CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES APRIL 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 131
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS FOR TERMINATING WAR IN LAOS
IRSi.~. A ^I /V.
Vientiane, 1 March. Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma sent letters to the
British and Soviet Embassies in Vientiane officially requesting Geneva-style
consultation on the situation in Laos. The British and the Soviets are co-
chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference which was intended to guarantee the
neutrality of Laos. Conference signatories were: Burma, Cambodia, Canada,
China, France, Great Britain, India, Laos, North Vietnam, Poland, South
Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
New Delhi, 4 March. The Indian Government has just appealed to both
sides in the Laotian conflict to end hostilities, an appeal interpreted by
some Far East observers as a first step to reactivate the International Con-
trol Commission of which India is the chairman and a fellow member with
Canada and Poland.
The ICC was set up in 1954 by the Geneva Powers for the purpose of ensuring
the inviolability of national borders in Indo-China.
Saigon, 11 March. Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam of the Republic of
South Vietnam officially denounced the North Vietnamese violation of the
1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, reiterated GVN respect for the Accords and
demanded that North Vietnam do the same. Lam also urged all signatories
of the 62 Accords to consult with the aim of halting North Vietnamese ag-
gression in Laos and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and expressed GVN readi-
ness to cooperate in seeking a solution which would guarantee the neutrali-
ty and integrity of Laos.
Paris, 12 March. The French Foreign Ministry called for the withdrawal
of all foreign troops from Laos, the full implementation of the Geneva Ac-
cords, action by the 14 signatories-to live up to their responsibilities and
the working out of an understanding among the Lao themselves.
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NEW YORK TIMES
1 March 1970
Profile of Laos
Population: 2,825,000, mostly Lao and Thai
speaking mountain tribes, 95 per cent rural.
Area and geography: 91,429 sq. mi., about the,
size of Oregon. Northern Laos mainly jungle-covered'
mountains; southern Laos, arid limestone terraces.,
Capitals: Vientiane (administrative), Luang
Prabang (royal).
Government: Constitutional parliamentary mon-?
archy headed by King Savang Vatthana. Prince Su
vanna Phouma has been Premier since 1962.
After 56 years as a French protectorate and a brief
j apanese occupation in 1945-46, Laos became an in...
dependent state within the French union in 1949..
But. it soon became part of the Indochina battle-
ground. The Pathet Lao, a Communist nationalist
movement, rebelled against the Government in the'=
early 1950's. Peace was restored under terms of the
1954 Geneva Conference ending the Indochina war,
and Laos was established as an independent state
-under a neutralist-Pathet Lao coalition.
Peace was short-lived. In 1960 the coalition broke
down, and more' fighting erupted. The 1962 Geneva
Agreement imposed a truce and supposedly guaran-'
teed Laos's neutrality. But again, the accord broke
down and fighting has continued off and on ever
since. The civil war has divided the country politi-
cally between the Communist-supported Pathet Lao
anti the. Western-supported neutralist-rightist coali
tion. The Communists control the eastern half, in-
cluding the Ho Chi Minh supply route; the Govern-
ment the Western half, with most ,of the rice land
and small cities. I
Without aid from the United States, Laos could
not exist as a contemporary nation. The United
Stated provides $50-million annually and equips and,
advises the Royal armed forces. The North Viet-
namese supply and. lead the Pathet Lao.
CPYRGHT
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THE WASHINGTON POST
7 March 1970
Ste
The text of PresidentNixon's state-
ment on Laos:
In light of the increasingly massive
presence of North Vietnamese troops
and their recent offensive in Laos, I
have written letters today ,to British
Prime Minister Wilson and Soviet Pre-
mier Kosygin asking their help in re-
storing, the 1962 Geneva agreements
for that country.
As cochairmen of that conference,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union have particular responsibilities
for seeing that its provisions are hon-
ored. My letters note the persistent
North Vietnamese violations of the ac-
cords and their current offensives;
support the Laotian Prime Minister's
own current appeal to the cochairmen
for consultations; urge the cochairmen
to 'work with other signatories of the
Geneva accords; and pledge full
United States cooperation.
Hanoi's most recent military buildup
in 'Laos has been particulary escala-
tory. They have poured over 13,000 ad-,
ditional troops into Laos during the,
past few months, raising their total
in Laos to over 67,000. Thirty North Vi-
etnamese battalions from regular divi-
sion units participated in the current
campaign in the Plain of Jars with
tanks, armored cars and long-range ar-
tillery. The indigenous Laotian Com- '
munists, the Pathet Lao, are playing,
an insignificant role.
North Vietnam's military escalation
in Laos has intensified public discus-
sion in this country. The prupbse of
this statement is to set forth the rec-
ord of what we found in January, 1969,
and the policy of this administration,
since that time.
1. What, We Found
A. The 1962 Accords
When we came into office, this ad-
ministration found a highly precarious
situation in Laos. Its basic legal frame-'
work had been established by the 1962
accords entered into by the Kennedy
administration.
Laos has been a battleground for
most of'the past 20 years, In 1949 it be-
came a semi-independent state within
the French union.- The Pathet Lao
Communists rebelled against the gov-
ernment in the early 1950s, and fight
ing continued until the 1954 Geneva
settlements ended the Indochina war.
Laos at that time became an independ-.
ent neutral state. The indigenous Com-
munists, the Pathet Lao, nevertheless
retained control of the two northern
provinces. Since then, this small coun-
try has been the victim of persistent
subversion and finally invasion by the
North Vietnamese.
By 1961,; North Vietnamese involve-
ment became marked, the Commu-
nist forces made great advances, and,.
'a serious situation confronted the
Kennedy administration. In his news
conference of Marcb, .1961, President
Kennedy said: "Laos is far away from
America, but the world is small ... The
security of all Southeast Asia will be
endangered if Laos loses its neutral in-
dependence."
In May, 1961, negotiations for a
Laotian settlement opened in.Geneva,
with Gov. Harriman as the chief Amer-
ican negotiator. During the course of
those long negotiations, fighting con-
tinued and the. Communists made fur-
ther advances. Faced with a potential
threat to Thailand, President Kennedy
ordered 5,000 Marines to that country
in May, 1962.
Finally, in July, 1962, after 14 months
of negotiations, 14 nations signed the
'Geneva accords providing for the neu-
tralization of Laos. Other signatories
besides the United States included the
Soviet Union, Communist China, North
Vietnam, the United Kingdom, France,
the Southeast Asian nations most di-
rectly involved and the members of the
International Control Commission,
Canada, India and Poland.
These accords came one month after
the three contending forces within
Laos announced agreement on the de-
tails of a coalition government com-
posed of the three major political fac-
tions and headed by the neutralist,
Prince Souvanna Phouma. North Viet-
nam clained that it favored a coalition
government. Both North Vietnam and
the Soviet Union backed Prince Sou-
vanna for his new post. The present
government of Laos thus has been the
one originally proposed by the Com-
munists- In approving the 1962 ar-
rangements, the Kennedy administtra
tion in effect accepted the basic formu-.
lation which had been advanced by.
North Vietnam and the Soviet Union
for a Laotian political settlement.
B. The Record 1962.1969
Before the ink was dry on the 1962'
Geneva documents, and despite the
fact that they embodied most of its; own.
proposals, North Vietnam started:-
vio-lating them. In compliance with th ac-:
cords, the 666 Americans who had
been assisting the Royal Lao govern-
ment withdrew under ICC supervision.
In contrast, the North Vietnamese
passed -only a token 40 men through
ICC checkpoints and left over 6.000
troops in the country.
A steadily growing number of?Nd!rth
Vietnamese troops have remained
there, ever since, in flagrant violation
of the Geneva accords. They climid
to about 33,000 in mid-1967, 46,OOQ'in
mid-1968 and 55,000 in mid-1969. Today
they are at an all-time high of s41pe
67,000 men.
These are not advisers or technicilins
or attaches. They are line units of,the
North Vietnamese army conducting
open aggression against a neighbor
that poses no threat to Hanoi.
In addition, since 1964, over a 11a1f-
million North Vietnamese troops have
crossed the "Ho Chi Minh trail': in
Laos to invade South Vietnam. This In-
filtration route provides the great bulk
of men and supplies for the war, in
South Vietnam.
The political arrangements for}
three-way government survived only
until April, 1963, when the Pathet Lao
Communist leaders departed from the
capital and left their cabinet posts va-
cant. Fighting soon resumed and since
then, there have been cycles of Com-
munist offensives and Royal Laotian
government counteroffensives. The
enemy forces have been led and domi-
nated throughout by the North Viet-
namese. In recent years Hanoi has pro-
vided the great majority of Communist
troops in Laos.
North Vietnam appears to have two
aims in Laos. The first is to insure its
ability to use Laos as a supply route
i ~ t ~:r~i ~ I. i~-,?, ~i i i~, x,117 ,' ~~
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for North Vietnamese forces in South steadily. increased both their in i ration American an Allied lives in South,
Vietnam. The second is to weaken and through Laos into South Vietnam and Vietnam which are threatened by the'
subvert the Royal Lao government- their troop presence in Laos itself. Any continual infiltration of North Viet-
originally established at its urging-to facade of native Pathet Lao independ- namese troops and supplies along tl q
hinder it from interfering with North ence had been stripped away. In Janu- Ho Chi Minh trail. Hanoi has infiW
Vietnamese use of Laotian territory, ary, 1969, we thus had a military assist- trated over 100,000 men through Laos,
and to pave the way for the eventual ance program reaching hack over six since this administration took offid-r"-.
establishment of a government more years, and air operations dating over and over 500,000 altogether. Our air.,
amenable to Communist control. four years. strikes have, destroyed weapons and'
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma The upplies over the past four yeaAI?
has tried a variety of diplomatic ef- 11. ThPolicy of which would have taken thousands ~$r
forts to restore peace in Laos. He has 'American lives.
repeatedly appealed to the cochairmen This Administration We are also supporting the inde?
and others to help arrange for restora- pendence and neutrality of Laos as set}'
tion of the 1962 accords. lie and the In. Since this administration has, been 'forth in the 1962 Geneva agreements,'
ternational Control Commission, ham- In office, North Vietnamese pressure Our assistance has always been at the
pered by lack of authority, have re- has continued. Last spring, the North request of the legitimate government
orted and publicized North Vietnam- Vietnamese mounted a campaign of Prime Minister Souvanna Phoumi
ported violations of the accords. And which threatened the royal capital and which the North Vietnamese helped es
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has moved beyond the areas previously oc- tablish; it is directly related to North
made several attempts to achieve polit cupied by Communists. A counterat- =Vietnamese violations of the agree-
ical reconciliation with the Pathet Lao tack by the Lao government forces, in- ments.
and to reconstitute a tripartite govern tended to relieve this military pressure We continue to be hopeful of even-
ment. and cut off supply lines, caught the tual progress in the negotiations in
enemy by surprise and succeeded be- Paris, but serious doubts are raised as
None s these efforts has borne yond expectations In pushing them off to Hanoi's intentions if it is simultane-trated
frts. and confronted in his his with h o continuing, the strategic central plain in North ously violating the Geneva agreements
ef- oorts
Laos known as the Plain of Jars. on Laos which we reached with them
outside aggression, Souvanna has The North Vietnamese left behind. largely on the basis of their own pro.
called upon three is government in huge stores of arms, ammunition and posals. What we do in Laos has thus as
trservi to assist his government in other supplies cached on the plain. Its aim to bring about conditions for,
preeserving Laotian neutrality and in? During their operations in the Plain of progress toward peace in the entire In-
tegrity. Jars last summer and fall, Lao govern- dochinese peninsula.
By fiy early Pathet 1 the No Vietnamese ment forces captured almost 8,000 tons I turn now to the precise nature of
. Lao had oppe enl y y breached hed
the 1962 agreements by attacking the of Communist equipment, supplies and our In aid to s Laos.
response to press conference'
neutralist government forces in North weapons, including tanks, armored questions on Sept. 26, Dec, 8, Laos and by occupying and fortifying cars, artillery pieces, machine guns qu I have indiSept
the area in Southeast Laos along what and thousands of individual weapons 30, ated:
including about 4,000 tons of ammuni- ? That the United. States has no
traicamle In to be these known as the Ho circumstances, Chi the LaoMinh- tion. The size and nature of these sup- ground combat forces in Laos.
.
