufrhicl ~pt~ci-~
moon in April last year but did
not return to earth.
Others thought Luna 15 might
be an ambitious effort by the
Russians to land an unmanned
spaceship on the moon and
hen return it to earth, possibly
with some rocks from the
moon's surface. .
if this were indeed the case,
the Soviet Union could beat the
United States In the "race" to.
bring samples from the moon
to the earth.
Attempt Has Been Hinted
Communist correspondents for
the last four months have been
advising some of their Western
colleagues here that the main
soviet effort would be such a
space venture. But their predic-
tions as to when the Soviet Un-
ion would launch such a mis-
sion have repeatedly been
;wrong.
II Some correspondents had said
that a launching was scheduled,
for July 10, and when this
launching did mot take place,
they said that the Soviet Union
would wait until after the Apol-
lo 11 mission.
Some Western diplomats have
said that a "scooping" opera-
tion to obtain lunar soil sam-
ples appears beyond the Soviet
capacity at the moment. These
observers contend that the Rus-
sians lack the ability to launch
a vehicle heavy enough to can-
tain a craft that could reach
the surface of the moon and
then take-off again.
American officials were some-
what concerned that Luna 15,
whatever its mission, might
present a hazard to the Apollo
11.
The view was fairly general,
however, that the Soviet Union.
knowing in advance what Apol-
lo 11 planned to do, would not
interfere with it.
Tass said that at noon to-
day, Moscow time, Luna 15
was about 41,000 miles from
earth. "There is a steady radio
communication with the sta-
tion," Tass said. The vehicle's
equipment was said to be func-
tioning normally.
The first in the Luna series
was launched on Jan. Z, 1959.
It passed within 3,728 miles of
the moon and then went Into
an orbit around the sun.
Luna 2, launched on Sept. 12,
1959, was the first probe to hit
the moon, and Luna 8. launched
on Oct. 4, 1959, was the first
side.
94 006tr8lre3sed
G TSubsequent Luna space shots
emphasized attempts to make
"soft landings" on the moon,
with Luna 9, in February, 1969,
making the first such landing.
None of the Luna series have
ever returned to earth.
The unmanned Zond 5.?
launched last September. and
Zond 6. last November; circled
the moon and returned to earth..
This led observers to believe
then that the Russians might
be planning a manned orbit of
the moon.
Earlier this year, a Soviet
astronaut, Lieut. Col. Ajeksdi A.
Leonov, was quoted by Japan-
ese newvspncn as saying that he
expected that rocks from the
moon to be exhibited by the
Soviet Union at the 1970
world's fair in Osaka, Japan.
and that an unmanned craft
!would pick them up.
But there was- no evidence
in the Tass announcement to-
day that Luna 15 vgould at-;
tempt to do this.
For the last week, the. Soviet
press has been focusing on the
Apollo 11 mission, with one
newspaper running ? the photo-
graphs of the three astronauts
who make up its crew-Neil
A. Armstrong, who is a civilian,,
and Col. Edwin E. Aldrin Jr.
and Lieut. Col. Michael Collins,'
both of whom are in the Air
Force.
Borman Met Podgorny
The recent visit of Cola
Frank Borman, the astronaut,
and his family also provided
the occasion for many articles
on America's space efforts.
After 'a 40-minute meeting in
the Kremlin between Colonel
Borman and President Nikolai
V.Podgorny, the Soviet leader
was quoted as wishing Presi-
dent Nixon and the American
people success with the Apollo
11 mission.
Colonel Borman was re-
peatedly asked by American
newsmen during his stay here
whether he knew of any Soviet.
space venture in the near fu-
ture, and he always indicated
that he had no knowledge of
any.
So far, the new Luna mission
has ? received scant publicity
here, merely being reported on
regular news broadcasts, with.
out the serious tone that is
reserved for major space
achievements.
If usual Soviet practice is
followed, little will be made
known about the mission until
it achieves its objective or ends'
Its mission -- with Tuesday
afternoon probably being the
earliest that any substantial
amount of information will be
feleased..
Approved For Release 1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3.
NEW YORK TI MS
34 July 1969 CPYRGHT
IVASA Officials FearnRussMns,
Are Trying to Upstage Apollo
By RICHARD D. LYONS
Special to The NOW Tat ?ml,
CAPE KENNEDY, Fla., July( However, space agency of-
known to be
i
l
h
i
ere are
c
a
s
13-Space agency officials ap i f
eared concerned and a bit concerned about the effect that
p eared a mission would have on
alarmed today. that the latest the attention focused on Apollo
Soviet lunar flight might be a 11. For 10 years an argument
dramatic attempt to upstage has raged over whether un-
America's scheduled launching manned space exploration
of a lunar mission on Wednes- would be not only less risky
but also less costly the and
day. 1 fruitful
scientific
They fear that the edge will standpoint as manned space
be taken off the Apollo 11 mis- flight.
sion, however successful, if the Commenting on Colonel Bor-
Soviet Union lands on the man's statements, a high offi-
cial of the National Aeronau-
P tics and Space Administration
',that scoops up lunar soil, then said the agency had known
,,blasts off from the surface and "for some time" that the Soviet
returns, to earth. Union "had the technical ca-
i The. Apollo mission Is In- pability to undertake such a
mission:"
,tended to land two men on ?
He emphasized, however,
'the moon and bring back ram- that the exact nature of the
aples of the lunar soil. Luna 15 mission was still ob-
m- scure, as did Dr. Thomas O.
Col
F
n
the
k B
ran
orma
,
}
.
co
mander of the Apollo 8 flight Paine, the agency's adminis-
trator.
around the-moon last Christ-
Dr. Paine said here: "We
mastime, who returned last hope that the juxtaposition of
week from 'a? trip to the Soviet two lunar missions in such a
Union, said, here today it was close time frame points out
his."guess" that this was; in the desirability of close cooper-
tact, the mission of Luna 15. ,ation in space between the So-
viet Union and the United
He said Russian space exports States.
he met in Moscow last week Colonel Borman, appearing on
"had made references to it." the National Broadcasting Com-
Tho Air 'Force officer assert- pany's program, "M" t the
'ed that it will be a geat feat" Press," said that ,unmanned
if the Russians bring back a loner r,bes were worthwhile
'but them is no substitute for
Isample of lunar soil, but added: human judgment."
"An unmanned machine cen Experts familiar with the
tainly will not take the edge 1Sovi(st space program were less
toff Apollo 11." certain that an automatic lunar
Other exerts familiar with it*'[ sampling station was the
p ,objective of Lunar 15, despite
the Soviet space program said, C'ulonel Borman's acknowledged
however. that they believed eap crtise and recent talks with
that the Soviet flight was Ithe Russians.
aimed more at scooping up The experts pointed out that
',propaganda, rather than lunar ,it had been known for years
soil. that in the Soviet Union the
have lunar landing launching "win-
"The Russians may dows"-that is, those times of
figured that they could keep the month that are most pro-
the world guessing and take pitious for moonshots-are six
the edge off the fact that they to seven days ahead of those at woul were not attempting a manned 'thePbetot my. Th
foris a Sov etl at
landing on the moon," one said. tempt at three or four days
He pointed out that the last ago, when there were rumors
Soviet moon flight, Luna 14, in Moscow that an automatic,
occurred 15,months ago. ;soil scooping attempt was go-
'Why launch Luna 15 now sing to be made.
rather than -a~Oe Release 1,994 t to d1%,! _VB
that was supposed to have been
launched last week and not to,
the one that went up today.
The essence of the Counter-
argument against an automatic
soil sampling station was that
Luna 15 was nothing more than
another Soviet lunar orbiting
flight. Even this type of mis-
sion, which has been accom-
plished by both the United
States and the Soviet Union,
would have a propaganda effect
because it would, however mo-
mentarily, deflect the focus of
world attention from the Apollo
1.1 flight.
Technical experts such as
Dr. George Mueller, a I4ASA
associate administrator who Is
a propulsion expert, said last
week that it might be possible
for an automatic spacecraft to
land and pick up material. But
he said he strongly doubted
that the craft would return to
earth. ?
Lack of Propulsion
The key to the ? argument
against return is propulsion. It'
the spacecraft descended di-i
rectly. as the American Suns
veyor ship did, it would need
an enormous propulsion sys,
tem to blast off and return to
earth. It,would be almost like
landing a huge rocket back;
.ward and then taking it oft
again without launching ppad,
gantry cranes and especially
men to help.
