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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 23, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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TWENTY YEARS OF DISSENT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
1949
October--
1954
a) Proclamation of People's Republic of China and flight
of armies of CHIANG Kai-shek to Taiwan which left the vic-
torious MAO Tse-tung in possession of the China mainland
but not entirely in possession of its inhabitants.
b) MAO's molding of the CCP to the point where dissent be-
came dangerous reached its fine point in the years between
1949 and 1954. Maoist cleansing of party ranks -- called
"rectification" -- resulted in the outright killing of
800,000 opponents of his regime. MAO admitted to that num-
ber of victims in his February 1957 speech on contradictions
(although the figure may be low). Killings were carried
out on the grounds that the regime opponents were "enemies
of the people."
1955 KAO Kang and JAO Shu-shih, dissented from MAO's policies
and were tried in secret proceedings conducted by LIU Shao-
ch'i and TENG Hsiao-p'ing. Following Stalin's tactics, MAO
and his prosecuting lieutenants "proved a long history of
dissent and conspiracy"on part of the accused. KAO, JAO
and the seven men who fell with them (similar to the anti-
party group purge in the USSR in 1957) have never reappeared.
KAO, the CCP says, "committed suicide."
1956
December
1957
February --
1958
In a Peking Jen-min Jih-pao (Peoples' Daily - CCP newspaper)
article covering Politburo discussions came a second attack
on "the fiction of no tension between leaders and led." Dis-
agreements sufficiently serious to be the subject of Polit-
buro discussions are difficult to disguise.
a) In a February 1957 speech MAO opened the door for non-
communist criticism of the CCP in an attempt to win over
dissenting Chinese intellectuals. This is the famed "hundred
flowers and hundred schools of thought" line which was launched
for MAO by CHOU En-lai in 1956.
b) Dissenters within the
as "harmful to the cause
in its criticism as well
some of MAO's own in the
ch'i,were included among
party openly criticized this line
of socialism;" the CPSU was violent
and there were even indications that
CCP leadership, including LIU Shao-
the dissatisfied.
c) MAO never admitted that the CCP dissidents to his line
were correct in their dire predictions of damage to party
unity. He simply halted criticism in practice, supported
it theoretically and in the "hundred flowers" revival in
1961 permitted "debate" only on academic subjects.
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1958 -- The Great Leap Forward conceived by MAO was a failure by
1960 the fall of 1958. The commune distribution system was
based on the fallacy that psychological and spiritual in-
centives could be substituted for material incentives as
the principal stimulus for production. This fallacy was
a target for criticism outside the CCP and China as well
as inside the CCP. Some of the dissenters in the CCP were
Politburo members including PENG Te-huai and CHTEN Yun.
The latter had been eased out of any real role in the CCP
by September 1959, if not before. PENG's fate (following)
was more dramatic.
1959 a) Marshal PENG Te-huai, China's Defense Minister in 1959,
was the leader of an "anti-party" group in the Politburo
who had written a letter to Moscow criticizing the Great
Leap Forward. His second sin was to resist CCP control of
the Army and the establishment of an "enormous untrained
militia." His third was to protest the growing breach
with Moscow, chief supplier of Chinese modern weapons.
b) PENG was arrested, underwent intensive reindoctrination
and finally wrote a "confession" divulging his wrong doings
to the CCP. He was replaced as Minister of Defense by LIN
Piao and most of his followers (including Army Chief of
Staff Genern1 HUANG K'o-ch'eng) were removed from their
party/government positions.
1961
The growing Sino-Soviet rift became open knowledge in 1961
with the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. There
was dissension within the CCP over China's stand against
Khrushchev's policies even in the Politburo. (This dissent
was part of Defense Minister PENG's crime.) The most notable
of the other dissenters was Politburo alternate member CHANG
Wen-t'ien: his disappearance from the scene since that time
can apparently be explained because of his opposition to
the anti-Soviet views of MAO and his more tractable lieutenants.
1962 The CCP initiated a long-term campaign to combat the deterior-
Early ation of party morale. Demoralization in the ranks of the CCP
was a result of the four years of privation connected with the
Great Leap Forward. Implicit in this campaign itself was
criticism of Chairman MAO since he was the architect of the
policies.
1962 a) CH'EN Yi, Foreign Minister of the CPR, in a series of
August -- speeches during this period placed great stress on "subver-
September sion" in China.
b) During the same period two Secretariat members were dropped:
General HUANG K'o ch'eng, former PLA Chief of Staff under the
2
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already purged (1959) Marshal PENG Te-huai and General
T'AN Cheng, whose department in the Secretariat was be-
lieved by China watchers to have failed to curb Army crit-
icism of the CCP.
196)4 At the Third National Peoples Congress held in Peking,
December -- Premier CHOU En-lai's speeches on internal matters clearly
1965 indicated continued CCP concern over popular apathy and
January disillusionment with party programs. (In part this was a
hangover from the Great Leap Forward period.) In the same
speech CHOU attached signs of capitalism as evidenced in
private plots and livestock.
1965 a) The United Front Work Department chief, LI Wei-han was
Spring summarily dismissed. The Department he had headed was
party organization responsible for working with intellec-
tuals.
b) The Minister of Culture, SHEN Yen-p'ing and several vice
ministers were dismissed. It is believed by China observers
that they had failed to bring the intellectuals into line.
SHEN's past work was said to have "weakened the class strug-
gle."
1965 LO Jul-ching, Chief of Staff of the Peoples' Liberation
November Army, disappeared from the scene as the PLA was apparently
readied for its role in the Cultural Revolution.
1965 -- 1969 Shanghai newspapers launched an attack on WU Han, non-
Communist Vice Mayor of Peking and the opening gun in the
Cultural Revolution -- now in its third tumultuous year --
was fired.
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LE MONDE, Paris
28 August 1969
Soviet Source Says 25 Million Chinese
Were Exterminated Between 1955 and 1965
Literaturnaya Gazeta, the Soviet Writers' Union weekly, devotes half
of this week's issue to a series of articles on China and the effects of
Maoism. You find the inevitable denunciations of Peking's "anti-Soviet hys-
teria," but the main body of the dossier deals with the internal situation in
the Chinese People's Republic. Everybody is in on the act, humorists and car-
toonists as well as reporters and photographers. There are even some documents
of.alleged Chinese origin, whose authenticity only Literaturnaya Gazeta can
vouch for, such as the letter from a Peking high school student called Chuo
Yang, on the way out to the country after completing his secondary studies,
who writes:
"Like all my comrades, I belonged to the Red Guard. We thought we were
making the revolution, that we were doing the right thing. But now, most of
the young people's eyes have been opened. Many people no longer believe in
Mao Tse-tung. But there are still a lot of people who believe in him, and who
do not understand that he is the cause of all China's troubles."
This recurrent theme of "China's troubles" is backed up with reams of
statistics. We learn, for example, that "more than 25 million people" were
exterminated in the decade from 1955 to 1965, that 30 million more were dis-
placed, and that there are 32 thousand people in the Takla-Makan concentration
camp in the Sinkiang desert.
A Power Struggle Among the Present Leaders
With the same abundant seasoning of figures, the Soviet writers' weekly
explains that "the spiritual food of the Chinese people" today consists of
almost nothing besides the works of Mao Tse-tung, of which 3,126,000,000 copies
have already been printed. The cult of Maoism is illustrated with selected
examples, including two texts singing the praises of the Chinese chairman pub-
lished under the title of "Ave Mao," and an item noting that all the gold dust
produced in the Nanking and Suchow workshops is now being used to gild busts of
Mao and to print the titles on his Little Red Book.
In such a context, political anPlysis is scarcely concerned with nuances.
The writers' weekly accuses Peking of "repeating the cruel history of the feudal
despots who ruled by fire and sword." And yet, everything is not all that simple
in Chinese politics. Literaturnaya Gazeta says that "we should not take serious-
1y everything Peking tells us about the alleged unity among the Chinese rulers
We are witnessing a complicated and largely secret struggle for power between
two major. opposing cliques, a struggle between two clans, that of Mao and his
wife, Chiang Ching, and that of Lin Piao and his wife, Yeh Chun." You can
glimpse the horizons opened up.to future historians and chroniclers .by the hy-
pothesis of this summit struggle for power among the leaders of the Chinese
Communist Party.
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Without searching for over-subtle meaning in these propaganda texts, we
can note that they give the Soviet reader a double picture of China. First they
are shown a "monstrous" country, subject to an intolerable regime, one that runs
against nature, thrust by its leaders into a manner of life that is the anti-
thesis of the aspirations of the Soviet people. While it is de rigeur to make
a distinction between the "good" Chinese people and the "bad" Maoists, it is by
no means certain that the general Soviet public will notice this nuance, and con-
tinue to rain it its racist feelings' which aro all too ready to crop out again.
The second image is that of a China by no means as powerful as it claims
to be, weakened by its tribulations, and consequently far less formidable than
the USSR might once have feared. This theme is relatively new, but it has al-
ready been mentioned once, just after the 13 August Sino-Soviet incident on the
Sinkiang border. At that time, an editorial in the Defense Ministry journal,
Krasnaya Zvezda, said that Peking's mobilization campaign in anticipation of a
possible war with the USSR posed no serious threat to the Soviet people.
"It goes without saying," the Defense Ministry editorial went on, "that
there is a very great distance between the inflammatory statements of the Peking
adventurers and their real capacities.1! Some observers concluded from this that
Moscow is trying to keep the fear of China created by the border incidents and
the way they have been handled from generating panic among the people.
LE MONDE, Paris
28 August 1969 CPYRGHT
!IN 11E3144'11A AIRE SOVIiTIQUE AFFIONIEI CUE VIINT-CINQ MILLIONS DE CIIINOIS
on tit EXTEIIMIS EMU 1955 ET 19651
De notre correspondent particulier ALAIN JACOB
lnoscou, I aout. ? to Lnera- tort de statistiques. On apprend par '
fournayd Gazeta, hebdomadalre de exemple quo < plus de vingt-cinq
l'Union des Ocrivains sovietiques, millions de personnes ? ant ete ex-
consacre cette semaine la mottle terminees pendant Ics decennia qui a
de son numero a une seri? d'arti- precede l'annee 1965, quo trente
cies sur la Chine et les allots du cadres millions oat Ott; deplacees,
manisme. On y retrouve les ine- quo trente-deux mill? detenus pet:- I
vitables denonciations de rhyste- pleat le camp de concentration de
rte antisovietique a de Pekin, mats:, Takla-Makan, dans le desert au
l'essentiel de co dossier est consa- Sinkiang.
cre a la situation interieure en Re-
publique populdire chinoise. Chacun tine lutte entre
y a apporte sa contribution, humo-
rLstes et caricaturistes aussi bien les dirigeants actuels
que journalistes et phtotographes.
On y trouve memo divers docu-
Avec tine memo abondance de
manta dorigine chinoise ?
chiffres, le journal des ecrivains
'
dont on no petit quo laisser
sovietiques explique quo la ? nour-
Literatournaya Gazeta le soi at de la
riture spirituelle du peuple chinois ?
n
n'est plus guere compose? aujour-
garantir l'authenticite, telle la
d'hui quo des ceuvres de Mao Tee-
lettre dun lycoen de Pekin, Van
toting publieles en 3 126 millions
Tchouo-yang, qui, en route pour
d'exempIaires. Le culte du maoisme
les campagnes au terme de ses etu-
est illustre a l'aide d'exemples choi-
des secondaires, ocrit : ? Comme
Mus mes camarades, fait partie sis, tels deux textes a la gloire du
t
des gardes rouges. On cfoyait faire presiden chinois publies sous le
titre Ave Mao, Cu cette informa-
la revolution, on croyalt bier, Mire.
lion selon laquelle touts la poudre
Male Cr present, les yeux de la plu-
d'or produite par les . ateliers de
part des jeunes se sont ouverts.
Beaucoup de gens ne croient plus a Nankin et de Soutchou est desormais
Mao The-toting. Mais ii y en a en-
employee a darer les bustes de Mao
core asses qui y croient et qui no
at les titres .de see recueils de cita.
comprennent pas qu est la cause dons.
de bus les rnalheurs de la Chine. Dans un tel contexte
..
Ce theme des .Appriomeci r opRelesseaW
nuances.
Chine a est developpe a grand ran-
Le journal accuse les diri-)
geants ae esin de ? repeter
loire cruelle des despotes feodaux
qui gouvernent par le feu et par
l'epee a. Tout n'est pas simple co-
pendant dans la politique chinoise,
estime la Literatournaya Gazeta, qui
affirme qu' ? on no dolt pas pren-
dre au serieux tout co quo Pekin
laconic au sujet de l'unite qui exis-
terait parmi les gouvern ants chi-
nois... On fassiste a une lutte com-
plexe, essentiellement secrete, entre
les deux principaux groupes adver-
ses, une lutie entre deux clans, ce-
lui de Mao et de sa femme Sien Sin,
of celui de Lin Pico et de sa femme
E. nun.. On entrevoit quels hori-
zons ouvre a de futurs chroniqueurs
l'hypothese de cette lutte au som-
met de la direction du parti corn-,
muniste chinois...
Sans chercher une signification
trop subtile ft ces textes de propa-
gande, on peut relever qu'ils don.
neat une double image de la Chine
au lecteur sovietique. D'abord cello
d'un pays ?monstrueux ? soumis a
un regime intolerable, contre na-
ture, pousse par see dirigeants vers
un mode de vie aux antipodes des
aspirations du peuple sovietique
s'il est de rigueur de faire lcr. dis-
tinction entre le ? bon ? peuple chi-
b? gAVE)17140I3Rif
quo d'U.R.S S en general continue
a tenir compte de cette nuance et
ft refrener des sentiments de ra-
cisme trop prets ft. renaitre.
La seconde image est cella d'une
Chine finalement mains puissante
qu'elle no pretend l'etre, affaiblie
par see epreuvei et, on consequence,
sans doute moths redoutable quo no
pourrait le craindre l'U.R.S.S. Co
theme est relativement nouveau,
male ii avail deja ete mention,16,
en particulier au lendemain
cident sino-sovietique du 13 doUt
dans le Sinkiang. On avait, en effet,
releve ft cette opaque un editorial
du journal du ministers de la de-
fense Krasnaya ZveScla affirmant
qua les campagnes de mobilisation
de Pekin en vue d'une guerre pos-
sible avec l'U.R.S.S. tie constituaient
pas en realite use menace serious?
pour le peuple sovietique. ? II va
sans dire, ajoutait le journal des
militaires sovietiques, quo la dis-
tance est fres grande entre les dEi-
clarations bruyantes et les possibi-
Ines reelles dos oven fullers de Pe-
kin. ? Certains observateurs en
avalent conclu qu'on souhaitait evi-
ter a Moscou quo le sentiment de
? pour de la Chine . cree par la
serie. des incidents de frontier? et
or l'exploit,g4an?qui en a ete faite.
00060G
Uzlirelus ou mains en
panique dans la population.
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July ,-- September 1969
CHINA'S GRAIN RESERVES
CPYRGHT
The general reader of Tho China Quarterly may well think it an imposi-
tion to be treated to a public debate on so technical a subject as
Chin's grain stocks. May I as his indulgence in vlow of the importance
of the issue raised by Kang Chao (The China Quarterly, No. 37
(January-March 1969), pp. 139-140). The question of the size and move-
ment of the national stockpile is indeed an integral part of any assess-
ment of China's grain policy.
Unfortunately Kang Chao does not define his use of the term stock-
pile or state reserve. Properly defined, it can only refer to that amount
of grain which is kept in government storage beyond the normal stock
in the pipeline.
In a country in which different grains are harvested at different
times of the year, substantial quantities are bound to lie in godowns
in various parts of the country. They do not necessarily form part of
a genuine carry-over. It is perfectly possible that 12.69 million tons of
"grain reserves" existed in mid-summer 1953 and 28.84 million tons
in mid-summer 1957?the time of the statistical change-over from one
crop year to the next?but they were not necessarily more than tem-
porary stocks; nor need the apparent increase in "grain reserves" by
16.15 million tons reflect anything more than an early harvest of summer
grains in the altogether favourable year 1957.
The "grain reserves" which, according to Viscount Montgomery's
account, were completely exhausted by the end of September 1961?
and well they might be after two man-made disasters following the
Great Leap Forward?are unlikely to have been in the same category as
those quoted for mid-summer 1953 and "1957. Difficult though it is,
we must try to compare like with like.
In estimating the likely size of government carry-over stocks, it is
worth recalling that some four-fifths of China's consumers produce
most of the grain they need. Let us assume that present gross supplies
of grains (and potatoes in grain equivalent) for human consumption
total, say, 150 million metric tons equal to, say, 170 kilos of milled
grain (at 80 rather than 85 per cent. average milling rate) per head per
year. Against this, the requirements of the consumers living outside
grain self-sufficient areas are unlikely to amount to more than, say,
25 million metric tons per annum, or 2 million tons per month, equal
to about one-sixth of total grain supplies for human consumption.
Only in very exceptional circumstances will the government have
to meet any of the needs of the self-suppliers; its normal concern will
be with the regular flow of grains to those who are not self-suppliers.
To prevent any breakdown in this flow, the government ought to be
able to draw at any time on a minimum reserve of, say, 5 million tons
or 10 weeks' supply for those who are not self-suppliers. A stockpile
of 10 million tons or 20 weeks' supply would entail a capital investment
in grain storage facilities which a country such as China would probably
deny itself?except when laying in a strategic reserve designed to meet .
eventualities other than those arising in peacetime.
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?
As to China's programme of grain imports, this?like the storage
programme?ought to be related to the needs of the non-self-suppliers.
As Professor Ta-Chung Liu rightly points out, the Chinese Government
spends roughly 30 per cent. of its annual foreign exchange earnings on
the purchase abroad of. say. 5 to 6 million tons of wheat and flour every
year. It does this so as to meet the needs, for a period of 10 to 12
weeks, of those who are not producing the grain they eat; or, to put it
in another way, tome 25 to 30 million Mute depend entirely on
foreign grain supplies throughout the year.
This is a problem of such magnitude that it can hardly be solved
by squeezing every member of the country's 125 million cultivators'
families to the tune of 75 calories or so a day. Policies other than
those of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution would
have to be introduced if a rate of saving even as modest as that of
3 to 4 per cent. of the daily diet were to be extracted from every one of
China's vain prriiiiiri.rs /mad their familloa.
W. KLATT.
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CPYRGHT
THE IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY MACHINE
CHARLES NEUHAUSER
After more than two years of intense activity, a good deal of
first-class melodrama, and an enormous outpouring of rhetoric, the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution continues to baffle most observers?and it
it would appear most Chinese as well. No two students of the Chinese
scene seem to agree entirely on what has thus far happened, or on just
why it has happened. Nor is the evidence available to those outside the
Chinese mainland in any way conclusive; it is at best contradictory, and
often misleading. Too much has happened, and too quickly, to form a
wholly coherent picture of events. And we are of course much too close to
those events to see them in full perspective.
One problem is that a great many forces, pressures and problems have
come together to produce the present upheaval. Another is that the main
protagonists in China appear to be reacting more or less on an ad hoc basis
to pressures and currents released by the Cultural Revolution itself?pres-
sures that may have been by no means fully expected and that can be only
dimly perceived by observers abroad. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the
convulsion do appear to be of major importance and can perhaps be isolated
for a tentative examination. One such aspect is the Chinese Communist
Party organization itself. For it seems reasonably certain that problems
within the party were a major precipitating factor in bringing on the Cul-
tural Revolution,' and that the party machine has been a principal victim
of the "revolution." The party has suffered a trauma easily the equal of the
Long March, but one from which it is unlikely to recover as quickly or
with such elan. Indeed, a better parallel may be the confusion and debilita-
tion caused by the abortive insurrectory movement that accompanied and
followed the break with the KMT in the late 1920s.
We should, however, be clear about one thing at the outset: the party
as such has not been under attack at any time in the course of the Cultural'
Revolution. No attempt has been made to deny its central legitimizing role
as the "vanguard of the proletariat" and the font of political authority in"
China. Rather, it is the party machine, the organizational command struc-
'For an examination of some of these problems, see Charles Neuhauser, "The Chinese
Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarter-
ly, No. 82 (September-December 1967).
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CPYRGHT
466 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
ture, that has been battered out of recognition in the past two years. But
it is of course true that in any real political sense the two are inseparable.
Political authority has flowed down from the chairman, the Politburo and
the Central Committee through the organizational machine to the levels
where policy is translated into practice. And an attack on the party machine
of the scope and intensity of that which has just taken place must not only
undermine the morale of party members but also greatly reduce the stature
of the party itself in the eyes of the general populace, and to some extent
at least bring into question the very legitimacy of the party as the arbiter
of Chinese political and social life.
The attack has been devastating. Of the 11 members and alternates on
the Politburo who were politically active in 1965, 8 have fallen by the way-
side. Of 11 politically active members of the Central Committee Secretariat,
only 3 have survived, and none appears to be performing secretarial work.
Of 10 known directors of Central Committee departments and bureaus, only
one appears to be active.
The Central Committee itself has been equally hard hit. Some 63 mem-
bers of the Central Committee promulgated in 1958 were politically active
in 1965; of these, 34 (52%), have been shunted aside, vilified and in many
cases "dragged out" and disgraced since the summer of 1966. Another 9,
or 14%, have been under severe Red Guard attack and apparently are or
have been in deep political trouble. Of 72 politically active alternate mem-
bers of the Central Committee, the figures are 27 (or 38%) and 29 (40%)
respectively. While some of these people will no doubt survive the Red Guard
assaults or will later be rehabilitated, the scope of the attack can be com-
pared only to that directed against the 1934 Central Committee of the
Soviet Party, which in the years of the Great Purge lost some 70% of its
members2?although in China the destruction has for the most part been
merely political rather than physical.
At middle levels the picture is bleaker still. Only 9 (20%) of the 45
provincial party 1st and 2nd secretaries known to be active in 1965 can
be identified today. Of these, many appear in supernumerary roles, and
relatively few seem to be performing meaningful political activities. The
provincial party committees themselves have not existed as organized, ac-
tive bodies since February 1967. The same is probably true of the regional
party bureaus, of which nothing has been heard since early 1967. Principal
party secretaries in the regional bureaus have without exception been
shunted aside or "dragged out" and disgraced. At hsien and municipal and
at hsiang, commune and district levels, the situation is probably not much
different, although all party committees may not have been formally "dis-
solved" as at the provincial levels.
Information regarding the basic levels is spotty and contradictory. It is
'Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party 01 the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage
Books, 1960), p.416.
01-5
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER 467
here, of course, that the vast bulk of party membership is tp be found.
Fragmentary information suggests that party committees and cells in fac-
tories have been hard hit. Lane committees and party fractions in produc-
tion brigades and work teams have probably suffered much less in terms
of actual Red Guard assault. Brigades and teams have been formally ex-
empted from Red Guard attack,8 but directives from the center apparently
no longer carry the weight they once did. Moreover, with the party's com-
mand channels short-circuited at the provincial and hsien levels, basic-level
cadres are probably largely inactive or are operating with the sketchiest of
instructions?a situation that in some ways may resemble that of outlying
guerrilla groups during the anti-Japanese war. Natural leaders probably
remain in command in the rural areas, but this is precisely because they
are natural leaders and not because they have .the weight of the party be-
hind them.
At the lower levels, particularly in the rural areas, the full impact of the
Cultural Revolution may not have been felt until well into 1967?particu-
larly during the upsurge in "revolutionary activity" that took place in April
- and May of that year. But at the middle and upper levels of the party ap-
paratus, the damage had already been done. The assault on the party ma-
chine reached its climax in December 1966-January 1967, and despite bit-
ter arguments about so-called "false seizures of power" in the course of the
"January revolution," essentially little more than mopping up operations
appear to have taken place at these levels since that time.
? In February, with the demise of the provincial party committees, local
power passed into the hands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)?es-
sentially to the regional and district military commanders. In most cases
it still remains there. The PLA has also assumed many of the party's func-
tions in propaganda work and is performing at least part of the party's
former supervisory role in the economic sphere. But this is clearly an un-
natural situation. That it has persisted for over a year is a measure of the
enormous difficulties caused by the breakdown of the party machine and
the resulting fragmentation of institutions of political authority and block-
age, of many normal channels of political communication. The year 1967
has seen a number of experiments designed to bring a degree of order out
of the present chaos through the establishment of new political and ad-
ministrative institutions. But these experiments, tenuous and hesitant at
best, have very largely been vitiated by powerful forces pressing for still
more "revolution."
Nevertheless, in the wake of the turn toward moderation that began in
September 1967, a new emphasis on "party-building"?which implies at
least a partial rebuilding of the party machine and the rehabilitation of
many party cadres?has been apparent. Thus far this effort does not appear
to have gone very far. Precisely because it presages a return to normality
Ven-min (IMIP), March 13, 1967.
f,,VIV,10)
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468 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION A'Nq THE PARTY
it is opposed by those "revolutionaries" who in the past two years have
acquired a stake in, and an emotional commitment to, continued ferment;
and because it portends a rehabilitation of cadres shunted aside n the
Cultural Revolution, it poses a political threat to some of those political
leaders who orchestrated and supported the attack on the cadres in the
first place.
Yet although the effort at party-building is likely to be slow and painful,
it may be possible already to perceive the shape of things to come. 'While
it is clear that some portion of the Red Guards will eventually be drawn
into the party, nevertheless at the lower levels a considerable proportion
of pre-1966 party members are likely to survive or be rehabilitated. In form,
the party structure probably will not look much different from the way it did
in the past, although a degree of streamlining and pruning is likely. Never-
theless, the Cultural Revolution has exacerbated rather than rooted out di-
visions within the party, and resentments born in the turbulent events of
the past two years will be extremely hard to overcome. Above all, party
morale has been shattered and cannot easily be repaired, while the party's
claim to unchallenged political authority and political infallibility has at
least to some degree been damaged. In these very important respects the
consequences of the past two chaotic years are likely to be very great in-
deed and will almost certainly plague Chinese political life for years to
come.
It seems increasingly evident as more material comes to light in the
course of the Cultural Revolution that for several years prior to its begin-
ning Mao had felt the Chinese revolution was losing steam, that there
was the distinct possibility that "revisionism" of the sort espoused by the
post-Stalinist Soviet Union was a threat not only within the international
Communist movement but also within China itself, and that the revolution-
ary ideals for which he had long fought were in danger of becoming lost
or downgraded as the Chinese Communist Party became enmeshed in the
difficult job of nation-building. Both old party members who had fought
against the KMT and newer recruits who had joined the party since 1949
had failed to sufficiently "transform their world outlook": their priorities
were wrong. And because this was so, there was a danger that the party
would become increasingly divorced from the "masses," whose untapped
"revolutionary enthusiasm" remained high.
Mao apparently felt that his plans for releasing this revolutionary po-
tential were being blocked by powerful figures within the party who felt
his ideas were anachronistic. Moreover, the party bureaucracy, growing
over the years, had itself become a deadweight, with bureaucratic methods
stifling revolutionary initiative. It would seem that Mao was at least partly
right on both counts, but the important thing is that he believed himself
to be thwarted, and felt that something had to be done about it. This meant
shaking up the party and removing a number of its important leaders. This
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER
. 469
surely was a prime aim of the Cultural Revolution from the start.
That start can probably be dated from September 1965, when Mao gave
the signal at an acrimonious work session of the Central Committee for a
strong attack in the cultural field against revisionism. But parallel to the
well-known attacks on literary figures that followed this meeting there also
developed a campaign directed at hsien-level party committees, the first such
concerted and extended campaign to involve party organizational questions
since 1962. Criticism of hsien-level party committees reached floodtide in
early 1966, but interestingly enough died away abruptly just when the grow-
ing clamor against Wu Han and Teng T'o indicated unmistakably that the
Peking Party Committee was in deep trouble.
The central charge against the hsien committees was that they had be-
come divorced from the masses?that party members had failed to "trans-
form their world outlook," had succumbed to bureaucratic inertia, and
would in consequence have to submit to open criticism at mass meetings in
which large numbers of non-party persons would participate. This in itself
was unremarkable, but along with the usual Maoist slogans a number of
other, rather different ideas were introduced into the discussions in the
party press. One was that to eradicate problems at the hsien level, party
members would have to supervise their subordinates more closely and take
into account specific local conditions and special situations in implementing
party directives4?in effect, hsien committees were told to act with greater
bureaucratic efficiency and pragmatism. One len-min Iih-pao article went
so far as to suggest that the problem was not "transformation of world out-
look" at all, but rather the need for better understanding of work condi-
tions and modern scientific procedures.3 Moreover, the press reported that
the idea of open criticism of party members by non-party masses was
strongly resisted.? Furthermore, in the course of the campaign a new hero
was introduced for emulation?one Chiao Yu-lu, a hsien party secretary
and the first emulation hero not to have a PLA background.
All of this suggests that the campaign was less a Maoist initiative than
a rear-guard action on the part of the party bureaucracy to protect itself in
the face of growing pressure. This episode suggests several conclusions;
first, that problems involving the party organization were at issue from
the earliest days of the Cultural Revolution; second, that there was con-
siderable resistance within the party machine to ideas of uninterrupted rev-
olution that would sacrifice the rather pragmatic tasks of nation-building to
less clearly focused ideological concerns; and third, that while "waving
the Red Flag" of reform of party organizational methods, important ale.
'See, for example, "Vigorously Promote Three Major Styles of Work, Strengthen
Basic-Level Development of the Party," JM/P, February 8, 1966, in Survey o/ the China
Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 3643, pp. 1 if.
"The 'Leap,' Something to be Learned," IMI!', January 17, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3628,
101)i. 7-8-
"Correctly Sum Up Historical Experience, Wipe Out Individualistic Thoughts,"
1MIP, February 13, 1966, in SCMP, No. 3648, p.8.
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470 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
ments within the party apparatus?who apparently had some control of
the Central Committee's own journal, fen-min Iih-pao?were evidently will-
ing and able to fight to protect party prerogatives, particularly with regard
to non-party intrusion into party affairs.
These divisions and tensions became at once more apparent and acute
following the fall of P'eng Chen in May 1966. P'eng's political demise led
quite aaturally to omplete ahake.up of the Peking party municipal or-
ganization, into which Mao was later to claim "you could not drive a pin."
If this were all, however, the implications for the party machine as a whole
would not necessarily have been very great or immediate. In fact, because
cultural issues were at least formally involved in the protracted dispute
that ended in P'eng's fall, a thoroughgoing purge of the party's propa-
ganda, educational and cultural "systems" also could not be avoided. This
was a move of cardinal importance, and it had major consequences almost
at once. The purge was conducted through the medium of "operation teams"
which carried out on-the-spot "investigations" of accused individuals and
attempted to lead struggle sessions against them in a manner reminiscent
of the land reform program of the late 1940s and early 1950s. This was
only ostensibly a concession to Maoist principles, for the "operation teams"
were directly controlled by the party apparatus, and Liu Shao-ch'i and
Teng Hsiao-p'ilig apparently took a direct hand in running them.7 These
teams were opposed?often in pitched battle?by less well-organized groups
of students responsive to appeals that had begun to appear in the official
press calling for unbridled revolutionary ferment.
- Two issues were at stake here. One involved the question of how the
purge was to be conducted?that is, was it to remain entirely an operation
run by the party secretariat or was the secretariat to be bypassed, at least
in part, in favor of direct action by the "masses," who were in turn respon-
sive to and probably manipulated by forces anxious to shake up the bureau-
cratic machine?principally Mao himself. The second issue involved the
question of who exactly was to be purged. Although some kind of purge
could not be avoided, if it could be kept within carefully controlled bounds
the damage could be limited. This apparently was what Liu Shao-ch'i and
Teng Hsiao-p'ing attempted.8
There was nothing subtle or indirect about the battles over the conduct
of the "operation teams"; the issues were now out in the open. But the
course of events had raised the stakes, which were now nothing less than
who was to control the party and how it was to be run. Yet at the same
time the conflict was personalized, and in such a situation Liu's prestige
was no match for Mao's. At the 11th Central Committee Plenum in August
1966 both Liu and Teng were downgraded and removed from effective
"Thoroughly Criticize Our Institute's Operation Team in Carrying Out the Anti.
Bourgeois Movement on the Cadre Question," Cheng./an Kung-she, April 16, 1967.
'Materials from the Investigations into Teng Hsiao-p`ing's Criminal Activities," Hung
Chl (Aviation Institute Red Guards), May 5, 1967.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER 471
?
power, although no formal censure was publicly pronounced. But by noilw'
the struggle had greatly expanded. To this point it had been a contest of
giants, in which Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Peng Chen ha 4 been
principal protagonists. Now a-much wider range of characters was invnived.
Liu and Teng's closest associates would of course be pushed aside, but the
episode of the "operation teams" had undoubtedly deepened Mao's sus-
picion of the entire party apparatus, which would now have to bear the
consequences of his distrust.
The slogan "95 percent of Party cadres are good or comparatively good"
had been incorporated into the 16-point decision issued by the 11th Plenum,
but it was clear almost at once that it would be honored more in the breach
than in the observance. Yet in light of both the size of the impending house-
cleaning and of the events of the spring and early summer, it was also clear
that the party apparatus could not be trusted to purge itself; hence the Red
? Guards, successors to the semi-organized bands that had hauled the "opera-
tion teams" in May, June and July. But the Red Guards were a heterogene-
ous group, composed mainly of youngsters, many of whom were not party
members, and initially at least loosely organized and relatively loosely con-
\ trolled. Moreover, the undifferentiated call to hit at "persons in authority,"
which now began to be heard, was certain to create a good deal of con-
fusion in itself. Under these conditions, the forthcoming struggle was bound
to be a messy affair.
It should not be thought, however, that the attacks on "persons in au-
thority" were a wholly spontaneous manifestation of "revolutionary fer-
ment." Mao and those in his immediate entourage on whom he relied
moved quickly to channel and direct the Red Guard movement. The extra-
ordinary number of meetings at which Red Guard groups were addressed
and admonished by major leaders was one aspect of this effort. Another was
the establishment of the Small Group for the Cultural Revolution of the Cen-
tral Committee, which clearly was given the task of overseeing and coordinat-
ing Red Guard activities. Theoretically subordinate to the Central Com-
mittee, this body was soon speaking with an independent and highly au-
thoritive voice.? Its members were all almost entirely dependent on Mao's
personal patronage and at this stage at least could be considered extensions
of his personality."