Tian prime minister requested Ameri- Ply caches the Communists had em- ? That there were 50,000 North Vi9t.'
m of supplies and placed on the plain by the summer of namese troops in Laos and that "mole;
_
:.- th
f
i
e
or
r
s perhaps are cv......g. zx
:munitions. The Kennedy administra- 1969 snow clearly that many tou
ro iced this assistance in line ago the North Vietnamese were pre- ? That, at the request of the Roy L?
p
with the Lea ' b ? ~ seek __ Laotian territory against the Royal Geneva accords of 1962, the G Geneneva accords cords to seehelp by the , w
in its self-defense. Lao government. have provided logistical and other as
In mid-May, 1964, the Pathet Lao sup- ? During the final months of 1969 and sistance to that government for the,
ported by the North Vietnamese attack- January, 1970, Hanoi sent over 13,000' , purpose of helping it to prevent the`
ed prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's additional troops into Laos and rebuilt Communist conquest of Laos.
neutralist military forces on. the Plain their stocks and supply lines. They . ? That we have used air power for
of Jars. North Vietnam also began to also introduced tanks and long-range the purpose of interdicting the flow of
increase its use of the Ho Chi Minh artillery. North Vietnamese troops and supplies
trail to further its aggression against During January and February, on that part of the Ho Chi Minh trail
'
pro- which runs through Laos.
South Vietnam. The Johnson admini- Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma
stration responded to Royal Laotian posed to the other side that the Plain
government requests to meet this esca- of Jars be neutralized. The Coinmu-
lation by increasing our training and gists' response was to launch their cur-
logistic support for the Royal Lao gov- rent offensive which has recaptured
ernment. In May, 1964, as North Viet- the Plain of Jars,and is threatening to
namese presence increased, the United go beyond the furthest line of past
States, at Royal Lao government re- Communist advances.
quest, began flying certain interdictory The prime minister is now once
missions against invaders who were vio- again trying to obtain consultations
lating Lao neutrality. among all the parties to the Geneva ac-
Thus, when this administration came cords, envisaged under article IV when'
into office, we faced a chronically seri- there is a violation of Lad sovereignty,,
ous situation in Laos. There had been Independence, neutrality , or territorial
six years of seasonal Communist at-. integrity.
tacks and growing U.S. involvement at In this situation, our purposes re-
the request of the Royal Laotian gov- , main straightforward.
ernment. The North Vietnamese had We are trying above all to save
? That, at the ? request of - the Royal:
Laotian government, we have flown re-
connaissance missions in northern
Laos in support of the Laotian govern-.
ment's efforts to defend itself against
North Vietnamese aggression and that
,we were engaged in "some other activi-
ties."
It would, of course,. have posed no' political problem for me to have dis-
closed in greater detail those military'
support activities which had been initi-'
ated by two previous administrations
and which have been continued by this
'administration..
I have not considered it in the na
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tional interest to do so because of our
concern that putting emphasis on
American activities in Laos might
hinder the efforts of Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma to bring about ad-
herence to the Geneva Agreements by
the Communist signatories.
In recent days, however, there has
effects thats theuUnited Stateso m olve
ment in Laos has substantially In.
-creased in violation of the Geneva ac-
cords, that American ground forces are
engaged in combat in Laos and that
our air activity has had the effect of
e:icalating the conflict.
Because these reports are grossly in-
accurate, I have concluded that our na-
tional interest will be served by put-
ting the subject into perspective
through a precise description of our
current activities in Laos.
These are the facts:
? There are no American ground
combat troops in Laos.
? We have no plans for Introducing
ground combat forces into Laos.
? The total number of Americans di-
rectly employed by the U.S. govern-
ment in Laos is 616. In addition, there
are 424 Americans employed on con-
tract to the government or to govern-
ment contractors. Of these 1,040 Amer-
icans, the total number, military and
civilian, engaged 1k a military advisory
or military training capacity numbers
320. Logistics personnel number 323.
? No American stationed in Laos has
ever been killed in ground combat op.
erations.
? U.S. personnel in Laos during the-
past year has not increased, while dur.
tian territory on the Ho Chi Minh I hope that a genuine quest for
trail. 'As commander-inchief of our peace in Indochina can now begin. For
armed forces, I consider it my respon-, Laos, this will require the efforts of
sibility to use our air power to inter.' the Geneva conference cochairmen
diet this flow of supplies and men into' and the signatory countries,
South Vietnam and thereby avoid a. But most of all it will require real]
heavy toll of American and Allied ism and reasonableness from Hanoi..
lives, For It Is the North Vietnamese, not we,.
? In addition to air operations on who have escalated the fighting. Today,
the :Ho Chi Minh trail, we have contin- there are 67,000 North Vietnamese
ued to carry out reconnaissance flights ' troops in this small country. There are
ing the past few months, North Viet-
nam has sent over 13,000 additional
combat ground troops into Laos.
? When requested by the Royal Lao-
tian government, we have continued to
provide military assistance to regular
and irregular Laotian forces in the
form of equipment, training and logis-
tics. The levels of our assistance have
risen in response to the growth of
North Vietnamese combat activities.
? We have continued to conduct air.
operations. Our first priority for such
operations is to interdict the continued
flow of troops and supplies across Lao:
no American troops there. Hanoi not
threatened by Laos; it runs risk}tly,
.when it moves its forces across`I r.
ders.
We desire nothing more in Laos
than to see a return to the Ge eva
agreements and, the withdrawal of
North Vietnamese troops, leavingo the
t ao iiaall}a to mottle tttair Owti`atlF '?
ee
!.-
p _ _ w.
nces
a
ready to cooperate in -every way th
the other countries involved. That
search prompted my letters today'?to
the British prime minister and the So-
viet premier. That search will continue
to guide our policy. ?.,
In north Laos and fly combat support,
? In every instance, our combat air,
operations have been flown only when
requested by the Laotian government..
The level. of our air operations has
u@ar1 1#1 I-t 31d. ably ii? 11i@ nlifHhalr Q?
North Vietnamese In Laos and the
level of their aggression has Increased,,
Our goal in Laos has been and conk
tinucs to be to reduce American in-
volvement and not to Increase it, to,
bring peace in accordance with the'
1962 accords and not to prolong the
war.
That is the picture of our current
aid to Laos. It is limited. It is re'
quested. It is supportive and defensive.
It continues the purposes and opera-
tions of two previous administrations.,
It has been necessary to protect Amer-
ican lives in Vietnam and to preserve a
precarious but important balance ix
Laos.
III. The Future
Peace remains the highest priority'
of this administration. We will con
tinue our search for it in Vietnam. I
hope my appeal today to the Geneva
conference cochairmen will help in
Laos. Our policy for that torn country
will continue to rest on some basic
principles:
? We will cooperate fully with all
diplomatic efforts to restore the 1962
Geneva agreements.
? We will continue to support the le-
gitimate government of Prime Minis.
ter Souvanna Phouma and his efforts
to de-escalate the conflict and reach.
political understandings.
? Our air interdiction efforts are de-
signed to protect American and Allied'
lives in Vietnam. Our support efforts,
have the one purpose of helping pre-
vent the recognized Laotian govern '
ment from being overwhelmed by
larger Communist forces dominated by`
the North Vietnamese.
? We will continue to give the Amer
lean people the fullest 'possible infor.
mation on our involvement, consistent,
missions for Laotian forces when re-
quested to do so by the Royal Laotian
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r HE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 8, 1970
Laotian Reds Outline Peace Plan
political arm of the pro-Commu-
nist Pathet Lao movement in
Laos has issued a program for
peace there similar to the Viet-
cong plan for South Vietnam.
The Laotian program-issued)
by the movement known as Neo`
Lao HakXat-calls for the com-
plete withdrawal of the United)
,States from Laos, the formation
of a coalition government and
the eventual election of a neu-
tralist tralist government of national
union.
The program called for all
countries to ' respect the sov-
ereignty, independence, neutral-
ity and territorial integrity of
Laos as provided in the 1962
Geneva agreements, and pro-
vided that the United States
"must put an end to its inter-
vention and aggression in Laos."
Nothing was said about the
67,000 North Vietnamese troops
in Laos, who are assisting the
Pathet Lao and have just taken
over the Plaine des Jarres.
Hanoi Broadcast Plan
Details of the program were
broadcast today by the Hanoi
radio. The program was made
public in Hanoi yesterday at
a news conference held by Phau
Phimpachman, member of the
central committee of the Neo
Lao Hak Xat and director of in.
formation for the group.
The Neo Lao Flak Xat secre-
tary general is Phoumi Vong-
vichit a Laotan Comrpunist.
, Statements of the Neo Lao Ha of Cambodia's Chief of Star
Xat can be taken as atuhorita Prince Nordom Sihanouk, th
tive expressions of Laotian all countries must affirm the
Communist views. recognize and respect the kin -
resent boundaries.
ttlemen d
'
oor
s p
The program for a se
of the conflict in Laos come The Neo Lao Hak Xat pr Britain, co-chairmen of the
at a time when Prince Souvan gram stipulates "respect fort 1962 Geneva conference
na Phouma, Laotian Premier, throne" and calls for electio Nonetheless, the officials said
has asked Britain and the So- to form a national assemb they considered the tone of the
viet Union, co-chairmen of the and set up a democratic gover proposal to be softer and less
.1962 Geneva conference, which ment of national union repr bellicose than those of the re-
.reached an agreement to neu sentative of all Laotians. cent past. It left much room
tralize Laos under a govern- for diplomatic maneuver and
ment of national unity, to ar- U.S. Studying Proposal '
range consultation among the'
Geneva powers on measures to By RICHARD HALLORAN
restore and preserve peace and - special to The Drew York bones
neutrality in Laos.
In his statement on Laos yes-
terday President Nixon pledged
United States cooperation as
-Conference agreement in seems --- move toward striking a
that provisions of the agree- political bargain, there.
ment are honored.
Nioxn Makes 2 Appeals
President Nixon has also writ
n letters to Prime Minister
ilson of Britain and Premier,
leksei N. lio?yy -in of flid $OVia
pion asking heir help in re
toring the 1962 agreements.
The timing of the Nco La
akxat program appeared in
ended to insure that the Corn unist view would get consider
tion at any international at
rcpt to settle the Laotian
roblem.
The program demanded that
e United States "stop escalat
g the war, completely cease,e bombing of Laotian tern`
ory, withdraw from Laos al
nited States advisers and mil*'
ary personnel as well as al
nited States weapons and war
aterial, stop using military
ases in Thailand and Thailand
ercenaries for purposes of ag
ression against Laos and sto
sing Laotian territory for inteention and aggression agains
ther countries."
The program said Laos mus
aintain strict neutrality an]:
hat Laos "respects Vietnam'
ndependence, sovereignty, uni
y and territorial integrity" an
he independence, sovereigns
eutrality and territorial integ
ity of Cambodia "within it.
resent borders"
The stipulation with regar,
o Cambodia would mean tha
AMR would abandon all claim
le o icta , , i
e aware of policy decisions,
aid they were giving the pro-
osal careful study. But they
autioned.that it contained sev-
fql 16(akiltd polno jnMthdina a
errand that the United States
stop bombing North Vietnamese
supply routes through Laos into
South Vietnam-
The officials also said that
the price the Pathet Lao was
sking of the Royal Laotian
Government was high. They
doubted that Premier Souvanna
Phouma would be willing to pay
it but said the United States
would def:x to him.
According to the sources, the
program was intended to serve
at least two purposes. Coming
just after the offensive in Laos,
it was designed to take the
sting out of the United States
charge that the North Vietnam-1
ese and Pathet Lao were the
aggressors and to put them into
a negotiating posture.
Secondly, the statement
would cover the North Vietna-
mese and Pathet Lao diplomati-
cally should they decide to
continue their offensive deeper
into Laotian Government-held
territory The Communists, the
. sources said, could contend that;
the proposal had been rejected,
and thus justify new military
;thrusts.
Officials here said that a ma-
jor difficulty in the Pathet Lao
proposal, issued almost simul-
taneously with President Nix
on's statement on Laos, was its
insistence on an internal solu-
tion to the Laotian problem.
They pointed out that Pre-
mier Souvanna had already.
undertaken a diplomatic effort
to areas in northern Cambodt
that were once a part of Lao.
