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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400150001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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1I UILY January 1970
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(22 November - 19 December 1969)
I. New Degradations by the Husak Regime
The lot of the Czechoslovak people has become progressively worse since
Husak's takeover last April, to the point that outsiders began to think that
the only direction it could go would be for the better. But the past month has
revealed a new law to date for the Czech people. Self-denunciation and denunci-
ation of one citizen by another, purges, and group self-criticism as practiced
at the lowest depths of Stalinism in the Soviet Union have become the policy of
the Husak regime. Some of the evidence of this depressing fact is recorded
below.
A. Do-it-yourself Brainwashing
Nearly simultaneously with the release of the notorious questionnaire by
the Czech Minister of Education, Jaromir Hrbek, requiring university faculty
to inform on their colleagues and students, Hrbek issued an even more diabolic
directive to all employees of his Ministry. This document requires Ministry
employees to evaluate at least ten colleagues and identify their weaknesses,
political, moral, and professional. Equally degrading, each employee must
evaluate himself, lay bare his private thoughts, confess his aberrations in an
ingenious kind of do-it-yourself brain-washing. The employee is warned: ".,.
untruth and incompleteness of your own evaluation will unambiguously testify
against you and render impossible any effort to do you good." It further warns
that the worker will be evaluated "by a collective of co-workers and eventual
contradictions in data will be investigated." The ostensible purpose is
stated: "At the Ministry people cannot work Who do:not possess the necessary
ability, who are not firm politically, who are insincere and have faults in
their character." The completed questionnaire will provide documentary grounds
for the dismissal of any employee of the Ministry and can be used as a weapon,
a sword of Damocles, threatening the economic and personal security of every
employee of the Ministry. This method of assuring obedience is properly labeled
an "Inquisition" by Hans Morgenthau, but in its utter cynicism it is devoid
even of the ideological heat and passion that was so important a motive force in
the Middle Age atrocities.
Some feeling for the monstrousness of this directive and its debasement ol
the human spirit can be gained if the reader will imagine himself being required
to answer to his present employer in these terms.
(The directive is attached in a translation published by The New York Review
of Books on 4 December 1969 along with apenetrating commentary by the eminent
American scholar Hans J. Morgenthau. Louis Aragon, French Communist Party Central
Committee member, published the other directive -- to the universities -- with
his own scathing commentary in his literary journal Les Lettres Francaises in
October.)
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B, Purges.
Purges sweeping through every level of party, government and public life
nave expelled thousands from their positions and forced resignations of many
more who resist pressures to conform, The latest and highest level purge was
'Ira'r of Josef Smrkovsky and 10 other liberal members of the Czechoslovak parlia-
ment (see attached New York Times article), The new Party orthodoxy increas-
ong_4 resembles Stalin-era Communism, as the following random examples show:
Jindricn Suk, chief of the Czech news agency C.T.K., former minister of
Eduction and Culture and former deputy editor of Rude Pravo, was ousted to make
may for hard-liner Otakar Svercina. One reporter estimates that 10% of all
journalists and broadcasters have been fired since the Soviet invasion of 1968.
(One network commentator, Vladimir Skutina, turned up in a Prague hospital
where he had been taken from prison, His arrest had never been admitted but
public outcry from Italian intellectual circles had apparently forced his release
from prison.)
Cestmir Cisar was replaced as chairman of the Czech National Council,
)n?: of the two state legislative bodies (the other, the Slovak National Council
Jill hold its own purge soon), Sixty-two of the 200 legislators were replaced
in one massive stroke -- nine were expelled, fifty-three were permitted to
resign, Cisar was popular with the students during the Czech Spring and so was
suspect and ousted despite his recent espousal of Husak-orthodoxy.
.- Emil Zatopek, internationally famous Olympic champion runner, expelled
from the Communist Party in October, "resigned" from the presidium of the Czech
Olympic committee on 28 November, Zatopek's denunciation of the 1968 Soviet
invasion had already cost him his Defense Ministry position and his post as
trainer in the Czech army athletic program. He is now having difficulty find-
ing even menial jobs to maintain livelihood for himself and his family.
So extreme and so widespread has this "cleansing" process become that it
eportedly alarms even some of Czechoslovakia's Communist neighbors. Hungary's
Party paper quoted a Prague comrade as saying that Czech tactics are "rough,
terroristic and inhuman." Communist Yugoslavia's news service TANYUG, which
lescribed the purges as failing of their purpose thus far despite having attained
"wide proportions," adds in a masterpiece of understatement: "It could ... be
said of the present political situation and the mood of the people that they
nave calmed down but not consolidated in the sense of their full engagement for
a new political concept...."
"Plea Culpa,"
A particularly humiliating -- and cynical -- turn of the screw in Czecho-
sivakia is the requirement for self criticism in which groups publicly purge
hemseives of their guilt for having supported "Communism with a human face."
"F:ghtist 014/trtvaism" is the phrase which officially describes their crime,
Aming recent examples are:
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. -- Workers in television news service on 21 November 'weighed their own
contribution by the fact that in the period since January 1968 the television
news in many cases slipped onto the platform of rightist opportunism." Now,
having "... self critically 5Ondemne7whatever was unprincipled, unsound and
harmful to our party" they "fully identify themselves with the political line
of the new party leadership headed by Dr. Gustav HUsak."
Prace, the Slovak trade union daily, sometimes "succumbed to reckless-
ness" in the period following January 1968, according to staff members attend-
ing a Communist Party meeting on 10 November. Now, "in a self-critical analysis,
the Prace staff considered the errors made in the past period, fully dissociates
itself from them and is determined not to repeat them in the future."
-- The Czechoslovak radio leadership confessed that "after January 1968,
under the influence of rightist opportunists in several leading and key positions
in the Czechoslovak radio, the activities of the radio became inconsistent with
its traditional revolutionary, socialist, and international mission." Now,
ono it assumes a great pledge: ... in the spirit of the recent plenums of the
CPCZ Central Committee, to return the radio to its mission of a daily fighter
for the genuine interests of the people, for the advancement of socialism and
for friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union and Of the other socialist
countries."
-- The Czech Journalists' Union management commission "abolished all po-
litically faulty and incorrect standpoints of the former leadership." The
South Bohemian branch "rejected, among other things, the practice of the past
year when the communications media became an uncontrollable force subjectively
serving rightwing opportunism and also clearcut antisocialist intentions"
These recantations from the journalists bring to mind the Czech journalists'
appeal to the International Press Institute on the anniversary of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. They urged "all journalists of the really free
world to describe objectively what is taking place in Czechoslovakia and to
give us moral support." (See attached, "An Appeal from Prague.")
II. Dissension Deepens Within Western European Parties
A. Democracy: Italian Coinniunist Style
On 12 November the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Sovie-,,
Union (CPSU) suggested in a major Pravda article that self-criticism and other
"democratic" practices should be improved at the lowest party level -- the
cell meeting. (The party report mentioned no such innovation for the higher,
decision-making levels of the Party.) It is ironic that while the Pravda
editors were encouraging more democracy and less centralism at the lower _Levets
of the CPSU for reasons peculiar to the Soviet Union, the most "democratic" ( f
Western European Communist parties, the Italian Party (PCI), was at the same
time insisting on less democracy and more centralism forts dissenting critic::.,
The PCI Central Committee had long been wrestling with the problem of the 11
Manifesto group. The dilemma: Should the leadership try to ignore the blunt
criticism of the heretical monthly and thus try to preserve the image of Party
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democracy and "unity through diversity"? Or should they expel the trouble-
makers, whose dissenting voice was undermining leadership policies by calling
f,;r reversion to pristine revolutionary radicalism and for rejection of
viet tutelage and of collaboration with non-Communist parties for the purpose
if participating in a coalition government.
The PCI Central Committee was finally forced to decide and on 26 November
suspended from membership the four key figures of Il Manifesto: ,editor Rossana
Rossanda, director Lucio Margi, and two parliamentary deputies, Aldo Natoli
and Luigi Pintor, The Il Manifesto group is clearly anathema to the CPSU, not
Dnly because of its contemptuous rejection of the Soviet model, but because it
ught (with increasing success) to frustrate the PCI's long-cherished hope of
participating in government. Therefore, rumors that the CPSU had wielded a
heavy hand to oust the Il Manifesto group have considerable credibility.
Moscow registered its unqualified approval of the suspension in a 10
December Pravda editorial. So in two strokes -- the suspension and CPSU public
approval of it -- the PCI gravely jeopardized its carefully nurtured image of
a-moderate Party, independent of Moscow, Other Italian political parties,
particularly those which were prospective coalition partners, wondered what
was image and what was reality:ln the PCI. Past PCI polemics with the CPSU
began to look more like shadow-boxing than a real exchange of blows, and the
PCI's disciplinary action, under Soviet prodding, against the Il Manifesto
editors spoke louder than words as to "democracy PCI-style."
B. Austrian Party Split Hardens
The long struggle between the strong progressive faction and the dominant
conservative group in the Austrian Communist Party (KP0e) came to a head at
the 24-25 November Central Committee meeting. It had been called at the in-
stigation of the progressives to reverse an earlier decision to oust Fritz
Zapf, head of the party's youth organization (FOJ) and member of the Politburo.
Phe FOJ has been openly critical of the dominant conservative leadership of
the Party. (The conservatives decreed its dissolution but thus far it has
refused to dissolve. Nor has it abated its criticism.) In a close vote,
37-34 with four abstaining, the Central Committee upheld Zapf's expulsion,
whereupon 27 liberals walked out of the Central Committee declaring they would
not participate in its work until full freedom of public debate was assured
for all in the Party. Among them were the editor of the main Party organ,
Volkstimme (People's Voice) and Politburo member Franz West, and two other
Politburo members, Egon Kodicek and Maria Urban.
Many parties, particularly in Europe, are trying to find a way to cope
with public dissent by members or groups of members (factions). One way is
to throw out the dissenters, force a split, as Lenin did frequently and as
the PCI and KPOe leaders (as well taught Leninists) have done. The question is,
do Communist parties have any other way? It will be interesting to watch
whether these parties will be able to evolve away from their traditional anti-
democratism and adopt the standards of parties in the open political system of
multi-party democracy. As likely as not, if the traditionalists continue to
wield dominant power in CP's (as they do in all but a handful of free world
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parties), progressive Austrian Communist and Central Committee member Theodor
Prager's prediction will come true: "If you continue 5our hard lire, you
will soon be standing all alone. Your majority in the Party will be total, but
so will your isolation from the working class." (Prager's full statement is
attached.)
C. Issues Cleaving the PCF
The PCI has its Il Manifesto dissenters, the KPOe its Wiener Tagebuch
dissenters, and the PCF has its Politive Aujourd'hui dissenters -- all of whom
have now been cast beyond the pale of normal Party activity. But the PCF still
harbors within its bosom in the Politburo what it regards as a viper: Roger
Garaudy. And the issue is the same: freedom for open, public debate and
discussion of divergent views within the Party -- which Garaudy insists on and
which the conservative leadership just as adamantly refuses to grant.
Garaudy expects his quarrel with the PCF to come to a head at the forth-
coming 19th Congress of the PCF on 9 February. In a television interview in
Paris on 5 December, he decried the lack of democracy in the PCF. While the
Party could publicize far and wide its charges against him, he said, his own
point of view had to be confined to closed meetings of Party organs. He as-
serted further than neither this form of socialism nor the kind imposed on
Czechoslovakia by Brezhnev was his idea of what socialism should become in
France. (Attached is a Le Monde report on the interview and on the PCF's
response to Garaudy's interview.) Garaudy admitted that he rather expected
to be excluded from the Politburo and the Central Committee. He added that
he would continue to work for the Party's program and the objectives "as a
simple soldier."
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THE NEW YORK REVIEW
4 December 1969
Inquisition in Czechoslovakia
Hans J. Morgenthau
The political act, in its distinctive
essence, is a matter of interests defined
in terms of pOwer, which ideologies
seek to clothe with rational necessity
and moral worth. More particularly,
judgments of necessity and worth are
relative to the interests and power of
the observer; what appears inevitable
and noble to one may be condemned
as capricious and vile by another. For
example,. the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia by the Soviet army, as seen
from the Western vantage point, may
be judged unnecessary, an exaggerated
response to a political threat, which
lost the Soviet Union more throughout
the world than it gained for its
European empire. But from the Soviet
perspective, it cannot be termed irra-
tional, that is, without an objective
connection with the interests and
power of the Soviet Union. For it is an
existential fact, well recognized by the
Czechoslovakian historians of the nine-
teenth century, such as Palacky, who
were also the awakener s of Czecho-.
siovakian nationalism, that Czecho-
slovakia, unable to stand alone, had to
lean on one or the other of its
powerful neighbors to ths East and to
the West.
In other words, Czechoslovakia has
never had to choose between inde-
pendence and alignment, .but between
alignment with Russia and alignment
with Germany (for which in the inter-
war period France was a temporary
and ultimately ineffectual substitute).
In the measure that Czechoslovakia
moved away from Russia, it was bound
to move closer to Germany. It was
against this threat that the Soviet
Union reacted, and may well have
overreacted, in 1968.
However, the political act as the
functional employment of certain
means for achieving certain interests
defined in terms of power is also
subject to moral judgment. The poli-
tical act establishes a relationship be-
tween the holder and the object of
power, in which the latter is of.
necessity diminished in his human
worth; he is reduced to the means Tor
somebody else's ends. Hence the es-
sential immorality of the political act.
What makes that immorality tolerable
is the proportionate relationship be-
tween means and ends. That is to say,
the human quality of the object of
power is diminished for the sake of
ends endowed with a transcendent
value. The extreme case is the sacrifice
of life in war for the sake of the
nation's survival.
At the other end of the spectrum,
the extreme disproportion between
means and ends may make the moral
condemnation of the means employed
inevitable. Genocide is a case in point.
The documents before us are another.
These documents were issued by-the
Czechoslovak Minister of Education:
Professor Hrbek, in the middle off,
September of this year; their authen-
ticity has been vouchsafed by two
independent sources. They were
brought from Czechoslovakia to France'
where they were translated into,
French. They were there discovered by
a group of American scholars who;
translated them into English. They are;
published here without changes apart
from corrections in spelling and punc-
tuation.
The purpose of these documents
twofold. Their first and immediate
purpose is not only to weed out from
the Ministry of Education and the
universities the supporters of the 1968
reforms but also all those who are not
completely identified with the neo-
Stalinist course of the present pro-
Russian regime. Their long-range pur-
pose is to establish ironclad controls
over the minds of the remaining em-
ployees and faculty in order to prevent
a recurrence of the events of 1968 and
to assure full support for the new,
policies. To those ends they propose to
kill not the bodies of men but their
souls. By confronting the objects of
power with the choice between corn-
plying to the satisfaction of the au-
thorities and risking social, political, and
pre, fe2SiOnall disgrace. the ques-
tionnaires aim at the degradation, cor-
ruption, and ultimate dehumanization
of man in order to make the holders
of power secure in their power. To
that end, they employ five devices.
1. They make men defenseless be-
fore the authorities. How is one to
answer the questions pertaining to
"personal evaluation"? If one declares
oneself satisfied with one's work and
capable of. carrying it out, one's super-
iors may disagree. If one answers these
and similar questions in the negative,
one's superiors may disagree again. In
other words, the object of power, by
being compelled to give definite an-
swers to questions which are of neces-
sity a matter of subjective valuation,
delivers himself into the hands of the
holders of power.
2. They force men to denounce
themselves without ever learning what
as it were, the "optimum" of
denunciation required. They may re-
veal more or less than is required. and
in either case they must lose.
' 3. They force men to denounce
their superiors, subordinates, and col-
leagues, again without knowing how
much or little of such denunciations
would satisfy the authorities.
4. They force men to lie. How else
can most of the recipients of the
questionnaires answer, for instance, the
question: "Are you today sincerely
convinced of the righteousness of the
,policy of the Party, the National
Front; are you ready consequently to
realise it and gain for it also other
co-workers?" (A 10)
S. They force the object of powert
to expose himself to the denunciations
of others: "Are you fully aware that
eventually, the untruth and incom-
`pleteness of your own evaluation will
unambiguously testify against you.
Are you aware that you will also be
evaluated by a collective of co-workers,
and eventual contradictions in data will
be Investigated?" (A15)
Two facets are particularty terrifying
ha this scheme of moral emasculation
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*and spiritual ?f I eaaepagiowcwohireaampas-atisse4Aeameo isooveise of
employment of the victim to design where indeed homo homini lupus,
his own moral and spiritual doom. Ile.
cannot blame what happens to him on
others. He has said too little or too
much, or the wrong thing at the wrong
Lime to the wrong person; and thus has
sealed his doom and that of others,
rcrhaps even worse, even if he has
t.en successful in avoiding for the
time being all the pitfalls of the
questionnaires, he will lead the cursed
life of' a master dissembler in constant
dread of being found out.
What adds to the terror of his fate is
the inescapable nature of his pre-
oicament. Whatever he does serves only
to entangle him further in the self-
made network of denunciations, eve-
itins, and lies. There is no prospect of
wlivation short of suicide. There is only
where men must use and destroy each
other in attempting to survive.
The scheme of the questionnaires
will bring out the worst in man. But it
will do more. By putting a premium,
both in moral duty and survival, upon
behavior detested by decent men, it
will not only make relatively decent
men into knaves, ashamed of them-
selves, but it will transform the latent
lagos, which all societies harbor and
decent societies try to repress, into
paragons of totalitarian virtue, proud
of themselves. The liar, the informer,
and the agent provocateur become the
ideal man.
The inmate of the concenqation
camp could console himself with the
thought that he was the innocent and
others, and he could find in the
camaraderie of the doomed the rem-
nants of human ties that bind men
together. The men to whom these
questionnaires are addressed can have
no such consolation, nor can they find
satisfaction in such ties. They are
forced to make their own prisons,
devastate their own souls, betray and
suffer betrayal, and in the end detest
themselves. In the face of the enormity
of the crime against humanity here
committed, it adds nothing more than
a slight touch of irony that the author
of these questionnaires is a professor,
that is, a man who has chosen as his
life's business to profess the truth, and
that he is in charge of educational
Institutions whose supposed purpose is
to safeguard and add to the truth. 0'
LETTER OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION
TO ALL EMPLOYEES IN THE uNnneitsrrY
15th September 1969
To all employees of the Ministry of
Education of the Czech. Soc. Republic.
Lear Comrades,
;Vomen Comrades,
You all know well how complicated
is the situation in the sphere of our
education and what complicated tasks
Are facing us.
The Ministry of Education of the
2zedt. Soc. Rep. can carry out its.
ninction successfully only when it has
dear programme, purposeful organi-
ition, good cadres with high work
...ale, and perfect control of work.
Elie higher the function assumed by
4:h-worker, the higher are the require-
iits from his professional carrabilt-
political awareness and moral
ro
At the Ministry people cannot work
who do not possess the necessary
,idility, who are not firm politically,
.Nho are insincen and have faults in
ir character.
I appeal to you and ask you that
f-tch one send to me personally and
Itirectly a sincere written answer to
vestions concerning two problems:
How do you evaluate yourself?
How do you assess your work hither-
o at the Ministry?
A. Personal evaluation
4.1. Name, personal data, function,
membership and functions in a politi-
cal party, in the Trade Unions, in the
Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League.
4.2. Are you yourself satisfied with
your work?
Are you capable of
your tasks?
carrying out
A.3. In which field would it be best
to utilize your abilities and ambitions?
4.4. What has, until now, hampered
a greater effectiveness of your work?
4.5. Do you keep regular working
hours, and really work in a concen-
trated manner and effectively? if not,
why not?
4.6. if you are a member of the
Communist Party, have you displayed ,
throughout the years 1968 and 1969 al
consistent Party attitude; have you!
defended the internationalist pro-
gramme of the Party; have you not
allowed yourself to be broken by the
attack of the rightist and antisocklist
forces?
A.7. Which co-workers at the Minis-
try of Education have participated in
campaigns against you, instigated them
and organised them?
2
To what discriminations have you
been subjected?
(Personal attacks at meetings, attacks
'In the Press, radio, signature cam-
paigns, relieved of functions, health,
:consequences of terror)?
Do you know of a worker thrown
out from the Ministry, prematurely
,pensioned, etc.?
4.8. in which anti-party and anti-
Soviet actions have you participated
against the true adherents of Marxism-
Leninism and socialist International-
Which pressure-resolutions have you
signed or voted in favour of? (Neutral-
ity of CSSR, abolition of Peoples'
Militia, resolutions on the occasions ofl
the negotiations at Cierna Nadtisov,k
' the entry of Allied Troops, the Mos-
cow Treaty, election of the President
of the Federal Assembly, strikes of
students, etc.?)
Have you condemned the meeting of
the old members of the Party at
Oechia, the participation at the cele-
bration of the anniversary of the Great
"October Revolution at LUCERNA; did
you sign or approve ycsolutions agal
so-called traitors os l collaborationists?
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your attitudes and deeds of that time?
A.I0. Have you been able honestly
and sincerely to get rid of the mistakes
and errors committed during the pre-
vious period?
Are you today sincerely convinced
of the righteousness of the policy of
the Party, the National Front; are you
ready consequently to realise it and
gain for it also other co-workers?
4.I1. Can you as a member of the
Party on your honour and conscience
publicly declare that from your own
sincere conviction you will actively
carry through the present policy of the
Party, expressed especially in the con-
clusions of the plenary meeting of the
Central Committee of the Party in
Nov. '68, April '69, and the realization
directives from May '68?
4.I2. Can you as non-member of
the Party publicly declare on your
honour and conscience, and from your
own sincere conviction that you will
actively carry through and realize the
policy of the present National Front
led by the CP of the CSSR and of the
? government of the nations and of the
Federal government?
4.I3. On what points do you not
agree with the present policy of the
Party and National Front; where are
you uncertain, and have doubts?
4.1.9. What personal frailties do
you consider incorrect and do you
want to get rid of them?
4.I5. Are you fully aware that,
eventually, the untruth and incom-
pleteness of your own evaluation will
unambiguously testify against you and
render impossible any effort to do
you good?
Are you aware that you will also be
evaluated by a collective of coworkers,
and eventual contradictions in data will
be investigated? -
B. The work of the Ministry
B.1. Which of the workers of the
Ministry do you consider to be capa-
ble, honest and efficient? Name at
least 10 workers with their functions.
B.2. Which workers have mistakenly
been neglected and their capacity not
made use of?
B.3. Which workers have been, on
the contrary, entrusted with functions
with which they cannot cope?
8.4. Which workers because of their
lack' of ability, neglect, bad morale. at
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for other reasons cl
stay at the Ministry?
Let us know all workers of this
type.
8.5. Which leading workers have
been discredited by their antisocialist
and anti-Soviet deeds and attitudes,
that they must not assume responsible
functions?
B.6. How do you assess the morale
of the Ministry on the whole? At
various departments?
B.7. Are you convinced that the
tasks of the Ministry can be mastered
by fewer workers?
B.8. Which pieces Of work, depart-
ment, divisions of the Ministry are in
your opinion working at their least
capacity?
8.9. Which, on the contrary, are
overburdened?
B.10. What concrete suggestions can
you give towards the improvement of
your field of work?
B.11. What improvements could be
introduced elsewhere?
8.I2. What obstacles hamper you
and other peoples' work?
8.I3. What is it necessary to do to
Improve the working environment,
hygiene, economy?
8.14. What fundamental changes-in
the organizational structure of the
. Ministry do you recommend?
8.15. Where Is it possible to make
considerable economies in relation to
the number of personnel and finance?
You do not have to type the answer.
It is sufficient to write by hand in pen
or pencil. In the case of workers
without higher education, I shall not
evaluate spelling, but only sincerity,
and an honest effort to contribute to
the cause.
Do not copy the questions, quote
only A.1., A.2.... B.1., B.15 ...and
write down only the answers. Write on
one side only of the normal-sized
paper A4 (typing paper)..
Your statement has to reach the
Secretariate in a - glued envelope not
later than 22nd September. I shall
process them myself.
I expect a relevant answer from
every worker in the Ministry.
Thank you in advance for your
collaboration.
3
Prof. Muallt asronir IHrbek, D.Se.
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MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION,
PRAGUE, SEPTEMBER 16,1969, TO ALL
THE RECTORS OF THE UNIVERSITIES AND
TO ALL TliE DEANS OF THE FACULTIES
I bring to your attention Elia, order
scud to me by the 12th October
1969 at the latest a written report
containing an appraisal and an evalua-
tion of the opinions, declarations and
unjust acts, above all of the orientation
of the rightist opportunists, anti-
s icialists, anti-Soviets, who took art
during 1968 and 1969 in the orgaNs of
the schools and faculties in, public
declarations of various teachers in the
organs of the student movement and
the public declarations of various stu-
dents. The report must substantially
contain the following information:
It. The participation of academic
civil servants and the scientific council
of the school, eventually of the facul-
ty, in the various pressure activities in
the resolutions, declarations, expres-
,ions of solidarity with the actions of
the students etc. Match the text and
the dates of these declarations, letting
it be known at the same time if these
unjust resolutions have been cancelled,
:Ind if you might be in a position to
propose their cancellation and at what
date. Ask each of the officers who
have taken part personally in these.
activities and demand from each one a
written personal evaluation of their
activities and a statement of their
attitude with respect to the general
ponties of the PCI, of the National
FiOnt, of the Federal Government and
tile National Government. Attach these
,3ersona1 evaluations to the report;
2. Which professors and lecturers of
your school, eventually of the faculty,
have declared themselves in the press,
by their public interventions and by
their activities within the K.A.N. (the
club of the non-party involved people,
in various clubs and organizations,
etc.)? If they acted as initiators or
organizers of pressure campaigns of
signatures; of the intervention of the
opposition from teachers and .students
against the politics of PCI and the!
National Front, as participants in cam-
paigns against the faithful partisans of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian in-
ternationalism. Mention their date of
birth, their position and brief descrip-
tion of their acts. Discuss these with
them and demand from them a written
declaration. Attach these to the report.
3. Who among the workers at the
school, eventually of the faculty, dur-
ing the year 1968 and 1969, who were
molested or who were targets of,
discrimination simply because they re-
spected the current acceptable attitude
of the party, who respected its inter-
nationalist programme and who had
not allowed themselves to be intimi-
dated by the psychological terror of
the anti-socialist forces and the forces
of the right. Mention the date of birth,
their position, the sort of discrimina-
tion and measures (attacks in the press,
radio, tracts, campaigns of signatures,
relieved from their duties, departure
from the faculty, being put into coven
(try, and the sequelae on their health of
'terror, etc.);
4. Evaluate the behaviour of an the
members of the Chair of social scien-
tists (Marxism-Leninism) and mention
if the person acted during the years
11968 to 1969 in the interest of the
accepted party policy. 'if he . re-
spected its interrkationalism pro-
gramme, if he had not allowed himself
to be broken by attacks from the
anti-socialist forces and from the right.
if he showed in his work any manifes-
tation of hesitation, but was able to be
free from these errors and faults miring
that period and is today sincerely
convinced of the correctness of the
peril, policy, and has decided to apply
himself to gain the students and the
other teachers. If he as a partisan or a
propagator of opportunism from the
right, as well as of Zionism, partici-
pated in the campaigns against faithful
partisans of Marxism-Leninism and pro-
letarian internationalism, etc. Demand
from each member who holds a Chair
a written reply to these questions and
a written evaluation of his conduct and
of the activities of the ywhola Chair.
Attach these to the report;
5. The list of all the officers of the
student union of Bohemia and Moravia
who have taken part who have spoken
to students of the municipal centre
and other organizations and clubs of
students in 1968 and 1969 in your
faculty or school of higher learning.
,Give their date of birth, their residelice
i(college), their faculty, year of study, ,
!results in this study, and a brief
'outline of their character.
Mention separately the list of stu-
dents who by their declaration in the
mass media, in reunions and above all
in other activities, worked as initiators
and organizers of interventions against
' the politics of PCT, the National
' Front, the Federal and National Gov-
ernments, who, have taken part in
campaigns against loyal partisans of
Marxism-Leninism and socialist inter-
nationalism, who took part in demon-
strations, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet,
'etc. Outside these dates give brief
information on their relevant activities.
Mention the following: what sums
the school, eventually the faculty, have
dispensed in contributing to new or-
ganizations of students .during the
course of 1968, and during the first
half of 1969, if and how machines for
duplicating by roneotype or the central
printing equipment of the school was
used for publication of tracts, for
names and for declarations. Present at
the same time examples of these
.publications.
I hope that your reports and evalua-
tions will be accurate and complete,
founded on just principles, and based
only on irreproachable criteria. Your
reports will be able to contribute
considerably to an accurate analysis of k
the situation in the schools of higher
earning, to amelioration of the work
on educational policy ad to accelera-
tion of the processes of consolidation.
The Rector of the school will attach
to the reports from his. Deans his /
independent appraisal which will also'
be complimentary. iFind out for your- i?
self which workers have eventually
refused to StibIllit a personal declass-
tkin. II ask that these should ba
77:
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denounced and their evaluation should
be discussed with the respective organs
of the PTC.
1 draw the attention of the academic
' officers of the schools and faculties to
,the fact that the Minister of National
'Education is carrying out at the same
time a proper detailed analysis of the
Students in different schools of higher
? learning derived from the information
at his disposal.. These conclusions will
be compared with your revelations and
evaluation and any contradictions will
eifntually be judged and discussed ,
with you.
5
11779r777,
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NEW YORK TIM%
18 ne center 1969
11 LIBERALS QUIT
CZECH ASSEMBLY
Smrkovsky, a Dubdek Aide,
Among Those Forced Out
Special to The New York limes
VIENNA, Dec. 17--Jesef Smr-
ovsky, who was Alexander
Dubcek's principal lieutenant
during the liberalization IN
Prague last year, resigned unJ
der fire from Parliament today'.
with 10 other liberals.
The purge stripped the 584
year-old Mr. Smrkovsky of hie
last public function.
The removal of the eleven,
who were probably the only lib-
erals who still held seats in the
national legislature, coincided,
with renewed warnings against
ultraconservatives from the
Communist party's center of
power.
These seemingly contradictory
developments indicated that the
Czechoslovak leadership under'
Dr. Gustav Husak, presumably,
with Soviet support, was fol-
lowing a centrist Course against'
"both extremes.
The Hungarian Communist
party chief, Janos Kadar, visit'
ed Prague today without pre;
vious announcement. This de-
velopment was viewed in some
quarters as a move to bolstei
Dr. Husak's position.
Now considered a moderate
at home and in Soviet-bloc af-
fairs. Mr. Kadar was thought
to have been invited to Prague
by Dr. Husak to help him rea-
son with the dogmatists in the
inner party circles. Dr. Husak
contends that their vindictive-
ness against liberal reformists
threatens to wreck the Czecho-
slovak economy.
The parliamentary purge %vat
seen as a new success for the
ultra conservatives.
The 10 Deputies who. lost
? their parliamentary seats With
Mr, Smrkovsky Included thei
r former president of the Acad:i
emy of Sciences, Frantisek
Sorm, and a member of the
, academy, Josef Macek.
Also purged were Martin
; Vaculik, secretary of the Prague
city. party under Mr. Dubcek;
I Alms Polednak, former head of
the film industry; Marie Mik;
ova, a militant liberal; Josef
Boruvka, a former Minister of
Agriculture; Oleg Homola, a
former secretary of the Czech..
osiovak-Soviet Friendship So-
ciety; and three lesser known
'Zdenka Kenclova and Mrs.
Deputies, .Jiri Lacina, Mrs.;
-Jirina Tureckova.
The Federal Assembly, whose
membership of 350 was elected
in 1964, was thoroughly
shuffled in an earlier purge id
October.
Dubcek Still a Deputy
Mr. Dubcek, until then As-
isembly chairman, was on that
:occasion demoted to simple'
!Deputy. He still holds a seat in
:the legislature, but will remain
Inactive when he takes up his?
new post as ambassador to
? Turkey.
Last Monday's announcement
:of Mr. Dubcek's appointment
was widely interpreted as a
defeat for the ultraconserva-
tives, who had pressed for
further diseiplinary action
against the former party chief.
? Today, the party weekly
Tribuna clearly, alluded to the
extremists when it cautioned
against "expressions of left,
wing radicalism." In the Com-
munist political spectrum, dog-
matism intensifies toward the
left and liberalism tdward the
right.
Tribuna's warning was even
weightier because it was signed
by the weekly's conservative
editor in chief, Oldrich SvestkaJ
The "left-wing radicals," Mr.,
Svestka wrote, 'tend to oper-
ate with force and power rath-
er than with reason." In an,
'allusion td police-state proced-
ures, the Tribuna editor added
.that the party must never at-
tempt "to break a person's
character," but must give ev-
eryone a chance to correct past
mistakes.
Analysts read the Tribuna ar=
tide as a deflittion of the moth
jerately conservative line that
the embattled Dr. Husak is
pounding.
6
F7,1"
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NEW YORK MIES
JO December 1969
1Czech Ultraconservatives Are
-
Gaining in the Party's Rank and File
By PAUL HOFMANN
Speclol to no New Tort 71mto
VIENNA, Dec. 9 ? Reports
reaching here from Czechosl&
vakia indicate that ultracon-
servatives are gaining ground
among the Communist party's
rank and file, causing concer
In the conservative Pragu
leadership and even, in Mo
cow.
The new extremists w d
put the clock back to the Sta-
linist era, while the conservis:
tives, who at present dominate
the Communist party appa.
ratus, vow that despite their
fight against the liberal teal
dencies of the progressiveR
there will be "no return" t
the police state methods of th
l
nineteen-fifties.
According to well - informed
diplomats in Eastern capitals,
Soviet ideologists are afraid
that ultraconservative gains
may prove fertile ground for,
he infiltration of pro-Chinese
tendencies.
The new left-wing radicals;
known as ultras, are pressing,
or ever broader purges to?exl
Pel from the party all those
who at some time in the past
advocated liberal reforms or
were critical of the Soviet Un-
ion, and are demanding pun-
ishment of the leaders of last
year's reform movement under
41exander Dubcck.
The conservatives who pre-
*ail in the present leadership
and in the party apparatus
stress that even those who for
a few weeks or. months as
year backed the reform moves,
ment may remain in the party
if they were "honest," engaged
in self-criticism, and supported
the current pro-Moscow line. -
Ant-intellectualism and thin-
ly veiled anti - Semitism are
rampant at Czechoslovak party
cell meetings these days, Infor-
mants say.
The rabble is taking over,"
a Czech who professes to be a
progressive but who still holds
party membership, said during
a short visit here recently. q
He told of a routine meeting
of the party cell in a Prague
district that he had attended.
He said that the meeting had
been dominated by tirades
against suspected liberals and -
that he himself had felt iso-,
ated.
"Names were named, and
whenever one had a Jewish
ring to it, there was laughter
and jeering," the, visitor re-
called.
He said that the name of
Mr. Dubcek was repeatedly
pronounced by speakers in a
derisive way, and every time
several people in the audience
shouted 'Try him for treason!"
"This is not the proletariat
that is gaining control," the
visiting Communist said. "It is
the lumpenproletariat." This
German term, meaning ragtag
proletariat, is Marxist parlance
denoting classless riffraff.
According to information
from other reliable sources,
hardline extremism is sweep-
ing also many other organiza-
tions of the Communist paity
in Bohemia and Moravia, while
many moderates stay away
from cell meetings and fail to
pay membership fees.
1,
Informed Czechoslovaks es-
timate that party membership
baa shrunk, frorh more thin
million two years ago to little
more than a Million. Czeclioj
slovakia's population is about!
14 million.
Assessments by informed,
Czechoslovaks and foreign ex-,
perts vary widely as to how'
strong the liberal, conserva-
tives and new radical factions
are. The leadership implicitly
acknowledged the disarray
in the party last week by
announcing that its long-de-
layed national congress, theo-,
retically the supreme party
body, would not be convened
efore 1971.
Curiously, the party base In
Slovakia, which remained con-
sistently more conservative
throughout last year's liberalf-'
zation phase, now Is compara-
tively more moderate than the'
Bohemian-Moravian rank and
file.
Rank-and-file pressure appar-
ently has set off a new wave(
of purges in Bohemia and Mo-
ravia, the Czech lands. Party
officials who replaced liberals'
after the Soviet-led invasion In
August, 1968, are now being'
removed from their posts in
the new extremist groundswell.
The party magazine Zivot
Strany (party life) disclosed
last week that in northern Mo-
ravia 335 members of local par.;
ty committees had recently,
been removed from their posts
on charges of "right-wing op-
rtunism" meaning progressive
tendencies, while 58 others
faced disciplinary action and
seven were om expelled fr
, ? ill
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22 November 1969
Czechs Said to Seek Support
In Hungary Against Extremists
SPedol to The New York Times
VIENNA, Nov. 21?Alois In-
&a, a leading pro-Soviet con-
servative, returned to Prague
today after a four-day visit to
Budapest amid reports that the
Czechoslovak Communist re-
gime was seeking Hungarian
support against hard-line ex-
tremists at home.
Mr. Indra, a secretary of the
Czechosqjvak communist par-
ty's Central Committee, con-
ferred with Janos Kadar, first
secretary of the ? Hungarian
Communist party, and other
members of the Hungarian rul-
ing Politburo. No mention was
made of the topics discussed.
However, analysts of Com-
munist affairs here noted that
Mr. Indra went to Budapest
even as the Hungarian party
press was publishing clear
warnings against extremist ex-
cesses in Czechoslovakia. In one
instance earlier this week, the
main hungarian party organ,
Nepszabadsag, quoted an un-
identified Prague Communist as
deploring "rough, terroristic
and inhuman methods" used by
hard-liners in the party.
The choice of Mr. Indra for
a mission to Budapest was held
to be significant. the 48-year-
old former Transport Minister,
is believed to have the abso-
lute trust of Russian officials.