Measures to control Red Guard activities were varied. The Red Guards
were given permission to use the railways and the state telegraphic net-
work for at ,best nominal charges.11 This was a virtual necessity as Red
'For example, directives issued by the central authorities were signed by this body
as well as the Central Committee, the State Council and the Military Affairs Commission.
lovang Sheng, however, had been active in party work and may have had some well-
placed adherents at lower levels.
"Evidence for this is found in later references to these privileges contained in official
documents, e.g., the central directive issued on June 6, 1967, Shou-ta Hung-wei-ping,
June 9, 1967.
4'4
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472 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
CPYRQHT
Guard activities expanded, but it placed the "rebels" in a dependent re-
lationship to the central authorities, who could revoke these privileges at
any time, and provided a degree of leverage of Red Guard actions.0fficial
permission was needed for major demonstrations against "persons in au-
thority,"12 which meant that Red Guard targets had to be officially approved
in advance either by authorities on the spot or by the Small Group in
Peking. Red Guard newspapers were published on state and party 'presses,
using state stocks of newsprint,1? which meant that at least a degree of
control could be exercised over what was printed in these papers. Above
all, after an initial period of permissiveness, fairly strict controls were es-
tablished over the collection, collation and distribution of "black materials"
?documented charges of wrongdoings to be brought against Red Guard
targets.14 Much of this material could only have come from archives un-
available to the general public; if some of it was "manufactured" for the
occasion?as was almost certainly the case?this could only be done by
persons with a detailed knowledge of high-level party affairs, which would
rule out nearly all the Red Guards themselves. Moreover, leaders of the
major Red Guard organizations were undoubtedly in close behind-the-
scenes contact with members of the Small Group for the Cultural Revolu-
tion, and transmitted instructions from them down to lower levels through
an increasingly elaborate organizational structure.
Nevertheless, anomalies were certainly not uncommon. Discipline in the
hastily organized Red Guard groups was by no means as well-enforced as
in traditional mass organizations, much less as in the party itself. Forged
"black materials" were put in use, although usually this probably involved
lower-level targets." Unplanned disputes between local "authorities" and
militant Red Guards, or between Red Guard groups themselves, frequently
escalated, involving peripheral figures and no doubt occasionally leading the
central authorities to approve new targets for attack only after the attacks
had in fact already begun. In other instances, important leaders in Peking
were clearly divided over the question of whether or not the assault on a
given individual should be pursued or curtailed." However, these disputes
generally involved party figures whose duties did not directly impinge on
the management of the party machine. By and large, party secretaries,
members of central party organs, and members of lower-level bodies con-
"Denial of this permission by local and provincial officials was later considered
"proof" of counterrevolutionary activity. See "Accusingly Reveal the Shanghai Muni-
cipal Committee's Activity of Planning and Organizing to Surround the Red Guards,"
handbill, n.d.
"Red Guard publications sometimes directly acknowledge use of party and govern-
ment presses.
"Central Directive issued January 13,1967, Pei-ching P'ing Lun, 1967.
"Ibid.
"Chou En-hal, for example, frequently attempted to head off attacks on individuals
associated with the State Council. Cf. also the reversal of the attack on Hsiao Hue in
January 1967.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER 473
cerned with party affairs?the backbone of the party apparat?were fair
game.
Confusion among the Red Guards and their mentors was 'mirrored by
an equal confusion among those under attack. It would be hard to over-
estimate the shock, anger and dismay felt by party cadres at all levels as
the Red Guard attacks widened. In Sian, for example, cadres accustomed
to defending and protoottn4 party prerogatives and tha avidity of the
party organization felt that the Red Guard attacks on leading party bodies
could only be counterrevolutionary." This undoubtedly was a typical re-
action. Precisely because the attacks were so widespread, because the Red
Guard targets were generally members of the leading locn1 party organs,
because the Red Guards themselves stood outside the regular party struc-
ture, and because the most militant "rebels" were frequently led by "out-
siders" from Peking," the Red Guard movement appeared to be a sinister
effort to destroy party prestige and authority and to sweep away entirely
the party as an institution. The reaction of the local cadres was violent
and extremely hostile. Militant Red Guards were attacked, beaten up and
jailed. By October, Mao himself admitted that the movement was largely
misunderstood in the provinces, and he called on leading party provincial
figures to cooperate with the Red Guards even though they and their sub-
ordinates understood the Cultural Revolution only imperfectly."
But if individual middle-level cadres reacted instinctively to what they
felt to be a challenge to party prerogatives and prestige, most upper-level
party bureaucrats in the provincial,- regional and important municipal bu-
reaus felt that they understood what was happening all too well. They were
the immediate targets of the Red Guard attacks, and they moved to protect
? themselves as best they could. For them the central question was no longer
that of outside interference in party affairs or the rationalization of bureau-
cratic procedures; it was simply self-preservation. Utilizing the resentment
felt against the Red Guards at all levels of the party machine, and probably
drawing on a resentment of "outsiders" felt by wider circles of the local
populace, the provincial party chieftains organized Red Guard groups of
their own, responsive to their own orders and ready to defend the party
organs under attack by the militants sent out from Peking. Some "rebel"
groups were declared counterrevolutionary.20 Many soon found themselves
virtually under siege.
7 This counterattack was surprisingly strong and sustained; it appears to
have virtually stalled the Cultural Revolution for several months. In essence
it appears to have been an instinctive reaction to an overwhelming chat.
"Andrew Watson, "Embattled Armies," Far East Economic Review, April 1967, p. 231.
"Revolutionary Masses in Canton Regard their Reception of Revolutionary Young
Fighters as a Glorious Political Task," Narplang Jilt-pars, November 19, 1966, in SCMP,
No. 3828, p. 9.
"Mao's Speech to die October 1967 Work Conference of the Central Committee,"
handbill, n.d., partly reproduced in remittal, November 7, 1966.
161Cwelyang radio, June 1, 1967.
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474 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
lenge on the part of provincial party officials; there is no evidence it was
centrally directed in any sense. But this show of strength sealed the fate
of more than the individual party bureaucrats who organized the counter-
attack. When the impasse was broken at the beginning of 1967, the target
was not so much individuals within the party as the party machine itself. The
call to "seize power," sounded on January 1, 1967, was in effect a signal
to dismantle the party structure.
The Red Guard methods of attack were primarily propagandistic. Hand-
bills, wall posters and unofficial newspapers kept up a drumfire of violent
criticism of chosen targets. This written propaganda was supplemented by
mass meetings, demonstrations, occasional "invasions" of party and state
offices, and confrontations with the targets of attack at struggle meetings
held under Red Guard auspices. This program put leading party officials
under considerable pressure, but it was insufficient actually to dislodge
them from their entrenched positions. In any event, the removal of major
officials required authorization from Peking.21 So long as regional provin-
cial and other local officials remained in office, they kept the most important
levers of political authority and administration in their own hands. In their
official capacities they could organize Red Guard forces of their own and
solve the logistical problem?food, housing and the like?of keeping them
in the field. They could, moreover, encourage factory workers and others
to make excessive demands on Peking for higher wages and other ameni-
ties.22 But to remove these officials wholesale was to invite chaos, for they
played a crucial role in administering both the state and the party. Hence.
the stalemate in the autumn of 1966.
Mao's solution to this dilemma was drastic. The Gordian knot was cut
at the provincial level, where resistance to the Red Guards had been con-
centrated in the period following the 11th Plenum. Both provincial state
governments and provincial party committees ceased to exist in any mean-
ingful sense. Regional party bureaus apparently also vanished at this time.
But while provincial state functions were generally taken over by the mili-
tary after a brief hiatus, the short circuit in the party chain of command
was allowed to persist. It has not yet been repaired.
The "January revolution" of course encompassed far more than an as-
sault on provincial "organs of power." But it worked differently in Peking
than in the provinces, and differently when applied to state organs than to
party organs. In Peking, no assault was launched against either the State
Council or the Central Committee as such, although members of both groups
fell from power in considerable numbers. Individual ministers and vice.
premiers came under attack for "counter-revolutionary" activities, usually
within their own ministries. A few members of the State Council?most
?
"Few such decisions have evidently been published, but there are numerous refer-
ences to central directives on personnel questions in Red Guard publications.
"It seems likely that this is how the "economism" issue arose.
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CPYRGHT
CHARLES NEUHAUSER 475
notably Chou En-lai himself?escaped unscathed; several other ministers
were severely attacked but managed to remain in position; still more were
shunted aside." But in no case was a ministry itself "dissolved." The work
of the ministries went forward, although under adverse conditionEk for un-
questionably a considerable number of lesser functionaries fell to Red
Guard assaults, and ministerial functions were frequently affected by Red
Guard disruptions within the ministries themselves. Several ministries,
particularly those dealing with transportation and communications, were
"taken over" by the PLA in February, but work has apparently gone on
under loose military supervision.
Party organs in the capital were even harder hit. There have been no re-
corded announcements of the "dissolution" of central party organs, but no
official has been identified performing party functions since January 1967.
Subordinate bureaus of the Central Committee seem uniformly inactive.
Only one director of a party bureau appears to have survived the on-
slaught;24 it is likely that some lesser functionaries within the bureaus have
also survived, but it is hard to believe that they have much meaningful work
to perform. The party's organizational bureau may be hors de combat en-
The party secretariat has not fared? much better. Three secretaries
still appear in public, but never in connection with their secretarial functions.
None has been identified as a party secretary since January 1967. In fact,
virtually no party official was publicly identified in a strictly party role?
not even as a member of the Central Committee?between January and
October 1967.
Nor can the state provincial organs be identified after January 1967, al-
though no formal "dissolution" was ever announced. A considerable num-
ber of provincial governors were attacked and presumably deposed as
"among the small handful following the capitalist road," but minor func-
tionaries probably continued during January to perform their tasks?large-
ly by rote, since it is unlikely that many instructions were transmitted down
from Peking. Nevertheless, confusion?or even a considerable degree of
chaos?must have attended state business at the provincial level through-
out the month. Since the state ministries continued to function in Peking
and presumably at lower levels as well, direct-line communications remained
relatively unaffected in this sphere. However, some working form of state
authority at the provincial level was obviously necessary if decisions made
in Peking were to be implemented, or if even routine administrative work
was to be performed over any period of time. These considerations almost
certainly played a major part in the decision to bring the PLA into the
Cultural Revolution, a decision announced on January 23.25 In February,
following this move, military control commissions were set up in virtually
"Lin Piao can scarcely'be considered a subordinate of Chou's, although the Defense
Ministry is theoretically subordinate to the State Council.
"Ta'ai Cleang, a relatively unimportant figure.
"Central Directive of January 21, 1967, TunOang-hung, January 31, 1967.
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476 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
every province in China.20 These commissions took over the task of civil
administration in the provinces, supplanting the provincial governors and
supervising the work of state provincial functionaries, many of whom un-
doubtedly continued to carry on their normal duties. Control commissions
may also have been established in the very few provinces that established
Revolutionary Committees formally reeognized by Peking, although in these
cases direct administrative responsibility, if not political power, apparently
rested with the Revolutionary Conunittccs.
In many respects this situation resembled that which obtained in the
years immediately following the Conununist takeover, when military con-
trol commissions also ran provincial affairs. But in this case there is one
major difference: there are no provincial party committees to check on the
work of the control commissions. The provincial party committees were
formally dissolved.27 References to them after January 1967 invariably speak
of "former provincial party committees." No individual has been identified
performing strictly party work on the provincial level. Since January, no
communication from the central authorities has been addressed to a pro-
vincial party committee: addressees are invariably regional and district
military commands, military control commissions, and, where they exist,
provincial revolutionary committees."
A similar situation appears to exist with regard to municipal party corn-
mittees. The regional party committees and party committees at the hsien
? also do not appear to be functioning, but here the situation is not so dear
cut." Many hsien committees may have been dissolved, but this does not
appear to have been quite so formal a process as that which took place at
the provincial level. But certainly, so far as can be observed from a distance,
no significant work is being performed by either regional or hsien commit-
tees. In any event, in a party organized in the way it was in China prior to
1967, a complete break in the party chain of command would render organs
at a lower level ineffective and organs at a higher level impotent.
Not all members of the various provincial committees were disgraced in
January, although virtually all provincial first secretaries active in 1965
were condemned. Several second and third secretaries showed up as mem-
bers of Revolutionary Committees or "preparatory groups" late in 1967;
"No announcement of the establishment of these bodies was made at the time, al-
though frequent references to the commissions soon began to appear in official and Red
Guard publications.
"See, for example, "Record of the Seizure of Power," Kuangchou Hung-wei-ping,
February 17, 1967.
"Red Guard publications, as well as wall posters, carry the texts of many of these
directives, including addresses.
"Regional Bureaus were organs of the Central Committee and therefore theoretically
inviolable. Power was "seized" in the "organs directly under" the several bureaus?i.e.,
in the various administrative departments of the bureaus themselves. Since January
1967 the Regional bureaus appear to have been totally bypassed. Reorganization of the
subordinate administrative units now seems to have begun, but the bureaus themselves
still have no real political significance.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER
but they appeared to play supernumerary rather than leading rule:, ;La
these bodies. Still more former members of the provincial committees are
apparently politically inactive.
The consequences of "seizure of power" began to be felt almost immedi-
ately. The Red Guards took their role as "revolutionary successors" very
seriously, and in many places apparently attempted to step into ;the shoes
of the party cadres they had displaced. This came close to being an un-
mitigated disaster on two counts: first, untrained youths proved inade-
quate replacements for experienced party bureaucrats, and second, the
numerous and fragmented Red Guard groups, prone to disputes from
their inception, now began to quarrel bitterly over division of the spoils.
The Center soon found it necessary to remind the "rebels" of the virtue of
humility and discipline.
Since the Red Guards could not perform administrative and supervisory
tasks by themselves?and in many cases probably not at, all?it was soon
clear that many of the cadres so recently shunted aside would have to re-
turn to the job. But this raised new problems. First, the cadres themselves
were reluctant to resume their old posts; they had just been through the
mill, and did not wish to repeat the experience. Second, the "rebels" were
not anxious to see them return, since this meant that newly won power and
authority would have to be shared. Full of revolutionary rectitude, they
claimed that only those who had "rebelled" from the first deserved re-
habilitation. Again the Center was obliged to press the line that most cadres
were comparatively good, that mistakes could be repeated and corrected,
'and that it made little difference when an individual cadre had first seen
the light.
A further complication arose from the first tentative and rather makeshift
efforts to rebuild a viable administrative structure in the provinces. From
the first, Peking saw military rule as a temporary expedient to be replaced
by something that would invite the active cooperation, support and partici-
pation both of a sufficient number of former cadres to ensure efficient ad-
ministration and of the vast majority of the revolutionary rebels. Not sur-
prisingly, this reconciliation of old and new?the vehicle for which was the
Revolutionary Committee?was difficult to achieve.
In the wake of the "January revolution," bodies calling themselves "Rev-
olutionary Committees" sprang up all over China at all levels. Most of these
bodies were soon accused by militant Red Guards of being nothing but a
false front behind which party "power-holders," who had engineered false
"seizures of power," continued to operate. In many cases there was prob-
ably more than a grain of truth in these charges, but the party officials in-
volved soon discovered that they were merely operating in a vacuum. Real
power now rested in the hands of the military control commissions, who
received and implemented instructions and directives from Peking,.bypass-
ing the "sham" Revolutionary Committees and allowingL1WW LW 17 ic? vat
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CPYRGHT
478 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
the vine. Only in Heilungkiang, Shantung, Shensi, Kweichow and in the
autonomous municipality of Shanghai did Ped;: recognize authentic Rev-
olutionary Committees. Below the provincial level, authentic Revolutionary
Committees were nonexistent.
In form, these new bodies were "triple alliances," that is, they inoluded
representatives of the Red Guards (who first had to form a "great alliance"
of smaller individual Red Guard groups which could not send repreienta-
tives directly to the Revolutionary Committees), "old cadres," and the mili-
tary. In practice, the military probably had a commanding voice in these
bodies, ruling indirectly rather than directly as in the case of the military
control commissions.3? But from the start there were anomalies. In Shang-
hai, the leading figure in fact as well as in form was Chang Ch'iin-chiao, an
authentic "rebel" and a member of the Central Committee's Small Group
for the Cultural Revolution." Even more interesting, in Heilungkiang, the
first province to establish a Revolutionary Committee, the leading figure was
P'an Fu-sheng, an "old cadre" and provincial first secretary before the
"seizure of power." P'an and Wei Kuo-ch'ing in Kwangsi were the only
provincial first secretaries to survive the January onslaught without signi-
ficant loss of power or status." In the remaining provinces former provin-
cial secretaries were also included as members of the new committees, but
they were lesser figures and probably performed little more than symbolic
roles as examples of reconciled cadres. Minor functionaries who had form-
erly worked in the party provincial committees probably continued to per-
form similar tasks within the new Revolutionary Committees, but the fre-
quent appeals in February and March for "old cadres" to come forward
and declare for the Cultural Revolution suggests that persons in this cate-
gory were not very numerous.
The Revolutionary Committees, insofar as they were more than merely
a facade behind which the military made the major decisions, were pri-
marily administrative organs, replacing the former provincial governorates.
Many tasks formerly performed by the provincial party committees no
longer had such meaning, in any event. Internal party administration ob-
viously was out of the question; the major task of supervising and carrying
out propaganda work had very largely passed to the PLA and in some re-
spects to the Red Guard organizations. Supervision of the work of the pro-
vincial organs of central ministries could not have been very meaningful;
"The precise relationship of the military to the early Revolutionary Committees is not
entirely clear. P'an Fu-sheng in Heilungkiang, and Chang Ch'iin-ehiao in Shanghai,
quickly assumed the posts of political commissar to the leading military command in
their respective areas. P'an has been closely associated with military figures since Janu-
ary 1967, and PLA personnel have played important roles in both areas. The East China
Fleet command has been increasingly important in Shanghai in recent months. Wei
Kuo-ch'ing acted only as PLA political commissar until the formation of the Kwangsi
"preparatory group" in December 1967.
"The Shanghai situation has in many respects been unique.
"Both Chang Ktto-hua in Tibet and Wang En-mao in Sinkiang were commanders of
their respective military regions and had troops at their disposal.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER
479
in the economic sphere this responsibility was shared with the PLA.88
Moreover, the very few Revolutionary Committees in existence in the early
months of 1967 had come into being very suddenly; members of the new
bodies had clearly been co-opted from above in the heat of the 4:n1-lent. A
great deal of sorting out had to be done, particularly with regard to the
participation of Red Guard representatives on the committees, for the sud-
den formation of "revolutionary great alliances" had papered over rather
than removed deep-seated differences among the various Red Guard groups.
Indeed, the very existence of the new committees, and more important,
the prospect that additional committees would be formed in other provinces,
exacerbated these differences and in fact so envenomed the disputes be-
tween Red Guard organizations that as a practical matter the formation of
workable "revolutionary great alliances" was in most places out of the
question. Red Guard groups argued over which individuals were to become
"revolutionary" representatives on the Revolutionary Committees, bow
many representatives from one group as compared to another should be
included, and whether or not some Red Guard groups should be represented
at all. These arguments were by no means merely academic. They quickly
degenerated into free-for-ails, and then into planned, pitched battles. This
sort of fighting fed upon itself, making reconciliation still more difficult.
The question of "who are our friends, who are our enemies" took on a
very immediate meaning.
To these intractable problems was added the continuing issue of the rec-
onciled cadres. The Red Guards were not alone in resenting the possible
return of relatively large numbers of former party officials and function-
aries to important posts. Those cadres *ho had early thrown their lot with
the "rebels" in hope of winning preferment and rapid advancement were,
not surprisingly, resentful of the line advanced in February and March that
most cadres were comparatively good no matter when they had first re-
belled. And to these problems there was soon added a new issue: As the
military took charge in the provinces they handled the Red Guards rough-
ly in the interest of rapidly restoring order. Many Red Guards were ar-
rested; Red Guard activities were restricted and "rebel" privileges with-
drawn; and some Red Guard groups were suppressed outright.84 Moreover,
the military were making the real decisions at the provincial level. In ef-
fect, military regional and district commanders and their subordinates had
become a new set of "persons in authority."
This combination of circumstances produced irresistable pressures from
below?pressures, in any case, that Mao and his radical friends in Peking
were happy to exploit. In February, retreat had proved to be a tactical
maneuver; by April, revolution was rampant again. Interestingly enough,
the signal for the new lurch to the left was the introduction of the first pub.
"See n. 25.
"Wall poster reports suggest that this action was especially severe in Tibet.
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480 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
lie attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i, and the central issue on which these attacks
turned was the question of Liu's approach to the cadre question. "Slavish
mentality" and unquestioning obedience to orders were roundly condemned.
In practice, this meant that the attempt to rebuild the new administrative
structure in the provinces had to all intents and purposes been abkindoned.
Indeed, with the new upsurge in revolutionary activity this was very largely
an impossibility. Moreover, atill another complicating factor had beip added
to the provincial situation. Red Guard attacks were now being directed
against the military authorities who were locally in power. The PLA com-
manders, taking a page from the books of the discredited party leaders, be-
gan to organize and encourage some Red Guard groups who would support
the regional and district commands." Clashes between these groups and
the more militant Red Guards, who were still manipulated from Peking,
very quickly overshadowed the disputes among he militants themselves.
These clashes were the central political fact of the spring and summer,
but the underlying issue remained the same: who was to hold power and
how was that power to be exercised. Yet for all the fury of the struggle?
in July and August the confusion, disruption and factional fighting reached
heights that surpassed the chaos of the "January revolution"?very little
really changed. A Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee was formed
in May, and a single provincial Revolutionary Committee and six "prep-
aratory groups" were set up in the summer, but these bodies were clearly
dominated by the military men already running the respective provinces
involved; they were in large degree Military Control Commissions writ
large.86
Furthermore, although important PLA figures came under severe Red
Guard attack between April and September, prior to August there was no
concerted effort to disrupt the military chain of command as the party had
been disrupted in January. Even when the brief, across-the-board assault
on the PLA was inaugurated following the Wuhan incident, the consequences
to the military establishment were comparatively few. Ch'en Tsai-tao, the
Wuhan Military Commander, was dismissed together with his immediate
subordinates. Apparently a number of commanders of the military districts
immediately adjacent to Wuhan were also sacked, but those men were at
once replaced by others of similar background brought in from other mili-
tary regions." There was no effort made to "dissolve" either the affected
regional or district commands; a shuffling of personnel sufficed. Indeed,
"In the spring of 1967, militant Red Guard groups began to attack their opponents
for having the support of local military commanders.
"This situation was obvious in Tsinghai, where military figures were clearly in com-
mand. In Peking, although Hsieh Fu-chih, chief of the new Revolutionary Committee,
was a member of the State Council, the situation apparently did not change appreciably
from that which had existed since February 1967, whee lbe Peking garrison took over
the municipality.
"Commands were apparently shaken up in the Hupeh, Henan, Hunan and Kiangsi
military districts.
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481
CHARLES NEUHAUSER
the assault on the military establishment was almost wholly abortive. The
unprecedented apology to the PLA made by leading members of the Small
Group for the Cultural Revolution early in September suggests, that the
Maoist radicals soon recognized that they could not take on the army as
they had the party; and PLA resentment and distrust of unbridled "revolu-
tionary" activity almost certainly was a major factor in the sudden decision
to curtail that activity in September."
The downturn In "revolutionary" activity was accompanied by a new ef-
fort to deal with the consequences of the "January revolution"?that is, the
consequences of the virtual dismemberment of the party. With one con-
spicuous exception, the methods employed closely resembled those of the
previous February; in a sense it could be said that the work of repairing
China's administrative and political structure was picked up where it had
been left off at that time. As in February, a major effort was made to recon-
cile and rehabilitate "old cadres," to tame the Red Guards, and to form
new Revolutionary Committees. Former party cadres were again urged to
step forward, declare for the Cultural Revolution, and take up new duties.
Implicit in this appeal was the fact that few cadres had done so in Febru-
ary, and fewer still in the intervening months. But from the Red Guard
point of view, what was important was that many cadres who had been
politically impotent for nearly a year were likely' to regain a measure of
authority. Many of these men had scores to settle; moreover, competition
for posts and positions would be intensified.
These were volatile issues, and indeed the whole question of what to do
about the Red Guards was very probably an explosive one. If they were
? allowed to remain active, the job of reconstruction and rehabilitation would
be immeasurably more difficult; if they were sidelined, large numbers of
militants would be alienated, and, more important, their political demise
would be virtually an open admission that the Cultural Revolution had run
its course. Even more important?critically important?the "rebels" had
close connections with leading members of the Small Group for the Cultural
Revolution in Peking, and although this group had been weakened in Sep-
tember,8? it apparently could still prevent any move to defuse the Red
Guard movement as a whole. Thus, only half-hearted efforts were made to
tame the Red Guards. Little real attempt was made to curb or end Red
Guard privileges, and, unlike February, virtually no troublesome Red Guard
organization was declared counterrevolutionary.40 However, some effort was
made to end Red Guard disputes by putting high priority on the rapid
? formation of "revolutionary great alliances," and the PLA was ordered to
help in this procc,s."
"See the September 5, 1967 speech by Chiang Ch'ing, in bCMP, No. 4I69, pp. I U.
"The weakening was effected by the political demise of Wang Li and Kiang Feng.
"An exception was the "May 16 Corps," but this shadowy organization was not a
major Red Guard group.
"See Central Directive of September 5, 1967, in SCM?, No. 4026, p.1.
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482 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
But the "revolutionary great alliances" were merely the first step in the
formation of the "triple alliances"?that is, in the formation of Revolu-
tionary Committees. This was made the first order of business.42 Never-
theless, progress in this direction was extremely slow, and this in itself is
a measure of the continuing difficulties that beset the task of rehabilitation.
By February 1968, only six additional provincial Revolutionary Committees
had bean set up, and only four additional "preparatory groups" bad been
formed. The pace has subsequently quickened somewhat; by mid-April an
additional nine Revolutionary Committees had come into existence, In near-
ly every case the formation of these bodies has apparently been preceded
by elaborate negotiations, almost certainly both in the province itself and
in Peking. These negotiations are not conducted publicly, but Red Guard
comments on specific situations, while highly polemic, give some idea of
the issues involved. The central question seems to be political patronage?
the issue that has plagued provincial administration since the "January
revolution." In the provinces themselves, disputes appear to center around
questions involving the relative merits, importance and prerogatives of in-
dividual Red Guard organizations, and, perhaps more important, around
the thorny problem of getting both "rebels" and "old cadres" mutually to
accept new provincial leaders. In Peking, the problem is to decide just who
those leaders are to be.
Until February the decision had been to accept the military figures al-
ready running the various provinces as the dominant figures in the new
Revolutionary Committees?a decision in effect to postpone more basic
political choices. Nearly all of these military men have been under some
form of Red Guard attack for months, but even more bitter disputes may
center around lesser figures drawn from among the rehabilitated cadres
and the Red Guard organizations. Yet even when Revolutionary Commit-
tees come into existence, disputes continue. Virtually every such provincial
committee?both those formed recently and those that came into being
early in 1967?appears to be under attack from without and racked by
strains from within. It is unlikely that similar bodies at lower levels, where
the committee-forming process has gone on somewhat more rapidly since
September, are immune to these pressures and strains.
In the past several months these troubles have apparently intensified.
Radio broadcasts in the affected provinces have become increasingly shrill
in denouncing "factional" disputes, which are frequently said to extend
into "leadership bodies." In late January and early February, Wen Hui Pao
was especially stern in condemning "factional crimes" which have inter-
fered with the functioning of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, but
it is clear that such difficulties are not confined to Shanghai alone." For
example, some kind of dispute between Cheng Kuo-hua, head of the
"IMP. December 31, 1967.
"The Wen Hui Pao editorials were reproduced by major Peking papers and given
national significance.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER 481
Szechwan "preparatory group," and Liu Chieh-ting, chief "rebel" repre-
sentative and number three man on the group, may be one cause for the
long delay in the formal establishment of a Revolutionary Committee in
that province."
Moreover, as the process of consolidation and rehabilitation goes on,
differences between "rebels" co-opted into leadership organs and those on
the outside tend to increase. As early as May 1967, warnings rare issued
to "revolutionaries" who had been elevated to leadership positions not to
assume the officious airs and bureaucratic ways of the party officials they
had displaced. The Shantung Revolutionary Committee actually issued a
code of behavior designed to correct such abuses.45 Still more important,
"rebels" in responsible positions now have something to protect. They and
the Revolutionary Committees are apparently being criticized by Red Guard
groups who have either been squeezed out in the formation of the new com-
mittees or who feel that they are under-represented on them. Nearly all
provincial Revolutionary Committees appear to be under pressure of this
sort,4? and as it continues leading "rebel" figures such as Chang Ch
chiao, head of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, find themselves less
and less spokesmen for "revolutionary" interests and more and more con-
servators of the status quo.47
The glue holding all these disparate forces together still appears to be the
military, but the PLA has itself tended to become a participant in, rather
than an arbiter of, the political infighting. Moreover, an army of less than
three million can scarcely perform the administrative and political func-
tions of a party of 20 million indefinitely. It is in this context that the ten-
tative steps toward restoration of a functioning party machine must be
viewed. For the major way in which the recent effort at rehabilitation dif-
fers from that of February is that on this occasion not only are individual
cadres to be reconciled, but apparently the party machine is, at least in
part, to be rehabilitated as well.
Since late November increasing emphasis has been placed on the task of
"party-building," which is now said to be an integral part of the "strategic
plan" introduced by Mao in September. 48 Leading figures are again being
identified by their party titles; discussion of the party's central role in
Chinese political life is again being emphasized. "Party-building" itself was
listed as a major task in the 1968 New Year's Day len-min Jih-pao editorial.
Much of the discussion of the party's role and functions in the official press
"In D^^ember, Liu was apparently downgraded?he dropped several places in official.
I. reported name lists?and seldom appeared in public with Chang Kuo-hua. In Febru-
ary he was restored to his number three ranking.
"Peking radio, June 22, 1967.
"Kweichow, Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia radio broadcasts have denounced at-
tempts to undermine the authority of their respective Revolutionary Committees.
"Shanghai has taken the lead in denouncing "anarchism and factionalism" and in
fact sounds much, more anxious about these phenomena than does Peking.
"The issue was first discussed at length in a series of Wen Hid Pao editorials.
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484
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
and radio has been remarkably vague and general, but several salient points
titand out. One is that the long-postponed 9th Party Congress will ap-
parently he held," at which time a new party constitution will apparently tic
adopted and such leading "renegades" as Liu Shao-ch'i, Tcng lisiao-p'ing
and P'eng Chen will be formally excluded from high office.5? A second is
that party cadres are eventually to form the "core and backbone" of the
Revolutionary Conunittecs---which means that the party's bureaucratic
structure will have to be restored in fact if not in name." A third is that
party officials in the military will probably play an extremely important
part in the task of "party-building."62 A fourth is that while considerable
numbers of Red Guards will obviously be allowed to enter the reconstituted
party, they will not be brought in en masse but will have to undergo a
thorough screening; former party cadres will also have to be screened, but
it is apparently contemplated that reasonably large numbers will survive
this process." Finally, the party bureaucracy will be streamlined.64
It should be emphasized that this scenario represents less a fully accepted
program of action than it does the pious hopes of those elements in the na-
tional leadership that have been pressing most strongly for a restoration
of order and rationality and an end to unbridled "revolution." While some
general consensus has probably been reached at the Center with regard to
an eventual reconstitution of party life, a program that so obviously assumes
the virtual end of the Cultural Revolution certainly cannot be popular with
large numbers of "revolutionaries," nor with those elements at the Center
who are most closely bound up with them. Transfer of real political power
to party factions within the Revolutionary Committees must deeply upset
many activists who quite naturally expect that, should it occur, the score
will be settled wholesale by embittered "old cadres"; some efforts are ap-
parently under way to reassure "revolutionaries" on this matter."
But this question is merely the symptom of a more basic problem, namely,
who will have control over the screening process when "party-building"
really gets under way. If the Red Guards are to have a real voice in the
process of rehabilitating party cadres, the process of rebuilding the party
machine may be delayed indefinitely. While this is not likely to occur, the
issue probably has not been settled definitely, almost certainly because the
central leaders in Peking themselves cannot agree on the matter." Some
"AFP, February 17, 1967.
"Ibid.
"IMP, October 21, 1967.
"Since the first of the year, frequent references have been made in official media to
the role of military party committees in "party-building."
? "Kweiyang radio, February 27, 1968.
"Harbin radio, January 16, 1968.
"Mao-Study" classes now being held all over China under PLA auspices are at least
partly designed to reconcile Red Guards to reconciled cadres.
? "In the autumn of 1967, wall posters claimed Mao had stated that Revolutionary
Committees were to be set up throughout the country by February. AFP, November 24,
1967.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER * 485
straws in the wind have begun to appear, however. In February Revolu-
tionary Committees were acting up in Hupeh, Hopeh and Honan, apparent-
ly without the usual, laborious, prior negotiations at the provincial level."
Although the Henan and Hupeh committees are dominated by military
figures, both include prominent party officials who were under very severe
Red Guard attack at the height of the "revolutionary" movement. And in
Hopeh the situation is even more interesting: The new committee is headed
by Li lisuelpfeng, former head of the party's North China Regional Bureau
and successor to P'eng Chen as First Secretary of the Peking Party Commit-
tee. Both he and his deputy, Liu Tzu-hou, were disgraced in late 1966; Liu
Tzu-hou was "dragged out" and paraded by Red Guards in early 1967.
Their rehabilitation hardly seems a victory for "revolutionary activists."