This would satisfy the positio
WASHINGTON, arc -
Officials here said today that
they consider the Neo Lao
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26 February 1970
Laos a awvn__-
but King-Sized
BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
'l'imes Hong Kong Bureau Chief
On the map, the craggy outlines of 1e
kingdom of Laos resemble a surrealistically.
elongated horse's head greedily dipping its
muzzle into fertile Southeast Asia. Yet the
,kingdom is no dashing knight in the chess
game of Asian power politics, but a pawn.
Laos is, however, the single most impor-_
taut pawn. Whoever controls the Laotian
lines of communication is, potentially,
master of the region.
The classic demonstration has been the;
war in Vietnam. The Communists could not:
have sustained their campaign to "liberate"
the Republic of Vietnam if they had been
unable to replenish their great losses by
sending soldiers and supplies south along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Cambodia and
Thailand also are vulnerable to insurrections
supported through Laos.
The obverse is also true.' No guerrilla
insurrection has succeeded in Asia without
external reinforcements and arms. Except
for Burma, exposed by its long frontier with
China, Southeast Asia is truly vulnerable to
effective guerrilla conquest only while the
Communists can move men and arms freely
through Laos.
Hanoi has no desire to conquer Laos now,
but is determined to keep its supply lines
open. Last year, American-sponsored irregu-'
lars, supported by American bombers, quite
surprisingly pushed units into the Plain of
Jars, a traditional Communist stronghold.
Feeling their supply lines threatened, the
Communists are now riposting.
*.
Laotian armies and Laotian battles are
always slightly opera bouffe-and, normal-
ly, casualties are pleasantly light. Ten years,
ago, I saw 800 men of a Royal battalion
stalled on the main road between the twin
capitals, Vientiane and Luang Prabang, by a.
force their lieutenant-colonel estimated as?
"about 10 snipers." Moreover, all reports of
Laotian battles must, axiomatically, be con-
sidered wildly exaggerated - until proved
,otherwise.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
But two new factors suggest treating the
current campaign with less skepticism.
It appears, first, that Hanoi may be
responding to the virtual invitation to move
in Laos the U.S. Senate issued last
December. Although that thesis cannot be
proved, the timing is most suggestive.
The Senate, stated its disapproval of using
American ground troops in Laos and
declared that it would deny financial
support to troops so employed. It further
registered its distaste for any American
military involvement in La including air
,support.
The second factor is equally intriguing.
Communist reinforcements along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail dropped sharply in 1969. though
the figures began rising toward the year's
.end. Reinforcements during January, 1970,
have just been calculated. They are the
highest since 1968.
More than 10,000 troops and political
cadres marched down the trail in January.
The reinforcements were obviously essen.,
tial to Communist strategy in the south.
Stepping up,action in Laos could, therefore,
be intended primarily to protect Communist
lines of communication, while punishing the
United States psychologically where we
have shown ourselves most vulnerable-in
Laos.
The attacks were, moreover, certainly
"provoked" by the earlier successes of the
irregulars. Hanoi would, naturally, prefer
.continued, undisturbed use of Laos as a
'channel for reinforcements and supplies to
its forces in South Vietnam. Unless the
Communists are "provoked" by effective
counteraction, they would prefer not to
fight in Laos just now.
Hanoi's chief objective remains South
Vietnam. The Communists have, after all,
announced that they will get around to
liberating Laos and Cambodia after they
have bestowed the blessings of "proletarian
government by revolutionary violence" on
all Vietnam.
Hanoi is, however, irked by military action
in Laos which threatens its immediate
bjective by threatening its essential supply
lines. If the United States did not "provoke"
he Communists by defending South Viet-
am in Laos, the kingdom would be free of
fighting-until its turn for "liberation."
Ali+4i!j~l'~
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2 March 1970
N hints Laos
t
mediation effort
CPYR HT
`Last chance of glory' CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
for International Control Commission?
By Ernest Weatherall
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
India's appeal to' both sides to end
hostilities in Laos is regarded here as
perhaps the first step in "reactivating".
its role as chairman of the long-dormant
International Control Commission.
The ICC was set up by the Geneva
powers in 1954 to watch that the borders,
of the new countries carved out of
French Indo-China were not violated.
Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh told Par-.
liament that during his recent talks with
Lao Foreign Minister Khampan Panya,
India was asked to use its influence to
call for a meeting of "interested pow-
ers" to resolve the present crisis.
Mr. Panya said: "We should consider"
this matter in a Geneva-type confer-
ence." However, Mr. Singh told Parlia-
ment he had pointed out that any Ge-
neva conference could only be called by
the cochairmen-the Soviet Union and,
the United Kingdom.
Caution traced
When the non-Communist opposition
in Parliament bitterly criticized Mr.
Singh for not identifying. the aggressors
Laos, the Foreign Minister said:,
"India cannot make any statement that
would jeopardize its position as chair-
man of the neutral International Con-
trol Commission. Any naming of ag-
gressors would have to be done with ap-
proval of the other members.
Right-wing members of' Parliament
said later that Mr. Singh's extreme cau-
tion in discussing the crisis in Laos is
because Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
government has not received any clear,
indications from the Soviet Union on
-how it feels. Many contend that Mos-
cow wants the status quo to be retained,
in Southeast Asia and will indicate that
India should go ahead as chairman of the
ICC and take the initiative in ending the
present conflict.
When the ICC was set up in 1954, it
was a balanced commission with Po-
land representing the Commuist bloc,'
Canada the NATO powers, and, Jawa-
harlal Nehru's nonaligned India (which'
had helped to end the Korean war) as.
chairman.
Now India is in effect no longer non
aligned. New Delhi has taken sides on
the Vietnam war in many ways, includ-
ing allowing the Soviet Union landing
rights for its transport planes going to,
Hanoi. Communist China no longer re
gards India as a neutral since their'
border conflict in 1962.
Criticisni by U.S.
India also has been criticized by the
United States for not taking a more,
active part in trying to end the Vietnam
war.
But there has been trouble in the,
"troika" since 1960 as well, The Poles,,
taking their cue from Moscow, now re-
fuse to discuss _ anything related to the
Vietnam situation.
The Canadians feel that at least the
ICC should go on record as trying to
work out some kind of Vietnam solu-
tion. However, the commission's task in
implementing the Geneva agreement
depends. on the two Vietnams cooperat.
ing. They have not, and there has been'
little the ICC can do but fade into the'
'background after being deserted both
"diplomatically and financially by the
:Geneva powers that created it.
With the recent withdrawal of /he ICC:
from Cambodia, the erosion j,pf the
-peace-keeping machinery has iseached
a point where New Delhi feels i ould
"adjourn sine die," meaning 1-could
be reactivated if the need shoul$ arise.
The Indian Government has m4? no
secret that it feels that the ICG s?out-'
A logical successor, it is thought, by
by President Nixon during last year's.
Paris peace talks that an "internat1a}gal'
supervisory body, acceptable to 'both
sides, should be created" to verify, with-
drawals, supervise a cease-fire,=;and
supervise elections.
UN auspices urged
All these functions are well b
the scope of the ICC.
1 Other Indians feel that an interna.
tional supervisory body, such as that
suggested by President Nixon, should be
under United Nations' auspices. How-
ever, it is felt that in order for UN
peace=keeping machinery to succeed in
Southeast Asia the world body must
admit Communist China and North Viet-
nam, otherwise there would be little
.hope it could succeed.
But all these peace consortiums ap-
pear to be only in the distant future. The
only mediator available today is the im-
perfect International Control Commis-
sion, to hell) end the crisis in Laos. And
it. may be, New Delhi feels, the -last
'chance of glory for the commission set
up,by the Geneva powers 14 years ago.
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CPYRGHT
LONDON OBSERVER
8 March 1970
'Hanoi plays
for big stakes
from MARA FRANKLAND.
VIENTIANE, 7 March
HA OI has apparently decided
to seek a limited military victory
in 'Laos in order to influence the
situation in South Vietnam:
It might be thought most un-
likely, that North Vietnam would
choose the present moment in the
.Vietnam war-when it most show
that America's Vietnamisation pro=
grainme will not work--to divert
men and material to Laos merely
to strengthen the hand of its Pathet
Lao' allies against. Vientiane. Yet
over the past year Hanoi has sent
in?ore soldiers to North.-East Laos
=and is making considerable efforts
to keen them supplied. And, for
the first time in the Laotian war,
it: is using these troops on their
own, with little or no protective
covering from Pathet Lao units.
The present fighting has grown
out of the conflict that began with
? the disintegration of the ' non
aligned' Coalition Government of
Laos provided for by the Geneva
Agreement of 1962, The break4
away pro-Comtnunist P;athet Lao,
supported by 30-40,000 North Viet-
namese troops before the current
escalation, have since been. playing
.`military battledore and sbuttlecock
with the 60,000 strong- -but weaker
-Royal Laotian Army and guer-
--rillas of Prince Souvani a Yhoun'ra's
Government, which is propped up
ecouoniically and militarily by the
Un&ted States.
What exactly does North Viet-
nam hope to gainby tbesa efforts?
There is general agreement here
that North Vietnam does not plan
to overthrow the Laotian Govern-
ment. But even by -restricting its
advance to the area that its Pathet
Lao allies claim is now illegally
occupied by the Vientiane, Govern-
ment---and all the major Laotian.-'
towns lie outside this area -Hanoi'
can still hope to force Vientiane to.
its knees and make it sue for peace."
Hanoi's price for agreeing to
peace talks can only be- a halt to
all American bombing in Laos,-
including the infiltration routes
through Southern Laos to South'
Vietnam. An end to thA bombing
of the trails would be, a rtiajor
military and political victory'fi?rt
the Communists in Saudi Vietn87ii
Its effcct on Saigon's biorabp in ad,
already difficult period. could be
near disastrous.
Hanoi's attempt to lift the war
here out of its limited Laotiafl On-.
Northern Laos over the past year.
-Although-at the time it made milt
tare sense for America' to use the
Thailand =based : planes left idle
after the bomibing halt over North
-Vietnapr, the 'heavier use of air
as"f 1164 ?ljcI ttl ItIFf isit unto'
a ajor political issue in the United
m
States without being able to achieve
decisive military results. It has
visibly increased American com
mitments in Indo-China at a time
when' Washington is ' trying to'
reduce them and at the one place
where America's power is weakest
`and least easy to reinforce. ' .
Even so, considerable military
sand political dangers tie in wait
for Hanoi. Although the Laotian
Army ? is `no match for North
Vietnamese troops, FIant muct
fight now in Laos' a war of move-'
meat in extremely difficult terrain
and with a vulnerable supply line.
` It must'raise the level of fighting
throughout the country to prevent
the Government reinforcing the
`North East. It has a very difficult.
echoice of targets to make, chiefly
between the . 'pro - Government
netttral?i*t base. at Vang Vieng, 60
'miles north of Vientiane, Which is
easily .appproacltable; and the, far
more inaccessible American-
supported guerrilla 'base at Long
Chen g.
Politically, the North Vietnamese
are well aware of the delicacy of
their position as foreigners in Laos.
'They must. certainly be asking
themaelves whether their invasion
-if pushed uncomfortably far-
.might. justify in the eves of the
world the introduction of foreign
,troo:ps into Laos to help Vientiane.,
Last and most important,. in
pushing for a halt to the bombing
of the Ho Chi Minh trails. Hanoi
is .playing. for very big stakes. The
ul?tinlate. prize is the collapse of
,American policy in Vietnam-and
Washington is not going to,sit back
while Hanoi runs away with that.
PLAIN
OF JARS
NORTH
Ali '., VIETNAM
HANOI
VIENfTIANE ~
Oomlhattd by
Communb-
Paths Lao
AOS
O MILES 200 ",
ta.w.a
SOUTH
,VIETNc
r,
4
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a. zscoNOMts~r. nu+nali 14, 1970 Along, soft talk
Tz
The Pathet Lao have now put forward
their peace proposals for Laos to the
harassed government of Prince Souvanna
Phouma. The main points are that the
Americans must stop the bombing of com-
munist positions and supply lines ; that
0,he?u should b tslkr to pet Up a "Yom$
ment of national union, " taking Into
account the realities of the present situa-
tion " ; and that the refugees from the
areas lately captured by the communists
should be resettled. It is a formidable list.
Its most notable exception is any mention
of the North Vietnamese troops fighting
in Laos, whose attack on the Plain of
Jars made it possible for the Pathet Lao
to ask for so much.