He was one of a group of three
men that the Kremlin reported-
ly wanted to set up a new re-
gime in Prague after the So-
viet-led invasion of Aug. 21,
1968. The other members of the
pro-Moscow group were Vasil
Bilak and Drahomir Kolder,
both influential in the present
Prague leadership.
Gustav Husak, the First Sec-
retary of the Czechoslovak
Communist party, has professed
complete loyalty to the Soviet
Union. However, he has repeat-
edly emphasized that he was
not an ultraconservative.
In one of the frequent policy
shifts within the Prague leader-
ship, Mr. Indra has aligned him-
self lately with Mr. Husak and
has acquired a reputation for
comparative moderation.
It is thought that Mr. Husak
asked Mr. Indra to go to Buda-
pest to enlist the assistance of
the relatively moderate Hunga-
rian Communist regime against
Czechoslovak conservative ex-
tremists who are said to be
trying to discredit him in Com-
munist capitals, Mr. Indra
would be well qualified for such
an assignment because of his
excellent standing in Moscow.
NEW YORK TIMES
30 November 1069
Prague Acknowledges Unpublicized
Holding of Some Political Foesi
By PAUL HOFMANN
SPectal tom. New Y6rk Times
VIENNA, Nov. 29 ? Thel
Czechoslovak authorities implic-j
itly acknowledged today that1
sornt of their opponents were
in jail by announcing that one
of them had been transferred to
A hospital because of illness.
The prisoner was identified
as Vladimir Skutina, a televi-:
sion commentator and author
who, after his dismissal from
the state network earlier this
year, had continued defying the
now leadership.
The Party newspaper Rude
Fravo reported that Mr. Sku-i
tine had been released from
prison under a court order of
Nov. 11 and taken to a Prague
hospital.
The arrest of Mr.. Skutina
after demonstrations marking
the first anniversary of the
1968 invasion was never offi-
cially reported. According to
private information, Mr. Sku-
tina developed stomach ulcers
in Pankrac prison. Other
sources say he has cancer. ?
It is not known whether any,
formal charges have beent
brought against him. Reliable,
Prague informants say that
scores of other political prison-j
e:s are being held in Pankrac'
bow ??????????ftelmow?????????????????????????
8
Prison without any indication
as to when, or whether, they
will be brought to trial.
Mr. Skutina's last book, pub-
lished earlier this year, was
titled "Prisoner of the Presi-
dent." It told of what its author
saw and suffered during a year
In jail on political charges un*
der Antonin Novotny.
Political Trials Barred
The present leaders have
pledged that no political trials
will be held.
One of several dissident In-
tellectuals who were arrested
with Mr. Skutina and are still
in jail is Ludes Paclunan,
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'chess champion and writer. It
is known that he went on a
hunger strike in September and
again last month. Friends say
that he is now taking food
again.
Mr. Pachman and Mr. Skutina
aroused the anger of the new
conservative party leaders by
maintaining contacts with pro-
gressive groups in factories in
Prague and other industrial
areas.
Pankrac Prison is also an in-
terrogation center for political
suspects who are still techni-
cally free.
The most prominent among
9
THE ECONOMIST
22 november 1969
!them, according to recent in-
formation from Prague. is Maj.
Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, former
political chief of the army and
head of the security department
of the party's Central Commit-
tee. He is under orders to re-
port every other day to the
.prison for questioning on al-
? leged anti-Soviet attitudes.
Words of Mao Cost Jobs
HONG KONG (UPI)?Thirty
oystermen lost their Jobs be-
cause they failed to attend spe-
cial classes to study the thought
of Mao Tse-tung, the British-
owned South China Sunday
Post-Herald said.
How Far Will He Go?
There are signs that Mr Husak may yet inflict the ultimate
weapon of repression?political trials?on Czechoslovakia
A cartoon in a Prague paper early this year showed a
depressed-looking man announcing on television: "We shall
not permit a return to the pre-January cra?if only to make
sure that January doesn't come again.' That reference to the
period before Mr Novotny's overthrow in January, 1968,
was made before Mr Husak took over. For a short time after
Mr Husak's succession it was possible to believe that this still
represented his attitude. Nobody could call Mr Husak.a pro-
gressive, but he had been a victim of Mr Novotny's police.
Today, however, it is no longer possible to feel that there
is nothing worse! in store for the Czechs. The repression they
are suffering mai), yet move on to a series of political trials.
It looks as if Mt Husak and his colleagues may be heading
back to the bad old days before Mr Novotny fell?not, of
course, in order to provoke a reaction by the liberals, but to
make sure that the liberals will not lift their heads again. They
arc frightened both of the Russians and of their own people;
and, as is so often the way with frightened men, their instinct
is to give way slavishly to those above them and ruthlessly
repress those below.
Mr Husak ought to be able to feel that hc has done enough
to satisfy the Russians. He has purged and purged again?
the party, the administration, the press and pretty well every-
thing else that matters. He has imposed a rigorous censorship
on the written, spoken and televised word ; black is white and
the moon is still made of blue cheese. About 750 non-
conforming journalists are now said to be out of work. And
the Russians have wen it all, and apparently thought that it
was good. Last month they invited Mr Husak and his
collaborators to Moscow and treated them like prodigal sons.
But there was a snag. Mr Husak, for all the feasting and
speechifying, went home virtually empty-handed. Ile took t
with him neither a promise of the kind of economic help
that the Czechs really need?a substantial hard currency
loan?nor any promise that the Soviet occupying forces will
bc reduced, let alone withdrawn. There was nothing there *
that might help to reconcile the Czechs and Slovaks to their
bleak future. On the contrary, he took with him a broad hint
?by no means the only one to be delivered before and after
the visit to Moscow?that his country's forced march back
into its dark past might have to go even farther than most
people had thought. The joint statement issued at the end of
the visit spoke of "carrying on to the end the struggle against
right-wing opportunism." The clear implication was that the
end had not yet been readied.
Indeed it has not?not, at least, from the point of view of
the Russians and the tiny handful of deep-dyed conservatives
in Czechoslovakia who support them. Too many people are
still refusing to knuckle under. There arc the students. The
new students' union, set up to replace the banned pro-Dubcek
union, is a resounding flop. This week the party paper Rude
Pravo has complained of "exaggerated nationalism and anti-
Soviet trends" at the universities. Last weekend the authorities
celebrated the 30th anniversary of the closing of the Czech
universities by the Nazis; official spokesmen bitterly criticised
the students who persisted in making embarrassing compari-
sons between the Nazis and today's occupying forces.
Then 'there are the intellectuals. The various Czech
" cultural " unions, of writers, artists, film-makers and so on,
have proved so recalcitrant that Mr Bruzek, the Czech'
minister of culture, has decided to by-pass them and deal
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V:
iirect I y with 5t416P pircl:NetfiliFa rviito1oase12 010 men : A :RID 121919 -014194A0 Otlitifit600011t 6c0ntent with
will make sure that only deserving writers and artists?that is, general statements, or will 'they want specific scapegoats ?
la'we who support the party's cultural line?will get. financial Enough mud has now been thrown at the motives of the
and permission to travel, to perform and to exhibit leading figures in Mr Dubeek's government to make what
;thwart. Lastly, and most damaging both materially and would pass as the basis of a case for putting them on trial.
morally, there is the passively hostile bloody-mindedness of Mr Husak" has said that there will ? be no return to the
many industrial workers. Their absenteeism and go-slow" excesses of the 1950s. No doubt he means what be says?when
.,(-,tics are making a sick economy sicker still. Empty shop- he says it. The trouble is that the regime is now sliding back-.
,..;,alows and resentful queues are no recommendation for wards so rapidly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to
ity government, let alone Mr Husak's. He is busy blaming believe that he can, even if he wants to, control those powerful
Ate country's economic troubles on the "wrong ideas" of forces in the party whose outlook is circumscribed by the
the Dubcek days. And while his economic experts are still personal power-seeking and doctrinaire narrow-mindedneis of
arguing over what the right ideas are? Mr Husak has taken the typical apparatchik. It is these men?". political corpses"
the precaution of extending the " temporary " repressive as they are called in Prague?who are now creeping out of
!gislation introduced after last August's demonstrations. obscurity, and into authority. ?
There is no reason to suppose that the Husak regime is in It must be remembered that although the authorties
aiy danger?not, at least, from the Czechoslovaks. The great really did begin to rehabilitate the victims of the Novotny
majority will endure it because they must ; they can neither :purges. very little was done to bring to book the men who,
-,ccept it nor overthrow it. If the regime could make up its actualarried out. the purges and organised the rigged
,airitt to draw a veil over the past and rest content with its ;?trials. RAbilitation proceedings have still not entirely'
resent absolute control (under the Russians) of almost every ,stoppetriatt .all the emphasis now is on the way in which
espect of national life, the situation, however frustrating for they have 'been allegedly misused to rehabilitate those who
both rulers and ruled, might become uneasily stabilised. But were "rightly hi' by the fist of working-class justice.", The
the regime, both because of its ideological training and pre- people who' .oushe to be .rehabilitated, it is now being said,
:amiably because of its deep sense of insecurity, cannot leave are the security men who were so much abused last year.
tile past well alone. It is compelled to reconstruct it into a This is ominous. So arc the hints?and more than hints--
patteni that will justify the present. 'that the party intends to twist the law to suit its Own purposes.
It is not enough for the men at the top publicly to accept The minister of juste complained last month that anti-
ay..: theory that only the Russian army saved the country from socialist forces, often under the slogan of the so-called
counter-revolutionary plot that would have destroyed Czech independence of the law courts,". were attempting to deprive
the communist party of its leading role in. the sphere of justice.'
:iocialisin and left the country wide open to penetration by
Ile could hardly have been more explicit.
imperialism. That idea must be publicly accepted by every-
one else as well. Hence the depressing series of " recantations"
that public and. professional bodies of all kinds are now
making. Even the Academy of Sciences has annulled its
condemnation of the Russians. Obviously, such recantations
arc not unanimous, but in most organisations there are tcrror trials. It is hard to believe that even the hard-fared
enough people who from fear, expediency or even conviction men behind Mr HuSak?men 'like Mr Indra and Mr
arc prepared to manage things so that the regime gets the :Strougal?would feel that full-scale political, p4.sectition,
,-titts it wants. There are a few brave exceptions. Last week .complete with rigged trials, could either make them'
entire party organisation of the Czechoslovak radio more secure or salvage their' discredited cause by providing'
tsigitcd rather than condemn its work during the invasion, any justification .for the Soviet invasion, But they are:, men.
.14',d day the television party organisation followed suit. ,with closed minds, who have apparently learned nothing from
How far will the process of recantation and falsification the upheavals of, the past 15 years The iway t,h9y are now
behaving, they might go that far.
Maybe the growing suspicions of the regime's intentions.
will prove unfounded. One must hope so ;' but the
Hungarian party Ooper, Ncpszabadsag, has enough doubts to.
have. warned Mr Husak last weekend against a .return to,
10
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LOS 4:GaLES TIME')
13 November 19G9
Prague Suspends 3 cadc-)Jmilt
D3ecis at CzT,chles
PRAGUE?All courses in -:,pure
, philosophy, sociology and history in
jCzechoslovakia's universities liave
:ken suspended indefinitely, It was
'earned Wednesday. .
The move ig F;cen as part Of the
.Overall drive by the present Commu-
leadership to wipe out all the,
, :Main pockets of liberal thought
'-;.,1which formed the vanguard of
-slipport for last year's 'attempts at,
liberal reform. ,
The faculties concerned with these.
stibjects in the major universities
were also the Main centers of
irt.istarice and protest against the
invasion in August, rns,
arif.1 against the resulting restric-
tions on freedom imposed under
:MO7COVeri pressures. -
, "Now things are quiet again in the
itniversities,". said a student leader
;It the philosophical faculty (school)
Prague's famed, ? old , Charles
.Univer5ity.. "For the first time in
'more than a year we are not
'engaged ,polltically?wq have (hue
, for studies in our other subjects
si.tch as economic planning, the
.111story of Socialist economy, oven
theolort,y," the young man added
l'bc authorities have given, no
public reason for, the suspension of
the courses. However, the students
iand some faculty members who
!'were willing to discuss the question
,helieve that the newly purged
-Commtinist regime and particularly
'the new hard-line minister of educa._
lion intend to redraft the textbooks
mid reorient the curricitla
alongstringently orthodox,
.:lines.
: How long it will be be.
, ? ? ?
BY OSGOOD CARUTHERS -
_ TIMID! Staff Writer
?
fore the courses will be
maimed is not known.;
ilowever, university
sources believe that the,
_ subject of sociology as it
is known in the West may:
be dropped altogether. ,
rome Czechoslovak stn.,:
dents Ivlio went to West-
er.ri Europe last year to
study such subjects under
?officially approved cultur-,
at exchange programs
'have discovered that their'.
credits are now neither
:recognized nor 'accepted,'
This in effect can hol
:regarrled as a. kind of
; overall reprisal Pgnina
large segment of the na-;
!tion's university' studene,
body which even early
this year staged sit-ins,-
issued proclamations and
?bittf:rly . catirical manoranda and sought liaison
'with the industrial work.
ers for joint action in
.protest against the Soviet,
occupation.
The students of the,
rphilrymphieal . faculty of?.
-Charles University trans?
'formed their building in'
:the center of the old city -
'into a virtnal headquan
ter:,; of support for the.
reform proram of last,:
:!year end of opposition to
Moscow's ever-increasing ,
pressures on the regime..;
The last evidence of tha
rimmering rtudent' tinrestTi
came this A ',mist ,on thj
int anniversary of thco.
11
-entry of the Warsaw' Pacti
forces in which the 1eavi.1
)y reinforced police react'
ed violently and with ap-
parent effect against'
v a it h demonstrations.;
However, university
I(lent leaders disassociated'
; themselves from the de-.'
imonstrationl and had de?
cided upon taking a corn-I':
pletely passive attitude.
: Even so, the efforts
ithe Communist leadership!
to herd thm students back'
Into a unified and easily.;
controllable national *body,
have not yet proved conW
`pletely ,sttecessful. '
Various student uniond
have been dissolved. The,
-leadership of the Cornmu-
,n Is t controlled youth
movement haa been:
.purged?replaced by men.
;whose recent utterances'
:prove them tn be of the!
!most trustworthy natio-
kioxy. But in general the'
students themselves have;
isetrcated into a kind of;
p at hetic nonparticipa-:
tion. They have been able'
:to do so Um far by taking2
'on inordinately greater in-
terest in their studies..
The only genulno ructi
ass that the authoritien!
can claim En far is that
centers of potential youth;
tut rebellicni In thought
and action tat comPletely:
,calm on the surface.
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INTERNATIONAL PRESS IMSTITUTE
Zurich, September 1969
AN APPEAL FROM PR AG
The international Press Institute ans-
wered nn appeal by Czech journalists
who in n letter smuggled from Prague
to the Swiss newspaper :Journal de
Geneve urged "all journalists of the
really free world to describe objecti-
vely what is taking place In Czechos-
lovakia and to give us moral support".
The message from Prague, timed to
coincide with the anniversary of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, came
. from a group or members of the
Mos of Catch journalists.
The Institute replied with an assurance
- that all 'its 1500 members in more
;.; than 50 countries considered it their.
duty to continue to report fully and
objectively the events in Czechoslo-
, villas, and to uphold the ideals of,
? truth, liberty and intellectual honesty
for which Czech and Slovak journa-
lists bad fought courageously end
which they continued totem despite '
theobstadesiadpresseireseoafroatlag
them.' ? ? A '
:
12
1
t
IPI's statement, signed' by Chairman
Hans Kluthe and Director F.rncst.
Meyer, said It "shares the hope
expressed .in the smuggled Unssage:
from Prague fern brighter future and
It will do everything It can to contd.'
butt to this hope through adherence
to the principles for which Czethos%,
lovakian journalists fought, giving an
example Without precedent te the
workro pin". IIPPs *tatty:wit yoss.
issued le hiettet etre wades ei
August VI'
71Urt-,
v -A -IseA
117,11friwrimf1;71t7i,gffyr,.i7...
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30 November 1969
'ITALIAN REDS OUST
.4 CHIEF DISSIDENTS
Party's image as Democratic
Force Found Damaged
By ALFRED FRIENDLY Jr.,
Footle to Tho New York TITAN
ROME, Nov. 29 Four
leading dissidents have been
ousted by the Communist party,
an action that, according to in-
formed sources, has severely
damaged its reputation as a
, democratic force in Italy aqd
has hurt its chances of joinhig
center and left-wing politicians
in an eventual coalition govern-
ment.
The ouster ''has thrown a
wrench into the works," com-
mented a Socialist Deputy, Ric-
cardo Lombardi, who has
long been sympathetic to the
idea of collaboration with the
Communists. "The least you
can say is that it does not
make the unifying process any
easier," he added, and a great
deal of cold blood, patience
and inventiveness will be
necessary to move ahead with
"restructuring the left."
' Limited Horizons Found
LONDON OBSERVER
30 Nov, 1969
What }flirts most, observers
agree, is the Communists' in-
sistence on putting party dis-
cipline above the right of dis-
sent. The ousted rebels, three
of them members of the Central
Committee and two of them
members of Parliament, de-
viated from party thinking by
advocating that Communists
work with revolutionary lett-
ering groups to overthrow the
existing system rather than
Maneuver for power within It.
The declaration that such a
line is heretical should have
reinforced the Communists'
stature as would-be democrats.
Instead, said a left-wing
Christian Democrat, Livio
Labor, a former union leader,
the decision shows "a desire
to slow down the process of
reorganizing the left" and re-
vealed that the Communists
are a party of limited horizons
without enough courage to Join
the "new social forces that
want to struggle to change
the country seriously."
The Central Committee
members ousted ? after a
haastily curtailed debate ?
are Aldo Natoli, a surgeon who
has five times been elected to
the Chamber of Deputies from
Rome: Luigi Pintor, a Roman
journalist who won a parlia-
mentary seat in Sardinia in
the 1968 elections, and Rossana
Rossanda, a publicist who
served from 1963 to 1968 as a
Deputy from Milan.
She and Lugio Magri, whi.
also lost his party standing,
are co-editors- of an in-
creasingly popular left-wing
monthly, II Manifesto, for whic
the whnle group of .rebels has
come to be named.
After ? only four issues
Manifesto, a 64-page, 65-cent
magazine commenting on the
political scene and on revolu-
tionary experiences in Cuba and
China, has scored what are for
Italy phenomenal circulation
gains. Its fourth edition sold
40,000 copies and its latest
number, published two weeks
ago, promptly sold out 45,000
and went into a second print-
ing.
New Historical Bloc'
In the November issue the
editors said Italy's "social
crisis" called for the forma-
tion of "a new historical bloc"
no longer based on outdated
traditions. To effect radical
transformation of the system,
they said, in the language more
popular with the student move-
ment and the antiunion fringe
groups among industrial work-
ers than it is with the Com-
munist party, "new organisms
of power from the base" are
necessary.
Alessandro Natta, Com-
munist Deputy who presented
the demand to the Central rem-
mittee for ousting the Manifesto
k1roup asserted: "We said we
would be willing to fight their
likes, but inside the party,
and its institutional structure.
They have refused our request
Ito end their revolt.'" ?
Italian Communists'
row with leading lady'
by NEAL ASCHERSON
THE Italian Communist Party'
has quarrelled with its leading'
lady: Signora Rona Rosanda,'
the red-haired veteran of the pare!
dans whose revolutionary views'
have made her into a heroine of
the New Left throughout Europe,'
has 'been Suspended from the
Central Committee. -So have
Aldo Natoli and Luigi Pintor.
Communist members of ParliaJ
merit, who worked with her On
the ncw magazine 11 Manifesto.
This collision--between revolu-
tionary Communists and party
leaders who are taking the respect-
able, parliamentary road to power,
?is not just an Italian affair. All
the Communist Parties in the Wcst,?
and the non-Communist Left as
well. have been blowing the dis-
pute closely.? Signora Rosanda and
11 Manliest? stand for all Corn-
munkti who not only reject Semite,
leadership but eche!: moderate. now
1
revolutionary tactics as
11 Afanifetto first came out in
lune. It appeared at a time when
Italy was already in a turmoil of
strikes, riots and factory occupa-
tions. Many were asking v hy the
huge Italian Communist Party?the
birzest political force in Italy?was
still trying to edge into Government
through alliance with ' bourpeois
parties. when direct revolution
see ed possible.
7114, Rosen& group had already"
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fired a few ranting shots in Feb-
ruary, at the Party Congress in
ltoloena. In spite of efforts to keep
the leftists in check. Luigi Pinter
called far workers' councils and
said the policy of making animal
with other parties A as'building on
But the fast number of Mani.
frno v,as 6, sebsation. Not only
'did it %cress) the secret th,eses for the
Czechostovak Patty?Congnass (the
one the Russians invaded tO Mop);
the leat:ier demandad open dialogue
wittan the party on basic siratcaYs
area called for a revival of 'the.
tense of revolution a. rupture
and ovcrthrosv of the eeisting ?
'order. . .
In the climate of Italy today:this
intellectually stiff periodical' sold,
out instantly and had to be re-
printed. Circulation soared to some'
' 150,000 within a ? few months.
People began to speak of th? e
Manifesto Group: and to tope
that its members would bridge the
gap betwen the Communist Party,
and disaffected young Marxists. ,
Rossana Rosanda had struck the
party on its most tender. .spot.,
Openly critical of Soviet behaviour,
THE WASHINGTON POST
11 December 1969
Soviets Endorse Disciplining
Of Thiefe Italian Communist
in. Czechoslovakia and within the
world Communist movement, the
party .issommjtted tpaI1uwirig. free
and .open internal 'debate. "Its
leaders .eek coalition with ' the
existing parties, promising that
"Communist Goternment would
permit a ritulti-party. system and
bear no resemblance to intolerant!
Stalinist models in Eastern Euro*'
At first, party haideti s'eert con-.
tent to warn' Rossana and hee'Coil
leagues.-and to discuss their'thesea
in the Communist lucks: The Afaulj
festo people were vet fiot-hesded
students, but : formidable 'and
mature ComMunists. respected
throughout the rarty and beyond.
But, as Italy this autumn c.ntered)
the long-awaited storm :of major'
strikes and street battles, with the;
Christian Democrat minority
Government riven by its own dis-
putes.- the Manifesto challenge
to the Communist leadership
appeared ? to threaten unity, ,wheni
it was most needed. ,
The party's 'central committal
held a hearing. ROssana'andber two'
two colleagues were assured that the
Pa* did not want ? their silences-
their surrender or their hurnilia-
tion: but that, without disciplinel
of some kind, the. party would
founder in impotent faction fights.'
The ? Manifesto Group' refused
to. be quiet
Last week: the party reluotently?
suspended Rosana and her col.*
leagues for 'aponsorinis' the frag-
mentation of the party. This Wag.
an . embarrassing dexidon for
Italian Commstnists. committed to
tolerance and diversity and "bold)
enough to say openly that 'no.
process of democratisation hat
'begun in. the Soviet Union the ,
messes intai hot Wired its the ;
cisiserf poWer.' . '.1 1 ?? ? n
-.The Party says that 'the :three will:
be tintatedit theY se:Sp publishing;
11Alanifrsto. which they Will aims-Li
certainly refuse 40 do. ,Th? suspen?
sions will produce A walkout.'ofj
'leftists 'into various forms of Mao..
I ism. Meanwhile parties considering'
with. thent. 'love been
'shaken id. find' that 'where -unity; ;p1
!conceenod.Alte'liberalistreolf Ita1101
rotrununisur hat aliMigt-1.41 itTrawa
i.;111
Washington Post Foreign Berries
MOSCOW, Dec. 10?The So-
viet Union publicly intervened
In the affairs of a Western
Communist party today. A
Pravda editorial officially en-
dorsed the suspension of a
three-member faction by the
Italian party.
Such interventions are rare.
Communist sources suggested
that this one was really an at-
tempt to bring the Italian par-'
ty?disaffected with Soviet
le a der shi p, fermentingol
,cracked but not yet deeply ?
split?back to a monolithic
structure - and a pro-Moscow.
position.
Other informed observers
said it might also be an at-
tempt to revive the fortunes
of the desiccated pro-Moscow
"right wing" of the Italiars,
party.
The sources agreed that the
endorsement was certainly not
sought by Luigi Longo and
other top leaders of the Ital-
ian party, that it took a
stronger position than the
Italian partra own statements
' and that it might boomerang
,and help the so-called Italian
Communist liberals and fur
:ther impair the unity of the
,Communist movement.
I .
, Last month the Central
!Committee of the Italian Com-
rnunist Party "excluded" Ros-
ana Rosanda, Aldo Natoli and
Luigi Pintor. They are Com-
munist members of the Italian
Parliament who publish a
'magazine caned II Manifesto.
;The. journal rejects Moderate
'tactics and wants to revive
:"the sense of revolution as a
rupture and overthrow of the
existing order." It also calls
for workers' councils, in which
it may be as much ,Titoist as
Maoist.
These views impugned the
,attempts of the Italian party
to join a coalition government
with socialist and 'perhaps
even "bourgeois" parties. .
; The Russians called the sus-
pension of the three "impor-
Itint'' - in today's editorisil,
which some observers said
carried more. weight. because
2
iit was signed "our own infor-
mation" rather than with the
name of a correspondent or
commentator.
The editorial called the posi-
tions of the Manifesto group
Ha muddled mixture of right-
opportunistic and ?leftist' the-
ses." It said they slandered
the Italian partyathe Commu-
nist movement, the Socialist
countries and the Soviet
Union.
It called the group's activi-
ties "subversive" and "disor-
ganizing" and said it attacked
"the Leninist principle of
democratic centralism" (rule
from the top with no debatel
after the leaders have reachedd
a decision).
Pravda ended by calling for;
."Ideological staunchness" uni
,der a variety of headings. Obi
servers asked how this
squared with the Italian Corn.l
'munist Party's own disregard
of "democratic centralism'.
and -with its criticism of th
Soviet Union for not allowing
the muses to share in the
Antall! OL P.OWerik
cu Ia-u / L . %-sTPC
zr-sa i I 41-WIJUKFLII:11-011UU I-
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VOLKSTIMME, Vienna
28 November 1969
THEODOR PRAGER
Posing naive questions is a very
opinion regarding the statutes?
centralism? What's your opinion
the Marek interview?
fashionable thing to do. What's your
What's your opinion regarding democratic
on Ernst Fischer? What do you think of
I would like toyose a few counter questions: What is your opinion
concerning the resol4tion of the 22nd August 1968? Do you still condemn
Athe invasion by the states of the Warsaw Pact? What's your attitude
1-egarding the full party control of all spheres of life in Czechoslovakia?
What is your attitude regarding the 19th party Congress which had stated
that socialism must \mean more democracy than bourgeois democracy, not less?
Charges of revisionism are leveled against us. But who revises the
resolutions of the 19th party Congress? Who drags us onto the road of
total subjection to the ever-changing needs of the foreign party leader-
ship?
The extension of party influence into all spheres is taking place
here also. Taking a critical attitude to neo-Stalinist "normalization"
in the CSR is being. prevented. Not even critical remarks of fraternal
parties are being published or talked about. The British party has asked:
"Where is proof of the alleged counter-revolution in the CSR? Which CIA
agents or other diversionists have been offered to the public? The
elected leaders of party and state were arrested." But access to such
information is prevented here.
Our attitude in public is being held against us, as presumably being
against the party interests. The now prevelant "hard" line is against the
vital interests of the party by its practical exclusion of (the opinions of)
exponents of other than the prevelant opinion. If you continue in this veih9 /
you will soon be standing all alone. Your majority in the party will be
total, but so will be your isolation from the working class. Your claim to.
total power within the party revieals your ideas of socialism. We entertain
different concepts and we shall not give up our intent to represent them
everywhere.
3
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Theodor Prager
Gretchenfragen sind derzeit groBe
Mode. Wie haitst du's mit dem Statut?
Wie haltst du's mit dem demokrati-
schen Zentralismus? We stehst du zu
Ernst Fischer? Wie stehst du zum Marek-
Interview?
Ich mochte mit em n paar Gegenfragen
aufwarten: Wie haltet ihr es mit unse-
rem Beschlug vom 21 August 19687
Steht ihr noch zur Verurteilung des Ein-
marsches der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten?
We steht ihr zur totalen Gleichschak
tung in der CSSR? Wie haltet ihr es mit
dem 19. Parteitag, der erklart hat, .der
Sozialismus mug mehr Demokratie be-:
deuten als die bOrgerliche Demokratie,
nicht weniger?
Man wirft uns Revisionicmus vor.
Aber wer revidiert die Beschlusse des
19. Parteitags? Wer zerrt uns auf dee
Weg der totalen Unterordnung unter
die jeweiligen Bediirfnisse elner,auswart
tigen Parteifiihrungt
Die Gleichschaltung 1st auch bei uns
im Gang. Man Verhindett jede kritl-
sche Stellungnahme zu ? der.neostalinistl.
!Olen ?Normallsierune_ in der. CSSL
Nicht einmal die kritischen Augerungre
von Bruderparteien diirfen .da erschel.
nen. Die englische Partel hat gefragtt
?Wo kileiben die Beweise Ober die an-.
gebliche Konterrevolution In der -CSSR1-
Welche CIA-Agenten oder sonstigen Di
versanten hat man der Offentlichkeit
vorgestellt? Verhaftet hat man dort diet
gewahlten Fiihrer von Partei und Staat."
Aber dari.iber darf man. bei uns nichts
erfahren.
Man wirft uns unser Auftreten in der
Offentlichkeit vor, das angeblich gegen
the Partei gerichtet 1st. Gegen die
Lebensinteressen der Partei richtet sich
die jetzt vorherrschende ,harte" Lime
der praktischen Ausschaltung von Expo-
nenten einer anderen als der herrschen-'
den Auffassung. Wenn ihr so welter
macht, werdet ihr bald vollig unter
euch sein. Eure Mehrheit in der Partel
wird total sein, aber auch eure totale
Isolierung von der Arbeiterschaft. Euer
totaler Mathtanspruch in der Parte
zeigt, was ihr fur Vorstellungen vom
Sozialismus habt. WIr haben andere
Vorstellungen, ,und wit werden nicht
'darauf verzichten, ie Oberall zu ver40
/Alen. _
- A 1 II IASI III
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LE MONDE, Paris
28 November 1969
Testimony from a "Progressive" Leader: "Normalization"
Marks the Decline of the Party
One of the principal personalities of the progressive current
in the Austrian P.C. sent a letter to us, asking that his name not
be mentioned, from which we have extracted the principal passages:
"Austria is a small world on the stage of which the big world holds
1t8 rehearsals." This quotation from Hebbel was used last year in
gonnection with the small Austrian Communist Party whose ranks never cease
to diminish and in which is reflected the crisis of the communist movement.
The party had attracted attention well beyond the national borders during
its nineteenth congress in 1965. Lowering the curtain on its past, it
decided to renew its leadership and elaborated a program of "Italian"
inspiration.
The progressive forces within the party had succeeded in obtaining
these changes only because the dominant group in the apparatus had not yet
realized the full significance of the ouster of Khrushchev. When this was
accomplished, a systematic resistance against the new orientation began to
show itself, essentially in documents unrelated to any political practice.
This action was sufficient, however, to give a feeling of the growing
pressure from the "friends." Written in German, these publications provoked
a responsive echo in the GDR and the traditions and ties dating from the
monarchy assured them a growing interest in Prague and in Budapest. The
attacks were concentrated on Ernst Fischer, the most outstanding personality
of the party and one of the most important of the workers? movement since
the Second World War.
The springtime in Prague permitted the progressives, for the most part
personal friends of the Prague reformers, to go over to the offensive. The
party saluted the program of the Czech communists, sent messages to Dubcek,
and after 21 August the central committee condemned the invasion; the
spokesmen of the apparatus were not present at the sessions. The Austrian
Communist Party equally took the initiative in asking for the convoking, of
a conference of communist parties from Western Europe. This proposal ran
into the refusal of the French Communist Party.
The pressure which began at this moment did not cease to increase,
occasioning open polemics with the GDR and the Soviet Union, who con-
centrated their attacks on Ernst Fischer.. Our party soon resembled a broken
mirror reflecting the "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. All possible
strategems and manipulations were used, a publication paid for out of the
account for developmental aid to a "friendly" country was utilized for this
work inside the party -- its first issue was directed against Ernst Fischer,
its second against Franz Marek, the spokesman of the progressive forces --
5
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finally, a congress of the party was prepared, which was held in January
and revenged itself on the preceding congress.
Immediately after this congress proceedings were instituted against
Ernst Fischer under the pretext of an interview on the radio. The
arbitration commission (average age seventy years) decided in May on the
expulsion of Ernst Fischer. A majority of the central committee refused
to ratify this decision. In October the arbitration commission, by six
votes against four, again pronounced itself in favor of expulsion, which
can now be annuled only by a party congress. Twenty seven members of the
central committee publicly protested against this decision which was as
sGupid as it was suicidal.
This public protest could hardly be more than a fight for honor. The
expulsion of Ernst Fischer was followed by numerous withdrawals and
resignations. The decline of the Austrian Communist Party is inexorable.
In the elections even some communists do not vote for the party.
The expulsion of Ernst Fischer had been preceded by another act, less
spectacular but just as symptomatic of the "Husakization" of the party.
The publication of the communist intellectuals, Tagebuch, had been run out
of the party office building after it had refused to submit to censorship.
Our party, which had once awakened interest, finds itself isolated
and without hope. It has always had trouble in becoming a power and no
longer has any chance of being considered as democratic and progressive.
It will continue, however, to participate in future conferences of
communist parties. This presence seems to be the only thing which counts
for the partisans of "normalization."
On temoignage d'un dirigeant < progressiste :
la normalisation ) marque le &lin .du parti
L'une dos principals:: person-
nalites do la tendance progras-
sista au sein du P.C. autrichien
nous a adresse. en demandant
quo son nom no ffit pas men-
tionni. une lettro dont nous ex-
Imports los principaux pas-
sages :
L'Autriche est un petit mon-
de sur la scene duquel Is grand
tient sea repetitions. a Le mot
de Hebbel a ete employe l'an
passe h propos du petit parti
communiste autrichien..dont les
rangs ne cessent de se reduire,
et oh se reflete la crlse du mou-
vement communiste. Le parti
avalt attire l'attention blen nu-
clei& des frontleres natIonales,
lora de son dix-neuvieme congres,
en 1965. Tirant un trait our son
passe, 11 decidalt de rajounir
sa direction et elaborait un
programme &inspiration e ita-
11enne a.
? Les forces progresststes h Vinte-4
rleur du parti n'avalent reussi
obtenir ?es changements quail
pane que le groupe dominant
dans l'apparell n'avalt pas encore
pris conscience de la portee de
la destitution de Khrouchtchev.
Longue ce fut chose ? faite, la
resistance systematIque contre is
nouvelle orientation commenca
se manifester, essentiellement
dans des documents auxquels no
repondalt aucune pratique poll-
tique. Cette action fut suffi-
sante cependant pour permettre
tie sentir la pression croissante
des e amis ?. Ecrites en allemand.
ces publications provoquerent tin
echo attentif en RDA et les tra-
ditions et les liens datant de la
monarchic leur assurerent un
teret croissant h Prague at
Budapest. Les attaques etalent
concen trees sur Ernst Fischer, la
personnalite la plus notable du,
parti et rune des plus Importantea
du mouvement ouvrier spits is
deuxierne guerre mondiale.
Le printemps de Prague per.'
mit aux progressistes, pour la
plupart des amis personnels des
reformateurs pragols, de passer
lioffansive 10 parti sales le pro.'
6.
gramme des cornmunistes tche-
ques adressa des messages
Dubcek, et awes le 21 sot% le,
comite central condamna Vinva-
sion, les portes-parole de rappa-.
roil n'assIsterent pas h, la s?ce..
Le parti communiste autrichlen,
prlt egalement rinitiative de'
demander la reunion dune confe-.
rence des partis communistea
d'Europe de l'Ouest. Cette propo-
sition se heurta au refus du,
La pression a partir de co
parti communiste francais.
moment, ne fit qu'aug,menter,
dormant lieu a des poldmiqueS,
ouvertes avec la R.D.A. et l'union.
soviatique, qui concentraient leure
-attaques sur Ernst Fischer. Notre
part! ressembla bientet a un
roir base refletant la a norma.
hsation a en Tcheccelovaquie.
Tous les stratagemes et man1pu-1
lotions possibles furent employee,
tine revue finance? au compte de
raid? au dtveloppement (run
-pays (anti') fut utilise? pour le,
-Vavall a.Finterieur 'du part! --
son premier numero fut dirt/4
_centre )ErndaVocher, son nuWdro
,deuz contra Zan% .Msrsk? 10
'
79-01194A000400150001-6
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1
porte-psrole des forces progres-
sistes enfin. un congres thi
parti fut prepare, qui se tint en
janvier et se voulut la revanche
sur le congres precedent.
Immediatement apres ce come
gres, une procedure fut engagee
contre Ernst PisCher, sous le pre.4
texte d'une interview accordee b.
la radio. La commission d'arbi-
trage (moyenne d'age, soixante-
dix ans) decide en mai l'exclu-
Sion d'Ernst Fischer. Le comite
central refuse, a la majorites
d'enteriner cette decision. En oc-i
tobre, la commission d'arbitrage;
par six voix contre quatre; se
prononcait une nouvelle fois pour
l'exclusion, quo seul, maintenant,
un congres dtaparti pourra lever.
Vingt-sept ratlines du comite
central protes rent publiquement
contre cette aussi stu-
pide rale suicidaire.
' Cette protestation publique no
pouvait etre g u ? e plus qu'un
baroud d'honneur. L'exclualon
d'Xrnst -ds
7
nombreux departS et demissions.