These recent rehabilitations are spectacular because they resurrect men
who had not simply faded into political limbo, but who had been quite
clearly disgraced. Yet while this development is almost certainty of con-
siderable significance, it probably is not decisive. The level of violence
and disruption is still high in nearly all areas of China, and the arguments
over place and position as well as over the future of the Cultural Revolu-
\ tion still go on." Furthermore, for all the recent smoke about' rehabilitation
of cadres, there still appears to be very little fire: positive information in-
dicating that much has yet really been accomplished in this direction is
lacking. Also, there is as yet no sign that the party chain of command has
in any way been restored; nor is there any indication that 'preliminary steps
have been taken to prepare for the 9th Party Congress. However, articula-
tion of a restored organizational structure for the Young Communist League
appears to have advanced rapidly since February.5?
Nevertheless, on the basis of what has in fact occurred in the past few
months, some speculation about the future shape of events is probably in
order. In the first place, if the party is to form the "core and backbone" of
the Revolutionary Committees, a party structure not noticeably different
from that which previously existed is bound eventually to emerge from the
rubble. This process has not yet really begun, but the outcome is not really
in doubt. The crucial issue is the staffing of the structure.
Here, too, changes may not be as great as once seemed likely. Since in
both February and September the fires of revolution were banked at least
in part because it was generally recognized in Peking that the administrative
costs of continued ferment were too high, the argument for experience and
"No "preparatory group" had been previously established in Hopeh. Hupeh and
Honan are less clear-cut eases.
"The fall of Acting Chief of Staff Yang Ch'eng-wu in late March seems to be in some
way related to problems within the Revolutionary Committees. His purge was followed
by a general attack on "rightists" and "double-dealers" who had "wormed their way"
Into the committees. This was accompanied by a denunciation of a tendency toward
"reversal of verdicts"?te? indiscriminate rehabilitation of cadres.
"Harbin radio, March 2, 1968.
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4136 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
administrative ability is likely to carry considerable weight as the party
bureaucracy is restaffed. Many old faces are likely to reappear in high posts,
although there may be some transfer of party personnel from jobs in the
state bureaucracy to party work. At middle levels, the need for experience
will probably also play an important role, but perhaps not quite ao many
cadres will return to the jobs they previously held. It seems quite,possible
that there :nay be room for some upward mobility at this level, end oecond,
and third-raaing officials may inherit important posts. In any event this
twents a teanonable11iy Imt it is no more than timt, At the basic
levels, the situation is even more obscure. A considerable number of cadres
in the rural areas probably have survived the Cultural Revolution relative-
ly unscathed, but it is at this level that the greatest infusion of Red Guards
is likely to occur. Perhaps a fairly high personnel turnover can be ex-
pected in urban areas, but here again we enter the area of pure speculation.
Those leading party figures who have been assigned major roles as vil-
lains in the course of the Cultural Revolution almost certainly can be
counted out of the picture permanently. Those who have been denounced
by name in official publications (as opposed to Red Guard papers and wall
posters) or in radio broadcasts are clearly beyond the pale. It is most likely
that such thoroughly reviled figures as Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing
(neither of whom have yet been denounced by name), P'eng Chen and T'ao
Chu will not even be given roles as "teachers by negative examples," but
will be excluded entirely from public life.?? If the recent events in Hopeh
and Hupeh are any indication of what is to come, however, at least a few
officials disgraced and humiliated by Red Guard attacks at the height of the
Cultural Revolution will finally be rehabilitated?although they may be
demoted and given lesser responsibilities.
Far fewer of the Red Guard rank and file are likely to be admitted to
party ranks than seemed likely several months ago." Many, but by no means
all, of those Red Guard leaders who have been co-opted into the various
Revolutionary Committees are likely to survive," but their relative standing
vis-a-vis "old cadres" and, at least temporarily, military figures on the
committees is by no means settled. And the same is true of those relatively
few party cadres who threw in their lot with the Red Guards and thereby
earned the title of true "leftists." The battles on these issues are quite clear-
ly still going on.
There have been enough twists and turns in the Cultural Revolution to
make all predictions hazardous, but if the picture just outlined has much
validity it is surely a picture of Thermidor. This is not to say that Mao
from the start has been conducting a charade and that many of the party.
"A wall poster claim, but likely to bo true.
'1Wa1l posters claim that Hsueh Fu-chih made a statement along these lines in No-
vember 1967.
"Two "revolutionary" members of the Shansi Revolutionary Committee were ap-
parently dropped from that body in February.
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CHARLES NEUHAUSER
487
peraonnel apparently disgraced in the paat two years were never in any
real trouble at all. It seems quite likely that circumstances?primarily the
sustained and unexpected resistance to the Chairman's initiatives?have
pushed Mao onto paths he did not originally expect to travel, but the battles
of the Cultural Revolution have been real battles, and the victims real
victims. Mao won most of the early battles, but only by escalating the war,
and the consequences of hie victories have boon eo grave, and the complica-
tions they have engendered so extensive, that in the end they have not been
victories at all. It is hard to believe that there are not very considerable
strains within the central leadership in Peking at present. These strains may
account in part for the slowness and hesitancy of the reconstruction process.
One major aspect of this process, "party-building," is beset by disputes in-
volving such questions as whether or not revolutionary enthusiasm or prag-
matic administrative qualities ought to be a primary qualification for high
party office, and whether or not non-party masses ought to endorse the
qualifications of party cadres. But these were the questions at issue when
the Cultural Revolution began. We have come full circle.
Yet even if we assume that these questions will be settled with a certain
degree of compromise and adjustment, according to the general terms out-
lined above, there remain several major issues regarding the relationship
of the party bureaucracy to the other elements of the Chinese Communist
system. The most important of these involves the future relationship of the
party to the state bureaucracy and to the military establishment.
Neither problem is new, but both are likely to arise in acute form in the
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Strains involving the interrelation-
ship of the state and party bureaucracies are almost certain to arise in the
Revolutionary Committees. These are administrative organs, supervising
many of the functions and services previously performed by the provincial
governorates; yet they are increasingly responsible for such ostensibly
party-controlled functions as supervision of propaganda, and they have ap-
parently taken under their wings such party-controlled organizations as the
Young Communist League. Moreover, party fractions are to be the "core
and backbone" of the committees. There is bound to be a confusion of
functions here surpassing anything seen in the past.58 In the central minis-
tries, however, the situation is different. These organs have continued to
function in the past year, while the party apparatus has been out of busi-
ness; party supervision and control for all practical purposes has ceased.
Reassertion of that control is not likely to be easy; furthermore, Chou En-
lai, who today appears to be a more powerful figure than ever within the
inner policy-making group, is unlikely to be overawed by any successor to
Teng Hs;ao-p'ing, as he may on occasion have been in the past. It is pos-
sible, but by no means certain, that he may resist a full reassertion of party.
gpmeenommommollmosni.e.
"Cf. Franz Schumann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 190), PP. 810 if.
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48a THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE PARTY
control over areas within the purview of the State Council.
Problems involving party-PLA relationships are obvious. The Cultural
Revolution has certainly not disposed of the old professional-political of-
ficer dichotomy, and in some respects the professional wing of the PLA
has been strengthened. Former commissars whose ties were primarily to
the party rather than the army have nearly all long since left the scene;
most of the commissars now active appear to be largely the creatures of
the several military region and district commanders." And those are the
men who in most cases are still running China's provinces. Moreover, no
officer known to be a member of the PLA's General Political Department
has appeared in public in the past several months." Yet it is the party
committees within the various military commands that will bear the major
burden of "party-building," for this is the only party "system" in any sense
operative; rather than having been destroyed outright, it has merely been
atrophied." In this situation, professional military problems are likely to
get a sympathetic hearing initially, but it is hard to believe that as the new
party structure is articulated, politics will not attempt to reassert itself over
the gun."
Beyond these problems there is the even more fundamental question of
party morale. The Great Leap Forward certainly had a deleterious?indeed,
virtually traumatic?effect on large sections of the party; it seems likely
that the Cultural Revolution will have an ultimate effect many times greater
on party morale at all levels. Thus far cadres have shown a great, although
perfectly natural, reluctance to "step forward" and resume their tasks. Even
after the Cultural Revolution is concluded, not many are likely to perform
with much enthusiasm or initiative. And animosities engendered in the
course of the "revolution" are likely to linger for years. These animosities
may prolong the "revolution" itself for some time to come, but the job of
picking up the pieces once it is over is likely to be arduous in the extreme.
The party organizational structure will probably be restored, but in this
sense it is safe to say that the Chinese Communist Party will never be the
same again.
"Most of these men appear to have made a career in the PLA rather than in the party
bureaucracy. When commanders and commissars appear together, pride of place is given
to the commander.
"Hsiao Hua, head of the GPD, fell in late August 1967. This entire development has
interesting implications with regard to Lin Piao's relationship to the PLA.
"Frequent references to military party committees began to appear in official media
early this year. There has still been no mention of other party organs. Of course the
army chain of command, to which the military party committees are related, has re-
rnained intact throughout the Cultural Revolution.
"This may have been a factor in the fall of Yang Ch'eng-wu.
CHARLES NEUHAUSER is a research analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington,D.C.
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The recent upheavals of "the cultural revolution" have made it harder than
ever to get reliable statistics on China. This economist reviews the available
facts and concludes that "Beneath all the shouting and pushing, there is the
unresolved problem of feeding and clothing the millions. . . . The cultural revolu-
tion has in the last two years moved to the issues of the people's livelihood.. ?
Communist Ohina:
The Economy and the Revolution
BY JAN S. PRYBYLA '
Professor of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
OMMUNIST CHINA has published
only one statistical manual: a slim,
? retrospective volume. entitled Ten
Great Years, covering the years 1949-1958.'
The figures for 1949-1952 are not very re-
liable because of the modest state of statistical
science in the country at that time. The,
data for 1953-1957 (the First Five-Year Plan
period) are probably the best of the lot, but
even here numerous technical difficulties arise.
Figures for 1958 (the first year of the "great .
leap forward," 1958-1960) were so exagger-
ated and fanciful that even the Chinese later.,
declared them to be totally misleading. No '
comprehensive statistics have been published
since 1959. Since 1966, the information
blackout has been complete. One could go '
so far as to say that the amount of quantified,
information emanating from Peking in the.
last three years would fit comfortably on a
sizable postage stamp. .
For a while (1961-1965) the Mainland
prcss carried much interesting discussion
about the economy. Here and there one
could pick up a suggestive datum, a hint on
what was going on in the fields of agriculture,
industry and trade. After 1965, this type
of reportage was replaced by inspirational
articles extolling the thoughts of Chairman
Mao Tse-tung. The language of these es-
says has become frozen by Maoist ritual. 'For,
a time, a study of the provincial press yielded;
some valuable information on leadership at- ,
titudes, since it was one of the principal
media through which instructions from the
` center were relayed to local authorities'. In
1967, the export of provincial newspapers
.witts banned. The Communist party's theo-
'
Approved For Release 1999/09/02
? retical organ 'Hung Chi (Red Flag) ceased
publication on November 23, 1967. In 1967
and early 1968, Red Guard wall posters could.
1.be resorted to in order to gain some idea as'
to the progress of events, but this source more
:often than not was contradictory and sensa-1
'.sationalist. In any event, curbs were put on:
?
? foreign correspondents' jotting'. down items,
from this .wall literature.
?. Businessmen and tourists supplied some
news but, here again, the information was of
liMited value. Travel routes were at ? all
I times strictly controlled, exception being:
-made for Communist sympathizers and others.
:whose? conclusions about China had been ar-
rived at beforehand. ? Following, the out-
:break of the "cultural revolution," the num-
her of foreign visitors ? in China declined
sharply. . . ?
:? There is; therefore, a serious' problem here.
Although Western economists have been
. trained by Stalin's .secrecy complex to deal,
'With this sort of censorship, the thoroughness
of the informational .blackout is unparalleled.
in the history of any modern nation. The
figures used in the present article arc Western
.estimates?informed guesses?based on tid-
bits of news issuing from the Mainland.
'SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A number of general principles about the
?Chinese economy should be kept in mind.
The designation, "planned economy," does
,not apply to China.. Like the rest of Chinese
society, .the economy in the past 19 years has
been run by a series of short-term expedients,
. typically assuming the . form of mass cam-
paigns. The only period which fits the des-'
ignation of Planning is 1953-1957. Commu.
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in various ways, among which po4 icy disagree-
ments within the top leadership should cer-
tainly be included. The major stages of shift-1
ing policy were the rehabilitation period
1,(1949-1952), the First Five-Year Plan ;
(1953-1957), the liberal interlude (late '
; 1956-1957), the great leap forward (1958-
1960), the period of retrenchment and re-
building (1961-1965), and the great pro-
letarian cultural revolution (1966 to the
'present). Each stage contained a number of
'minor substages, some of them mutually con-
tradictory.'Each stage also revealed policy'
:shifts horn right to left and back again de-
:pending on whether emphasis was placed on
\ :economic calculation or ideological euphoria.'
The cultural revolution, for example, shows
' at least seven such swings in the revolutionary
, pendulum. To some extent, these move-
ments are consciously directed by the leaders
on the theory of alternating tension and re-
laxation. Increasingly, however, the swings
appear to be spontaneous and uncontrollable.
? Like other underdeveloped economics, the
Chinese economy is not fully integrated.
There is a considerable clement of localism
and local self-sufficiency in the mechanism.
To sonic extent this is a legacy of the past
which the Communists have tried to eradi-
cate. On the other hand, not a few measures
taken by the Communists since 1958 have
tended to encourage local economic auton-
omy. The interesting point about this is that ?
it enables the economy to withstand upheav-
als at the center, to keep on functioning lo-
cally in spite of confusion at the top.i
The Chinese economy is "aidless." It has
never received any grants from abroad and
the last long-term (Soviet) loan was received
in 1954. China's external economic contacts
are based on cash (mostly hard cash) pay-
ments and short-term credits for the purchase
abroad of specified items. Two-thirds of the
country's trade is presently carried on with
"capitalist" powers.
At least since 1961, the Chinese economy
has not been "Marxist-Leninist" in the Stal-
inist sense. In the *U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu-
rope the Stalinist economic priorities were?
and to some extent still are?heavy industry,
light industry, agriculture. China's official
priorities after 1960 have been: agriculture,
light industry, heavy industry. This depar-
ture from the orthodox pattern was largely
dictated by the urgent need to feed and
clothe a rapidly increasing population.'
aiA_TREypintiogifsaiku8166.66615
e,conomy one must constantly ear in min
the cultural gap between Western and Chi-
nese conceptions of life. It is difficult enough'
to understand the workings of totalitarian ,
systems when one has not been exposed to
them directly and for corisiderable periods.
It is even more difficult to graspthe elusive
qualities of a totalitarian system imposed on
,a society whose values are very different from ,
ours, and whose language loses more than the
usual share of meaning in translation. There
is no civil or criminal code in China today,
nor are there any codes in other areas of law.:
The whole body of Chinese Communist law'
takes up just 600 pages of rather large print,'
3and most of the "laws" are, in fact, admin-
istrative decrees, many of them applying ret-
rospectively. The General Code of Laws of
the Ch'ing Dynasty made it a criminal of-
fense to "do what you ought not to do."
The Chinese, moreover, have a capacity for
!separating the public from the private face,
so that noisy expressions of obeisance on the
part of private individuals must at all times
' be viewed not only in the context of a sys-
tem of fear but in the light of a special ethic
which existed long before Mao and Marx.
AGRICULTURE
' At the end of December, 1966, the cultural
revolution was extended to economic life.
Red Guards and Maoist workers' formations
("revolutionary rebels") were ordered to take
over offices, factories and farms. At this
juncture, the upheaval in the "superstruc-
ture" (politics and cultural life) invaded the
"base" (the economy) . Since that time,
there have been several shifts to the left and
right, but the important point is that the
revolutionary turmoil is now common to both
political and economic life and directly af-
fects the growing of grain and the making of
steel.'
1 Scc Jan S. Prybyla, Why Lommunist s
Economy Ilas Not Collapsed After Two Years of
' Cultural Revolution," in J. S. Prybyla (cd.),
Communism at the Crossroads (University Park,
? Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1968).
2 Albert P. Blaustein, Fundamental Legal DOM ?
meat: of Communist China (South Hackensack,',
? N.J.: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962), and F. Ka-
linychev, "Democrdcy and Legality," lavestia,
February 12, 1967, p. 4.
, Jan S. Pryby!a, "The Economic Cost," Prob.-
terns of Communism, March-April pa, pp. 1,43.
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trancous matter is discarded, China's funda.?
; mental problem is seen to be what it has
always been: how to feed and clothe a grow,'
I
lug population. The economic answer to
1 this problem lies in modernization, that is,
[ the breaking out of the limits imposed on
productivity by traditional, methods of pro-
duction, and the application of modern sci-
ence and technoloxy to the economic process.
1There are various ways in which this can be
? done. However, because the margin between
food and mouths to feed is extremely narrow,
I
1,the range of options is for all practical pur-
(poses restricted to one: the development of
!agriculture. During the relatively pragmatic
period, 1961-1965, the Chinese Communists
recognized this constraint and applied them-
selves to promoting agriculture and indus-
tries directly serving agriculture, including
I ight industries supplying the peasants with
consumer goods. The importance of this
sector is, of course, further enhanced by the
, fact that .about 80 per cent of the Chinese
,people derive their living directly from the
soil. Help from abroad must for the time
!being be ruled out.
There are two hard figures to go on. The
first is the 1953 population figure of 583 mil.?
lion, the second? is the grain output figure for
,1957 which reads 185 million metric tons.
,Both figures seem reasonable and they have
been repeatedly endorsed by official China.
The rate of natural population increase since?
1953 is subject to dispute. Estimates range
from 1.4 to 2.5 per cent per annum.' If the
lower rate is taken, China's population in
1957 would be 615 million. The 2.5 per
cent rate is probably too high. Taking a
more reasonable rate of, say, 2 per cent per"
annum, the 1957 population would be 631
'million. Assuming a 1957 population of 615
'million and a domestic grain output of 185
I in 1957 works out at 0.3 tons. If the 2 per munist China Produce?" The China Quarterly,
,
UTC (707 million) and the higher grain avail-
ability figure 4205- million tons), the per
capita grain availability in 1967 works out
, 0.29 tons. If the higher population figure
takee (770 million) together with the,;
grain figure (205 million tons), the!
is a per capita grain availability of 0.27.
All this may sound involved, but the con-
t hision is simple; per capita grain availability
I a China MIS prnetivally the titanel WV ns
kt 1957, and this on the most favorable as-
tumptions. There appears to have been no..
visible improvement., It should be noted, of
ourse, that the' fact that the Chinese ClOra...
mmists have managed to keep up with popu.
4ttion growth is in itself tin achievement not '
Aimed by ell underdeveloped countries. On :
.,the other hand, the result should be qualitied
:least in three ways. ?
The 1967 harvest was exceptionally good;
, ?
,Irt 'fact the cultural revolution has so far un-
:rolled in good weather, unlike the great leap ?
,trorwartl. There are indications that in the
iast two .years water conservancy projects
have been neglected and that there has been.
an increase in illegal chopping down of trees
.by peasants.. One is inclined to assume 'that,
!:the Chinese have not yet won their age.longl.
! battle against the elements, and that any seri...,
ons adverse. change in weather is likely to
affect agricultural output much the same;
way is it did in the past
onitu distribution in 1957 was probably,
?better .than in 1967. One of the known
cf
i'feets of the cultural revolution has been .the
..disrttption of rail transport. It is possible,'
,...therefore ,:that local shortages of grain have
developed and. that this may, 'turn, have
:repercussions on labor productivity and the
Iwodurtion of livestock.
? There have been reports of widespread
theft flout storage bins and of distribtt-
? million tons, the per capita grain availability 4 R. M. Field, "How Much Grain Does Corn
L. D Tretiak,
cent rate is assumed, the per capita grain
'Population Picture," Far Eastern Economic Re-
ary-March, 1968, pp. 105-107; .
ailability in 1957 would be 0.29 tons.
? view, April 4, 1968, p. 14.
Now, if we assume that the average rate of5 The 1957 figure for population is based on
t he 1953 census The 1957 figure for grain output
population increase from 1953 to 1967 was Is from Ten Gr.cat Years, (
1.4 per cent per year, China's population in ; guages Press, 1960), p. 119. The 1967 grain
graal-
? 1967 would be 707 million (and 770 million, , fire:: ;.'eli estimatesn7P0a .t tii(;'1:aDoafwaca!,tsi ilo'n?). F.
:if the 2'per cent per annum rate is assumed).- Revolution," in An .-Economic Profile of IlLinlamnid.
filtraco(nWgraesshsinfg, jvoolliti Eco;r4,ch Committee,
CPYRGHT
Western estimates show that grain output in
cRenzwist:
.1967 was 190-200 millidn metric tons.5 To ? Intelligence Congress,
Quarterlyp'EcOnmeic
, .. . a`t Tit% ffoVitT Korea, Hone Kong, April, 1968, p.
this must be added 5 million metric tons of
see the article by Thomas Dow, Jr., in ti
issue.
fnurptlrloet?lclemis:
.1mpulted u,iairt, giving either 195 or 9fli cussion of M:i'nnias:1:1Pbc1:in'aPs. p93oPuYaotfo
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tin(.(1' grain to peas.mts by oflieials opprised
:to the M.toist line. It is also ilossible that the
quality of storage has stiffered and that, there-
fore, loss of g-rain: in storage has been higher
than in 1957.
One could validly object that grain avail-
ability is only one measure of food supply,
and that titPre Other commodities which
should be taken int() account. The United
Nations Pond and Agrictiltural Organization
, and other agencies have tried to quantify the
problem in fare of nflicial Chinese silence, but
?
the results are at best tentative. It is pos.
kible to say, for example, that rice output,
r'which was 86.8 million metric tons in 1957, .
+
J./reached about 88 million tons in 1966, that ,
...seybeatts, which were at 10 million tons in
11957, reached perhaps 11 million tons in 1966,
i.and that is a31.4 : It is possible that the
crease in the output of grain crops and .other..
i',.e.rops was due in part to increased per acre
yields--which would be reasonable in view of.'
-the increased application of chemical ford-
?IJlizers?but the evidence at this stage is ratheC.
`.ttaicertitin.
t-
The .overall contittsitm which emerges is
a per capita .grain availability of .0.3
,,.tnetric tons or thereabouts represents a satis-
factory present level, but that it will be in-
. treasingly difficult to maintain this level in
the future unless (a) a determined effort is
.-made to raise per acre yieltls, extend the cul-
tivated area and 'keep floods and droughts in
;:check, and. (b) the natural population in.:
:crease is brought under control. This de-.
:t?Inands some hard thinking unhindered by
dialectical mysticism. There seems to be, .
- 'frankly, very little room left for the kind .of ?
= ideological calisthenics Which the Chinese'
' :have enjoyed for the last three years.
A final note about clothing, .which means
; ;iprimarily cotton. The Chinese these days.
'are not given to conspicuous consumption in
the matter' of 'apparel. The millions are
drably but cleanly dressed. Cotton output
appears at present to be inadequate to cover
:anything but the most modest requirements
of domestic consumers and state exports.
; Total cotton production in 1957 Was 1.64 ml!-
llon
,
metric tons. .By 1966, it had probably'
:declined to 1,3 million tons.' If, as the Chi-
nese claim, cotton output in 1967 was better
than in the ,previous year (let ,us assume a .
20 per cent improvement), it may now ' be.,
roughly back.wherC it was in 1957.'
And sriin this area too, there is littic. room
left for ideo;ogical revivalism., There is,
'rather an urgent need for economic rational-
by, as Mao's Communist opponents have re-
peatedly said.
!FOREIGN TRADE
I: China's foreign commerce is the one sector
! about which the outside world has relatively
reliable information, simply,because it is pos-
' sible to get at trade figures issued by China's
partners. The country's total imports and
exports are in the $344 billion range, which
is not very much by world standards, but is
crucial for China. Again, thorn of interest-
ing but somewhat irrelevant incidentals, for-
':.eign trade is important for the Chinese be-
' cause it enables them to get chemical /era-
lizers and chemical plants and some Indus-
trial equipment which they lack, as well as
svIteat to fill the gap between inadequate and
mum nutritional standards. The chemi-
cals, plants and wheat come overwhelmingly
:from the Western industrial countries and
...japan. Australia, Canada, Argentina and
France are the major wheat suppliers. A
tons of imported wheat costs the Chi-.
ese $50460 million in hard currencies, so'
.:..that the annual expenditure on this item runs.
?- these days into some $2504300 million.
? Since the wheat deals are settled in cash
tor on a short-term credit basis, the Chinese .
'have to be very careful about their foreign
-.exchange reserves and about the way their:
'trade balance shapes Up each year. What
:China's foreign exchange (i.e., hard currency ,
reserve) position is at present, is anybody's
guess, but there are clues. ?
The Chinese have at all times scrupulously
:.settled their foreign debts, even in the face'
of unfraternal provocation by the Soviets. -
They have paid promptly. and in full, thus:
.esiablishing for tIzemselves a good name, if
.not a credit rating, in the world. Mainland
China today has DO outstanding debts, except
the usual short-term ones, which are settled
hi the normal way.
To pay for essential imports, The Chinese
have made a determined effort to promote,
! exports of agricultural commodities (e.g.,.
rice) and light industry products (e.g., cotton
fabrics, cement, simple consumer goods).? ?
China's foreign trade balance (commodity
. account) has usually been in slight surplus.
??????????*.-11.1.
Jones, op: cit., p. 94 and Economist Intel-
Unco op. cit., Annual Supplemtnt 1968,
5.'
Cf., China Netes Analysis, (Hong Kong), '
No. 691, January 12, 1968, pp. 1-7,
. .
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In this way, a small inflow of foreign cur-
rencies has been assured over the years.
An important source of foreign exchange ,
has been China's trade with Hong Kong. !
The Chinese supply most of the goods and
services (including water) which the Hong ;
I Kong population needs daily and buy very
little from the colony. The surplus is settled
by Hong Kong in pounds sterling.
Invisible payments (I.e., the services ac.%1
,count), such as freight and insurance and the ;
servicing of loans, are settled by hard cur-
rency remittances from overseas Chinese. It
I is estimated that overseas Chinese remit about
!,$150. million to Mainland China every year,
although the amount has no doubt fluctuated
and has probably dropped to half that sum
in each of the last three years.
In some years, recourse has been made by
the Chinese to bullion sales, especially of.,
silver. From 1959 to 1962, China sold in
London' about $50 million worth of bullion,:
and there have been no sales since. In 1965 '
, . and 1966, the Chinese bought some gold in -
!,London, possibly as a hedge against the ex-
pected devaluation of the British pound, in?
,'
.which China's foreign exchange reserves are:
Mainly held. China did not join in the rush '
on gold at the end of 1967 and in early 1968.?
1. Since the early 1950's, but especially after
the break with the Soviet Union, the Chinese,'
have extended credits to various non-Com-
munist developing countries. Most of these;
loans have been tied to the delivery of Chi-
nese-made goods, although there have been
few instances of emergency foreign ex-
change loans. As a rule, the loans are inter-
est-free and directed to specific projects in
the beneficiary countries.
; One of the disturbing side effects of the
'cultural revolution has been a decline in Chi-
nese exports and a concurrent rise in imports,
resulting in a trade deficit of some $50 mil-
lion in 1966 and about $200 million in 1967.
;The drop in exports is probably traceable in
' the first place to disruption in Chinese ports
and confusion on the railroads, and also to
; production problems in industry. Less sig- '
!nificantly, the cultural goings-on have'
strained
strained China's relations with a number of
trading partners, including Hong Kong.
Because of the continuing need to import
; wheat (in 1968 wheat impOrts are likely to
exceed 6 million tons), there is here again no
rocnr: for ideological exuberance. Most West
Asss sig.'s, ,
European countries are eager to tra c WI 1
Mainland China. Whether their eagerness
will be rewarded depends to a considerable
extent on China's ability to put her own
house in order quickly. Even Mao Tse-.
Tung, in his brief spells of economic ration-
ality, has come around to this view, A Red
Guard poster in Canton quoted him as saying
that
this nationwide disorder, including military clip
order, is to occur for the very last time. 'After
that, the nation will return to peaceful order, '
and the world will once more be in the hands,
of revolutionary rebels: The Central Govern- '
ment this time deliberately allows the existence
of this nationwide disorder.?
There is a non sequitur in this (Le., the revo-
lutionary rebels are the agents of disorder),
but it is at least more sober than the state-
ment made by Wu Fa-hsien, Commander of.
.the 'Air, Force, in August, 1967: "in imple-
menting Chairman Mao's directives we must
,completely disregard? whether we understand
them or not."'?
INDUSTRY
Industry, as well as agriculture, has been
plagued throughout 1967 and the better part.
of 1968 by problems of labor discipline. The -
authority of professional managers and local
government officials in charge of plants, of-,
; flees and farms has been undermined, and
in numerous instances the professionals have '
, been replaced by- inexperienced mixed com-
mittees of workers, rehabilitated cadres and
the military. In addition, the workers have
,been torn by factional disputes, some siding
with the Maoist revolutionary rebels, others
? with the anti-Maoist Officials. By the latter
part of 1967, the original issues had become
blurred; personal vendettas appear to have
I been at least .as important and frequent as
ideological positions in causing clashes in
factories and offices. The summer months of
1967 were especially violent, and bloody;
armed clashes were reported daily from most
J. S. Prvbyla, "Communist China's Foreign
Exchange," .'iteen's Quarterly, Winter, 1965, PP.
51 9-527 ; Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit.,
(Annual Supplement, 1968), p. 11; China Trade
Report, monthly issues.
:.0 Quoted in Union Research Service (Hong
-Kong), January 19, 1968, p. 80 from Red Guards
. (October 23, 1967) a newspaper edited by the
Red Guard Combat Unit of the 4th Field Army,
'Red Guard Canton General Headquarters.
10 Quoted in L. D. Tretiak, "Less Fighting
Talk," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 11, ?
,1968, p. 46.
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CPYRGHT
in d u s triklyppft veldt's the RiaqbAceivirlys9/
now on this side, now on that.11--Nstances
of absenteeism and resort to go-slow tactics ,
have often been mentioned in press, radio
land wall poster reports. ?
; It seems fairly clear that industrial pro- .
duction was little affected by the early ideo-1
'logical and power struggle phases of the cul-!
fural revolution in 1966: One gets the im- I
iression that output of most major industries
?in that year was somewhat better than in '
1965, although this is exactly what it says:
an impression. The Chinese have published 's
no industry-wide production figures, and*,
,Western estimates are based on scattered in-
formation from various plants and localities '
and on the general tenor of the reports. It
is possible that in 1966 China produced about
10 million tons of crude oil (1.5 million in ,
1957, and about 8 million tons in 1965), per-'
i
? haps 40 million tons of iron ore (16 million ,
, tons in 1957), perhaps as much as 12
14tons of steel (up a million tons. from 1965),
and about 250 million tons of coal and lignitel
(130 million tons in 1957, and perhaps 210
million tons in 1965).12 The figures, to re-
peat, are informed guesses and the most one
can say is that in 1966 there was no discern-
, ible evidence of an industrial crisis, and
, probably some improvement.
The picture changed radically in 1967,
, after the cultural revolution was carried into
the economy. A new note of urgency and
,worry was struck in Mainland reports, side,
by side with the usual references to "great
,upsurge" and "unprecedented achievements.",
'A socialist recession appears to have devel-
oped rapidly, gathering momentum as the
troubled months dragged on. The situation'
' seems to have deteriorated further in 1968, as
:the longer-term effects of the cultural up-
heaval began to be felt, chief among them
; the lack of competent leadership at the plant,
level, and worker restlessness.
? The signs pointing to a deteriorating situa-,
'tion in industry may be summed up as fol.,.
, lows:
; 1. In the winter of 1967-1968 a serious
coal shortage developed partly because of
fights, skirmishes, riots and strikes in coal
mines. At the Lungmen colliery in Loyang,'
for example, "civil war" had raged for sit
Months prior to February, 1968. Similar
trouble had apparently hit the Fushun col-
lieries in Liaoning Province, a major source
of coal for the key Anshan steel works. Fact
0012'' 11sria.4RdeaRNWEnzizaes1 in the coa
lames ' row Frfiegfille! I VI9A00106D110 6
' almost wholly dependent on coal fpr the run-
ning of her industry and railroa4; shortages.
in this sector were bound to h4e adverse ,
repercussions throughout the industrial econ-
2. There have been practically spo reports
in 1967 and the first half of 1968 from some
:4 China's most important industVal areas of
Szechwan and Kansu. Even during the cul-
tural revolution, when information of any
kind was scarce, good performance would
have been praised to the skies as a manifesto-,
tion of the inspirational power of Mao Tse-
tung's thought. A similar, information black-.)
out was imposed on the once much vaunted..
Taching Oil fields. For about two years pre-.
arious to 1967, Taching and the "Taching
spirit were the themes of a mass propaganda
,1
campaign illustrating the economic benefits
to be derived from Mao study. It is an in,'
teresting comment on the sort of data one
! gets out of China these days that, in spite,
;of millions of words written on the subject of
Taching, the field's exact location is not,
known to this day.
, 3. Anarchism, factionalism, groupism, sec.;
tarianism, "mountain-topism," and all the .?
other sins attributed to those who oppose the'.
cultural revolution, have been mentioned in
connection with the Anshan steel works and
in the steel city of Wuhan. A month after
the installation of a Municipal Revolutionary.'
Committee in Wuhan (March, 1968) "acute:
class struggle" was still being talked about on'
, the radio and in the press.
4. Urgent calls to "make revolution thrift-
fly" were being broadcast in the spring and:
summer of 1968. These appeals were ad-
dressed primarily to factories and farms.
5. Railroad transportation has been seri-
ously disrupted in 1967 by strikes, sabotage
;
and pitched battles between warring factions
of railroad workers and between workers and
,students. Particularly disturbing for the Chi,'
nese has been the paralysis which gripped
tho ir,rrinrit railway junction of Chem:-
11 Sec for example, reports from the Chinese
press in 'Union Research Service, January 16, 1968,
p.57 11.
12 Ten Great Years ? also Arthur G. Aslibrook,
"Main Lines of Chinese Communist Economic
Policy," in An Economic Profile of Mainland
)China, Vol. I, p. 25; IL M. Field, "Chinese Coin.