If the Russians were to put
a craft into lunar orbit, detach,
a smaller pickaback spacecraft
to the surface for a soil pickup,
then blast it off for a rendez-
vous and docking with the
mother craft, the weight would
be less but the timing would
be extremely complicated and
perhaps impossible.
Sir Harrie Massey, chairman
of the British National Com-
mittee for Space Research, said
n Britain that lie believed that
Luna 15 "was not of very spe-
cial significance.
In Washington the State De-
partment issued a statement
saying that while the Russians
"have not yet stated the intent
of the mission, we welcome
this further exploration in space
and wish them every success in s
man's effort to better under-
>
9-0.11.94A dAffff AOtf~'Pd3 ,
had some , connection wlttt SLLWile"3 W a,vavuc. &Ma.o..
110.1' { could have been for a mission
 Approved For Releast 9I02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
NDI YORK TIMES
28 July 1969
REDS HELD GLUM .
OVER MOON FEAT!
Strains and Embarrassment
Reported in Soviet Bloo
By PAUL HOFMANN. i
syedd to TM New Toek Mm" ' 1
PRAGUE, July 27 -- Well-
informed Eastern European'
sources report that the triumph.
of Apollo 11 and the perform-
ance of the Soviet Luna 15'
spacecraft caused lively con-
troversy within the Moscow
leadership and strains through-
out the Soviet bloc.
The debate and recrimina.
tions are said to Involve Leonid
1. Brezhnev, General Secre-
tary of the Soviet Communist,
party.
Gloom and embarrassment
over the landing of the United
States astronauts on the moon
and the apparent crash of the
unmanned Luria 15 craft on
the moon's surface are said to
have hung heavily, over talks
that Mr. Brezhnev conducted
with Eastern European leaders
In Warsaw last week.
Mr. Brezhnev and President
Nikolai V. Podgorny of the
Soviet Union conferred there
from Monday to Wednesday
with Wladyslaw Gomulka, the,
Polish Communist party chief,
Dr. Gustav Husak, First Secre-
?.ary. cf_ the Czechoslovak Com-
mun{st party, PrFmier Willi
Stoph of East Germany, and
other high officials of the three
countries.
A e occasion was the 25th
anniversary of Communist rule
in Poland. Soviet proposals.for
`a collective security system to
guarantee the status quo in
Eastern Europe and the imp
a1
cations of President Nixon.
visit to Rumania, scheduled fort
Aug. 2 and 3, were understood
to have been major topics of
the Warsaw meeting.
The Communist leaders Rath
ered in Warsaw were said tot
have been disturbed by reports
reaching them of the enthusias-I
tic reactions across Eastern
Europe to the feat of the Apollo
astronauts.
Live television coverage, via
communications satellite. was
provided by the state networks
of several Eastern European'
countries. not including th
Soviet Union. which showe
delayed videotapes of the a
tronauts on the moon.
The public response. taken a
Indicative of lingering an
latent sympathies for. th
United Staes and its way of lie
was reportedly strongest in th
technologically most advance
countries of the Soviet bloc
East Germany and Czechosl
vakla.
interest Is Widespread
Mass Interest for the Apoll
11 mission and some publi
gloating over the Luna 15 epi~
code were noted also in Polan
Hungary and Rumania. accord
ing to Information availabl
'here.
Communist officials respo
aible for Mass media In th
Soviet bloc are understood t
be worried that many hew
paper writers. editors an
broadcasters in the area ma
have gone out of their way t
show goodwill toward th
United States In connectio
with the Apollo 11 success.
It Is reliably disclosed th
news media In various Easte
European countries have bee
requested by the Communi t
authorities to stress, in repo
Ing on President Nixon's ore
ent tout of Asian eouMtrie ,.
what b viewed as Uad
States Aggression In via
CPYRGHT
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 25X1C10b
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
REUTERS
CTPii6Hr69
PYIRGHT
To Establish
Plans Parley
End War.
:Terrris to
T1ii~iiets,
9
Two Parties
SAIGON, April 7 (Mon
day) -- South Vietnamese
President Thieu proposed a;-
six-point peace plan today,', including the withdrawal of
all North Vietnamese forces
nd the setting up of an in'
ernational control system.
The President said he would',
all a conference of all leading
olitical figures in a few days
o? work out the basis for set-'
ou Vietnam should
adopt a policy of national recta
conciliation.
? Reunification of the two,
Vietnams to be decided by the:
free choice of the entire popg?
lation through democratic
processes.
? An effective system of In
ternational control and relia..
ble guarantees against "thei
resumption of Communist ag
Thieu said economid. and
cultural exchanges between)
;North ' and South Vietnam;
could be explored-"together;
with other intermediary meas.'
ures of peaceful coexistence"
-pending reunification of the,.
i'two countries.
s He pledged that If North!
Vietnam withdraws its "sub-;
,versive" forces and there is
a drop In the level of infiltra
tion and violence, South Viet-
nam "will ask its allies to re-
move their forces."
He said Hanoi should pull:
out troops stationed in . Cam-
bodia and Laos and ' should+
Z--l- ---?... 1. .
l
a
so
`parties.
One would be for the goo-
,ernment-headed by himself=-;
and one for the'opposition.
At the opening of a new ses-
sion of Parliament, Thieu said'
he would guarantee political
`rights to former Vietcong
Imembers once peace Is se-
,cured.
"Those now fighting against
:us who renounce violence and
respect the laws will be wel
loomed as full members of the
national community," he said.'
"As such they will enjoy full
political rights and assume the
same obligations as other law
ful citizens under the national'
"constitution,"
Thieu listed ' his . six points
for peace as-
* Communist aggression,'
should stop.
? North Vietnamese troops
and cadres should be ? com-i
pletely withdrawn from South
Vietnam..
? The territories of the
NEW YORK TIMES
7 April 1969
Saigon's A id
in Paris Sup orts
Supervised ote
With Vietco l g1
PARIS, Monday, April 7
Pham Dang Lam, South Viet-
nam's chief delegate t the
Paris peace talks; said day
that his country would a cept
general elections under hit rna-
tional control with. the p
pation of the Vietcong whe
fighting halted.
Mr. Lam made the state ent
In an interview publishe by
the Paris morning newsp per,
Le Figaro.
The offer to give the Vie ong
a role in elections was reg deg
by observers as a diplo atic
Initiative. . ,. . pre
Mr. Lam strictly ' qualifie his the
neighboring countries (Cam- offer by stating that the let- in
bbdia and Laos)-should not be tong, the National Liber lion ch
violated or used by North Viet-. Front, must "change their I el"
namese as bases and staging to enter any elections. He aid of
areas. forA11P Ped.F'or ~l~' el Lai
'cf181m `1 ~ . {FAi
YRGHT
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 June 1969
Hanoi rebuff"
on parley
jolts India
The Clirlitian Science Monitor
New Delhi
The Indian Government Is,'
Now-'th-e s oo g down of New;
Delhi's attempts to begin peace,
talks has convinced many In.
dians that Hanoi inflexibility'?is
:prolonging the war.
puzzled over North Vietnam's-
abrupt request that Foreign Af
fairs Secretary T. N. Kaul post.'
.pone his talks in Hanoi.
lieu t. had been announced,
that Mr. Kaul would be going to
Hanoi and Saigon to 'explore;
;the possibilities of speeding up
the Vietnam peace. talks' lit
Paris." This marked the first
i time India, which chairs the In.'
?ternational Control Commission;
has taken an active part in try.
-ing to end the Vietnam conflict.
India's position on the Viet-'
nam war, during past years, has
closely followed 'that of the So-
viet Unibn: The United States.
?should. stop bombing the North,'
;Pull out its troops, and let the
,Vietnamese decide for them-!
`selves."
But there now appears to be.
more sympathy for the Amer
ican position in Vietnam: It be-+
:gan with President Johnson's'
decision not to seek office again.