No doubt talking has advantages for
both sides at the moment. It will enable
the North Vietnamese and' the Pathet
Lao to consolidate the gains they have
made, and minimise the chance of a
government counter-offensive. It will
enable the government to regroup its
forces and pray for more American aid
in arms and ammunition. But, even in
the weak bargaining position in which
Prince Souvanna Phouma finds himself,
the talks are unlikely to lead to a workable
settlement. By insisting that the Americans
call off their bombers the communists are
attempting to take away the most effective
weapon in the hands of the government.
The State Department has said that the
United States will accept any settlement
reached between the Pathet Lao and the
government (though it expects all the
nations that took part in the 1962 Geneva
conference to play a role in restoring
peace). But what matters is the terms the
Americans would be willing to encourage
Prince Souvanna Phouma to settle for.
The prince is prepared to talk. But'
that phrase about the " realities of the
.present situation" means that the. com-
munists want their victory in the Plain
of jars to be translated into a dominating
position in a coalition government. Colonel
Petrasi, the Pathet Lao representative in
Vientiane, told a Japanese correspondent
this week that the Pathet Lao might con-
tinue their advance across the 1962 cease-
fire line. The Pathet Lao radio has been
.telling its listeners to step up the fighting.
Prince Souvanna Phouma says the North
Vietnamese now have tanks and 122 mm
artillery. in, Laos., The fact. -is that the
Laotian government has almost nothing to
,give away short of surrender, and the
communists are asking for something very
elese to dint.
 CPYRGHT
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ASIAN SURVEY, BEBKEIEY, CALIF
January 1970
LAOS: THE FORGOTTEN WAR WIDENS
JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF
In 1969, the most significant change in Laos was the widening
of the "forgotten war," "notre guerre oubliee," as Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma calls it. Both the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the Pathet
Lao (PL) expanded their military operations, each attempting to influence
? the internal power balance as well as the external forces, so important to
the future of the country.
The prevailing ground rules, established when government and Com-
munist forces resumed fighting in 1963, were that the Communist forces-
North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao-take the initiative during the dry season
(generally October to May), followed by ripostes during the wet season by
RLG forces, with U.S. air support. The war in Laos was not on the scale
of the larger, grinding war in South. Vietnam, but rather consisted largely
of small unit attacks on isolated positions, struggles for certain tactical
mountain-top and road control positions in sparsely populated highland
areas, ambushes, and hit and run encounters in some valley sites. The RLG
retained control over the Mekong Valley regions, where the bulk of the
lowland Lao live, and they held certain adjacent mountain areas and a few
scattered sites within enemy territory which they could reach only by air-
craft. The Communist forces controlled the northern and eastern segments
of the country, including all territory which borders on Communist China
and North Vietnam, covering regions inhabited largely by highland minori-
ties. The widened war in 1969 made it clear that these ground rules of en.
gagement had been significantly altered.
MII.ITARY DEVELOPMENT: 1969
The Communist dry season campaign, b ggun about October 1968, con-
tinued throughout the first half of 1969, and did not abate, as it had in
previous years, with the onset of the rainy season. The Communist gains
were substantial, if not decisive. In the South they demonstrated the weak-
ness of RLG General Phasouk Sourly by forcing him to abandon Tha Theng,
and in the North they showed superiority over the Meo" fighting forces with
the capture of Na Khang. In Sam Neua Province they cleared out most of
the isolated RLG posts which had been supplied by air. The Communists
also attacked certain Mekong Valley areas, which previously had been sel-
dom molested, assaulting an ordinance depot near Vientiane, ambushing
several foreign aid teams working in villages, -a tscking" $6 Wattay'*'trport
CPYRGHT
near Vientiane and crippling road traffic from time to time along the Mekong
Ever read.
During this period of Communist advances, General Vang Pao, with U.S.
air support, attempted in the spring to swing the pendulum back to the RLG
side by committing his Meo troops to attacking some Communist positions
on the Plain of Jars, including an assault upon the province capital of Xieng
Khouangville, held by the Communists since the early 1960's. The attack
succeeded in expelling the Communist forces, temporarily, but several months
later the Communist authorities again moved in behind their armed forces.
In June, another serious Communist attack was launched at Muong Suoi
on the Plain of Jars. The Communist forces, estimated at two battalions of
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA)
units, with Russian tanks, overran the area around Muong -Suoi, sending
three battalions in retreat. The forces of Vang Pao, with U.S. tactical air
support, were reported to have counterattached at l4luong Suoi, and failed.
Heavy losses were sustained in these engagements on both sides: an Asso-
ciated Press account put government troops killed and wounded at 400,
while the Communists (according to RLG sources) had 385 killed, largely
by air bombardment.' This attack was politically significant because it was
aimed at RLG Neutralist forces. These forces, originally constructed by
Colonel Kong Le (now in political exile in Paris), constituted the military
element of Souvanna Phouma's Neutralist faction which had been awarded
important representation in the government by the Geneva Conference of
1962. The Communists may have been preparing for a future political claim
that their own Neutralists, the "Patriotic Neutralist Forces," led by Colonel
Deuane Sipraseuth, should have a share in any future settlement which might
reestablish a Tripartite Government, like that provided in the 1962 settle-
ment.
In September 1969, RLG forces opened a major offensive against Com-
munist positions on the Plain of Jars and in the He Chi Minh Trail area:,
The New York Times reporter wrote from Vientiane. citing "reliable and
well-informed sources," that RLG forces, joined by "Royal Thai soldiers in
Laotian uniforms, had moved onto the plain and went along Route 9 after
round-the-clock bombing had leveled several towns and scattered small de-
fending forces." He added that the attacks were "the result of fully integrated
American-Laotian military planning and the most intensive American bomb-
ing ever seen in Laos."2 While there were some differences in detail in the
various newspaper accounts reporting the offensive, it appeared that RLG
assaults were made against a number of towns, inclbading Xieng Khouang.
ville, Khang Khai, and Phoung Savan on the Plain of Jars, Muong Phanh
in central Laos, and Tchepone further south in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.
The Communist forces were apparently taken by surprise and fled their
=Washington Star, June 25, and 28, 1969
'T D. Adman, New York Time; September 18,1969.
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positions. As the year was drawing to a close a severe Communist counter.
attack appeared likely, but it had not yet begun by late November.
The costliest toll in casualities among the NVA and LPLA has been ex-
acted by U.S. airpower. While the RLG forces, with some notable exceptions,
are generally a poor match for the NVA and their LPLA allies, supporting
U.S. aircraft has provided some measure of balance. The aggravation of
the ground fighting in 1969 was accompanied by a substantial increase in
air bombardment by U.S. planes. Writing in the Washington Post, Stanley
Karnow quoted Pentagon statistics as showing that
"the number of sorties by U.S. aircraft flown over Laos now surpasses
those flown over North Vietnam at the time President Johnson called a
halt to bombing ... U.S. airplanes were then flying about 12,000 sorties
a month against North Vietnam and about 4,700 against targets in Laos.
Sorties in Laos have now increased to an average of about 12,500 a
month." He reported that the U.S. air operations appear to have two
missions: one largely with B-52's (code-named Steel Tiger) is directed
against NVA infiltration to South Vietnam; the other, called Barrel Roll,
consists of Phantoms and Thunderchiefs and carrier-based bombers
directed against NVA and LPLA in northern Laosa
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RLG AND TIRE U.S. ROLE
The military gains of the Communists during the first half of 1969, and
signs of a declining American investment in Vietnam, produced reports of
pessimism among the Lao elite in Vientiane. However, the RLG military
initiatives later in the year satisfied some and, whatever the temporary mood,
life seemed much the same in Vientiane. No significant political crises
emerged in the capital during the year and the configuration of the RLG
remained fundamentally unchanged. The principal decision-makers, both
civilian and military, continued to be the lowland Lao drawn largely from
the few most powerful families of the various regions of the Kingdom, and
a few highland minority leaders, like the Meo General Vang Pao, who ex-
ercised control among their own ethnic groups.
Prince Souvanna Phouma sustained no serious challenges to his control
of the government. While his style has not aroused enthusiastic popular
support, he has been successful in commanding the respect of a good portion
of the politically-fractious elite and in retaining the confidence of his foreign
`supporters, including the United States and, though with less vigor the
Soviet Union. There were signs of discontent with his policies from some
right-wing factions and there were rumors early in the year that former
General Phoumi Nosavan, in exile in Thailand, was preparing a new maneu-
vet to return to Laos, but nothing emerged from this. Although Souvapna's
government was stable, there were few signs of the building of new political
?W'ashington Post, August 16, 1969; 'see also"Asbiebkie i 'Fasten gton Star, August 20.
1969.
6a
institutions, despite the fact that Souvanna spoke, from time to time, of the
need to construct a unified party for future con )ntation with the Pathet
Lao, whose superiority in political organization le has acknowledged.
Prince Souvanna's strategy in coping with the Communist military action
in his country during 1969 was to launch a majoriplomatic effort to mobil-
ize support from the great powers against North Psstnamese interference and
to separate the problem of Laos from the Vietna t War. He met with the
Chiefs of State in Tokyo, Paris, London, and Washington, and he called
upon a number of diplomats at the United Natiims in New York. At his
numerous press conferences, he denounced the pence of what he claimed
were 60,000 North Vietnamese troops in his covatry. He appealed to the
Soviet Union to take "more energetic measures" 2D restrain the North Viet-
namese and asked the British, as co-chairman (vih the Soviet Union) of
the Geneva Conference, to pressure the North 'Y tnamese into ending the
"invasion" of Laos. Though his effort was vigonus, there were no visible
signs that Souvanna, as the head of a miniatuiz. politically-divided state
deeply enmeshed in the Vietnam war, had succaied either in forcing the
North Vietnamese from his country or in separatiig Laos from the Vietnam
problem
During his diplomatic tournee, Souvanna thcmmtened to call upon the
United States for increased military assistance if tie North Vietnamese kept
up their military offensive. Though the U.S. government had continued its
important economic and military support to the RLG during 1969, there
was growing concern within Congress, particuladr the Senate, about the
U.S. involvement in Laos. The Senate expressed &is concern by approving
86 to 0 an amendment offered by Senator John Sherman Cooper to a $20
billion military authorization bill, which specifid that none of the funds
could be used for support of "local forces" in Taos or Thailand. In sup-
porting this amendment, majority leader Mike Mansfield explained that the
purpose of the amendment was to see that "we eb not back into another
Vietnam in Laos or Thailand." However, views pressed by Senator Sten-
nis, and a Defense Department memorandum wlsh he read during the de-
bate, suggested that the Senate had not entirely absed the door to the use
of funds, under other appropriations, for supportef U.S. forces in Laos and
Thailand.
A month following this Senate vote, the Symiaon sub-committee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted caret hearings on U.S. ac.
tivity in Laos. The sub-committee heard testimoay from U.S. officials in
Laos and from several decision-makers in Washiton. including CIA Chief
Richard Hehns.4 At the close of the hearings, Senator Fulbright and several
others reiterated their concern about U.S. involvement.
`C.Qasurrently ,etc 3'oc k Zimes,ran a,, s,~ppecial ser~a fAuskleT -on .Iags,.beginning
"Octdber 26,?I9, iic'h descihbed aspecfs~E "11S imadiiig CIA- Support of
General Vang Pao's forces, called the Armce ?andestine.
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THE PATHET LAo ZONE AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ROLE
It is still difficult to follow developments in the Pathet Lao zone. Few
outsiders, particularly Westerners, entered the zone and communications
from inside consisted largely of official propaganda. Nevertheless, the public
statements of the authorities on the PL radio and refugee reports provide
some insight into events there.5
The progress of the NVA and LPLA troops during the first half of the
year gave the PL leadership reason to rejoice. Their own advances and the
apparent political gains of their Vietnamese Communist allies made it ap-
pear that they were closer to achieving their goals. However, the increased
.havoc wreaked upon their zone by the expansion of the war tended to curb
the optimism. The frequent bombardments forced residents to move into
make-shift underground shelke'rs where some lived for months. Particularly
damaging was the RLG fall offensive. Refugees reported heavy damage in
the towns in the path of the attacks. For example, in Phong Savan on the
Plain of Jars which was assaulted in September, refugees reported that there
was not a house left standing.e
Furthermore, food, clothing, and other resources were scarce in the PL
zone and refugees asserted that taxes were onerous. The PL authorities im-
posed heavy demands on their population. Most of the able bodied young
men and some women were drafted into military service, while the remain-
ing villagers were conscripted for service as porters, laborers for road-build-
ing, irrigation and dam digging, and fortification construction.