Le declin du parti communists
autrichien est inexorable. Aux
elections, meme des communistes
ne votent pas pour le part!.
L'exclusion d'Ernst Fischer
avait ete precidee d'un sutra
acte. moms spectaculaire, mats
tout aussi symptomatique de la
chusakisation du parti. La re-
vue des intellectuels communis-
tes, Tagebuch, avait ete chassee
de l'immeuble du parti sures'
qu'elle cut refus6 de se soumettre
une censure.
Notre parti, qui exalt, un mo'
ment. evellle l'interet, se retrouve
isole et sans espoir. Il a toujours.
eta du mat a devenir une force,
et n'a plus aucune chance d'?e
considere conune democratlque ep
progressiste.
? 11 continuera toutefois parti;.
elper aux eventuelles conferences
des partis conununistes. Cette
'Presence, aerobia etre la seule
Chose qui compte pour les partli.
Ws ie leocnOrmalleatIon.a.
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LE MONDE, Paris
6 December 1969
MR. GARAUDY IS DISPOSED TO "SERVE" THE C.P. "AS A SIMPLE SOLDIER"
Mr. Roger Garaudy, member of the political bureau of the communist
party, director of the Center of Maricist Studies and Research (CERM),
evoked Thursday evenipg, during the television program "Panorama," the
conflict which opposes him and his party on the subject of Czechoslovakia.
After having recalled his point of view -- "the socialism that I wish
for is not that imposed by Brezhnev on Czechoslovakia" -- he declared:
"I am not in disaccord with the program, the objectives, and the policy
of my party, otherwise I would resign. It is possible that I may be ex-
uded from the political bureau and from the central committee of my party,
ut I would then insist on continuing to serve it as a simple soldier. I
wish, however, that it will be possible for each person to be able to express
himself in full liberty within the party."
H. GARAUDY EST DISPOSE
A ? SERVIR LE P.C.
? en tont que simple soldat
M. Roger Garaudy, membre du
bureau politique du parti commu-
niste, directeur du Centre d'etudes
et de recherc hes marxistes
(CERM), a evoque Judi soir, an
cours de remission televisee ? Pa-
norama ?, le conf lit qui l'oppose
A son part' au sujet de la Tche-
- coslovaquie.
Apres avoir rappele son point
de vue ? cc le socialisme que
souhaite n'est pas celui impose
par Brejnev a la Tchecoslova-
quie ?. ? 11 a declare:
? Je ne suis pas en desaccord
avec le programme, les objectifs
et la politique de mon parti, sinon
je demissionnerais. 11 est pos-
sible que je sots exclu du bureau
politique et du comite central de
mon parti, mals e tiendrai alors
a continuer de servir celui-ci en
tant que simple soldat. Je sou-
haite toutefois soit possible
chacun de pouvoir s'exprimer
en toute Mend au min du pang. lo,
8
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LE MONDE, Paris
7-8 December 1969
In expressing himself on television
MR. ROGER GARAUDY "COMFIRMS HIS OPPOSITION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM"
writes l'Humanite
L'Humanite on Saturday morning returned to the subject of the
statements made Thursday evening by Mr. Roger Garaudy, member of the
political bureau of ti* communist party, on the televised program
"Panorama" and writes:
"The French Radio and television Organization broadcasts at length the
speeches of Chanban-Delman, of Debre, of Poujade and all the other anti-
communist attacks. It was not to an expose of the policy of the communist
party that "Panorama" consecrated its broadcast of Thursday evening, but
to an interview with Roger Garaudy. It is very necessary to stress the
singular character of this interview. Once again it is by a book,
published during the preparations for a party congress, that Roger Garaudy
expresses his point of view. He confirms in it his opposition to the
analyses and conclusions at which the collective organs of the leadership
have arrived; he confirms in it, despite his denigrations, his opposition
to the principles of democratic centralism.
But one who wishes to prove too much risks proving nothing at all.
Obliged to recognize that he has always been able freely to express himself
in the political bureau of the central committee, Roger Garaudy had nontheless
said nothing about the fact that the central committee has decided to open,
as it has done before each congress, in the party and in its press, the
preparatory discussion for the congress on the basis of the draft theses
adopted by the central committee. Roger Garaudy, member of the political
bureau, has the right to express his opinion there on this. Which is what
the secretary general of the party invited him to do at the meeting of the
central committee of last 13-14 October. In effect, Waldeck Rochet said
then: 'I wish, in the name of our political bureau, that Garaudy would
change his attitude, that is that he defend the policy of the party and
participate, like all the militants and members of the party, in the
preparation of the nineteenth congress in the framework Of the principles
which rule the party and of its statutory regulations.? But it is
regrettable that once again Roger Garaudy prefers the publicity of bad
quality which television obligingly accords him."
9
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LE MONDE, Paris
7-8 December 1969
En s'exprimant a la television
M. Roper Garaudy ( confirme son opposition
aux principes du centralisme ddmocratique
ecrit Mumanite
i
L'Humc ir s ite revient samedi ma-
tin sur declarations faites
jeudi solr ar M. Roger Garaudy,
membre du bureau politique du
parti communiste, dans remission
televisee e Panorama n, et ecrit :
? L'O.R.T.F. dif fuse 4 longueur
d'emission les discours de Cha-
ban-Delmas, de Debre, de Pon-
jade et toutes les autres attaques
anticommunistes. Ce n'est pas 4
un expose de la politique du poll
communiste qua a Panorama s a
consacre son emission. de feudi
soir, mats 4 une interview de Ro-
ger Garaudy. Interview dont il
, fent bien souligner le caractere
sin puller. line fois de plus, c'est
par un nue. publie en pleine
preparation du congres, qua Roger
Garaudy exprime son point de
, vue. II y con/Irma son opposition
aux analyses at aux conclusions
auxquelles se sont livres les orga-
nes collectifs de direction; il y
eon/Irma, malgre see denegations,
'son opposition aux principes du
,centralisme democratique.
. s Mals qui vent trop prouver
risque de ne rien prouver du tout.
Oblige de reconnaitre gull a ton-
lours . psi s'exprimer. libremcnt
.. . .-. ..?. ?-?,ii ? 1,, rat :ag....t.s.183,,t),,,....41i.t.4 dAt.
dans le bureau politique et l?.
comite central, Roger Garaudy
n'a cependant rien dit du fait que?
le comite central a decide d'ouvrir,'
comma ii le fait avant cheque,
congres, dans le parti at dans sa,
'presse, la discussion preparatoire
au con gres, sur is base du projet -
de theses adopte par le comite
central. Roger Garaudy, membre
du bureau politique, a is droit
d'y exprimer son opinion. C'est
d quoi le secretaire general du ,
parti l'invitait 4 la session du.
comite central des 13 at 14 octo- I
bre dernier. En ef fet, Waldeck ,
Rochet disait alors :a Je sou-1
? haite, au none de notre bureau
? politique, que Garaudy change
? d'attitude, c'est-4-dire gull de- ,
? fende is politique du parti et
? veuille bien participer, commis
s tons les militants et les mem-
? bres du parti, d la preparation
? du dix-neuvieme oongres dans
? is cadre des principes qui regis-4
? sent is parti et de see regles
? statutaires. ? Male Il est regret-
table qu'une fois de plus Roger
Garaudy prefere la publicitti de
mautntis obi qua liii amnia,
complaisamment la television.
A ?
10
1.77(.31-9. 11
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LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris
20-26 October 1969
Before the Central Committee at Ivry, Roger Garaudy Asked
the Right Questions. Nobody Answered Them.
By - Jean Geoffroy
Because he is luckier than Alexander Dubcek, Roger Garaudy
is still a member of his-party's Political Bureau. But he will
have only 4 months' respite. On 8 February next, the 19th Con-
gress of the French Communist Party, meeting at Nanterre, will
"forget" to include his name among those of the members of the
Central Committee, which will undoubtedly have a number of new
'faces on it, if only because there have been practically no
,changes in its makeup since the last Congress was held in Tann-
1967.
Garaudy's two speeches to the Ivry CC last Wednesday are,
at least at this level, his swan song. They highlighted not only
:his isolation -- even Aragon was silent, although he had first
made sure that there would be no immediate sanctions imposed on
Garaudy -- but also the degree to which the problems he raised
are currently bothering the leadership of the French CP.
It is not mere happenstance that the hardest attacks on
the director of the Center for Marxist Studies and Research were
mounted, at the Ivry session, by spokesmen for the Stalinist
old guard, like Loon Feix and Andre Stil, the former editor-in-
chief of Humanita, who distinguished himself in 1956 with his .
commentariei?a?The events in Budapest. The younger generation
in the Political Bureau, although it has failed to back Garaudy9
is more circumspect. Roland Leroy, Reno Andrieu, Rena Piquet.
and Paul Laurent took no part in the debate. They left it to
Waldeck Rochet to deliver the only party reply to the Garaudy
charges to see publication.
"If we were to follow Garaudy..."
As he voiced them in his initial speech, and then in re-
ply to the several rebuttal speeches9 his views bear chiefly
on three points.
1. Tho events in Czechoslovakia should induce French
communists to question themselves more probingly than they have
hitherto on the matter of their relations with the Soviet Union.
Waldeck Rochet's reply:
'Once again, Garaudy is trying to exploit the events in
Czechoslovakia to help anti-Sovietism and the opportunist'
cliques."
11,
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2. The international communist conference that met last
June in Moscow adopted a document that provides no answer to
a number of fundamental problems (such as that of the indivi-
dual paths each country chooses to move toward socialism), and
contains no valid analysis of the present situation in the cap-.
italist countries.
Waldeck Rodhet's reply:
"If we wereto follow Garaudy, we should be aggravating
the dissension within the international communist'movement and
Its weakening, askwell as the division within our own party,
to the advantage or imperialism and of the class enemy..."
3. The prespt principles of organization of the French
gommunist Party pr4vent any meaningful debate on these problems
as a whole..
Wladeck Rochet's reply:
"Garaudy frequently violates the principles of organiza-
tion. He has publicly made statements contrary to the party's
policy in a Yugoslav newspaper, statements which have been
picked up by a great many bourgeois newspapers. He cannot
therefore be overly surprised by our response."
The condemnation is clear, although the Secretary-General
thought it wise to add that he hoped "that Garaudy will change
his attitude, that is that he will defend Party policy and will
be kind enough to join with all militants and Party members in
preparing for the 19th Congress."
This discussion took up several hours of the second day
of the CC meeting, although it was not originally on the agenda.
It would be a mistake to conclude from this that the Garaudy
problem is one of the Party's central concerns. This is merely
the crystallization of a more complex debate which the French \
CP clearly does not dare to plunge straight into, but which it
is finding more and more difficult to dodge: without breaking
its privileged ties with the Soviet CP (which nobody, for that
matter, has asked it to do), can the French CP run the risk of
disagreeing with the "Soviet comrades" by committing itself on
a practical level to the definition of a French path to social-
ism?
Of course, on 21 August 1968, the French communist leaders
expressed their disagreement with the Soviets. This is no minor H.
thing, nor is the fact that that disagreement is still remembered
today, even when the new team on the government in Prague is re-
vising the opinions formulated when the Warsaw Pact troops were
actually invading Czechoslovakia. But, important as that recol-
lection is, it does not answer one burning question: what does \
the French CP think of the total obliteration of what Mr. Waldeck
Rochet himself called "the justified changes made in Czechoslovakia'
12.
T0777 4r77771, 0 7
117? .7'77
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in January 1968," which, he adds, his party "assessed and found
desirable?" One seeks in vain for the slightest token of an
answer in the speeches made before the Central Committee at Ivry.
This is the same question which Alain Savary's Socialist
Party plans to pose to the Communist Party in the dialogue which
:will shortly be opened between the two organizations. It would
be surprising if the communists had been saving their real confi-
dences on such an issue for the socialists, and this is why it
Is highly unlikely that any such debate will get very far. In
his speech, Georges Frischmann, like Waldeck Rochet in his con-
cluding address, referred to that dialogue without enthusiasm,
and indicated that it would deal with quite different issues.
1The Mitterand Method
It is precisely because he believes that this can be no-
ithing more than a dialogue of the deaf that Frangois Mitterand
,advocates another method. Starting with the assumption that
the present balance of power, which is too unfavorable to the
non-communist left, merely strengthens the French CP in its ri-
gidity, the former president of the Left Federation thinks that,
before engaging in any dialogue whatever, it would be well to
go back to the grass roots and recreate that rank-and-file drive
for unity that made it possible, from 1965 to 1967, to reach
at least the beginning of an agreement with the Communist Party
on a common program. He refuses to entertain the notion -- and
he gives his reasons at some length in his book, "Ma part de
verit6" rMy Share of Truth3 -- that the events in Prague have
made it forever impossible to reach an understanding with the
French CP.
The Party is faced with two different appeals one is an
abstract and delicate dialogue with its traditional partner, the
Socialist Party,and the other is a more practical confrontation
with a partner whose loyalty it appreciates, but which looks
very much like a competitor on the unity turf.
The Ivry Central Committee session provided no enlighten-
ment on this point, either. We shall have to wait for the
"theses" of the February Congress, which will be published in
the next few weeks, to find out whether the present leadership ,
of the Communist Party really intends to make even the beginning
of an answer to both these questions.
13
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Car P.
MraVe ?e I eas
Connais
olus!
* Devant le comate central
d'Ivry, Roger Garaudy a
pose les bowies questions.
Personne n'y a repondu.
Plus hcureux qu'Alexandre
Dubcek, Roger Garaudy est
A toujours membre du bureau
I politique de son part'. Mats
ii n'aura quc quatrc mois de sursis
le 8 fevrier prochain. lc XIXe congres
du liarti communiste francais, reuni
a 'Nanterre, e oubliera D son nom
sur la liste des membres du comite
central qui sera sans doute sensible-
mem renouvele, ne scrait-ce que
parcc qu'il nc l'a guere ete lors du
dernier congres, en janvier 1967.
Les deux interventions que Garau-
dy a fakes mercredi dernier dcvant
le comite central d'Ivry sont done,
cc niveau du moms, son chant du
cygne. Elics ont demontre non seu-
lenient son isolement ? Aragon lui-
meme est demeure silencieux, apres
avoir, cepcndant, obtenu l'assurance
qu'auctme sanction immediate ne se-
mit prise contre Garaudy ? mais
aussi a quel point les problems qu'il
pose preoccupent un grand nombre
des dirigeants du P.C.F.
Cc n'est pas tut itasard si les prin-
cipales attaques contre le directcur du
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches
marxistes ont ete pottees, a cette ses-
sion d'Ivry, par des representants de
la vieille garde ex-stalinienne tels quo
Leon Feix et Andr?til, l'ancien re-
daeteur en chef de l'Humanite
qui s'illustra en 1956 par scs commen-
taires sur les evenements de Buda-
pest. La jcune generation du bureau
politique, bien qu'elle se desolielarise
de Garaudy, dcmcure plus eir-i
conspecte. Ni Roland Leroy, ni Paul
Laurent, ni Ren?iquet, ni Ren?
Andrieu no sont intervenus dans ie
debat its ont laisse a Waldeck Ro-
cha le soin de formuler la seule re-
ponse officiellement publiee aux the-
ses de Garaudy.
? Si l'on suivait Garaudy... >>
Telles qu'il les a exprimees dans
unc premiere intervention puis en re-
ponse a scs contradictcurs, ccs theses
portent cssentiellernent sur trots
points.
Les evenements de Tchecosle-
vaquie devraient simmer les commu-
nistes francais a s'interroger plus
gulls ne ront fait jusqu'a present sur
la nature de !curs relations avec
e12000/68t2eis CIA-RDP79-0
Reponse de Waldeck Rochet :
e Une lois de plus, Garaudy tente
d'exploiter les evenements de Tche-
coslovaquie pour alimenter l'anti-
sovietisme at les courants opportu-
nistes.
2) La conference internationale
communiste reunie a Moscou en juin
dernier a adopte un document qui
n'apporte aucunc reponse a des pro-
blemcs fondamentaux (comme celui
des differentes votes adoptees par cha-
que pays pour alter au socialisme) et
ne comporte pas d'analyse valable de
la situation actuelle dans les pays ca-
pitalistes.
Reponse de Waldeck Rochet : e Si
Pon suivait Garaudy, ce sarah Pag-
gravation des dissensions au seindu
inouvernent communism international
et son al faiblissement, ainsi que la
division de noire propre parti au be-
nefice de l'imperialisme et de Pen-
netni de classe...
3) Les principes actuels d'organisa-
tion du Parti communiste frangais cm-
pechent tout veritable &bat sur
scmble de ccs problemes.
Reponse de Waldeck - Rochet
Garaudy viole frequemment ces
principcs d'organisation. 11 a fait pu-
hliquement des declarations contraires
a la politique du Parti dans un jour-
nal yougoslave, declarations qui dnt
CiC reproduites par de nombreux four-
naux bourgeois. 11 ne peut done
s'etonner de noire reponse. lr
La condamnation est donc claire,
.hien que le secretaire general ait cru
bon. d'ajouter qu'il souhaitait que
Garaudy change d'attitude, c'est-a-
dire qu'il defende la politique du Parti
et veuille Men parficiper comme tous
les militants et les membres du Parti
al la preparation du XIX' congres
Cc &bat a occupe plusieurs heures
dc la scconde journee du comite cen-
tral, bicn qu'il ne figurat pas a son
ordrc du jour. II scrait faux d'en
conclurc quo le problemc Garaudy
est au centre des preoccupations du
Parti. 11 n'est que la cristallisation
dun &bat plus complexe quo le
P.C.F.. de toutc evidence, n'ose pas
aborder de front mais qu'il lui est
de plus en plus difficile d'eluder :
sans romprc ses liens privilegies avec
le P.C. de l'IJ.R.S.S. (cc que personne
d'ailleurs ne lui ?demande), le P.C.F.
prendre le risque de se trouver,
en contradiction avec les camaradcs 1
sovietiques en s'engageant concra-,
temcnt dans definition d'unc voie c
frangaise de passage au socialism ' 6
Cortes, le 21 aorit 1968, les diri-
geants communistcs frangais ont ex- q
prime !cur desaccord avec les Sovie-
tiques. Ccla n'est pas negligeablc, a
comme ne rest pas non plus lc fait d
que cc desaccord soit aujourd'hui q
rappcle alors meme que la nouvellc
equipe au pouvoir a Prague revise
les jugements port e& a repoque sur
ice*
rintervircn des UNA% pacte
httortant
que soit cc rappel, ne repond pas
a unc question prescnte : que pense
le dc l'annulation totalc de
cc que M. Waldeck Rochct appelle
lui-meme I les changements justifies
operes en Tchecoslovaquie en janvier.
1968 ct dont il ajoute que son parti
les avait apprecies de facon posi-
tive ? On chercherait en vain le
moindre element de reponse dans les
interventions qui ont ete faites au
comite central d'Ivry.
C'est egalement la question quo lc
Parti socialiste d'Alain Savary s'ap-
prete a poser au parti communistc
dans le dialogue qui s'ouvrira pro-
chainement entre les deux organisa-
tions. 11 serait etonnant quc les corn-
munistcs reservent leurs interlo-
cuteurs des confidences sur un tel
sujet, et c'cst pourquoi est pcu pro,
bable qu'un &bat ainsi engage aille
tres loin. Georges Frischmann, dans
son rapport, comma Waldeck Rochet
dans son discours de cloture, ont
d'ailleurs &toque cc dialogue sans en-
thousiasme, pour lui donner un tout
mitre contenu.
La ncethode Mitterrand
C'est precisernent parce qu'il pcnsc
qu'il no petit y avoir l?u'un dia-
logue de sourds quc Francois Mittel.-
rand proconise unc autre methode.
Partant de l'idee quo lc rapport do
forces actucl, trop &favorable A la
gauche,ncrn communistc, no fait qua
renforccr lc P.C.F. dans sa rigidite,
l'ancien president de la Federation de
la gauche pcnse qu'avant d'engager
quclque dialogue ideologique quo cc
soit, convicnt de recreer a la base
le courant unitairc qui aVait permis,
de 1965 a 1967, d'arrivcr avec lc
parti communiste I u &
n debut d'accor
sur un programme commun. 11 re-
fuse de considerer ? s'en explique
longuement dans son livrc Ma part
de verite que les evencments
de Prague empachent desormais toute
entente avec lc P.C.F.
Cclui-ci se trouve done dcvant deux
sollicitations differcntes : d'un cote
un dialogue abstrait et &heat avec
lc partenaire traditionnel qu'est le
Parti socialistc, dc l'autre unc
confrontation plus concrete avec un
partenaire dont il apprecie la loyaute
mais qui so pose en concurrent sur
c terrain de runite.
Sur cc point non plus, lc comit6
cntral &Ivry n'a apporte aucun
claircissernent. 11 faudra aiiendre les
a theses D du congres de fiwrics,
ui seront publiees dans quelques se-
maines, pour savoir si la direction
ctuelle du parti cornmunistc entend
onner I rune ct I Value de ccs,
ucstions un Commencement de re-
ponse.
JEAN GEOFFROY
1 la
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UkIR-DEBAT, Paris (Dissident Communist bulletin)
10 September 1969
The Resignation of Comrade Francis Halbwachs
Comrade Francis Halbwachs, Professor at the Marseille Faculty of
Sciences, who came into the Party during the German occupation,
has resigned from the Party.
Our position is well-known on the necessity of remaining in the
ranks of the French CP as much as possible to work for its reha-
bilitation and to avoid giving the Stalinist bureaucrats the sa-
tisfaction of a voluntary departure.
However, Comrade Halbwaths's brother had just been unjustly re-
moved from the Party, and we all know there are circumstances
when resignation becomes the only step possible.
We publish Comrade Francis Halbwachs's letter of resignation to
the Central Committee of the Party through the kindness of com-
rades who were good enough to pass it on to us. [Text followsi
Comrades,
Today I am sending you my resignation from the Party after 27 years
during which I can truly say that the Party was at the center of my life.
When I became a communist in 1942, it was not just to fight in the
most effective way possible against the Nazi occupation. I had been a part
of the '36 movement, I had read a lot and thought a lot, and had had complete-
ly formed my conviction that the fundamental fact of modern history and the
source of all the values of our time was the struggle of the workers to des-
troy the capitalist regime and build a just and humane society, and that this
struggle, the October Revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR
constitute an essential stage. I still believe this, with many more reasons
for doing so, more experience, more lucidity.
that in the course of All I have been through I have gradually become
convinced -- end today thin conviction is absolute -- that you are no longer
capable of carrying on thin struggle, and that in our own country at least,
the Communist Party has lost the capacity to direct the socialist revolution
-name day, or even to participate in it. My conviction rests not upon affec-
tive reactions, but rather on reflection striving to be scientific in charac-
ter, nnd playing upon the phases of en evolutionary progress which I lived
,through with the whole Party over many years, which I now believe myself
capable of judging am a whole.
This evolution was long and progressive, but the stages and breaks
nrr clearly discernible. The most important one in my opinion, the one that
reprements an irrevocnble turning-point, might be placed in time around
1T-6-57.
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v?an thn period of the XX Conprese, where everything was revealed
h,dOna benenth the m7th of the Soviet model of secialism and
0-teeUeurn nf Ole Party-enide. The Congress wnn soon followed by the
-i-own Of: the doctrinal and organic unity of the international communint
Flevement. 'Mete revelations and this breakdown called into question the vory
frAmdations of what had up td that time been our mode of thought (dogmatic)
pnd our form of party government (centralist). It would have been a first
eacity to bring ahot A radical change in our principles in these two do-
. mAinn. Now you obstinritely refuted to enter into the necessary self-criticism
.oad instead gave yourself over. to denunciation of those among us who were
. t:7ing to begin a change in direction.
This was also the time of the major choices on the for of struggle
against French imperialism and colonialism in connection with tho war in
,hLgeria. At a time when that was called for was courageoue committal to
a.dangerous combat! -- against the dominant chauvinist and racist
cLirrent, aiming for the ineluctnble victory of tho Algerian people, you pre-
::-,-rred to yield to the current and abandon to their fate the young people
who wore leaving for the war, and sacrifice the opportunities for struggle
to the great Thorom project of an alliance with the socialiet ecu m -- a pro-
ct which enjoyed the cuccess everyone knows. It has been since this time
tbat you have been obnonned by the fear of being outflanked On your left,
which hoe brought you further and further over to the right. From then on,
due to lack of confidence in the Party and the masses, you have refused
battle on every occaeion -- even tho moot favorable ones -- to the point
that the most serioun defeat the French bourgeoieie hen endured since the
war ultimately became the occasion for conoolidating its ttrength.
From then on, subject to a pitilese dialectic, you got ever further
hogried down in your errorz, which you pronounced as truths for fear your in-
allibility nicht be called into question (an Lenin said, a party may be
t7s.ken neriouely according to its attitude toward its cwn mietakes). Thun
it wan that you caue-nd the Party to conceal into the imago it hae today:
struCture eri rncia1-e,7=ocrat relicy.
However the year just past has marked a new stage and a new disin-
tegration, and it is essentially due to the events of this year that I feel
compelled to break with you, not only because of a new net of negative traits
in you which it brought to light, but chiefly because of positive traits and
new hopes which have appeared -- outside your fold.
Let us first speak of the events in Czechoslovakia. It is quite clear
that in the statement you boast about on every occasion (especially around
Guy Mollet), you deliberately passed the question by. The principle of "non-
interference" you invoke is contrary to internationalism and the very nature
of the communist movement. Ever since the October Revolution the communist
movement has drawn the essence of its doctrine from a position taken on what
has been accomplished in the country (or countries) of socialism. The open
debate in Czechoslovakia since last January is in the category of those you
should take sides in, clearly and before the Party and the French workers.
It is a debate on fundamental issues, and one which basically concerns us:
for decades on end we have prnclaimed our passionate attachment to a socia-
list form of government which rejected and suppressed -- especially among
communists -- all freedom of expresaion and communication of ideas, in which
0. group of bosses arrogated to themselves the right to impose upon a wholo
INT-10 VV. I.
4.?
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nation what they must think, and sent to prison or penal servitude hundreds
of thousands of people for crimes of opinion arbitrarily so characterized
by a police apparatus. It is true that for the last few years you have given
lip-service to different principles, but without the slightest shred of self..
criticism, as if you all had always been irreproachable models of democracy.
This year, for the ,first time within the heart of the communist movement, a
party has frankly and by deeds repudiated the practises of bureaucratic so-
cialism and has struck out in the direction of freedom and democracy, which
is precisely the one that suits the traditions and aspirations of the wor-
king people of our country. The armies of the neo-Stalinist states are shat-
tered by the power 44 this attempt. You protest about the form, you say
nothing about the fundamentals, but then you go on to affirm your solidarity
with the "brother parties" and you get ready to proclaim jointly with them
a community of doctrine at the next Moscow conference.
I tell you here and now that I am leaving you because I want to have
nothing further in common with the Brezhnevs and Motchars, and that I am per-
lsuaded that the only chance socialism has in France, the path of hope opened
4o us by our Czech comrades, depends upon a resolute break with the theories
lOnd practices of the heirs of Stalin.
Finally there were revolutionary events in May and June of 1968. Up
to that point one might have thought that the deplorable level and lack of
outlook in the Party's activities, going from annoying subscriptions to
dreary election campaigns, was in all nothing but the reflection of the gene-
ral attitude of a working class infected with bourgeois psychology, bogged
down in the alienations of a consumer civilization. That is why everyone was
taken aback by the impetuous uprising, which started in the universities and
passed down to the entire working class, the most powerful movement in the
,antiro social history of cur country. You absolutely failed to foresee this
!Mevellent. Pecauao it did not enter into your plans -- in all their grand
:.strategy -- because it hod not been unleashed at your command -- a command
vhich for nese timo has been incapable of unleashing anything -- you deli-
berately ignored the epontaneously revolutionary force and you denntured it,
pretending to see nothing core in it than mere wage demands. You were not
satisfied until everything got back in order and you were able to get back
into your electioneering routine, end we can see right now what a sordid
'impose? that has brought us to, for lack of any effective mass action .. ac-
tion you took such pains tc dcmobilize, among other things by your incredible
:decision of I May lent.
However, for many authentic communists -- and I am one of those --
whose phobia for little splinter groups does not hide the mermen in motion,
:the days of 1963 completely changnd the outlook. We now know what a fermi-
!dablo revolutionary force lies in the power of the working claen and the
youth of our country, a force which in May and June began to take on a
rdiffused ewarenese of its own aspirationo. Henceforth it in thin force and
'these aspirations that will be the target of our hopes and efforts, whatever
our sclerotic machine may turn into. My personal intention is to use them as
'point of departure for the tank of doctrinal intensification and development
of the Marxism to which I will devote myself from now on.
have the firm conviction that outside your orbit and in spite lot
the movement born in May and Juno 1968 will develop, rationalize itself,
'Trot
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ituelf,espncially nmong the youth, and that this movement will
un the bnnnnr of rcientific and revolutionary socialism you let fall --
n onn thinks that you had the nerve, without even consulting the Party, to
nuTlest to tha heroic prolotorint of June, utill panting from the fray, that
they shnu)d rally around thn "infamous tricolor flag" of Thiers and Poincaro,'
it in like wearing:one's heart on one sleovel
In this new'stagn I em keenly aware of my own intogral fidelity to
the., guiding line of my entire life, the communist convictions which once
1,.,(1n me entnr the Party and serve it as a militant, and which today absolute?
tv compel me to leave it.
Francis Halbwachs
CriMU i VT MUM ab LIATITIV-01 . r I -Li I 4/Ali VI) LK/TX ..1%.11.11J I-12
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azran,44ade Francis Ilallnvzchs
derithaionthuz
110CUMENTS
Le comarades Francis Halbwachs, professeur a to
Foculte des Sciences de Marseille, venu Cu Patti en
pleine occupation, a donne sa demission du Patti.
On connait notre position ou ujet de la tikes-
site de demeurer autant quo possible dans les rangs
du P.C.F. pour ceuvrer a son redressernent et pour
no pas donna aux bureaucrates staliniens to sotis-
foction et l'avantage d'un depart volontaire.
Mais le here du cornered? Halbwechs venait d'?e
injustement exclu, et nous sovons tous quill est des
circonstances air lo demission devient Biunique res-
source.
cast b titre de document que nous publions to
lgt6e de &mission adressee par le comrade Francis
tfilbwachs au Comite Central du Parti, grace b des
cerarodes qui ant bion Youlu nous la communiques.
7:4
Camarades,
Je !mils .adresse aujourd'hui ma demission (hi
Parti, apres vingt-sept ans pendant lesquels je pais
dire ,que le Patti a ete au centre de ma vie.
Lorsque je suis devenn communise en 1942, ce
n'etail pas settlement pour tuner le plus ejficace-
meat possible icontre Woccupation wazie. J'avais
participe au mouvemeni de 36, beaucoup lu et re-
flichi, et entierement forme. ma conviction que le
fait fondamental de l'histoire moderne du monde
et Ia source de Louses les valetas de noire temps
elan la tulle des travailleurs pour abaft re le re-
gime capitaliste et construire tine societe piste et
hurricane, et que de cette tulle, la Revolution d'Oc-
tobre et la construction du socialisme en U.R.S.S.
constituaient une elope essentielle. Je le crois en-
core. avec beaucoun Was de raisons de le eroire,
plus d'experience, plus de hicidite.
Mats, a trailers tout cc que j'ai .vectz, le me suis
pen a pen convaincu ? et aujourd'hui cette con-
viction est cli-Folue ? que VOUS etes desornmis
incagables de mener cette lutte, et que, dans notre
pays tout au moms, le 'Para Communiste a perdu
definitivement la capacita de diriger Lin four la
revolution socialiste, peut-etre meme d'y prendre
part. Ma conviction repose, non sur des reactions
affectives, mais sur une reflexion qui cherche a
tre scientifique et qui porte sur les phases d'une
evolution que fat vecue avec tout le Path pendant
beaucoup d'annees ,et sur laquelle je crois pouvoir
maintenant porter un jugement d'ensemble.
Celle evolution a et?ongue et progressive, mats
on pent y deceler des elopes et des ruptares. 1.,a
plus importanle, is mon avis, retie qui a ea en
fait In valeur d'un aiguillage irrevocable, pent etre
sititee vers les annees 1956-57.
C'est l'epoque da XX' Congres, oa s'est revele
tont cc qiti se cachait sous le tnythe du modete
sovietique du socialisme et de 'excellence du Patti-
guide. Congres ideated staid par la rupture de
l'unite doctrinale et organique du mouvement mu-
t/um/4e international. Ces revelations et cette rup-
ture meltaient en question les fondements meince
de re qui avait ete jusqu'ici noire mode de pen-
see (dogmatique) et noire forme de direction (reit-
tratiste). 11 eat He vital de faire une mutation,
tin changement radical de no principes dans ces
deux domaines. Or vous irons etes obstinement re-
fuses our autocritiques necessaires, et consacres
an contraire a la denonciation de ceux (Ventre
nous qui essayaient d'amorcer le tournant.
Crest aussi l'epoque des options majeures sur
les formes de luttes contre l'imperialisme et ite
colonialisme frangais en liaison avec la guerre
d'Algerie. Alors qu'il aurait fallu engager cottrageu-
sement le combat ? un combat dangereua:!
contre le courant dominant chativin et recite, en
nusant sur l'ineluctable victoire du peuplz alge-
Hen, VOUS avez prefere ceder au column' aban.
donnant a tear sort les jeunes qui partalent pour
La guerre, et sacrifier les perspectioos de lutte
au grand pro jet thorezien d'alliance avec In cra-
pule socialiste ? projet qui a.eii le succes que Pon
salt. C'est depuis cette ?que que volts etes obs-
des par la crainte d'?e debordes sur ?olre gau-
che, cc qui vous a de plus en plus deportes
droite ; vous avez desormais, par man que de con-
fiance dans le Parti et dans les masses, refuse la
lutte dans chaque occasion ? meme les occasions
les plus favorable. ? si bien que la pl:fs !guile
defaite que la bourgeoisie frangaise all subie de-
puis la guerre lui a ete finalement l'occuszon de
ren forcer son pouvoir.
Des lors, soumis a une dialectiqtte impitoyable,
vous vous etes enfonces de plus en plus dans vos
erreurs, que vous proclamiez des verites, de pear
que votre infaillibilite fat mise en question (le
serieux d'un pant, disait Lenine, se mesure i son
altitude devant ses propres errettrs). Vous aye:
ainsi fige le Parti dans la figure quill a aujourdind :
une structure stalinienne et une politique sociaie-
democrate.
Mats l'annee que nous venons de vivre a marque
une nouvelle etape et un nouveau decrochage, et
c'est essentiellement les evenements de cetle annee
qui m'obligent a rompre avec volts, non settlement
tit cause des nouveaux traits negatifs qu'lls oni
reviles chez vous, mats surtouf a cause des traits
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positifs et des nouveaux !; espoirs qui soul apparus
--- en dehors de vous.
Parlous d'abord des evenements de Tchecoslova-
quie. 11 est bien clair que, dans la declaration dont
nous votts !argue: en toute occasion (particulie-
rement attpres de Guy .11Ol(el), vous elcs passes
volonlairement a ate de la question. Le principe
de a non-ingerence dont tams volts prevalez est
contraire l'internaliontdisnte el a la -nature menu
mouventent Depttis la Revolution
d'Oclobre, celui-ci lire l'essentiel de sa" doctrine
Wane prise de position sur cc qui est realise, dans -
le (ou (Cs) pays du socialiime. Le debat ouvert
CU Tchecoslotatquie depuis janvier est done de
ceux oft tants volts (fettle: de prendre part! claire-
ment devant le Parti et devanCles travailleurs fran-
- Cest un daat de fond el qui nous concerne
eSsenliellenzentnozis avons, pendant des dizaines
d'annees, proclanze noire allachement passionne
ponr une forme d'Elat socialiste qui rejelail et re-
primait ? specialetnent parnzi les communistes ?
Mule liberle d'expression et de -communication des
ides, m un groupe de dirigeants s'arroyean le
droit d'imposer a tout tin peuple cc qu'il devait
penser, ci envoyait en prison ou au Layne des
rentaines de minim de yens pour des delfts d'opi-
nion cararterises arbilrairement par un apparel!
policier. Vous avez, il est oral, depuis quelques
annees off trine en paroles des principes dif ferents,
naffs sans friin,f. lt nzoindre autocrilique, comme
si nous- attic: ele de Ions temps des modeles sans
reproche en matiere de democratie. Celle annee,
et pour la premiere lois au sein du mouvement
un parti repudie franchement et dans
seg actes les pratiques du socialisme bureaucratique,
el s'engage datts la vole de la liberte el de la
democratic, qui est precisement colic qui convient
aux 'traditions et aux aspirations du peuple tra-
vailleur de notre pays. Les armees des Etats neo-
staliniens brisent par la force cetle tentative. Vous
. prolestez sur la forme, volts ne dites rien sur ie
fond, mais par la suite vous affirmez votre soli-
(far he avec les parlis ireres et nous vous pre-
pare: a prochtmer avec eta tine communaute doc-
'Hattie a prochaine conference de Moscon.
Je liens a vous dire id i que je me separe de
nous parce pre Je ne year plus rien avoir de com-
mun avec les Brejneu el les Molchar, et que je suis
convainett tine la settle chance du socirdisme en
France, la voie de l'esperance que nous ont on-
aerie nos cantarades Tcheques, passe par une rup-
ture resolize. avec les theories et les pratiques des
itiiitiers de &aline.
Enfin ii y a eft les evenentents revolulionnaires
de mai-juin 68. Jusqu'ici on pouvail croire que le
nivean lamentable et Pabsence de perspective des
act wiles du Parti, se trainant des ennuyeuses sous-
criptions aux nzornes cantpagnes electorates, n'etail
sonanie toute que le ref let de ['attitude generale
20
Approve or e ease
d'ane classe ouvriere enabourgeoisee, engluee data
les alienations de kg civilisation de consummation.