'The bombing halt and recently
the proposed withdrawal of
some American troops won In
,dian approval. On the other
-hand, Hanoi has no + made
CPYRGHT
orally forbids Communism," it, electfJn PpR Vict we ac--
fw '
Communism, he added. name the 'government of their
Coalition Regime Opposed ' choice."
ut, he continued, "nothing = We sincerely hope that the
ents the Front's people and 'political struggle will fireplace
r partisans from taking part the war," Mr. Lam said: "Wt
general elections if they are ready, as soon as the com-
ge their label." bat stops, to accept general
e strongly rejected the idea elections, under' International
coalition Government ?say.. control i n ce sary, whatever
 CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
WARNING OF - LIMITS TO PATIENCE
SAIGON (VNG) -- President. Nguyen Van Thieu Friday offered to let the Na onal Liberation
Front aparticipate> in elections and to let them sit on an electoral commission a i they renounce
vi lenee and pledge themselves to accept
tb-e results of the elections.*
also promised that the
Go erment of Vietnam swill
abi a by the results of the
elections, whatever these
res Its may be.a
e new offer came in the
for of a six-point set of
pr osals contained in a
nat nonal address aon the res-
tor Lion of peaces in Viet.
na .
Tie President also ticked
off eight repeated acts of
goo will for peace made by
the allies.
S t he warned that athere
is a point beyond which we
sha I net tired of making uni-
late al acts of good will.))
Ile also pointed out that
eth re is an obvious connec-
tio between free elections,
sup rvised withdrawal of
non-So nth Vietnamese forces
and an end to violence and
terrorism.)
Six. points
The gist of the six aprin-
ciples> on which free electi.
ons could take place :
- All political hues) inc-
luding the NLF... can partici-
pate... if they renounce vio-
l-;nce and pledge , themselves
to accept the results of the
elections; f'
- An electoral commission
which could include the NLF
could be set up a to make
sure the elections would be
conducted in all fairness...;)
- An international body
should. supervise the
elections;
- a We are prepared to
discuss with the other side
the tune-table and modalities)
for election;
- aThere will be no repri-
sals or discrimination after
the elections ;)
- The Government decla-
res that it will abide by the
results of the elections, wha-
tever the results may be. We
challenge the other side to
declare the same.)
The President said he was
renewing ethe offer of private
talks with the eNLFs, without
preconditions, to discuss the
above and any other quetions,
toward the restoration of
peace and national reconci-
liation.
a The other side should.not
misconstrue our desire for
peace as a sign of weakness.
It should not be induced by
our repeated acts of good
will Into believing that It
has only to remain adamant-
tiy negative for us to accept
eventual surrenders
Gestures ' of
good will
The eight gestures of good
will the President mentioned:
- Pre-Paris contacts with
non-involved parties for the
purpose of negotiations ;
- Agreement to par ial
bombing halt of North Viet.
nam in March, 1968;
Agreement to dotal bomb
leg halt.of North Vietnam
in November, 1968;
- Agreement to let a NLF)
s t with Hanoi In Paris;
-Agreement to attend Paris
t Iks in spite of enemy hos-
t itie';
-Agreement to simultan-
e us withdrawal by allies'
a d communist aggressors;
- Offer by President Thieu
i March of this year for'
mate talks ;
- Agreement to redeploy-
i enl of U.S. troops in
V etnam.
He noted that none of
t ese gestures had met with
a y sign of reciprocal acts on
tile o' her side.. _
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 CPYRGHT
For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP + I1 AU 00080001-3
kVIET REDS URGE
STEPPED-UP LIAR
Calls Made On Anniversary
Of Geneva Peace Pact
PYRGHT BY~EDWARD K. WU
[Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun]
Hong Kong, July 20-The Com-
unists in North and South Viet-
m11 nmrlted the 15t1 annlversa-
y of the tienrvu police agree-
iens today with renewed calls
o step up the war In the South.
The official Rawl newspaper,
han Don, In a commemorative
ditorial entitled "Persist In and
romote the Fighting, Advance
oward Complete Victory," said
he Viet Cong had "advanced'
owerfully and steadily, with,
ew posture, new strength,' new
ilitary situation and new inter-
ational position."
In its clandestine` hideout In
e South, the self-proclaimed
rovisional revolutionary gov-
ernment Issued an anniversary.
ommunique today urging..con-
inued fighting until not a single
erican soldier is left.
The editorial and the commu-
~,q:re, brvad:
the county to be reunited b
elections in lum. South e -
nam did not sign the agree-
,.ment and in 1956 would not
`agree to elections.
t President Thieu has pro-.
posed reunification through,
"free choice" of the people of
!the North and South.,The For-`
eign Ministry statement today,,
which in essence repeated this;
statement,: said: "The Republic'
of Vietnam solemnly asks
North Vietnamese authorities
to discuss directly and sera=
ously ... reunification of the
South and North through in-
ternationally controlled gen.
CPYRGHT
I se 1999/09/02 : CIA-R a o e e! A i ,r 01-3
.1 b
meet to discu
ss closer ties be.'
.tween the two sides."
 CPYRGHT
:c7t YETESHA`'ORK
S~tTL'.a~ JUNE 14. 969
iii ed States started bombing Nor It Vietnam in February 196.5
Ethiopia opposed and condemned this I honing. The raids against th.
0 A L
ESCALATING PEACE EFFORTS
~ e end of the \'ietilaiil n tr ;ernes neither far ofl not in sight. It
not seem far because Washington is bent on z, Process of Inilit, TV
deg ialation.' But it is not in sight for Hanoi has so tilt. turtiecl its ba ?k
ail escalation towards peace. The United States wants to get out )f
.the mess'that has become the Vietnam ttau Find it is ul.tt ise not to 1-
lox an exit. Unless the effort to de-escalate the war is reciprocate 1,
the conflict could degenerate into a situation that will further threat 'n
world peace and stability. Hence the inlp)ortance foi broth sides to r 1.
liz that the solution to tilt: Vietnan) problem is political and not it i-
lita
The cost of the iv:ar is astronomical. To date the tvar lias cost 1
es i ated 700,OIX) lives and S 1.3(0 billion. Though the heaviest bl r
de of the war has been borne by the Vietnamese people, the Unit d
Sta es has not been spared punishment. The United States -lids so f r
spe at nearly. S 300 billion. Its casuality record reads 3:3?u(X) killed at d
20000 wounded. Vietnam has hurt the U.S. not only at the war fro it
but also on the home front and around the world. No winder tli ii
that the U.S- wants to get out of Vietuaun. The wain has proved it se v
re unishnient to the punisher.
North Were totally halted last October i id the cessation of the bomb
log helped launch the Paris peace tall:. I'Ile fact that the talks have
_:continued is an indication that no aicht ?emetlt ii is he eli made after
done year a icl`does not furnish nluc?h c? ruse foi comfort. The. United
States noix, has "announced that it will unilatei ills i?edin. t its troop
strength in Vietnam b withdrawing ?? ,(XX) soldici?s. This should be
welcomed a s a ratan st to the peace eff c it going on in Paris
In the hest four pears, the United St t.~s has initiated ,.n supported
20 .niia;ot peace efforts in `'ietnam. North \'ietti tin ai:cl its amines de-
,t
serve. credit for reciprocating the bonibi w, halt i:)t- showing Lill in Pa-
tit
~ns for peace-talks:: Another opportunity or it reciprocal aictioli is now
offered' in the troop reduction just announced.' The ~va11 in Vietnailtt
is being waged by the forces of capitali in and conminnisilt, and the\
are these forces that must tacitly agree o peace without victory. The
people of,Vietnam hive had wars for o~~ r two clec a(les. I et them h ar c
peace for achange:
anous?peace efforts are trying to ei d the 10-year old tsar in
S'ietna n. The combatants have manifest d a measure of willingness ti)
-bring about a negotiated settlement I.)v holding pence talks in Paris.
'~'haf has been done for peace in the la t one -.ear is good, but it hat.'
'mot been enough. Both sides must now i lake bigger and better efforts
=b?T ' i acing arid `reeipwc eatin g in a cl -esealatio-n of the war. The
world in general and the non-aligned states in particular must helps
bringabout'a r-egQtired settlement by c editing iliitiated peaze?e efforts
'and by - encouraging reciprocity .
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
YRGH.HE WASHINGTON POST
5 June 1969
Top . a ,oi Aide Ai.x?a 1?~~s
Spurns
By Murray' Marder
washiniton post Staff Writer
PARIS, June 24=North ' Vietnam's chief strategist in
Paris rejects in advance any compromise with the Saigon
r?gime for using a mixed commission of Communists
'arid non-Communists to organize a special election to
decide South Vietnam's political fate.