There were no apparent dramatic political changes in the PL zone during
the year. Reports from RLG sources of the death of two key PL leaders,
tCaysone Phomviban and Prince Souphanouvong, appear to have been
groundless. Prince Souphanouvong, chairman of the Neo Lao Hak Sat
(NLHS) Front, celebrated his 60th birthday in July to public acclamation,
according to Radio Pathet Lao. RLG sources state that refugees had reported
in January 1969 that Kaysone, probably the most powerful PL leader as
head of the Marxist-Leninist party, the People's Party of Laos (Phak Pasa-
son Lao, or PPL), had been killed by air bombardment in Sam Neua Prov-
ince in August 1968.7 Since the PL radio failed for months to mention Kay-
son's presence at public functions, as had been the previous practice, and
did not deny his death, the reports gained credence. However, during the
ceremonies in the zone to commemorate the death of Ho Chi Minh, Kaysone
was reported in attendance and has since been mentioned in radio broad.
casts. It is possible that Kaysone had been injured, or was ill, and had been
out of public circulation until the memorial service for Ho.
'Bangkok Post, January 3,1969; Le dfonde, January 2,1969. "Radio Pathet Lao in Lao, Feb 9,1969.
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An indication of the sizeable refugee flow resulting from the widened war in Laos is
found in reports from RLG refugee officials in August, that 80,000 refugees had alrcAdy
fled the northeastern provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang during the year.
Washington Star, August 22,I969.
New York Times, October 11, 1969.
Unlike their RLG counterparts, the PL-leaders devoted serious attention
to expanding their political party, the semi-secret PPI., and to improving
the NLHS, the open administrative instrument of the PL movement. The
North Vietnamese political and administrative advisory role to the PL au-
thorities continued to be of major proportion and may well have increased
with the augmentation of NVA troops in Laos.8 Fifer economic distance
from the RLG was created by the introduction of new currency called "Lib-
eration Kip," and the requirement that all RLG currency be exchanged for
it on a one to one basis.
The PL hardened their political position toward the RLG. On the occa-
sion of the 7th anniversary of the signing of the Gesexa Agreement of 1962,
PL authorities announced that the Tripartite Natisnal Coalition Govern-
ment was no longer valid and that Souvanna Photmra was "no longer the
Prime Minister of the Tripartite National Coalition Government nor the
leader of the Neutralist Party." Souvanna was denounced as a "traitor,
capitulationist, and a follower of the U.S. aggressas:"9 Although they had
hinted at this position earlier, they had not previoy stated their denunci-
ation in such severe terms.
The PL also reiterated their position, stated earler in the 12 Point Pro-
gram of November 1968, that the Laotian problem must be settled on the
basis of the 1962 Geneva Agreement and the "reatiln"es of the present situa-
tion in Laos."" Although they have not spelled old the exact meaning of
the phrase "realities of the present situation," they seen to be saying they
will insist in any future settlement upon recognition r their territorial gains
since 1962 and will demand that their "Patriotic Nes ralist Forces," as men-
tioned earlier, be granted a share in representing de Neutralist faction in
the country. Their vituperation against Prince Susanna Phouma in his
.capacity as Neutralist Party leader, in addition to their military attacks
against Neutralist-held positions on the Plain of Jars,, lend substance to this
possibility.
An issue of primary importance to the Communist authorities in the PL
zone, both PL and North Vietnamese, was the U.S. bombing. Their radio
broadcasts contained daily denunciations of the a< attacks, but claimed
great success in coping with them. They intermillently announced a box
score of planes destroyed, and on February 9 claimed their 1,000th U.S.
plane.11 They tied future negotiations over the quesion of Laos to a cessa-
tion of the bombing, stating that the U.S. "must hart their bombing raids on
the zone of the patriotic forces so as to create conAtions for the Laotians
'For an account of the North Vietnamese role in Laos, see Paul Langer and Zasloff,
Revolution in Laos: The North Vietnamese and the Pathd Lao. RAND, RM5935, Sep-
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to settle among themselves their internal affairs, without U.S. interference."ls
In their external relations, the PL authorities relied principally upon the
North Vietnamese. The NVA, who provide the military backbone of the
Communist effort in Laos, appear to have the capability to overrun the
RLG-held territory if they decide to commit sufficient resources.13 So far,
the North Vietnamese have found it more in their interest to limit the mili-
tary activity of their 50,000 troops in Laos (according to U.S. estimates),
to holding, with LPLA troops, the PL territory and to operating the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, through which their soldiers and material pass to sustain the
war in South Vietnam. Their primary goal is to win the war in South Viet-
nam, and major offensives in Laos would divert needed resources, risk U.S.
retaliation against North Vietnam, and possibly bring on international con-
demnation for aggression against Laos. Their major concerns in Laos have
been free access through the Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam and pro-
tection against possible hostile activity directed at North Vietnam either
from Laotian military bases or through the subversive actions in North
Vietnam by highland minorities recruited in Laos. Concurrent with their
own interests in Laos, they have promoted the fortunes of their junior ally,
the Pathet Lao authorities.
The stand-off which had developed in Laos by 1969 (under which both
sides remained principally in the areas of their control, with only small
changes in territorial control) presented certain advantages to the North
Vietnamese. If the Americans and the Thais had been tempted to engage in
military activity in Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail, they must have
?-ao- -^:?- '.-...'.: ra*+. by +1- 1",owledge that the North Vietnamese could
easily move into otne, -%r crises. In addition, if
? conditions were to deteriorate in Som..: -_ . . '--
would retain the option of increasing activity in Laos in or....
to the Americans that, at a relatively low cost, they could make trouble for
American interests elsewhere.
This latter point may be an important factor behind the increased Com-
munist activity in Laos during 1969. As reports came from South Vietnam
of an improving military climate for the South Vietnamese government,
Communist pressure in Laos increased. Whether or not these reports were
accurate, growing NVA activity in Laos may have been designed to demon-
strate to the Americans how fragile is their capacity to guide events in the
larger Indochina area. This interpretation would suggest that the more suc-
cessful the efforts to defeat the Communist in South Vietnam, the more
likely are the North Vietnamese to expand the hostilities in Laos. Their
"Radio Pathet Lao in English, July 24,1969.
"Former US. Assistant secretary of State Roger Hilsman, writing of the 1963 period,
stated that the "Communist North Vietnamese could easily put enough troops into Laos
to take it over within 2 to 4 weeks, if they were willing to take the risk of American
intervention." To Move a Nation, Garden City, Nc i Rork, ;1967. This assessment seems
equally reasonable today:
pressure may also be interpreted as an effort to halt the U.S. bombing of
the PIT, .. zone.
Communist China and the Soviet Union recognize Laos as lying prin-
cipally within the North Vietnamese sphere. A reminder of China's con-
tinuing interest in Laos, however, was the work in 1969 on the construction
of a road running from China to Muong Sai, some 30 miles south of the
border, with apparent plans to link it with Route 19, which runs to Dien-
bienphu in North Vietnam. The Soviet Union, while continuing to deal
politely with Souvanna Phouma and the RLG, has remained on good terms
with the Pathet Lao, whose radio carried reports of Soviet support with in-
creasing frequency during the latter part of 1969.
In summary, while the PL leaders may feel encouraged by what they re-
gard as favorable political and military trends in Laos and Vietnam and their
negotiating position has hardened in reflection of their growing strength,
the people in the PL area continue to suffer badly from the ravages of war.
JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF is a member of the Department of Political Science at the *.su-
versity of Pittsburgh.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A travers la zone liberee lao, Editions de Langues Etrangeres, Hanoi, 1968.
Fall, Bernard, Anatomy of a Crisis, Doubleday and Co., Garden City,. New
York, 1969.
Langer, Paul F. and Joseph J. Zasloff, Revolution in Laos: The North Viet-
.namese and the Pathet Lao, The RAND Corporation, RM 5935, September
1969.
Memorandum du comme du Neo Lao Haksat concernant les cinq annees de
bombardments aeriens des imperialistes americains contre la zone liberee
lao (17-5-1964 a 17-5-1969), Editions du Neo Lao Haksat, 1969.
haplen, Robert, Tint,e, f'-2V 'arper and Row, 11? 1 1969
ov d' o 'R se, fl DP74'1 14i 00040 1 10001.0.
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THE ARTICULATE REFUGEES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
April 1970
The most recent writings by some of the more prominent and knowledgeable
Czechoslovakian refugees that have been published in the West have evoked
loud protest, both official and propagandistic, from those presently in charge
in Prague. The same writings, however, have tremendous appeal for and have
sparked lively discussion among the more articulate of the Western dissident
communist and far-left literati. Last month in Rome there appeared the first
issue of a new journal-in-exile which unites the talents of Czechoslovakian
refugees with those of Western dissidents -- a bold enterprise sure to provoke
even more vituperation from Prague.
In the attached list of references are cited titles of some of the books
and articles that have stimulated the most reaction. They were written by
such well-known refugees as: Ota Sik,* referred to in the West as the design-
er of the Czechoslovakian economic reform and the frequent target of Soviet
vituperation; Jiri Pelikan,* former director of Czech TV who achieved world-
wide notoriety for the way in which he encouraged and sustained opposition to
the Czechoslovakian occupation of August 1968 with his 60-transmitter net-
work, and Antonin Liehm, an outspoken champion of liberalization as early as
the Czech Writers' Congress of June 1967 and throughout the Dubcek era.
Mr. Liehm's book, Three Generations, came out in Paris last month with a
30-page opener by Jean-Paul Sartre. As described below, the Sartre-Liehm ef-
fort is causing consternation in Prague while it is getting favorable reviews
from Communists Ernst Fischer, Giuseppe Boffa, and others. Fischer wrote in
Politique Aujourd'hui: "It is an important book, and anyone on the Left owes
it to himself to read it in order to reassess preconceived ideas and to con-
tribute toward finding the answer which the problems of European socialism
call for." Boffa wrote in L'Unita that in his opinion, Liehm's book "involves
one of the most effective testimonials that should enable us to understand
what happened and what is still happening in Czechoslovakia." (See the at-
tached reprints of these two Western reviews.)
The Team of Liehm and Sartre
Jean-Paul Sartre's introduction to Three Generations is entitled "The
Socialism that Came in from the Cold." Sartre asserts that because of what
*As evidence of "official protest," Ota Sik and Jiri Pelikan were deprived,
as of 24+ February 1970, of their citizenships for "damaging Czechoslovakian
interests by their acts abroad."
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happened in August 1968 the Soviets can no longer seek shelter in the morality
of their system, and recommends that "The people must seize it and throw it
into the garbage can."
Both Sartre and Liehm were attacked on Czech television on Friday evening
13 March 1970 by Vladimir Minac, a Slovak writer. Minac said that "Nothing
remained of Sartre's Marxism in the preface to Liehm's book.... Sartre had
completely yielded not only to one-sided information, but also to a one-sided
interpretation of reality." Minac said sarcastically that Sartre knew every-
thing about Czechoslovakia because "Antonin Liehm told him about us.... Thus
we learn in a typical Sartre transcription the truth of our radical petty
bourgeois that February 19+8 was the beginning of a disaster for the Czech and
Slovak nations, that we were living in the Kafka world... that for the smallest
outburst of gaiety the heaviest sanctions were threatening us."
Minac found it incomprehensible that Sartre should feel that Czech intel-
lectuals were driven to despair by the revelations of the 20th Congress of the
CPSU (at which Khrushchev's secret speech revealed Stalin's transgressions).
Minac added that Sartre fell, not for the first time, "a victim of those whom
he considers victims." He blames Sartre for accepting "ready schemes without
examination, as for example, that at the beginning was a word, that is, the
word of those intellectuals who had awakened and radicalized the peacefully
sleeping working class, and this in turn has radicalized the whole movement."
Minac accused Sartre of drawing "strict and shocking conclusions from gossip,
pettiness, half-truths and complete lies" as, for example, when he said that
"our Western bourgeoisie was not wrong. The entry of tanks into Prague has
assured it of the correctness of not ending the cold war and not concluding
a new holy alliance with the Soviet Union, which would rule over everything."