C'est pottrquoi on a ete totatement pris an de--
paltry!, par le soulevement inapelueux qui, parti"
des Facalles et propage a tonic la classe outtriere
a ete le mouvement le plus puissant de toute Phis-
toire sociale de notre pays. Ce motive:nen!, vous
ne l'aviez absolumenl pas pretzu.? Puree qu'il n'en-
trail pas dims vos plans ? si hautement strait:-
gigues parce qu'il n'avail pas eU declenche a
:wire appet ? appel qui depuis longlemps tie de-
elenche plus Hen ? nous en ave: deliberentent
ignore la puissance spontanement revolutionnaire,
el vous l'at'e: denature, affeclant de n'y ztoir qu'une
simple revendicalion de solaires. Vous Wave:: eti,
finalement salisfaits qtic quand tout etait rentre
dans Pordre, que mats rwer. pu reprendre Holm
train-train electoral, dont nous pontoons voir ces
jours-ci dans quelle sordide impasse il nous a
conduits, a defaut de tole action de masse effec-
tive .. action que vons ads lard de soin
denzobiliser. y cornpris par noire incroyable deci-
sion du premier mai dernier.
Mais pour beaucoup de comnutnistes authenti-
ques, dont le suis, ? qui la phobie des zt grott-
puscules ne cache pas les masses en mot:vet:tent
? les journees de 68 oft completement transform?
les perspectives. Notts savons maintenant quelle
force revolutionnaire formidable reside en puis-
sance dans la classe ouvriere el la jeunesse de
noire pays, force qui en mai-juin a commence a
prendre flue conscience .diffuse de ses aspirations.
C'est desormais A cette force et A ces aspirations
que vont tous nos espoirs et qu'iront tous nos
efforts, quoi qu'il en soil de noire Nellie machine
sclerosee. C'est d'elles que fai personnellement
l'intention de partir pour te travail d'approfondis-
sement et de developpentent doctrinal du marxisme
(argue'. je vats desormais me consacrer.
fat la ferme convection que, en dehors de voux
el mature vous, le mot:Ile:nerd ne en mai-juin 68
va se developper, se rationaliser, s'organiser, spe-
cialement dans la jeunesse, et que c'est lui qui
ramassera le drapeaa du socialisme scientifique el
revolutionnaire que vous avel laisse torn bet -
quand on pense que vous rive: os, sans Wine con-
stiller le Patti, proposer et l'herolque proletariat
de juin, encore hale taut de son combat, de se rat-
tier antour de l'infame drapeau tricolore de
Thiers et de Poincare, on en -a le ccettr sur les.
Mores
Dans celle nouvelle etape, fat clairement cons-
cience de rester integralement fidele a la ligne
direct rice de toute ma vie, mix convictions com-
munistes qui m'ont fait autrefois entrer.a militer
an Part! et qui aujourd'hui m'obligent absoltttnent
a en sank.
Francis HALBWACHS
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nntLSUII nVTV
DATES WORTH NOTING
January 1970
January 15-16 USSR 35th anniversary of first show trial or
the Great Purge, 1935. Grigoriy Zinoviev
and Lev Kamenev, the two leaders with
whom Stalin initially shared power in a.
triumvirate during Lenin's illness, were
convicted and imprisoned as counter-
revolutionists responsible for the assas-
sination on 1 December 1934 of Sergey
Kirov, the man assumed to be Staiin's
heir apparent. It is now widely beiieved
that Stalin himself arranged Kirov's
assassination. In August 1936, Zinoviev
and Kamenev were retried and executed,
January 16 Czechoslovakia 1st anniversary of Jan Pallach's self-
immolation in Prague, 1969, protesting
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia,
20th anniversary of Indian Republic, pro-
claimed in 1950. (January 30 is Martyr's
Day in India, commemorating the assassina-
tion of Mohandas K. Gandhi on that date
in 1948.)
January 26 India
February 10-14 USSR
February 14 USSR-China
Anniversary of trial and conviction in
1966 of Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyavsky
and Yuli Daniel, for writing books alleg-
edly "slandering" the USSR. Sentenced
to 7 years and 5 years hard J.abor, re-
spectively, both are now in prison.
20th anniversary of signing of' USSR-
China treaty of alliance, called Sino-
Soviet Friendship Pact, in 1950. Anni-
versary of Khrushchev's Secret Speech
at the CPSU 20th Congress, Moscow, 1956,
in which Khrushchev revealed Stalin's
crimes and denounced his regime.
February 14 Cuba Anniversary of Cuba's exclusion from the
Organization of American States in L962
by action of the OAS Council, which ruled
that the present Marxist-Leninist govern-
ment of Cuba is incompatible with the
principles of the inter-American system.
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CHIN 41130.91VCIA69r-BROMe 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400150001-6
6 December 1969
DESTRUCTION OF NAM NGUM DAM SOUGHT BY VIETNAMESE, LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS
The peoples of Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam are anxiously
looking to the early)completion of
the grand Mekong River Development
Project from which these peoples
will derive their progress and pros-
perity. This 50 billion dollar pro-1
ject is designed to benefit the sup-
ply of electricity, tlip development
Of water resources, iiiiigation, trans-
portation, agriculture, mining and
fol4estry.
Component projects in Thailand
mpleted are the dams at Nam Pong
d Nam Pung, and under construction
is the dam of Nam Dom Noi at Ubon.
And a bridge that will link Nong Khai
with Vientiane by rail and motor ve-
hicles will soon be abuilding.
The great Prek Thnot project in
Cambodia, and the Nam Dong and Sodong
projects in Laos are under construc-
tion. But among all the component
projects, the Nam Ngum Dam stands out
as the key to the various lower Mekong
projects that are to follow upon its
completion, because, of the importance
of its location in the upper reaches
of the river.
The 31 million dollar expenses
for the Nam Ngum project are borne
by a number of nations; other nations
taking part in the work include Austra-
lia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Holland,
New Zealand, France, USA, U.K. and
Thailand. Over 1,000 engineers, tech-
nicians and laborers are working at
the site. In a future phase, the
working force will be increased to
2,500. Dam completion is set for
1972. Thailand has donated 1.25
million dollars worth of cement, and
upon its completion, Thailand will
get its electricity supply at a spe-
cial rate.
1
While the building of the dam
is in progress, the North Vietnamese
Arny and Laotian Communists (Pathet
Lao) have continuously attacked the
working area, one of the assaults foil:-
ing the working force to withdraw. Un-
ashamedly, the Pathet Lao radio an-
nounced the assault, at the same time
vowed the destruction of the dam if
it should be completed one day. Ob-
viously, the Mekong Development Pro.
ject is not liked by the Communists
and they use a smearing tactic in
accusing the donors of embarking on
a "money digging" venture.
The Mekong Coordinating Committee
met on the 23rd and 24th of August
to discuss the protection of the Nam
Ngum project from North Vietnamese
Army and Pathet Lao attacks. Parti-
cipants in the meeting included
Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Australia,
Canada, France, UK, Israel, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, USA, an
ECAFE representative, who together
with U Thant, Sec-Gen of UN, cabled
from UN Hqs in New York unanimously
and strongly supporting the Laotian
Government in its efforts to safe-
guard the workers at Nam Ngum. The
participants in the Mekong project
pointed out its importance to the well
being of the peoples of Laos, as well
as to those of the entire Mekong basin.
Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos
has asked if the Secretary General of
UN could approach the participating
governments in the project underlining
to them the importance and the inter-
national character of the project, and
the desirability of establishing and
respecting a neutral working zone.
Prince Souvanna has indicated that he
was willing to declare as neutral and
inviolable a zone for a radius of 10
kilometers around the dam site. If\
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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : cIA-RDP/4-01P49111010130400140881-6 -12 690...,..
WM. - , ,.:.',?-?9''''nvr,t2L.V9?2911Nrriar,rT,CE.Eine:a.....41=10111
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r... s:;fy 9 9 111 7x ? 2jIrnjA M'Zi i :"11&:E!Iii li. ? MS: ?
area, leaving only the police. "4 f*P:c:P}=-1.JT:4 ., ittilIMA ??.'4 -.?7.7kFls.."."-'4 A. Pr T ' '
Communists who are out to destroy
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special plea to the upsR asking
Prince Souvannajlas made a 1.3 t.,,itsil. friirj:ifi, ,g.g.4:!2:0P2111111, 4i7t,i.:11". 19:liA,L1.41.,.:414134:1.?;:i'ir -ill'i".1:15l.t-Pkli .1
r4 3:9 T. V-4 Z' *. 9
the project. EIV,Ipl, W1:7VE-Fila2EA1-!1:4'11"iiiNiA
y...w :.,,_, ,, i itd4V TkiP :7i.lps'-',`4RITclatii'?" 9 ty 1A'
thetic to Souvanna's plea and the
UN should render its good offices
World opinion will be sympa- 1_- ?:1,,,,,,,.*,...,,, ji:. ii4?4,1", 447a, IIII-t.:741ciiii.!!!TI,ILti,ii,:ft. 1:14:]-1.1.:z:11411.a::; ell: ,,,,?9:i1::::l.t.i. ,1:1;14:11)
p --I,75:10) FL gi 1,2:-.flit 15'd. rLI(liAl'i4g(ki)L1113-114ifI-7k 1
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pleting the project because of ntltig_Zil.py,-'31}.?Jaja . , elf,',.!t!p9s PA ;Ill ii3
0 mtvAtThiidit k - -
Notwithstanding delays in corn-
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one day and the Communists will
Mekong Project will be completed :ii., tA.1.1::iurillta...":,..11i t.11-;:a...,.!11il:,,:41};: laor'123 ;r2t::(13:14'' ijkii:11. ii:::14:747a- 11;
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June 1968
THE MEI(ONG SCHEME: GUIDELINE FOR A SOLUTION
TO STRIFE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
W. R. DERRICK SEWELL
,For more than 20 years Southeast Asia has been the scene of
constant political turmoil. Civil wars have raged in almost every country
in the region and guerrilla activity continues in most of them. In Vietnam
conflict has exploded into one of the fiercest wars in the history of man-
kind, causing destruction and devastation on a massive scale. Tragically,
too, the milipxy contest seems unlikely to solve any of the basic problems
of the region. No matter what the eventual outcome, Southeast Asia will
still be an Oka of abject poverty, and there will still be a compelling desire
for political independence. At the same time there will still be considerable
dependence on the rest of the world for assistance.
Clearly there is no simple solution to these problems. Of all the attempts
that have been made to deal with them so far, however, the Mekong scheme
seems to have enjoyed the greatest and the most continuous success. Con-
ceived as a means of stimulating and facilitating economic change in the
region, its achievements have gone well beyond this important goal. It has
provided the people in the region with the opportunity to make decisions
about their own future, and at the same time has provided them with
the financial and technical aid they need to solve the problems that now
confront them. It has stimulated cooperation among the nations in the
region, an accomplishment of no mcan importance in Southeast Asia
where cultural and political diversity lead more frequently to conflict than
to cooperation. What is the Mekong scheme and ivhat lessons can be learned
from its experience in dealing with the problems confronting Southeast
Asia?
THE MIGHTY MEKONG
The scheme is concerned with harnessing the Mekong, one of the world's
greatest and most majestic rivers. Flowing 2625 miles, from its headwaters
high in the Himalayas of Tibet to its outlet on the South China Sea, the
Mekong passes through 6 countries?China, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cam-
bodia and South Vietnam. Its drainage area covers 307,000 square miles.
Its minimum flow is 60,000 cfs, twice the minimum flow of the Columbia
River at its mouth.
Thus far the Mekong has hardly been touched. There is no dam on the
mainstem of the river, nor at present any bridge across it. Over 24 mil-
lion acres could be irrigated in the basin, but the present irrigated acreage
amounts to only 380,000 acres. Potentially the river could be navigated for
more than 1,000 miles from its mouth. Today, however, navigation is con-
fined to the lower reaches. Thc river's energy could be converted into hydro-
electric power, but today it flows unharnessed to the sea.
It has long been suspected that the development of the Mekong River
could bring forth substantial benefits. It was not until after the Second
World War, however, that any systematic attempt was made to determine
the river's potentialities. In 1951 the Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East (ECAFE) requested its Bureau of Flood Control to undertake
a preliminary survey of the river. Its report pointed out that there were
major opportunities for developing the river for power, irrigation, and flood
control and suggested that more intensive studies be carried out. The
3
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countries which share the lower basin received the report with great en-
thusiasm, but due to hostilities in the region no further action was taken
for the time being. With the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1956 interest
in the river was revived, not only in the region but on the part of other
countries too.
The United States offered the services of its Bureau of Reclamation to
undertake a study of the river. The four countries sharing the lower part
of the basin accepted the offer and the Bureau went to work. The report,
completed in 1957, has become a basic document for the studies which have
been undertaken since. At the same time, ECAFE called together four inter-
nationally known specialists to undertake a study of the river and the pos.
sibilitics for its development. Their report became the cornerstone of the
planning which has taken place since then. It stressed the need for a basin-
wide, cooperative international approach to development, involving data
collection, Planning and actual implementation. It recommended the es-
tablishment of an international clearing house for information nn plans.
This recommendation was adopted by the countries, who set up a Com.
mince for tlie Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin
(popularly known as the Mekong Committee) in 1957.
THE MEKONG COMMITTEE
The Mekong Committee is composed of representatives from Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam. It was intended primarily to coordinate
the studies of the river and enlist and supervise assistance from countries
and agencies outside the region. Gradually its responsibilities increased,
so that it is now a major instrument for promothig economic and social
change in the region, involving not only river development but also health,
education, welfare, transportation facilities, etc. It meets several tittles a
year, each time in a different country and sometimes outside the region.
Its chairmanship is rotated between its members. Since all decisions of the
committee must be unanimous, one might expect that no agreement would
ever be reached. But the record of accomplishments of the committee shows
that this is not the case.
The first act of the committee was to request the United Nations to send
out a team of highly reputed engineers to map out the course of needed
investigations of the Mekong and its major tributaries. Lt. General Raymond
Wheeler, former chief of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, was appointed leader
of the team. The Wheeler Mission reported in early 1953, recommending
a program of data collection and investigations estimated to cost over $9
million. Many observers felt that such a program was far beyond the capa.
billies of the Mekong countries, and there would have been little surprise
if interest in developing the river had died right there. It did not. The Mekong
Committee regarded the Wheeler Mission's report as a charter for action and
resolved to garner support to gct the studies underway. The response was
overwhelming. In a short time sullicient money had been obtained to under-
take most of the required investigations. While S9 million seemed an over.
whelming sum at the time, it is minute compared with what has been con-
tributcd to the Mekong Committee since then. To date, more than $124
million has been pledged to aid the Committee's planning functions and to
get development underway.
The United States, France, Canada and Japan were among the first
countries to offer assistance to the 14?Ickong Committee. The U.S. offered to
provide a hydrometric network for the basin, establish base levels for
surveying, and undertake a hydrographic survey of the main channel, at
an estimated cost of more than $2 million. Canada offered to undertake
aerial surveys and mapping of the mainstem and major tributaries, at a
cost of some $1.3 million. Japan agreed to undertake a survey of the major
tributaries to identify the significant possibilities for development. Australia
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undertook ^cologic mapping at the major dam sites. France carried out
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countries became involved, and progress in getting the studies done was
steppe4 up accordingly.
TILE PROGRAM
There are several outstanding features of this program of cooperative
international assistance. First, it has involved more than 20 countries from
all over the world. Some of them are major powers, such as the United
States, Great Britain and France, but many of them arc small countries
with only modest means, such as the Philippines, Denmark and Luxem-
?
bour". Second, the cooperative program has enabled several countries to
work together on a single project. The planning of a given project, for ex-
ample, may depend upon maps prepared by a Canadian team, geological
surveys undertaken by Australia, irrigation studies carried out by Israel,
mineral surycys by France, forcst surveys by Scandinavian countries, and
legal and jurisdictional studies by Italy. Third, an essential part of the
studies, investigations and development programs has been the training of
local personnel to carry out similar work on other projects. The hydro-
metric and meteorological networks are now operated by local personnel.
Soon the navigation of the river will be in the hands of local pilots trained
by experts from the Netherlands. About 40% of the staff of the Mekong
Committee Secretariat are native to the region. Fourth, the aid given to the
committee has taken a variety of forms, including cash grants, low cost
loans, and gifts of material and equipment. New Zealand, for example, pro-
. -Ts.......-., .. - , .,
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LOWER MEKONG RIVER BASIN
Projects Proposed and Under Construction
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vided survey boats, India gave rain gauges, and the World Food Program
supplied food. West Germany provided low cost loans for the construction
of the Nam Pong project in,Thailand. France has loaned money to Laos for
the construction of the Nam Dong and Lower Sc Done projects.
In addition to aid froin individual countries, the Mekong Committee has
received considerable assistance from the United Nations and its various
agencies. Some thirteen U.N. agencies have collaborated with the Mekong
Committee, So enthusiastic has the U.N. been about the Mekong scheme
that it has supported it on a continuous basis ever since its initiation. In no
other case has the United Nations provided aid for planning and develop-
ment of ah international river on such a basis.
Although ,countries outside the region have been extremely generous,
the schezne has not been an international handout. Far from it. The Mekong
countries themselves have provided 28% of the funds for the scheme, i.e.,
some $35 million. This is no mean achievement for countries whose gross
national product is so small.
A great deal has been accomplished since the Mekong Committee was
established in 1957. Hydrologic and meteorologic networks have been set
up, the main river channel has been surveyed, aerial photographs and maps
of the mainstem and major tributaries have been prepared, studies of the
geology of mainstem projects have been completed, and surveys of soil
conditions, mineral availability, and fisheries have been undertaken. Studies
of various economic and social factors are also underway.
The committee is well along in its preparation of a comprehensive plan
for the development of the river. It expects to 'have this ready sometime in
1968. Although the final selection of projects for the comprehensive plan
has yet to come, the basic outline is already discernible. The scheme will
consist of a number of large, multiple purpose projects on the mainstem,
and several smaller ones on the major tributaries (see map). Data relating
to the scheme are set out in the table below.
The initiation of tributary projects has had several advantages. It has
provided the inhabitants of the countries with tangible returns on their
investment in investigations and planning. Evidence of such returns is es-
pecially important in lesser developed countries such as those in Southeast
Asia. The initiation of these projects has also provided an opportunity for
the countries in the region to experiment with international cooperation in
river development. An especially outstanding example is the cooperation
between Thailand and Laos in the development of the Nam Pong project
in Thailand and the Nam Ngum project in Laos.
The Mekong Committee believes that the cooperation which has been
achieved in the development of the smaller projects will encourage coop-
eration with regard to the mains.tem projects as well. Several of these
projects will require international agreement and coordination. Some, such
as the Pa Mong project, are located on the boundary between two countries.
Others, such as the Sambor project in Cambodia, can operate at maximum
efficiency only if there is close coordination with operations of other main-
stem projects, some of which are located in other countries, notably the
Pa Mong project in Laos and Thailand; and Luang Prabang in Laos. Co-
ordination between the Pa Mong and Sambor operations, for example, will
permit much greater power production at the latter project than would
otherwise be possible.
6
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POSSIBLE MAINSTREAM PROJECTS ON TIIE MEKONG RIVER
Project, Purposes
LOCatI013
Estimated
staled
capacity
(kilowatts)
Estimated
irrigated
arta
(hectares)
Possible
uptreatil
116.14atles
Improvement
(kilometers)
Pak Deng
Luang Prabang
Pak Layb
Pa Mong
Thakhek
Kliemard
Khone
Stung Treng
Sambor
Tonle Sap
TOTAL
=--
P?=?Power, N = Navigation, J==Irrigation, F=-.Flood?Control, and D=
Drainage.
b Slightly downstream from the recently investigated Sayaboury site in Laos.
Source: Mekong Committee, "Annual Report, 1961," United Nations Doe,
E/CN.11/577, Jan. 8, 1962, Table IL
APPRAISAL OF THE MEKONG SCHEME
Although a great deal of progress has already been made, much remains
to be done before the major economic and social benefits of the Mekong
scheme will being to appear. The scheme is truly massive in scale. No pre.
cise estimates of its ultimate costs arc available but they range from three
to twenty billion dollars or more, depending on how much of the investment
beyond the damsitcs and irrigation canals is included. The countries thern.
selves have already shown that they have great faith in the scheme and aro
prepared to sink a considerable portion of their national investment into
it. But this will not be nearly enough. It will be necessary to continue to
rely on substantial contributions of financial and technical aid from
countries outside the region. This provides both a challenge and an op-
portunity for the more advanced nations of the world.
The countries sharing the lower Mekong basin will derive tremendous
benefits from the scheme, and it is probable that these benefits will spread
to other countries in the region. The provision of irrigation water and the
initiation of drainage schemes, for example, will permit a vast increase in
rice production. In some parts of the region it will be possible to grow two
crops instead of the single one grown at present. The importance of such
an increase is underlined by the fact that rice production in recent years
appears to have increased by only 2% per annum while population has
increased by almost 3% per annum. Not only does this deficiency pose the
problem of the Malthusian dilemma, but it also means that these countries
will no longer have a surplus of rice with which to earn foreign exchange
for the purchase of needed imports. Studies by a Ford Foundation team
indicate that to secure the food requirements for the 90 million people
expected to be living in the region by the cnd of the century, and to pro.
vide a surplus for export necessary to generate a modest increase in in-
come from other economic activities, will require an increase in the pro-
duction of milled rice from the present 8 million tons to 17 million tons,
i.e., an increase of about 4% per annum.
The scheme will also make it possible to reduce the huge flood losses
which plague the region each year. In late September and early October
the Mekong begins to rise as a result of the monsoon rains. Sometimes ha
peak flow reaches 20 times the minimum flow. On occasion the river over-
PNF
PN
PN,
PINF
PIN
PIN
PN
PINF
PIN
PNID
Laos
Laos
Laos
Laos/Thailand
Laos/Thailand
Laos/Thailand
Laos/Cambodia
Cambodia
Cambodia
Cambodia
1,450,000
560,000
60,000
1,800,000 1,500,000
500,000 50,000
1,450,000 50,000
1,000,000 50,000
2,200,000 1,000,000
1,600,000 150,000
3,000,000
10,620,000 5,800,000
280
110
100
340
160
260
50
220
80
120
1,720
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flows the natural levees that have built up over the years, and as much as 10
million acres may be inundated as a result. Plans call for the storage of
flood flows on the mainstem and in the Tonle Sap reservoir for later release
for power and irrigation purposes.
Moreover, the Mekong scheme will furnish large amounts of low cost
power. This, it is hoped, will help to stimulate industry and raise the
standard of living. Present power consumption in the Mekong countries
is very low?e.g., 18 kwh per capita annually in Cambodia, compared with
4,800 kwh in the U.S. A major reason for this discrepancy is the high price
of power in Cambodia, estimated at about 150 per kwh, compared with a
U.S. average of less than 20 per kwh. Low cost power could be used as a
basis for expanding forest products and food products industries, and for
developing electrometal and electrochemical industries in the Mekong
countries. It could also foster agricultural development through fertilizer
production and the mechanization of certain farm operations.
Another benefit of the scheme will be the improvement of transportation
and communications, particularly through the extension of navigation.
Ultimately, navigation will be extended to Luang Prabang?more than 1,000
miles from the sea. This should foster trade between Laos and other
countries in the region. It should also help to promote economic and social
development in Northeast Thailand, an area where economic backwardness
has sown the seeds of political discontent.
The greatest accomplishment of the Mekong scheme, however, may be
the example it has set as a means of reducing political tension in the re-
gion. Bringing together lour countries which trade with each other very
little (less than 2% of the international trade of any of the Mekong countries
is with other countries in the region), which do not cooperate with each
other on anything else, and some of which do not even have diplomatic
relations with the others, is no mean achievement. The fact that the Mekong
scheme has survived through the civil wars and the Vietnamese conflict
indicates that the partners in the scheme enthusiastically support its aims
and objectives and the manner in which these have been pursued.
The Mekong scheme has been one of the most successful attempts to solve
economic, social and political problems in Southeast Asia. It is difficult to
isolate the reasons for its success, but at least four factors seem to be in-
volved. First, the scheme focuscs on the need to increase the food supply
and raise the standard of living, matters on which there is broad agree-
ment among all factions in the rer,cion that action is essential. Second, it
leaves basic decision-making in the hands of the Mekong countries but still
provides these countries with the opportunity to obtain needed financial
and technical aid. Third, assistance is obtained on a multilateral rather
than bilateral basis, thus reducing, dependence on any one country and
minimizing the influence of any one power bloc. At the same time, countries:
which have only minor foreign aid programs have had an opportunity to
participate. Fourth, it encourages a regional aproach to development, which
not only enables the countries concerned to take advantage of the econ-
omies of cooperative development, but which hopefully will also foster
tolerance and mutual understanding among the various partners.
The Mekong scheme cannot be expected to solve all the problems of South-
east Asia. It was never intended to do so. But the principles underlying the
scheme appear to have applications far beyond the development of the
river. They offer useful guidelines for the formulation of policies now be-
ing conceived to deal with poverty, social distress, and political unrest in
this troubled region.
WM.
W. R. DERRICK SEW ELL is Associate Professor of Economics and Geography at the
University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C., Canada.
8
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BANGKOK WORLD
23 October 1969
Fighting has nearly stopped
the giant Mekong Project time
and time again; Instability and
politics hold back a scheme
which would benefit 0million
people.
BY CHINCHOME 1NDRA
wilEN the Mekong :CO'nfriiit.
v tee was founded in 1957,
nobody seemed to envisage at
portant obstacle which blocks the
progress of the Lower Mekong
River Basin development. But: the
intensity of the Vietnam war, the
internal fights between the two
sides in Laos, and the conflict be.
Men Cambodia and Thailand,
.have caused doubts about the
future of the Mekong Basin.
Obviously the biggest obstacle
is war?which is threatening the
people of Mekong's four riparian
countries (Cambodia, Laos, Thai.
land and Republic of Vietnam)
and maybe the whole world as
.well. After the downfall of Prcsi.
dent Ngo Din Diem and the Viet.
nam war became a threat to the
:world, the question of security arose_
li its sluirpest form. Insecurity has
:hampered and delayed Mekong
"projects in many respects especially
,Hitinaneing the projects,
_
^
The World Bank has backed out
many times. This has occurred in
the case of proposals for the Nam
Ngum dam in Laos, My Thuan
bridge in South Vietnam and the
Pa Along dam in the mainstream
between Laos and Thailand. And
the only reason for backing out is
?lack of security.
Recently, concern fo security
has been intensified in view of
of the Pathet Lao's attacks on tho
construction group of Nam Ngum
darn, a $30 million project, 50
kilometers northwest of Vientiane.
On May 4, five Thais were killed
and two wounded in an ambush
of two trucks heading for the dam
site. They were geologists and darn
workers.
Later, Pathet Lao forces threa-
tened to kill foreign technicians
working en the dam, unless they
abandoned their work. These
technicians, about 170 of them,
and 900 workers, work for Japan'..
9
Hazema Gum i Construction Corn.
parry. The Laotian Army then
moved in.
Immediately, the Laotian Gov-
ernnient invited the members of
Mekong Committee (Cambodia,
Thailand and Republic of Viet-
Nam) together with some 22 other
representatives from countries and
agencies co-operating in this
Mekong Committee for a special
meeting in Vientiane on 24 August
to discuss security at Nam Ngum.
But . meanwhile, the Laotian
Government has negotiated with
the Pathet Lao and announced
that the Laotian Army would with.
draw all troops from the Nam
Nguni dam zone, and leave only
police there to keep cider. Sour.
ces said that Prince Souvanna
Phouma wanted to establish a nein.
tral zcne 10 kilometers around
the site.
At the same time, the United Na-
tions, through ECAFE, stepped in
and tried to emphasize the role of
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the U.N. in the Mekong projects.
ECAFE tried to convince both
sides in Laos that the project was
a humanitarian one which would
olay an important role in the hfe
of the whole nation of Laos.
These measures seemed to tea'.
urc the technicians and workers,
who have now resumed work on
the darn; But strangely enough, in
spite of Pic obvious threat to secu-
rity, and the rush and emergency
meetings to obtain security--7-on1y
once was the- word security :men-
tioned in, the four-page communi-
qucr05.014 after the meeting,
and Min? p the two-page letter of
,
app 11?Secretary U Thant.
Irhe thr4: of war, it seemed, had
to be t "invisible".
This oud be one important
factor hampering the progress of
Air; INIekoii;: project. If the members
of the Mekong Committee would
be .calisri enough to discuss
security, ;then financing the pro-
jects noul4 not be so difficult,
BANGIt0K POST
214 No'iember 1969
No finance
Twelve years have passed, but
so far only two tributary dams, the
Nam rung and Nam Fong, in the
noth-east of Thailand, have come
to life. The other projccti have
been delayed because at financing.
My Thuan %bridge, a project pro-
posed and _approved many years
sgo, is a gcod example. For the
past three years, the proposal los
this $22 million bride across the
mainstream of the Mekong River
Ljn Vietnam was delayed because
3;mo( lack of support to finance con-
struction. ?
In the last meeting of the Mekong
Committee in Bangkok on 11-13
September, the tepresentatives of
the United Skates said "when the
security and economic conditions
warrant, the Government of the
United States will give sympathetic
consideration to a Mekong Com-
mittee request for funding. up to ZS
percent of the cost of the bridge."
However, his Government's review
of the situation "force us to the con4
? Con,su?uctlon of the Nam Ngum Dame
irt a stte 40 miles north of Vientianei is
ireoceeding well despite fears earlier this
year thrf,t Pathet Lao terrorists and labour
preblerris might put the $33 million pro-
1?:'arn,-,nte behind schedule.
An aerial photo, taken lastweek when
the 1.':conomic Commission of the Asian
.'arliamentnry Union visited the dam site,
ii)W s access roads, construction huts and
f,arth-moving equipment at the Nam Ngum
gorge. By 1971, when the project is
scheduled for completion, the dam will
block the narrow gorge in the Nam Ngum
river, and begin to form artificial lake
in a large valley behind the dam whose
construction is aided by a nearly perfect
natural range of low hills. The dam will
provide irrigation water for the develop-
ment of the Vientiane Plain, and clee-
.4.icity for Laos and northeast Thailand.
At a Press conference on their depar-
ture from taos, members of the Economic
Commission called for inereaseddevelop-
mnt assistance for Laos.
elusion that construction is not ;
desirable at this time."
Risk project
Of all the ten proposed main-
stream projects, Pa Along, a pro-
ject of SSO million, abbot 30
kilometers above Vientiane between
the border of Laos and Thailand,
has been considered the most
feasible as far as the "security and
economic conditions" arc concern-
ed. Yet the World Bank, when
asked to finance the project, tut ned
down the reqest canine it 3 "risk
project".
The Pa Mong site was recogniz.
cd very early by the Mekong
Committee as a key to the overall
Basin plan and was given highest
priority for plannin4 and construc-
tion. But the Mekong Committee
will have to wait tor some time for
the financing of the dam before
the actual construction can begin.
And it might take 10 years before
the construction can be completed..
(DEPIllnews..)
WASHINGTON STIR
5 December 1969
N. Viets Accused
VIENTIANE. Laos (UPI) ?
North Vietncmcse troops killed
British nurse Therese Norsefield
on Saturday, not Communist Pa.
thet Lao tros as first reported,
!military sources said yesterday.
F, The British Embassy ;declined
comment on the report
Miss Norsefield, 36, and her
Vietnamese mechanic-driver'
) Nguyen Mu Chung, were shot to
,death by a band of mea hkh
stopped., %belt .car. pest .tho
10
?
Of Slaying Nutse
NamIthou .Beidge on Highway 13:
about 110 miles southeast of
here. ? ? ' t
The military scums said local
villagers fishing in the vicinity
saw and hoard the entire inc1J,
dent, ? ?
They stild the troops spoke to,
the driver in Vietnamese, then1
after an argument fired through
the windshield. killing.
Nortefieid. The driver tried 4,
moot was sbot I the back. '0i4
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INDIAN JOURNAL OF POWER AND RIVER VALLEY DEVELOPMENT
THE MEKONG PROJECt NUMBER, 1968
(EXCERPTS )
The Master Plan
ri-IIIE EKONG DEVEIDPNIENt. PROJECT IS CENTERED
in the Lower Mekong Basin, which stretches
more than 1,500 miles from the Burma border in
the North to the China Sea. The lower basin
embraces large portions of CaMbodia, Laos, Thai-
land, and the Republic of Vict-Nam. It has a drain-
area of some 236,000 square miles, and thus
carers an area somewhat larger than France, and
ncrJy twicc as large as Japan. Some 25 million peo-
pyive in the basin, and about 50 millions live in the
four riparian countries of which the basin is a part.
t'he Project seeks the comprehensive develop.
int of the water resources of this lower basin,
including mainstream and tributaries, in terms of
nyldro-clectric power, irrigation, flood control,
i nage, navigation improvement, water manage-
..,ent, and water supply, along with related far-
thing economic and social growth, for the benefit
fU people of the area without distinction as
10 politics or nationality. A measure of the growth
potential is provided by the prospect of the present
id hictoric undermilization of the water resources
of the basin, evidenced by inter alia the facts that
less than 3 per cent of die basin is irrigated although
vast portions of it could with great profit be irri-
gated froni the ample waters of the Mekong; and
that alimr no hydro-electric power is drawn from
the river toough the four riparian countries yearn
for industrial development for which the tremen-
dous hydro-electric power potential of the river
and its tributaries could provide a prime ingredient.
Mekong development work is directed by the
Mekong Coordination Committee, established in
1957 by the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thai-
land, and the Republic of Viet-Nam as an auto-
nomous inter-governmental agency under the aegis
of the United Nations, more particularly the United
Nation*. Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East. The Committee consists of four pleni-
potentiary representatives (one 'from each of the
four riparian countries), and is formally empow-
ered to "promote, coordinate, supervise and con-
trol the planning and investigation of water resour-
ces development projects in the Lower Mckong
i;1"; and to "make requests on behalf of the
irovernments- for special financial and
kc. !cal asm%tance and receive and administer
C. Hart Schaaf.
Executive Agent
Mekong Coordination Committee
separately such financial and technical assistance,
and take title to property ...". The Committee
requests and receives advice on major questions
from an international Advisory Board of high com-
petence, which meets with the Committee at least
once and usually several timcs a year.
Day-to-day management is provided on the
Comtnittee's behalf and under its direction by an
Executive Agent assisted by a small full tinic staff
attached to ECAFE, and financed in part by the
four riparian governments, in part by the UN
regular budget in its ECAFE section, and in part
by the UN Special Fund. Approximately half of
the professional members of this central manage-
ment staff arc nationals of the four member ripa-
rian states.
In addition to the four riparian governments, 21
countries from outside the basin (Australia, Canada,
India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, United King-
dom, and the United States, under their Colombo
Plan programmes; and Belgium, Republic of China,
Denmark, Finland, France, Iran, Italy, Israel, Fede-
ral Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
Philippines, and Sweden), 12 UN agencies
(ECAFE, the Special Fund, the Technical Assis-
tance Board, the Bureau of Technical Assistance
Operations, the International Labour Organization,
the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United
Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organi-
zation, the World Health Organization, the World
Meteorological Organization, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the World Bank, and the
World Food Programme), 3 foundations, and a
number of private business organizations have to-
date collaborated with the Mekong Committee.
Some $105 million have to-date been pledged?about
one-third by the four riparian partners themselves
?to projects sponsored by the Committee. The
Committee issues a detailed Annual Report of its
activities, thc most recent of which covers the
period ending 31 December 1965. (E/CN.11/714).
The construction stage has been reached on six
tributary projects and one tug and barge building
programme; construction of two of these six tri-
butary projects has been completed, with power
generation on the fiat- formally inaugurated by His
Majesty the King of Thailand on 14 November
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1965; the second and much larger tributary project
is scheduled to be brought into Operation in March
1966. ?
The Committee divides its work into (a) Basic
(lath collection; (b) Overall basin planning; (c)
A biostream projects planning; (d) Tributary pro-
jects; (c) Navigation improvement; (f) Ancillary
projects including experimental and demonstration
farms, mineral stirveys, power market projections,
industrial growth estimates and recommendations,
iorest resources development, and fisheries studies;
(g) Supply programmes, including food for cons-
truction workers, petroleum, and cement; and (h)
Training. Other essays in this edition of the Indian
Journal ,of Power and River Valley Development
dcal with facets of work in the foregoing cate-
gories. It Will perhaps be in order, in describing
The Master Plan, to focus upon (a) The Key
Intcr-relation of Proposed Initial Mainstream Pro-
jects; (1)) Financial Dimensions; (c) Timing; and
(d) Prosbects.
TIMING
A frequent question asked about Mekong Deve-
lopment is: When will Mekong Development be
completed? This is a little like asking: When will
India be fully developed? Or Japan, or the United
States, or Australia? One can hope that economic
development and growth will never end in any of
these countries, or in any others. And one can
hope and believe that, say a century from now,
water resources development projects will still bc
being planned and constructed on the Mekong
Mier and its tributaries, so vast are the resources
which -may ultimately be utilized. -
The Mekong Coordination Committee was estab-
lished in 1957. In 1959 it cmbarkcd upon its first
five-year programme of work, of which the cssen-
tial part was data collection and planning, with the
emphasis on the planning of tributary projects. The
sccond five-year work programme, 1964/1968,
while envisaging work in all thc many categories
of Mekong Committee activity, fairly may be said
to be concentrated on the construction of tribu-
tary projects, and the intensive planning of main-
stream projects; it is likely that six or eight tribu-
tary projects will bc constructed during this second
five-year period, and the Committee hopes that
the feasibility investigations of several of the main-
stream projects, notably Pa Mong, Sambor, and
Tonle Sap will by the end of this period have been
brought to the point where scrious financial discus-
sions looking towards construction can begin. The
decade commencing in 1971 will hopefully see the
completion of a number of additional tributary
projects, and of at least these three mainstream
projects.