Imunist Industrial Production," in op. cit., Apperv;
dix C, Table 9.
13 China News Analysis, No. 697, January 23,
1960, pp. 1-7; ' '
CM(t1PrrRGHT
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6'
`16' rftitig
IDbecn reported, in vel e anguage.
6. Most analysts seem to? agree that the'
crucial chemical industry has been affected
by disruption in supplies and by labor disci-
pline problems. Almost complete silence has
surrounded the cement and construction in.
dustrics for months.
It is reasonable to assume that one of the
major issues In dispute between the Maoists
and their opponents?between romantic,
guerrilla Communists and the party and gov-
ernment bureaucrats, technicians, and man-
: agers in charge of the day-to-day conduct of
' economic affairs?has been and remains to-,
this day the question of economic incentives...,
Beneath all the shouting and pushing, there.:
, is the unresolved problem of feeding and
clothing the millions.
The Maoist utopians believe that increases:
in production and productivity are a func-i
tion of the political will, that asceticism and
' unshakable political faith can literally move'
;mountains, that apparently insuperable prob-
lems can be solved if only the spirit is willing.1
' Material incentives, the normal human de-
sire for a better life now, are seen by these{
people as dangerous manifestations of petty, i
bourgeois flabbiness.
The Communist pragmatists deny this and'
see in it an invitation to disaster. The
di-
;viding line between the two groups is per.,
haps not clear, but it is there.. From a vio.;
lent struggle at the top of the Communist:
pyramid, the cultural revolution has in the:
oljr: cui'lktrnIPIVAft?159666* b b t25 CPYRGHT
peop e s hve oo , as increasmg y e.
? IP
1 cornea question of physical survival. The
gap between minimum material needs and
availabilities is still being met partly by mi-
ported grain, but more and more by a leftist
philosophy of poverty which finds in destitu-
tion and self-denial the supreme human vir-
tue. ?
The trouble is that avail the Slightest maul.
festation of empiricism, in the state of China's
present madness, is branded las Soviet-type
revisionism. The time to reverse gear is now :
no longer an academic question; it is an abso-
lute necessity if so-called socialism in China .
Is to survive, and beyond that, if China is
not to plunge once again into bitter interne.';:
eine warfare.
CHINA REPORTING SERVICE
? 18 September 1968
PYRGFIT "Bump
Doubted
1
PEKING'S CLAIMS of "bum- I
per" harvests of early rice have '
been received with considerable
doubt by some qualified agri-
cultural observers. They point
out that the term "bumper" does
not rank very high on the scale
of past Chinese harvest claims
and may be an attempt to cover
up a 'mediocre, if not poor, crop.
Conspicously absent, so far,
has been any comparison with
previous years. And unlike last
y ar's early r harv t claims,
14 Colina MacDougall, "Nothing to Boast
About," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 25,
1968, pp. 221-223.
jan S. Prybyla is coauthor of World Ten.:
Istons: Conflict and Accommodation (New
'York: Appleton-Century-Crofts) and co-
feditor of From Underdevelopment to Al. ,
finance: Western, Soviet and Chinese Views ,
! (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts)
!Economic Systems: Market, Contmand and.,
His forthcoming books include Comparative.
Changing Custom (New Yeti:: Appleton.'
Century-Crofts) , and The Political Economy
k) ,
, Communist China (Scranton, Pa.: Inter-
national Textbook Company).
CPYRGHT
r Crop Clams
1 1 ?
no mention has been made of
expanded acreage or increased
unit yield. Additionally, pro-
vincial reports on the early rice
vest have been similarly
ue and stressed successes of
ous communes and brigades
her than province-wide in-
ases.
hese observers believe that
a year's actual production of
y rice, because of severe
ather and other problems, is
newhat below the 1967 crop.
ice is the staple food for
st of the Chinese people.
rly rice harvests in South and
ntral China and the central-
th coastal regions ? where
ar 0
usually account for about 15
percent, or 25 to 30 million
metric tons of China's total an-
nual grain production.
Floods, Frost, Drought
New China News Agency
(NCNA) claimed that "bumper"
rice crops had been collected in
Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Chekiang,
?Hunan, Hupch, Anhwei and
Kiangsu provinces and in Shang-
hai municipality. These main
early rice growing areas to-
gether account for about 80
percent of early rice production.
Although NCNA &tinted the
"bumper" early rice crops fol-
lowed good harvests throughout
it /tidal
uni ro,
Appro
vest!or
vws Gutayaisimmoggit
ed seed germination in some
areas in Kiangsi, Hunan, Hunch,
5:.techwan and Anhwei pro-
mnces." NCNA added that
"part of the early rice in Kwang-
tung, Fukien, Kiangsi and Hunan
provinces suffered as a result of
Nods" (see chart).
Although NCNA glossed over
the severe weather problems,
Kwangtung, the most important
early rice ?province, suffered
drought and frost at the time
of spring transplanting plus tor-
rential rains, serious flooding
and a lack of sunshine during
normal grain filling and matur-
ing stages.
Worst In Memory
Earlier, official provincial
radio broadcasts had reported
that the summer floods in some
provinces this year were the
worst in living memory. In
Kwangtung province alone, for
instance, more than 100,000
: tptirppirweght?ztAcpoesIckg618914T4
tze o bat e on( s.
, Drought conditions were also
reported by the official press
from Inner Mongolia, Heilung-
kiang, Shantung and Honan pro-
vinces, mainly in the northern
part of China (see chart).
Along with the absence of
harvest comparisons with pre-
vious years, there was also a
conspicuous silence on expanded
acreage or increased unit yield,
Indicating that there was little,
if any, acreage increase over
1067.
Although NCNA also reiter-
ated the claim of "bumper"
harvest g of winter crops, ob-
servers 'believed they were no
I better than the mediocre 1967
harvests. In 1967, China's total
early and late rice production
was estimated at 86,400,000
metric tons. Taken together,
the latest harvests of winter
crops and early rice seem to
have definitely fallen below
those of last year.
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
18 September 1968
. .
. SEVERE rains, floods, frost and drought have hurt crops in mainland China.
Farm Problems Pla
ONE OF THE most serious
and persistent economic prob-
lems for China's leaders is how
to increase the populous nation's
agricultural productivity.
The acuteness of the problem
becomes evident when it is rea-
lized that agriculture in China
accounts for almost 50 percent
of the national income, employs
about 80 percent of the labor
, force and provides a major pro-
,
portion of the country's exports.
Additionally, the size of the
ilyearly harvest vitally affects
! consumption, industrial produc-
tion, capital investment, rev-
enue, foreign and retail trade
and other economic variables.
An estimated 11 percent of
, China's land area is now cul-
tivated, and about 40 per-
cent of it is probably double-
cropped. The total sown area is
roughly equal to that in the
, United States. However, almost
all tilled land is located in the
eastern half of the country,
where there are sizable areas
with 50 percent or more of the
land under cultivation.
These areas include nearly all
of the North China Plain and
the valley of the lower Yangtze
below'Wuhu as well as parts of
the Manchurian Plain and the
Szechwan Basin. The amount
, of land in cultivation in the rest
of eastern China _varies_ widely.
Approved For Relea
: But it generally averages below
1 30 percent, and it typically oc-
curs in sinuous and relatively
narrow bands along the river
valleys and on the immediately
1 adjacent slopes.
i New Lands Opened
1
The cultivated area of China
has fluctuated within relatively
narrow limits during the past 15
years. Although new land has
been brought into cultivation it
apparently has not been suf-
ficient to offset the losses caused
by greatly expanded urban and
industrial areas, as well as the
construction of a large number
of reservoirs, and a number of
physical factors such as saliniza-
tion and erosion.
Most of the new land has
been opened in Northeast China
and in Sinkiang by state farm
1 and military resettlement pro-
jects. Although a potential for
opening new land for cultivation
, remains, most land that is not
' already in use is in marginal
agricultural area. Aridity, al-
titude, short growing season, and
other physical factors discour-
age farming there.
A reluctance of the Chinese
Communists to invest in costly,
large-scale land reclamation
,projecis ails! has limited the ex-
se 1999/09/02 ::CIA-RDP7
.?
we Chin
41
pansion of land under cultiva-
tion. Most plans for significant
Increases in agricultural output,
therefore, have been geared to
Improving yields.
:1
Basic Problems
The further expansion of
irrigation and multiple cropping
may increase output. However,
a substantial improvement in
agricultural productivity ap-
pears to depend more on the
greater use of chemical fer-
tilizers and the use of improved
seed.
Basic to all plans for increas-
ed agricultural production is the
need for better land manage-
ment and coordination of the
land and water conservancy
programs.
Rice Dominates South
The most significant division
in China is that which separates
the rice-growing southern pro-
vinces from the northern pro-
vinces that specialize in wheat
and small grains. Within these
two broad groups a large variety
of other crops is grown.
Rice is dominant almost every-
where in South China, where
about 35 to 80 percent of the
cultivated land is irrigated. In
tio151 Itatit56rdtro 1--5
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011:11
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(from Chinese Communist press and radio as indicated)
"In medical and health work, put
the stress on rural areas"
Mao Tse-tung, quoted by NCNA,
January 15, 1969.
During the Cultural Revolution, in an attempt to correct the imbalance
between town and country in the field of medical care, the Chinese authori-
ties launched a drive to move doctors and nurses from urban to rural areas.
As a consequence, urban hospitnls were left short-staffed and standards de-
clined.
In addition, the number of so-called "barefoot doctors" increased, but
many of these poorly trained doctors do not know their limitations and have
consequently endangered their patients lives.
The cooperative medical care system intended to improve rural medical
facilities is already suffering from shortages of drugs and a mediocre serv-
ice.
The regime has made a sustained attempt to discredit the "bourgeois"'
attitudes of city doctors and to reform their outlook and doctors have
been subjected to political indoctrination and even physical harassment.
Various disruptions during the Cultural Revolution have also caused short-
ages of drugs and a decline in standards of public health.
In an attempt to overcome difficulties caused by lack of facilities
in rural areas and the desire of many doctors to return to the cities, the
authorities, with some assistance from Army doctors, have emphasized the
use of Mao's thought as a medical aid.
The opening shot in the latest campaign to send medical personnel away
from the urban areas and into the countryside came before the beginning of
the Cultural Revolution in an instruction from Mao Tse-tung in June 1965
which said:
"Urban hospitals should retain some doctors who have
graduated for one or two years and who are not very ex-
perienced. All the others should go to the countryside."
By March 1968 this already sweeping directive had been extended by the
Central Committee, with the instruction that all 1966-67 graduates from med-
ical schools were to go to the countryside. This provoked a strong reaction
from the young graduates concerned, many of whom resisted it on the basis of
Mao's June 1965 directive - only to be?told that Mao's ideas were "lively,
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flexible and changeable, and should not be interpreted too narrowly."
Available evidence suggests that these directives have been rigorously
applied and Chinese urban hospitals have lost virtually all their trained
doctors and that the nursing staff and trainee doctors are doing what they
can to cope with this unprecedented situation. Certainly there is abundant
evidence of a massive influx of medical personnel into the rural areas.
The New China News Agency (NCNA) on December 7, 1968 reported that in
Heilungkiang over 3,600 medical personnel had recently settled in rural
areas and that over the past two years over 8,400 had done the same.
Kweiyang Radio on December 8 said that thousands of public health
workers had gone to settle in the rural areas of Kweiyange
NCNA on December 12 stated that in Kiangsi 11,000 medical workers had
already settled in rural and that 10,000 more would soon be going.
Canton Radio on January 4, 1969 reported that so far 5,000 medical
workers in Kwangtung had gone to rural areas and that "in some cases whole
units have been moved to the countryside."
Travelers -from China reported in January 1969 that because so many
trained nurses had been sent to rural areas, patients in Canton's hospitals
were required to enlist the help of relatives to look after them. In one
Canton hospital, it was reported in December that, about one third of the
staff had been sent to the countryside and therefore treatment was only
available to outpatients from 7:30 until 12:00.
In October travelers reported that 50 per cent of the staff at the
Canton Peoples Hospital had received a directive to proceed to rural areas.
"Barefoot Doctors"
In addition to the dispatch of trained medical personnel from the cities
to the rural areas, the Cultural Revolution has witnessed a great increase
in the numbers of the so-called "barefoot doctors." The People's Daily of
September 14, 1968 and Red Flag No. 3 both published a joint "investigation
report" entitled: "The orientation of revolution in medical education as
seen from the growth of 'barefoot doctors.'" It described the organization
of medical facilities at commune and brigade level and made suggestions
for the reorganization of medical education. This report described "bare-
foot doctors," as mainly young peasants with education up to junior middle-
school level, who have been trained in a variety of basic medical practices
either by two month courses at commune health clinics or on the job with the
help of commune doctors. After two years experience they are said to be
able to prescribe about 100 medicines, perform acupuncture, cure measles,
pneumonia, pleurisy and diagnose appendicitis. During the Cultural Revolu-
tion the number of "barefoot doctors" has increased.
2
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The People's Daily and Red Flag. articles proposed that in the future,
medical schools should take their students from among the "barefoot doc-
tors" and other rural health workers who will return to the countryside
after training.
Cooperative medical care
A further measure - cooperative medical care - intended to improve
the medical facilities in rural areas was described in the People's Daily
of December 5, 1968 as something new which has emerged during the great
proletarian Cultural Revolution.
The paper described how this scheme has been organized in Loyuan com-
mune, Hupeh Province. On the basis of actual medical expenses in the past
it was decided that each person should pay an annual cooperative medical
fee of one yuan. In addition each production team should pay 10 fen (cents)
from its collective welfare fund for each member who subscribed to the med-
ical service. Except those suffering from chronic ailments, each commune
member should pay 5 fen for every treatment and be given free medicine.
Canton Radio reported that a similar system had been established in
Kwangtung. There, each person was to pay 25-30 fen a month, forwarded
twice a year by the production team to the collective where any deficiency
would be made up from the collective welfare fund. The members were each
to have a card entitling them to medical treatment at the brigade public
health center. The cooperative system has also been inaugurated in several
areas.
The system however seems to have come up against obstacles. Travelers
reported in December 1968 that at one Kwangtung commune the system had been
started but that most farmers had not joined and if they were sick would
see private doctors. This was said to be because the new system suffered
from a chronic shortage of drugs and that the service was very mediocre.
Army aid
Two communes, one near Peking and the other in rural Kwangtung, have
both been "helped" by the PLA to establish a cooperative medical system
according to NCNA on January 15, 1969 and Canton Radio on January 11, 1969.
It was not clear whether PLA help was necessary because of opposition to
the scheme or because there was such a shortage of qualified medical per-
sonnel that only the Army could provide the necessary medical expertise.
The "revolutionization" of urban medical staffs
Along with the drive to send medical personnel away from the cities
in order to improve the situation in the rural areas during the Cultural
Revolution there has also been a sustained attempt to discredit the "bour-
geois" outlook of medical practitioners who wished to "stay in big hospitals
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and become great doctors" (Canton Radio, November 6, 1968). Many doctors
have accordingly been required to spend much valuable time in Mao-study.
Travelers from CarrtOn reported in early 1968 that it was common to see a
line of outpatients waiting for up to two hours outside a hospital while
doctors read from the "little red book;" at the People's hospital in
Canton it was reported in September 1968 that the staff had to study Mao
from 8:00 until 8:30 every morning.
Other doctors have been criticized and humiliated. In Canton hospi-
tals, according to travelers reports, so many doctors and other medical
staff have been "struggled" against that Worker-peasant teams had taken
over the running of the hospitals.
In the Kwangtung Provincial People's Hospital all cleaning work was
carried out by doctors under criticism according to reports in October.
The doctors wore labels around their necks reading "Guilty of manslaughter
by negligence during medical treatment."
In another Kwangtung hospital patients reported that 12 of the 16 doc-
tors previously employed in the obstetric ward and outpatients section were
assigned to the rural areas, and were replaced by six school drop-outs who
are expected to learn the profession by experience and observation. In
the same hospital the nurses and cleaning staff have also been interchanged,
in accordance with a directive calling for the "re-education" of trained
medical staff. Doctors who tried to point out the harm unskilled treat-
ment could to to patients were criticized. When the staff of the Kwangtung
People's hospital were informed that they were required to go to rural com-
munes for farm work by April 30, many doctors protested at the number of
patients who would be neglected if they went. They, too, were criticized.
Shortages of medicines
Disruptions in the pharmaceutical industry and of the transport system
during the Cultural Revolution resulted in an acute shortage of medicines
in many areas. In Kwangtung in early 1968 it was reported by travelers
that drugs had been short since late 1967, especially supplies of strepto-
mycin, penicillin, chloromycetin and tetracyclin. In May 1968 a shortage
of medicines was reported in Tientsin.
Drugs were reported to be in short supply in Kwangtung, especially in
Canton, from July until October 1968. Travelers in September said that due
to the serious shortage, patients at Canton city hospitals were advised to
attend hospitals for treatment until supplies returned to normal.
Decline in public health during the Cultural Revolution
The Cultural Revolution has also apparently contributed to a decline
in public health standards: refuse and nightsoil collections were curtailed
and rubbish was allowed to pile up in the streets. Mass meetings, rallies
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and long marches assisted the spread of infectious diseases. Reports of
epidemics of cerebral and spinal meningitis have been numerous.
Shanghai Radio on January 21, 1968 published a notice on sanitation
with particular emphasis on meningitis prevention methods. An Australian
student who visited China in early 1968 saw a Peking general hospital
notice board listing precautionary measures to be taken against type-B
meningitis. Travelers from Kwangtung reported in early 1968 that since
the beginning of 1967 type-B meningitis had been evident in Kwangtung hav-
ing been spread by individuals participating in the movement to "exchange
experiences." The disease was also reported, by travelers in May 1968,
in Kiangsu where the death rate was rising because of shortages of doctors
and drugs.
Mao's thought as an aid to medicine
On April 18, 1960, the Central Committee issued a directive on health
work in which it was stated:
"It is wrong to regard health work as a piece of isolated
work. Health work is vital because it benefits production
work and study."
In the spirit of this directive the authorities have sought to stress
the political aspects of health work and the importance of putting Mao's
thought in command. Many of the city doctors and medical staff sent to
rural areas have encountered difficulties in coping with the lack of facili-
ties and in changing their "bourgeois" desires to remain in city hospitals
where they feel their talents would be put to better use. The emphasis on
the use of Mao's thought as a medical aid is designed to overcome such doubts
and difficulties.
The New China News Agency on December 4, 1968 reported that in Kansu,
a rural medical team had "performed a caesarian section with only six artery
forceps and one scalpel," and that "a throat specialist of another team
successfully extracted a stone weighing 12 gr. and measuring 5 mm. in diam-
eter, from the bladder of a commune member."
The report added:
"All this proves that Mao Tse-tung's thought, once grasped
can work wonders."
NCNA on December 10, 1968 broadcast a People's Daily report on a tu-
mor operation in which it stated:
"The concept of 'incurable diseases' is not in line with
the thought of Mao Tse-tung."
5
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Medical personnel who, thus inspired, have undertaken risky and dan-
gerous tre44:tments are acclaimed by the press and radio. Army doctors have
featured prominently in such exploits and are evidently serving a propaganda
purpose in being specialists in the impossible.
On January 30, 1969, NCNA reported that doctors and nurses at Hsinhua
Hospital attached to Shanghai No. 2 Medical College recently saved the life
of Chou Teh-ming, a worker whose heart had stopped beating for 23 minutes
after an electric shock. On arrival at the hospital the patient received
cardiac massage and artificial respiration but he did not respond. He was
then given an injection of adrenaline despite "bourgeois conventions and
old medical 'textbooks?" which rule this out in cases of electric shock
because it causes strong contractions which may go into uncontrollable
fluttering and result in death. Twenty-three minutes after the patients
heart had stopped, it started to beat again. Five minutes later he took
his first breath.
Sining Radio on December 5, 1968 carried an account of an operation by
an army mobile medical team on a commune member suffering from a tumor of
the liver. Although the team were "understaffed and insufficiently equipped,"
they determined to overcome all obstacles with the help of Mao's thought.
First they cabled the hospital for instructions on how to handle the op-
eration and having received them, the team prepared for the operation.
"Lacking anesthetics, the team consulted the masses about
measures for anesthetizing the patient.... On September 23
the teams studied Chairman Mao's quotations.... They were
thus much encouraged. Members of the team took their pre-
arranged positions and carried out the surgery while Chairman
Mao's quotations set to music were sung.... The operation
ended successfully."
On November 3, 1968 NCNA acclaimed a PLA medical team using new
acupuncture techniques on deaf mutes at the Liao Yuan school for deaf mutes.
They tried an important acupunture point formerly called a "forbidden point"
by specialists, because to insert the needle that far "would endanger life."
After acupuncture for half a month 32 of the 157 deaf mutes could shout
"Long live Chairman Mao."
Hofei Radio on December 5, 1968 reported that the Anhwei Provincial
hospital had accepted a post-natal cardiac ailment complicated by fibril-
lation. On her second day in hospital her heart stopped. The medical
personnel on duty applied heart massage and artificial respiration for
25 minutes with no success. The medical staff feared to perform open-
heart massage on such a frail patient fearing that she would die, but
"the workers propaganda team and revolutionary leading
group organized everyone to study Chairman Mao's teachings
on ridding oneself of weak thinking and repudiate Liu Shao-
chi's line of having experts manage hospitals."
6
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Open-heart massage was then carried out successfully.
Peking Radio on April 7, 1968 reported that PLA dispensers with no
advanced medical training had operated on a child's crushed hand keeping
politics in command.
People's Daily on July 9, 1968 in a report on a Shanghai hospital
stated:
"Quite a few nurses can do appendectomy and hernia
surgery. In the neurosurgery department there are
some nurses who ... as a result of being steeled in
practical work have mastered the surgery of removing
brain tumors which formerly could only be done by
doctors who had had special training and a long period
of experience."
7
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Excerpts from China Mainland Media ' June-Nov 1968
Revealing Regime Treatment of Scientists
Warning To China's Nuclear Scientists.
Chien San-chiang, Director of the Institute of Atomic Energy of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences since 1958, has been denounced as a "capitalist-
roadar and secret enemy agent" who must be "toppled." (Canton Red Guard
newspaper, Red Flag Bulletin, No. I, June 1968.)
This attack on Chien, one of China's leading nuclear scientists who,
although he studied and worked abroad between 1937 and 1948, has since
held a number of political as well as scientific posts, reflects the
changed official attitude towards scientists and technicians seen in Mao's
recent instructions on technical training (Peking Radio, July 21) and in
reports on the experiences of the Shanghai Lathe Plant in adopting new
training procedures.
The emphasis in technical training is now to be on practical labor
at ordinary factory or agricultural worker level as opposed to theoretical
research which is said to divorce intellectual workers from the masses.
Foreign influences and revisionist views such as those attributed to "China's
Khrushchev" (Liu Shao-chi) are to be resisted.
The relevance of the latest instructions to scientists has been
clearly underlined. On July 21, the People's Daily, commending an investi-
gation report on the Shanghai Lathe Plant prepared by the New China News
Agency. and Wen Hui Pas, urged scientific research departments and "leading
units" to read it carefully as a "sharp weapon for further criticizing
and repudiating" Liu Shao-chi's i'counterrevolutionary revisionist line in
science and technology."
Wen Hui Pao warned on July 26 that the situation in scientific and
technological circles was "not satisfactory," and complained that "some
people" sought to put work first, indulged in personal ambition, relied
too heavily on foreign textbooks and conventions, and did not move beyond
the library or laboratory. They did not intend to follow the direction
indicated "long since" by Mao for science and technology. The newspaper
also complained that a "number of so-called experts, extremely politically
reactionary and completely ignorant in their work," had "usurped leader-
ship over science and technology."
And in research bureaus, the strata were "strictly defined" and the
"newly emerging forces," (presumably the revolutionary workers), were sup-
pressed. In short, the structure of scientific and technological depart-
ments had become a "hotbed for the breeding of revisionist intellectual
aristocrats."
Wen Hui Pao warned on July 26 that some scientific and technological
units had abandoned the task of "consolidating and expanding" revolutionary
great alliances and three-way alliances. Instead of struggling against
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"capitalist-roaders," they were divided by !'civil wars." A Special Edition
of Materials (published jointly by two Canton revolutionary groups and
recording Chou En-lai's meeting on April 20-21, with representatives from
the National Defense Scientific Commission, the Military Control Commis-
sion, the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building and the Chinese of Sciences),
dlsclosed that the "violent struggle of the Seventh Ministry of Machine
Building was connected with the factionalism of the Scientific Commission."
Both those departments are thought to be eeneerned with China's nuelear
program.
Wen Hui Pao laid down certain tasks for scientific and technological
circles. They were to
"combine revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation
'with the purification of the class ranks, with the task of
struggle-criticism-transformation in individual units and
with the rectification of the party organization, and carry
mass criticism and repudiation through to the end."
This sterner attitude contrasts with that revealed in the 16-point
decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Cultural
Revolution, adopted on August 8, 1968, which laid down that during the
cultural crevolution,
"the policy of unity-criticism-unity should be con-
tinued toward those scientists, technical personnel, and
working people; so long as they are patriotic and work ac-
tively without opposing the party and Socialism, and so
long as they have no improper association with foreign
countries. Those scientists and technical personnel who
have made contributions would be protected. Assistance may
be rendered in the gradual transformation of their world
outlook and work methods." (NCNA, August 8, 1966)
"Red v. Expert" campatzn continues.
Laboratories have also become a target of the new wave of the "Bed
versus Expert" battle now being waged in China. In 1963-65 during the
period of recovery from the three previous years,necessity caused greater
reliance on expertise, but currently the emphasis on the leading role of
workers has given rise to a new prestige for "Redness." Consequently pur-
.chases of technical equipment and money spent on proper research facili-
ties in 1963-64 are now being condemned as bourgeois and counterrevolu-
tionary.
Eight workers at a silk weaving mill. in SOochow, Kiangsu province,-.
who wrote a report on their investigations at the mill',s,laboratory
China News Agency (NCNA) on October 31, 1968), said that since it was 'set
up in 1963, the laboratory had been controlled by a "handful- of capitalist
roaders and reactionary bourgeois teChnical:authorities" who believed in
"letting experts rut the plant"i
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"These fellows were so free with money that they
bought a good deal of apparatus blindly, regardless of
whether it was needed or useful."
The workers also condemned the "appalling extent to which the labora-
tory laced itself above the masses," and concludiull
"The laboratory staff have gone down to do produc-
tive work on the shop floor where they are being reedu-
cated by the workers."
The story of the laboratory at Chuchou Tientsin Locomotive and Rolling
Stock Works was told by Changsha Radio (October 30). This laboratory was
established in 1958 at which time it was quite simple and in regular touch
with the workers. But in 1964, encouraged by official emphasis on "expert-
ness," the "reactionary bourgeois technical authorities" spent 8,000 yuan
on "a fine-looking laboratory" in the main building of the works and they
also built a second laboratory.
"These persons also made a big thing of buying instru-
ments, trying several of the same kind at one time."
The laboratory personnel were
"gravely divorced from production, sitting around in
their laboratories and going in for so-called creation,
invention, scientific research and theorising? They always
reckoned themselves superior to the workers."
The report ended:
"The laboratory staff must take it in turns to do
production and steel workers must take it in turn to work
in the laboratory."
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CPYRGHT
Victory for Maoism in Past Decade?
If the opening of the Ninth Congress marks
a victory for Maoism over China's more prag-
matic theorists, the events of the past
decade?the "hundred flowers" campaign, the abortive eco-
nomic "great leap forward" and the development of the ideo-
logical dispute with the Soviet Union (all of which reflect
Mao's guiding hand) were largely responsible for the disturbed
political climate which forced its continual postponement. In
August, 1966, Mao told the Central Committee: "We have
been preparing for a congress for many years; in all likelihood
it will be held at a suitable time next year". However, he
clearly had great difficulty in making sure of majority support
for his views, and the formation of the new organs of power, the
revolutionary committees, was continually delayed by factional
disputes, so that they were not completed at the highest
administrative level until September, 1968. Even today less
than half of the provinces claim to be "all-Red", with revolu-
tionary committees at all levels. These difficulties may have
been the reason why Hsieh Fu-chih laid down in 1967 that the
congress should start from national level, with the party com-
mittees being formed afterwards at the provincial and county
levels?a reversal of the old pattern in which provincial con-
gresses came before the main event. It means that the top party
organs are no longer supported by a broad-based pyramid of
reliable local organisations. The fact that many local broadcasts
still refer to persisting factional disputes, the prevalence of the
theory of "many centres" and continuing support for Liu
Shao-chi's policies, indicates that there are many problems
ahead in rebuilding the party at the lower levels.
NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1969 CPYRGHT
JAPANESE .TUDY FINDS CHINA' S GROWTH RATE STUNTED BY 3 YEARS OF TURMOIL
and other Asian tAddelb 4ftek
By PETER GROSE
4154,1146o Mt Nor 'Pork Votes
WASHINGTON, May 18?
Asian analysts see the economk
legacy of the Cultural Revolu-
tion in Communist China as a'
stunted growth rate, a sharp'
decrease in the supply of.
trained specialists required WI
industrial development and a
decision to gamble that moral'
inspiration can supplant ma-
terial incentives throughout so-'
These conclusions are drawn
in an exhaustive survey of the
Chinese mainland economy pre-
pared by the Japanese Foreign
Ministry and made available
here.
Even if the political turmoil
that has gripped China for
three years now subsides, the wou d have completed training
1967-68 if schools and tech-, by hinese Communist officials
report states the economic and, more jr.p.ortan,t in the re-
During Communist China's mil
first five-year plan, 1953-57. the
economy grew at an annual
tate of 8.9 percent. This Was
the I eyday of Chinese econom-
ic growth, benefiting from large-,
seek Soviet aid.
,The second half of 1968 saw'
the tart of a return to normal
ocon)mic activity,' after the
conf isiOn of the purge of the
governing bureaucracy launched
by Ctiairman Mao Tse-tung, but,
the ,cale of industrial and agri-:
culttral production last year:
is itimated at only slightly1'
? above the levels of 1965.
, Or e of the most striking ef-
fects of the Cultural Revolu-
tion detailed in the 76-page re-:,
port is the loss to the economyi
of 400,000 specialists who
Included in this estimate are
90,000 teachers, 50,000 doctors
and 140,000 industrial techni-
cians whose skills would be
considered crucial to an ex-
panding economy. '
"As a long-range forecast,
'the reform of the school system
and the strong tendency toward
'being red rather than expert'
are considered likely to have
adverse effects in the future on
the training and supply of
technical specialists," the Japa-
nese report said. "The slighting
of basic research will have,
particularly great effects ini
matters of military technology."
The Japanese analysis, in-
tended primarily for scholars
and economic policy planners in
Tokyo,? draws on data supplied
firite.inh can be gnIr morrtffar r NPAIVIsNecilYdVd c itio 4114V9115
4 per cent annually.
SI!
?
he. r ilti rAl rtwOlu.' mates an o n
take part le t
visits to the mainland. It is
believed to be more thorough
than any similar analysis pre-
pared in the West.
Tokyo, like Washington, does
not recognize Communist China
but, unlike the United States,
Japan conducts and is trying
to enlarge trade with the main-
land Chinese. In both 1967 and
1968, Japan carried on the larg-
est trade of any non-Communist
nation with Communist China.
Though the supply of physi-
cal resources for industrial de-
velopment is considered ample,,
Ithe capital investment available
to exploit those resources is de-
ficient, according to the Jap-
anese analysis.
"Internal investment in 1965
was only slightly over the
amount of 1956," the report
said. "There are no figures for
00060004 ter the Cultural
Revolution, but judging from
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CPYRGHT
tne fact that basic construction
came to almost a complete
standstill, the decrease in
amounts of Investment must
have been very large.
"Coupled with the low pro-
ductivity in the agricultural
sector, and in view of the esti-
mate of six months to one year
for industrial production to re.'
gain the level of before the Cul-
tural Revolution, an increase in
the investment level can hardly
be expected for some time to
come.
"The basic problems of the
Communist Chinese economy
are: (1) Low productivity of ag.
riculture is limiting the develop-
ment of industry, and () In.
,creasing the size of the work
force keens the problem of un.
employment constantly un-
solved,"
Unable to push forward rapid
economic development through
capital and technical invest4
ment, the Japanese analysts
stated, Chinese authorities
"groped for a reform of human
nature through the Cultural
Revolution u a method of 'set.
tling the economic problem."
' "The material incentive poll.
cy, introduced after 1962, was
criticized as 'revisionist,' and in
its place mental incentive was
emphasized," the report said.
'Participation of the masses in
?the management of enterprises
was promoted. As a result os
Ithis, nobility of . the spirit
looming to be stressed more than
scientific and rational judg-
ment."
THE ECONOMIST MAY 17, 1969
China CPYRGHT
Small hops forward
FROM A CORRESPONDENT
Mao has had his congress. But there Is
little evidence that this formal victory;
means' a retUrn to the economies' of the
1958 Great Leap Forward. The ;'olci
maoist goals remain:'the cult of the
commune, of self-sufficiency,"' of
of
decentralisation of industry, of ,
as against material incentives. But th<
reckless urgency and naive optimism with
which they were once pursued seem' to
have gone?perhaps, now. that Mao is 75,'
gone for good.
The economic disruptions wrought' by
the cultural revolution never, matched
those of the great leap, but there has been
a' toll. The recovery in industrial pro-
duction during the 'early, '196os was
actually accelerated in 1966, despite the
initial launching of the cultural reyolution,
but in 1967 output probably "fell by
between to and 20 per cent: ' The slide
has since been halted,- but' even on' the
most generous interpretation industrial
Production at the end of 1968 was,
reckoned to be little higher than in z 965;
and only some 50 per cent higher 'than in
1957. ' ' . ? `"
True,' agricultural production' has been
blessed by good weather and spared the.
full impact of the cultural revolution.
Many China-watchers now reckon that
the population numbers no . more than.
roughly 720 million and that annual grain,
output in the past four years. has, reached.