Opposition: to any form of compromise involving the
'United Press International
LE DUO THO
. "vicious circle"
present government in Saigon
? -on which the Nixon Admin.
istration has pinned its hopes
for a diplomatic settlement of
the war-was expressed yester-
; day by Hanoi Politburo mem.
ber Le Due Tho.
In an interview with The
Washington Post, Tho equally
ruled out any form of inter-
national supervision or partici-
pation in an election test in
:'South Vietnam. He similarly
brushed aside any prospect for
.formal or tacit agreement to
reduce the level of fighting so
long as the Nixon Administra-
tion, tries "to proceed from a
position, of strength" to end.
the war.
The harshest language was
aimed at President Nixon per.
-sanaliy;
'Mr. Nixon's "personality"
and his deeds since he has
been in office, said Tho, have
revealed a "warlike nature"
that has produced a policy re-
flecting "the most warlike
military circles in the United
States."
Tho said that In the five
months since President Nixon
has been in office he has en-
gaged in "futile . . . maneuv-
ers" that "can be compared to
building castles in the air."
Now time is running out on
the President, said Tho.
"Mr. Nixon finds. himself in
a vicious circle. He wants to
withdraw U.S. forces from
South Vietnam but he fears
that the puppet rmy and - the
puppet adminisatration will
collapse. But if Mr. Nixon Is
determined to pursue the war,
U.S. casualties will increase ...
. "The intention of Mr. Nixon
is to stay in Vietnam in order
Jo build up the puppet army
and administration that will
permit the prolongation of the
war. But I think that time is
not on the side of Mr. Nixon.
"Now ... what has Mr.
Nixon been able to achieve in
.his last five months at the con.
ference table? We. may say
that he has achieved, nothing."
The essence of Thbl,,3 attack
has been reverberating for
some weeks here across the
conference table.
But what Tho added was a
highly personal attack from the
leading Communist policymaker
on this scene, who is one of the;
highest-ranking colleagues' of,
North Vietnamese President,
Ho Chi Minh and a veteran
revolutionary whose words
carry special Weight in Hanoi.a
M'ho's' as parent objective
was to maximise the prew,sursa
of American dissent and war
frustration mounting on the
Nixon Administration, to put,
pressure on Washington to
accept the Vietcong - North
Vietnam ten-point plan for'
ending the war--most especial-
ly, to abandon the present
South Vietnamese regime. .
The thrust of Thos remarks
was Intended to show no ray
of hope; no way around yield
ing to the demands of the
Communist side.
His comments appeared to
support the prevailing allied
strategy assessment that the
Communist side is determined,
at least in the next few weeks
of these talks, to show a total-
ly uncompromising posture in
order to stimulate more Amer-
ican and international de-
mands on the Nixon Adminis
tration for a change of policy.
The question among allied
.strategists is whether, after a
time, the Communist side will
shift to a more flexible nego-
tiating stand if U.S..policy re-
mains unchanged.
Others Expound Theme
Normally, Tho rarely speaks
in public here, but now offi-
cials on the Communist side
of the negotiations have
joined in expounding a similar
theme. Tho's official title is
"special adviser" to North Vi-
etnamese ? delegation chief
Xuan Thuy. But the white-
haired Tho, a man of dignity
and evident power, Is recog-
I,iized as the dominant strate-;
gist facing U.S. Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge, as he did
Lodge's predecessor, W. Aver
ell, Harriman, who was much
impressed with him as an ad-
versary.
Tho indirectly confirmed, In
a recent remark when he re
ferred to a discussion with
Lodge, that he has talked with
Lodge privately, at least once.
In the interview, however,.
when asked If she saw any`
prospect for surmouting the
negotiating barriers here by,;
further private talks with
Lodge, Tho said-
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 CPYRGHT
pprove or a ease
"We think that private meet
ings do not constitute a deci-
sive factor in settling the
problem. If the U.S. is not se-
rious and has no good will,
whatever private meetings
there have been and how
many private meetings there
may be, they cannot settle the,
problem."
Tho also said:
"In the previous month, Mr.
Nixon spread rumors to the of-
feet that there were many se-
cret meetings between us and
the United States Admin1stra-J
Lion and that a settlement.wasl
about to be reached. But the l
truth Is not so.
"On the 19th of June," Tho
added, "Mr. Nixon also hinted
at a settlement between two
or three months: His intention
Is to created hope among the G
American people. But the facti
is that no progress at all has;
been made in the meetings. In
fact, our positions are very far
apart."
(What Mr. Nixon said, at his
White House news conference
that day, was: "Now we are
down to substance" and "the
two sides are far apart. But we
believe that the time has come
for a discussion of substance
and we hope within the next
two to three months to see'
some progress in substantive
discussions.") ' E
Tho, speaking In Vietnam-
ese at his delegation head-
quarters here in suburban
Choisy-le-Rol, with a, North Vi-
etnamese interpreter translat-
ing his words into English,
developed the theme that all
responsibility for the impasse
In these talks rests squarely
on Preisent Nixon.
"The personality of Mr.
Nixon," said Tho, speaking
partially from written notes, Is
especially Important because
"the President of the United
States is in a position to make'
decisions'on war without hav-
ing the consent of the Senate
and the House of Representa-
tives."
That reference was one of
many scattered through Tho's
comments that appeared to be
acutely and adroitly aimed at
appealing to the sensitivities
of Mr. Nixon's war critics.
The most important new`
element in Tho's conments
was his seeming off-handed re-
'ection of the most send-l
ive objective in the Nixon
Administration's attempts to
udge the Saigon govern
ent into negotiating range,of
he Vietcong.
This is the potential offer
by the Saigon regime of a
new form of "political settle-
ment" which was referred. to
on June 19 by President Nix-
on--reportedly to Saigon's
thigh irritation because Mr.
Nixon publicly anticipated its
action. This offer centers on
the so-called mixed-
commission approach to an election
as an alternative to the Comr
munist demand for outright
replacement of the Saigon re-
gime by a provisional coali-
tion government, which would
then conduct its own election
for an entirely new govern-
ment system.
Denied by Saigon
The Saigon government to-
day.denied reports that such
a plan, to allow Communist
membership on an election
board, is even in the offing. .
There have been growing
doubts that the Communists
will participate in, an election
that the Saigon government
helps to organize. Those
doubts have increased consid-
l erably since the Vietcong an-
nounced earlier this month
that they have formed a pro-
visional revolutionary govern-
ment as an outright "legal"
challenger to the Saigon re-
gime.
Tho virtually brushed the
whole question aside. There is
no room whatever for such an
approach, he said, in view of
the ten-point political program
of the National Liberation
Front, or Vietcong. That pro-
gram is now the program of
the new NLF government, as
well as the program of North
Vietnam.
"As I have pointed out," he
said, "in the ten-point overall
solution, general elections are
to be organized by a provision-
al coalition government. And
only in this way can fair and
democratic elections be held.
No other body than this pro-
visional coalition government
can organize fair and derhocra-
tic elections."
Tho was similarly Inflexible;
on the question of internation-
al supervision of any election.
He said:
"The general election is an
internal affair of the South'
Vietnamese people. There can
can be no international super.
visiori under whatever form to
supervise these elections be-
cause, such supervision would
I supervision would not respect` the enemy, Mr. Nixon Is keep-
self-determination of the rights ing quiet . and a number
of papers under the influence
of Mr. Nixon have not spoken
about these counterattacks.;
Mr. Nixon's Intention is to
conceal the truth."
Tho was asked for comment
on recent statements by Harri-,
Man that. the Communist side
.was prepared for a "disen-
gagement' last November..
Harriman said he and his then-
'deputy In Paris Cyrus R.
Vance, believed that when
the North Vietnamese pulled
the bulk of their troops out
of the northern provinces of
South Vietnam this represented
"a political action on their'
part."
But because North Vietnam
never has admitted officially
It has any troops in the South,
Tho did not respond directly
to the issue. He said: ,
of the South Vietnamese peo+
plc."