The practical point is that Mekong Develop-
ment is not only already in the construction phase,
with the first project already generating power, but
that the overall project is very rapidly arriving at
the point where big finance will have to be dis-
cussed?arriving at this point very much sooner
than perhaps has been generally appreciated.
12
"SS SY?.
11.1111?
- -66?-?ww op ?
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U. S. NEWS a WORD REPORT, luty 2e, 196/
WHERE THE REDS ARE
STOPPED IN VIETNAM
Fortunes of war are turning in
South ._ Vietnam's vital Mekong
Delta. Allies are running strong,:
Communists are hurting. Enemy
casualties,- we high, defections
on the rise.
Still, there are many "ifs." Main
uncertainty, is whether Hanoi will
move in vtith its own troops to
keep th(t. iet Cong afloat.
yINH LONG PROVINCE,
South Vietnam
! Here in .lhe vast lower reaches of.
South Vietnjun, the Vict Cong military,
machine is rtipning out of steam.
While Arnerican and South Vietnam-
ese military 'experts warn that a coin,:
plete end to fighting is a long way off,,
evidence of Allied successes is piling up
in the rich Mekong Delta-
? Viet Cong defections to the .Saigon
Government have spurted to 300 a month'
in this Proynce alone. A year ago the
rate was 50 0 month.
? The Communists, riddled by man-
power loss;, appear unable to mast
their forces or launch the multihattalion
strikes they Used to. Ammunition short-
ages are developing as Allied troops put
the squeeze on supply lines.
? Roads mid canals that only a few
months ego were "guerrilla territory" ,
-are being opened up. An air of pros-
perity is returning to once-isolated pro-
vincial and district capitals.
? Sa' - seems to be ruling more ef-
o Hiles and villages.
? ., against the guerrilla "in- !
fiasti'ticti&'"-t1 isp1v personnel, spies
? and terrorists-are imrtiog the Reds. In
the first five months or this year, U. S.
sources report, 60 per- cent more in-
frastructure personnel have been rooted
out than in the previous five months.
The situation in the Delta is stump-4 ,
.up this way by one long-time observer:
The Communists are being forced to !
pull ii their horns, to operate with less
A
and less freedom. That means their
ability to tax, to recruit, to impress fight-
ers and to carry out terrorist attacks is
being minimized all the time."
Meaning for all. What happens in
the Delta has special meaning for all of
'South Vietnam. Almost half the nation's
17 million people live here. The region
produces most of the ccnintry's rice. Both -
the Communists and Saigon view success
or failure here as a key influence on the
political struggle now shaping up be-
tween the Reds and the Government.
As one expert explained:
"A Government presence in the Delta
would be .proof that Saigon can produce
stable and viable rule as the U. S. begins
.to pull out.
"Viet Cong dominance, on the other,
band, would go a long way toward con-
vincing the rest of Vietnam-and the.
outside world-that there is no chance to
build a non-Communist administration in
the country."
Fighting in the Delta is a "separate"
conflict from that going on in the areas ,
stretching from north of Saigon to the
border of North Vietnam. There are al- .
most no North Vietnamese troops fight-
ing here. Guerrillas native to the region '
carry the brunt of battle.
The land itself is a terrorist's haven-
pocked with swamps, mangrove and
bamboo forests, streams and man-made
canals. There is no clustering of huts
in villages. Hamlets, instead, may string
out for 15 miles along a canal. Trying
to achieve security under those condi-
tions has posed an enormous challenge.
More and more, American air, water
and ground forces and Saigon troops
seem to he meeting that challenge.
Success involves more than simple
military gains. For instance, war-weary
peasants, once hostile to the U. S. and
Saigon, now are starting to co-operate
with the Allies rather than with the
Communists.
One example: Four guerrilla units in-
filtrated Vinh Long Province to attack
the provincial capital and its airport.
Peasants inforrncd the Government. Then,
when South Vietnamese regulars failed
13
to repel the attackers, a local militia
unit made up of discharged Army vet-
erans and youths threw back the assault.
Such intelligence gathering and fight-
lug spirit long have been mksing ele;
ments On the Government side.
Traveling tlimiigh the Delta, it is easy
to spot NOM(' of the changes that have
taken place oily recently.
Meetings of provincial chiefs are Ink-
ing place hi some towns where, until
six months ago, South 'iletnamese
ers had never dared visit for fire yirars.
Itehigees who fled to escapi. the Viet
("long or to get out of the way of Amer-
ican air strikes are beginning to. 16e
ramps and return home. Last him -
8,100 refugees went back to their
lap.% in I h Delta, compared with just
55 in June, 19(i8.
Fields left deserted arr being planted
again. Pmviticial and district capitals look
busy and flourishing, as links with Sai-
gon and the rest of the country are re-
stored.
Route 4, the main kmil artery in the
Della. is tipening up td traffic. American
engineers are completing a new stretch
of road between the Mekong and Missile
riversit, Vitilt !Amp, The Manh
Thit Canal, a key IMItterway, is being
'used in haul goods despite Viet ii;?,ig
threats to attack. Even ui An Xtiyen
Pros ince on the Ca Man _Peninsula-
syliere !lases dide hack lo Ilie
French f,uI War cif I 9t14.54-"re-
occ1ipa if m" Is moving InSter ban
n big push now by Smith 'Vietnamese
and American officials is to bring vil-
lagers and townspeople into a primitive
process of "home ink." The whole U. S.
aid effort itu the Delta is grared to de-
veloping this "village initiative."
The process works like this: A small
part of the nil !midget is assigned to a
hamlet. AI a "town meeting,- the vii.
lagers-or their leaders tir elders-devidc
how in spend Ilse money: building
bridges, buying sampans, constructing
a school or replenishing livestock.
Object of the program it to refuto
Communist charges that the interests / 4
the villagers and of the Saigon regime
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arc not compatible.
Consensus so far is that the program
?at least in Vinli Long,.Pnwince?is en-
joying considerable sticcess.
Nob o of caution. Despite all the
"poses," those Familiar with the ebb
and flow of earlier Saigon "successes"
are advising against false optimism.
Reasons for caution become clear
wheu slut ton down the list tif iininii.
derables that most be dealt with.
1 he Viet Cong command structure ap-
pears to be intact, though weakened 1.)y
defections. No really high-level officers
have surrendered recently. Ni Province-
level cadres have been captured.
Commimnist base areas?where die Viet
Cong operate hospitals, monitions plants
mid rest cantps?have not been dint-
Mated.. There are at least 10 such major
areas in the Delta from which the Reds
, can lattnch attacks.
Although Ilic Allies are increasingly
effective itt breaking op the Red supply
apparatos, twins and ammunitiou still
reach the goerrilla squads and main-
force units. One big source of ntrariel
for the Communists: sanctuaries in Cam-
bodia just ocross the !ander, all im-
mune to Allied attacks.
The beginning of the pullout of Amer-
iron combat forces?elements, of the Del-
ta-bsised U. S. Ninth Infantry Division
alrelrly are going home?revives anew
the question of whether Saigon can hold
its own against the Communists.
Some military experts anticipate there
will br?at first?an easing, perhops only
temporary, of the pressure on the. Viet
Craig in the Delta.
Reason for this is that Saigon's Regu-
lar Atmy fortes are spread too thin, these
experts say. Smith ?letnam enjoys a 10-
to- 1 manpower mirgin over the Della
Viet Cong-350,000 replier and para-
military personnei to the Communists'
35,000. nut there are only three South
Vietnamese divisions here?a total of
50,000 regttlars.
? Should the U. S. begin soon to pull
not its support units?lieliowlers, artil-
lery, supply planes iiml Navy personnel
?the fear is that the initiative could
swing back to the Communists.
Controlling the waterways. Crucial
II) the months ahead %vitt be tvhat limp-
OH the waterways. Saigon, ft is
generally agreed, must control the maze
of water routes that crisscross the Delta
if it is to contain the insurgency.
The jolt is awesome. There are, ra-
cially, 5,000 nines of waterway in the.
Delia. The total may actually he double
that figure. An estimated 1.2 million ?
vessels ply the waters, all of -them pn-
tentially part of the Communist supply
systetn.
So far, the U. S. Navy's river fleet
has played a big role in patrolling Delta
waters. Now the Navy has started to
Into over its fleet ol more than 700 boats
to Smith Vietnam.
Saigon's ability to develop the skills
and mount the co-ordinated attacks need-
ed to dominate the waterways is a criti-
cal question mark.
Biggest "ir? facing the Allies: NVill
Hanoi order North Vietnamese regulars
into the Della to assist the Viet Cong?
If Hanoi does that, some ranking U. S.
officers believe, it would take a massive
effort and probably increased U. S. as-
sistance to keep them out.
Already there are two North Vietnam-
ese regiments operating in the Delta. In
March the Beds sent a unit of 1,000
men ban the Seven Mntintalits area in
the southwestent corner of South Viet?
nem. A second regiment, crippled and
low in effectiveness, operates in Long An
Triivini..e. !atoll) of Saigon. There are tin-
'confirmed reports of n third regiment
in the Delta.
Elements of four North Vietnamese
divisions it Ms% over the Cambodian
border to the north mid west of Salmi.
To nifilitate them into the Delta %you'd
nta In?elilrirtiH.TIII! border %via; Cam-
Itodia, even in the best ?of. times. is a
frositier impossible. to pmlive.
Expert opinion on %%hitt !hoof will do
is divided. Some observers believe North
vo,tomo win want to beer up
the
Cong to Isilsier the Cnimioists. flag-
gilig forumes. This woolt1 also pot Notili-
erners hit() IN' DeliVi as a nucleus for
another instirgeney later On iiia nem-
NellIe1111"11( oi the present war does
lino give tlie
Other anaiysts argue against
lion a she Delia war by Itaimi. They
point out that the North Vietnamese are
considered "Intriguers" by Southerners,
that any effort to eltange the home-grown
tptality of instirgency here could boom-
cratig against the North.
For all the dimittit about the future.
the over-all assessment of progress in the
Delta is a favorable one.
Violence, it is agreed, %vill emititme
for so long time. Communist insurgency
is by no means wiped out. But there is
a feeling that at ,last the Viet Cong
drive for ? military victory has been
blunted in this vital portion of South
Vietnam.
1.4
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December 1969 '
Members of Mekong Coordinating Committee
Cambodia
Laos',
South Vietnam
Thailand
Nations Which Have Protested North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao Harassment of Nan Ngum Dam Site and Workers
Cambodia
Thailand
.South Vietnam
Nations Which
14.1stralia
Cfnada
FFance
Great Britain
Israel
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
United States
Have Contributed to Mekong Development Program
Australia
France
Israel
Pakistan
Austria
Federal Re-
Italy
Philippines
Belgium
public of
Japan
Sweden
Canada
Germany
Korea
Switzerland
Republic of
Hong Kong
Malaysia
UAR
China.
India
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Denmark
Indonesia
New Zealand
United States
Finland
Iran
Norway,
15
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25X1C10b
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January 1970
INDIAN-SOVIET DEAL ON RAILWAY CARS ENDS IN FIASCO
During a visit to New Delhi in January 1968, Soviet Prime Minister
Alexei Kosygin made a surprise offer to purchase some 54,000 railway freight
cars from India. Even though the deal would tie up a substantial portion of
her steel production and would inevitably mean close economic bonds to Moscow,
the offer was warmly received by India, which was then suffering an economic
slump. Kosygin's bid caught the popular imagination and helped greatly in
making his visit a success.
In high hopes, Indian negotiators set out for Moscow to work out the
terms of the purchase. Before long, however, it became apparent that the two
sides were worlds apart on the question of price, even though they managed to
come to terms on the technical specifications for the cars. The negotiations
dragged on for months. Despite abundant evidence that the Soviets would not
increase their offer, the Indian government persisted in its belief that a
deal could be consummated. On 28 July 1969 the Minister for Foreign Trade
and Supply told the Indian parliament that a Soviet technical team was ex-
pected to arrive in India shortly for a final round of talks on the negotia-
tions. He said: "It is hoped that a contract will be signed following these
talks...." The negotiations were a principal point on the agenda of India's
Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, when he visited Moscow in
September 1969 to discuss possible fields for further development of economic
cooperation between the two countries. According to news accounts, the
Soviets promised him speedy efforts to sort out the difficulties blocking
the final agreement, and reiterated their promise to send a technical dele-
gation to India in the near future to discuss these issues.
The technical delegation finally did arrive in India. After further
protracted negotiations, the Soviets' final offer was Rupees 56,000 per car,
the raw materials for which would alone cost India Rs 74,000!
It was finally clear to even those most eager to deal with Moscow that
the Soviets probably did not intend to go through with the deal. Why
then had Kosygin made the offer in the first place? Several explanations
can be offered:
-- The proposal, as mentioned earlier, made Kosygin's January 1968
visit a great success.
-- Shortly after Kosygin's visit the Soviets agreed to sell tanks to
Pakistan, India's arch rival. The railway car bid may have been intended
to assuage Indian concern over this sale.
-- By binding India more closely to itself, the USSR may have hoped to
develop more influence over Indian foreign policy, which was attempting to
remain neutral on the issue of the war in Vietnam in view of its membership
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in the International Control Commission established by the Geneva Accords
of 1956.
-- The USSR may have hoped to offset the great prestige accorded the
United States as the result of huge American shipments of wheat and other
grains which prevented widespread famine in India.
Another explanation appeared well after Kosygin's visit; it may have
been in the back of his mind at.the time, or, more likely, it may have mere-
ly developed in parallel with the negotiations on the railway cars. It is
this: The Indian Airlines Corporation needs to buy some new airplanes to
replace planes now in use on regional and trunk routes. It has been con-
sidering four alternatives: the BAC-111, the DC-9, the Boeing-727 and the
Soviet TU-154. Technical opinion in the Indian airlines is strongly in
favor of the Boeing-727 rather than the Russian TU-154. Despite this, there
were extensive rumors in New Delhi that Russia was bringing pressure on the
Government of India to purchase the TU-154. Otherwise, it was stated, Russia
would not buy railway cars from India. The situation has been compounded by
the fact that the newly appointed chairman of the Indian Airlines Corporation,
Mohan Kumaramangalam, (who went to Moscow to discuss the deal) was not only
a former Communist but the counsel for the New Age, the Communist Party news-
paper, in a libel case against the weekly filed by an Army officer!
This case is not without precedence. The USSR has negotiated
large trade treaties with other countries, or granted large economic credits,
and then failed to live up to the recipient's expectations. The original
signing of the treaty or granting of credit is accompanied by great propa-
ganda campaigns, and the subsequent fizzling out usually passes unnoticed.
In fact, India came out of it better than the Canadians, who signed a
treaty for the sale of 9 million tons of wheat to the USSR and were left
holding the bag when the Soviets broke the agreement by buying only 5.5 mil-
lion tons (and later renegotiated to buy the remainder under terms more
favorable to the USSR).
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29 uly 1969
agon deal proneets
with Russia good'
New Delhi, July 28 (UNI)?
Minister for Foreign Trade and
Sup! y B. R. ?Bhagat expressed
optimism in the Lok Sabha today
that India would be able to
strike a deal shortly with the
Soviet ',Union for the supply of
railway wagons.
Replying to a half-an-hour
discussion raised by Mr N. K.
Sornani (Swat) Mr Bhagat said
that 'a Soviet technical team was
expected to arrive in India
shortly for a final round of talks
on the negotiations.
He said: "It is hoped that a
Contract will be signed following
these talks as agreement has
Riready been reached on a num-
ber of points, including technical
matters such as approval of the
specificationa of the 17 proto-
types to be supplied. Also, the
prices we have quoted are Inter-
nationally competitive."
is The Minister said .the deal was
THE HINDU, Madras
31 July 1969
The Union Minister for Civil
Aviation and Tourism, Mr. Ka-
ran Singh, told the Lok Sabha on
Monday that a decision on the
purchase of new aircraft for
Indian ,Airlines would be taken
very soon. Since the kind of
plane the Government purchas-
ed now would set the pattern
for air traffic in India for the
next ten years, he said, the Gov-
ernment wanted to take a little
more time to consider the issue
in all its aspects.
However, the fact remains that
this question has been hanging
fire for the last many months. The
matter came up before the Cabi-
Let Neveral times and no deciaion
was taken. This has given rise
to considerable speculation that
the delay was due to .the fact that
pont ical pressure was being
brought to bear on the Govern-
ment of 111(11;4 by certain court-
tries. 13oth Mr. Karan Singh and
Mr. Bhagat, Minister for Foreign
Trade, bad slated in categorical
terms' that in arriving at a Oct-
slott on the kind of aircraft it
would be acquiring, the Govern-
ment would not yield to any kind
of political influence and the na-
tion's interest alone would be the
Main consideratioi.
being negotiated on purely teehno-,,
economic considerations and 11
was totally wrong to suggest
that political pressure was being
brought to bear on India to link
this deal with the purchase of
Soviet civilian aircraft by India:
The Minister conceded that
there had been, delay in the ne-
gotiations. But it should not be
forgo:ten that this big deal is
for no less than for 54,000 special-
type wagons, the delivery suite.
dub e of which would run over
a period of eight to ten yeah"
and many details had to be gone
into. . .
,
Mr Bhagat added it might be
necessary for sometime in , the
beginning to import wheel-set
but that, in any case, the past o
all imported components Would
not exceed 25 per cent of thil
cost 4t 4 wagon. ......... ' A
Problem of New Planes
for Indian Airlines
By M. Pattab
The question of replacement of
planes in use in the trunk lines
and the regional routes of Indian
Airlines has no 'doubt been engag-
ing the attention of the authori-
ties since 1966. A committee which
was set up tinder the chairmanship
of Air Marshal P. C. Lal recomMen-
ded that the Viscounts bi use were
good enough for another five years
and they could be replaced in a
phased manner from 1971-72.
Therefore. at least by then, In-
dian Airlines must acquire new
Overran. It will be Interesting to
note /II this -context that air traffic
in India has been growing at the
rate of IR per cent per year?much
higher than the world rate of 12
per cent?and consequently. In-
dian Airlines has beet) anxious
that correspondingly its carrying
capacity must increase by the ac-
quisition of bigger aircraft.
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE'S
REPORT
It was early in 1068 that Indian
Airlines constituted a technical
committee for evaluating four
types of aircraft, namely, DC-9 (40
series already flown and certified).
Boeing 737, BAC-111 (200 series)
and TU-134 and make recommen-
dations as to which of them would ,
be most suitable for Indian Air.
-
-
hiram ?
lines. This team consisted of the
Assistant General Manager. the
Director of Operations. the Direc-
tor of Planning and the Director
of Engineering of Indian Airlines.
They visited the United States mid
held discussions with the maim-
facturcrs of both the DC-9 and
the Boeing 737. They also confer-
red with Scandinavian Airlines
and Lufthansa, which were using
one of the two varieties on their
services. The team submitted its
report in May 1968 to the Board
of Indian Airlines recommending
the purchase of the Boeing 737.
h. its report, the team had actual-
ly stated that both the DC-9 and
the Boeing 737 were equally good,
but as the price of the latter was
less by Rs. 18 lakhs for each air-
craft. the team thought it would
be desirable to go in for the Boe-
ing 737 in the interests of econo-
my and saving in foreign exchange.
The seating capacity of both the
types of aircraft is just about the
same ?115 to 125.
The team rejected the sugges-
tion for the purchase of the TU-134
and the BAC-111 though they
were sound planes from the tech-
nical point of view. The Soviet
plane was rejected primarily be-
cause of its high operating cost. -
breakesen load lector is stet.
1
ed to be 110 per cent en stage-
lengths of 450 nautical miles. while
It is 90 per rent on stage-lengths',
or 650 nautical miles. As figaillSt
this, the DC-9 has a breakeven
load factor of 49 per cent on stage-
lengths of 650 nautical miles, while
for the Boeing 737, the corres.
ponding figure Is 51 per cent. The
BAC-111 has a slightly higher
breakeven load factor ranging
from 55 to 56 per cent, but its
seating capacity is only 96. hi
other words, the team has found
that the cost of operation of a Roe-
Ing 737 or a DC-9 was much cheap-
er with its larger seating capacity.
Further. the TU-I34, which has
only a seating capacity of 60, needs
an extra navigator on it flights.
The team had thus no difficulty in
eliminating the Soviet and the '
British planes.
The technical tram's report was
submitted to the I.A. Board, which
In turn appointed a sub-committee
to examine it aed make its recom-
mendation. The sub-committee con-
sisted of Mr. Bharat Ram, Mr.
J. R. D: Tata .and the General Ma-
nager of Indian Airlines. The sub."
committee, however. came to the
conclusion that the DC-9 would be
preferable in view of Its larger
cargo capacity compared to the
Boeing 737. The sub-committee took
into consideration the feet that
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traffic in the country had
been on the increase even without
any special efforts by 1.A. and
therefore, in the iiiterests of earn-
ing more revenue and augmenting
the profits of the corporation, it
to recommend to the Gov-
nment the purchase of five DC-9
aircraft within the next five years.
ALLEGED SOVIET
rrtEssuRE
',V n this proposal came up to
the Ministry, it took some time to
examine the report of the techni-
ea! committee as well as the find-
ing of the Board. It was in De-
ftember MIR that the matter was
Taken up by the Union Cabinet in
right earliest. but to facilitate
further study. a Cabinet sub-com-
mittee comprising Mr. C. M. Poo-
nacha. Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao, Mr.
Dinesh Singh. Mr. Karan Singh
and a representative of the Fi-
nance Ministry was set up.
The Cabinet sub-commit4e held
several meetings without coming
to a definite conclusion and it was
at this stage that there were
rumours that Russia was bringing
pressure on the Government of
India to purchase the .TU-134 air-
craft or the later version of the
TU-I54. Otherwise, it was stated.
Russia would not purchase railway
wagons from India and it ..wasthis
PATRIOT, New Delhi
13 September 1969
Ry. Wagon Deal:
Dinesh Singh's
Talks in Moscow
MOSCOW, Sept. 12.
India's Minister for External
Affairs, Mr, Dinesh Singh, to-day
Had talks with Mr. Baibakov, Head
of the Soviet Planning Organisa.
tion anti Mr. Novikov, Deputy
Prime Minister dealing with eco-
nomic relations.
The talks, which were officially
described as friendly and cordial,
covered the fields of further dcve
lopment of economic oa.operatton
between the two countries.
? Among the major point of accord
emerging from the talks was for an
early assessment of surpluses .and
INDIAN EXPRESS
13 October 1969
that was stoutly denied by Air.
Bhagat in Parliament. The Cabinet
subcommittee did not, however,.
come to any definite conclusion,
but remitted the entire matter to
the Indian Airlines Board for re-
consideration. ,
Indian. Airlines re-examined the
issue, but decided that there was
no case for modifying its earlier
opinion that it should go in for
DC?9 aircraft. It also said that as
no new factors had emerged since
its earlier recommendation, It saw
no reason to change its original
verdict-
This is where the matter stands
now. The Jumbo jets will touch
down at our airports in 1970, bring:
needs of both sides on long-term
basis so as to fit them in the eco-
nomies of the two countries.
Mr. Dinesh Singh raised the ques-
tion of speeding up the deal on the
Soviet offer to make long-term bulk
purchases of Indian railway wagons.
Speedy efforts to sort out the ini-
tial difficulties were promised. The
Soviet side reiterated its proposal
to send a technical delegation to
India in the near future to discuss
these issues.
log along hundreds of foreign'
tourists. Unless Indian Airlines by
their acquires enough capacity to
transport passengers from one
place to another, there will be
utter chaos. Normally, it takes 16
to 18 months for the manufacturer
to deliver an aircraft and this is
one important reason why an
early decision has to be taken. It
is stated that the manufacturer! ,
of the DC-9 have some 'aircraft
ready, which they could deliver in
six months if orders are placed'
Immediately, It is also feared that
there will be a price escalation in '
the next few weeks and this also
rails for an early decision by 140
Government. ..;$
There was appreciation of Indla's
need to diversify items of trade in
keeping with the changing pattern
of its Industrial capacity and to
accelerate optimum utilisation of
excess capacities.
Mr. Dinesh Singh resumed his
talks with the Soviet Foreign Ml
nister, Mr. Gromyko, this afternoon.
after a luncheon he gave at .which
the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister,
Mr. Alazurov, was the chief gueeti
6,1174
Protest Against Indian Airline Chief's Power to Choose Planes
QUOTE: Mr. Loke Nath Misra and Mr. R.M. Singh Deo, Swantantra members
of the Lok Sabha, have protested to the President and the Prime Minister against
Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam being vested with the power to choose planes to
replace Caravelle in Indian Airlines.
In their letter they have pointed out that Mr. Kumaramangalam was a card
holding communist' until 1966. He left the CPI to become Advocate General
of Tamil Nadu but he has not ceased to take interest in communist affairs.
Both MP's pointed out that he was even now the counsel for New Age in the case
against the weekly filed by an army officer.
The letter writted to express the resentment of some section of parlia?
mentary opinion against the haste with which the union government was seeking
to make a deal. The Swantantra group holds the view that in a world where
the most advanced nations competed with sophisticated planes it would be a
tragic mistake to saddle Indian Airlines with noncompetitive aircraft. Mr.
Misra and Mr. Singh Deo regretted that a canard was started against Mr7 Mfarat
Ram to make his resign his chairmanship of Indian Airlines and alleged that
2
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this has been done with the object of making it easy for Mr. Kumaramangalam
to be installed in his place.
Mr. Kumramangalam left today for Moscow where Mr. Misra believes he will
receive "some advice from his Russianfriends on several activities concerning
our country. UNQUOTE.
INDIAN EXPRESS, New Delhi
20 October 1969
QUOTE: Technical opinion in the Indian Airlines is strongly in favour
of Boeing-727 rather than the Russian TU-154 as the plane to meet the IA's
requirements in the fourth plan period.
It is understood that the Russians have underquoted their American counter-
parts in their bids. While final prices are subject to further negotiations,
Boeing-727 will cost about 6.5 million dollars against only about 5 million
dollars for TU-154. But in spite of price difference, the technical data and
performance of Boeing-727 is so superior to that IA experts favour the former.
Both planes are 160-seaters, but TU-154 is of 63,000 H.P. against only
43,500 HdP for Boeing-727. This means that the Russian Planes's fuel consump-
tion will be almost 50 percent higher than that of the Boeing. In India, avia-
tion fuel is so expensive that fuel costs constitute 29 percent of flying costs
as against only 11-14 percent for most other airlines. In view of this, the
flying costs of TU-154 would be much higher than that of Boeing-727, possibly
to the point of being completely uneconomical.
The Russian planes higher horse power means that it can take-off from
short airstrips. But this is considered irrelevant for Indian conditions, where
a 160-seater would be used only on trunk routes where the runways are already
long enough to take planes like the Caravelle or Boeing-727.
Apart from the question of fuel costs is engine performance. Boeing-727 is
generally regarded among the best planes ever built, and is certainly the best-
selling plane in aviation history. The engine life of TU-154 is expected to
be only about 3,000 hours, But Boeing-727 has a proved engine life of 7,000
hours plus, possibly going up to 10,000 hours. Moreover, the Boeing has been
in production for a long time and is a proved aircraft, while TU-154 is still
in the development stage. The reliability of TU-154 engine will have to be
taken on trust.
This factor ties up with delivery dates. The government is scheduled
to take a final decision on planes in November, and if it chooses the Boeing
then delivery can be made by June 1970. But it will be only in the middle
of 1971 that the Russians will be able to deliver TU-154.
On the question of spare parts, the IA seeks to have 75 percent of engine
parts and 20 percent of the airframe parts in stock. In the case of TU-154's
63,000 H.P. engines, spare parts will obviously cost more than the Boeing's
43,000 H.P. engines. The ratio of spare parts cost to plane cost will be
about 30 percent in the case of the Boeing, but nearer 45 percent in the case
of TU-15hUNQUOTE.
3
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MARCH OF THE NATION Bombay
1 November 1969
r).1
11"PircL\ ? I AE1
7V3'.-T1 GIG mu
ALL !Jo OFR01.11
From Our Special Correspondent
NEW DELHI: The feeling is growing that the
Government wants to push through the Indo-Sot
wagon (teal before Parliament blows it to bits when it
reconvenes on November 17. ?
The Russians, on their pint,
hat., liven playing it cool. Their
team %vas originally trivet:tett
in Delhi Ora Septeniber 15. \\-then
it failed to inaterialise. ft?atitic
appeals were despatched to Ivlos-
cow to hurry things no.
The "please-Moscow-at-till-
(lists" brigade breathed easy
-when at last a seven-member
ilci 1.1M1 ion, !Waded bV Comrade
--faxittiov, descended on the
apitat, It otlwrs are wondering
just what caused them to change
their minds.
Could it lie that even the Rus-
sians are a trifle tiervons the deal
vvon't go through if once rill the
F acts me laid before Parliament?
iittfIN()LIS LOSS
That they hnv reason to be
oi.rvoi I4 Pi iil!rtilallILINO for,
tiesnite the well-drilled applause
linwereil I\ loseme for more
fl voar, India will be saddled
;Aa'ill a loss of S011 111111(1??(15 Of
of roppoq if the Russians
.t wagons on their terms.
Great \Vogt?) Boblwry?
mashed wit h stilled) fanfare
c;i it NVI1S announced that the
tot Union woehl ? as it frater-,
;tal gesture, of course! ? buy
wagons from tis.
this state of euplun.ia,
dy thought of asking \vital
era e they Nvould pay,
India, quoting Its 1.10 laklis'
wagon (a rate readily paid by
bitv?ers) ivetived a rude
k when the llussiaivs counter-
,4lercti somewhere armind Rs
*2,000,
Tlwre was much begging and.
pleading to be reasonable. much'
breaking down of material and
maimfacturitig costs ? to no
avail.
The Russians grudgingly raised
their price from time to thne, but
with manufacturing costs also
spiralling, the gap between our
production costs and the Russian
offers remained -abolit Rs 50,00(.
The present position is that
the price of steel has risen by
some 30 per cent since the offe,r
was' first made.? Freight 'rates tn
Soviet ports have also risen lw
7.5 per cent.
In cash terms, this means that
India eon sell wagons economi-
cally only at around Rs 1.50
laklis each, while the Russians
are now offering only Rs 05,000
per piece.
DINESIPS BRIGHT IDEA
Ane suggestion emanating from
Dis)) Singh and now griing the
romid of pro-Snitu
e sorces in
should
hl
and
Indian
Government is that India
accept die Russian offe
make on the difference to
wagon builders.
If this outrageous proposition
that d facture
lsh of
be met
is accepted, it will mean m
Soviet Union will get our wagons
at half the cost nf manu
roil the loss of half a la
nipees per wagon will
from the public exchequer.
`lids is not "socialist co-ope?,
ration"; it is a swindle, pure and'
in it'W of the hard economte
facts of filo thotter, pcoph.: are
4
wondering what exactly Mr S.
RaltlaVhandran, who heads India's
wagon delegation, is going to
discuss with Mr E. Maximov, his
Soviet counterpart, at the talk
presently, being conducted in
Delhi.
The Soviet attittide is all the
more unreasonable since no
country in the world ? not even
Russia's stooges in the Socialist
Moe ? can match lndia's low
rates.
The wagon deal is, in fact, not
a straightforward commercial pro-
position but a typical piece of
political ann-twisting.
TIE-UP WITH PLANES
As is pretty well known by
now, not only do the Soviets want
our wagons at Rs 50,000 below
cost. but also waut to thrust un-
tried :ind uneconomic ,,,TU-154
let airliners on Indian Airlines..
It is quite significant that
Maximov's wagon delegation
arrived in Delhi only a couple of
days after Mr Mohan Kumara-
utangaIam, the Communist Chair-
man of the IAC, went on his pil-
grimage to Moscow.
%moms in the Capital siiggest
that the IAC Chief has alreativ
made up his mind to buy the
Russian planes ? but if he does,
he will have bell to pay in
Parliament.
He will also have hell to pay
from a completely new enemy,--1
the Computer.
' With the recommendations of
?
I?) i( committees repeatedly
slielvcd by Covertiment, some-
braly hod the bright idea of feed- ?
ing in facts mid figures into an
electronic computer in Delhi.
The machine, miswaved by
political bias of 71114 killd, digested
relevant (Iota about. American, -
British and Soviet planes, and ?
cast its l'IlteS in favour of either
the American Boeing or the
British BAC-111 as the best ty_
planes to replace the present
JAC Cariwelle fleet.
Even the Communists will have
a bard time accusing the compute'
of 'being a henchman cif the
Syndicate or a stooge of the -
Imperialists!
As for the wagoes, it is time
that T?dia dealt with Russia riir a
straight commercial basis. It is
also time we insisted on Moscow
making a firm commitment ?
and honouring that cominitmenl.
VVriggling tint of vague assu-
rances is nothing new with the
Soviets. For instanee, Moscow
some time nen contracted /with
Canada to buy their wheat for
dire,* Years. At the Hine the' vvern
in deep trouble because of food
shortages. t
; ?
A Year later, when they brir??
vested a gond crop, the contract
with Canada was promptly for- '
gotten! The Canadians are still
howling, but to no purpose.
Delhi, of course, regards Ric-
sin as our closest friend, but
surely it would not be out of
place to ask the Kremlin tn match
its flne words with fine deed%.
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TIMES OF INDIA, Bombay
18 November 1969
WAGON DEAL
OFF
It is not at all surprising that
the promise of a massive rail-
evaY wagoo deal with the So-
viet Union. has ended in a fias-
co. There have been any num-
ber of indications since early
this year that the agreement
, for the sale of well over 50,000
lwagons for the Siberian Rail-
way may not come off in view
of the ridiculously low prices
which the Russians have been.
offering. If New Delhi chose
to ignore these, it has itself to -
blame. Even :',after his recent
trip to Moscow where he un-
doubtedly raised the issue, Mr.
Dinesh Singh thought it fit to
pin his hopes on the visit of '
a second Solyiet delegation to
India. This team has now gone
, round the country but has stuck,
io the earlier quotation of Rs.
56;000 for each wagon. This
'figure is even lower than the
cost of the raw materials alone
which is estimated at Rs.
74,000. The Soviet delegation
cannot be unaware of this sim-
ple fact. All this goes to show-
that it has gone through the
motions: of examining India's
capacity and of discussing pri-
ces without any intention of
entering into an agreement.
There are several possible rea-
sons for this strange behaviour.
It is, for 'instance, conceivable
that Moscow has wanted to use
the offer of the wagon deal to
"persuade" New Delhi to go in
for its TU 154 planes and is
therefore dragging its feet be-
cause India has not yet decid-
ed to "reciprocate" its gesture
or goodwill. It is also possible
that the Russians genuinely
doubt whether the Indian-built
wagons will be able to stand
the rigours of the Siberian cold.
But if this was the case they,
should have said so long ago.
Mr. Kosygin took New Delhi
BALTIMORE SUN
20 November 1969
Indian-Russian Deal Collapses
by surprise early last year when
he %oltinteered to purchase In-
dian railway wagons by the
thousand. The country was then
facing the dual problems of,
recession and inflation and was
greatly cheered by this unex-
pected offer. It confirmed New
Delhi in its belief that Russial
could be depended upon to
come to its rescue at a critical
time. But apparently Mr. Kosy- '
gin had? either not thought the
proposition through which is
unlikely or he had some other
objective in view. It is not
possible to establish a link be-
tween the promise to buy Indian
Wagdnseand the sale of tanks,
to PakiStan later in the year.
But great powers often resort
to such tactics to soothe the
feelings of aggrieved nations.
There is impressive evidence in
any case to show that in 1967
the Russians were critical of
India's performance in the field
of foreign relations and the
general policy of allowing
greater freedom to private ine
dustry. They felt that though
the Government still followed.
the policy of non-alignment and
had not gone hack on its pre-
vious commitment regarding
the expansion of the public
sector, its emphasis was strik-
ingly different. New Delhi wag
not unduly critical of America's'
Viet Nam policy, was graduate
ly dismantling economic con-
trols and suitably trimming the
next five-year plan. It would
not be surprising therefore if
Moscow concluded at that time
that it had to do something big
to arrest the decline in its influ-
ence. It could not possibly
meet even one-quarter of
India's requirement of ten
million tons of foodgrains
which New Delhi needed des-
perately to avert a widespread
famine. But it could. as in the
past, make a dramatic offer of.
help in the field of industry or
trade. This is precisely what
, Mr. Kosygin did.
New Delhi Refuses To
Subsidize The Sale Of
Now, with the Indian economy,
tut the Finance Ministry was
4etuctant to go even that far on
it deal this big.
Manufacturers Unenthusiastic
The scheme to sell the gondo-
la-type cars over a period of
Seven years first was broached
1:er Soviet Prime Minister Alexei
Kosygin when he visited India in
January, 1967. It was welcomed
enthusiastically by Mrs. Gandhi
iind by Dinesh Singh, then her
eommerce minister and now
injnister of external affairs, as a
generous offer to help India's
recession-hit engineering indus-
trY?
The manufacturers, however,
were never enthusiastic. They
did not want to commit their
factories for many years to a
special Soviet design. At the
same time, they felt the govern-
ment had so much political capi-
tal invested in the deal that they
I
could demand a huge subsidy if
it went through.
54,000 Rail Cars ,
By ADAM CLYMER,
[Neto Delhi Bureau ol The Sunl
New Delhi, Nov. 19?Thelar1i.
an government has decided not
to provide large subsidies for the
sale of 54,000 railway freight
oars to the Soviet Union, and the
deal has collapsed.