190 Million to 2oa?million tons.?
? These figures imply. ; that increased
availability of fertilisers and agricultural
machinery has more than, offset blunders
in managemenk and that r.1,;,,n v-rvy have
been, able to use part of its imports of
western , wheat since 1964 to rebuild its
depleted reserves. In this period China
has also, restored. its reserves of hard
foreign. exchange, . perhaps by now to
nearly .$i,000 million, the equivalent of
eiglit months' imports.from the West. But,
on any estimate, grain output per bead;
is still below ,the 1957 level. Moreover,:
Ch:na has. now had seven good, harvest
yea -s ;, and its crops tend to, suffer from
bad weather three . years in every. ten. ;
I si the recent spate of national
cam-
paigns, the most important include,: a
massive movement of people back: to the
c.ou ltryside (perhaps a. fifth of the 'urban
pop ala.tion . ,over . the next few years),;
the . transfer of, responsibility for basic
edu ation and health programmes in twat
arez s to the ,brigade or commune level
the decentralisation of factories producing
fertilisers, pumps and farm, machinery.;
and the narrowing of wage .differentials
in both industry and agriculture.';
AA 'this his, a very ,maoist .ring. But;
in r resent eircurnstances, the 'redistribut-
ing of population and the 'decentralising
of selected industries make 'some economic
sense. Even before' the cultural' revolu
tion compounded the difficulties, the crea..
tion of .new jobs in the cities was laging
behi id the increase in their pOpulations';
and' an underemployed. urban popula-
tion' costs more to? maintain than a rural
one. And, at a time when the weakening
of administrative 'machinery and the drop
in ? it dustrial production. must 'have cur.:
tailed the, Central government's' ability to.
mobliSe 'resources; it makes ? 'budgetary!
sense to shift some of the burdens of social,
welfa Wand capital investment, on to the
shouiders- of, loCal authorities. '? Moreoverp
there is no sign thaCthe decentralisation.,"
of industry is being 'purctHrorlelf.velr
CPYRGHT
although new factories are being set up,
as well as existing ones handed over, back-
yard furnaces are evidently out.
The campaign I to squeeze wage differ-
entials has gone farthest in industry. The
elimination of bonuses and reduction . of
skill differentials has evidently' meant a
real drop in income for many workers.. In
agriculture, the giving of points for cor-
rect political thinking has beenintroduced,
but this is apparently being applied, with
some flexibility. There is no hard
evi-
dence that it ,will have serious disincenl
tive effects......
??, Far more ?ominous are the reports corn-
ing from the, countryside of a renewed
emphasis .on, communes and brigades
rather. than , on the smaller production
teams ; of.consolidations at all three levels
into larger units; of payments in kind in
lieu of a portion of wages; and, worse
still, of ' interference with private plots
and with the marketing of the peasants'
sideline" production.
There are two 'qualifying factors, how-
ever. First the new emphasis on the brig-
ade'and commune may in practice merely
mean' making. these units financially cap-
able of running the newly decentralised
schools; and clinics.' There have been
reports of brigades taking a larger slice
of the ' income of 'production teams (t3
per cent instead of 7 per cent, ' it one
instance). But there have been no . signs
of the brigade or commune again becorn-'
ing the basic' rural accounting unit.
Second, the other reports of more radical
socialisation ?drives have been confined to
a few provinces, and usually only to. a
few communes or counties. These reports
suggest experimental sc:-..emes;not national
campaigns.. 'By Chinese standards it all
suggeSts that, for the present, the maoists,
are being allowed., only, to 'tinker ',with
not to leap in without .testing, the
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23 June 1969
CPYRGHT
The doubtful existence, of a
ne hina
itteports from Peking agree ?that
a new atmosphere! is about" in the
Chinese capital. The cultural revolution
has not been ended by the ninth party
congress and may never now be for.
malty wound up, since the evil spirit of
capitalism will always be, abroad. But
for the ordinary people the political
load has been lightened. Foreigners find
that shop assistants are more polite; the
train journey, can be accomplished
without the loudspeaker blaring out the
thoughts of Mao set to mimic or
otherwise; and if there are any Political'
posters left in Peking they flap unre-
garded 'on out-of-the-way walls. The
cymbals', and gongs, that herald yet
another demonstration . are no longer,
heard.
All this might suggest a new start in
I China. Are not ambassadors going back
; to their posts after more than two years'
absence? Does?this not mean that China
is resuming its contacts with the outside
world? Such assumptions are altogether
too sanguine. A new. China of some
kind may be taking shape after the
ninth party et:ingress:but its outline is
not , visible ? and its existence must
remain in doubt. The truth is that the
long-awaited ninth party congress told
us yery little, offered no prospects, and
thus far has given birth to nothing. As
simple proof of this one might take the
daily English bulletin of the official
New China News Agency. In the eight
weeks since the congress ended "the
headlined items in this bulletin have
been as follows: 13 'dealing 'in retro-
spect with the congress itself and the
campaign for unity in China; 17 attacks
or angry notes ? exchanged , with the
Russians, .and other attacks were on the
United States (3), India and Bulgaria (1
each). Occasions of support were one
each for Vietnam, Albania and Tenzer'
nia. 'On 11 occasions no items of news
was worth headlining.
That is to say not one single promi.
nent item has dealt with current events
in China, or future events, or economic
plans, or anything to suggest that
internal conditions have taken ,a new
turn. Nor was there anything in the
congress itself that promised change.
Where the eighth party congress in 1956
invited delegates from all over the
communist world, the ninth had none;
where the eighth published all the
speeches in a volume of 1,000 pages,
the ninth has given only the text of Lin
Piao's report and the revised constitu-
tion : where the eighth set' forth future
economic plans. the ninth offered a
justification and a defence of the cul-
tural revolution
future.plans. ?PtlapEitntitinFetritelea
. . , .
SE
By Richard Harris
STATE .OF DISARRAY
It seems almost as if tnese wings can
Wait while Chairman Mao, after all the
effort of the past three years, satisfies
himself that China has' been saved for a
doctrine .which is now precisely laid
down, even to the hyphens : Marxism-
Leninism-ao Tsetung '?
M' thought ".
One recalls Lin' Piao's rernark 'early in
the cultural revolution thatt" Chairman
Mao's experience in passing through
many events is more profound than
that of .Marx& Engels and Lenin.' ?No
one can surpass Chairman 'Mao in' his
rich revolutionary experience ".
Nevertheless the abiding, impression
is that China is still in a 'fair state ?of
disarray. The theme of unity pro-
claimed at the congressls being pressed
energetically and with an almost anx-
ious forgiveness. There begins to .seem
no limit to those who, if they show the
right 'attitude, can work their.w.ay hack
Into thejold. .".Those who committed
:serious Mistakes but are not i?ncor-
irigible'! ! Should be kindly treated;.
." those ? 'Who committed the errors
characteristic Of the capitalist-roaders in
'power but are not, absolutely unrepen-
tant ?4 is another category that would
seem to collect. those who fell through
the mesh of the first definition.
One of the difficulties is ?that those
who were the. first to declare for
revolutionary Maoism resent taking
back into the ranks those they criti-
cized; nevertheless they are 'told that
they should '! warmly -welcome those
comrades who have caught upfrom
behind ". The gatherings,, at which this
campaign of reconciliation and unity is
being pressed s provincial.'party
conferences "at which? some kind of
accommodation Is 'being hammered out
between the old party organization ?and
the new revolutionarsre? committees.
What will come out of it it is impossible
to, say. "Unity ,in sonic units is not
ctinsolidated". ? we read; ? elsewhere
bourgeois factionaligrn ',' is as rampant
as ever; revolutionary :committees still
have to be told that 'it is. -" positively
impermissible to consider,. Well-inten-
tioned criticism ? from' the masses As
sabotage by the?cnemy".
The divisions in the country, in the
centres of political power at least, seem
as bad, if not as violent, as they were
during the cultural revolution. If the
revolutionary committees Which are,
supposed to be the, Maoist rcpresenta-
iioet ?r el ArT
loggerheads h.ys ve ntrid
llOti
success of the .cultural revolution in
substituting for a corrupted bureau-
cracy dedicated revolutionaries In the
image of Chairman Mao. ? ?
Flow ihn f hInn rillorl rnnnyr
;? Well not by the Chinese Communist.
Party at least ", said one close student
to whom I put. the question in Hong-
;kong a few weeks ago. Certainly at the
centre 'this seems to be true. China's
'inner cabinet must now be regarded as
the standing committee of the political
bureau in which Mao, Lin Piao and
Chou En-lai are the awkward triutrivi-
rate backed by Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's
faithful secretary and spokesman, and
K'ang Sheng, the shadowy, ex-Comin-
tern, ex-intelligence chief. Three. men
over 70, two in their sixties. There is an
obvious gap between these five and the
?rest, of the political bureau, 'made up
mostly of army officers who have been
picked by Lin Piao, plus Mrs. Mao and
Mrs. !Lin. It does not look a body to
compare in ex perience .and , homogeneity
'with the men who formed the old
politieal bureau. ? "
The Same iS true of the'central
committee. The committee elected at
the eighth party. congress. in 1956 were
men of long revolutionary experience in
party,: army and government; 'men
whose positions for the ?'most part
gave them power. The new central
committee Is very different. Almost half
.of the total of regular' 'and alternate
members are .military," many of, them
men of' power in the military regions
and' :revolutionary, committees . they
heard, .but not possessed of power at the
centre by their membei:ship, of the
central committee.. The rest iS made up
'of survivors Of the old Committee?too
,old and too ineffective in some cases to
represent a Ihreat-together With .battle
'heroes, 'Tibetan liberated serfs, revolu-
tionary 'ballet idancers and model, peas-
ants, members of -a ,Maoist chorus to
fill up the back of the stage. ' : ? ?
' So an oligarchy at the centre of Mao,
Lin and Chon,li:as'''Sertiehow ,to hold
the loose reitis that -reach .out to the
provincial reVolutiOtiary committees
and the refurbished provincial party
organization.. Coaxing'. and,' exhorting
rather than sharp orders promptly
obeyed Will, be the Manher' .of rule in'
Mao's new China?bin then the cul-
tural revolution revealed how much this
had. been true' of Mao's old China 'too.
It will not be exceptional or, necessarily
disastrous. The imPulse: to .unity,'?,will
iernain :strong in China where it has
been Inculcated for centuries past,. ? An
94A6005000400044 nor any politi,
cal foundation;' had such a conceit
3 .
cpApowed For Release 1999/09/02:
existed the opposition to Mao would
have swept him aside long before 1966.
Thus the' struggles that continue at
lower levels are struggles for power at
the provincial level as, the old 'cadres
and the new rebels cornpete. Whatever
leaders emerge will certainly go on
paying tribute to Mao and his thoughts
while firmly adapting Mao's instruction
to the conditions Of their own area' and
the realities they face as rulers..
?
NOTHING, STANDARDIZED
As for the transformation of society
that Mao dreams 'about there is little
that can be said for the moment. The
gulf between town and country, be-
tween intellectual and peasant, between
ruling bureaucrat and obedient masses,
YOMITITRI , Tokyo .
20 February 1969
R ALITYwasin
By' Edward Neilan
'Cl
CIA-RDP79-01194A000500060001-5
? CPYRGHT
will not have been obliterated by three
years of shouting, still less by the
millions of discontented secondary
school and university graduates who
have been "sent to the , countryside ".
New plans for education, reshuffling the
structure of communes, the approved
size of .the private plot, revising the
? peasants work points, self-help in a new
health service?on all these fragments
of information come from different
parts of the,.Qountry and the only
conclusion is that nothing is yet stan-
dardized. The probability is that noth-
ing 'ever will be standardized while a
man Who 'dislikes inttitutions: and has
no real idea of' how they function
stands alone at the centre insisting that
he and, he alone tnust ' be the symbol
and the guide of the new China. .rf
CPYRGHT
.7t1 AIS.2ND?RAT
ornmunIst unina s economy,
for all the regime's propaganda
trumpeting about its dynamism,
is Asia's prime- stretcher case.
In this 20th year of commu-
nist rule on the mainland, there
is not even the slightest hint
'available that China's present
leaders have come up with a
'solution to the problem of the
nation's plodding economy:
"The Thoughts of Chairman
Mao Tse-tung" have perhaps
motivated some Workers at low,
er lets but there are no,. clues
In production figures to suggest
that the chairman's pep talks
have obtained results beyond
short-term hypnosis.
, Communist China's economiC
stagnation is all the more
shocking when viewed from the
free world's second biggest pro-
ducer in terms of gross national
product (GNP).
1 The result is that Communist
China, which looks very strong
and foreboding on 'the map, is
really a second-rate power. It
simply does not have the econ
noinic'wherewithal to .be other-
Wise.
; These considerations are in-,
Creasingly important ,as more
and more discussions are being
held on the future of Asia, the
US role in Asia, and the con-
cepts of one, two or three
Chinas.
Communist China's economic,
growth is expected to creep
along at an unspectacular four,
Percent: for the next few' years,.
according to a report by the
japanese Foreign Ministry.
I The Japanese report concurs
with information available in
}Tong Kong to the effect that a
measure of political stability is
returning to China after the
tumultuous cultural revolution.
But its agricultural produc-
tion in 1968 is believed to have
'fallen short of the 1907 level
of 2,000,000 tons, This is due
partly to floods and drought in
different parts of the country'
last June 'and July and to the
shortage of fertilizer.
Industrial output is estimated
to have dipped by 10 to 15 per
cent last year.
Some comparisons and trade
figures help reveal ,the plight
of China's economy.
One example is steel output.
China's production is around
12,000,000 tons annually or
about one-fifth of Japan's pro-
duction.
Annual oil consumption
figures ard revealing also. Per
capita usage of oil in China is
eight to 1 gallons, compared
to 1,800 gallons per capita in
the US, 800 gallons in the So-
viet Union and 200 gallons in
-Japan.
' China's modest -progress in
'industry, furthermore, has been
mostly borrowed from abroad:
Complete "turn-key" plants
have been set up but these
have apparently not made a
demonstrable effect on the eco,
nomy.
The World Bank estimated
China's per capita income In
1966 at $95. That's below the
figures for such countries as
Cambodia, Ceylon and Thailand,
Nationalist China, by con-
trast, had a per capita income
of $189 for 1966 and $209 for
1967.
China's foreign -trade declin-
ed in 1968 for' the second
straight year, a development
directly traced to the cultural
revolution.
The Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO), 'survey,
Ing Communist China's trade
with its most important non.
communist trading partners,
noted a 17.8 percent decline in
China's total trade in the first
six months of 1968.
Exports fell by 1:3.5 percent
and imports dropped by 22.1
perat in that period. The
treed for the last half of 1968
suggests no upturn.
Trade with communist coun-
tries also has slowed. UN
figures show that trade be-
tween the Soviet Union and
Communist China in 1908 fell
to five percent of its peak level
in 1950.
Less aid to No'rth' Vietnam.
Peking's cutback of aid to
North Vietnam 'has been wide-
ly interpreted as an indication
of China's, displeasure at Ha,
noi's participation in the Paris,
peace talks. But it is- entirely
possible, in view of the sober.
production figures for. last year,
that the cuts were made partly.
out of necessity.
. And what about food?
The problem to end all prob-
lems?population growth?keeps
increasing no matter what pro4
grams Peking tries. The dif&
culties in feeding 750 million
people are Sharpened by domes-
tic production sluggishness and
the trolde imbalance that is
growing as China imports food,'
The question arises-of China's
long-range potential for eco-,
nomic power and political,
strength. But the answer does
not come easily. It could be.
that China, is .involved in
downward spiral with whicli
the present regime cannot cope:t
All of these, points loom as
important in realistic evalua-J
tions of China's future, botW
politically and economically.
Questions such as these arise: ,
Can the free world afford to'
bring China back into the
world? Conversely-, can it afford. I
not to?
These questions about the'
future potential of China can!
be debated another day.
On the firmer ground of pre-',
sent-day realities, the verdict'
has to be that Communist
China now is a second-rate
power with fourth-rate eco-
nomic management.?CNS,
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9
igrevolEs n. snover
By PETER T. KUMPA
CPIRGHT
!-fon Kon"k
N the early, conspiratorial ays
? communism, party congresses were held
so that opposing factions could slug it ott
and decide the next stage of the revolt),
tion. In recent years, ruling parties have
staged elaborate congresses to give mes
chanical approval to major decisions al.
'ready reached by a small inner circle o
career bureaucrats and theoreticians.
The ninth national congress of. the
Chinese Communist party apparently had
elements of the old and the new.
Becauge of the time involved (24 days);
the rumor-proof secrecy (no one discov?
ered in which building meetings were
held) and the visible preparations, whick
seemed to have anticipated a shorte ?
, meeting, it is reasonable to conclude tha
there was disagreement. The untidy state
of the party just before the tongresi
virtually guaranteed conflict. ; ?
As the congress publicly produced ex
achy what was expected of it, it could bc ,
described as staged. There was mon i
planning evident, however, in the nois3\
celebrations of hundreds of. millions o
Chinese this past week in the sweaty
hysterical spectacle that ancient lanc
produces.
Mao exalted
The hoarse throats and the. hypnotic
. chanting slogans that marked the `victon'
?ry" of the congress were largely saluting ,
.. the one man who still dominates China ??
; with his will and personality. He is Mao
?! Tse-tung, at 75 the deified father-figure of-:
the country.
' ? 4
Mr, Mao was continued as the leader,
? the party chairman. Better still, the con-
gress elevated him officially to the same ,
exalted philosophical rank a5 Marx and',
Lenin, a promotion that the Chinese can ,
take pride in, and the rest of the Coin-,
munist ruling parties (except the Albani-
ans) can reject.
The congress gave China a new faith.
It was not called "Z?laoisrn," which would
be too simple and undignified. Rather it
was called "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse
tung thought." .And it confirmed Lin -
Piao, the quiet military strategist With
.the heavy eyebrows, the most faithful
conduit of Chairman Mao's ideas, as his
successor.
? More of. the same
Disposed of was a
no
Disposed
(IT eleatesils999109lina cd41 1
2,1a
79-0
party during the cultural revolution. ,The Neal fami was avertea by the bureau plunged China Into 'economic despair..'
For the future, the congress promised
China me of what it has hod during the.
past sevcral years. The cultural revolu-
tion was "victorious" but not yet ended.
Massive :ampaigns of ideological educa-
tion were going to be dosed out as cures
.for all tilt country's
This wr s all that was produced in three
sober, la .gely 'sterile communiques, the
new and somewhat vague constitution
and finaLy the list of 279 names that
comprised a new central committee.,
Egalitarian dream
?
The ccngress .was, of course, much
more then that. With gale winds of
change I lowing through China, it ap-;
peered to be one of the'last, great scenes,
in the second revolution of Mao Tse-tung.
Nearly 29 years before, Chairman Mao'
had proclaimed the People's Republic of:
China, th fruit of a guerrilla revolution.
and civil war, for Which he could thank
hated fol eign invaders and a softened
and corroded Nationalist' opposition.
Though Chairman Mao led it, that was a
revolutior from below, relying on Ehe
messes o millions of posir or disaffected
Chinese.
'A corn )rex man, Chairman Mao has
simple but utopian goals. Not only has he
worked t) restore China to its ancient
greatness but he was also driven by the
dream of an egalitarian China, free front
the hated exploitation of the past?a land
where tit( worker and peasant would be
as culturc d as the intellectual who would
also do m mual labor., '
Hatred had driven Chairman Mao to
despise rr andarins of any persuasion. He
considered them a ? bureaucracy out of
touch will, the people, snooty intellectuals
quoting classics, seeking special pay and
special pn.vileges.
'Slum bid on "great leap"
Success in guerrilla war, in mass edu-
cation anc in propaganda techniques had
convinced Chairman Mao that he could
"remold the majority into new men." He
believed hat subjective will could be
turned int) objective force. With some-
thing like 500,000,000 backward, supersti-
tious peasants living barely above sub-
sistence in a tired land, China profited by
a Mao preaching the impossible.
Chairmai Mao's techniques worked un-
til the "g-eat leap
forward" when's
Mr. Kompa oltiof of The knee Hoag
Kong Bureau.. . . _
policies to pull China slowly back togeth-
er. Chairman Mao never admitted his
error but fought back to wipe out exactly
What he feared would ruin his purist
dreams. '
. Peasants were thriving with their nri-
vete plots, private pigs and private mar-
kets. Workers were getting incentive pay
rather than laboring for the ideological
glory. The party was full'of experts and
managers, drifting from Chairman Mao's
Idealized contact with the masses. Chair-
man Mao never saw nor wanted to sea
that China was progressing, ?just, as he
never cared to see Russian progress. All
he could sea was his egalitarian: vision.
being destroyed by his old comrades irt
arms. , ; .
Party defeated
By 1962, he was-striking back. Wlaat'tho
outside world saw as a conflict between.,
ideologues and, pragmatists was the be-
ginning of Chairman Mao's accond reps-
lution. By 1966, Chairman Mao alone
carefully ripped off the head of the party
he had built and slashed .at its innards;
using Red Guard students and his mass
techniques of rebellion.
'The giant party of 18,000,000 members
that controlled every aspect of Chinese
life fought back, but in the end it fell
?defeated. Down went most of its leaders,
Liu Shao.chl and others, denounded as
traitors. History was rewritten to Show.
they had opposed .Chairman Mao foe
years, when all they had done in fact was'
to jolly him along. ci
?
Chairman Mao had to call in Lin Pia,
and.. the army to maintain order. Tho;
military is still there, on farm and in,
factory, to put down resisting "class enc.:
rnies.' The chairman had to entice back,
cadres, who finally restored some sembl,
ance of administration through the;
"three-way" revolutionary committees,.
.along with the military and some of the
revolutionaries. But it took two long'
years.
? I
Rebuilt in Mao's fashion
? The process was to toughen "millions"'
of Chairman Mao's "heirs of the revolu-
tion. The price was a setback in Indus.'
N9400005000600 Odliefti on for.
e country's youth and the planting ot
vage rivalries aecp unna's labric. it
cost Chairrnrin Tann tohnfounr, ft-lift% +1-in
illegality of the , th
congres.s legitimized the new rulers. .
itirnoci fn nrnarnniin
CPYRGH4
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intellectuals had In.him:
Still the more difficult task was the'
rebuilding of the party, for nothing elsd
has been able to run China's 700,000,0001
people. The rebuilding has to. be done'
from the top. The congress was the he
ginning of that process, but it Is 1)64
done in Chairman Mao's' way. This will
not be easy, for the congress showed it
could agree on honoilng Its old loader but'
nothing else.
, It 'said nothing about education, , agrk
culture, health or industry. For its Polit.
burn, it could not even agree on a peck=
lag order below Chairman Mao and Mr..:
Lin. Prescribing more and more Mao.'
study, it seemed as if , the 75-year-old
leader had decided to start all ?vet' again
to convince the country of the righteous..
THE klialNIOMIST
3 .Ma.y 1969 .
a 0;
CPYRGHT
and the FAIn
1111)
ness of his ways:
Time, it seems,, has caught up with a
figure as heroic as Chairman Mao hag
b2en for his China. His ideas are essenj
'tinily rooted in the past. He talks of
modernization, but he opposes just' what
China needs: the experts to run a modern
'economy. Chairman Mao's ideal of pond,'
eally loyal workers who think and Intel.?
lectuals who work just is not good
enough. Undoubtedly, Chairman Mao wit's'
told this behind the closed doors of the
ninth congress. From what was said;
publicly, he is not convinced. .
? Communist China therefore faces an'
uncertain unstable future. Chairman
Mao's heirs today are a group of un-
known, inexperienced, unsophisticated
military men. And it is too Late to have A.
third Maoist revolution..
men
The great man and his chosen heir' naturally came.out,on top again at China'
ninth party congress?but there was quite a bit of a dust-up' ?
in the lower ranks of the communist hierarchy
Almost everything about . China's.ninth 'party Congress
predictably, Maoist. ? Lin Piao's political.report; 24,000 words
long, which was published on Monday; was a 'catalogue of
;familiar Maoist'themes, from . the need for Ceaseless'classi?.!
? struegle at?home to strong support for revolution abroacli.:-The:::::
inew party constitution; essentially sliC same ? as earlier arafty;
versions; .a. Maoist prescription. for an antk-bureancratiCi4
bureaucracy. And, the me%) pt Y leadership; selected last
j week, was similarly dominated by, Mao and ilis'.men:?"i
:f which men they would be was anything but' predictable.
? :
The publication of the membership roste'r Tor Peking's neWv?;;
.; central committee ended' the' mYstery.4bout -the. p'rolongationl
. ,
:iof, the congress to 24 days. .Nine of these days were Fvidently
occup by y a complex and controversial election process.
Instead of the expected' routine translation of the 176-man ;
congress presidium into the central committee, the new..
;Icentral committee emerged as a greatly enlarged body of 17o
full members and 109 alternates which .did not even include"
,?
36 members of the presidium. And the most startling thing.,
about the new central committee was that for the first time
in, Chinese communist history it was presented, not according.
to rank, but, except for Mao and Lin, in the Chinese equiva,
lent of alphabetical order. Both the increased size and the"
unhicrarehical order suggest 'that the selection 'of the corn- ?'
mince was ,marked by serious disputes which could be resolved, '
in no other way, ? But the unprecedented omission or ranks
may also be a Maoist innovation to promote a " democratic "
party style.: This explanation gained ,credibility on Monday.
when the central;cOmmittce,. in its first plenary session, elected.
A new, politburo., And, lo' and behold, the politburo was in
:non-rank order.
? I '
. CPYRGHT
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The politburo'also confounded:China-watchers by...depart:?.
vediFpro-M, ear ill999/0321/Cf2r:4-1A011:0h7,91201.1(94400
like an established leadership. Four provincial representatives
!were ?acIcled to the ,group, three Military commander* from
!Nanking; Shenyang .and Anhwei, plus the ,little-known depufy
chairman of the Honan revolutionary Cominittee Who had n.q
'even made it on to the presidium, Among the leaders, who'...`:
were booted downstairs were the foreign minister, Chen
two economic planners and three top-ranking soldiers... ?
The results of the considerable changes in the politburo antr,.
the central committee are to strengthen the clasped hands of:
Mao `and his constitutionally. designated successor, Lin Piao.'".
,The surprisingly small standing committee of the politburo,.
surrounds the pragmatic prime. minister, Chou En-lai, .with
;the 'cultural revolutionary inner. core of Mao, Lin; Chen:
Po-ta and Kang Sheng. (What was` it that made Mao ,stop','
? short of including his wife?) In the full politburo, nine, out of;
;25 arc full-blooded cultural revolutionaries and nine of the' ten
;military members can be considered political comrades of Mad
and Lin. '
The central committee membership in itself does not look
overwhelmingly Maoist. Some 40 per cent are military 'and
about a quarter arc old cadres. Assuming that the 4o....odd
unknowns are most, likely s' to be revolutionary types, the
Maoists would constitute 'up to one-third:. But given the
unwieldy "size of the committee, its membership is not likely
to mtake much difference. The politburo wilr be stronger than
ever and the politburo is, a ?secure Mata instranent.: ,
What will the Maoists use their 'enhanced ,pdider'to?,do
Lin Piao's political report .did not Make,this clea.r,:eiteept4 of
course? for ?continuing to saturate the Chinese people' with
Mad Tsetung thought (Mao's name is now denuded of its
hyphen, apparently to make 1..it an equal partner in the
triumvirate,: Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung. thought)
The ':wide dissemination of Mao Tsetung thought," .said
Lin, was "the most significant achievement of the great
proletarian cultural .revolution.', ? .??
,
If' the full', flush of the cultural revolution is now over?
anid the congress 'doe's signify an. end of some sort-=---the
struggles which it stirred up arc not. Lin juggles the same con-
. tradictOry instructions that the Maoists have been issuing for
'over two years; Felass struggle mist continue; the proletariat
:Must criticise the bourgeoisie and fight anti-Maoists on the left
and the right; the ranks must be purified and the 'party must
keep on "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh."
But at the same time Maoists must catry out a conciliatory
policy towards their enemies, particularly old cadres and
intellectuals, most of whom can be re-educated. But again,
"we must for ever remember this .lesson : Whoever opposes
chairman Mao, whoever ? opposes Mao Tsctung thought, at
.any time and under any circumstances, shall be 'condemned
and punished by the whole party and, the whole nation." And.
'what if the class enemies stir Up trouble again ? " Just arouse
the masses and strike them down. again. In other words,
strike up another cultural revolution.
:Lin's is not a dove-like statement.' But apart from its
revolutionary rhetoric,. it provides few concrete guidelines to.
policy. On economics, Lin sounds a moderate note, asserting
that revolution should not replace production though it must
command it. And while he uses the slogan "new leaps
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CPYRGHT
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r ; i,,,r ; ; ? 11,i r,' HW,e11,1'
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:model:. Curiously, Lin'sparcs hardly a word for what would
,logically seem to have deserved a central place in the speech :
the reconstruction of the party. He makes no attempt to
,resolve ,the crucial Auestions of whether thc 'party will 0,ton-
stitUte an apparatus , distinct ?from the revolutionary com-
mittecs? and whether an ?effort will be made to overeoni9
Military dominance at the local level. ? ,? ,
On foreign affairs, 'Lin employs similar revolutionary
language' and balances, similar contradictions between the
need to struggle and a will!ngness to coexist peacefully. He,
is much More bitter ,?in 'his :attacks on the apostate Russians
than on the Americans. But in his one discussion of specific
'policy he reveals that the Chinese have already had some
exchanges with the Russians about their border problems?
started by a Kosygin telephone call to Peking?and arc con-
sidering a Soviet proposal for *hat. are described as con-
sultations. ', ?:?? ;,: ' ?
mall its massive, text, the Lin Piao report says little that is
.new and settles none of the basic problems raised by the,
',cultural revolution.. As a statement of general principle, it is
in the Maoist style, for Mao does.not choose to concern him-
r,t elf with detail, A more:pirogrammatic policy document may
be produced by: a national .people's, congress which is
Tunipitied to .be, in wOrks,' But :?..with' the leadership
'gripped pi' mpg ,..of its administrators and planners' there
may be:,nothing tuOnoral #peratiyea'issuing.out of Peking
for som4 ;irric to '-?
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4
China is at present in the grip of ar
unprecedentedly crucial moment of the
?sharp struggle between two lines: L
struggle between the line of Marxism
Leninism and proletarian international
.m and the line of anti-Marxist Mao-
'm and bourgebis nationalism, betweer
t le Chinese Republic's socialist develop
raent and the anti-socialist developmen
of China.
In the latter half of 1966, relying or
nilitary units which he had deludec
and on the hungweiping and tsaofar
organizations that had been set up b3
dtceit and under pressure brought to
bear by him, Mao Tse-tung used the
screen of "cultural revolution' to launcl;
a n anti-communist anti-popular counter
r wolutionary military coup and estab
lish a personal reactionary military dic
tatorship. At the close of July 1967 he
s !nt paratroops and warships to strike
at the bloody_ retribution against the
working people of Wuhan. He followed
nis up by sending the 40th and 47th
a:mies and another five divisions against
tele revolutionary workers and revolt:.
t.onary military units in Canton, caus?
i g enormous bloodshed among the
revolutionary masses with such heavy
v eapons as artillery, tanks and so forth,
'lb this day Mao Tse-tung, constantly
uses armed force against Communists
a ul working people now in one place
nnw in another. As a result, in the surn.
mer of 1967 a situation began to emerge
hi China which could cause the counter
revolutionary military coup to develop
into an anti-people's civil war.
An unparalleled tragedy has over-
t ken the Communist Party and the
Ic ng-suffering Chinese people in conse-
q ience of the counter-revolutionary
c Imes of Mao Tse-tung and his group.
The gains of the Chinese revolution are
threatened with total annihilation. The
building of socialism ' in China faces
complete collapse.
THE sit
19
fgE
,
? 0 -0
? ? ?
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Organ of Canadian
Communist Party .
CPYIGHTiffp fl
Cctillgan11
.,7 rou
gilnlloor=ro ollo
by WANG MING
CPYRGHT
fallft02
1100-2 11??Calf
The author of this work, Wang Ming, is a veteran of the
Communist Party of China and of the Chinese people's struggle
for socialism. He was a member of the central leadership of the
party through the years of arduot4s and perilous underground
struggle against the bloody repression by which Chiang Kai-shek
tried to destroy the Party physically by murdering scores of thou-
sands of the finest sons of the working class.,---thousands of them
by beheading in public without even the pretence of a trial. From
January 1931 until January 1935 Wang Ming was the First
Secretary of the Party under* the illegal party name of Chen
Shao-pl.
In January 1935, in the course of the famous Long March.
Mai Tse-tung became First Secretary and Wang Ming was
assigned to the position of representative of the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of China to the Communist Inter-
national. In that capacity he participated actively in the prepara-
tion of George Dimitrov's famous report to the 7th World Con-
gress and he was elected by the Congress of the Executive Com,
mittee.
Wang Ming worked as the representative of the Chinese
Party in the world centre of the Comintern until that body dis-
solved in 1943. After that he continued, by decision of the leader-
ship of the Chinese Party, to be its representative in Moscow. He
negotiated and arranged the details of the decisive assistance that
was extended to the Chinese revolution by the Soviet Union.
Throughout those years he continued to be an active member of
the leadership of the CPC and he was re-elected to its Central
Committee at its 8th Congress in 1956.
While, constitutionally, Wang Ming is a full member of the
Central Committee of the CPC, he is not able to play an active
role in the Central Committee of the Party in China today. Those
who read this document will readily understand why. '
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CPYRGHT
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In domestic policy the Maoists are
doing their utmost to drag China onto
the dismal road of political reaction,
economic chaos, cultural retrogression
and poverty. In foreign policy they use
all their resources to drag China onto
the reactionary and dangerous road of
hostility for the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, split the world corn-
monist and working-class movement,
subvert the national liberation, social-
progressive and democratic movements
and also the world peace movement,
and provoke another world war.