In his indictment of Nixon'
Administration policy, Tho
singled out, as formal Corn.
munist statements here have
done, President Nixon's
speech at the Air Force Acad-
emy at Colorado Springs, on
June 4. In the speech, Mr.
Nixon firmly defended the ne-
cessity of American military
strength to preserve global
stability and assailed critics of
'U.S.,military power.
"This statement of Mr`.
Nixon," Tho charged, "has re-,
vealed the warlike nature of
Mr. Nixon" and shows "that
Mr. Nixon is still pursuing a
policy of positions-of-strength
on all problems of the world
. these words by Mr. Nixon
have been embodied In his
policy in Vietnam, on the bat-
tlefield.as well as at the con-
ference table."
The said that "the U.S. has
been continuing to exert maxi-
mum military pressure on the
,battlefield. The amount of
bombs and ammunition it
used during the last five
months can be said to have
exceeded the bombs and am-
munition used in every other
period since the beginning of
Claims NLF Strong
He said that "from the.ces-
sation of the bombing of North
Vietnam" on Nov. 1 `-to Janu-
ary, 1969, the U.S. was of the
opinion that the NLF forces.
on the battlefield have been
weakened and that the NLF
forces have not been in a po-
sition to carry on their activi-
ty, and that is why the U.S.
has. intensified its own activ-
ity.
"But the reality," he con-
tinued, ".Is that NLF forces
have not weakened in any
way. In February, the Front
Intensified the war just to
give an answer to the intensi-
fied attacks of the U.S...."
Tho claimed that there have
been more "counter-attacks"
than the allied forces have ad-,
m,itted.
He said; "In the month of
February When we counter-
attacked the enemy power-
fully, Mr. Nixon made noisy
statements about this, threat-
ening the resumption of the
bombing of North Vietnam.
But after his threats were re-
"As to the comment made
by Mr. Harriman, I think
every person has a right to
give his own comment and I,
have no remarks on Mr. Harri -
man's comment." !
Tho, tracing his version o
the history of the Vietnames
war, said the U.S. is -now e -
gaged in duplicating Its "f l-
ures" of the last 15 years.
The U.S. was defeated In
the "special war" it conducted]
before introducing its own
massive forces Into South Viet-1
nam, said The.
Now, he added, "after four
years of local war, which
failed, the United States wants
to withdraw gradually and
build up the puppet army and
administration to shoulder the,
,main responsibility of the war
while the U.S. stands aside,
commanding and aiding the
puppet - army and administra-
tion to carry on the war. In
other words, the United States
wants to revert to the special
war as before."
Sees Effort Doomed
But this Is also doomed,
said Tho. "The U.S. has start-
ed to try this," he added. "This,
can be seen at the Dakto bat-
tlefield, Xuanloc and Blen-
hoa, As can be seen from these'
cases, the U.S. has let the pup-
pet forces [be] directly de-
feated and the U.S. had to,
come as reinforcement and
saving forces ...
"We. can say that this was
the first step of de-American-
ization or 'Vietnamization' of
constitute interference in the vealed [to be] in v a i n now the war, and that this first
Internal affairs of the South at our people are increasing step of the maneuver, hasi
Vietnamese people ,and such that
counterattacks . against failed ..' ? J
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 ,,QPYRGHT
Tho was asked to comment
on the recent proposal by for-
mer Defense Secretary Clark
M. Clifford for a withdrawal
this year of "about 100,000"
U.S. troops as part of a gen-
eral pullout of all American
combat forces by the end of
1970."
He replied that "if Mr. Clif-
ford desires to withdraw U.S.
troops more rapidly than Mr.
Nixon from South Vietnam
than I raaliso that there is to
some extent a positive aspect
in his statement. But there is
a very important point; that
is that Mr. Clifford still wants
H WASHINGTON POST
11 July 19 9
to maintain in South Vietnam
the U.S. Air Force and logistic
troops to help the puppet
troops to de-Americanize- the
war. This is the wrong point
in his position."
An equally "wrong. point" In
Clifford's position, said Tho,
Is that "only after the with
drawal of what .he called. the
North Vietnamese forces from
South Vietnam will the U.S,
withdraw all its forces As
for us, we demand the U.S.
troops and the troops of its
allies -be rapidly. withdrawn
from South Vietnam without
any conditions being imposed.!',
Text of Thiea's T
'
m
rehen sine Offer
is
tk
t
g
a j,a
z
text against us, can participate results may be. We chal- drawal of non-South 'Viet
of South Vietnamese Presi- In the elections' if they re- lenge the other side to de- . namese forces, and an end:
dent Thieu's speech propos- nounce violence and pledge elate the same.
:ing a commission to arrange themselves to accept the re- to violence and terrorism.
''elections in South Vietnam: suits of the elections. It The controls 8 8 other side per cent o claimf the that today I renew the offer'
this war cannot be per- 2) To make sure that the of private talks with the,
muted to last indefinitely, elections would be con population of S out h Viet- NLF, without preconditions,"
It should be ended one way ducted in all fairness, an nam. We say that t hey to discuss the above and any,
or another. We, the peace- , electoral commission could. dominate by force only a other questions, toward the
loving people would like to be set u in which all - small portion of the papula restoration of peace and na-
po
solve this war by way of re- litical parties and tion. Let these claims be put tional reconciliation.
groups, to the test of elections. If the
conciliation. Including the NLF now The other side should not
other side really believes its ,?
To move the negotiations fighting against us, could be misconstrue our desire for
forward, I feel that a major represented. own claims, and r e a 11 y peace as a sign of weakness.'
stands for the right of self- initiative is needed. To that The electoral commission determination of the Viet- It should not be induced by
1. effect, we are willing to will assure equal opportune our repeated acts of good
namese people, there can be
? make, as another act of good- ties in the campaigning to no reason for it not to acct will into believing A hat it.'
will,
,will, a comprehensive offer all candidates. Pt has only to remain admantly
f .for the political settlement of. It will also enable all polit- Our offer of genuinely free, negative for us to accept
conflict. ical parties and groups to elections, in which they can eventual surrender.
Both sides in this stru le Participate in watdhiup the participate without discrim- We are fighting for a just
t have said that the internal.. Polls to see that people vote inatibu, not only the covot- ntrol cause and self-defense,
have
absolutely f r e e 1 y, and in ing but also in the control and we are becoming every
of South Vietnam of the counting of the votes, day stronger. We shall not
should be decided b the watching the counting of the
by ballots to see that .they are with international supervi- grow tired in this struggle.
f S o u t h Vietnamese them- lion: In fact there is a point be.
selves, in a free and demo honestly counted. To be meaningful elect-
; static fashion. 3) An international body should g conducted yond which n unila gal`
tions is to be established to su- tired of making unilateral
The only way for the Peo- pervise the elections, and to under conditions under ' acts of goodwill. Hanoi will`
plc of South Vietnam to ex- which, the South Vietnamese then have to bear all the e
sure
that
the elections ercise their right of self- aarekh e 1 d under conditions people can exercise their consequences of the pro-
f. determination, to ; partici- fair to all
choice, free. from fear and tracted war, and It has to as
pate In public affairs, and coercion. some full responsibilitis for,
to determine they future of 4) We are prepared to dis- ' Thus, there is an obvious the sufferings that it im-
the determine
country, is through,elec- cuss. With the other side the connection between free poses on the people in both
ttons In w h f c h they, can timetable and the Modal- elections, supervised with parts of Vietnam.
enuinely express their hies under which the
elpc
choice. free from fear n,n i tions will be held.
In this spirit, free elee- prisals or . discrimination
Lions can be based on 'the 'after the elections.
following principles- 6) T he' Government of
1) All political parties and.. Vietnam declares that it will
groups, including the NLF abide by the results of the
which Is now bearing arms elections,. whatever ,t tli es e
REUTERS
6 April 1969
Hanoi 'Finds No Progress
HONG KONG, April 6 (Reu-
ters)-The Paris. peace confer-
ence on 'Vietnam, after holding
11 sessions in 2 rponths, con-
tinues to mark time, the North
.