, The Finance Ministry, now un-
der the control of Prime Minis-
ter Indira Gandhi, balked at
ihaking up the difference be-
tveen the unbudging Soviet offer
$7,466.67 per car and the re-
ciently Increased Indian asking
itrice of 416,333.33, according to
informed source. The govern-
tnent does subsidize some rail-
iiay-ear exports by 20 per cent,
5
picking up, they have a backlog
of orders which they seem uni
likely to fill on time. Limitcd
supplies of steel from India's"
limping government-run steel
plants are contributing to the
delay.
Sharp Price Increases
Another problem, although ap-
parently not determinative, is
that the Soviet specifications for
an ore car capable of withstand-
ing the extremes of Siberian
weather require 10 tons of a spe-,
cial chromium-vanadium steel
?which India would have to
spend its own scarce hard-cur-
rency to import?in each 80-me-
tric-ton-capacity
, Sharp increases in internation-
al prices of steel this year led
India to boost its asking price
front an earlier level of ;14,667.
Yesterday, a Soviet delegation
which was heralded as having
been sent to clinch the deal left
for home after a fruitless four'
weeks. A spokesman for the
State Trading Commission here
said today: "There is no break-
ing off of talks. Another round i3
possible. But we do not have any
new dates."
Today, Bali Ram Bhagat, the
minister of foreign trade, insist-
ed to Parliament that India
would sell the cars only if the
U.S.S.R. offered an advanta-
geous price.
One official here said the ne-
gotiations had brought India one
significant benefit: publicity for
its railway-car industry, which
In turn has led to export orders
'?many of which were for hard
currency?from Kenya, Poland,
Ceylon, the Sudan, Iran, Nigeria
and Nationalist China.
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MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
29 November 1969 1
The Carrot Disappears
just how gullible can one get? The Wagon Deal
lollipop that the Soviets have been dangling
before the Indian Government has finally been
snatched away, but even now, after Soviet negotiators
have packed their bags and left for home, the wishful
thinkers of Delhi keep hopefully proclaiming that the
corpse may yet be revived and Moscow yet honour the
promise it made nearly two years ago.
Early in 1968, Soviet Premier Kosygin, during one
of his periodic trips to this country, seemed to conclude
that Indo4oviet amity was not quite as glowing as it
once had leen; Soviet arms aid to Pakistan and disap-
pointmenCover promises broken by Moscow had alie-
nated even those normally given to looking at every-
thing Russian through red-tinted glasses.
Cleaily a gesture was called for, and Kosygin
made one on a grandiose scale.
Seeing that the Indian wagon industry was suffer.i.
ing from recession, he made the lordly offer to buy
54,000 wagons. The magnitude of the order promptly
sent the Indian Government's publicity machinery and
a large section of the press into a state of uncritical
euphoria. It was only when time dragged by and no
firm order materialised that optimism at last was re-
placeu by uneasiness.
When, people wondered, were the Soviets 'going
to sign a firm commitment? Tho Soviets did not reply.
They listed specifications, talked about special steels,
flooded India with a mass of data about technical re-
quirements, and hinted that Indian facilities were-0
quite equal to the manufacture of the wagons in terms
of both quality and quantity.
These hurdles were overcome, but the final one
WI lay ahead ? the question of price. It was only
atter every technical pitfall had been surmounted that
the news leaked out that between Indian manufactur-
ing costs and the Soviet offer there was an unbridge-
o'ole gulf.
It soon became clear that Soviet "generosity" was
phony and that Moscow's terms were not only unie-
inunerative but utterly absurd ? and neither the many
taigh-powered delegations that rushed to and fn.) be.
tween India and the Soviet Union, nor piteous cries
about Indo-Soviet friendship, could save the deal.
The last delegation to pursue the subject a fort-
night ago offered Rs 56,000 per wagon when it well
knew that the minimum feasible Indian quotation Was
Rs 1,16,000, and that even the cost of raw materials
per wagon amounted to Rs 74,000.
In terms of simple arithmetic, the "generous ges-
ture" of the Soviet Union had finally boiled down toIndia facing a loss of almost Rs 325 cores if the deal
went through!
Lest there be illusions about whose rates were
fair, India's or Russia's, it may be pointed out that
this country has sold wagons in the past not only to
South Korea, Ceylon, Iraq, Yugoslavia and East Africa,
but even to socialist Hungary, the Soviet Union's
junior partner in COMECON.
Indian prices are not only lower than any in the
world, but the Soviet Union has not been able to
acquire these wagons elsewhere. Its insistence on
acquiring them at less than half our manufacturing
cost is nothing, therefore, but a piece of outrageous
thumb-twisting.
It is a long-standing Soviet practice to make tall
claims, to reap immense propaganda benefits, to in4
troduce extraneous factors, and then back out; in4
to mulct a country of Rs 325 crores and to call it gene-
rosity cannot be contained even in the extremely flexi.i
Me framework of Socialist Truth ? and there is no
reason why India should do business on such term-s.
It is time the Indian Government realised thati
Russia's so-called friendship is a pure and simple hoilixe
Our hopes of its siding with us against Pakistan were
dispelled years ago; its much touted aid has amount-I
ed to a small fraction of the help given to AIN
by our friends in the West. In return for its largespq
Russia has exerted unashamed pressure, interfered in
our internal affairs and sought to control our foreign
policy.
The rot has gone in far enough. The integrity
this nation cannot be bartered against wagons and
untested aircraft. Even less can it be bartered against
promises of non-existent carrots. Please cut it out
1
qji VUILI r.11 TeIdbe LUULM.To7 . L?IR-M.fr FV-1./ ITULFACWUU4UU I OIRMI -0
25X1C10b
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Approved ForRelease2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400150001-6
" moimemomoimilimamai??i? January 1970
SOVIETS' USE OF MENTAL INSTITUTIONS TO SUPPRESS DISSIDENTS
Stalin's successors have tried to create the impression that blatant
terror has faded from the Soviet scene. Indeed, until recent years world
opinion and even many Soviet citizens showed little awareness of the ex-
tent and harshness of imprisonment in present-day forced labor camps. Far
less is known about the subtler means that the Soviet secret police (the
KGB) uses to enforce political and intellectual conformity. One of these
means, initiated under Khrushchev and expanded by the Brezhnev-Kosygin re-
gime, is confinement to a mental institution. A number of political pro-
testers are known to have been put out of the way in psychiatric hospitals
of a special type dubbed by some Soviets as "hospital-prisons." How many
other, unreported, cases there may be is open to speculation.
A list of dissident Soviet citizens who are known to have suffered
this fate is attached. Five of the cases, on which more detailed informa-
tion is available, are presented as examples of the situation. They'in-
volve: former Major General Pyotr G. Grigorenko, former collective farm
chairman Ivan A. Yakhimovich, mathematician Alexander S. Yesenin-Volpin,
interpreter Natalya Gorbanevskaya, and writer Valeri Y. Tarsis.
As is evident in these cases, the KGB makes little pretense of follow-
ing legal procedures. Even the civil rights laws, which favor the state
and offer the individual only flimsy protection, are flagrantly violated.
As Mrs. Grigorenko noted, Soviet laws are observed with regard to murderers
and rapists, but totally ignored in the case of her supposedly paranoid
husband. It is extremely interesting to note that Yesenin-Volpin prepared
a guide for protestors to advise them of their legal rights when being in-
terrogated by the KGB.
A feature common to several of the cases is the evidence that the "pa-
tients" not only are not insane, but could well be termed highly superior
citizens. Grigorenko's wife declared that his sanity was confirmed in De-
cember 1965 by the Medical Board for the Determination of Disability, and
that he was healthy enough to work as a construction foreman. Mrs. Grigor-
enko stated to the general's investigators that she had "never noticed" his
insanity and was told, in reply, that her husband's political views and his
dissemination of them rendered him "socially dangerous." Yesenin-Volpin
was described by 95 leading Soviet mathematicians in a signed petition as a
"talented and able-bodied mathematician" whose forcible commitment to a
hospital for seriously-disturbed mental patients was injurious to his health.
Tarsis, in Ward 7, an autobiographical novel on his term in an insane asylum,
wrote that the inmates were quite sane and that the psychiatrists, instead
of trying to treat patients, often adopted the role of prosecutors in-
vestigating "anti-Soviet" activities.
The achievements of some of the "patients" are impressive. Grigorenko
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rose in the army from private to major general, had a successful record in
World War II, and was a lecturer at Moscow's Frunze Military Academy.
Yakhimovich was a collective farm chairman, a job in which his talents
and enthusiasm evidently excelled according to a laudatory article in the
national newspaper for Soviet youth. Yesenin-Volpin, besides being a tal-
ented mathematician, is a recognized poet and translator. Tarsis was an
editor and translator, a twice-wounded war correspondent, and the author
of short stories and two books.
Beyond the group's achievements is their general tendency to be sensi-
tive and caring, to have a strong impulse to promote and defend social
causes, and a willingness to suffer the consequences of open protest. Some
of the causes espoused by the "patients" by means of letters, petitions and
demonstrations are:
--to help the Crimean Tatars to regain their full rights;
--to head off the rehabilitation of Stalin;
--to permit the Czechs to carry out their liberalization program;
--to voice support for the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia;
--to secure an open trial for young writers accused of anti-Soviet
activities and to protest the violation of those writers' rights when
closed trials are held;
--to protest the arrest of writers Sinyavskiy and Daniel by publicly
demanding that the provisions of the Soviet Constitution be observed;
--to publicize the facts of the oppressions of the Stalin era;
--to protest violations of legal procedures at a Leningrad trial.
How to cope with such "offenses," is a difficult problem for the regime.
The acts are not crimes which can be easily proven in court; rather, they
would require the prosecutors and the KGB once again to stage sham trials
like the ones which evoked stormy domestic and foreign protest in 1966, 1967,
and 1968. Apparently the regime prefers not to subject itself to the poten-
tial embarrassment of a seoret trial ora closed trial from which the tran-
script may leak to the Western press. Instead, it chooses at times to deal
with these kinds of dissidence by committing the perpetrator to a mental in-
stitution. To be effective, this policy should be just well-enough known to
serve as a threat that will cause the dissident-minded to keep quiet, but not
so well-known that it will arouse large numbers of Soviet citizens and darken
the Soviet image around the world.
As will be seen, much of the attached material comes from the Khronika
Tekushchikh Sobytiy (Chronicle of Current Events). This is an underground
journal put out bi-monthly in the USSR by means of "samizdat" (literally
"self-publishing," this term relates to any material that is printed or writ-
ten and then copied and circulated from hand to hand). Khronika deals with
a wide range of protest developments, and has provided several revealing ac-
counts of persons committed to mental institutions.
ove ore
'A . PYOTR G. ORIGORENZO
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HIGOREN G e.
RICORNKO ) ons ruc-
tion engineer, former Major-General and lecturer at the
Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. Active in various
protest movements since 1961, when he sent an "open
letter" to Moscow voters protesting restraints on freedom
in the USSR and was consequently dismissed from Frunze
Arddemy. In 1964, after making an allegedly anti-Soviet
speech, reduced to ranks and confined in a mental asylum
for 14 months. In March 1966, demonstrated against the
partial rehabilitation of Stalin and in June 1966 wrote
another "open letter" to Pravda and 1 zvestia. Protested
recent trials of writers (Does. 10, 25, and 34) ; also par-
ticipated in demands for full rehabilitation of Crimean
Tatars (see Doc. 44). In July 1968, together with Kos.
termand Yakhimovich (q.v.), voiced his support of liber-
alization in Czechoslovakia (see The New York Times,
July 30, 1968). For additional biographic information,
see Doc. 38, signed by his wife, Zinaida Mikhailovna
Grigorenko.
WASHINGTON POST
13 December.1969
MOSCOW, Dee, 12?Former
Maj, Gen..Pyotr Grigorenko, a
lending figure in the tiny dis-
sident movement here, was,of-
fieltilly declared insane in
Tashkent' today; according-to
his family: ? ? ,
They sald..GrIgorenlco had
been found to be suffering
from "paranoid development
! of his- personality," combined
With an arteriosclerosis ofnat%
Her origln . ?
They also said that former
colleetIve-farra chairman Ivan
Yakhimovitch was undergoing
psychiatric examination' in
Moscow in anticipation of simi-
lar proceedings In Riga, Lot-
yin. . Yakhimoviteh wns ar-
rested last March after- pro-,
testing the Soviet invasion of
Creeliesloyakia in 1963.
Commitment to a mental In-
stitution 'is a 'common Soviet
method of dealing with
dents. It stems the domestic
embarrassment of a ecret,
Stalin-like trial and the for-
eign embarrassjnent of a pub-
lic trial whose transcript" may
leak: - '
Ctrigorenko. was, arrested
last May in Tashkent, 'where
ce4ciiing
By Anthony Astrachan
worstristQs Post Poreart rPrvi,
he had gone to attend the trial
Of a group of Crimean Tatars
arcused of slandering tiw So.
viet state. They had protested
their continued exclusion
from the Crimean homeland
from which Stalin deported
tem during World War IL
Grigorenko wa.s..also
charged with slandering 'the
state. He was first imprisoned
and then confined last. Octo-
ber in the Serbski Psychiatric
Institute in Moscow.
It now appears that this con-
finement was to examine his
mental condition. Grigorenko
was token to Tashkent Dee. 2,'
the family sources said, for
the next step. His lawyer, So-
phia ,Kallistratova, was there
today and was told of the 'find-
ing of paranoia and given doe*
uments supporting it.
F rime further legal proceed-
ing is expected to remove the
,slander charges from the
docket, since Grigorenko has
been. 'found "insane" rather,
than "criminal." lie presuma-
bly will- ha retorted eventu-
ally to a mental Innitution.
Meanwhile he is in prisOn
Tashkent. .? ?? ? ,
, ?
lOne Letter a Month:
I The aources'said,MCI, Grigo-
renko had been dented perrniS-
sion to see her husband when
she traveled. to Tashkent;? or
even to look lit him-from a sliS-
tnnee. She Is allowed" Jo Writd
one lettet a Month. .
Grigorenko has, ,been' in
trouble, with the -authorities
since 1901, when ,Ite accused'
Nikita Khritshchey h f foster-
ing his own "personality cult"
?the very charge Nhrushehel,
had laid against Stalin.
Grigorenko was arrested in
February, 1964. jailed dor
seven months and then kept in
a Mental institution 'for eight
months on the same. psychiat-,
ric diagnosis made today, the
sources said," . '
? Ire was steel/wed sane and
released in 7965, after Klernsh-
chev's ouster, ,bnt was not
readmitted to the Crorimuntst
Party nnd was demoted to pri7
vato anti strIppr4 of hls pstis.
skin. . "i '? i-
Attack oh Stalin
I,.
Later 'lie wrote an attack on
1 Stalin's conduct Of Soviet
preparations for?WOilti War II
and defended the chain of dis-
sidents proseratted by the So,
viet authorities.
? Early this year Grigorenko
and Yakhimovitch called on
Soviet citizen to support
Czechoslovaks ? pretesting the
Soviet invasion ne, their eoun.
try.
Yakhimoviteh ? was once -1
collective farin chairman, such
a good, one that he was the
subject of a laudatory article
In Komsomolsita,va Pravda. Ile
thus differs as much as a gen-
eral would:from. the usual So-
'yict dissidents; who for the
? most part ? are wiltera and in;
tellectuals.' ?"
In February, 1668, Yalchla
movitch wrote o letter to Mik-
hail Stislov, the top party ide-
ologist, protesting the trial of
dissidents Yuri Galrinskov and
Alexander -Ginztturg.. He was
later ' dismissed as kolkhoz
chairman . and expelled front
the Communist Parts'', ? Dissi-
dent sources said the dismissal
was against the wishes of -his
collective farmers and that the
expulsion . was Ilona without
the Potion of WS loett. unit
which is 'against party rules.
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f!
Approved For Release 2000/08/29:
Protest by Grigorenke's Wife
To: Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC of the CPSU
Comrade Corkin, The USSR Supreme Court
The Procurator General, Comrade Rudenko
The President of the Academy of Medical Sciences,
Comrade Blokhin
From Zinaida Mikhailovna Crigorenko; party member;
2nd Komsemolsky Pereulok 14, Apt. 96,
Tel. G-6-27-37
DECLARATION
At the request of Attorney Kaminskaia, my husband,
Piotr Grigorevich Crigorenko was to appear in the Mos-
cow Municipal Court as a witness in the trial of Ginzburg,
Calanskoy, it af. The Chairman of the court,. Miromov,
turned d
issued b
attestin
Thi4
by thDiabilite
n the request, citing as his reason a certificate
Mental Health Clinic No. 1, Leningrad District,
hat my husband is mentally unbalanced.
rtificate is false; in December 1965, a decision
TEK [Medical Board for the Determination of
] confirmed his sanity; his case was removed
from tl4 files and since then he has not [even] been
called in' for consultation. A document to this effect was
presented to the court.
In 'full possession of his health, P. G. Grigorenko is
employed as a foreman at the SU-2 [a division of the
Moscow Building Trust], and also heads a party school
in the capacity of propagandist. There are 20 people in
his group, 13 of them Communists and seven non-party
members.
It turns out, then, that in one place my husband serves
as a political leader, while in another he is regarded as
mentally disturbed. What is this?a mistake? No, it is
a violation of legality, which has been going on for more
than four years.
On February 1, 1964, Grigorenko?a Major-General
and Candidate in Sciences?was arrested and charged
with anti-Soviet activity. Yet, his case was not investi-
gated, and instead he was sent to the Serbsky Institute,
where he was found to be mentally disturbed. On the
basis of that finding, he was sent to a Leningrad prison-
hospital for compulsory treatment..
When I asked precisely when my husband had lost hie
sanity?since I had never noticed it?I was told by the
CIA-RDP79-01194A000400150001-6
investigators, Lt. Colonel[s?] Kuznetsov and Kantov,
that my husband's political views and his dissemination
of them rendered him socially dangerous. I was also in-
formed by the [other?) investigators?lawyers?that he
would be kept in the [army) reserve in the status of a
sick person, retaining his rank and pension.
From party sources I learned that there is a regulation
that mentally ill people temporarily have to relinquish
their party cards, which are restored to them after re-
covery. What, then, happened next?
By Khrushchev's order of August 29, 1964, my husband
was demoted to the rank of private and expelled from the
party as mentally unbalanced.
All of the patients in the hospital received sickness
benefits?except my husband. The law was observed
with regard to murderers, rapists. Two of the inmates?Lt.
Col. Shevchenko, who had knifed his daughter and Lt.
Col. Burkovsky, who had shot three men?were retired
into the reserve, also keeping their ranks and pensions.
On April 29, 1965, my husband was discharged from
the hospital as a Group-2 invalid. For ten months this
Group-2 invalid, a disabled war veteran, was refused both
his pension and a position. He was forced to go to work
as a loader.
In December 1965, by a decision of the VTEK of
Mental Health Clinic No. 1, Leningrad District, my hus-
band was certified to be mentally healthy and his case
removed from the files. But this was not followed by the
restoration either of his party card or of his military
rank, or of the pension he had earned by 34 years of
honorable military service. Wounded a number of times,
he has not been certified, to this day, as a disabled war
veteran.
The entire story which I have related here is nothing but
a gross miscarriage of justice. I consider it a prelude to
new repressions against my husband. I am filled with,
horror, the more so because during the years of the
personality cult I lost my first husband, my sister and my
brother-in-law, in addition to having been myself sub.
jected to repressions.
As a Communist and as a citizen of the Soviet Union,
I demand an end to the illegal acts against my husband
and my family, and to the persecution of my children and
myself. I demand the complete restoration of my hus-
band's rights as a party member and citizen,. and the
reinstatement of his military rank.
?
January 23, 1968
GIUGORMICO
\
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B? IVAN A. YAKHIMOVICH
NAP' A. YAKIIIMOVICH (1930?- )?Philologist, gradu-
ated Latvian State University in 1956, appointed chairman
of a collective farm in Latvia in 1960. Author of appeal
to Susloy (Doc. 17), which cost him his job. In July 1968,
declared his support of the Dubcek regime in Czecholova-
kin (see The New York Times, July 30, 1968). For back-
ground information, see laudatory article about Y. which
appeared in Soviet press in 1964 (Doc. 18).
"The Duty of a Communist": From a
Kolkhoz Chairman to Suslov
do not have sufficient information to judge the
degree of guilt of the persons subjected to repression,
but of one thing I am firmly convinced and one thing
1 know--the type of trial that took place in the Moscow
Municipal Court January 8-12, 1968, is causing enormous
damage to our party and to the cause of communism,
lint', in our country and elsewhere.
We have celebrated the glorious [50th] anniversary;
we pride ourselves on our achievements in economic
and scientific techniques; and we ourselves, at the very
time the IJnited Nations has declared 1968 the Year
of the Defense of the Rights of Man, are handing the
enemies of communism trump cards to be used against
us. It is absurd!
We were naked, hungry, and destitute, but we won
because we placed in the foreground the liberation of
man from injustice, outrage, lack of rights, etc. And we
can lose everything, despite our rockets and hydrogen
bombs, if we forget the origins of the Great October
Socialist Revolution.
From the time of Radischey,1 trials of writers have
always been an abomination in the eyes of progressive,
thinking people. What were our home-grown leaders
thinking of when they shut [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn's
mouth, made rr fool of the poet [Andrei] Voznesensky,
"punished" [Andrei D.] Siniavsky and [Yuli M.] Daniel
with forced labor, when they involved the KGB [secret
policell in spectacles with "foreign enemies" ?
One must not subvert the confidence of the masses
in the party; one must not speculate with the honor
of the state, even if a certain leader wants to end
santizdat.2 Sarnizdat can be eliminated only by one means:
by the development of democratic rights, not their vio-
lation; by observance of the Constitution, not its viola.
lion; by the realization in practice of the Declaration
of Human Rights, which [Andrei Y.] Vishinsky [former
Foreign Minister] signed in the name of our state, not
by ignoring it.
Incidentally, it appears that Articles 18 and 19 of the
Declaration read:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion . . . Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.
3
You know Article 125 of our Co, titution perfectly
well, so I shall not quote it. I only t ant to recall the
thought of V. I. Lenin to the effect t ' .f! need full
and true information, and truth should 1...! tit --;?nd upon
the question of whom it should serve" (IP ,!. edi-
tion, Vol. 54, p. 446).
I believe that the persecution of young dissenters
a country where more than 50 percent of the population
are younger than thirty years of age is an extremely
dangerous line?adventurism. It is not the toadies, not a
public of yesmen (0 Lord, how they have multiplied!),
not the mama's boys, who will determine our future,
but rather those very rebels, the most energetic, brave,
and high-principled members of our young generation.
It is stupid to see in them the enemies of Soviet power?
and more than stupid to let them rot In prisons and to
mock them. For the party, such a line is equivalent to
self-strangulation. Too bad for us if we are not capable
of reaching an understanding with these young people.
They will create, inevitably they will create, a new
party. Ideas cannot be murdered with bullets, prisons,
or exile. He who does not understand this is no poli-
tician, no Marxist.
You, of course, remember the "Testament of Palmiro
Togliatti." I have in mind this part of it: -
A general impression has been created of foot-drageing
and opposition in the matter of a return to Leninist
norms which would insure both within the party and
outside it more freedom of utterance and discussion
on questions of culture, art, and politics, as well.
It is difficult for us to explain to ourselves this Pool-
dragging and this opposition, particularly in view of
contemporary conditions, when the capitalist encircle-
ment no longer exists and economic construction has
attained enormous successes.
We have always proceeded from the thought that
socialism is a system in which there exists the broadest
freedom for the workers who participate in the cause,
who participate in an organized way in the leadership
of social life as a whole. (Pravda, Sept. 10, 1964.)
Who benefits from a policy of foot-dragging and op-
position? Only overt or covert Stalinists, political bank-
rupts. Remember: Leninism?yes! Stalinism?no! The
20th Congress of the party did its work. The genie is
at large and cannot be confined again! By no forces
and nobody!
We are on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the
Soviet army [Feb. 23]. We are on the eve of the con-
sultative meeting of the fraternal Communist parties
[which opened in Budapest Feb. 26]. Do not complicate
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your work for yourselves, do not darken the atmosphere in
the country.
On the contrary, Comrade Podgorny [Soviet Presi-
dent] could amnesty Siniavsky, Daniel, Bukovsky, and
could order a review of the case of A. Ginzburg and
others. The Moscow Municipal Court, in this last case,
permitted the grossest violations of legal procedure.
Prosecutor Terekhov, Judge Miroriov, the commandant
of the court, Tsirkunenko, should be punished in ap-
propriate fashion, primarily for acting like idiots and
abusing their power.
One cannot achieve legality by violating the laws.
We will never permit anyone to prostitute our Soviet
courts, our laws, and our rights. Such violators should
be thrown out with a vengeance, for they are doing
Soviet power more harm than all your NTS's, BBC's,
Radio Liberty's, taken together.
Let,Novyi mir again print the works of A. Solzhenitsyn.
Let Q. Serebriakova publish her "Sandstorm" in the
USSIti and Ye. Ginzburg her "Journey Into the Whirl.
wind." Anyway they are known and read; it's no secret.
I live in the provinces where, for every electrified home,
there are 10 unelectrified ones, where in the winter the
buses can't get through and the mail is late by whole
"I Warit to be That Happy": Excerpts
from the Diary of I. A. Yakhimovich
NOTE: More than three years before he wrote the above
letter ol protest to Party Secretary Suslov, f. A.
Yakhimovich received unexpected publicity through the
publication of excerpts from his personal cliary in the
Soviet youth organ Komsomolskaia pravdq (Oct. 30,
1964). 4n abridged translation 0/ these excerpts, with
the introduction by the paper's correspondent, is pre-
sented below as a sidelight on the personality and views
of the author o/ the letter.?Ed.
He wears brown cowboy pants, is black "devil's hide"
jacket, and a beret. But it's not so much the kqlkhoz
chairman's "suspicious" manner of dress as it is his
beard that bothers leaders in the district and even in
the republic: "Isn't that Yakhimovich a dandy!" I heard
it as an intimation and even as a simple statement of
fact in Kraslava and Riga, hut not in Sivergala.
The Sivergala kolkhozniks would never think of their
chairman that way. To them, Antonovich is hardworking,
honest and fair, a man who worries more about the
kolkhoz than about himself.
The chairman's house is full of books. The shelves,'
bookcases and table are loaded with them. There are
two booklovers in the house: Ivan Antonovich himself
and his wife. Both are philologists, graduates of the
Latvian State University, he in 1956 and she in 1960.
While she was still a student, he was teaching rural
children, then became a regional inspector and, finally,
the head of a backward kolkhoz. When she began teach-
ing in the Sivergala school, he became a student again,
this time by correspondence with the agricultural academy.
weeks. If information [of the trials] has reached us
on the broadest scale, you can well imagine what you
have done, what kind of seeds you have sown throughout
the country. Have the courage to correct the mistakes
that have been made, before the workers and peasants
take a hand in this affair.
I don't want this letter to be passed over in silerice,
for the cause of the party cannot be a private cause, a
personal cause, and, even less, a second-rate cause.
? I consider it the duty of a Communist to warn the
Central Committee of the party, and to insist that all
members of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union be acquainted with the contents
of this letter.
The letter is sent to Comrade Suslov with this in view.
With Communist greetings!
I. A. YAKHIMOVICH
1 Aleksandr Nikolnevich Radishchev, 18th-century Russian
philosopher and poet. One of the first to advocate a revolt'.
tionary transformation of Russian society, he was exiled to
Siberia for six years after writing a book (Journey /roar
Sc. Petersburg to Moscow) which greatly influenced 19th.
century Russian revolutionary democrats.?Ed.
1.5canirdat h the term for underground literature.?Ed.
A year ago I learned by accident that Ivan Antonovieh
Yakhimovich, chairman of the "Young Guard" Kolkhoz,
was keeping a diary. At that time, he told me that he was
keeping the diary only "for himself." This fall, how-
ever, he entrusted me with his notebooks. Here are some
excerpts from that diary, which he decided to make
public, and which I thought would interest everyone.
?D. Vasilieva, correspondent
for Komsomolskaia pray&
1960
March 12: A month has passed since our wedding.
And it's already a month since I became chairman of
the kolkhoz. Ira is in Riga finishing up her studies.
Work, work, and more work. Even asleep I can't
get away from my worries and anxieties. The kolkhoz
is poor, and I'm considered just another poor relation.
My pay is 300 rubles. I set the figure myself. This seems
. eccentric to lots of people, the act of a little boy play.
ing at patriotism. But to me, these are the hard, cold
facts of life. Besides, the 300 rubles is only temporary,
until the kolkhoz picks up.
April 5: We bought five tons of potassium nitrate
with money borrowed from the kolkhozniks. There isn't
a cent in the bank. An urgent payment of 70,000 rubles
has suddenly come due. The debt to the kolkhozniks
is now 42,000. It has been dragging on since 1958.
We run o the stores and the trade bureau carrying
a suitcase with the cash. Whenever we appear, they
taunt us by asking, "With or without suitcase?"--i.e.,
with or without money?
May It: I've been accepted as a candidate member
of the CPS.
May 22: The planting is simper done. The spring
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' wheat is in, more than half the flax, 40 percent of the
, potatoes, 10 percent of the corn. i
Have I learned how to judge time? I don't know,
but I do know that I value it rpore than ever before.
hate 20; Some sailors from Ole Baltic Fleet came
to the kolpoz. Their concert wps too fine for words.
Our people were pleased, and our guests were pleased
Iwith themselves. If only our amateur performances were
on , the same level!
' December 2: The farms in Latgaliia cannot be com-
pared with others in the republic. Latgaliia is eco-
:
nomically tiackward. There are no sound buildings, no
purebred cattle. The soil is poor. To get a good harvest,
two ''irir thype times as much has to be put in as in
other parts of Latvia. Our bread, tri lk, and meat cost
us so i much more because the rail id is so far away
and the roads to the fields are so bad.
Latgaliia is really virgin land. It has to be developed
decisitelr and boldly.
I,
1961
April 23: So much is happening! What a blast-off,
what a flight! April 20th, Yuri Gagarin leaped into
space and returned to earth. The invasion of Cuba and
the crushing defeat of the interventionists.
Spring is coming. Tomorrow we begin planting. We
have advanced everyone twenty kopek. apiece, Of two
rubles in old money, for each working day .. . .
May 3: How often we still try to justify our mistakes
in education and our simple laziness by blaming the
poor, ungifted students. Someday it will be different:
lack of talent, not talent, will be the exception. The
mediocre person will be considered a waste and a failure
on the part of the whole collective. The normal human
being hies tremendous potentialities within him?that's
a law, not an invention. It is the duty of society and
of each individual to turn the potentiality into reality.
May 29: I received a severe reprimand for not fulfilling
the quarterly quota for meat.
June II: Heat and drought. A few more days of
this and the fields will burn up and the harvest will
be 14t. There are unpromising clouds floating about,
sometimes even thunder and two or three drops of rain,
then once more it's dry and hot. The streams have
dried up, and the swamps have settled. All the roads
have become passable.
But the winter rye is all right despite the weather, and
even the clover has matured early. The nightingales
give no peace. Summer residents, fishermen, and tour-
ists have arrived, making us envious as hell. But there
isn't even time to be envious?we're starting to get the
fodder ready. The first stalks of grain have already
appeared. What a wonderful smell!
July 21: I'm reading the story "The Last Wish of
Aleksandr Ulianov" in Sergei Lvov's Fire of Prometheus.
August 3: Being a kolkhoz chairman is like being
sentenced to hard labor! How many hours does a
chairman work? Around the clock. How many hours
does he sleep? Only enough to keep him on his feet.
But that isn't the hard part. Serving the people is a
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heavy responsibility, but an honorable one. It's horrible
when bureaucracy interferes. How tired you get o
petty supervision! They figure it out, chew it over, and
shove it under your nose: how many hectares to plant
with what, what kind of harvest to get, and when.
This is called planning from below .. . .
August 10: I'm going to Riga for a 91-54 tractor.
The news has spread all over the kolkhoz.
August 25: We're beginning to thresh the rye. Such
impatience, such an itch to make something out of
this! Electricity, a club, a barn, a new organization of
jobs, rational discipline! It's time to launch a real
campaign for these things, one that will carry everyone
along. How we need such a campaign! It's the only way
to attract good people.
September 30: I'm a papa. My daughter was born.
Just think how old I've gotten overnight. What a
wonderful way to grow old!
November 6: We've paid our debts. Now we don't
owe the government or anybody. It has changed every-
thing; it's as if the resentment, suffering and agony had
never been.
November 28: The nausea and pains have come back.
I'm not smoking. I've become irritable, and I get tired
easily. A "repair job" Is necessary. I'm going to the
hospital tomorrow.
December 7: I didn't go to the hospital. Things
changed, and so did I.
5
1962
February 19: The brigade leaders greeted the sugar.
beet project with silence. When we got down to con-
crete plot sizes for each brigade, the reception turned
hostile. Bleidel remarked, "Twenty hectares in our
situation is no joke!"
March 10: Communism is the highest quality in every-
thing, from man on down to a child's little sock.
May 16: Today's meeting of the management has left
a bitter aftertaste: we punished several men for mis-
handling the machines. Brench got a stern reprimand
and a fine of thirty rubles. Geka is going to be tried.
The failures and problems in dealing with people!
July 7: We're beginning to spray the corn with
herbicides. There was a general meeting of the kolkhoz.
The semi-annual report. It's possible we'll become "hun-
dred-thousanders" this year.
July 13: Irochka crawls along fast, pulling her little
legs under her. She claps her hands together and says
"Papa" already. She is very curious and bright. She's
a lot of trouble, but more joy.
August 16: Nikolaev, Popovich . . . One gets used
to miracles.
September 25: Rain. Uninterrupted rain. We're plow-
ing the fields for fall. The tractors get stuck. So Ivan
Trubach has decided to do his plowing in two separate
steps. He takes care of the swampiest spots by first
dragging his feet along the ground, feeling out the best
path for his tractor. Where Trubach has been with his
machine, there will be a harvest.
November 29: Our number has increased! They
brought Tatiana Ivanovna home from the maternity ward
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yesterday.
December 11: We raised the money for a ten-kilowatt
1,Jotor for our drying room. By actual count this is the
fifteenth motor already. Do you recall, Comrade Chair-
man, how you ran around looking for kerosene lamps?
1963
February 2: It's too bad that so far we haven't been
able to reconcile our young people to systematic labor:
nudging and scolding don't get very. far. And we've
had no luck with the Komsomol secretaries. Maybe
Rosa Butkana should be nominated. She's energetic,
strong-willed, and principled.
March 4: Again and again we go back- to Lenin,
not out of duty like the schoolboy or student, but out
of the natural need for advice, ideas, and moral purity.
April 2: A light blue, faultlessly clear sky, the tops
of the birches barely moving. This is all I can see from
lily hospital bed. A stomach ulcer sent me to the hos-
pital a ftdr all. A lot of our fellow kolkhozniks are here,
being "ntended" before the planting. I look upon my
own illness as a soldier wounded in battle looks upon
the mutilated part of his body: put this to rights as
quickly ,its possible and let me get back to the ranks.
Almost iveryone here has similar thoughts. When the
attack crimes, each of us must be at his post.
April 4: I can't get the clash with Krikov, head of
the financial planning department, out of my head.
lie didn't want any arguments and on his "own discre-
tion" fixed the plot sizes for flax, corn and sugar beets.
I told him the plan would only work on paper, and
not on the land. Krikov just about choked with fury.
Was I being cheeky? No. It's all very, well to be
humble, but not in all situations. To be humble where
the truth is concerned is to be a scoundrel.
April 7: I have armed myself with books: Turgenev,
Pushkin, Chekhov. I especially want to reread Turgenev.
I go from book to book, becoming less tired and more
delighted all the time.
But I miss my work like the very devil. In the near
future we're going to have to work out our fertilizer
ourchase and distribution in such a way as to avoid
having to move manure to the outlying fields. We should
keep a supply of peat out there (piles of it, mixed with
ground phosphates and dung-water) and prepare the
compost on the spot: a little manure, peat, soil, and
mineral fertilizers. The manure could also be bought
on the spot from the kolkhozniks. We must wage an
all-out battle against unproductive expenditures.
Pastureland should be closer to the farms so that
milking times can be coordinated. Calves, sheep and
horses should be kept in the farthest fields. Also, lu-
pine plants, pea plants, mixed vetch and oats, and seed
...lover. In toward the center the land should be worked
more intensively.
April 15: My neighbor in the next bed treated us all
to eggs, proudly explaining, "My wife brought them,
hiking 25 kilometers on foot. We've lived together a
long time and never had a serious .argument." Before,
this peasant looked plain and grey to me, but now he's
transformed, handsome even. My mood picked up im-
mediately, but it could have been completely ruined by
Icy Ovalov's Story of a Life.
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Right now, nothing depresses me more than a
thoughtless attitude toward human feelings, toward the
purity of those feelings. Did the heroine of this story
ever love her drunkard-husband? No. Consequently,
their domestic relations are petty, stupid, and offensive
from start to finish. All the heroes of the book are
narrow, mediocre and weak. I'm sorry for them, with
all their little ideas and little passions, but most of
all I'm sorry for the author. The book leaves a flat,
grey impression like the description of a bygone day.
I compare everything I read with my own experience,
observations and feelings. It's disappointing not to find
in a book anything that you can strive for.
I look at our love and am glad it is growing, becoming
broader, more mature, deeper, more humane. Our love is
not afraid to look truth in the ere, not afraid to demand
that we each fulfill our duty. Most important of all, it is
growing and will continue to grow along with us and our
children. For us, where to live or how to divide the house-
hold chores is no more of a problem than filling our time
and avoiding boredom. We live in the whole world and
bring the whole world to each other.