At the same time thousands upon
thousands tit Communists and Young
Communist Leaguers, workers, peasants
and intellectuals, officers and men of the
PLA and of the public security forces,
and foremost youth and juveniles have
selflessly risen against the Maoist
counter-revolutionary military coup and
Mao Tse-tung's personal dictatorship.
They have risen in defence of Marxism-
Leninism, the Communist Party and the
legal state authority, in defence of the
gains of the Chinese revolution and the
cause of socialism. In contrast to Mao
Tse-tung and his group they aim to put
China, in domestic policy, on the bright
road of political freedom, economic
fluorescence, cultural progress and a
happy life, and, in foreign policy, on the
road to win progress, world security, on
the road of friendship, co-operation, al-
Hance and mutual assistance With the
Soviet Union and other socialist coun-
tries, the road of unity and co-operation
with the world communist and working-
class movement and with the national
liberation, social-progressive and democ-
retie movements, the road of concerted
struggle with all the peoples for world
peace, to avert another world war.
At the very outset of the so-called
"cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung and
his group had openly proclaimed that
it was a life and death struggle be-
tween two roads, between two classes,
between two lines. Countless facts show
that the anti-communist, anti-Soviet, anti-
popular counter-revolutionary Maoist
group is indeed a "handful of people in
authority taking the capitalist road,"
that they are in fact championing the
interests of the bourgeoisie and pursu-
ing a reactionary, bourgeois policy.
The leaders and cadres of the Party, a
state, military and mass organizations h
who are in the front ranks of the anti- t
Maoist revolutionary struggle are the P
real revolutionaries who are following a
the socialist road, and they are indeed e
championing the interests of the work- A
ers, peasants and intellectuals and pur- s
suing a proletarian revolutionary policy. L
Approved For Releas
Judging by indisputable facts and o
the basis of my own experience gaine
in the struggle against the thought an
policy of Mao Tse-tung in the course o
decades, I should like first and foremos
to say that the blame for the presen
catastrophic state in which the CPC an
China now find themselves devolves pr
manly on Mao Tse-tung, on his though
and policy and his extremely self-cen
tred, extremely careerist, criminal cal
culations.
At first Mao Tse-tung and his grou
shifted and dodged, claiming that Ma
Tse-tung was accomplishing only a "cul
tura' revolution," whose purpose was to
"safeguard the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat," "safeguard the socialist sys
tern," and "avert the restoration of capi
talism." They said that the "cultural
revolution" was aimed only at a "hand-
ful of persons in authority in the Party
taking the capitalist road" and "cham-
pions of the bourgeois reactionary line,"
only against "counter-revolutionary revi-
sionists," "traitors" and so on.
However, facts are stronger than de-
magogy. They cannot be twisted. Let us
see what Mao Tse-tung is really doing.
TEN MAJOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY
MAO TSE-TUNG IN CHINA
1. He is trying to expunge Marxism-
Leninism from the minds of the Com-
munists and working people of China
and replace it with the anti-Marxist,
anti-Leninist thought of Mao Tse-tung.
He insists that the "thought of Mao
Tse-tung must ,capture all ideological
positions," that the "thought of Mao Tse-
tung are the highest instructions in all
spheres of life," that the "thought of
Mao Tse-tung are the absolute autho-
rity" and so forth. At the same time he
declares that Marxism-Leninism is "ob-
solete" and trumpets that "the world
has entered a new epoch?the epoch of
the thought of Mao Tse-tung?'
n sale of his sinister anti-Marxist, anti-
d Leninist "thought" in China and abroad,
d everything he is doing proves that in
f effect he is using the screen of Marxism-
t Leninism to destroy Marxism-Leninism.
t Actually he is replacing Marxism-Lenin-
d ism with the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist
i- reactionary "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.
? 2, He is smashing the Comnumist
. Party of China and preparing to re-
place it with an essentially anti-Corn-
munist party which will be "Communist"
o in name only.
In a tatzupao written by him person-
ally on August 5, 1966 he proclaimed
the slogan "open fire at the headquart-
ers," which was the signal for the rout
- of the CPC. He crushed the CC CPC
that ,was elected by the 8th Congress Of
the CPC. According to reports from vari-
ous sources, of the 174 members and al-
ternate members of the CC CPC nearly
four-fifths have been subjected to re-
pression. All the members of the Poli-
tical Bureau of the CC and its Standing
Committee as well as of the Secretariat
of the CC, elected prior to the 11th Ple-
nary Meeting of the CC, with the excep-
tion of Mao Tse-tung and a few persons
from his group, have been brutally per-
secuted on the basis of all sorts of false
accusations. They include the Deputy
Chairman of the CC Liu Shao-chi, Chu
Teh, Chen Yun, the General Secretary of
the CC Teng Hsiao-ping, members of the
Political Bureau Peng Teh-huai, Ho
Lung, Chen Yi, Peng Chen, Tan Chen.
un, Lu Fu-chun, Lieu Po-cheng, Tung Pi-
wu, Li Hsien-nien, Li Ching-chaure alter-
nate members of the Political Bureau
Ulanfu, Chang Wen-tien, Lu Ting-yi, Po
Yi-po, members of the CC Secretariat
Wang Chia-hsiang, Tang Cheng, Teng Tzu-
hui, Huan Ke-cheng, Lo Tui-ching, Tao
Chu, Wang Jen-chung, Liu Ning-i, Li
Hsueh-feng, alternate members of the
? CC Secretariat Yang Shang-kun, Hu
Chiao-mu and Liu Lan-tao. All these
comrades were without foundation an.
of "counter-revolutionaty revision-
ism," branded "traitors" and "elements
against the three" ("elements opposing
Mao Tse-tung, the Party and socialism")
and subjected to cruel repression, per-
secution and insults. Of these some were
"defiled," others "defeated," still others
"overthrown," arrested, killed, declared
as deserving to be "burnt alive," slan-
dered, insulted or publicly humiliated.
Premier of the State Council Chou En-
lai, who was also Deputy Chairman of
the CC until the 11th Plenary Meeting
of the CC, was likewise repeatedly de-
clared by the hungweipings as deserving
W4bAolyabtfino tiosy_gao Chu, who
He has banned the reading of Marxist-
Leninist literature. He burns progres-
sive Marxist-Leninist literature. He calls
Marxism-Leninism "revisionism" or "dog-
matism." Earlier he had called Marxist-
Leninists "dogmatists," now he calls
hem "counter-revolutionary revisionists"
nd persecutes and destroys them. He
as made the persecution and destruc-
ion of Marxist-Leninists ideologically,
olitically, organizationally, spiritually
nd physically the principal means of
radicating Marxism-Leninism in China.
though at times he is compelled to use
uch an authoritative term as Marxism-
eninism as an honourable_ 7i.9 Vi 1
e 1999/09/02 CIA-R15113
CPYRGHT,
wee elected 4FANIRKUSt
Bureau and of its Standing Committee
at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CC,
has been subjected to brutal repression,
while Nieh Hung-chen, Hsueh Hsiang-
chen and Yeh Chien-ying, who were elec-
ted members of the Political Bureau,
have fallen into disfavour. Mao Tse-tung
is destroying Party committees and CPC
cells of all levels. Wherever it has been,
possible he has sent hungvvelpings, Cm-
fans, the military and the police
mercilessly to smash territorial bureaus
of the CC CPC, provincial, municipal,
district, county and regional Party com-
mittees, and Party cells at workshops,
factories, 'mines, transport organizations
and rural production teams, and also
brutally to persecute and destroy lead-
ing functionaries and cadres of the Party
committees.
The ,persecution and physical annihi:
lation of Party leaders, cadres and rank-
and-file members has become Mao Tse-
tung's main means of destroying the
CPC.
Mao Tse-tung and his group have dealt
our Party, a severe blow such as the
International imperialists, the Peiyang
warlords or the Kuomintang of Chiang
Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei could not
Inflict in the course of decades. But they
have not been able to destroy the Party,
which has nearly 25 million members
and enjoys tremendous prestige and the
all-round support of the working class
and the whole people.
Although in issuing orders and instruc-
tions for all sorts of sinister actions
Mao Tse-tung still demagogically uses
the name of such an authoritative organ
as the CC CPC, it is nothing more than
what is correctly described in a Chinese
proverb, which says: "Where the skin
is lost what is the hair to cling on to?"
Since Mao Tse-tung has already routed
the Communist Party of China and its
leading organs?the CC and its Political
Bureau?how and on what grounds can
he still call himself Chairman of the
Military Committee of the CC CPC?
Since these organs of the CPC have, in
effect, ceased to exist, on what grounds
does Mao Tse-tung commit acts of vil-
lainy in their name? What right does
Mao Tse-tung have to use the name of
the CC CPC to guide the so-called "Group
for Cultural Revolution Affairs at, the
CC CPC" to all sorts of anti-communist,
anti ? popular, counter - revolutionary
crimes? Who gave Mao Tse-tung the
right to convene the so-called 11th and
12th "plenary meetings of the CC CPC"?
No matter how much he tries to use
the signboards "CPC" and "CC CPC" to
e niA211P9Mihcc,iivilPFalt-igt.
tray him as an anti-Communist from
head to toe. His group is inconte itabky
an anti-Communist clique. He 3ends
every effort to destroy the CPC as a
genuine Marxist-Leninist, revoluti nary
Party of the working class, a Party tha t
emphatically opposes the reacti )nari
thought and policies of Mao Tse-tting in
general, and his counter-revolutionari
military coup masked as a "eulturd
re-
volution" in particular.
He plans to organize a false Com.'
munist Party of his supporters to sup-
ersede the former real CPC. A campaign
to "prepare" for the so-called "9th Con-
gress of the CPC" was conductec for
this purpose last year. Actually these
were not preparations for the 9th Con-
gress of the CPC but only preparations
for an assemblage of anti-Commuilsts,
of Maoists.
The decision of the so-called "12th Ex.
tended Plenary Meeting of the CPC" was
published recently in Peking. Thi: , as
everybody knows, was a plenary meeting
withbut the participation of the, ever-
whelming majority of members an I al-
ternate members of the CC CPC, In-
stead, it was attended by members of
Oe so-called "Group for Cultural Revo-
lution Affairs," representatives of the
hungweipings and tsaofans, of the pro-
vincial "revolutionary committees" and
of military leaders favoured by Mao Tse-
tung. Incidentally, ,Mao Tse-tung grant,
ed all of them the "right of a casting
vote" of members of the CC CPC. The
decision stated that the so-called '9th
Congress of the CPC" would be corwen-
ed in the immediate future. On the one
hand this decision proclaimed that dele-
gates to this "congress" must be those
who were utterly devoted to Chairman
Mao and to his thought, those who had
shown this devotion? in the course of
the "cultural revolution," i.e., those hung-
weipings, tsaofans and military who had
been particularly vicious. On the oilier
hand, it was announced that there we uld
be another purge of Communists, Yong
Communist Leaguers, foremost worlars,
intellectuals and peasants at every ofice,
factory and educational institution, in
every people's commune and in el,ery
family. Moreover, the draft of the so:
called "New Rules of the CPC" to be
submitted for endorsement to the com-
ing "9th Congress" have been circulated.
This is a monstrous anti-Communist and
anti-democratic document.
Mao Tse-tung's notorious thesis of
"removing the old and absorbing the
new," which has been given wide pub-
CPYRGHT
fty in recen9OO1 moniPs and has now
been formally included in the above-
mentioned "draft Rules," is a cynically,
frank admission of the fact that he is
preparing to make away completely with
the real Communist Party of China and
replace it with a new false Communist
Party, which he plans to use to further
his personal aims. All this irrefutably
proves that the so-called "9th Congress
of the CPC" will be, in fact, a gathering
of Mao Tse-tung's toadies even though
a small group of leading functionaries
and cadres of the CPC are to be allow-
ed to attend in order to hide its real
face with the purpose of misleading the
Chinete people and public opinion
abroad. But their participation cannot
in the least change its true, anti-Com-
munist nature. "Delegations" from for-
eign pseudo-Communist parties will
most certainly attend this gathering.' It
will, indeed be a conclave of traitors and
renegades of all hues, who together
sign an anti-Communist, anti-Soviet,
anti-popular tune under the direction of
Mao Tse-tung.
? A new Maoist anti-Marxist, anti-Lenin-
ist, reactionary party, "Communist" in
name but anti-Communist in substance
is to be formed at this gathering. Mao
Tse-tung reckons that this is the only
kind of party which he can use as a
blind tool to prop up his tottering im-
perial throne and pursue reactionary
domestic and foreign policies. He cal-
culates that this is the only kind of
party that can be used as an obedient
tool for the continuation of the sinister
work he has bequeathed to Lin Piao,
the successor he has himself appointed.
Judging by reports from various sour-
ces, after this false Communist Party
'is formed Mao Tse-tung plans to follow
the example of his predecessor and teach-
er?the Judas Trotsky?to set up an anti;
Communist, counter-revolutionary Mao:
ist "International." I am' deeply con-
vinced that not only Chinese Commun-
ists and the Chinese people but also?
Communists and their friends through-'
out the world take a firm stand against
these machinations of Mao Tse-tung.
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
3. He has smashed state organs of the,
democratie dictatorship of the people
and is replacing them with the machin-
ery of his personal reactionary military
dictatorship.
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CpYRQHT
CPYRGHT Approved For ReleaseA999/09/09 ?__CalA,R79_4111-94A000500060001-5
Mao Tse-tung tried to use the slogan
of the destruction of the old bourgeois
state machine as a pretext for crushing
the constitutional state organs of peo-
ple's power in China. He has completely
paralyzed the higher legislative body?
the National People's Congress and its
Standing Committee, both of which had
been elected in accordance with the
Constitution, The Chairman, Deputy
Chairmen, members of the Standing
Committee and most of the deputies of
the NPC have been savagely persecuted
on all sorts of false accusations levelled
at them by Mao Tse-tung.
To all intents and purposes, the State
Council, which is the highest organ of
executive 'power in China, has also been
paralyzed. More than two-thirds of the
Premier's deputies have been relieved of
their posts or arrested, and the remain-
ing deputies have been slandered and
attacked by the hungweipings and tsao-
fans.
With the exception of the Defence
Ministry and a few other offices, the min-
istries and state committees subordina-
ted to the State Council were placed
under the control of hungweipings and
tsaofans and then an integrated mili-
tary control was established over them.
Allany high-ranking officials of the State
Council and Ministries have been killed,
wounded, baited until they lost their
health or subjected to other repressions
in the form of unbearable, humiliating
or health-destroying hard labor.
Provincial a.nd lower people's con-
gresses and people's councils have been
made away with, and legal organs ?
people's courts and people's procura-
tor's offices of all levels?have likewise
ceased to function. Their heads and
cadres have been either persecuted or
physically destroyed. The exceptions are
the members of the national bourgeoisie
in all legislative and executive bodies.
They have not been touched at all by
Mao Tse-rung.
Mao Tse-tung has elected to liquidate
.the Party backbone and foremost repre-
sentatives of non-Party people in organs
as the cardinal means of destroying
these organs of power. In planting so-
called "rc -)Ititionary committees," Mao
Tse-tung counted on creating a weapon r
of his personal military dictatorship. s
Their paramount task is to persecute
and annihilate Communists,. Young
Communist Leaguers, revolutionary e
servicemen and foremost workers, pea- r,
?
sants and intellectuals. As soon as a
so-called "revolutionary committee" m ai
set up, hungweipings led by the ch2ip-
man of the "revolutionary committe
publicly smashed the signboards of the
local CPC committee and of the peopl es
committee.
This was followed by the publicati r,
of notices ordering all officials of lora
Party organizations and Communists a
well as cadres of the organs of powe
to register at the "revolutionary con
mittee" within three days and await far-
ther sanctions. Arrest, exile, imprisca
ment or murder awaited many of thost
who registered and also those who cd
not register but were later discovered,?
Communists who headed provincial or
other local Party organizations or
people's committees and charged wi h
being "counter-revolutionary revision,
ists," "traitors" or "Soviet spies" we T
brutally executed at public rallies n
many localities where so-called "rev>
lutionary committees" were 'formed. A .e
these not typical features of an an 1-
communist coup of any, cout?ter-revol
tion? '
The key role in the "revolutionary
committees" is played by military peop e
whom Mao Tse-tung still manages to
delude. The so-called 'Leftist element:"
(hungweipings and tsaofans) are men-
ly their assistants, while the few form r
Party and administrative cadres who
have been recruited with the help of
the "tripartite alliance" slogan play tt e
role of supernumeraries. In spite cf
Mao Tse-tung's having proclaimed the,
slogans of "struggle against the dictato
ship of the bourgeoisie" and "defence cf
the dictatorship of the proletariat," a I
his actions prove the reverse,: behind
the screen of "defending the dictator-
ship of the proletariat" he is destroy-
ing the people's power and replacing it
with his personal reactionary Military
dictatorship.
4. He is inflicting harm on the People's
Liberation Army, splitting its ranks and
employing it as a blind tool for his own
personal ends directed against the Party
and the people.
Mao Tse-tung has 'used part of the
PLA as an instrument of the counter-
evolutionary coup and reactionary per-
onal military dictatorship, concentrated
art of the PLA on seizing power from
Communist Party and the people's gov-
rnment, killing Communists, workers,
easants and inteljectuak;
part of the PLA against another pan
and ordered the PLA to pursue his re.
actionary policy of "three supports"
and "two military measures."**
He' utilized the abolition of military
ranks as a means for isolating in one
blow the marshals, generals and officers
who held no military posts from any
contact with the arty, Mao Tie-tung
has purged and persecuted marshals,
generals, officers and sergeants of the
PLA. Of the nine marshals, all except
Lin Piao have been subjected to brutal
persecution and indignities and some,
for example, Marshals Peng' Teh-huai
and Ho Lung, have even been arrested.
The number of generals and admirals
of the army, navy and air force re-
moved from their posts and persecuted,
runs, according to incomplete data,
from 70 tO 80. According to information
from various sources, among those pur-
ged are four Deputy Defence Ministers,
the Chief of the General Staff and seve-
ral of his Deputies, Chief of the Opera-
tional Department of the General Staff
and his Deputy, Chief of the Central
Political Administration and two of his
Deputies, three Deputy Commissars of
the Public Security Forces,' three Deputy
Commanders, the Commissar and First,
Deputy Commissar of the Navy, the
Commander, four Deputy Commanders
and three Commissars of the Artillery,
seven Deputy Commanders, the Commis-
sar and two Deputy Commissars of the
Air Force, Commander of the Armored
Forces and his Deputy, three Deputy
Commanders and Deputy Commissar of
the Railway Forces, Deputy Commander,
*Three supports: "support of the1.
Lefts," meaning support of the hung-
weipings and tsaofans, "support of in-
dustry" and "support of agriculture",
which means the establishment of mili-
tary control over the country's entire
economy.
**Two military measures: "military
administration," which signifies the es-
tablishrnent of a military regime in the
cities and countryside, In factories, offi-
ces and educational establishments to
watch the workers, peasants, intellee-
tuals and students and persecute them:
"military training", which means that
the entire population, young and old, is
forced at the point of the bayonet "to
study Mao Tse-tung's thought" and that
military drill is introduced in schools
and higher educational establishments,
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CPYRGHT
of_ the, r.n oVediFtir Re! elaS
Aiti-Aircrafgtilitn, five Deputy Chiefs,
the Commissar and Deputy Commissar
of t1-1. Central Administration of the
Logistics Service, and so on.
Still more commissars and political
workers were persecuted among the me-
dium-rank and junior officers. More than
half of the personnel in the General
Staff and the Central Political Adminis-
tration of the PLA have been removed
from their posts and persecuted; the
removal and persecution of the corn-
panders of the Peking Military Area and
the Peking garrison was even reported
on two occasions. The facts show that
Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao not only
carried through a mass purge, persecuted
and annihipted the higher commanders
and commissars and also the command-
ers and political workers of all ranks in
the former First, Second and Third Field
Armies?, which they have always regard-
ed as an alien body, but they also pur-
ged, persecuted and annihilated, group
after group, the higher commanders,
commissars, commanders and political
workers of the former Fourth Field
Army whom Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao
did not trust or who Chiang ,Ching
,thought did not obey her orders.
They are ruthlessly purging the corn-
munist backbone of the PLA and are
'planning to replace wholesale the cadres
'of Communists and members of the
Young Communist League in the PLA
with the new men tried and tested in
the course of the "cultural revolution".
All this is being done to make it easier
for Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and Chiang
Ching to usurp all the power in the
PLA and to convert, in a conspiratorial
way, the People's Liberation Army, crea-
ted and led by the Communist Party,
into their personal anti-communist hord,
es directed against the people.
They have already set up special army
units directly subordinated to the
"headquarters of Mao Tse-tung". It is
only with the help of these units that
Communists, the population and "un-
reliable" detachments of the PLA are
suppressed and the "revolutionary com-
mittees" in the localities are protected.
All this demonstrates the fear of Mao
Tse-tung and his supporters in face of
the dissatisfaction mounting in the
army. Indeed, the commanders, politi-
cal workers and soldiers of the PLA will
not be able to tolerate for long the pre-
sent situation. Sooner or later they will
rise up to fight against Mao Tse-tung
and his group, for the restoration of a i
? genuine Chinese Communist Party and I
the building of socialism in China.
e51969L09102g GlAmtRilW7g9n0111
tion; he has disbanded the Young Com-
munist League of China and is replac-
ing it with the reactionary organiza-
tion of hungweipings.
On the one hand, Mao Tse-tung has
disbanded the Young Communist Lea-
gue and the Young Pioneer Organization
and is brutally persecuting the leaders of
the YCL and the Young Pioneers, their
functionaries and YCL members. On the
other hand, utilizing the military and
the police as the leading core and back-
bone of command, he has by coercion
,and deception compelled part of the
university students and secondary and
elementary school pupils to organize in -
hungweipings and to play the part of
the storm detachments in villifying,
hounded, insulting, beating up, arrest-
ing and killing people and in arranging
arson?all according to his wishes?to
act as small fry, as bullies who shed
their blood to stage the "rebellion" and
the seizure of power he wanted.
He has compelled millions of young'
people and children to waste their valu-
able time, to drop their studies, to'
undergo moral corruption and to lose
.their health and life. He has committed
a grave crime, crippling the growing
generation of the Chinese people. He
has wounded the soul of tens of millions
of fathers and mothers anxious for the
fate of their young sons and daughters.
Those whom Mao Tse-tung and his
group wanted abused and insulted were
abused and insulted on their orders by
the hungweipings at their assemblages.
Those whom Mao Tse-tung and his group
wanted purged or ousted from office
were, on their orders, marked down by
the hungweipings, who, at their rallies
and demonstrations demanded that they
be purged or ousted from office. Those
whom they wanted beaten up, were, on
their orders; beaten up by the hungwei-
pings. Those whom they wanted to ar-
rest, on their orders were arrested by
the hungweipings. Those whom they
wanted to kill, on their orders were
kill-
ed by the hungweipings. The books they.
wanted to burn and the historical monu-
ments they wanted to destroy, on their
orders were burned and destroyed by
the hungweipings.
But all these actions, committed by
them through their puppets, just as the
"campaign to rectify style" and other
false "mass movements", staged by Mao
Tse-tung in the past, are demagogically
pictured by them as a result of apply-
ng the "line of the masses", that is, "the
me from the masses ? to the masses", c
as some kind of "big democracy" of
he masses, as a "real mass movement"
9414t00651100600111124sscs." But all
their demagogy cannot deceive anyone.
When the hungweipings were sent to
commit their infamies, Mao Tse-tung and
his group repeatedly and openly declared
that no one, no institution or organiza-
tion, including military institutions, had
the right to interfere in the actions of
the hungweipings or stop them, because
the hungweipings were the "little initia-
tors" and "the vanguard" which was
carrying out the "cultural revolution"
under the personal guidance, the per-
sonal organization and personal leader-
ship and command of Mao Tse-tung.
Similarly, the hungweipings, too, often
shouted that Mao Tse-tung was their
"supreme commander-in-chief," that
they were the "guards commanded by
Chiang Ching."
' Replacing the Young Communist Lea-
gue and Young Pioneer Organization,
by hungweipings and hunghsiaopings,
Mao Tse-tung thereby wanted not only
to abolish the assistants and reserve of
the Communist Party, but also to abolish
the most politically conscious, the most
organized vanguard of the youth and
children, the vanguard richest in revo-
lutionary traditions, in order to make
the young people and children easily sus-
ceptible to his fraud and convert them
into his personal reactionary tool for
any crime.
Today many hungwelping detach.
meats have escaped this control and
millions of young people have become
aware of the criminal character of the
"cultural revolution" and the reaction-
ary nature of Mao Tse-tung's "thought."
The Mao Tse-tung group is brutally sup-
pressing them, sending millions of young
men and women to remote areas and
to the countryside in order that they
should not be able to raise a rebellion
against Mao Tse-tung and his group in
the cities under the selfsame slogan "a
rebellion is a just cause!"
But this does not save the situation,
because they can raise an anti-Mao
"rebellion" not only...in the cities to-
gether with the masses of workers, but
also in the villages, together with the
peasant masses. There is no doubt what-
soever that China's younger generation
cannot,tolerate for long the present situa-
tion. It will necessarily rise up more and
more to struggle against the baneful
regime of Mao Tse-tung and his group,
for a bright future for themselves and
their country.
6. He is attacking the working class
and splitting its ranks. He has disband-
d the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions.
Mao Tse-tunz is breakine up the Party
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and his group? The aiin pursued by
Tse-tung in splitting the working c
is, on the one hand to ?
of the working class?the Chinese Com-
munist Party. He has disbanded mass
organizations of the working class?the
All-China Federation of Trade Uni
and trade unions of all levels, is brut
persecuting the leaders, functiona
and rank and file of the trade union
Mao Tse-tung is openly advocatin
reduction of Wages. He has abolis
plactoratfia and bonuses. Ha opanly C
for lowering the living standard of
workino class to that of the rural po
lation. pn the pretext of "the strug
against I counter-revolutionary eco
mism," he is against improving the 1
of factory and office workers, is arresti
and killing all who advocate an i
provement in the life of factory and
lice workers.
Ignoring the difficult living conditio
of the workers, he pursues the so call
"combination of industry, agricultu
and military affairs," compelling t
workers, in addition to their jobs,
engage also in agriculture and under
military drill. He has sent to each i
dustrial, mining and transport ente
prise military units for permanent b
leting in order to institute military co
trol over the workers and other c
ployees and bring military, pressure t
bear on them. Before their shift start
workers and other employees are force
to recite and sing "quotations" in fron
of Mao Tse-tung's portrait. This is calle
"asking Chairman Mao for directives;
at the end of the shift, they also recit
and sing "quotations"?"report to Chai
man Mao about their work for the day.
Military men make use of every free
minute to compel the workers and other
employees "to study Mao Tse-tung
thought," depriving them of an possib
lity of resting.
By coercion and deception he force
part of the workers and other employee
to organize into so-called tsaofans, t
attack the overwhelming majority of th
workers and other employees at fac
tories, mines and on transport as con
servatives and reactionaries, to rebe
against them and capture power. from
them. This splits the unity of the work
ing class and causes conflicts in their
ranks.
On many occasions Mao Tse-tung has
falsely proclaimed that "in conditions
of the dictatorship of the proletariat
there are no grounds within the work-
ing class for necessarily splitting into
two irreconcilably hostile camps." But
the question is asked, who split theworking class into two irreconcilably
hostile camps? Was it not Mao Tse-tung
Mast; He, as before, adheres to the crro-
_
lass neous division of the middle peasants
into three sections: higher, average and
lower, constantly compelling and pro-
yoking the so-called poor and lower
middle peasants to hound the so-called
average and higher middle peasants; he
is wrongly ousting the well-to-do middle
peasants from the middle-peasant ranks
and deititying them as The main tvpro?
sentatives of capitalism in the country-
'side. All this is ruining the internal soli-
darity of the peasants, undermining their
labor enthusiasm and impeding the de-
velopment of socialist agriculture.
He, far from abolishing the system of
the food tax, far from establishing single
rational rates and purchase prices of
farm produce, even decided to raise the
food tax, increasing thereby the burden
borne by the peasants. Moreover, he is
also applying the notorious "combina-
tion of industry, agriculture and mili-
tary affairs" compelling the peasants, in
addition to farming, to engage in indus-
trial production and undergo military
drill. He sent military units for per-
en- manent billeting in the countryside in
of order to institute military control and
ut supervision over the work and life of
ass the peasants. Members of peasant fami-
at. lies, men and women, aged and young,
ri- are forced every day to waste much
on time in memorizing "quotations" and
ss "studying" Mao Tse-tung's thought, rob-
g's bing the peasants of rest after arduous
le, work.
SS On the pretext of fighting against.
he "counter-revolutionary revisionism" he is
to rejecting the system of workday units,
st 'based on the principle of payment ac-
cording to work done, and also material
p. incentives?rewards for increasing pro- .
a- duction. Under the cover of the noto-
rious slogan of "reliance on one's own
forces," the state does not render the
? necessary financial, economic and tech-
? nical assistance to collective farming
a- ? which was just getting under way, as-
c, sistance to the peasants who lead a
? wretched and hard life. As a result of
Mao's pursuing this entire wrong policy
? China's agriculture, as hitherto, is ex-
? tremely backward and the life of the
f peasants remains poor and hard.
But the working peasants cannot
tolerate such a situation for long. They
necessarily will rise up more and more
I to resolute mass struggle against Mao
Tse-tung for improving their material
and cultural standards.
8. He is destroying cillture and educa-
tion, destroying the cultural heritage,
persecuting and annihilating the intelli-
gentsia.
or ?
ons ing class from being a solidly-knit and
ally united foremost leading force in China's
ties political and social life and, on the other,
s. to prevent the working class from acting
g a as a solidly-knit and ' united force
hcd against the counter-rovolutionary
au, mill-
tary coup of Mao Tsimung.
the Recently, under the demagogic slo-
Pu? sans that the "working class must lead
81e everything" and "the Proletariat must
no-
ife exercise its dictatorship in the entire
ng superstructure, including all the spheres
in, of ideology and culture," Mao Tse-tung
of_ has forcibly organized so-called "work-
ers' brigades for the propaganda of Mao
Tse-tung's thought." Actually these are
ns a kind of detachment of storm troop-
ed
ers who act merely as assistants of mili-
re tary units in suppressing the intelligent.
he
sia, hungweipings and other student
to .youth; they have nothing in common
go either with the "leadership of every-
thing by the working class" or with the
r. dictatorship of the proletariat. This v
re of Mao Tse-tung is foul mockery
e ideas of scientific communism abo
e leading role of the working cl
d the dictatorship of the prolctari
Though Mao Tse-tung resorts to va
s methods of blackmail and decepti
an attempt to rally the working cla
der the banner of "Mao Tse-tun
ought" to support his reactionary ru
e facts show that the working cla
China wishes to rally only under t
anner of Marxism-Leninism so as
ht unitedly against the anti-Marxi
m
ao Tse-tung's thought" and the an
mmunist, anti-proletarian Mao grou
. He is persecuting the working pc
ts and is ruining socialist constru
n in the countryside.
ao Tse-tung is shifting rcsponsibilit
the ? failure of the people's corn
nes in the countryside onto rural c
s and the peasants. Since 1962, h
er the guise of the "movement to
ialist education," has been effectin
tal persecution of the peasants
ed the "four purges" (that is, "purg
ideology, purge of politics, purge o
anizations and purge of the ccono-
.).
the course of the so-called "cultura
lution" he has even further stepped
the endless indignities, arrests and
ng of the cadres and members of
1 people's communes, has broken up
Party, Young Communist League
administrative organizations of the
pie's communes, production teams,
and SO On_
tu
71 - th
th
an
s,
ou
t
un
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e th
of
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fig
a
is co
i?
7
s san
tio
e for
mu
die
?
und
soc
bru
nam
of
org
my'
In
revo
up
rura
the
and
peo
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CPYRGHT
? Approved For Relea
To "defend the absolute authority of
Mao Tse-tung and of Mao Tse-tung's
thought," he is destroying the precious
national cultural heritage . accumulated
and preserved in China throughout the
milleniums; he is also seeking to wipe
out the influence of progressive foreign
culture. He is burning Marxist-Leninist
literature published in China and other
countries, destroying progressive books
of national and foreign origin. He is
destroying the works of classics and
contemporary writers and artists: novels
?from Cervantes, Balzac and Ibsen to
Leo Tolstoy, Gorky and Sholokhov;
poems?from Homer, Dante and Heine
to Whitman, Hikmet and Neruda; musi-
cal compositions ? from Mozart and
Beethoven to Tchaikovsky and Shosta-
kovich; the works of Shakespeare, Gogal
and Tagore, paintings of Leonardo da
'Vinci; Rembrandt, Picasso and Siquei-
ros?all this is regarded by Mao Tse-
tung as objects which have to be des-
troyed.
He prohibits the showing of plays and
films of different countries in China.
Even Chaplin's films and Paul Robeson's
records have been placed under a strict,
ban by him.
He is destroying the works of the
classics and contemporary writers and
artists of China: poems ? from Chu
Yuan, Tao Yuan-ming, Li Po, Tu Fu, Po
Lu Fang-weng to Hsiao San and.
Ai Ching; novels ? from Lo Kuang-
chung, Shih Nai-an, Wu Chen-en, Tsao
Hsueh-ching to Ting Ling, Lao She and
Chao Shu-li; plays -- from Kuang Han-
ching, Wang Shih-fu to Mei Lan-fan, Tien
Han and Tsao Yu; musical compositions
? from Yu Po-ya, Tsai Wen-chi, Chi
Kang to Nieh Erh, Hsi Hsin-hai and
Huo Lu-ting; paintings = from Su Tung-
pe, Chen Pan-chiao to Chi Pai-shih and
Hsu Pei-hung; works on history ? from
Ssuma Chien, Ou-yang Hsiu to Lu Chen-
you and Hou Wai-lou ? all this is re-
garded by Mao Tse-tung as objects
which have to be destroyed.
All plays and films, which have not
been revised by Chiang Ching and do not
extol Mao Tse-tung have been banned by
him. Artists beloved by the entire peo-
ple like Chou Hsin-fang, Yan Hui-chu
and Pal Yang are persecuted by him.