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r Tho nevertheless made it
evident, as he did at a recep-
tion here Thursday night, that
despite what he claims to be
a total lack of movement in
these talks on the part of the
United States and South .Viet-
nam, his delegation has no
desire. to break them off,
Even when asked if the
allied and Communst sides
here are "further apart than
ever on political questions" as
a result of President Nixon's
latest show of'support for the
S a I g o n government, Tho
avoided any characterization
of absolutely impenetrable
The Hanoi 'daily newspaper
said that the lack of progress
was, the fault of the United
States for refusing to discuss
what, .it termed the fundamen-
tal "problems-an end to United
States a ression and the total
i1 4 United States
troops-ilk ss"Clv yie!!-i ..
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August 1969
CPYRGHT
LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
Peru's Land Reform Law
On 24 June President Velasco of Peru announced major land reforms that
provided for expropriation and redistribution of all major landholdings in
Peru, including those owned by U.S. companies. Under the new decree land
holdings will be limited, thereby doing away with the large holdings of the
wealthy and the extremely small plots worked by peasants. The maximum size
for privately owned lands will range from about 75 acres in the mountain
and jungle areas to approximately 370 acres in the coastal areas and up to
3700 acres for natural pasture lands. New, small landowners will be en-
couraged to join in cooperatives. Large estates will continue to operate
as units, but estate workers will share ownership and control.
Only two days after the program was announced, the government started
taking over the vast holdings of W. R. Grace and Company of New York,
These plantations, which will be operated as cooperatives, produce about
17 per cent of Peru's sugar. Since officials of the company have been
assured that fair compensation will be made for the expropriated property
and that other industrial operations will not be affected, the company
has announced its support for the reforms.
The Peruvian government has promised compensation for the expropriated
property, partly by paying in cash and partly by issuing 20-year non-trans-
ferable bonds for the land; the bonds may then be exchanged for shares in
new industrial investments provided shares of equal value are purchased
for cash. Both skepticism and apprehension have been expressed as to the
underlying motives of the military regime in announcing such sweeping
reforms, as well as to the indications of other extensive and radical
changes to be made in the entire economic and social structure of the
country.
Land Reform Elsewhere in Latin America,
The problems created by land ownership in Latin America are well known
and are not unique to Peru. Although redistribution of the land, such as
outlined by the Peruvian government, is important in any program of land
reform, it is only one aspect of the problem. Other questions include the
use made of the land -- whether it is cultivated or lies fallow; the nature
of land tenure -- whether farm workers are held in near-serfdom or live in
independence and dignity; the education and social welfare of the peasants
which, if increased, would help to close the great gap which separates them
from the small ruling elite; the development of unsettled or under-developed
land; and increase in agricultural production, both for domestic consumption
and for export. The goals are therefore both social and economic, with the
ultimate effect of restructuring the social, economic and political life of
a major part of the nation.
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Although it has taken many years to reach a national consensus in
each country on the d sirability and nature of such reforms, these goals
are now codified in reform laws in practically every Latin American country.
A few countries started their reform programs years ago, with Mexico as the
best known example. However, it has been mainly in the past decade that
most countries have passed laws to promote reform.
The impetus which led to their adoption came partly from a slowly
developed recognition of the problem and its solution, and partly from
encouragement by international agencies such as the United Nations and
the Food and Agriculture Organization. But the decisive push has come
from violent protest by the peasants: invasions of private and public
lands by peasants determined on reform or revolution.
In general, however, significant action on agrarian reform laws has
not been taken because of a variety of factors: Often proposed reform has
been too broad in scope; instead of focusing on a few key issues, it has
tried to change the rural tenure pattern, economy, society and technology
of the country all at once. Inaction has also resulted from a lack of
funds, as reform has frequently foundered on the financial inability of
a government to provide the necessary capital to facilitate and accelerate
reform. Finally, it must be acknowledged that in many cases inaction has
been mainly because of a temporary lessening of pressure from disgruntled
peasants. This respite, in turn, is due to various factors, including
the failure of Castroism in Latin America, the pitiful example of Communist
directed agriculture in Cuba, the time needed to digest the partial gains
already made, and the hope raised by the passage of new reform laws in
numerous countries.
However, the respite will undoubtedly be brief it rapid and tangible
progress is not made in carrying out the promises of the reform laws.
The population explosion in Latin America will double in twenty-five years
the number of peasants seeking land -- but the amount of arable land can-..
not be doubled. The rapidly growing population will also urgently need
food to eat, which can be produced only as a result of a revolution in the
agricultural methods of the continent. Adding to these problems, improved
communcatio'ns'and rising.literacy'levels will make the peasants ever more
conscious of the social and economic inequities they suffer and of the
promises of extremists to eliminate them.
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26 June 1959
LIMA, Peru, June 25 (AP)-
The Government of President
Juan Velasco Alvarado today
announced the details of Peru s
sweeping new land reform law.
It limits the size of land
holdings, strengthens small and
medium landholders and opens
a way for the conversion tiof
large landholdings that produce
crops used by industry into co-
operatives.
General Velasco said that the
law would be applied without
favor to particular groups, and
that it would "end once and for
all the unfair social order that
has kept_ peasants in pover,t
The expropriated 'lands will
e sold to cooperatives, peasant
ommunities, agricultural so-
ieties of social interest and
Vela,own A warts Land Re hrm
Will Be Applied Without Favor
Crowds In the 'Plaza ;de
Armas at the Presidential
ce sang songs and danced: Es -
t
night when the President tlttid
!the lands will be for "'the
peasants." They shouted
Br vnl Braavnl" wham hp 4n.
es no longer would be callod
unities."
vtl
AmericanConcerns Affecte4n
The law will involve the ex-
propriation of foreign - held
ands, including holdings of tie
merican-owned Cerro do Pasc'p
fining concern and W.. R
race & Co., which has sugar r
The complex law estabiishe
Government bond issue for
onds along with cash pay
rents as compensation fort
ver. Cattle and agricultural l
ash up to a certain vilue,'
ith the balance of the spay
ent in the Government bgpds.
Bonds that the Government
a made in cash, The Gov@ -
o construct the respective co-
ollectively _ to groups _. of
ersons previously judged
ualified. Lapd can be granted
Price Will Fidetuate ` '
The price of each grant will
be made through a buy-sell
contract, with right of eminent
domain for a prico that will
be . fixed, according , to, the.
economic capacity of the agri-',
cultural unit that receives the
grant. The sale price will be
paid in 20 annual quotas, be-
ginning with the date the land
is awarded.
.To be considered for a family
plot, a peasant must be a citizen
of. Peru, 18 years or older,
head of the family, a peasant
without land and a resident
in the area.
The Government will give,
technical and credit assistance
with priority to cooperatives,
peasant communities and agri-
cultural societies, which ' also
will be given preference in
direct export of their produc.
tion to the foreign markets
that pay the best prices, once
national needs have been satis-
The average minimum plot
uovernment said. -
Industrial agrarian - prop-
erties-defined as agricultural
an industry--will not be divided
or separated under the law, but
rather will be operated as units
organization , of big landlards,
tense campaign by television
to stop the implementation of
the reform, to halt sales of ag-
ricultural products to creata a
shortage, to start strikes
against production and market-
ing, to block roads with the
aim of disturbing transporta-
tion and to request support of
sugar workers to cooperate in
sabotage.
The society rejected the Gov-
ernment's accusation saying it
strongly protested "these state-
ments lacking in wldsom and
seriousness."
', r A Correction
The International Basic Econ?
omy Corporation does not ex-
peet to be affected by the
Peruvian Government's agrar-
ianreform bill, spokesmen for
the company said yesterday.
It was erroneously reported
,In 'he New York Times yes
terday that the agrarian re-
forrh measures ? outlined - by
Por4's military junta Tuesday
Would Involve properties owned
by" 1.B.E.C., a New York con-
corgl,
`Ije spokesmen said that the
Company's Interests In Peru
Cons tft of an insurance concern,
a poultry-breeding operation,!
housing developments (which
are sold with the land beneath'
them to the public) and a super-
market chain. . , ,
"Neither operation Involves
any appreciable amount of
lat-'d," the spokesmen said, "and
th refore we do not expect to
1 `affected by the agrarian re-
!f measure."
Rj To. company has long been
'ss 014ated with the Rockefeller
family. - which.. creatod, th
works'=wide ' organization toj
stimulate development of oor-
er economies. i-fowevor, it Is
now a publicly owned concern
'in which Governor Rockefeller'
Owns "less than'one-half of 1
per dent of thO shnr, o144-the
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CF
WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1969
Peru o eize .