Minac concluded by saying that everything which Sartre wrote about "our
Czechoslovak concrete case is in a sharp contradiction with what he professes
generally."
Literarni Listy Reborn
Last month there appeared in Rome the first issue of a new Literarni
Listy, the Czech literary journal which was forced out of business in Prague
shortly after the Soviet invasion. Contributors to the "journal-in-exile"
were:
--Ludvic Vesely, former Deputy Chief Editor of Literarni Listy;
--Jiri Pelikan, former director of Czech TV;
--Ivan Svitak, Czech philosopher and writer;
--Evzen Lobl, former Vice Minister of Foreign Trade;
--Ivan Bistryna, Doctor of Law and Sociology;
--Milan Schulz, former TV editor of Literarni Listy;
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--Jan Schneider, song writer;
--Ernst Fischer, Austrian Marxist theoretician;
The origin, scope, and objectives of this journal are stated in the
5 March 1970 issue of L'Europeo (Rome), translation attached.
Czechoslovakia is going to remain a compelling subject for some time
to come. Not only the prominent Czechoslovakian refugees but also,it is
evident, leading Marxists in Western Europe will be involved in trying to
fathom the lessons of Czechoslovakia.
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Books
Ota Sik, La Verite sur 1'Economie Tchecoslova ue, (The Truth about the Czecho-
slovak Economy , Fayard, Paris, 1q 9? (Also published in German as Fakten
der TNo oohoolowa1iechen Wirtichaft, Molden, Vienna, 1969. The book
based on six TV talks delivered in Prague in the summer of 1968.)
Jiri Pelikan, Le Congres Clandestin (The Secret Congress , documents related
to the li+th Congress of the Czech CP which took place just after the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia), Le Seuil, Paris, 1970. (Also published in Ger-
man as Panzer Ueberrollen den Parteitag, Europa Verlag, Vienna, December
1969.)
Antonin Liehm, Trois Generations: Entretiens sur le Phenome`ne Culturel Tcheco-
slovaque (Three Generations: Conversations on the Czechoslovakian Cultural
Phenomenon , with 30-page introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre, Gallimard,
Paris, 1970. (See copies of reviews by Giuseppe Boffa in l'Unita, 17 Feb-
ruary 1970, and Ernst Fischer in Politique Aujourd'hui, February 1970,
attached.)
Piller Report, a document on the Stalinist trials and executions in Czecho-
slovakia in the nineteen-fifties, prepared during the Dubcek regime by
a committee of inquiry which had access to Czech CP archives; publica-
tion date for this 125,000-word document is not known. (Story in London';
Times of 1 March 1970, attached.)
Articles
Politique Aujourd'hui, Paris, November 1969, "Je Poursuis la Lutte," open
letter from Jiri Pelikan (attached).
The Times, London, 20 December 1969, "Sik Accuses Husak," statement released by
Professor Ota Sik (attached).
Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 22 January 1970, "Sik's Economic Theories
Haunt Czechs," Vienna dispatch from special correspondent Eric Bourne
(attached).
Le Figaro, Paris, 2+/25 January 1970, "La regime impose a la Tchecoslovaquie
nest pas du socialisme," interview of Jiri Pelikan. (Article and trans-
lation are attached.)
L'Europeo, Rome, 5 March 1970, excerpts from Literarni Listy, an exile publi-
cation of a journal closed down in Czechoslovakia after the invasion.
(Excerpt from L'Europeo attached.)
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LE MONDE, Paris (Weekly Selection)
4+ March 1970
CJECN ITEL[[CTU[S, liv C1OS[-iP
T HESE ton drawings' by the Czech writer and artist Adolf.
Hoffm?ister illustrate the volume Trois Generations : Entre-
tiens sur le Phenomene Cultunzl Tchecoslovaque (Three
Generations: Conversations on the Czechoslovakian Cultural Phe-
nomenon), which Anton Liehm, a Czech writer and journalist, has
just published in a French translation (Gallimard, 330 pp.,
32 francs), with a preface by Joan-Paul Sortro.
Josef S~vorccky (top of the middle column) is one of those
interviewed ip the book, and we refer the readers of his Armoured
Squadron (reviewed below) to the charming portrait that he gives of
himself, defining his position in regard to criticism, literature and
From top to bottom left: Jan Skacel, Karel Kosik, Milan
Kundera. Middle: Josef Skvorecky, Antonin Liehm, Laco
Novomesky, Jaroslav Putik. Right; Eduard Goldsti cker, Vaclav
Havel, Ludvik Vaculik.
CPYRGHT
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[13ook review by Giuseppe Boffa: "rourt:oen Witr..e:,:, Statements on the
Czechoslovak Crisis"; Rome, 1'Unita (organ of Italian CP), Italian,
17 February 1970, p 10]
Three generations examine their conscience. The: press
had much to say about the volume by Antonin Lielm, al-
though uuuly witt regard to the preface by. Sartrc. Nat-
ional acid socialist self-criticism on problems of uni-
versal significance.
T'ho pre,-,s had a good deal to :,ay about the book by Antonin Li slim,
which Gallima;:d published In Paris. Vic book jl., Outit.leC Three Cenera-
tions. The press in particular commented on tlit: preface by ysartre,_ en -
titled "The Socialism That Came Out from the Cold." It said very little
about the rest. I would like to try to proceed in a different manner.
I, too, will say something in brief about the preface but. I will. then
fright away concentrate on the volume as a whole because, in my opi 4on,
it involves one pf the most effective testimonials that should E-nable us
,to un erstand what happened and what is still happening in Czechoslovakia.
Sartre's passage was written with polemical passion. His theses
Ishould be examined one by one. Personally, for example, I find good
!grounds for his energetic opposition to any tendency to import or impose
in any country models" oL socialism which were implemented in other na-
tions. Sooner or later, the consequences are harmful. Czechoslovakia
roved this. On the other hand, I find that this analysis and inter.pre-
tation of the Czechoslovak events of 1968 in Sartre -- events which he'
iews as the "rediscovery of the councils" -- correspond to a perhaps
suggestive sdheme which 1 dt4*v'er?has--i-d+tle--to do with reality: what
append in Czechoslovakia was quite a bit more complicated.
But the thing that I want to underscore most is another point. It
is necessary to clear the field of one ambiguity which the infinite specu-
lations of Silone and the bourgeois press have created. Here it suffices-
:0 recall that all of them have notliini; to say about the fact that
eirtre's point. of departure is always a denunciation of the Western
apitaiist yocieLies, In order to understand where the distortion finally
rinds up. The- criticism of the existing socialist societies -- even the
ost severe criticism -- has a quite different meaning if this criticism
.s made to defend the society in which we live or merely to seek new and
more advanced criteria for the construction of socialism. The first is
he position of men such as Silone, Aron, and our domestic journals.
he second is that of Sartre.
But OssEntially this is also the position of the witness testimonies
hich have been collected in this volume, of which there is so much talk.
We have here 13 very extensive interviews conducted with as many Czecho-
?lovak writers by Antonin Liehm who was one of the chief editors of the
ournal of Czechoslovak writers, Literarni Noviny and Bien Literarni Listy
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plus un introduction by the principal author which is more in the nature
of a self-interview. One of the 13 interviews, which involves Eduard
Goldstuecker, was published in Italy at the time by "Editori Riuniti."
The principal value of the various writings in my opinion lies in their
sincerity. They were for the most part collected and finally published
in Czechoslovakia, even before the downfall of Novotny. Still, they can
be reprinted and translated now without those involved having felt any
need for mpdifying their statements -- not after January 1968 and not
even today.
I would like to say right off that we have here 14 witness state-
covering a crisis, a rather serious political and cultural crisis.
Nevertheless, none of those questioned is even remotely thinking of pro-
posing any step backward -- not even amid the increasing emergence of the
expressions of profound dissatisfaction with the situation in which these
?, men are; in other words, they are not proposing a return to private owner-
ship of the means of production or to the prewar bourgeois republic. No,
they do not want a restoration of ways which they consider anachronistic
even in view of the existence of economically advanced countries, some of
!whose aspects they might envy them for (they are not even thinking in terms'
of a restoration here). This is precisely why their examination of con-
science is all the more dramatic and this is why their criticism of the
"present" is all the more harsh.
As for the rest, we are not so much dealing with a critique here.
Instead, we are dealing with a confession. These witness statements con-
stitute a continuous and somet'imesanxiety-filled process in which these
men question themse ves, a many times repeate attempt to dig into them=
se ves, into their own country, into their own culture, into their own
society. he responses, more often than once, are a simple and sincerd
"I don't know..."
!iuL LIES MlJ;suit Of Ghr.: cq,cr,; Loth.; iod t1ue pr ,l,.l.c'ui:, wli.Jc}l utnc.-
tl.nles l;u.l~l of and. LL other Lime,; c.halleng[og Jill always-. "c._omnatLcd"
- rUl)resents the major vll:l.ui of th:c book.
TlhL: i^e,ids : ` iirc3 ti1'aai-at5;on . I do not know wheLhcl: tb(
real me;illillg dii E:}le book J.;; pr.operJy e ;pitossed by this Lita.r'. men
interviewed certain.I.y dil.-fdicer'it age bradlce BBL LhLLY IL,; ';:ave been independent in
the past -- in a world that has become much :;m-illcr. The dominant tone
is self-critical, rather t.h,:a% ca i :.ic,a.L: but there ara accents of national.
set-cr'it- cisjr- at east much as there accents of a soci191.1 self-
cr t .c .sm which is designed to settle accounts, with the Sta).:tni:;t deforma-
~t an.
one can observe that the answers are oi:i:en lacking. This in effect
was the great: obstacle auto which thy: ".ac::1 course" of 1968 ran, when the
answers, which could not Of, 1,r.epared in advance, hid to be looked for
!rather feverishly while the crisis had already exploded. lut the prob-
lems are no less real. for all that. Aud Lire thins= that. counts is that these
dare not just Czechos.loval. problems, that these ar..: not just, the problems
o the already existing soci_.jlist societies, but r.:ither that they are
pra . eni~, which all. face, probhms .aced by anyono who fights for soc-
1ial pro;ress, problems cueoutiter-ecl by an onu who is inevitably persuaded
These are universal pro -
to seek the solutions on t: to road of socialism.
ems concerning Me struggle for tie socialist renewal of society:' this
was demonstrated by the French May, it is demonstrated by the youth re-
volt; and it is continuously dcmcust:rated by t1 political. conflicts which
are becoming increasingly Iggr. ] Vat_~d in the West whcere this struggle is
more than ever beforuob the agenda, In its search for a small pretext
fox aar,ticommunist ropaganda, the.bourgeois press closes its eyes to all
i this,
As far as the answers are concerned, it is up to us to give them
1--- it is up to us who want to be the vanguard force, It has been said
';that the witness s~:atements in the book were published in the Czechoslo-
vakia of Novotny to a rather great'extent, in spite of their bitterness.
This was the sign of a tolerance which was interrupted by authoritarian
excesses only here and there and these excesses were expressed in the
person of the hard although useless actions taken by the censors. But
this is not the striking thing here; instead, the striking thing is re --
;presented by the fact that these testimonials of crisis could be left
standing without any attempt at a positive response, a response capable
of understanding the moving forces behind all this. After the August
+1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, there were people who directly re-
proached Novotny for his tolerance, rather than for his powerless silence
before this proliferation of questions. But intolerance and censorship
even when they were at their most rigid -- did not cause the problems
to disappear.
There has been much justified talk about the "leading'role" which
the worker party can and must adopt. But the party leads precisely when
it manages to come up with an answer to the problems that keep maturing
in the class, in the people, and in the nation. When the party is silent
and when it seeks silence, it is no longer leading. This is precisely
why we believe that an answer to these questions will have to come, once
again, first of all from our movement.
:*r
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POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI, Paris
February 1970
(Underlining added.)
lal paux?or
Is bpnhaur
Dc MO O an% re" Wduto?nnaore
A propos do l'ouvrage d'antonin lehm
erns Fischer
L'ouvrage intitule Trois generations (1) vient de paraitre en edition francaise
.son attteur, Antonin Liehm, fut un des promoteurs de la revolution democratique
tchecoslovaque, cette revolution nop violente ecrasee par la violence de 1'exterieur.