He has dug up the graves of ancient
Chinese thinker Confucius, the national
hero Shih Ko-fa, the world renowned t
painter Chi Pai-shih, the well-known I
leader of the CPC and man 'of letters
Chu Chiu-po, burned the memorial
se 1999/09/02 . CIA-RDP79-01194A000500080001-5
, museum of the hero of the Tai Ping establishments and to turn all higher,
, revolution Li Hsiu-chen and destroyed special and military-political schools
. the monument to the great revolutiom into short-term courses (from a few
ary democrat Sun Yat-sen and the monu- months to a year) of the Kanda type
ment to the world-renowned poet Push- that existed from the close of the 1930s
kin to' the beginning of the 1940s in Yenan.
, Mao Tse-tung is destroying Buddhist He forces young people and children
and Taoistic temples and pagodas which to read less and even not to read at all.
are of great cultural and artistic value, He has instructed all educational insti-
tutions to replace scientific and literary
desecrating and destroying Moslem
mosques. He has inflicted on ,the Chinese text-books with his book of "Quotations"
nation losses in the sphere of culture and "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung."
which are incalculable and irreparable.
Under the guise of "struggle against Already in the beginning of the so.'
authorities" he brutally, persecutes pro- called cultural revolution the hungwei-
minent intellectuals in all fields of pings acting on Mao Tse-tung's orders
knowledge. He mercilessly baits philoso- burned text-books on various subjects
and named their former teachers and
phers; historians, economists, lawyers,
medical workers, mathematicians, che- employees of educational institutions
mists, physicists, biologists and other "counter-revolutionary black bandits"
scientists and specialists in social and and "revisionists"; they humiliated them
natural sciences. Under the pretext that in all manner of ways, subjected them
literary and art workers of the 1930s to public dishonor and beatings and as-
sassinated them. As a result studies in
followed the so-called "Wang Ming line"
China's educational establishments cant
and the trends in Russian literary criti-
not be resumed to this day. This situa-
cism and that the literature and art of
China were not in accord with the tion is exactly what Mao Tse-tung had
planned. Only in such a situation can
thought of Mao Tse-tung, all CPC WE- he, on the one hand, direct a great mass
cials and prominent non-party literary of the hungweipings into the army (ac-
and art workers of the period from the cording to available information 500,000
1920s to 1960s inclusive were dubbed have already been sent there) and thus .
"counter-revolutinary revisionists" and gradually change the composition of the
"counter-revolutionary black bandits"; officers and rank-and-file of the PLA, and,
they were subjected to arrests, beatings on the other, send servicemen into edu-
and humiliation, forced to march cational institutions of all levels so that
through the streets wearing dunce caps henceforth prim., ly only two subjects,
condemned to hard labor or killed.
, "Mao Tse-tung's thought" and military'
Under the slogan "seize all the posi. training, should be taught.
tions of public opinion," Mao Tse-tung This discloses his great fears of in-
routed newspaper and magazine offices tellectuals and of knowledge. That is
throughout the country, and arrested, why he not only persecutes and exter.
humiliated and exiled to hard labor or minates the best part of the Chinese
killed newsmen. More than 500 news- intelligentsia, but also pursues a policy
papers and magazines have been closed of stupefying the people thus prevent-
down. ing the younger generation of China from
To prevent the intellectuals from of- becoming knowledgeable people and
fering him organized resistance, he dis- turning them into a crowd of fools.\
solved and routed the All-China Federa- Knowing only Mao Tse-tUng and his
tion of Literary and Art Circles, the All- thought they can become no more than
i
China Association of Educational Work- the blind tools of ,Mao Tse-tung and his
ers, the All-China Journalists' Associa- group and would be ready to fulfil all
tion and other mass professional and their wishes and suffer any sacrifice for
scientific organizations of 'the intelIec- their sake.
tuals.
In destroying culture and the cultural
Under the slogan of struggle against
heritage in annihilating the intellectuals
the "counter-revolutionary revisionist
(
system of education" he, in effect, stop-
and enforcing the policy of stupefying
ned the work of all educational in,stitu-
the people Mao Tse-tung has committed
ions in the country. Mao Tse-tung harsh-
incomparably greater crimes than Chin'
y persecutes and annihilates education-
Shih-Huang-ti (first emperor of the Chin
alists, he has burnt the bulk of the text- dynasty) who in the 3rd century B.C.
buried alive/ several
books and decided greatly to shorten burned books and b
he period of study in all prinpati. which Confucianists f hp AIJAQ
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a?ne lp?n91r9219A.15PkaER.Pits?dinig9. 4
ore ly in some regions inhabited by national
uch minorities, the leaders, cadres and the
3rd masses of the Han people* have been
find rallying together with the national
Tse- minorities for joint resistance against
hih. Mao Tse-tung.
the 10. He does everything to protect the
national bourgeoisie and co-operates
an with domestic and external reaction.
According to Mao Tse-tung's theory of
the "new democratism," the bourgeoisie is
eir a class which exercises dictatorship
jointly with the workers, peasants and
re- the petty bourgeoisie. In his explanation
dal of the national flag of the CPR?red with
nd five stars?he says that the bourgeoisie
iii- is ao equal member of society just as
al the working class, peasantry and the
a petty bourgeoisie. Therefore he attach-
ch es particular significance and grants
n, special privileges to the national bour-.
si- geoisie in the spheres of policy, econo-
ct my and social status.
ns In the economic sphere, immediately
after the country's liberation Mao Tse-
al tung acceeded to the demands of the
ei- national bourgeoisie and allowed them
er to retain capital and profits, thus foster-
ing the development of capitalism. In
d 1956, after the establishment of the
0- joint state-private administration of in-
d dustry and trade he decided to pay an
t- annual five percent guaranteed profit to
d the capitalists for a period of 5-7 years.
S In 1962, upon the expiration of this
d term, Mao Tse-tung decided to prolong
s, the payment of profits for another five
years. This period has also expired and
he has once again decided to continue
paying out profits for another . . . 10
' years.
At the same time the administration
of all state-private enterprises in effect
remained in the hands of the capitalists.
Occupying the posts of directors, mana-
? gers, engineers and so forth, capitalists
receive salaries several times higher
than those paid to other people hold-
ing the same jobs. Prior to the adoption
of the Constitution, at the time when
the so-called new democratic policy was
being put through, representatives of the
bourgeoisie made up a considerable part
of the People's Political Consultative
Conference. A considerable number of
them also held the posts of heads and
their deputies in the Central People's
cursed byqPpeop for all tunes.
romped For Rele
the 20th century there are many m
intellectuals in China and they are m
wiser than the intellectuals of the
century B.C.; they will assuredly
appropriate ways of punishing Mao
tung, the present, second Chin S
Huang-Ti, this most despotic of all
despots in China's history.
9. He conducts a barbarous great-H
chauvinistic policy with regard to
national minorities and annihilates th
revolutionary leaders and cadres..
Following the traditions of the
?actionary regimes of Chinese feu
emperors, the Peiyan warlords a
Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung uses m
tary-police forces to decimate nation
minorities; he steadfastly enforces
policy of great-Han chauvinism whi
finds its expression in discriminatio
disparagement, repressions, forcible as
milation or resettlement and disrespe
for the faiths, customs and traditio
of the national minorities.
At the outset of the so-called cultur
revolution he sent numerous hungw
ping detachments from Peking to Inn
Mongolia, Sinkiang, Ningsia, Chingha
Tibet, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow an
other regions inhabited by national rain.
rifles where they destroyed temples an
mosques, insulted the believers, commi
ted murders and arson, "rebelled" an
seized power. He used military unit
deceived by him to annihilate cadres an
ordinary citizens ? Mongols, Tungkang
Chuangs, Tibetans, Tais, Miaos an
_others. Mao Tsc-tung arrests and perse
cutes Party, administrative and military
leaders of the Mongol, Uighur, Tung
kang and other peoples. He tests atomic
and hydrogen bombs in regions inhabi
tea the national minorities, caring
little for their health or lives.
lie dispatched military units consist-
ing of national minorities to Canton to
attack the workers and the troops re-
maining loyal to the revolution, and in-
cited them to fratricidal slaughter mak-
ing cat's paws of other people to be
able to fish in muddy waters.
These crimes of Mao Tse-tung are
alien to Marxist-Leninist national policy
and a betrayal of proletarian interna-
tionalism. They evoked not only vigorous
resistance and armed struggle of the
national minorities, but also opposition
to his reactionary policy and compas-
sion for the national minorities on the
part of those local Party and administra-
tive workers and servicemen of the Han
people Who adhere to the Marxist-Lenin-
*There are more than 50 nations and
nationalities In the CPR. The Han na-
tion accounts for over 90 percent of
the total population.
116999MgV9r9cilind the State Ad.!
ministrative Council, in its ministries
and committees. On top of that they
had a fairly large number of official
posts in the consultative councils and
administrative bodies in all major, med-
ium and small towns.
The national bourgeoisie retained a
very important place in China's politi-
cal life even in the period of the social.
1st revolution and the building of social.
ism and after the Constitution was
adopted. Statistics show that out of
approximately 1,260 deputies of the
National People's Congress (NPC), the
country's highest organ of power, 260
were representatives of the bourgeoisie.
It is common knowledge that deputies of
the NPC are not elected by a direct
vote. Nominally they are elected at pro-
vincial meetings of people's representa-
tives. In fact, however, they are all
selected by Mao Tse-tung. As a result of
this selection the national bourgeoisie
which numbers less than a hundredth
part of the country's population held
over a fifth of the seats in the NPC,
while the workers, peasants and the
petty bourgeoisie comprising over 90
perecent of the population had less than
four-fifths of the seats.
There is a fairly large number of the
bourgeoisie occupying posts of deputy.
chairman and members of the Standing
Committee of the NPC. In the State
Council and its ministries and state com-
mittees many of the heads and deputies
are from the bourgeoisie. Moreover, they
hold an even larger number of important
posts in the People's Congresses anci
People's Councils in all towns. For ex.
ample, Jung Yi-jen, a big capitalist, who
annually gets over 3,000,000 yuan in pro-
fits, is a deputy of the NPC and member
of its Standing Committee; he is deputy
of the Shanghai Municipal People's Con-
gress and deputy-mayor of Shanghai. .
In the course of the so-called cultural
re olution workers? peasants and the
intellectuals had been and are being
subjected to brutal repressions on the
part of the hungweipings, tsaofans, the
army and the police, and only the na-
tional bourgeoisie continues to live as
before, and as before receives profits
and ,exploits the people. Foreign corres-
pondents after visiting China and seeing
the lite of the Chinese bourgeoisie, !un-
animously agree that in the China which
is living through the so-called "cultural
revolution" the bourgeoisie is the sole
flourishing and contented class. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoi-
sie, in the cotarso of all its major con-
ferences, has always sent telegrams of
8
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11;
Approved For Releas
greetings to Mao Tse-tung calling him
"beloved father and teacher" and thank-
ing him for his profound solicitude and
all-round care.
As regards the facts of Mao Tse-tung's
connivance with internal and external
reaction there are more than enough of
them. We shall only mention some of
the more striking ones.
Mao Tse-tung had an exceptionally
high opinion of LI Chi.shen. After the
formation of the CPR Li Chi-shen was
appointed Deputy Chairman. of the
Standing Committee of the NPC. What
sort of a man was Li Chi-shen? He
was a notorious hangman. After Chiang
Kai-shek had betrayed the revolution
of April 14 (1927) in Shanghai, Li Chi-
shen on' April 15, 1927 betrayed the
revolution in Canton and in the course
of three days executed more than 5,000
Communists, revolutionary workers and
students. Therefore, at a solemn recep-
tion on the occasion of the formation
of the CPR a veteran Party member
upon seeing Li Chi-shen and others of
his ilk, hit the table with his hand and
exclaimed: "This is an outrage! Old
revolutionaries are valued less than
non-revolutionaries, and non-revolution-
aries are valued less than counter-revo-
lutionaries."
Mao Tse-tung is on friendly terms with
Li Tsung-jen, he made Li Tsung-jen his
honoured guest and the guest of all the
country. What sort of man is Li Tsung-
jen? He is also a notorious hangman who
together with Wang Ching-wei betrayed
the revolution of July 15, 1927 in Wuhan.
Within a few days they executed tens
of thousands of Communists and other
revolutionary workers and students. He
is war criminal No. 2 who had replaced
Chiang Kai-shek as president in order to
bring the anti-communist, anti-popular,
counter-revolutionary civil war to a con-
elusion.
A loyal flunkey of U.S. imperialism he
fled to the United States after the de-
feat of the Kuomingtang in the civil war
and stayed there for 15 years. Upon Li
Tsung-jen's return to China in 1965,
Mao Tse-tung organised official welcomes
and receptions in his honour in Peking
.and other cities at which Li Tsung-jcn
widely propagandised the slogan "td
fight against imperialism it is necessary
to fight against revisionism" which he
had brought from the United States. In
fact, Mao Tse-tung made him his adviser
for anti-Soviet, anti-communist and anti- I
popular affairs.
Mao Tse-tung admired Chang Tung.
sung. What sort of a man. is Chang s
CPYRGHT
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Tung-sung? Chang Tung-sung taught the
notorious history of Western philosophy
His book "History of Western Philo-
sophy" praises to the skies the reaction-
ary-idealistic philosophers of the west.
Marx's name is mentioned on the very
last page. "As regards the philosophy of
K. Marx," it is stated in the book, "it
simply merits no discussion. For only
the insane can balleVa In his phil000phy."
At a joint meeting of 'the leaders
the central ministries and committees
held a few days prior to the official
proclamation of the CPR, someone, sud-
denly informed Mao Tse-tung: "Chang
Tung-sung has arrived!" A joyous smile
spread across Mao Tse-tung's face and
he said for all to hear: "That's great!
That's great! Chang Tung-sung has also
arrived! He is a veteran of the Peiyang
and Yanchiu groups and on top of that
he is a prominent professor. Since he
has come to us he at least should be
given the post of member of the Cen-
tral People's Government Council." I
told him there and then: "Chairman
Mao! This man still needs to be looked
into. The veterans of the Pciyan and
Yanchiu groups had not only always
opposed the Communist Party but even
the Knomingtang at the time when it
was still participating in the revolution."
Several days later the name of Chang
Tung-sung was on the list of members
of the Central People's Government
Council. A short while later public se-
curity organs discovered that he and
his son were American spies and had a
secret radio station in their home
specially for maintaining contact with
the U.S. secret service.
On November 25, 1965 Jenmingjihpao
published an account of how Mao-Tse-
tung and his wife congratulated the
writer Anna Louise Strong, propagan-
dizer of Mao Tse-tung's thought in
the U.S,A. on her birthday and publish-
ed a group photograph. The newspaper
mentioned that all the Americans on the
photograph were friends of Mao Tse-
tung and Chiang Ching. The past of
some of these people is still unclear.
Among them were L. Early and Ep-
stein who, as is well known, were advis-
ers and friends of Chiang Kai-shek and
his wife Sung Mei-ling and have now
become the advisers and friends of Mao
Tse-tung and Chiang Ching,
Mao ITse-tung is striking a secret dip-
omatic deal with the U.S. imperialists.
The Chinese and American ambassadors
have already had 134 meetings in War-
aw. Both sides have made the subject
of their talks a complete secret from the
Chinese and American peoples and from
. the world public. A U.S. State Depart
ment representative frankly admitted
that Washington and Peking have been
maintaining direct contact ever since
the Geneva Conference of 1954 and that
although the U.S.A. has no official diplo.
matic relations with Washington, the
successes that have been achieved at
,tho %Yoram tolke by for stimuli those
achieved by Britain and other countries
who have diplomatic relations with Pe-
king. It is clear from the above that the
secret diplomatic deal between China
and the United States has already at-
tained considerable scope and level.
Such are the 10 principal crimes com-
mitted by Mao Tse-tung withih the
country.- These crimes are proved by
incontrovertible facts. These crimes
cannot be refuted by any verbal aril-
flees of Mao Tse-tung and his group.
These 10 crimes demonstrate with
especial clarity and precision that Mao
Tse-tung is engaged not in some kind of
a "cultural revolution." but in an armed
counter-revolution, an anti-communist
counter-revolutionary military coup dir-
ected against the people. Even at the
time when the vaunted "cultural revolu-
tion" was only getting under way,
Marxists-Leninists of all countries point-
ed out that the so-called "great prole-
tarian cultural revolution," launched and
led by Mao Tse-tung personally, far from
having anything to do with either the
proletariat or culture, or the revolution,
was indeed spearheaded against the pro-
letariat, against culture, against revolu-
tion; far from having anything in com-
mon with Marxism-Leninism; it was
spearheaded against Marxism-Leninism;
far from resembling in any way the
policy of a Communist Party and a
socialist state, it was spearheaded
against the Communist Party and social-
ism. The entire course of subsequent
events has increasinglydemonstrated
the absolute correctness of such an'
appraisal.
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Sec-
retary of the Central Committee of the
CPSU, in his speech at a meeting with
electors on March 11, 1967, already con-
cretely pointed out: "The legend about
the 'proletarian cultural revolution' is
merely clumsy camouflage of a policy
alien to Marxism-Leninism." "This looks
more like a reactionary coup." In his
speech on September 8 of the same year
at a brotherhood meeting in Budapest he
once again noted: "What has been named
the 'cultural revolution' by the Mao
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ise-tung grotP woultcr e more correct
to call counter-revolution." Subsequent
events in China have fully corroborated
the exceptional correctness of this
Marxist-Leninist evaluation.
These 10 crimes also demonstrate
very clearly that the aim of the so-called
"cultural revolution" effected by Mao
Tse-tung and his group is not "to safe-
guard the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat," but, on the contrary, to abolish
people's rule in China; not "to safeguard
the socialist system," but, on the' con-
trary, to undermine the foundation for
building socialism in China. These 10
crimes show with exceptional clarity and
precision that the object against which
the "cultural revolution" is spearheaded
is not "a handful of Party persons in
authority taking the capitalist road" and
not "carriers of the bourgeois reaction-
ary line," not "counter-revolutionary
revisionists" and not "traitors," but, on
the contrary, it is the Marxist-Leninist
Chinese Communist Party which unites
in its ranks about 25 million members;
it is the Young Communist League of
China which unites in its ranks about
30 million members; it is the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions which
unites in its ranks over 20 million mem-
bers; it is the millions of leaders,
cadres and activists of Party, adminis-
trative, military and various other insti-
tutions and organisations, including
schools, higher educational establish-
ments, industrial, agricultural and tran-
sport enterprises; it is the majority
of the workers, peasants and intelligent-
sia of the entire country. According to
incomplete data, the number of people
persecuted, arrested and physically an-
nihilated by Mao Tse-tung and his
group in the course of the "cultural
revolution" exceeded five million long
ago.
And, lastly, these 10 crimes prove
with exceptional clarity and precision
that indeed the so-called "handful of
persons in authority taking the capital-
ist road" and "carriers of the bourgeois
reactionary line" are no one else but
Mao Tse-tung himself and his group!
The facts show, and all recognise, that
the anti-communist and anti-popular
Mao Tse-tung group consists only of a .
few people. And among them the per.
son closest and most trusted by Mao
Tse-tung is his wife Chiang Ching. That
'is why Mao Tse-tung is forced himself
openly to praise her as the only person
who really understands well, propagates
and applies Mao Tse-tung's thought in
'general and his thought in the sphere
CPYRGF,1T
cutAnnnsnnnAnnni _s .
of literature and art in' particular:That
is why he has appointed her formally
the deputy, and actually, the chief of the
so-called "group for cultural revolution
affairs and commander-in-chief of
hungweipings. That is why he artificially
put her in the third place, so far after
Lin Piao, in the Mao heirarchy. And that
is why public opinion in China and for-
eign observers unanimously agree that
Chiang Ching remains the only person
Mao Tse-tung could really trust in
everything.
Here indeed is a handful of persons!
iitted 10 such are breaking
y, the people's
unions, Young
so on and whoal bourgeoisie
The persons who coir
crimes, the persons who
up the Communist Part
government, the trade
Communist League, and
are protecting the nation
politically and economically ? are not
really take th
y the bourgeoi
day they abuse
he name of th
the CPC, the
ilitary Commit-
nmittee of the
these the persons who e
capitalist road and carr
reactionary line! To this ,
and take cover behind, te
Central Committee of
Council of State, the M
tee of the Central Cor
CPC, are sending troops to suppress ancants and intel-
g Party, admin
dies and crush
lministering the
I
annihilate workers, peas
lectuals, to attack leadin-
istrative and military bo
their cadres; they are ac
"Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs
e of the CPC,"
the hungwei-
of the Central Committe
under whose command
pings and tsaofans daily and everywhere
ted and killed
eally the "per.
the men who
insulted, beat up, arres
people. Are not these r
sons in authority"? Are
committed 10 such crimes not real
visionists and
his group have
hi, Teng Hsia-
s they fabricat-
counter-revolutionary re
traitors to t, revolution?
That Mao,Tse-tung and
tacked on to Liu Shao-c
ping and others the label
ed, such as "a handful of Party persons
in authority taking the capitalist road"
and "carriers of the bourgeois reaction-
ary line," is a political trick with con-
cealed aims.
?
These aims are, first, to blame Liu and
Teng for the- various mistakes and
crimes committed by Mao Tse-tung over
a number of years in home and foreign
policy and thereby make Liu and Teng
the scapegoats.
Second, Liu and Teng were for many s
years colleagues of Mao Tse-tung and
know of the many crimes and unseemly
secrets of Mo Tse-tung in internal and f
international 'affairs; that is why Mao is r
trying to liquidate Liu and Teng as s
living witnesses.
Third, another still more, important
aim is to tack on to Liu Shao-chi, Teng
Hsia-ping and Tao Chu labels of "Party
persons in authority taking the capital-
ist
and on this pretext to liqui-
date Liu, Teng and Tao themselves and
then arbitrarily tack on a label of "sup-
porters of Liu, Teng and Tao" to all per-
sons whom Mao Tse-tung and his group
intend to persecute.
The real objective of their call?nec-
essarily to link together "big criticism"
of the "top Party person in authority
taking the capitalist road" with the cam-
paign of "struggle, criticism and trans-
formation" in all the country's institu-
tions and organisations, is to utilise the
slogan 'of "struggle against the handful
of Party persons in authority taking the
capitalist road" as a screen and pretext
for persecuting and destroying Party
cadres in all institutions and organisa-
tions throughout the country.
By decision of the unlawful so-called
"12th Plenary Meeting of the Central
Committee of the CPC," Liu Shao-chi
was removed from all the Party and state
posts he held and "expelled from the
Party for ever" on the basis of absolu-
tely false accusations entirely fabricated
by Mao Tse-tung himself. Mao Tse-tung
followed this up by another, wider, still
more slanderous campaign in the press?
radio and at meetings and rallies all
over the country under the slogan of
"launching a struggle of unusual scale
and depth against the top traitor, top
scab and top spy of the Kuomingtang,
imperialism and Soviet revisionism, Liu
Shao-chi, and his supporters in all the
localities." This once again most clearly
reveals "the tiger's aspect and snake's
soul" of Mao Tse-tung as an unprece-
dentedly bestial and absolutely brazen
plotter.
Communists and other upright people
throughout the world are raising their
wrathful and just voice. in protest
against such foul persecution by Mao
Tse-tung of the Vice-Chairman of the
Central Committee of the CPC and Chair-
man of the Chinese Pt20, .-'S Republic
Comrade Liu Shao-chi,
Mao Tse-tung acted in a similar way
during the so-called "campaign to rectify
style," started in February 1942. Making
use of the military power he usurped in
he Party and the difficult international
ituation during the early period of.the
Hitlerite attack on the Soviet Union,
Mao Tse-tung began this campaign which
ormally was called the "campaign to
ectify three styles" (that is, the Party
tyle, style of education and literary
?
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style); actually it was a campaign of
"four antis" (that is, anti-Leninist anti-
Comintern, anti-Soviet and anti-Party).
For what purpose did Mao Tse-tung
need that campaign? In preparing it and
in the course of conducting it, Mao ?Tse-
lung himself repeatedly said that by car-
rying out the campaign he wanted to
achieve three aims: 1) to replace Lenin-
ism by Maoism; 2) to write the history
of the Chinese Communist Party as the
history of Mao Tse-tung alone; 3) to
elevate the personality of Mao Tse-tung
above the Central Committee and the
entire Party. Why did he have to do it?
He himself replied: this would give him
two opportunities: first, to capture the
chief leading place in the Party leader-
ship and all power in the Party in his
own hands; second, if he already has
taken the first place in the Party leader-
ship, .no one should ever be able to
? oust him.
To achieve these ends he did the fol-
lowing in this campaign: 1) he declared
Leninism to be Russian Marxism suit-
able only for leading the Russian revo-
lution and unsuitable for leading the
world and the Chinese revolution; 2) de-
clared that the leadership and assistance,
of the Communist International to the
CPC was entirely wrong; 3) declared
that the all-round support given by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(Bolsheviks) and the Soviet Union to
the Communist Party of China and to
the Chinese Revolution was not only
"invalid" and "ineffective" but even
."harmful"; 4) accused the entire Party
of "non-recognition of Maoism" and of
"loyalty to Leninism and the Commun-
ist International" and of "adherence to
the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union?'
And who was to blame for all this?
Mao Tse-tung held that the blame lay
with all the leaders and important
cadres of the Party who had studied in
the Soviet Union and spread the influ-
ence of Leninism, the Comintern, the
CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union in China.
Their main representatives were Wang
Ming, Ching Po-ku, Chang Wei-tien,
Wang Chia-hsiang, Kai Fang, Yang
Shang-kun, Chu Jul and others. And who
was to blame for supporting these
Comintern men? Mao Tse-tung held that
these were Chu-Teh, Chou En-lai, Hsien
Ying, Teng Fa, Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung
and others.
And who was the "top man" to blame?
Mao Tse-tung held that this was Wang
Ming. According to his statement, Wang
Ming was the "main representative of
_Russian Marxism and the line of the,
pp
Comintern in the Communist Party of
China." Wang Ming was the "principal
adherent and defender of the CPSU(B)
,and the Soviet Union in China." Wang
Ming was the "principal foe of Maoism
in the CPC." But how was the struggle
against Wang Ming to be waged and
finked with the struggle against the
absolute majority of the leaders, Party
cadres and members?
For this Mao Tse.tung artificially div.
ided the entire Party into two groupings
?the "dogmatic" and "empiristic" and
at the same time united them as one
target of his attack. He placed all the
Communists who, had studied in the
Soviet Union or engaged in ideological
and political work and also those who
? socially originated from the intelligent-
sia into the so-called "pro-Soviet and
dogmatic Wang Ming grouping. All the
Communists who engaged in practical
work orrwho were of ?working-class and
peasant social origin he placed into the
so-called "empiristic grouping." At the
same time he declared that the empiris-
tic grouping was a "captive and assist-
ant" of the dogmatic grouping.
Moreover, Mao Tse-tung held that in
order to write the history of the CPC
as the history, of Mao Tse-tung alone it
was necessary not only not to recognise
the, services bf Leninism, the Comintern,
the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union in
the history of the CPC and the Chinese
Revolution. It was necessary to deny
that any leader, any Party functionary
or member had rendered any service to
the CPC and the Chinese revolution. Ac-
cording to Mao Tse-tung's statement, it
was particularly necessary:
1) to deny the services rendered by
Chu Chiu-po in the struggle against
Right opportunist Chentuhsuism and
also the services of the extraordinary
August Conference of the CPC (1927)
which approved in its decisions this
struggle and the services of the Comin-
tern leadership which Was the direct
sponsor of this conference and to pro-
claim the line of the August CPC Con-
ference to be a "Chuchiupoist Left
Opportunist line";
2) to deny the services rendered by
Wang Ming in the struggle against the
Left adventurist line of Li Li-san and
also the services of the 4th Plenary
Meeting of the Central Committee of
the CPC, sixth convocation (January
1931), and the Presidium of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Comintern (May
1931) which approved this struggle in
their decisions and to declare the line
of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the CPC
Central Committee a "Left opportunist
line of Wang Ming";
' 3) to deny the services rendered by
Wang Ming in putting forward the pol-
Icy of the anti-Japanese national united
front and the services of the 7th Com-
intern Congress which approved this
policy in its decisions and to declare
this policy of the anti-Japanese nationai
united front, a "Right-wing capitulatory
line of Wang Ming."
According to Mao Tse,tung's state,
ment, if the services of other persons is
the history of the CPC and the Chinese
revolution were recognised then "there
would be no Maoism," "the history of
the CPC as the history of Mao Tse-tung
alone would be impossible" and there
would be no "especially high and un-
shakeable place of Mao Tse-tung in the
CPC." In keeping with his conspirator-
ial plan, Mao Tse-tung first of all struck
the main blow at Wang Ming?not only
ideologically, politically, organisationally
and morally, but also physically (at the
beginning of this campaign Wang Ming
had already been gravely poisoned by
toxic preparations).
Mao Tse-tung also struck blows of dif?
1"4-tent severity at the absolute majority
of the leaders, cadres and Party mem-
bers. Employing diverse methods of
deception, slander, threats and coercior
compelled all of them to admit thal
Nary were either dogmatists or em'pir.
icists, that is, "captives and assistants
of the dogmatists" and that, of course,
all without exception carried out the
above mentioned so-called "Left" or
"Right" line of Wang Ming. Moreover,
by similar methods and cruel torture
he compelled a considerable part of the
Communists and YCL ,members to Con-
fess that they were "traitors," "counter-
revolutionaries" and "spies of the Kuo-
mintang, the imperialists and the Soviet
Union." Many of those who did confess
to being such criminals were arrested
or killed or committed suicide. This con-
tinued for more than three years.
As a result of this campaign, the 7th
Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central
Committee, 6th convocation (April 1945),
under the pressure of Mao Tse-tung
adopted a "Resolution on Some Histor-
ical Questions of the CPC." This was
the first official document falsifying the
history of the CPC in accordance with
Mao Tse-tung's concepts. Following this
the Rules, adopted by the 7th Congress
of the CPC (April-May, 1945), forcibly
Included recognition of Mao Tsetung's
thought as the only guiding ideas of the
CPC. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung succeeded
in capturing the top leading post (at
the 1st Plenary Meeting of the CPC
Central Committee, 7th convocation, he
.I-
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Approved For Releas
for the first time was "elected" Chair-
man of the Central Committee) and all
power in the Party, in creating a cult of
his personality, and establishing his per-
sonal dictatorship in the CPC which
relied 'mainly on the support of army
After the 7th Congress and until the
so-called cultural revolution, for more
than 20 years, Mao Tse-tung constantly
conducted campaigns under, different
names. But their chief content, chief
aims, chief methods and chief objects of
attack in the main were the same as in
the first "campaign to rectify style" of
1942-45.
The fist "campaign to rectify style"
was a rehearsal of the so-called cultural
revolution. The various campaigns which
followed it, were to one or another
extent direct preparatory measure& for
the "cultural revolution." During this
time in view of the many fundamental
mistakes and repeated failures and de-
feats of Mao Tse-tung's home and for-
eign policy and especially in view of the
obviously reactionary and counter-
revolutionary nature of these campaigns
and the "cultural revolution," even men
who were closest and most loyal to
Mao Tse-tung as, for example, Liu Shao-
chi, Hu Chiao-mu, Tan Chen, Tao Chu,
Lo Yui-ching, Ho Chang-kung, Peng
Chen, Lu Ting-i, Chou Yang and othcrs,
one after another became his enemies
and victims. These facts graphically
show that Mao Tse-tung, notwithstand-
ing his frenzied terror and perfidy, is
today even more isolated and is in a
really unprecedented desperate position.
Similarly Mao Tse-tung has slyly
branded Peng Teh-huai, Ho Lung, Lo Jui-
ching and others as "army persons in
authority taking the capitalist road,"
not only to utilise this as the pretext,
for persecuting them but also in order
to be able arbitrarily to brand as "sup-
porters of Peng, Ho and Lo" any military
leaders and army cadres whom he
intended to persecute.
Similarly, as early as 1962 Mao Tse-
tung ordered Chi Pen-yu to write an
article slandering as "traitor" the na-
tional hero of the T'ai P'in revolution
Li Hsiu-cheng who heroically perished
at the hand of the national traitor Tseng
Kuo-fan; thereby Mao Tse-tung initiated
the so-called "campaign of struggle
against traitors." Following this, Chu
Chiu-po, well-known . ldader of the
Chinese Communist Party who heroic- t
ally perished singing the "Internation- a
ale" at the hand of butcher Chiang s
Kai-shek, was classed among the pa
"traitors." Next a list of "traitors" was b
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compiled which inclUded more than their own real visage of anti-communist,
2,700 leaders and important cadres of anti-popular, anti-Marxist and anti-
Party, administrative, military educa- socialist counter-revolutionaries.
tional and mass organizations whom he It is because the slogan of struggle
had long ago planned to destroy.
against the so-called "handful of Party
In reali
y, o these persons are the persons in authority taking the capital-
flower of the Chinese people, the finest 1st goad," put forward by Mao Tse-tung
sons and daughters of the, Communist for plotting purposes, has such an in.