J.S.-O tvned .
erties
LIMA, June 24 (UPI)--The
Peruvian government an-
inounced today it will expro-
priate all major? land tracts
now privately owned and di-
vide, them among the people,1
including vast lands owned by
such U.S. investors as the
W. R. Grace Co., and New
York Gov. Nelson A. Rocke
feller.
President Juan Vclasoo AI-
yarado promised '"just com-
pensation" for all land-hold-
ers, foreign and Peruvian,
whose properties will be turn-
ed over to the peasantry
under an agrarian land re-
form. ? . .
Velasca announced the.gen?`
eral objectives of the land
reform program that will af-
fect millions of dollars worth,
vian-held prope*ty in a na-
tionwide television address..
His voice repeptedly broke.
with emotion. H s immediate
audience at the !Presidential'
Palace interrupted his speech
with applause anti shouts of
;'Bravo!" -and "Viva, land re-
form L'
The land reform law, Vetas.i
co said, "will Pe . applied,!
throughout the corn try, with-.
out privileges and wwith no ex6
ceptions. Only in (his' manner
will a coherent agricultural
development be possible."
This made it clear that all
of the major U.S. Investors in
Peru would feel the' bite of~
the reform law, a development
Which swept far beyond even
the most pessimistic predic-
tions of diplomatic observers]
he. , : ;
[Under Peru's, previous
,
agrarian reform' law, the Ve-,
lasco government earlier ex,I
propriated agricultural land:
holdings of the Cerro Corp.,,
a U.S-based firm engaged'
chiefly In mining. The come)
pany did 'not oppose the move,?
Last October, 'the govern '
ment seized the properties of.
the International . Petroleum
Co., a subsidiary of. Standard
Oil of New Jersey, without!
compensation.' Peru maintain-.,
ed that IPC had never legally,
owned Its Peruvian' oilfields;
"and' therefore owed the Kpv
ift
,'ernment about $690 milliolf,
?pant profits. `~.
The United States resp
,ed to the seizure lyy.suspen
ng economic aid to Peru,
share of the U.S. sugar impor4u?
marker. It has postponed ful``h":.`
-Cancellation 'of these Items un' _j
til August, in hopes a settle
ment can be reached between'
Peru and IPC. .
Relations we r e further
,worsened by Peru's seizure of.
S. fishing boats in waters Mk
sclaims are under Its sovereign-,
:ty. The United States recog-"
-nizes only a 12-mile '.: limpit,j "
against the Peruvian claim to ?200 miles, and has cut off arms f.;;
sales to Peru in retaliation for!,!"
.the seizures.
Among the U.S. firms stand?
' ing to be hit hardest by the
new law is the Grace 'Co.,
,which apparently will lose its
vast sugar plantations at Para
monga and Cartavio. Diplo-
matic sources said the Grace
4holdings "will . be, in the. mll
?lions of dollars." 1 -About 40,per cent'of Peru's
-sugar productionls estimated
..to come' from U.S.-owned. plan-
stations.,'
.w,
500080001-3
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FROM: AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
Editor:. T. Lynn Smith
Publisher: Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1965
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The titles in this bibliography have been carefully selected
Even though they total slightly more than i 50, they repre-
sent merely a small fraction of the items thoroughly perti-,
nent to the subject ' that might have been included. Such a
list seems especially short if it is compared with those in the"
two most comprehensive bibliographies in the field, one ed
itkd by Accioly Borges and the .other compiled and edited by.,
Ca'iroll,'.which contain 1,164'and 1,072 items, respectively.:
Moreover, the titles included here are by no means limited.:
to those given in these two excellent sources.
In determining specifically which publications to include,
out of the welter of possibilities, there were many complex-
ities to be faced and many decisions, some of them rather.
arbitrary, to be taken. Perhaps ,a -brief mention of some of the
basic criteria used and of exceptions made will enable the
reader to evaluate more adequately the results of the en-
deavor. First, it was considered essential to give preference
to items that may be said to have professional standing
represented by the books, monographs, and articles in rcc
ognized journals in such fields as economics, history, geog-
raphy, and sociology-over those that appeared in newspapers.
or in popular magazines, or the many that have been circu-
lated. merely in mimeographed form.
Next, it was thought preferable to concentrate largely upon
publications of a substantative nature, to which the reader
might go for additional analysis and description of problems
and programs, rather than to use much of the space for bibli-
ographies, guides; and other aids to research. The two most
recent and comprehensive bibliographies were included, how-
ever, because they are lists that greatly surpass and outmode
all earlier compilations.
Because the bulk of the pertinent material is of recent.
.-origin, a preference was. given to studies published since
1950. Nevertheless, an intensive search was made for earlier
background materials, and a considerable number of the
.more significant early items was included. Likewise, despite'.
the fact that much of what has been published on the sub-;,
ject of agrarian reform in Latin America deals. with matters
in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia (for which Carroll includes
184, 1o6, and 75 titles, respectively, in contrast with only 4
for the Dominican Republic and 7 for Panama), an attempt
was made to represent all of the widely divergent sections of
Latin America.
It was assumed that most of those who read this volume
:;will find additional reading on the subject of agrarian reform
Z,more accessible and more useable if the materials are in Eng=
dish. Therefore, in this bibliography preference was, given to
books, monographs, and. articles. written in .that language-.',,,
Even' so, however, the predominance of those who write in
t
Spanish or Portuguese, among those who have made funda-`
.,
mental contributions to the exposition of matters related to
agrarian reform in Latin America, is so great that approxj
t matcly two-thirds of all the items In our list are available
only In ono or the other of these languages.
Finally, particular attention was given to the inclusion in
this compilation of titles to works by Latin American econ'.,
mists, historians, geographers, and sociologists who have es'.
` tablishcd enviable reputations for competency in their rc
spective fields, and to works by their fellows in the United
States and Europe whose; names have come to figure promi-
nently in the study of Latin-American peoples and societies:
In conclusion it shoyld be indicated that many of the
books in our list thpms4ves contain substantial and selected ''-
bibliographies relating tb land tenure and the size of ogri-
eultaral holdings, to t ie highly institutionalized and '4'.r%
the soil in parts of Latin America, to locality groupingo~ lid `
community organization and development, and to other n
~'mf
ters closely related to agrarian reform in the area under cc ;
sideration. In this respect the books by such authors as Fa
Gorda, Fernandez y Fernandez; Ford, IIom e, Leonard, M&
Bride, Mendieta y' Nuncz, Nelson, Senior, Smith, C. G ::.
Accioly Borges, Pompeu, red., Bibliografia s6bre Reformd
Agrdria. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto dc Cicncias Sociaj,
Universidade dc Brasil, r96z. F ,
Acci6n Sindical Chilena, Tierra y Libertad por la Re form
Agraria. Santiago: Acci6n Sindical Chilena, 1961.
.. Adams, Richard N., "FrcFdorn and Reform in Rural X)aln!
America," in Frederic B. Pike, cd.,, Freedom and Re f ohit
in Latin America. Notre Dame, Ind,: University of No(re.:.~.
Dame Press, 1959, PP- 7.03-7.30.
?Aguilez Berlioz, Rodolfo,' Rdgirnes Agrarios. Guatem44 %
I'allcres de la Tipografia National dc Guatemala, 1g5,.,:,l
Alexander, Robert J., "Agrarian Reform in Latin Amcnca
Foreign Affairs, Vol. No. i (October, 1967.), pp
191-7.07.,w
The Bolivian National Revolution. New Brunswick,'
N.J.: Rutgers. University Press, 1958.
Antczana, E. Luis, Resultados de la Refornta Agraria en
Bolivia. Cochabamba; F. O. Cuenca Sucs., 1955.
Arze-Lourciro, Eduardo, Actitudes Sociales Rclacionadas
con la Refornta Agraria en Bolivia. (Mimeographed). Ca-`
racas: Escucla dc Ciencias Econ6micas, Unisversidad Cc-F:.
tral do Venezuela, 1958.
Baldcrrinta G., Adalid, La Iteforma Agraria' y is Experict r: t
cia Boliviana. La Paz: Editorial dcl Estado, 19 S9.
Barbero; Guiseppe, "Realizaciones y Problcmas de In Re-
forma Agraria en Bolivia:" El Trimestre Econdmico
(Mexico), Vol. XXVIII, No; ;4 (Octubre-Dicicnmbre; {.