April 20: I left the hospital yesterday. I didn't want to
wait for the bus, so I got back to the kolkhoz on a dump
truck. My life begins again with a working day. . . .
June 14: There's no doubt that talent has been un-
covered and put to work for human society by material
incentives. But moral incentives will predominate in the
future and will so eclipse the former that any comparison
of the two will seem an absurd joke. . . .
August 25: I once wrote to the republic Ministry of
Production and Purchases with asuggestion for organiz-
ing purchases preferentially, based on the need for spe-
cialization. Livestock products should be emphasized, and
grain minimized. Well, in practice, I've had to abandon
that viewpoint. In fact I had no alternative: I had no right
to sacrifice grain. In the interests of the state most of all,
I didn't have the right. What kind of a mood would the
kolkhozniks have been in, what would they have planted
in the spring?
For over a week auditors have been digging around in
our files. Rumors and gossip are spreading. All this dis-
organizes people, interferes with work. It's possible that
I'll be replaced by another man. That would be hard to
take. I can't imagine not being on the kolkhoz. To have
lived four years with its trials and tribulations . . . I'm
most concerned not for myself, but for the kolkhoz, that
it shouldn't take a beating. It's very important that not
just any man be allowed to take the post of chairman.
October 15: In the forest, it's ashf all the summer smells
were being burned away in a great smoldering bonfire.
Autumn. The work in the fields is done. People are in a
good mood. The main thing is that there is faith in the
coming year, which means "a desire to work." This makes
me glad and gives me strength. I still don't know my fate.
December 8: A reprimand . . . Well, that's not so bad.
The main thing?they left me in the kolkhoz.
1964
January 1: A tiny fir tree in the room. The candles
are lit. The children are asleep. Ira and I have wished
each other a happy new year. We turn things over in
our minds and agree that the past year hu been good,
iii; '--I- '-S SSSASS ill
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I became a student again, and our kolkhoz became a
"millionaire" (old price scale), meeting the plan for
meat and milk deliveries to the state and settling up
accounts with the kolkhozniks. Despite the difficulties
and special problems of the year, we made a good
stride forward: All branches of livestock production
became profitable. Even pork brought a profit this year.
February 2: The reports and elections meeting. I was
re?elected chairman.
February 9: We've gone over to monthly wages for
the kolkhozniks. The advantages of this system have
become immediately apparent: it gives people a taste
for money, diverts them from private farming, encourages
the accountants, and gets the kolkhoz finances moving.
, I reniember Janis Nartysh's "philosophy" which he
:elaborated for me at the start of my tenure here. "What's
:bad for the kolkhoznik? Freedom of choice: if he
,wanls he works; if lie doesn't want to, he just lies
the 'stove." Now Janis doesn't much care to lie on
he id ovi?.
February 9: Yesterday we saw "The Living and the
D ead." both parts. The penal servitude of war. The
povierles'sness of the strong. Hut it was as it should be:
the determination to defend one's country is more powerful
than the will to enslave. It was that great determination
that gave the strength and forged the victory. I liked
the whole film, it went straight to my heart?the author,.
time director, the netors--everythingt
ell, v The worst things for production are
1.114111V1.1111?111 ill habit, Menial Inertia. Certain
n .
,ot io (Tomtit lenders have not yet managed to shake
,this disease. They put instructions above everything else.
The words we waste in conversation! We talk?and
'decide nothing. We sit down, but not together. We
must work, pencil in hand: think, think?not just pour
one empty vessel into another.
February 2.5: Another daughter, our third. Weight:
four kilos. Hair: black.
Erhpery. I feel so sorry for zupery! How hard it
must have been to live persecuted and alone. To forget
oneself only in the endless skies, or with children. To
feel the constant need for beautiful people, a need almost
like hunger . . . How tragic that fate foisted off on him
a friend-mistress and a nutty wife. What a wild absurdity
those relationships seem, when you see people of St.
ExupCry's type.
April 3: I went to Yelgava, to the agricultural academy.
My exams and tests are behind me, my first year is behind
me. I did well in the history of the CPSU, mathematics,
and physics; I got a C in chemistry. I'm happier about
that than about all my A's put together. But it's too bad
I didn't have two or three more days. Slimit is Shmit,
and it's shameful to pass with just a C from such an
instructor.
; April 16: Khikmet is a thousand times right in saying
that in the 20th century only a genuine Communist can
be the happiest of men. I want to be that happy.
May 21: The planting's nearly done, but it's cold.
May is always capricious. This year we stood firm on
our right to full autonomy. Down to the last hectare.
we figured out and decided for ourselves what to plant.
July 6: The drudgery of harvest time approaches. In
those fields where neither reapers nor combines can be
used, we'll cut the grain by hand. We held brigade
meetings, and a specific rye field was assigned to each
household. The kolkhozniks determined the dimensions
themselves, according to their abilities. Everyone is in
a cheerful mood. In addition to the pay, we're going to
give out bread. Everyone is clear an our goal: to finish
up before August 1st.
The harvest "watchmen" have been approved: they'll
be responsible for overseeing the collection, weighing,
and delivery of the grain. As usual, Yazep Kovalsky will
be one of them. Nobody has ever doubted the honesty of
this man. He is the conscience of the kolkhoz.
July 31: All the grain is in. It took seven days. For us
that's record time. . . .
Khronika, issue #4. of 31 October 1968, provides some background on ?
Yakhimovich prior to his being arrested and placed under psychiatric exam?
ination, as follows:
On 27 October 1968 a search was conducted at the home of Ivan Yakhimovich.
Yakhimovich, in the not?too?distant past the chairman of the collective farm
"Yauna Gvardo" in the Kraslavsky Region of the Latvian SSR, was relieved of
,his job after he wrote his well?known letter to the Central Committee. His
wife, Irina Yakhimovich, was also expelled from the school where she taught.
,Now their family, including three children, lives in Yurmala, a town in the
,Latvian SSR. Irina Yakhimovich works in a kindergarten. Ivan Yakhimovich in
'the summer of 1968 was illegally deprived of his registration -- in his pass?
port the militia simply cut out the registration stamp -- and, naturally, he
has not found a job.
In setting up the search, which was authorized by Kvieshons, the Deputy
Procuror of Yurmala, it was said that the search would be conducted because of
the suspected robbery of Yurmala branch of the State Bank in the sum of 19,654
rubles. Of course, no money was found in the course of the search -- but the
searchers seized several pieces of samizdat material, the protest letter of
Yakhimovich on the occasion of the arrest of the participants of the demon?
stration of 25 August, the draft of his unfinished article on the post?January
development in Czechoslovakia, the personal diary of his wife, etc.
7
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C. ALEXANDER S. YESENIN?VOLPIN
(also, A. S. VOLPIN)
ALEKSANDR SERGF.EVICH YESENIN-VOLPIN (1924- )?
Mathematician and poet-philosopher, son of poet Sergei
Yesenin (who committed suicide in 1925). Yesenin-Volpin
was twice imprisoned (in 1949 and 1959), in the latter
instance for smuggling an "anti-Soviet" philosophical
treatise to the West. A collection of his poems, A Leal
of Spring (New York, Praeger), was published in 1961;
in 1962, his poetry was described by Leonid Ilichev (then
head of the Ideological Commission of the party's Cen-
tral Committee) as the "ravings of a mentally deranged
person." On December 5, 1965, led a rally in Moscow's
Pushkin Square in protest against the arrest of Siniavsky
and Daniel. On February 19, 1966, challenged the legality
of the Siniavsky-Daniel verdict in an interview with a
correspondent of The New York Times. An active pro-
tester against the Galanskov-Ginzburg trial (Docs. 21
and 32), was picked up at his home in mid-February
1968 and again taken to a mental institution. In March
1968, 95 mathematicians protested his forcible confine-
ment in a letter to the Minister of Health, the Procurator
General, and the Chief Psychiatrist of the City of Mos.
cow; 15 withdrew their signatures after the letter was
made public by The New York Times (Does. 35 and 36).
Petition of 95 Mathematicians
To: The Minister of Health, USSR
The Procurator General of the USSR
Copy to:
Chief Psychiatrist, City of Moscow
We have learned that the prominent Soviet mathemati-
cian and well-known specialist in the field of mathemati-
cal logic, Aleksandr Sergeevich Yesenin-Volpin, has been
forcibly, without prior medical examination, and without
the knowledge or consent of his relatives, placed in Psy-
chiatric Hospital No. 5, Stolbovaia Station, 70 kilometers
from Moscow.
The forcible commitment of a talented and entirely able-
bodied mathematician to a hospital for seriously-disturbed
mental patients and the conditions in which he finds him-
self as a consequence of the very nature of the institution
subject him to severe mental trauma, are injurious to his
health, and abase his personal dignity.
Proceeding from the humanitarian aims of our legisla-
tive organs and, even more, of our public health services,
we consider this fact a flagrant violation of medical and
legal norms.
We request that you intercede immediately and take the
necessary steps to enable our colleague to [resume] work
under normal conditions.
Signatures:
P. S. NovtKov?Member, USSR Academy of Sciences;
Lenin Prize Winner
I. M. Gurario?Corresponding Member, USSR Academy
of Sciences; Lenin and State Prize Winner
LAZAR LtusTEnutx--Corresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences ? State Prize Winner
Mont MmucoeCorresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences
Umi iti Muoll Corresponding Member, USSR Acad.
cmy of Sciences; State Prize Winner
S. P. NOVIKOV?Correspondling Member, USSR Academy
of Sciences; Lenin Prize Winner
I. 11. SHAFAREVICH?Corresponding Member, USSR Acad-
emy of Sciences; Lenin Prize Winner
VADIM AsivoLD?Lenin Prize Winner; Professor; Doctor
of Physical-Mathematical Sciences
ANATOL! VITUSIIK1N?Lenin Prize Winner; Professor;
Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences
ALEKSANDR KnoNnoo--State Prize Winner; Professor;
Doctor of Physical-Mathematical Sciences
Yuri' MANIN?Lenin Prize Winner; Doctor of Physical.
Mathematical Sciences
N. M. AIEIMAN?State Prize Winner; Professor; Doctor of
Physical-Mathematical Sciences
Professors/Doctors of Phyaical-Mathematical
F. F. SOKSIITEIN
D. A. llocilvaa
V. A. YEFRF.MOVICH
LIUDMILA KELDYSH
A. A. Kiniu.ov
V. A. KONDRATEV
A. G. Kunosit
YE. M. LANDIS
A. M. LODSHITS
A. YA. POVZNER
N. B. ZDOLINSkY
I. I. PYTETSKY?SHAP1I0
F. P. PALAMODOV
Yu. M. Shimmy/
S. V. Fomir
G. Z. Smov
A. M. YAGLOM
I. M. YAGLOM
Doctors of Physical-Mathematical Sciences:
M. S. AGRONOVICH V. PONOMAREV,
A. V. ARKHANGELSK; Senior Scientific Worker
Assistant Professor YA. G. SINAI,
Senior Scientific Worker
V. ? W
111110I.
". A Isl.es sus
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Candidates in Physical-Matirmatical Sciences:
B. G. AvEnntixit, Assist- L A. KnoNam Assist-
ant Professor ? ant Professor
B. M. ALEKSF.EV, Assist- A. N. Kanitkov
ant Professor A. L. KRYLOV
L. M. BALAKINA 0. S. KULACINA, Senior
'I'. M. BAnANovtat, Assist- ? Scientific Worker
V, LEVCHENKO
?L. LUND
R. A. MIntos, Senior
Scientific Worker
K. A. MIKHAILOVA
A. L. ONISIICHIK, Assist-
,
ant Professor
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to the Minister of Medical Care of the USSR, Academician B. V. Petrovsky, first
by Academicians A. N. Kolmogorov and P. S. Aleksandrov, and later by 99 other
scientists (including the greatest Soviet mathematicians-academicians, profes-
sors, winners of Lenin Prizes) did the situation of Volpin improve a bit; nov
he is once again in Kashthenko Hospital, but in Section 32, which is more
pleasant than Section 3.
"The regulation 'Concerning the Urgent Hospitalization of the Psychiatric-
ally Sick Who Represent a Public Danger' (regulations concerning 'Legislation
on Medical Care,' volume 6, 1963) could be the only official basis for such
actions. However, in the first place, it is only official and not legal, since
the very fact of the forcible hospitalization contradicts Articles 58-60 of
the Criminal Code of the RSFSR under which measures of compulsion of a medical
nature are established by a court of law.
"The hospitalization of persons as 'publicly-dangerous' directly contra-
dicts the basic principle of legality, the principle of the presumption of
innocence, since the confession of being socially dangerous is made by a per-
son who has committed an offense, which can be established only by the verdict
of a court of law. In the second place, even this somewhat cruel and illegal
regulation was rudely violated. When someone stays in the hospital for 24
hours he must be examined by a commission of three men, which did not take
place in the case of Volpin, nor in the case of Gorbanevskaya. Their rela-
tives were not informed, which they should obligatorily have been according
to the regulation. Finally, the commission, appointed after the letter was
sent by the mathematicians, established only that Volpin requires care and it
partly improved his conditions of confinement in the hospital. According to
the regulation, the commission was similarly obliged to examine the patient
once a month and thereupon to report, not whether he is sick in general, but
rather whether his sickness is of a 'publicly-dangerous nature.' If not, the
patient is discharged in the care of his relatives. The regular commission,
which was set up on 17 April, also declared that Volpin needed another month
and a half to 'get well."
Note: Brief mention is made in Khronika # 6, 28 February 1969, of A. S.
Yesenin-Volpin's advice on the legal rights of those who face interrogation,
as follows:
"Interrogation may face anyone, sometimes if only because his telephone .
number is found in a notebook seized in a search. But it is important for a
person to know not only his own rights, but also the extent of the rights of
the investigator conducting the interrogation. Volpin's 'Instructions,' even
though written in the author's own complex style, will provide a great deal
of legal information necessary for the person being interrogated so that he
can survive the increasing violations of legality and not become their un-
witting accomplice."
10
A
'A AIIIAll III
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D. NATALYA GORBANIFSKAYA
Note: The following is from Khronika # 1, 30 April 1968:
"N. Gorbanevskaya, without advance notice and without the consent of her
relatives, on 15 February was transferred from Maternity Home #27, where whe
was lying to conserve strength for her pregnancy, to Section #27 of the Kash-
chenko Hospital. The decision to transfer her was undertaken with the parti-
cipation of the psychiatric duty officer of the Timiryazevsky Zone, but the
basis for the transfer was termed the request of the patient to be discharged.
Al 23 February Gorbanqyskaya was discharged from the Kashchenko Hospital, since
the psychiatrists con ded that she didn't require treatment.
11
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E. VALERY Y. TAMS
VALERI YAKOVIEVICH TARSIS (1906- ) Joined
the party as a young man and worked as an editor in a
state publishing house. Fought in World Wail' and was
twice wounded. In the early 1960's, had several novels
published abroad, including The Bluebottle (London, Col-
lins and Harvill Press, 1962) and Red and Black (New
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), both of which are set in
the Stalin era. Arrested in 1962 and kept in an insane
asylum for seven months after writing a letter to Khru-
shchev calling the Soviet Union an unbearable place to
live. After his release, wrote Ward 7 (London, Collins and
Harvill Press 1965), a barely fictionalized account of his
confinement in which he predicted the inevitable over-
throw of Soviet totalitarianism, which he equated with
fascism In 1966 was permitted to go to England, where
he bitterly denounced the Soviet regime and was granted
political asylum, resulting in the revocation of his Soviet
citizenship.
4 000400 50001-6
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F. OTHERS
Issues 3 & 4 of Khronika reported the arrest of several Leningraders and
the circumstances of that arrest. In #5 of Khronika, 31 December 1968, it is
reported that in October, two of the accused -- Nikolay Danilov and Yevgeny
Shashenkov -- were declared not responsible, and the court prescribed compul-
sory treatment in a psychiatric hospital of a special type, i.e., a hospital-
prison.
Nikolay Danilov, a jurist, at the end of the 1950's worked as an inter-
rogator of the KGB in the Ukraine and in Sakhalin Oblast, after which he left
that job and for some time was a common laborer. It was not until recent times
that he began to work as a legal adviser. He writes poetry. Absenting him-
pelf from the institute, in April 1966, together with Yury Gendler, Lev Kva-
qhensky and Viktor Faynberg he wrote a letter to the General Procuror of the
11SSR about violations of legal procedures permitted in a Leningrad trial.
In June 1966 he was kicked out of the institute. Nikolay Danilov has a 9-
year-old daughter.
Yevgeny Shashenkov is an engineer. In 1960, when a student at Leningrad
University, he wrote a letter addressed to Stalin, after which he was arrested.
He experienced every cruelty of the investigator of that period, and then for
the first time was placed in a prison-like psychiatric hospital. The second
time he got sent there was in 1963 or 1964. Now he must undergo this experi-
ence a third time. In any event Shashenkov displayed firmness during the
interrogation and refused to give testimony.
13
4
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TIME,
28 November 1969
RUSSIA
Notes from the Underground
Soviet newspapers almost never men-
tion the acts of protest against gov-
ernment policy that have become com-
monplace in Russia during the past few
years. Scarcely over do they speak of
the arreSts and other reprisals against dis-
senters that are now taking place with in-
creasing frequency in the Soviet Union.
Despite the blanket of official silence,
there is one publication in Russia that re-
cords the protests and persecution of
the country's dissenters. It is a small,
often tattered, clandestine newsletter
called Chronicle of Current Events. De-
spite constant KGB (secret police) ef-
forts to stamp it out, the Chronicle.
which usually runs no more than 40
typescript pages, circulates among in-
tellectuals in Major Soviet cities with
the speed of a brush fire.
The Chronicle appears through what
Russians call satnizdat, which means
self-publishingt it is a play on the So-
viet term Gosizdat, the state publishing
house. Behind closed doors, readers type
copies of the newsletter. which they
pass on to friends in chain-letter fash- ?
ion. Fresh news items kir the paper are
sent back to the anonymous editors by
the same chain of communication.
Though anyone who copies or circulates
the Chronicle faces severe penalties, ten
issues of the Chronicle have appeared
since it was launched in 1968: The..
front page of a recent issue carries a quo-
tation from the U.N. Bill of Human
Rights and a list of the cases reported
in the issue (see cut).
Dispassionate Tones. Along with for-
eign short-wave broadcasts, thc Chron.
He has become a main source of in-
formation for Soviet intellectuals. It
broke the news of the arrest of three
naval officers for having drafted an ap-
peal for free speech (TIME., Oct. 31). It
was the only publication in Russia tore-
port on such historical documents as Al-
exander Solzhcnitsyn's letters to the
Writers Union about the banning of
his works. The Chronicle regularly of-
fers listings of the latest officially for-
bidden hooks by both Western and Rus-
sian authors circulating in samizdat edi-
tions in the Soviet Union.
Dispassionate in tone, it prints terse
bulletins about the condition of polit-
ical prisoners, like the writers Andrei
Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, together
with their labor-camp addresses. Top
KGB investigators, prosecutors and judg-
es who are involved in important po-
litical cases arc identified by name for
the record, The avowed purpose of the
Chronicle is to secure civil rights for So-
viet citizens within the letter and spirit
of the constitution. Summaries of re-
cent items:
Alexander Daniel, the 20-year-old son
of Yuli, was denied admission to Tartu
University in Estonia, although he had
been accepted earlier and had graduated
at the top of his high school class. Re-
cently he was fired from a menial job
in the computer center of the Moscow
Engineering Institute. At a meeting
called to discuss young Daniel's case,
the rector of the institute, Nikolai Strel-
chuk, expressed particular dissatisfaction
about the number of Jews, like Daniel,
who had been hired at the institute.
On July 11, Genrikh Altunian, a So-
viet army major and a teacher at the Mil-
itary Institute of Kharkov, was arrested
after u house search had turned up cop-
ies of Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward and
issues of the Chronicle. He was ex-
pelted from the Communist Party, cash.
iered from the army and jailed in a
KGB isolation prison.
ir A KGR investigator, Nikolai Danilov?1
left his work on the island Of Sakhalin?
and took a job as a legal-aid consultant
in a Leningrad law office. He was ars.
rested and confined in a special insane
asylum for political offenders, where he
is being "treated" with insulin shock.
to. In Leningilid last December three in-
tellectuals were tried and sentenced to
hard labor for "producing harboring
and circulating works of an anti-Soviet
nature." These included M Ruyan Djilas'
The New Clavs and Barry Goldwater's
1Vhy Not Victoty? and The Conscience
of a Conservative.
Ominous Forecast. In instances
where Western specialists could check
the veracity of the Chronicle reports,
they have proved to be accurate. That
only makes the newsletter's prediction.
about Stalin seem more significant. Is-
sue No. 10 which has just begun to cir
culate in Russia. reports that the So-
vict leaders are planning, a major cam-
paign to "rehabilitate" Stalin on the
occasion of the 90th anniversary of his
birth next Dec. 21. Major articles in
Pravda and kvestio are ill preparatiott,
together with a four-volume edition
his works. Posters and a statue are also
being made ready for the event. As It
to confirm the. Chronic/es prediction,
two pictures of Stalin last week op.
peared in a photo exhibit of Soviet hit.
tory in Moscow. Since the Kremlin's
attitude toward Stalin often has been
barometer of the government's willing..
ness to repress dissenters, rehabilitation
of the defamed dictator would portend.
an even bleaker era for the readers of
the Chronkk.
25X1C10b
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January 1970
COMMUNIST DEFAMATION EFFORT FAILS
A libel suit brought by a retired Indian Army officer, Brigadier Eric T.
Sen, against the Indian Communist Party weekly publication, New Age, and its
publisher, D. P. Sinha, involved the 1967 publication of a booklet, "I Was a
CIA Spy in India," allegedly written by John Smith, a former Foreign Service
communications clerk in the United States Embassy in New Delhi. Smith dis-
appeared in 1960, then turned up in Moscow in 1967 as a defector and as the
ostensible author of the booklet which was obviously prepared by the Soviets.
Among other wild accusations, it charged that Sen was involved in CIA activi-
ties in India.
Brigadier Sen brought suit against the New Age Printing Press, charging
that it contained libelous references to him. The case had innumerable hear-
ings over the next eighteen months, with the Communists using every legal
means -- and some illegal -- to defend themselves, to delay the proceedings,
to discredit Brigadier Sen and to frustrate his suit. In fact, a reading of
their cross-examination of Brigadier Sen provoked a stinging observation from
a justice of the Delhi High Court that the Communists had grossly abused their
opportunity for cross-examination, and that besides casting "wholly unmerited
aspersion on the character and patriotism of all those distinguished officers
and soldiers who joined the Indian Army before independence, the questions
have not the remotest connection with the defense set up by the petitioner
(accused)."
Also in the course of the hearings, Bhupesh Gupta, editor of the Commu-
nist Party of India weekly, New Age, and member of Parliament, was convicted
of contempt of court, an offense involving moral turpitude, by the High Court
of Delhi as a result of his paper's irresponsible reporting on the case.
Brigadier Sen endured the Communists' harassments and pressed his case
to a successful conclusion. On 25 October the Communist Party's official
publisher of the booklet admitted in open court that his charges were un-
verified; he apologized and regretted the harm caused to Brigadier Sen; and
he pledged not to publish, print or sell any further edition of the pamphlet
Following the apology, Brigadier Sen agreed to withdraw his defamation suit.
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26 October 1969
Compromise allowed in
'CIA agent' case
Iiiindustan Times Correspondent
New Delhi, Oct. 25?Brig. E. T.
Sen (Retd) and D. P. SInha,
printer and , publisher of New
.Age, a Communist Party weekly,
were today st,Ilowed to enter into
a compromise by Mr G. S. KaIra,
Judicial Magistrate, in the defa-,
=Aim case - filed by Brig. Sen
against the printer.
Brig. Sen had charged that a
pamphlet published by Mr Sinha,
which ?contained what were pur-
ported to be the confession of
John Smith, an alleged CIA
agent, had wrongfully linked his
name with John Smith"; espion-
age activities in India, and had
thereby defamed him.
The compromise was effected
on an application made by Mr
Sinha under Section 345 of the
1
Criminal Procedure Code.
In his assurance, ..Mr Sinha
said: "I published the pamphlet.
"/ was a CIA Agent in India," a
Communist Party publication,
without any intention of causing
any personal harm to Brig. E. T.
Sen. When this pamphlet was
published I had not verified the
veracity of the allegations con-
tained in the pamphlet from Brig.
E. T. Sen or 4ohn Smith."
Mr Sinha said that he was
sorry for the harm caused to
Brig. Sen? and that no further
conies of the osmnloot would be
printed or sold by him.
The magistrate allowed, Brig,
Sen to withdraw his cordolaint
after he gave an undertaking ,that
he woula not take any legal Pro-
ceedings about the alljigations
against him In the pamphlet.
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L 1;cavember 196.9
SOVIETCP1. PLOT CP .SD
SPY CHARGE ON ARVAIMAN
WRANG0.CONFESS gJDs
T-TOW the Soviet Union and Corn.
rounist Party of India work in
close collaboration to defame In-
nocent rersons in this country as
CIA agents' for their own purposes
was established last week in a case
concerning a CPI publication "I
was a CIA agent" by Jahn Smith.
Smith who was F n underling in
the US embassy in India from 1954
to 59 claimed In that book that the
CIA was behind a good lot of poli-
tical events that happened in India
frcm 1947 to 1966, though he biro-
sell had been not even in US service
since long. Later Smith defected
tO Moscow. Among the persons
Implicated by Smith was One Brig.
1i. T. Sen.
Seh filed a defamation petition
areinst Mr D. P. SInha, printer tied
publisher of New Age publications,
a CPI Institution. And last week
Mr Sinha told a Delhi judicial mag-
:.-traie that he had failed to verify
the ilegations against the Brigadier.
inha also agreed that the Brigad?
had nothing to do with the CIA.
.anet then, the CPI's official publish-
openly expressed regret for his
Jetion and undertook not to pub.
fish or sell in any manner the same
aamphlet in any form.
Accordinp to knowledgeable circles
the CPI bad taken a high level
decision to tender an uncoodl?
By Our Special Correspondent
(lonal apology fearing the case
was going against the party in-
terests and worse revelations
would come out if the case pro-
ceeded any further. Consequent-
ly it decided to cut itc nose by
confessing a par; so es to save
It face and prevent more
dangerous revelations.
The text of the apology render.
ed by the CPI's official publisher
h interesting in this context: He
stated:
Sinha's Apology
"I published the pamphlet 'I
was a CIA agent in India! a
Comm/List Party Publication
without any intention of caus-
ing any personal harm to Brig..
E. T. Sen. When this pamph-
let was published I had not veri-
6ed the verazity of the ailega?
lions contained in the parnph et
from Brig E. T. Sen or. John
Smith.
Prig. E. T. Sen has stated that
he bad nothing to do with the
CIA and the allegations against
him are not true. I take him at
his word and accept his state-
ment as correct. I am sorry for
the harm caused to him. It is
regretted.
There are no more copies of this
pamphlet in stock with us. No
further edition of this pamphlet
2
will be published, printed or soul
by me either directly or indi-
rectly. Furthtrmore, Brig E T.'
Sen can make public this state-
ment in any manner he desires"
In this context the public opini-
on in India should be well warned
against Soviet-CPI efforts to elimi?
nate political opposition by dubb-
ing it as CIA aient. Communist
publications go all cut to dub peo-
ple they do not like as American
agents. And as the CPI's official
publishsr has now confessed they
have done it In this particular case
without any verification or any facts
to support them. It is therefore
reasonable to suppose that to many
other cases also the allegations aro
made without any baslr. The case
also reveals the close collaboration
between the Soviet Intelligence sera
vices who concoct these charges and
the Communist Party of India
which spews them through Its net-
work of publications.
On behalf of Brig. Sen, the case
was fought by Advocate C. L.
Sareen. Mr Sateen had shot into
the limelight after he successfully
protected a defecting Soviet sailor
Taresov whom the Russians want-
ed to whisk off after charging him
falsely with theft. Mr Sareen
also successfuly represented the
Soviet student Ulugzade who
had sought asylum in American
embassy In New Delhi.
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ORBIT , New Delhi
9 November 1969
Cfl-Soviet
bsg 1e
exposed
By Our Specia,
Correspondent
-%;131clia of th': book I Was
Clit, Agent, a COMIZIll?
PartY4, publication9 is a
,ydarning t'e Oa: public about
Corar 1t chaiques of the
131,6 1.113,7:!
Coma aist attempts to
character ast.....sinate innocent
people by uubhing them as
fore12n ,c.;nce agents
wIcu jL.?..fis, forging of
doeurnent.L., b.-owbeatine, of
their victii . the victims
atand up to ?..,:terld their repo.
tattoo, maligniiv, their lawyers
and giving 0 i ,:orted versions
'of court t, ...iony to servo
,eda ends were
eloquently breught out in the
proe:euinos of the case con-
cc rni the! book.,
M we have already report-
cd, the Communist patty's
ofi.?,ial publisher apologised
in court for the publication
and confessed that the charge
that the retired army officer
rr...ationed in the book v.as
CIA agent was based on un-
verified information. 'rho
('or.,munist party has also un-
der.L.:-,1 not to publish the
book or any vetsion of it in
any r.,..antr (.a photostat of
the sineu apology of the
Communist party's publisher
is reproduced here for public
benefit).
::.bject Failure
Th4upolo;:y of ue puha-
seer N.S CITIMUX to their
ton a ad tortuous attempt.
to lauke propaganda capi.:
tai out of the proceedings
..: case. The upology
only after ail these
raft, rapts not only ended in
ject leisure but brought
connrmation of their dirty
tactics.
, The apology was given.
accordin.? zo competent sour.
ces; on, after the Communist
bigwigs got convinced tht
furiber proceeding of tlic ci.se
worild brin:,, out revelations,
dangerous so them.
The impugned book was
supposed to have been written
by one John Smith, an em-
ployee In the American em.
hasty in India upto 1959 who
later defected to Moscow. ,
There is evidence that
many statements in the
book were never there In
the original
The book first appeared In
Russian in the Moscow maga.
zinc Lltteraturenya Gazetta.
When the Communist party
central office circulated the
magazine articles on Novena-
ber 29, 1967, to "editors of
all party journals and state
councils" with a directive to
give the 'widest publicity to
this, It was the translation of
the article from the Russian
Into English that was circula.
SO.
This itself is strange.
:Smith did not know Russi-
an and must have written
the book, if at all he has
written it, in English. Yet
the original as written by
Smith was not used for
circulation in this country
'but the version as edited
by the Russians was re-
transinted from Russian..,
Why was this devious
means ust.i? Was It because
Smith may not have written
much of the stuff that has
gone under his name?
The version published la
a pamphlet form differs algal-
Scantly from the version cir-
3
cuiated by the Communist
Central office on November
29, 1967. . Whole sentences
have been recast, names that
are not there in the circulated
document are there in the
book. In some pages whole
paragraphs have been added
which do not find a place la
the circulated document. .
This in Itself is enough to
cast serious doubts on the
arithenticity of many passages '
in the book. But the authen-
Ilefty of the whole book itself
is questIonable?
, ?
Many incidents have been
referred to In the book which
occurred after the alleged
author left India and US goys
=meat service. Then there
are most absurd references Co
attempts to remove Krishna
blenon in the early fifties when
the fact Is that Krishna Men.
on himself became a promi-
nent figure and Minister after
1954. ?
There are references to al-
leged attempts to defeat KrIsh-
na Menon in 1962?when in
fact the alleged author was
not even anywhere near the
scene having left India in 1959
and U.S. services later.
. The way the cow proces-
sion of November 1966 and the
attack on Kamaraj's house
are described could have come
only from an eye witness. But
Smith was all the time in the
United States or roaming in
Latin America and Europe.
The whole book is riddled with
inaccuracies, insinuations
and charges against impor,
tent political personalities.
Some of these personali-
ties this Smith could not
have met, his position
being what it was In the
US Embtssy?t'Ist of a
:ommunication clerk.
According to knowledge.
able sourcei which have made
a thorough an-styli' of the
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book, it w fahl: filo%
ten down b9 roVrer n
co with a specific purpose: de-
certain individuals and.
to trump up a charge
tamerican interference in In-
internal affairs.
as coons .1 for the Sojet How far the
rstir Release 2011010N28 :v1W&ROP79-0114.14A0010400
'When the the retired army
officer who was implicated in
the book went to court, the
Communist organs blared out
that they were going to ex.
pcys more persons.
The Communist anger was
particularly aimed at the coun-
sel or the petitioner, Mr C. L.
Sareep. They had reason to
.angry at Mr Sarcen.
Tata ',advocate had given
their 4 principals, the R1.14.
sians.ienough to think about
KW
escape into into freedom but WAS miag blackmailing, maligning
held down by the Russians on and browbeating all those
a charge of theft. who wanted to estantish the
truth as against their calumny,
forms a story all by itself.
It is a tribute to the Indian
judicial system that despite
the technique of the BIG LIE
and the high pitched propa-
ganda from Communist or-
gans, the Communists were
exposed for what they were.
And ultimately bad to seek to
wriggle out of the situation by
tendering the type of apology
t hey g a ve In writing.
(The drama of the trial and
the judiciary', findings on the
Communist tactics will be
published in the next issue. )
In the trial of Tarasov
which created world w'de In-
terest, held in New. Delhi. the
justness of the Indian legal
-s)stem triumphed over the
machinations of the COMEAU*
fist dogma. Tb s charge
against Tarasov was found to
be trumped up and without
any substance.
3o when Sareen appeared
for the army officer who wan-
ted to clear his name, the
Communists went all out not
only to malign the petitioner
but also his counsel.
? -Statement et-Accused- D.P.,Sinha.
[NI,Jnager and Publisheitt-,rM AGE
1.. Prnti P7."44313,"113.2A411%111A Road
? .0.; :
ert Delhi..
.???? ?i i"- ;is!' ZH:
hinhdthpumph1ntISA CIA iiilT If? -
; ?A?
a'COMMUNP1T PARTY. PyBLICATION with tit any intention o.
,?
cai.uin wiy oronft fiUrm.? to13rig.E.T.Sen. When th::.e
? :7 , , ?
pamphlet was nubli!lhod-I had,not.vorifiedtheiveritei 7
':? _7 !y !'': ?
?
of 'tho allegations contained 'in the ..p..mphlet;,frouirig,.,.?
-.". ,? ?
E.T.Sen or John Smith.
'
"
?
' , ?
.Brig..B.T.Sen -.f?'CasYsti.ed:thathe,hata nothing to c
do with the CIA?and the ileationeinst him no
true. I take.'him.at :his ,Ivoi'd and accept his sttor.i-.nt?, ?
an cOrr4et. I m boiiii,fOr'the.haim'CJ'liacd-to him.
?
? *
?
r f,.; ?
in togretted. -
? ? 1
:
I .q
There arc no morc.,copiep of this p-...inchic;t &ji ptoek 404
441. r
with LW. No further editionof,,this paMphletvfll
. ? ?
, ? It
Oublished, :printed or ,Rold by me either dirr?o07.%
indirectly. E.T.Sen can ploKep
thin'statnt. in .).ny:manner.he tie iron.
4
?: ?
/ -Sinhiz)
??ri- .
Accused,
rove or e ease
7-01194
00
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ORGANIZER, India
8 November 1969
BHUPESH APOLOGISES:
The loud-mouthed libellous
C'17711111/11,TIS have asked for
Brig. E. T. Sen's forgiveness
in the defamation case which
the artny man launched agai-
nst the publisher of NEW
AGE, edited by Bhupesh
Gupta, for ',printing the pam-
phlet "I WAS A CIA
AGENT". The slanderous
pamphlet, 1,411t ten by a for-
mer Amelcan Embassy
C
clerk,, had contained wild
charges agains, some lead-
ing Indians including Gen.
Thitnavya, Ram Subhag Sin-
gh, Frank Morues.
One of the victims of the
communists' vicious character
assassination campaigns, was
Brig Sen who took them to a
court of law. During the hear-
ing of the case of com-
munists arid their lawyers tried
ORBIT, New Delhi
23 November 1969
to malign Sen in a manner
to which the High Court took
serious objection, administer-
ing them a "severe warning".
However after these attempts
failed, the comrades just caved
in and tendered the apology.
Said the printer of the CPI
weekly: "When this pamphlet,
was published I had not verified
the veracity of the allegations
contained in the pamphlet
from Brig. E. T. Sep or John
Spy charge exposure-3
Smith.. .7 am sorry for the
harm caused to him. It is regre-
tted."
In order to mollify the sol-
dier further Editor Bhupesh
Gupta is also reported to
have ackedfor hisjargiveness
with 'folded hands' in the -
lwayers' chainber. MI-. M.
C. Chagla and C. L. Sarecn
appeared on behOr of the
brigadier.
vice conspiracy to discredit
I dien Army o ecers
By Our Special Correspondent
THE Communist Party publication "I Was a
1 CIA Agent" was a Soviet-CPI plot to sow
seeds of suspicion between the people on the one
hand and the army and some leading politicians
on the other, sources that have analysed the con-
tents of the book suggest.
The contents of the book
first appeared in a Soviet
magazine and later were pub.
lished in a pamphlet form by
the CPI. Though an Ame-
rican who was declared of
unsound mind and who later
defected to Moscow is its
official author, its real author
is the Soviet intelligence which
dreamt up this plot.
The Communist Party has,
after a protracted legal battle
in which it was humbled, ad-
mitted that the contents relat-
ing to one of the army cfficers
was unverified and agreed
that it will neither print nor
distribute the book as a whole
or in part, in any form. This
confessiou, legal circles say,
came in order to protect the
CPI from being fully exposed
in the court for its conspiracy
with Soviet intelligence.
[In the earlier two issues
ORBIT had analysed this
CPI apology.]
Fake Incidents
The attempt to create dia.
trust of the Indian army's
officers is patent in the bc.ok.