< Treize entretiens, quatorze tcmoignages ou, si vows preferez, quatorze confes-
sions... Ceux qui parlent, romanciers, auteurs dramatiques, poetes, essayistes - it y
a memo un philosophe - semblent detendus, mesures, rarement brutaux, souvent
ironiques ; s'ils brulent de la rage revolutionnaire, ils n'en laissent presque rien
paraitre >>. C'est en ces termes que jean-Paul Sartre depcint dans sa preface le livre
et ses auteurs, Liehm et tous ceux qu'il a interviewes. C'cst un livrc jmportant, et
quicollque se situe a gauche se doit de-le lire, pour redresser des idees preconeues
et contribuer a trouver la reponse qu'a pcllent les roblemes du social isnle- euro eon.
s entretiens atent des annees 19 et 1968, a livre a ete achevc en mai 1968.
La preface de Sartre se termi.ne par ces mots : ? ... mettre a profit cette analyse pour
repenser, sans presupposition ni parti psis, la gauche europcenne,
ses
objectify,
ses
taches, ses possibilites, ses differents types d'organisation en vue
de
repondre a
la
question fondamentale de cc temps : comment s'unir, liquider les vieilles structures
ossifcGs, dans quel sens produire les nouvelles pour eviter a la Revolution prochaine
d'aceoucher de cc socialisnne-ld >>.
En fait, it s'agit de repondre, a la question suivante : quelle est la signification
du 21 Gout 1968 et de ses suites, non seulement pour la Tchecoslovaquie mais pour
le mouvement socialiste europecn tout cnncr ? 11 strait assez vain, aprces les reflexions
que nbus livrent J: P. Sartre cc Antonin Lichm, de faire une critique de cc livre
dans la forme ordinaire ; on voudra bien plut6t pcrmettre au ? critique ? d'en extraire
quelqucs questions qui lui tiennent a tour.
la faute
Et tout d'abord, cello que Liehin a dcja poste dans une courte preface a ,'edition
allemande : L'entree des troupes a-t-elle cte
provoquee par les fautes des rcforuiatcurs tchccoslovaques ? N'aurait-on pu se garder
de bien des choses qui furent .cites on qui furent faitcs sous la pression democratique
`des masses ? Les mass-media ont-ils tenu in langage trop radical ? Fallait-il se montrer
plus ptudcnts, ou au contraire plus energiqucs ? Il n'y a pas de mouvement revolu-
tionnaite exempt de fautes - mais on bout aujourd'hui repondre avec assurance que
cc ne sont pis les fautes des communistes tchccoslovaques qui out determine la
CPYRGHT
(t) A. Lichm : Trois generations. IE"ntreticas .rur le pbrnomiine tulI,,rel tchicoslonaque, preface ds J.-P. Sartre,
deuins A. Hofjineisler, 370 pages, 32 F, Gallmnard (Collection Tenroins).
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puissance sovictiquee a intervenir tnilitairemcnt. La f MAC, c'etait ciu'un people osat
sc vouloir librc, qu'il osat, en rncme temps qu'il sccouait un regime devenu intole-
rable, sc rebeller contre l'omnipotcnce d'un imperiunt. Jusqu'a present, chnquc combat
pour la liberte a etc une faute, quelquefois nbsoute par le succcs, mais la plupart
du temps chaati6e d'une defaite. Vouloir etre Libre, c'est le peche origincl ; ue suffit-il
done pas de manger, de dormir, de travniller et d'obcir ?
C;,onstitue daus un onus a 1rairrc arriere, a partir de conditions tout a fait difle-
irenter le >ture
Answer: The future? I see it in two stages. The first is rather
pessimistic. I believe that the sit'iatien is going to deteriorate in
the months to o-Dme beoaitse the population oannot aeoupt tshj.a aQaul~ati,an
status and one cannot control it by force. There will be some persecu-
tions, purges, trials, an.1 then an economic, ideological and cultural
crisis. But from this initial tragedy there can come the solution
later. in fact, things will be so bad that the Soviet directorate it-
self will iinderstard that new ideas are necessary and will take up
again some of the theses proposed by the "Prague Springtime."
Ruestion: Then you still have hope?
Answer: Yes. The people. of o'er country unierstood that change
was possible. They developed a taste for freedom anti these truths will
end by asserting themselves in other socialist countries.
?
I see a g6-neral movement manifesting itself in international
communism, a mavemant in which China itself'is participating an-1 I
believe that all this is going to create new. conditions favorable to a
renewal of this experience of the "Prague Springtime."'
25
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tPYRGHT'"
L'EUROPEO, Rome
5 March 1970
(Excerpts)
"This journal (I4t,erarni Listy) is born as an attempt to make public a
series of thoughts on questions - past, present and future - concerning the
Czechoslovak problem.
"Naturally it covers only a small part of these questions and more often
than not offers a contradictory diversity of thoughts. Thus the reader, al-
ready accumstomed for some time to this type of open and free journalistic
discussion, must judge for himself the truth and justice of the various argu-
ments.
This, our newspaper, comes out under very special circumstances, from
all points of view.
"The collaborators, for the most part long-time contributors to Czecho-
slovak literary journals, almost all live abroad. And the readers too are
spread out in various parts of the world.
"The quality of the publication, for these reasons, cannot be the best:
May the reader excuse us. The important thing is to make one's own voice heard
in some way. Only he who has no way of making himself heard can remain silent,
"If some copies of this newspaper succeed in reaching our country, we beg
the recipient to have it read by the largest numbers of people.
"We finally believe that one day it will be possible again for a free
Czechoslovak press to reach its readers through normal channels."
26
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April 1970
SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Foreign interest in the progress of the Soviet economy has reached its
highest peak of recent years as the result of a "secret speech" by Secretary
General Brezhnev to a CPSU Central Committee Meeting on 15 December 1969.
What apparently was the substance of Brezhnev's speech, which sharply criti-
cized the lagging economy, was given in the lead editorial of Pravda, the CPSU
daily, on 13 January 1970. Subsequent articles in the Soviet press have ham-
mered away at the individual themes which Brezhnev apparently stressed.
The Yugoslav newspaper Borba,in commentary on the Pravda editorial,
concludes (full text attached):
"the key problems of the Soviet economy are to increase the efficiency
of social production and the application of modern technology"; no
longer can Soviet economic growth rely simply on "increasing the num-
ber of employees and a high rate of increasing investments."
Borba points out that the Pravda editorial and subsequent Soviet press ar-
ticles do not detail precise ways in which greater efficiency is to be at-
tained. Rather, Pravda only emphasizes the formula of technology, responsi-
bility, and discipline and adds, vaguely, that "a new stage of development
does not permit working in the old way; it requires a new method and new
solutions." Borba feels that in the foreseeable future only insignificant
and nonessential changes can be expected in the centrally directed manage-
ment of the economy. Picking up a phrase from Moscow's recently published
"Theses for Lenin's Centennial," Borba wryly adds that this form of manage-
ment "stands out as an inviolable basis of a socialist economy."
The Paris daily Le Monde carried two commentaries by Alain Jacob, its
Moscow correspondent, on the 13 January Pravda editorial (full texts attached).
The first, on 14 January, discussed the editorial's severe criticism of the
organization of the economy, and expressed the opinion that the cause of the
alarm is "the immobilism, the passivity, the sclerosis of the State apparatus."
On 31 January a dispatch by Jacob asserted that the deficiencies of the Soviet
economy pose a political problem. He cites "certain specialists" who estimate
that "the economic situation is worse than in the autumn of 1964, when diffi-
culties of the same kind contributed to M. Khrushchev's downfall." Jacob
cautions, however, that because the political situation has changed the po-
litical effect of the similar economic situation won't necessarily be the same.
Another comment on Brezhnev's speech appeared in an extraordinary open
letter addressed to Brezhnev and signed "Sakharov." The letter ranges some-
what farther afield than Borba or Le Monde. Whereas Borba points out that,
according to statistical reports, the Soviet economy is performing within
tolerable limits, "Sakharov" paints a picture of economic shambles in the USSR:
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--Not only have the Soviets lost the moon race but also the com-
petition for economic achievement.
--The USSR is turning into a supplier of raw material to Europe;
--Only the "fantastic natural resources" of the USSR and the
"traditional patience of the peasantry" enable the country
to hold its own.
--The imaginary world of the USSR, where self-deception keeps
people from facing the truth, is permitting other countries
which are building their economies on solid ground to pull.
"further and further ahead of us."
These current commentaries open up three questions which are discussed
below: What are the general economic trends? How are the outstanding eco-
nomic problems being attacked? And, what are the prospects for solving
these problems?
General Trends of the Economy
Throughout 1969 unfavorable economic news kept cropping up in the Soviet
press. On 16 December, State Plan Chairman Baybakov and Finance Minister
Garbuzov confirmed earlier impressions of a lagging Soviet economy by reveal-
ing that overall indices had fallen short of expectations. The growth rate
was declining. Plans were unfulfilled. Productivity gains were disappoint-
ing. Underlying these trends was the demonstrable ineffectiveness of the
1965 economic reform program, now rarely mentioned.
The growth of national income and gross industrial production declined
at an unusually rapid rate between 1967 and 1969:
1967
1968
1969
1970 (Plan)
National income
8.6
7.5
6.0
6.0
Gross industrial
production
10.0
8.1
7.0
6.3
(Western economists would reduce these figures -- from Soviet sources --
by two or three percentage points, since Soviet economic computations do not
follow the same standards as those of free world nations.) The growth of
gross industrial production was the lowest since 1946.
The status of the fulfillment of the over-all economic plan is somewhat
muddled because over-all plans were stated twice: in February 1966 and in
October 1967. Assuming that on the later date Soviet planners knew more about
what they could accomplish in 1970, the following comparison can be made:
gross industrial production was planned as of October 1967 to rise by 53% in
1966-70; the expected actual increase, will be 39%. This is the picture in
the key industrial sectors:
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1969 pro-
Current
1970 Plan per
duction
1970 Plan
five-year-plan goal
Electric power
(billions of kwh)
Oil
(millions of tons)
Natural gas
(billions of cubic
meters)
689
328
183
740
350
196
830 to 850
345 to 355
225 to 240
Coal
(millions of tons)
608
665 to 675
Crude Steel
(millions of tons)
110
115
124 to 129
Plastics
(thousands of tons)
1,452
ca. 1,800
2,100 to 2,300
Mineral fertilizers
(millions of tons)
46
58
62 to 65
Trucks
(thousands)
504.5
574
750 (revised from
Passenger Cars
(thousands)
293.6
348
600 in January 1968)
700 to 800
Gross agricultural production will fall short of the five-year plan goal
even if an 8.5% yearly increase planned for 1970 is attained. The 25% total
increase planned for the five year period 1965-1970 will only reach 21%.
Shortfalls are expected in meat and meat products. The state's investment in
agriculture in 1966-70 is expected to reach only 78% of the amount planned in
1966. This is reflected in a cumulative shortfall from 1966 to 1970 of more
than 300,000 tractors, 450,000 trucks, and about 80,000 combines. Combined
with a 6,000,000-ton shortfall in mineral fertilizer, this belies the Soviets'
claims that unfavorable weather has accounted for the disappointments in agri-
culture.
In the consumer sphere the picture is equivocal because of the peculiar-
ly inflationary situation. Workers and employees will earn an average 25%
more in 1966-70, versus a planned increase of 20% plus; collective farmers'
average earnings will be about 40% higher. Retail trade turnover is expected
to have increased by 49%. Nevertheless, it is widely reported that the man-
in-the-street either can't find what he is looking for in the stores, or has
to waste an inordinate amount of time shopping to buy poor quality goods.
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Small wonder, then, that Soviet consumers have been turning their backs on
the poorly supplied stores, and have been saving their money at unusually
high rates. In 1969 personal savings deposits rose by 18.5%, following
annual increases of 20% during the previous three years. Total bank account
savings now equal almost one-fourth of the annual money income of the popula-
tion.
Housing, the most aggravating shortage in Soviet society, has been short-
changed by 10% to 15% during 1966-70 as construction continues to fall far
short of goals. Annual plans for housing construction have not been fulfilled
for 11 straight years. Instead of the 9 square meters of living space per
person by 1970 promised by Khrushchev in 1957, Soviet urbanites average only
some 7.2 square meters.