1961), pp. 6 i a-65o.
Barros, IIcnriquc dc, A` Estrutura Agrdria come Obstdculo
rI ASdo Agron6mica; a Re forma Agrdria coma Problenla
Econ6mico, Sao Paulo: Escola do Sociologia c Politica,
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I3auta, Juan F,, "Posibilidadci Constitucionales: y Legi]es do
3
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la Redistribuci6n de Tierras en America Latina." Revista x
Interamcricana de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. 2, No. 1 " the Prime Rlinister of Cuba, 1959?
(1963), pp, 5-28. ' Dclgado, Oscar, "La Rcforma Agraria: America Latina Frente
Bernhard, Guillermo, La Reforma Agraria en.los Poises a su Destino." Cuadernos (Paris), Na 53 (1961),pp?y
Latinoamericanos. Montevideo: Imprenta Garcia, 1962 55 67?
Beyer, Robert Carlyle, "Land Distribution and Tenure in "Revolution, Reform, Conservatism: Three Types of
Colombia." journal of Inter-American Studies (Gaines Agrarian Structure." Dissent; Vol, IX, No. 4 (aa96a), pp.
ville, Fla.), Vol. 111, No. 2 (April, 1961), pp, z81.29o. 350'363? ,
Bonilla, Frank, "Rural Reform in Brazil." Dissent, Vol. IX, De Young, Maurice, Man and Laud in` the Haitian. Eccn+
No. 4 (1962), pp. 373-38x? omy. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 3958.
Brazil, Comisslo Nacional de Polltlca Agraria, Reforms Di6gues, Manuel, Jr., "Anteccdentes da Rcfornna Agraria no
"
Agrdria no Brasil, Estudos e Projectos. Rio de Janeiro:
'Editora e Grafica Guarany Ltda., 1956.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, "Tensoes Sociais no Campo e
Reforma Agraria." Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pol#ti
i z (Octnher_ 1n61) _ nn_ ?7-26.
cos. No
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or "' "?6"""'~`? ` Duran Marco Antonio Del A rarismo a la Rcrol i6n'
Aires: Edit. Asociaci6n Argentina por la Libertad de la ` g
A
l
l
Me
i
T
Cultura, 1961.
Carroll, Thomas F., "The Land Reform Issue in Latin
America," in Albert O. Hirschman, ed., Latin American
Issues. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.
???--- Land Tenure and Land Reform in Latin America: A.
Selected Bibliography (Regimen, de Tierras y Reforma.,
Agraria en America Latina; una Bibliogra f is Anotada de
Brasil,
Cuadernos Brasileiros (Rio de Janeiro), Anq V,:,
No.4 (Julho-Agosto, 1963), PP- 51-54 `.. i
Populacdo a Propricdade da Terra no Brasil. Wash
ington, D. C.: Pan A9ncrican Union, 1959.
Duarte, Nestor, Reforma Agraria. Rio do Janeiro: Scnico
gr
co
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x
co:
allcres Graficos de ]a Nacibn, 947,
--- "LaRcforrna Agraria en Cuba." Et Trimestrd`Eco.
ndrnico (Mexico), Vol. XXVII, No. 107 (1960), pp. 410-469.
Los Sofismas de la Reforma Agraria. Mexico: Liga
de Agr6nomos.Socialistas, 1q;q.
Cardcter Selectivo). Washington, D. C.: Inter-American;
" versity of Minnesota Press, 1961. .
Development Bank, 1962. . Escobar, Romulo, El Problema Agrario. El Paso: Imprenti
ed L, Cr?acio . d, Nuevas U.#.4-des A r#coIdc
?, g Juarez, 1915.
(Informe del II Seminario Latino-Americano sobre Pro- . Fals Borda, Orlando, El Hombre y la Tierra on Boyacd:
blemas de la Tierra, Montevideo). Santiago: Regional Of-
fice for Latin America of the Food and Agriculture Or
Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Primer Seminario de Ia
Reforma Agraria. Cuadcrnos 1, 2, 3, and 4. Bogota: Ccn
tro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1963 and. 1964.
Cleofas, Joao, Reforma Agraria no Brasil. Recife: Institutor
Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais, 1960.
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Conforti, Emilio A., Colonizaci6n, Reforma Agraria, Mi
graciones Internas. Quito: Junta Nacional de Planifica-'
rConselho Superior das Classes Produtoras, Reforma Agraria FemSndcz y Fernandez, Ram6n, "La Reforma Agraria Mex.'
Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Superior das Classes icana: Logros y Problemas Dcrivados. ? Bolet#n de Estu-
Produtoras, 1g6o. dios Especiales (I116xico: Banco Nacional de Credito Eji-
Cook, Hugh L., "The New Agrarian Reform Law and Eco- dal), Vol. VIII, No. 93 (July, 1957), PP 211-2Z0. .
` nomic Development in Venezuela." Land Economics Reforma Agraria en Venezuela, Caracas: Las Novo
(Madison, Wisconsin) Vol. XXXVII, No. i (February? ? dadcs, 1948-
1961), pp? 5-17 ------ "Reforma Agraria en el Ecuador.?i El Trim?stre Eca
Cordero Michel, Jos6 Ram6n E., "Datos sobre la Reforma ndmicb (Mexico), Vol. XXVII' (4), No, .11x (Octubrc-;
Agraria en.la Republica Dominicana." Caribbean Studies Diciembre, 1961), pp, 569-594?
(Puerto, Rico), Vol. II, No. i (April, 1962), pp. 23-33?; Econom#a Agricola y Reforma Agraria. Mexico: Cen-'
Corvalan, Luis, Cosas Nuevas on el Campo. Santiago tro de Estudios Monctarios Latinoamericanos, Grafica=
(Chile) : Imprcnta Lautaro, 1960 (?). Panamcricana, 1962.
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c1 Janeiro lnslituto Nacional do Livro 1 nomiea Vol. XXV, No. i (February1943) PP? 219'x34?
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Ct s1ey, J. C., "Agrariann Reform in Latin America." The rerragut, Castro, "La Reforma Agraria Boliviana: Sus Ante-'
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of original English text submitted as a Ph.D. Dissertation
under the title A Sociological Study of the Relationships
Between Man and the Land in the Department of Boydcd,
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"La Reforma Agraria,'? in Memoria: VI Congreso
Latinoamericano de Sociologfa, Tomo IT. Caracas: Im-
prenta Nacional, 1961, pp. 229-237.
"La Reforma Agraria," Revista de la Academia Co-
lomhiana de Ciencias Exactas; Fisicas y NaturaIes, Vol.
XI, No. 4a (1960), PP? 93-97?
` - + y ~o~?p ~~~. ,
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-3
vista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Washington,
D. C.), Vol. 2, No. 1 (1963), pp. 78-15i, American Economic Affairs (Washington, D. C.), Vol.
Flores, Edmundo, "Land Reform in Bolivia." Land Econ.' XIII, No. 4 (Spring, 196o),pp.46-66.
nomics (Madison, Wisconsin),. Vol. XXX, No: 2 (May, Hcysen, Luis E., "Acerca de`la Reforma Agraria." Revista
1954)/ PP 112-124. Mcxicana de Sociologfa (Mexico), Vol. XVIII, No. i
E
Ab
il
6
nero-
r
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Flores Moncayo, Jose, Derecho Agrario Boliviano. La P;z , (
Editorial Don Bosco, 1956. Hildebrand, john R., "Latin American Economic Develop
Ford, Thomas R., Man and Land in Peru. Gainesville: Uni-. ment, Land Reform andU. S. Aid With Special RGfer?,
versity of Florida Press, 10 enee. to Guatemala," Journal of Totter-American Stu1ies
rrnnco Anr~ter, Alberto, "Dlstribuel6n do Ticrras y Re.
...,,...j, ~ x.U.4ZI t19u2),PP?1371-1370.
I reitas Marcondes, ' J. V., "Reforma Agraria A Luz das Ci
encias Sociais." Sociologia (Sao Paulo), Vol. XXIV,
(Cainesville, Fa.) ; Vol, YV, No. 3 (July, 1962), pp. 351'
"Hill, George; Gregorio Bbitr'an, and Cristina Marino, 1Sp
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