The Delhi High Court has
detected this in analysing the
cross-examination conducted
by the CPI counsel. The
book accuses several officers
including the late Thimayya
5
of being American agentF.
No proof is produced except
some misstatements and bear4
may and what the author John
Smith says he knows. But
these ?Negations do not stand
even elementary scrutiny.
Counsel C.L. Sareen who
appeared on behalf of the reti-
red army officer maligned in
the book proved that the real
author of the book does not
know a thing about the Indi-
an army nor much about
topography of Delhi either.
He could prove that almost
every incident mentioned in
I; is fake. ?
That the real author of
the book has made allegations
without even making sure of
his facts, is also clear from
the incidents mentioned
In the book. In one of these
he says that a colonel In
charge of promotions could
get a car and an aircondi-
tioner because of the money
he recieved from spying for a
foreign country.
However, the fact is that
this colonel was drawing a
four figure salary at the time.
His wife was working in a
Commonwealth High Corn-
mission and getting a !sigh
salary. The colonel got his
car by taking a car loan from
the government. And as an
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-.;my officer iltAp ovitttfortRelaastii200046&129)usChkeRlitflUSianitNADAQA0016000e1a6 on the charge-
on the elegibility of Dr. San
jiva Reddy as a Presidentia
candidate. Now, the Deih
High Court says, that the
party lawyers were unable to
guide the party properly as in
regard to contempt to law
will the CPI stop parading its
pack of "Supreme Court law-
yers" as paragon of legal wis-
dom anymore?
lo foreign made drinks from
ai stores at a very cheap
the book says he
not afrord foreign
sly and that the CIA sup-
oiled it for him. The whole
1340k is full of such howlers.
t one more fantasy is
claim that the author
..ave the bomb in Delhi to a
e:liinese who planted it sub.
equently on the plane that
tr to carry Chinese leaders
io Bandung meet. Is Amen-
zan intelligence that inefficient
t it cannot get a time
,(infii right in Hong Kong or
i:orrnosa itself and needs such
.:tuif to be flown all the
way from Delhi at such risk?
Advocate Sareen also pointed
Gut that She statement of
smith thei4sy the time Smith
zcturned m Maiden Hotel
tot; hawailfore House, the Chi-
nese cold go to Palam and
hoard wplane, cannot be phy-
sically done as Palam is far
!`lr away from the ,hotel corn-
pored to Bhawalpore House.
One more silly piece of
nonsense is the discovery in
the communist party pubhca-
'ion that there is no freedom
opinion in the United
States! That American naval
ratings were happy when a
Japanese fleet was sunk, rot
out of patriotism, but because
the American naval ratings
'hought that by sinking Jape.
fleet they had helped
Union! Mr Sareen,
analysed the book
loroughly found that apart
- fictitious incidents
.1roil also contradicted him-
on every page.
That the governmenj
ouid have left this book un-
!,?,11enged is a pity. For, if
--thing, it has tried to bes-
'lrqh the fair name of the
:eidters in authority much
Jute.
instance, the book re
.c' the cow agitation and
resignation. Though?
was nowhere in US
at that time he claims
with American money because
the former Home 'Minister
had discovered something
about CIA. Are we to be-
lieve that what Nanda did to
expose CIA was not followed
up by his eminent successor?
Is this not a terrible and cal-
culated slur on the spotless
character and patriotism of
Nanda's successor? Surely
such 'Communist-Soviet plot
to malign the outstanding
leaders, of our country should
not be allowed to go unchal-
lenged:
The Home Ministry which
is also concerned with general
law and order in the country
must take note of some of
the 'developments during the
trial. The Communists who
first challenged the army offi-
cers to come to court tried to
use their well known techni-
que of misleading the public
when the court case proceed-
ed.
All the Communist organs
were pressed into service
to publicise widely the
proceedings in such a
manner as to force the
complainant to leave
the case. When the com-
plainant went to Delhi
High Court against the
publication of truncated
and tailored versions of
his testimony, the Delhi
High Court observed:
"The hearings and versions
were not a fair and.
faithful report of proceed-
ings in the court which
seems to betray an oblique
purpose and motive." The
court further observed: "But
as their plea is that they were
ignorant of the precise Impli-
cations of the law of contempt
and their legal advisers were
also unable to guide them pro.
perly..." The Communist
Party however always parades
its pack of "Supreme Court
lawyers" and their collective
views as the last word in legal
wisdom in national and inter-
national affairs. It was this
6
Poisoning Mind
The Delhi High Court also
remarked: "The Impugned
publications (the Commu- India and parliamentary ?pin,
nist party 'lepers) were ion cannot but take note of
accordingly designed by this attempt.
the respondents in both the
cases to hamper the fair in. kir an example of Comma.
al of the case by poisoning nist hypocrisy in making un-.
the gullible mind against verified charges, there is One
the plaintiff" (the army incident in the trial that stands
out.
officer).
ter and patriotism of all
those distinguished officers
and soldiers who joined the
Indian army before inde-
pendence..."
This observation of th
court only strengthens 'th
conclusion of knowledgeab
circles that one of the purpos
of the CPI-Soviet conspirac
in publishing this book wa
to malign the Indian army an
sow seeds of suspicion abou
its loyalty in the minds of th
people. The Government o
The Communist purpose
is clear from this.
The Communists also made
an attempt to browbeat the
army officer and his lawyer so
that they may give up the pro?
secutlon of the party for lebelo
lious matter. This again is
one of the classical communist
techniques.
The Delhi High Court ob-
served "it appears to me that
a considerable portion of the
cross-ex rmination of the com-
plainant" (the army officer) "is
a gross abuse of the opportu-
nity afforded to the accused
for cross-examining the com-
plainant."
Malign Army
?
It is pertinent to point out
hero that during the cross ex.
amination, the Communist
party's counsel tried to belittle
the Indian Army and its sense
of loyalty to the country. The
Delhi High Court observed
about this.
"Apart from the fact the ques--
lions have a tendency to.
east a wholly unmerited
The Communist party's
counsel made an attempt to
implicate the complainant
army officer with a foreign
power by suggesting that the
legal fees of the complainant's
lawyer was being paid by a
foreign embassy. When the
army officer said that he was
paying it himself, the Commit.
nist party counsel wanted the
army officer to produce the
bank account.
This Is how the Delhi High
Court described the incident: ,
1
Cross-Examination
"The counsel for the peti-
tioner (CPI) insisted upon the
production of the bank ac-
count of the complainant
(army officer); but when the
account was summoned by
the court and the cross?exami-
nation of the complainant
proceeded thereafter for seve-
ral days and scores of other
questions were put Co the
complaint with regard to the
payments made by him on go-
count of counsel's fee, not
even once did the learned
counsel refer to the statement
of account called far from the
bank." No further comment
is needed.
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MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
November 8,1969
pi gise
?kr
S
From Our Special Correspondent
NEW DELIII : For eighteen months the Commu-
nists tried to wear the gallant old soldier down by
impugning his patriotism and using smears and
innuendos to blacken his reputation. And for eighteen
months retired Brigadier E. T. Sen fought doggedly
on, trading blow for blow till final victory.
In the end the publisher of the
Communist pamphlet that lip-d
libelled Brig, Sen had to admit
he had not even bothered to
check the facts in the discredited
booklet, which appears to have
been ghost-written by KGB
(Soviet Secret Police) hacks in
the name of John Smith, the
mentally deranged code clerk
who defected to Moscow and
claimed to be a CIA agent.
In the Rajya Sabha on February
2, 1968, Congress MP Arjpn
Arora had asked his Home Minis-
ter: "May I?know if the Govern-
ment has advised its army officers
mentioned in the pamplet
WAS A CIA AGENT' to file a
defamation case so that the vera-
city of the allegatipns may he
questioned before a court of law?"
COM. GUPTA'S BIG TALK
Before the Minister could
reply, Comrade Bhupesh Gupta'
of the CPI, who is also the Edi-
tor of the CI'I mouthpiece, NEW
ACE, shot up in his seat and in-
terjected : "We would welcome'
that because it would give us a?
chance to cross-examine and get
the Prime Minister as a witness..
Do it. We welcome it!"
The defamation case was duly
filed. But when judgement was
delivered it turned out that the
brave Comrade had to eat his
.7ords. The printer and publisher
of NEW ACE, in a statement in:
the court of Mr C. S. Kaira.i
Judicial Mnistrate, apologised:
for publishing- the pamphlet. Ice-,j
grettecl the harm caused to.
Brigadier Sen. said there were no!
Stocks of the booklet in hand, and
promised not to reprint it.
ABJECT RETREAT
In the lawyers' chamber.. Bhu*
pesh t;tipta, it is reliably learned,
begged opposing Counsel to fcir-
give and forget, folding his hands
in repentance.
Like his dear Prime Minister,
whom he wished to cross-examine
in court, Bhupesh confessed that
the charges in the pamphlet were
based on "wrong assumptions"
and Inmee untenable!
The apology tendered by D. P.
Sinha, Manager and Publisher of
NEW AGE (Editor: Bhupesh
Gupta) says :
"I published the pamphlet
WAS A CIA AGENT IN INDIA,'
Li Communist Party publication.
without any intention of causipg
any personal harm to Brig. E. T.
Sen.
NOT VERIFIED!
"When the pamphlet- was
published, I had not verified tile
veracity of the allegations co_n-
tained in the pamphlet from Brig.
E. T. Sen or John Smith. ,
"Brig. E. T. Sen has stated
that he had nothing to do with
tIte CIA and the allegations
against him are not true, take
him at his word and accept his
statement as correct. I am sorry
for the harm caused to him. It
is regretted.
"There are no more copies of
this pamphlet in stock with Its.
No further editon of this pamph-
let will be published, printed or
sold by me ,either directly or
indirectly. Furthermore, Brig.
E. T. Sen can make public this
statement In nny manner he
desires."
Sd/- D. P. Sinha
25.10.339
(D. P. Shiba)
Accused
7
ENDS IN A WHIMPER
So ended in a whimper the
massive character assassinatipn
campaign the Communist Party
had mounted in 1907 against a
number of reputable Indians who
opposed India being turned into
a Soviet satellite. The pamphlet
was part of the game. Supposed
to have been written by a former
dismissed clerk of the American
Embassy, it contained allegations
against Gen. Thimayya, Dr Ram
Subhag Singh, Mr Frank Monies
and a host of other well-known
personalities.
Brig. E. T. Sen, who filed the
defamation case, was one of the
main victims of the John Smith
smear campaign. He took up the
challenge that Bhupesh Cupta
threw in the Rajya Sabha on
February 29, 1968.
The Communists played it
pretty rough. There were some
vicious attempts by their lawyers
to break Brig. Sen in Court and
NEW AGE and PATRIOT indul-
ged in tendentious and highly-
coloured reports.
But these tactics proved a dis-
mal failure. Contempt of Court
proceedings were launched against
the two journals and they were
given a "severe warning" for
misleading reporting.
In his judgement on October
17, 1969, Justice Hardayal Harilv
of the Delhi High Court did not
mince his words when he com-
mented on the conduct of the
lawyers defending the Communist
slanderers : -
GROSS ABUSE
"At several places the cross-
examintion (by the defendani's
lawyer) was apparently directed
to matters which have not the
remotest connection with the
matters in this issue. A number
of questions would appear to
have no more connection with the
the case than what the journey
of the American Astronauts to
the moon mizht have with the
political situation in Czechoslova-
Ida or India. And vet onees dna
pages of the record seem to be
filled with such quotations.
it appears to me that a
considerable portion of the cmss-
examination of the complainant
(Brig. Sen) is n gross abuse of the
opportunity afforded for cross-
examining."
We reproduce a sampling of
the line of cross-examination:
Q. Did you have any conscience ?
to join the Army (in 1940) con- 1
trolled by the foreign rulers when
you joined?
Q. Did you join the Army be-
cause you were keen to fight the
Fascists of Germany and Italy?. ?
Q. When you joined the Army
were you aware that there was
national revolt for the freedem
of the country?
Q. Were you aware in 1940
that the British Army was being
used to suppress the Indian
National Movement?
. Q. Were you aware that the
Indians hired by the British rulers
in the Indian Army as also the
British officers of the Indian Army
were used to suppress the National
Movement of the country?
Q. Did you or did you not have
any qualms of conscience that you
were likely to be used against
the National Movement in the
Indian Army?
Q. Was it your aim M 1941 to,
serve the British masters or India
after independence?
Q. Were you completely in-.
different to the political and
military objectives which may be
assigned by the British Govern-
ment to the Army when you
joined the Army?
Said Justice Hardy : "Apart
from the fact that the questions
have a tendency to cast n wholly
unmerited aspersion on the
character and patriotism of nil
those distinguished officers apd
soldiers who joined the Indian'
Arrny before Independence, the
questions have not the remotest
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2onnection with the (Terence set
ip by the petitioner."
The John Smith-KGB, memos,
and the base manner in which
they were used by the CPI, 4re
a typical example of Communist
character assassination tactics.
SMEAR CAMPAIGN
Through their chain of news-
papers, the largest in India? they
levy wild charges against their
intended victims In the hope that
some of the dirt will stick and
that the victims Will not prote?st,
partly because of back-brealdngi
'court procedures, partly out of
fear of becoming the targets ofi
further mud-slinging. I
Once in a while, however,
their victims accept their chg.!.
lenge, like Brig. Sen did, and
have courage and perseverance
enough to pursue the struggle to
the bitter end.
Unfortunately, the Communists
and their fellow-travellers have
invariably got away with a mere
apology,, as in this case.
Mr M. C. Chagla and Mr C. L.
Sarin (who made their mark in the
Tarasov and Oultig-Zade cases)
appeared on behalf of Brig. Sen.
The defendants were represented,
among others. by Mr Motion
Kumaramangalarn, one time
member of the National Executive
of the CPI and recently appoint..
ed Chairman of Indian Airline.
8
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MARCH OF THE NATION, Bombay
29 November 1969
jurists Furious At Red
SIants if Gen. Thimayya
NEW DELI!!: Parliamentary .'circles are deeply
perturbed by the Communists slandering the Indian
Army in the now impugned pampNet "I was a CIA
Agent," fabricated by the Russians and the CPI to
malign such distinguished sons of India as Brigadier
Sen, the late Gen. K. S. Thimayya and, a number of
other disting.uished soldiers and politicians, painting
them as traitors to their country.
The- pamphlet was published
by the official Communist organ,
NEW AGE, edited by Comrade
Bhupesh Gupta, MP. The court
proceedings were reported exten-
sively in NEW AGE and PAT-
RIOT, the two Russian financed
papers, ? "in a tendentious man-
as was held by the Court,
which administered theM a severe
warning.
But the Communists also ac-
cused Cen. Thimayya, and for this
they have not apologised. The
question tho outraged Indian na-
tion and its Army would like
these Russian collaborators _to
answer is :
Was Gen. K. S. Thimayya, the
illustrious soldier of India, a CIA
agent?
In normal circumstances, one
would expect Mrs Indira Gandhi
or Y. B. Chavan to force the
Communists to apologise. Thpy
are, however, new allies of theiss.
But the PEOPLE are waiting for
an answer.
Four Parliamentarians have re-
peated the question MARCH now
poses to the Indians.
"REPREHENSIBLE"
In a letter to the Brigadier's
lawyer, C. L. Sareen, Mr M. C.
Setalvad says: "It was a delibe-
rate and reprehensible attempt to
libel the Brigadier and other offi-
cers of the Indian army. I km
not an active politician, but if an
opportunity arises, I shall certain-
ly take up a proper attitude in
the matter in Parliament."
Says Mr Ashok Mehta; "I cop-
gratulate you and Brig. E. T. Sen
on the firm stand you took. You
have exposed the technique of
character assassination much fav-
oured by certain sections of poli-
tical opinion in the country today.
I agree with your analysis and
with the alert you have sounded
against palpable dangers."
In his forwarding note to the
Members of Parlhunent, lawyer
Sarcen says: "In the impugned
pamphlet, several army officers,
both named and unnamed, were
clubbed CIA agents. Our illustri-
ous soldier, Cen. Tbknayya, as
also not spared. The retired BO-
9
gadier decided to make a stand
and, despite all the calumny and
threat, risk of exposure of ids
private life and expense, electicl
to clear his name.
"In the court, a serious attempt
was made by the counsel of the
accused-publisher to condemn
our army officers who joined -Up
during the British regime. While
pursuing the cress-examination of
Brig. Sen by these lawyers, Jus-
tice Hardayal Hardy of the Delhi
High Court observed:
"'It appears to me that a con-
siderable portion of the cross-
examination of the complainant is
a gross abuse of the opportunity
afforded to the accused for cross-
examination of the complainant!"
After quoting these strictures
by the judge against the Com-
munists', Sareen appealed to the
Parliamentarians:
"As a Parliamentarian charged
with the defence of the country's
interest, you cannot afford to
leave the matter at that. The
pamphlet is a part of an arganis-
ed attentrit to create distil:1st
between the people and the Army. ..
This itself should be serious. llut
as the pamphlet was published in
collusion with a foreign country,
the enormity of the crime can be
understood.
:"The attempt to malign inno-
cent people, to sow the seeds of
suspicion about the patriotism of
the Army among the people by
the CPI, in collusion with a
foreign country, you would agree,
merits attention at the highest
level.
"The people, several of whom
are victims of similar calumny by
certain political parties in collu-
sion with a foreign power, but t
who cannot defend themselves, .?
now look up to you to protect
the from such nefarious activi-
ties."
? MARCH of the NATION
sincerely hopes Parliament will
take up this issue and prevent
the honour and integrity of
India's fighting men being sul-
lied by those to whom slander h
a convenient weapon and the big
lie . an accepted way of life.
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25X1C10b
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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Approved For Release 2000/08/291. U1k-DP79-01194A000400150001-6
--Revanchism: the late, late show recapping the sins of the German
Third Reich.
--Frank and businesslike atmosphere: total disagreement. A term
normally reserved for crucial negotiations.
Obviously this is a game anyone can play, in any language. We suspect you may
well be able to do better than Mr. Reston, whose complete article is attached
for a starter.
3
SECRET
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January 1970
Distinguishing the Palestinian Commando Organizations
All Palestinian commando organizations have the same basic aims:
(a) the regaining of all of Palestine, including present-day Israel, and
the establishment of a Palestine state which would include Muslims, Christ-
ians, and Jews; and (b) the rejection of a peaceful solution of the Arab-
Israeli impasse, and the use of armed force as the chief weapon against
Israel.
The Major Palestinian Organizations:
1. The Palestine Liberation Movement (Fatah), the largest commando
organization, has no special allegiance to any particular state or political
party. In contrast, other major commando groups are sponsored by either an
Arab government or a political party (sometimes both).
2. The nucleus of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) comes from the George Habbash wing of the leftist Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM). The ANM's more extreme Marxist-Leninist faction, led by
Nayif Hawatmah, controls the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP).
3. The Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War and its military arm, al-
Saiqa, are sponsored and controlled by the Syrian Government and the Syrian
Ba'th Party.
4. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was created by the Iraqi Government
and the Iraqi Ba'th Party.
5. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by
the Arab Summit conference as a quasi-governmental organization. It has a
regular army of its own, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and a commando
unit, the Popular Liberation Forces, which was formed after the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war.
In February 1969, after al Fatah succeeded in taking over its control,
the PLO began to function as an umbrella for the various commando organiza-
tions and other Palestinian groups. Its Palestine Armed Struggle Command
(PASC) coordinates the release of information concerning fedayeen commando
operations, and is also to coordinate their military activities. PASC now
includes eight commando organizations. The PFLP is the only.major fedayeen
group which has not yet joined and which still continues to operate inde-
pendently of PASC. Efforts are being made to bring PFLP into both the PLO
and PASC, but so far no agreement has been reached.
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Differences between the Commandos:
1, Party affiliations and sponsorship.
Arab governments sponsoring commando groups have tended to give their
time and effort to their own rather than to Fatah and other groups. They
have also been suspicious of commandos sponsored by a rival government or
political party and have at tines deported them or curtailed their activities.
2, Nature of cooperation.
Disagreements have arisen over reorganizing the PLO and over representa-
tion in that body. Fatah favors proportional representation, depending on
the size of the commando organization, and is against equal votes for each
commando group because the small groups could then paralyze action with their
veto?
3. Smaller vso larger groups.
Fatah is against the formation of smaller groups because it feels that
these are being used to sap the energy of the bigger organizations. In con-
trast, the small commando groups feel that they serve a useful purpose and
reflect differences of opinion.
4. Class struggle.
Most commando groups consider themselves representative of progressive
national liberation movements. The PDFLP believes that the commandos should
only include the workers and peasants because of the collusion between im-
perialism and the big bourgeoisie. Fatah believes that this class limitation
would weaken the movement and that Marx's class breakdown is not applicable
to the Palestinian situation anyway.
5 Palestinian vs. Pan-Arab movement.
Some groups such as the ALF emphasize the Pan-Arab nature of the struggle.
Others such as Fatah consider the conflict as primarily a Palestinian one
linked with the Arab revolution.
6. PFLP strategy.
Although the commandos sympathize with any attacks against Zionist, im-
perialist, and Israeli interests, only the PFLP has engaged in terrorism
against these targets abroad. Fatah has registered its opposition to those
activities, and at this time the PFLP is alone among the commando groups in
undertaking them.
2
*
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 December 1969
Hue Massacre:
Effort to Destroy
Entire Society
Authority Says Murders
Were According to Plan
and Almost 6,000 Died
BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Times Staff Writer
HONG KONG?"A squad with a
death order entered the home of sr
community leader and shot him, his
wife, his married son and daughter-
in-law, his young unmarried daught-
er, a male and female servant and
'their baby. The family cat was
tr an d; the family dog was
'clubbed to death; the family goldfish
were scooped out of the fishbowl
and tossed on the floor."
? Douglas Pike, a leading authority
"nn communism in Vietnam, reports
that scene after conducting an
intensive investigation of events in
Hue when_ the Communists held the
old imperial city for 24 days in
February, 1968, and slaughtered
What he estimates was almost 6,000
'civilians for political purposes.
"When the Communist squad left,"
he continues, "no life remained in
'the house. A 'social unit' had been
eliminated."
Foreign Service Officer
, Pike, a Foreign Service officer, is'
the author of "Viet Cong," the boolc
generally judged the single most
authoritative and exhaustive study
of communism in South Vietnam.
The extinction of the community
leader's family "was not due to rage,
frustration or panic," Pike said. The
execution" was part of what Pike
identifies at "Phase II" of the
continuously sanguinary Commu-
nist occupation, when "cadres be-
lieved for a few days that they were
permanently in Hue?and acted
accordingly."
He notes ' that Ale Viet COM
thereupon launched "a -period of
social reconstruction. Cominiinist
style. Death orders went out againat
'social negatives,' Individuals or
groups who represented a potential
ilanger for liability."
There was no discernible personal
animus, despite the wanton cruelty
that tortured the pets.
"This was quite impersonal." Pike
said. It was not a blacklist of
Individuals but a blacklist of titieS
and positions in the old society. It
was directed not against people, but
against 'social units'?religious ots,
ganizations, political parties and
social movements like women's and
youth associations."
5,800 Dead or Missing
By Pike's count, based on his own
research and local estimates, 5,800
Hue civilians are dead or missing,
and the missing are not likely to
reappear. In addition, 1,800 civilians
were hospitalized, making a total of
7,600 civilians killed, abducted or
Injured by the Communists.
Pike said almost all the killing was
dictated by political aims and or-
dercd by political commissars. A
few civilians, not more than several
hundred at most, were killed or
Injured in the course of battle.
So far, 2,780 bodies have been
recovered from the mass graves
where the Communists carefully hid
their victims. Further finds are
made daily. But Pike does not
expect all the bodies to be recoyerq
(because the Communists
went out of their way to
conceal the mass graves.
The number of deaths
would probably have been
higher but for the limita-
tions of time and circum-
stances," he said.
Out of approximately
75,000 persons under ef-
fective Communist rule,
for about three weeks,'
7,600 became casualties.
Even allowing the widest'
latitude for battle casual-
ties and inadvertent kill-
ings, that means not less
than 5% of the civilian
populace and perhaps as
high as 10% were deliber-1
ately slaughtered.
Pike, now stationed in:
Tokyo with the U.S. Infor-,
nation Service, lived in
Yietnam for eight Years.
?
before writing "Vi e t
Cong." During a leave of
absence he returned to
Vietnam, as he does perio-
dically, and spent more
than a week early this'
November pursuing his
research in Hue.
Lengthy Conversation
Ills findings and conclu-
sions as reported here are
abstracted from a lengthy,
personal conversation and
the draft of his report on
his investigations at Hue.
After his research, Pike
believes that the massacre
of Hue will be the pat4
tern for nationwide acs
tion should the Commu-
nists conquer South Viet,
nam. He bases that conclu-
sion upon the fact that the
massacres were deliberate
acts of policy, rather than
random individual deeds.
He divides the Commu-
nist campaign against the
civilians of Hue into three
periods:
Phase I occurred during
the first few days of the
occupation, when the Viet
Cong did not expect to
stay but wished to make
an example and to "break
the enemy's administra-
tive structure."
"Civilian cadres," Pike
said, "accompanied by fir-
ing squads executed key!
!individuals to weaken
'governmental administra-
tion following Communist'
withdrawal. This was the \
'blacklist period, the time
pf the drum-head court.
Kangaroo Courts
' "Cadres with clipboards
,bearing lists of names and
'addresses summoned Va-
rious 'enemies of the revo-
lution' to kangaroo courts.
Public trials usually lasted
'about 10 minutes, and
there were no known run.-
'guilty verdicts. Punish-
knent, invariably execu-
tion, was meted out imme-
diately."
Aside from "particularly*
venomous attack on Hue
intellectuals," w h o de-
mised coiturkuoisoLio
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rohNOFfOrt?irle eas 51704/0/gt.' D P79
procedure.
Phase II was the period
of "social reconqruction."
In order to "build a, new
social order, it was neces-
sary to purge the old
order," The "social nega-
tive s" were eliminated.
Anyone who might stand
in the way of the Commu-
nists' consolidating their
hold and imposing , their
own rule was killed.
During Phase 11 approx-
imately 2,000 of the 5,800
dial, including the family
that was slaughtered, even
to cat, dog and goldfish.
Worst Phase
Phase HI, however, was
the worst. During the last
week of their sniy, the
Communists knew theyt
would be forced to ,with
draw. They were deter-
mined to leave no witnes-
ses who might testify
against them or identify.
the 150 clandestine Com-
munist cadres who had;
"surfaced" to i ale Due.
"Most victims were
kil-
led in batches during Ibis
period. At the Sand Dune
Grave they were tied
together in groups ,of 10
and cut down with sub-
machine guns."
? Pike adds: "A favorite
local sonvenie is a spent'
Russian m a c Ti in e - gun,
shell taken from a 1,;rave.
Frequently, the dead were:
buried in layers of three or
four, making iticritifica.t
tion particularly difficult."'
He believes the Hw
massacres were different
from other Viet Cong ter-
roriSm "not only in degree,
but in kind."
? New Government ,
It was not the , quick
terror used to build Viet
Cong morale or to frighten
the populace but the slow,
intensifying terror intend-
ed to create the basis of.si
new government. . ?
"There was no agonized
outcry, no demonstrations
at North Vietnamese em-
bassies around the world,".
Pike said. "Lord Russell;
has not sent his 'war
crimes tribunal' to -take.
evidence. In toned tram.:
wend do:; not ti..noiN
hinmenori or, it it 1.navis;
doein' c "
The- e. - indeed, # a -
.remarkaltic lad. 0, -rtoott--;
log on the Hue mils:malts,
in psi t K cau th #Cotia4
minis ts- had hidden thei
'victims co welt dioaevtr;
ac Pike ,indicatirs. thereas
rew.h spathy -regirdito-;
?v!, corp., afro itirt.r. -
'her -are not nevt-e.Aitet
brylies hive been trwritogi-
p in.2a 1-,7Telt 1., I It.; t7
"in on2 plice,, a rsrmier,
g :the
dunes trotted evei =atolot;e
of ctickinp out Of the-
mud. In ire, he . jerled
it. OM, of the r?anti at the
earl of trite wire tenet a -
bony inm and at .
Vie' itnS wrists hat betni
bound evit.Il wire heft:0
eqr u tin 1.
? Teams are still- expli ming_ _
the hie ore i wearing.
su reit a i ginvea.veil I
dense+ ni alcA01..
tre-sm ##.-k-:ril iitgpirst th
stray+. L'hey dig .4 Stmital
t teal Lsing li ch
inciples . . midi a 4101-
low eicimz mo-errierttf
I .ocah teciirrite r have
sprieared, Pike sal._ for
digiiig-ILIS (1t,ie1t,t be- _
i-nme amo chin lustt y.
"nril eld niar hes gained..
faille Air his abhity -to
idontify acquaititanecs tioy:
thn slmt, ie and- reel AA their-
sli ight- (nu gressl#
is nn a'fliost waria-*
th-t lieintutednealth.',
(Third reit, like ;one J 4-yedr.-
Oa by have ritoroiote&-
htetlies itley eateired- thet,
bary.l! -
in ore find. "Only; let#0_
lad EMI 4.1 wer.cakikuldi Otit;
ye. La th :riany Mir Ts' bad
iii en w-trlied L.# Cie Inotith
of th sit:am hat.; vas the
etttint gfim 410,4 Aniting
dead \sere four Yiena-
ne
an fof
Ki112d at 41.e saae
.1,te w r V es . iVgritant
aid Irk :IOUS
de:Teta, eichti
J-.ar.; to o-,-acling biedicine
.at. the alue Mt JiLirjCl1OG
?lid
teoptia.
*IA &P
43'11194Xio 640-1310wo 0 -6
he pattern as c .
Anyone. Vietnamese or
foreign, who sustained the
old society in any way,
political or social, was
doomed.
What happeni do a city
that suffers so?
Pikebelieved that, de-
spite material recovery;
there are 'deep recesses in
the mind of Hue that will
never again know the
sun."
Resentment is stilt*
widespread against Saigon
and Washington, which
eould not preveht the orgy
of slaughter.
? Look Into Future
"But spending an evens
log with survivors," Pike
said, "one is submerged in
hatred against- the Com-
munists like a- thick fog.
The fence-sitters and the,
advocates of nonviolence
are gone. Hardly -anyone
did not find a relative or
intimate friend, in a Cont.',
inunist grave. Hue's Im-
placable hatred of commu-
nism is as fixed as a math-
ematical law."
And the lesson of Hue, If
here is one? 4
Pike believes it is clear!
"If the Communists win
decisively, all foreigners
would be expelled from,
the sout h, particularly
hundreds of newsmen. A;
curtain of Ignorancei
Would descend. Then the,
bight of the long knives!
'would begin. 1,
"A new order is to be,
built. While the war was
long, so are memories of;
old scores. AR political
'opposition; actual or
potential, would be and.:
bated. They would elimii#
Inate not the individual (fcli,
who cares about indivit
duals?) but the latent dan-
ger to the dreatb, the force
that might someday even
inside the regime dilute
the system," Pike said. ,
"Little would be known'
a b es) a d," he concluded.'
"The Communists would
'create a silence of death;
and the world Would call lk
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BALTIMORE SUB
13 December 156_9_
French Reds Hint Chiefs Ouster
fly PATRICIA email
Voris Ruteou 01 The Suns
Paris, .DCC. 12?A French
Communist party announcement
on the illness of the party secre-
tary, Waldeck Rochet, appears
tot have confirmed reports that
he will be ousted as leader of the
Vest's second-largest Commu-
nist party at its next Congress in
'February.
The communique from party
headquarters last night said Mr.
Rochet had been advised by his
doctors to begin "several
months of convalescence and re-
duced activity."
The 64-year-old Communist
leader has undergone surgery
twice this year for kidney and
prostate trouble.
Strong Constitution
A man with a strong constitu-
tion, Mr. Rochet has told party
officials and Moscow that he will
soon be fit again.
, According ' to Informed
sources, his doctors have sec-
onded this verdict, but the party
Is apparently turning s deaf ear.
Since Mr. ,Rochet succeeded
The late Maurice Thorez in 1964,
he has been the center of contra
? versy, starting with a brief in-
tra-party struggle before be
,even landed the Job.
, The invasion Of ezdchoslo-
NAIR by Russian troops in 1968
caused Mr. Rochet considerable
!toddy. The amblguout $111tude
of the French Communist party,
which was split over whether to
support the invasion reinforced
this. Mr. Rochet was attacked
by the conservative wing of the
party for following Moscow only
after a period ef hesitation.
The liberals took him apart
for not taking a strong stand
against Russian occupation of
Prague. -*
Two men figure prominently,
In the Speculation as to who will
succeed Mr. Rochet. Both of.
them are pillars of the Political
Bureau.
Roland Leroy, a 43-year-old
deputy for the Seine-Maritime
department, is secretary of the
Central Committee of the Com-
munist party. His mission has
been to control the dissident in-
tellectuals. A protege of Maurice
Thorez, his main drawback is
his youthful ardor. He is known
as a man in a hurry.
Fifty-year-old Georges Mar-
chats, on the other hand, is s
"Stalinite" of the old school. Un-
like Mr'. Leroy. he has never
been in the public eye, and is
what the Russian Communists
call an "apparatehik." ilk du:
ties have been strictly confined
to the internal affairs of the
In the Paris suburb of Nan
Communist party.
terre, where Mr. Rochet lives in
a two-dory six-room house with
his wife Pauline, Whevfl he ma
tried le 1 t(93111111$
3
Braila! continue. Mr. Rochet
will preside at the yuletide din-
ner for his three children and Mx
grandchildren. Only one topic of
conversation is strictly forbid-
den by the head of the family
and that is papa's future.
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
9 December 1969
Red Nonsense
'Still Nonsense
BY RICIIAllp RESTON,
Tithes Mo co Burcan Chief
MOSCOW. Once tipk..n a time there was a
Russian langtwge thot it74de setre. That was
long ago,..back in tllo .days. of Dostoevsky,'t *
Toistoy, ?Chekhov and Ilislikin, all modest
fellows with a bit or poetry in their souls. i
The yearS, went. by and along came ti.
teoUple of new chaps named-Marx and L.nfin.J,
fjt was a good. team . and together they1
Armed an , ideology, kno . ill today . QS;
liarxism-Leninism.
It was the best ide,Ao;-,,y around, a splendid
idea for the whole human race, or so said th,,ii
'13oisheviks of their revolution 57 years ago.
,The man has not yet arrived, but a new:
. The revolution would create a new man.,
political language has. It is a truly wondrousi
thing.
America can no longer claim a nionopolyi
On political nonsense. flusAa now has a.A
.'"sufficiency .of strength" backed by al.
:Mighty arsenal of convoluted politicali
cliches. Indeed, the Uniteil States is in grave.
danger of losing this race for the ulpimate,
weapon?the phrase or word that means:.
absolutely nothing to ei-eryone. ? ' -1
,,. ? What the two great. p,uvers need is a newi
;round of negotiations in Licisinki, known asi
the MALT talks, ot Movement for ani
Alternative Line of Twatidii, ..,i
: But, first, it is necessary to compile for the
outside world a glossary defining Some of,
the Kremlin's mo i'e potent political wea7i
ipans. This could prove critical to the success
of MALT. The following is suggested:
Oading for all bcwilderclt adults:
Running dog of imperialism: an animal?,
especially of American extraction, suffering:
Ifrom distemper. It tends to froth a tho,
pouth while giving press cOnferences in
(Washington, particularly at the Pentagons.
, Rightward and leftward deviation: pe
,son 'driving under the influence of alie
Ideas and badly in need Of a lecture from the:
'iearest Marxist-Leninist cop; ? -
?Revisionism. individualist ? or .non-confor4
LWIsL Someone,. who ..does, thin
',without first reading the gospereccording ttt
Moscow. Frequently a Chinese, Czechoslo4,
vak, Yugoslav or Romanian. , ? 1
Behind the cover of ultra-revoIutionaryi
'phrase mongering: new movie banned in the
Communist world.
Leninist interpretation: a sort pap
encyclical backed by a force other
'c1 ion.
. Dictatorship of the proletariat: the peopl
may not always be right but the Kremlin.
never wrong.
!. Internationalist approach to hation
Problems: you scratch my back,.btit.I'll break
/ours if necessary. Czechoslovakia know
Rightwing and leftvving opportunism:
wrong-thinkers anywhere in the world.
Adventurist actions: if you've got to do
your bit, try it when big brother is not,
Awatching.
Fralernal aid: with friends like this, who
'needs enemies? (Ask any Czech).
The happy worker: boozy befuddlement
after borscht and one bottle of vodka
washed down by a second.
Socialist realism: the world's only tolera
'ed art form. Never let it be said that,
experimentation or enlightenment Inter
!feral with this school of art.
Solidarity of the working class: eommu
ving is in. Togetherness is happiness.
More vigilance: Communist substitutejor
Revanchism: the late, late show recapping
the sins of. the German Third Reich.
Centrifogal tendencies: a leak in theA
ilcrernlin's plumbing, particularly in Easte
Europe and China.
Certain shortcomings: we're only 'sec?
best but we try harder.
Petty bourgeoise: tiny westerner with tin
mind.
Social or Communist democracy: oft used,
phrase of uncertain meaning comment to:l
traditional communiques.
Frank and businesslike atmosphere: total
dLagreement. A term normally reserved for,
!crucial negotiations.
Inevitable fiasco: Kremlin predictio4
when the West is about to score a success.
. Leading role of the Communist Party: d
unto others. . . and forget the rest. ?
Capitalism versus communism: according
to at old Armenian joke, capitalism is thit
exploitation of matt by man and conrmunishl
18 the opposite. . ' ' ? "
Moral--Never trust a' man vOth
I cin 7eur throat., " ? ?
7,11.r.71'711711rgnr111711771177.7":''''"
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