Party of China, worthy fighters of the
groat am), oaf Werld COITIMISAlift1 W110 tricate and perfidiously treacherous
aantarit that ha and ilia palm Mimi),
have been reared in the spirit of the repeat that this slogan indicates "the
great doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, main direction of the struggle" in the
who have for decades been tried and vaunted "cultural revolution." They
tested and schooled in revolutionary openly extol this slogan as the "great
battles against international imperial- strategic plan" of the so-called "cultural
ism and internal reaction. Such criminal revolution" elaborated by Mao Tse-tung
actions, falsification of the "corpus delic- well in advance.
ti," slander of upright people with the In the course of the "cultural revolu-
object of elevating himself and tramp- tion" Mao Tse-tung issued so-called
ling upon others?these are Mao Tse- "latest instructions" such as "we mnst
tung's favourite foul ways and perfidious fight egoism and criticise revisionism,"
methods. "combat clannishness" and so forth as
Fourth, Mao Tse-tung deliberately and the main trend in continuing the "Cul-
with great pomp pictures the counter- tural revolution" in an attempt to reduce
revolutionary military coup, effected by the steadily mounting discord and split
himself and directed within the country within the Maoist group and, in particu-
against the Communist Party and the lar, among the hungweipings and tsao-
people and also against the Soviet Union fans; to charge cadres of Party, adminis-
and the international communist move- tration, military and mass organizations
merit, as struggleor "seizure of pow- of all levels who oppose Mao Tse-tung
er'' between his group and the so-called with "revisionism" and also "egoism" in
"supporters of Liu and Teng." Similar-
ly, the general movement of resistance order to have an additional pretext for
' slighting or persecuting them; to use
in the entire Party and the entire coun- the bugbear "egoism" against non-
try, aroused by his counter-revolution- party workers, peasants and intellec-
ary military coup, he also deliberately tuals inasmuch as in their case it was
pictures as a struggle for "seizure of
more convenient than the bugbear
power" between the so-called "support- "revisionism." But the main thing was
ers of Liu and Teng" and "supporter that he aimed to use these slogans to
of Mao and Lin," thereby trying to mis- mask what for the entire nation were
lead the people of h'
ry an the increasingly evident ugly features of
world progressive opinion, to prevent the counter-revolutionary military coup,
them from divining the essence of Mao which he was accomplishing for the sake
Tse-tung's counter-revolutionary mili- of his own extremely egoistic, careerist
tary coup.
interests and those of his wife and other
Fifth, one of the artifices frequently
employed by Mao Tse-tung is that he
members of his group.
not only abuses in the vilest terms the Developments upset his expectations.
They showed that the louder Mao Tse.
various abominable crimes actually tung called for a struggle against
committed by himself, but even shifts "egoism" and "clannishness" the clearer
the blame for them onto the victims of he revealed the substance of these sl-
his attacks and persecution in order to gans and the more obvious it became
distort the truth and to mix black with
white. . that none other than Mao Tse-tung was
the egoist No. 1 and that his group
In other words, it is because Mao Tse- personified premier clannishness found-
tung himself and his group arc really ed, besides, on an abuse of state power.
the notorious handful of persons in What, according to his explanations,
authority taking the capitalist road, the does the "struggle against egoism"
carriers of the bourgeois reactionary mean? That "unselfishness" should
me, it is because they themselves- are triumph. What does "unselfishness"
he counter-revolutionary revisionists mean? "The loftiest unselfishness means
nd traitors that they, like a thief who boundless devotion to Chairman Mao."
houts "stop thief!", fraudulently re- And what does "devotion" mean? It
ackste the labels of these crimes onto thc means "stowing to defend to the last
s of
others in order to conceal breath Chairman Mao's status as th
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Therefore, despite the fanfare sur-
rounding the publication of these slo-
gans, he failed to stimulate the lauded
"great unity of the whole country" or
the notorious "unity of the,three sides"
and he failed to reduce the split and
conflicts among the hungweipings and
tsaofans. All he did Was to increase the
split and the bickering among the
forces forming his immediate rnainsta);
moreover, all he achieved was that
those in whom political consciousnes:,
Party conscience and a sense of justic
still live' are rising against Mao Tsceun g
and his group, who arc committing an/
crime for the sake of their egoisti:
interests.,
The soalled "Group for Cultured
Revolution Affairs of the CC CPC" cor-
sisted of 17 persons handpicked by Mae
Tse-tung. Twelve of them have beet.
subjected to repression, and only five
arc left. Even people like Wang Li, Kuala
Feng, Chi Pen-yu, Mu Hsin and Ling
Chieh, who had displayed exceptiona.
zeal in the "cultural revolution," fume.
themselves in disfavour, and today one
after another they are declared to be
"counter-revolutionary black bandits'
who have opposed the "thought" of Mac
Tse-tung, the "Group for Cultural Revo
lution Affairs" and Chiang Ching.
Yang Cherewu, Acting Chief of thc
PLA General Staff and commander of
the Peking Military District, Yu Li-chin
who was recently appointed Political
Commissar of the Air Force, and Fu
Chun-pi, commander of the Peking
Garrison, have likewise been declared
"double-dealing counter-revolutionaries"
who had opposed Mao Tse-tung, the
"Group for Cultural Revolution Affairs"
and Chiang Ching.
These facts best of all bear out the
aforesaid.
No matter what cunning Mao Tse-tune
and his group resort to in their dema.
gogy and no matter what masks they
put on, whether it be the "cultural rev?
lution," Marxist-Leninist "Leftist" verb
iage, the slogan "struggle for power of
two groups" or any other new screer
which they may yet conjure up, they
cannot hide the truth about their anti-
Communist, anti-popular counter-revolte
tionary military coup. -The ten crime:
committed by their hands are ten
indictments which they themselves
have inscribed. ?
'
11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
FIVE MAJOR CRIMES COMMITTED
BY MAO TSE-TUNG
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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Foreign policy is a continuation of
domestic policy. Let us now see what
'crimes Mao Tsa?tung has committed in
the sphere of international policy.
L He frenziedly attacks the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries.
He organised a siege of the embassies
and other diplomatic offices of the
U.S1.S.R., Bulgaria, Hungary, the German
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia
and Mongolia in China, insulted the
leaders of these countries and caused
the manhandling and baiting of diplo-
mats and members of their families.
Like the Peiyan warlords and Chiang
Kai-shek he in effect does not recognise
the Mongolian People's Republic as an
independent state, openly threatens its
sovereignty and lays claim to its terri-
tory. He persists in his frenzied opposi-
tion to joint action with the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries in
the rendering of assistance to the Viet-
namese people in order to repulse United
States aggression, and seeks to under-
mine the Vietnamese people's bonds of
friendship with the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries, thereby encour-
aging U.S. imperialism to keep escalat-
ing the war of aggression in Vietnam.
He spreads slanderous rumors, insulting
and undermining the prestige of the
Korean People's Democratic Republic;e
t hereby encouraging provocations
against the KPDR by aggressive United
States troops and the South Korean
puppets. Besides bringing 'trade and
economic pressure to bear on Cuba after
the manner of the U.S. imperialists, he
-engages in subversive activities against
the Communist Party and revolutionary
3overnment of Cuba. He openly pro-.
elaims his intention of "demolishing"
the U.S.S.R. and other socialist coun-
cries, constantly fans anti-Soviet hysteria
China and fosters hostility for the
soviet Union.
Mao Tse-tung savagely attacks the
CPSU and the Soviet Union because the
reat Communist Party of the Soviet
nion, founded and reared by Lenin,
as the longest history, the most exten-
ive experience; the most imposing
chievements and the greatest prestige,
because the great Land , of Soviets,
? created by Lenin and embodying Marx-
ism-Leninism, is the world's first social-
1st country with the longest history, the
most impressive achievements and the
greatest might, because led by the
CPSU thee Soviet Union is indeed the
mightiest and most reliable mainstay
of the world 'revolution and of world
peace, that it is indeed the most edur-
ing and consistent revolutionary bastion.
of the struggle ? against imperialist
cli eues and reactionaries of all the
capitalist countries headed by the U.S.A.
Mao Tse-tung has turned frenzied
an I-Sovietism into his banner of strug-
gle against Marxism-Leninism, against
the Communist and Workers' Parties,
ag inst socialism and communism,
against the world revolution and peace
in order to gain the approval and un-
derstanding of the imperialist clique
heeded by the U.S.A. and obtain .the
po sibility of collaborating with it.
nother reason for the violence of his
att icks on the Soviet Union and the
CP43U is that the Great October Revolu-
tion has witnessed its 50th anniversary.
Th Great October Socialist Revolution'
am. its brilliant achievements in the
budding of socialism and communism '
over the past 50 years have opened the
vis a of a bright future for all mankind.
This is the greatest force inspiring the
wo -king class and all other working
pee pie throughout the world. It is the
greatest force inspiring the CPC and the
Chinese people, who are at present
afil cted by a great tragedy.
Through furious anti-Soviet campaigns
Ma) Tse-tung seeks to rupture the long-
est blished, traditional friendship and?
fra ernal relations between the Corn..
mu list Parties and peoples of China and
the Soviet Union. He is beset by a har-
ros ing fear that the Chinese Commun-
ists and the Chinese people will learn
of lhe immense achievements, which the
So s iet people, led by the CPSU, have
attained in the course of the fulfilment
of the new Party Program and the de-
cisbns of the 23rd CPSU Congress, in
the building of communism, in the
struggle, for world peace and in render-
ing support to the communist and
wor king-class movement in different-
coustries and to the national liberation
and social-progressive movement in ,
Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Ha is exceedingly afraid that the
Chinese Communists and the Chinese.
peo7le will learn that the material and
cult rral life of the Soviet people is
stea lily improving, that they are gradu-
llly moving from the principle of "from
eacl according to his ability, to each'
leeexding to his work" to the principle
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'of "from each according to his ability,
to each according to his needs," in other
words, that they are moving towards a
prosperous and happy life under com-
munism.
Mao Tse-tung is extremely afraid that
if the Chinese Communists and the
Chinese people learn the truth in all
these (Aiestions they will see Weimar
the gross absurdity and perniciousness
of the 'so-called "thought of Mao Tse-
tung" apd of his policies. They will then
inevitably and unanimously demand
that China take the correct Marxist-
Leninist road of socialist construction
and of the struggle for peace, which has
been followed by the Soviet Union.
After appreciating all this they will rise
with greater determination, on a larger
scale, in a more organised manner and
in greater unity against Mao Tse-tung
and his "thought," against the counter-
revolutionary coup of Mao Tse-tung and
his group. That is precisely why anti-
Sovietism has become the focal point of
Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy and the
core of his policy at home.
The armed provocative attack of the
Mao Tse-tung clique on Soviet frontier
guards of March 2 on Soviet territory
on the Damarisky Island in the Ussuri
river and in this connection the new
anti-Soviet racket in China and abroad
'accompanied by outrageous territorial
claims to the U.S.S.R. are not accidental
events. Internally, they .represent an at-
tempt by Mao Tse-tung to distract the
attention of the Chinese people from the
incredible and growing difficulties of a
political and economic character aris-
ing out of the consequence of the so-
called "cultural revolution," as well as
the preparation for the carrying through
of the so-called "Congress of the CPC"
in an atmosphere of exceptional anti-
Soviet, anti-communist hysteria.
Externally, this armed provocation
and anti-Soviet propaganda ballyhoo re-
presents an act of assistance to the anti-
Soviet, anti-Communist sorties of the
ruling circles of the ,U.S.A. and of the
German Federal Republic, in particular
in regards to the Bonn venture to carry
through presidential elections in West
Berlin of March 5 and even more so
serves as an encouragement to the re-
vanchist claims of Bonn to reshape the
map of Europe. It also represents an
attempt to interfere with the Interna-
tional Conference of Communist and
workers parties which aims to achieve
the strengthening of the unity of the
world communist and workers' move-
ment and the unity of action of all anti-
imperialist forces.
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Simultaneously these facts clearly
show the absurd, shameful, adventurst
and dangerous point , reached by the
anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism of
Mao Tse-tung.
2. He venomously attacks the Marxist-
Leninist Communist and Workers' par-
ties of all countries.
Ha goes to extremes to intensify his
splitting and subversive activities
against the overwhelming majority of ,
the militant contingents of Communists
in different countries, organises a fifth
column to combat Communist and
Workers' parties, openly slanders them,
calling them "counter-revolutionary re-
visionist" parties, and publicly proclaims
his intention of "destroying" them. He
has slandered the Karlovy Vary Confer-
ence which was attended by representa-
tives of 24 Communist and Workers'
parties, calling it a "conference of scabs
and traitors," and he has called the
leaders of each of these parties "a hand-
ful of traitors and scabs." The Budapest
Consultative Meeting, attended by rep-
resentatives of 66 Communist and
Workers' parties, has been named by
him "the Budapest farce," while the
parties which attended it have been
called a "handful of traitors and scabs."
In Western Europe he concentrates
his attacks mainly on the largest and
most influential Communist parties. He
not only maliciously attacks Comrade
Waldeck Rochet and other leaders of the
French Communist Party but also slan-
ders the late Maurice Thorez, the great
fighter for communism. He not only
maliciously attacks Comrade Luigi Longo
and other leaders of the Italian Com-
munist Party but also slanders the late
Palmiro Togliatti, who was another
great fighter for communism.
At the same time he fiendishly attacks
the heroic Communist Party of Spain
and its glorious leader Comrade Dolores
Ibarruri, a party which is in the fore-
front of the struggle against fascism.
He intensifies subversion and splitting
activities against the Communist parties
of the U.S.A., Canada and Latin America
as well as against the Communist par-
ties of the Arab countries. He makes a
special effort to split and undermine the.
communist movement in Asian coun-
tries neighbouring on China. The Com-
munist Party of Indonesia which came
under the influence of Mao Tse-tung's
"Leftist" and reactionary ideas, suffered
a tragic defeat as a result of which mil-
lions of Communists and non-Party i
workers, peasants and intellectuals suf-
fered horribly. Mao Tse-tung drew no
lesson whatever from this.. Instead, he
imputed the blame to the leaders of the
Communist Party of Indonesia, who
died heroically.
He ceaselessly engages in splitting
and subversive activities against the
Communist parties of India and Ceylon,
causing enormous difficulties in their
work, In this easie of the Communist
'Party of Japan, which, urged Mao Tse-
tung to create a united front of struggle
against U.S. imperialism and came out
against the Maoist anti-Soviet "united
front," he did not confine himself to
open slander and splitting and subver-
sive activities. He organised Chinese
residents in Japan into hungweiping
gangs in order to manhandle Japanese
Communists and attack and destroy the?
building housing the Society for Japan-
ese-Chinese Friendship; he bribes hooli-
gans and Trotskyite elements to attack
offices of the Japanese Communist Par-
ty. In Peking, acting on his instructions,
hungweipings beat up and seriously in-
jured alternate member of the Presi-
dium of the CC CPJ Itiro Sunama, cor-
respondents of the CPJ newspaper, as
well as Japanese students. Moreover, he
openly proclaims his intention to "de-
molish" the CPJ and calls for the liqui-
dation of top leaders of the CPJ, com-
rades Sandzo Nosaka and Kenclzi
Miyamoto.
Thus, Mao Tse-tung mouths "Leftist"
verbiage about a "world revolution" but
in fact engages in splitting and subver-
sive activities with the object of "de-.
molishing" the foremost contingents
heading the revolutionary movement in
different countries; he speaks of a
"struggle against the imperialist clique
and reactionaries of all countries head-
ed by the' U.S.A." but does exactly what
'the U.S. imperialists and all reaction-
aries want but cannot do.
A striking example in this respect is
his attitude towards the Alevelopments
in Czechoslovakia. He and his group
level dirty slander and fabrications at
the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries as well as against the healthy
forces in the Communist Party of Czech-
oslovakia and among the Czechoslovak
people, thereby directly and openly
pouring grist on the mill of U.S. and
West German imperialism and of the
counter-revolutionary and anti-socialist
forces within Czechoslovakia.
3. He plans ,to split and undermine
the national liberation movement in
Asia, Africa and Latin America, pursu-
ng a policy of openly pressuring the
developing countries of Asia and Africa.
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He does his utmost to split and under-
mine the Afro-Asian unity movement
and the movement for solidarity of the
peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin Amer-
ica in the joint struggle against imper-
ialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.
_He is, in fact, helping to put into effect
the imperialist design of crushing the
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America one by one. He Makes eVery
&OA to underniine the friendship and
unity of the national liberation and
social-progressive movements of Asia,
Africa and Latin America with the
Soviet Union and other socialist coun-
tries as well as with the international
'communist movement, thereby seeking
to isolate the national liberation and
social-progressive movements in Asia,
%Africa and Latin America and deprive
them of the all-round assistance of the
socialist countries and the international
communist movement. Mao Tse-tung
keeps talking about support and assist-
ance for the national liberation move-
ment in Asia, Africa and Latin America,
but no sooner does U.S. imperialism
undertake aggression against any Asian,
African or Latin American country than
he, in effect, sides with U.S. imperialism.
When Vietnam was made the target
of armed aggression by U.S. imperial-
ism, instead of taking joint action with
the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries to help the Vietnamese people
repulse this aggressor, Mao Tse-tung
directed his efforts towards slander and
provoking a rupture of the Vietnamese
people's friendly relations with the
Soviet Union and other socialist coun-
tries in order to isolate the Vietnamese.
Similarly, in 1962 when Cuba was , con-
fronted with armed aggression by U.S.
imperialism, instead of taking joint
steps with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries to defend the Cuban
revolution, Mao Tse-tung concentrated
on slander and on provoking a severance
of the Cuban people's friendly relations
with the Soviet Union and other social-
ist countries in an effort to force Cuba
into isolation and thereby help U.S.
imperialism to smash her.
When the Arab states were subjected
to U.S. imperialist stage-managed Is-
raeli aggression, instead of taking joint
steps with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries to help the Arab
states, Mao Tse-tung directed his efforts
towards slander and provoking the
breaking off of the Arab countries'
friendly relations with the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries in order to
isolate them and thereby facilitate U.S.
and Israeli aggression,
At a time when the vast majority of
countries have applied economic sanc-
tions to the South African Republic,
which, created by the British imperial-
ists and colonialists, proclaimed barbar-
ous apartheid as its policy at home, Mao
Tse-tung acts at one with the U.S. and
British imperialists. He has used this
' opportunity to promote trade with the
South African Republic, Mt only pur-
chasing chromium ore from that racial.
ist Government but selling it armaments
and munitions, thereby helping in the
repressions against the indigenous popu-
lation of the South African Republic. In
effect, he sides with the white racialists,
vivid testimony of this being his vitriol-
ic outpourings against Martin Luther
King, the late leader of the civil rights
movement, of the movement against
poverty and against the U.S. war of ag-
gression in Vietnam. This man, who
enjoyed the respect and affection of all
American Negroes, was called by Mao
Tse-tung "a tool in the service of the
reactionary ruling groups'in the U.S.A."
During the "cultural revolution" 'Mao
Tse-tung still further intensified his
policy of pressure founded on barbar-
ous great-power chauvinism with ,re-
gard to developing Asian and African
countries, which had recently shaken off
imperialist rule. The reactionary
"thought" of Mao Tse-tung is exported
by compulsion with the help of Chinese
diplomatic representatives and technical
experts to countries like Nepal, Cambo-
dia and Ceylon. Mao Tse-tung forces citi-
zens of other countries to wear badges
with his portrait, infringes upon the
sovereignty of other states, and inter-
feres in the internal affairs of other
countries, thereby giving rise to inter-
state conflicts and development that
seriously harm relations between states.
Vis-a-vis India he not only frequently
provokes armed frontier conflicts but
proclaims his intention to organize arm-
ed uprisings in India with the purpose
of overthrowing the Indian Government.
In Burma he organizes Chinese resi-
dents into hungweiping gangs in order
to provoke armed conflicts and blood-
shed; in addition, he is hatching out
Plans for an armed invasion across the
Burmese frontier and the organization
of armed uprisings to overthrow the
Burmese Government. Protesting against
Mao Tse-tung's interference, through
Chinese diplomats, in their internal af-
fairs African countries like Dahomey,
the Central African Republic and Bu-
rundi have already broken off diploma-
tic relations with China. In Kenya and
Tunisia, as well, Mao Tse-tung has used
Chinese doplomats for openly circulat-
ing documents discrediting the govern-
ments of these countries and propagat-
ing the reactionary "thought" of Mao
Tse-tung. This has brought diplomatic
relations between China and these coun-
tries to the brink of rupture.
The policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung
with regard to developing Mian and
African countries is fully in line with
the Great-Han "Celestial Empire" policy
of the Chinese feudal emperors. Its sub-
stance is that a foreign state must be-
come either a vassal of the "Celestial
Empire" or its enemy. Having become
the victims of Mao Tse-tung's insults,
the Asian and African countries have
replied to him by word and action that
they have no desire to be vassals of .
Mao Tse-tung.
4. He plans to provoke a U.S.-Soviet
and world war.
At the Moscow International Meeting
in 1957 he openly pressured for a nuclear
war, which would destroy from one-third
to half of mankind. In documents at-.
tacking the world communist movement,
published in April 1960, he continued to
call for a nuclear war, which could
destroy the entire world. He constantly
shouts that the "atomic bomb is a paper
tiger," that the "hydrogen bomb is a
paper tiger," that atomic and thermo-
nuclear war is not "terrible at all."
The purpose of all this is to demora-
lize the world anti-war movement and
instigate a world war. He constantly
comes out against any action taken by
the Soviet Union and other socialist
' countries on the international stage to
relax international tension, avert a
world war and secure peaceful co-exist-
ence and peaceful conditions for the
building of communism and socialism.
His objective is to undermine world
peace. He slanderously accuses the lead-
enship of the Soviet Union of "modern
revisionism," of "capitulating to U.S.
imperialism," of "U.S.-Soviet collabora-
tiob in order to rule the world together."
The motive underlying these accusations
is that in upholding the interests of the
Soviet people and of all mankind, the
leadership of the Soviet Union does not
accept his mad proposals for the un-
leasing of a U.S.-Soviet and world war.
The main reason for Mao, Tse-tung's
constant displeasure with the U.S. rul-
ers is that, being aware that by starting
a thermonuclear war against the U.S.S.R.
they would be signing their own death
warrant, they do not dare to begin a,
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thermonuclear war against the U.S.S.R;
Therefore, while the presidential cam- Tse-tung is preparing? Were he prepar-
paign in the U.S.A. was under way in in for a war against imperialism he
1964, Mao Tse-tung openly called upon would have never started a counter-
the American people to vete for the revolutionary military coup, which was
leader of the "hawks" Goldwater, who internally directed against the Corn-
shamelessly urged war against the munist Party and the people and exter-
U.S.S.R., a world war. Inasmuch as Mao nally against the Soviet Union and the
Tse-tung's plan to provoke a U.S.-Soviet international Communist movement, as
thermonuclear wilr cum be ballad a means of preparing for war. On the
to this day, he has turned his hopes on contrary, considering that he regards
some local war growing into a U.S.-
the anti-Soviet, anti-communist, anti-
Soviet and world war, popular counterrevolutionary coup as a
For that reason he welcomes the U.S. preparation for an international war, it
war of aggression in Vietnam and wants is clear that his entire activity not only
it to continue as long as possible and
does not foreshadow some sort of inter-
acquire the largest possible scale. He
national war against the U.S. imperial-
welcomed the frontier conflict between ism, but, on the contrary, is designed
India and Pakistan and opposed the
to promote the anti-Soviet, anti-com-
agreement on the cessation of hostili- munist plans of the U.S. imperialistsand to curry favor with them with ex-
ties and a peaceful settlement of the dif-
ferences between the two countries. For pressions of loyalty.
that reason he came out against the In recent years he has been extending
Tashkent talks and the agreement that a hand of friendship to the neo-nazi and
was signed there. He welcomed Israel's
militarist ruling circles in West Ger-
war of aggression against the Arab many. In the sphere of commercial and
states, a war inspired by U.S. imperial-
economic relations with China, the
a halt of the
F.R.G. has already surpassed Britain and
ism, and was opposed to -
Israeli forces and a cease-fire as preli-
France and now holds first place among
the European countries. The West Ger-
minary steps towards abolishing the
consequences of the aggression and re man Government is co-operating with
storing peace in the Middle East. -
Mao Tse-tung in the armaments field
He does not give up' hoping that the and is sending specialists to help him
imperialists should continue fanning the expand the war industry, particularly
t
flames of local wars in many parts of the production of nuclear weapons and
r
the world and that in the long run they rockets. According to reports from dif-
f
would flare up into a raging conflagra-
erent sources, Mao Tse-tting and Bonn
tion of a U.S.-Soviet and world war. But are intending to establish closer politi-
his hope that local wars would develop cal ties. It is common knowledge that
into a world war have still not materia- co-operation between Mao Tse-tung and
lized and now he is endeavouring to in-
Bonn rests on anti-Sovietism, anti-corn-
cite it himself. He has already turned munism, disruption of peace in Europe
the Sino-Indian border into a major and Asia and incitement of a world war.
base from which he can stir up inter- Hence it is vital. that the Chinese
national tension and provoke military people and peace supporters in all coun-
incidents between _states whenever he tries should keep a vigilant eye on Mao
wants to. He is trying to create a simi- Tse-tung's intrigues. In the current situa-
lar situation on the Sino-Burmese and tion when fie is beset by increasing dif-
Sino-Nepalese borders. He has repeated- %ficulties and has to face ever gloomier
ly announced his intention of annexing prospects Mao Tse-tung, spurred On by
the Mongolian People's Republic and his extreme selfishness and extreme na-
seizing part of Soviet territory and car- tionalistic fanaticism can really plunge
ried out acts of provocation on the Sino- China into a reactionary and adventuris-
Soviet. and Sino-Mongolian borders. In tic international wars.
the future such provocations might in- Why is Mao Tse-tung so impatient to
crease in scale and become more num- provoke a U.S.-Soviet and world war?
erous. Because he views it as a means of at.
He has frankly stated that one of the taming his extreme individualistic and
aims of the so-called cultural, revolu- selfish aims. He believes that if he would
tion is preparation for an international , succeed in provoking a U.S.-Soviet and -
war and that one of the aims of the 'world war, he would not only attain his
hungweiping movement is likewise pre- goal of "killing two birds with one
paration for an international war. What stone," but would also see his dream of
is this international war for which Mao "winning twice on one stake" come
true. What he means by "killing two
birds with one stone" is that he wants a,
war in which while destroying the
U.S.S.R. and the international commun-
ist movement, both 'deeply hated by him,
the U.S.A. would also be destroyed to-
gether with other states whom he deep-
ly envies for having a higher level of
economic and scientific development.
His dream of "winning twice on one
stake," if it were to come true, would
permit him to spend the remainder of
his years enjoying the longed-for life of
a sovereign and ruler of that part of
China's territory where, according to his
imagination, "there would still be
people," while at the same time he would
make an attempt to realize his age-old
dream of becoming the "master of the
world" and instituting his rule over it
on the ruins left in the wake of a world
thermo-nuclear war.
5. In the economic sphere he is sever-
ing all ties with the world socialist
system and transferring them to the
capitalist camp.
This, above all, is clearly seen in the
changes that have taken place in China's
foreign trade. In 1950, right after the
country's liberation, China's foreign
trade still bore the old semicolonial
features: 74 percent was with the capi-
talist countries of which 50 percent fell
to the share of the imperialist states,
while the share of the socialist countrie
and the U.S.S.R. was 26 and 23 percent
respectively. By 1959, China's foreign
trade had undergone radical changes: all'
foreign comme,rce with capitalist coun-
tries 'dropped' to 32 percent of which
,the imperialist states accounted for 23
percent, at the same time trade with
socialist countries went up to 68 per-
cent including 60 percent with the
U.S.S.R.. Here we have a clear manifes-
tation of the distinguishing feature of
the foreign trade of a socialist country.
But by 1967, the situation in China's*
foreign trade became evdn worse than
in 1950: commerce with the non-social-
ist countries went up to 80 percent in-
cluding 57 percent with imperialist
states, while trade with socialist coun-
tries fell to 20 percent of which only 7
percent was with the U.S.S.R. Today
China's chief trading partners are not
only Britain and the countries of the
British Commonwealth ? Canada, New
Zealand and Australia ? not only Japan
and West Germany but also the U.S.A.
which Mao Tse-tung daily showers with
Invectives and curses but with which
he has established economic ties
through Hongkong. Thus, in the sphere
of foreign economic relations China has
once again become dependent on im.
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In the begiar?0Ye ?r e ea
g the 1960s, prepar-
ing to curtail economic ties with so-
cialist countries Mao Tse-tung launched
intensive propaganda of such thoughts
as "reliance on one's own forces" and
"rejection of outside assistance." Today
facts show that they were a pretext for
severing foreign economic ties with the
world socialist system and going over
to the capitalist camp. He views as
necessary economic co'operation with
the capitalist world as part of his plat-
form of "reliance on one's own forces,"
and economic ties with the world social-
ist system as unnecessary "outside assis;
tance." All this is striking indication of
the fact wihat in the sphere of foreign
policy, *it as in the sphere of domes-
tice policy, Mao Tse-tung has taken the
road of political and economic rap-
prochement with the bourgeoisie direct-
ed against the proletariat and the work-,
jag people, that he is supporting capi-
talism and is against socialism.
Such are the five principal crimes
actually committed by Mao Tse-tung in
the international sphere. There are in-
disputable facts proving these crimes,
and they cannot be disproved by what-
ever dcmogagy Mao Tse-tung and his
group may resort to. The crimes of Mao
Tse-tung and his group in international
affairs just as in China's internal affairs,
merely play into the hands of imperial-
ist circles and reactionaries in all coun-
tries headed by the U.S.A. Therefore
they have been welcomed in imperialist
countries with unfeigned pleasure. For-
mer U.S. President Johnson, former
State Secretary Dean Rusk, former De-
fence Secretary Robert ,McNamara re-
peatedly spoke in favor of hastening
the adjustment of U.S.-Chinese relations
and establishment of U.S. co-operation
with Mao Tse-tung in the Far East.
A conference of U.S. specialists On
the Far East frankly declared that the
White House is staking on Mao Tse-tung
because his victory in the cultural revo-
lution would be in the interests of the
U.S.A. Expressing hopes for the estab-
lishment of co-operation with Mao Tse-
tung, the U.S. Government has not only
permitted U.S. publishers to issue Mao
Tse-tung's "book of quotations" and sell
them in the U.S.A., but has also sanc-.
tioncd their ,export, thus helping Mao
Tse-tung to spread his "book of quota-
tions.".
It is universally known that Spain's
fascist secret police and the neo-nazi
West German secret service more than
anything else fear the publications of
the Spanish and German Communist
Parties or any other Communist litera-
it ,
i amt o .
Nonetheless, they do not ban the anti-
Soviet and anti-communist propaganda
materials put out by Mao Tse-tung. On
the contrary they help spread these
materials and even frequently reprint
them. All this leaves no doubt as to
who are Mao Tse-tung's friends today
and against whom their joint efforts are
directed. ?
No matter how Mao Tse-lung and his
group shift and dodge and no matter
what screen they set up around them-
selves ? whether it be the slogan of.
"struggle ,against modern revisionism"
or the slogans "spur the world revolu-
tion" and "support the national libera-
tion movement," and no matter what
double-dealing they engage in under the
the mask of "we are against the U.S.S.R.
and against the U.S.A." in order to ca-
mouflage their anti-Sovietism and their
make-believe struggle against U.S. im-
perialism, no matter what old and new
intrigues they may employ to conceal
their activity ? they cannot cover up
the real character of their anti-Soviet,
anti-communist and man-hating crimes
in international affairs. The five crimes
,they have committed, are five indict-
meats written with their own hand.
CPYRGHT
Inasmuch as such 10 major crimes
inside the cduntry and 5 major crimes
in international affairs were perpetuated
on the initiative, under the personal
supervision and on instructions of Mao
Tse-tung, he has become not only an
enemy of the Communist Party of China
but also the common enemy of the in-
ternational communist movement. He
has become not only the enemy of the
Chinese people, but the common enemy
of the entire progressive and peace-
loving humanity.
Mao Tse-tung spares no effort to com-
mit every kind of infamy chiefly for the
sake of achieving his extremely egois-
tic goals, namely while he lives he wants
to preserve his unlimited imperial rule
in China and to prevent anyone from
overthrowing his power. And when he
will leave this world nobody will be
able to make him pay for the terrible
crimes he committed during his life-
time.'Yet facts show that his intentions
are not destined to materialize and that
everything will be totally unlike his ex-
pectations
Mao Tse-tung is aware Of his real
position and realizes the dangers aris-
ing from his hostility towards the Com-
munist Party of China and the interna-
tional communist movement, towards
the whole Chinese nation and all pro-
gressive and peace-loving mankind. He
can be likened ,with a coward whO is
a e y night and try-
ing to dispel his fright by whistling.
He requires a daily dose of sedatives.
And so on his instructions Chinese news-
paper editors daily give a great deal of
space to articles describing how the
Changs, Wans, Lis and Chaos throughout.
their country "dearly " love Chairman
Mao," how they are "devoted to Chair-
Mao" and wish him "long, long years."
They also publish other stereotype
eulogies, which can only evoke a feeling
of disgust and loathing. This is supple-
mented by false reports allegedly corn-
ing from abroad that in all countries
citizens ,A, B, C, D, etc. "dearly love
Mao Tse-tung," that they are "devoted to
Mao Tse-tung," and his "thought" and
that they wish him "innumerable years
of life." All this is just as shameless
and absurd as his personal deificatitict
as the "sun," or all the all-seeing and
omnipotent "living god". All this is just,
as comical and ridiculous as his claims
that his "thoughts" are a talisman Ca-
pable of "miraculously and imme?dia-
tely transforming any wish into reality,"
and that his "Three Old Articles,"
"Book of Quotations" and "Selected
Works" are a "Magic Encyclopaedia"
or "sacred books." MI this is by no
means a sign of his strength, but of
his extreme weakness. It shows his mor-
bid fear and desperation of a person
held in a vice of difficulties at home
and abroad, of ti'man abandoned by his
near ones and associates, a man who in
solitude faces a dismal future. '
No matter what Mao Tse-tung invents
or does to ele'vate or praise himself, to
deceive or soothe himself, historical,
facts prove that only one destiny awaits
a man such as Mao Tse-tung is today,
and that destiny is inevitable defeat,
which neither charlatanism, incanta-
tions, demogogy, slander, nor resort to
killings, arson "rebellions," "capture of
power" or other like methods can avert.
Such is the irr;:vocable law,of historical
development. And such will be the inevi-
table end of Mao Tse-tung, of his
"thought"?and of his policy.
Why has Mao Tse-tung fallen so low?
It is by no means an unexpected pheno-
menon but the inevitable outcome of
the natural evolution of the thought and
policy of Mao Tse-tung over the decades.
All this has its ideological and theoreti-
cal as well as historical and social roots.
But these questions have to be studied
separately.
,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C1A-RDP79-01194A000500060001-5