Productivity gains have been relied upon by the Soviets to provide for
the bulk of the planned gain in output. The Soviets base their plans on the
expectation that existing plants will produce increasing quantities of goods,
and they count on obtaining higher production rates from new, technologically
more advanced industrial facilities. Moreover, they include in their plans
specific increases in the total output per worker in industry and construction.
However, productivity has not risen as expected, and dragged-out construction
schedules have deprived the economy of the benefits of new technology. Most
disturbing is the recent downward trend in industrial labor productivity.
Official statistics show the drop in growth rate from 6.6% in 1967 to 5.0%
in 1968 to 4.4% in 1969. And, according to Soviet economist Alexander Birman,
gains reported in national statistics may well be deceptively high. This
claim is supported by the heavy pressure being put on workers to sharply
increase output.
Attempt at Reform
In October 1965, what was then called "the new, business-like Soviet
leadership," instituted a new economic reform. Economic performance in the
early 1960's had grown flabby, the blame for which was placed largely on
Nikita Khrushchev.
The reform proposed to give greater economic latitude to plant managers
"on the basis of the expansion of commodity-money relations." This meant, in
effect, to encourage managers to increase profits by producing more efficiently
and increasing the quality of their products. (Soviet propagandists went to
great pains to explain that Soviet "profit" was completely different from
capitalist "profit.") Managers themselves would be offered the incentive of
higher bonuses; at the Minsk meat packing plant, for example, bonuses rose
from 8% to 28% of the salaries of engineers, technicians, and office workers.
To a lesser degree, production workers were to share in the profits by re-
ceiving bonuses and through plant-funded construction of housing, kindergar-
tens, and other facilities.
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Initial results were trumpeted as demonstrating the success of the eco-
nomic reform; national income and gross industrial production rose rather
sharply in 1966 and 1967. This growth, however, was stimulated by the initial
enthusiasm with which the Soviet leaders backed the program, and by the unique
opportunity afforded managers to dispose of surplus goods and equipment. Af-
ter 1967 the program lost steam and economic growth and performance slowed.
By fall of 1969, when 72% of all industrial enterprises had been con-
verted, a halt was called to further change-overs. Since mid-1968 the Soviet
press had been increasingly sour on the economic reform. By late 1969 and
early 1970, aspects of the economic reform program, were being severely criti-
cized as contributing to poor discipline. For instance, enterprise managers
were said to have gotten overly independent and so preoccupied with profit
that they avoided costly technological improvements. Managers were accused
of trying to enlarge incentive funds faster than they were raising labor pro-
ductivity. The few defenders of the economic reform, such as Academicians
N. Fedorenko and A. Birman, appeared to have no visible political support.
In late 1969 Birman, a prominent liberal economist, made a detailed case for
extensive changes in the organization and management of the Soviet economy,
lamenting the feeble efforts undertaken thus far to improve the economic ma-
chinery. But by December 1969, when Brezhenv gave his "secret speech" to the
Central Committee Plenum, the "economic reform" showed few signs of life.
Outstanding Economic Problems
The USSR's disappointing economic results are considered by foreign ob-
servers to be largely the result of unrealistically ambitious planning, poor
management, the lack of effective incentives, and the unreliability of the
agricultural system. However, the Soviets are inclined to point their fingers
at unsatisfactory returns on investment in science and technology and low
labor productivity as the main causes of their present economic difficulties.
Campaigns designed to attack these problems are under way.
To Encourage Innovation
The gap between what the Soviets have expected from their science and
technology programs and what they have gotten has been a prime concern for
several years. According to Borba's analysis of Brezhnev's purported speech,
how to increase application of modern technology is one of the key problems
of the Soviet economy. The problem has three main aspects: scientists and
technologists are not interested in the mundane business of developing and
applying new techniques to manufacturing; industrial officials are reluctant
to cooperate with scientists and technologists in introducing innovations;
and the slow rate of construction of new plants hampers technological advances
in industry.
A Government decree of October 1968 had spelled out ways to raise the
efficiency of scientific organizations and to speed the adoption of scientific
and technical advances in the economy. According to the decree, practical
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economic results, i.e. , research and development translated into profits, were
to be the basis for judging scientists and engineers. The latter had been
criticized for preferring more scholarly pursuits, and industrial officials
had been reluctant to cooperate with them. This situation still prevails as
recently confirmed by a study in Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette) pub-
lished in January 1970 which points out that because of the time and costs in-
volved, nobody is interested in "being the first to introduce a new idea."
Launched with fanfare, this program for making scientific and technical work
profitable and efficient has been discussed very little of late, and it
seems fair to conclude that improvements resulting from the program have
failed to provide the economic stimulus that the Brezhnev/Kosygin regime had
wished for.
The economic costliness of the slow construction rate was noted in Borba,
31 January 1970, which quoted a Soviet director as saying: "When we cut the
ribbon at the ceremonial opening of a new factory and we distribute awards to
deserving construction workers, the factory is already obsolete and impracti-
cal." Borba also cited an article from Pravda, 24 July 1969, in which Deputy
Chairman Vadim Trapeznikov of the USSR's State Committee for Science and Tech-
nology wrote that the scheduling of construction is such that twice as many
structures are being built simultaneously as is economically appropriate.
This causes long construction periods, and thus delays technological innova-
tions; on the average, according to Trapeznikov, in the USSR it takes 8 to 12
years between the development of new technological ideas and the initiation
of mass production based on them.
Toward Labor Discipline
Low labor productivity, a persistent problem in the USSR, was highlighted
as a major current problem in the 13 January 1970 Pravda editorial which pur-
portedly expressed Brezhnev's criticisms of the economy. The unsatisfactory
attitude of "some workers" was typified as showing lack of conscientiousness
and poor discipline. The editorial placed major emphasis on "increasing the
struggle against antisocialist manifestations such as embezzling socialist
property, idleness, and misuse of alcoholic beverages."
An indication of the seriousness of the labor discipline problem is seen
in the recently inaugurated crackdown by trade unions and the State Committee
for People's Control. Units of the latter group, according to a statute of
19 December 1969, can now institute criminal proceedings and demand the "dis-
missal of workers, wage stoppages, and other forms of punishment." A trade
union plenum of January 1970 passed resolutions authorizing the imposition of
disciplinary measures such as denying delinquent workers' rights to vacations,
new housing, and social security benefits. (See the attached analysis of
these threatened measures published in Borba, 5 February.)
The magnitude of the workers' "embezzling socialist property" and "idle-
ness," as charged by Pravda, would be difficult to measure; however, there
are some indications of how much "misuse of alcoholic beverages" is going on.
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An intense press campaign to curtail drinking has emphasized the waste of mil-
lions of man-hours a year caused by excessive drinking and resulting in huge
losses of state production. Reportedly, one-sixth of all retail spending in
the USSR goes for drink, mainly vodka.
Meat and autos may present additional, particular economic problems in
1970. It was highly unusual for Pravda in its 13 January editorial to confess
a widespread meat shortage. It is speculated that nothing would have been
said if there weren't some official basis for thinking that the shortage will
persist. The production of autos this year is planned at 348,000, as opposed
to the earlier scheduled production of 700,000 to 800,000 autos in 1970.
These two disappointments, when added to general inflation and continuing acute
housing shortages, may well compound the regime's problem of rebuilding worker
morale and discipline.
Prospects
It is possible that the Soviets' current campaign to tighten discipline
will yield some short-term results. However, unless the Soviet leaders can
at the same time offer material incentives, the prospects of enduring improve-
ment in discipline and resultant gains in productivity are none too bright.
Neither are prospects any too bright for reinforced reforms or, for that
matter, the mild economic reforms decreed in 1965. No doubt the December Cen-
tral Committee meeting would have focused on this possible source of improve-
ment, if reforms were to be made meaningful.
The prospects for economic improvement, thus, will have to be considered
unfavorable until evidence to contradict this impression becomes available.
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BORBA, Belgrade
31 Ja uary 1970
Soviet Economy Today
UPSWING AND -- LACK OF SATISFACTION
by S. Vujica
What the Pravda editorial shows regarding the conclusions of the Central Com-
mittee plenum on the economy.
It seems, not without reason, that the recent Pravda editorial entitled,
't'oward New Achievements," has produced exceptional interest and wide commentary.
Reports from Moscow say that the text of the official organ of the party (about
2,000 words) for the first time publicly points to the content of a still un-
published speech of Leonid Brezhnev at the plenum of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party on 15 December 1969. At that time the secretary general,
as was officially reported, presented a speech "On the Political Activity of
the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in the Field of Foreign and In-
ternal Policy," in which, the editor of Pravda reports, considerable attention
was devoted to "an analysis of the status and prospects of development of the
Soviet economy." The latest reports from Moscow say that sharp criticism of
the failure to fulfill the plan tasks and of lagging in the economy was also
included in the speech of Leonid Brezhnev.
What Is Being Criticized
According to published statistical data, economic trends in the 4 years of
the present Five-Year Plan (the last year is 1970), are satisfactory. Basic
indicators on the trend of industrial production, national income, real earn-'
ings, housing construction, and similar factors, are within the range provided
for in the directive of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU Central Committee on
development up to 1970. Also, the 1969 plan was successfully fulfilled overall.
Nevertheless, judging from the Pravda editorial devoted to evaluations of
the plenum on the economy and a series of other articles in the Soviet press
published in the last few days (which also refer to the Brezhnev speech), a
basis is provided for concluding that the Soviet leadership is dissatisfied
with the present trends in the economy.
Industrial production increased by about 7 percent (7.3 percent was planned).
In the judgment of those who know, this is the lowest growth rate of industrial
production in the last few years, which has always been a significant standard
for evaluating the development of the Soviet economy.
The lag in the growth of labor productivity is even larger. The plans of
the 23rd Congress regarding a 33-35 percent increase in 5 years have been con-
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siderably jeopardized by the 1969 achievements: instead of the planned 6.5 to
7 percent increase, labor productivity increased by only 4.4.percent.
The growth rate of the national income was also reduced in 1969. While in
the first 3 years of the Five-Year Plan the average annual increase amounted to
more than 8 percent, in 1969 income growth increased by 6 percent.
The Pravda editor reports that the plenum showed that "several economic
fields are lagging"; that "the increase of labor productivity and of the
efficiency of social production is slow"; then it pointed to a "lack of a
sense of responsibility among some workers, lack of conscientiousness, poor
discipline, which is above all, shown in the lack of a serious attitude toward
fulfilling the state plan,"; it also pointed to the fact "that difficulties
have appeared in supplying the population, especially in the large cities, with
livestock products."
From an official report published a few days ago it is seen that in 1969
seven important industrial branches (this is the largest number in recent years)
did not fulfill the established plan tasks. Two industrial branches -- meat and
gas -- failed to fulfill the plan by as much as 4 percent, while among the
branches which are also lagging are ferrous metallurgy, the chemical industry,
and the wood, cellulose, and paper industry.
The six central Asian republics also did not fulfill the plan: Turkestan
(Turkmenia] (the plan was 94 percent fulfilled), Uzbekistan (98 percent fulfilled),
Kazakhstan and Azerbayizhan (99 percent), Tadzhikistan (99.4 percent), and
Kirghiz (99.6 percent fulfilled).
Major Shortcomings in Construction
The Pravda editorial's emphasis that the plenum found "major shortcomings
in the field of capital investments" attracts special attention. However, this
appraisal also was present in many editorials published before the plenum, as-
well as a series of other articles devoted to this subject in the Soviet press.
Recently, for example, on the pages of Pravda, Academician Trapeznikov pointed
out that twice as many structures are today being built simultaneously in the
Soviet Union than is economically appropriate and that such a "broad front"
causes a long construction period for new structures, which is a significant
factor of slow technological innovation of the Soviet economy.
Moreover, Academician Trapeznikov disclosed that on the average a period
of 8-12 years elapses in the Soviet Union from the initial development of new
technological-technical ideas to their realization in series production (which
is several times longer than in developed economies), and that the construction
period for factories also extends up to 8 years under existing technological
procedures. (Recently, a Soviet director said, criticizing slow construction:
"When we cut the ribbon at the ceremonial opening of a new factory and we
distribute awards to deserving construction workers, the factory often is al-
ready obsolete and impractical.")
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Pravda's editorial writer also emphasizes the judgement of the plenum
that increasing the efficiency of social production and the application of
modern technology are today "the key problems of the Soviet economy"; that
iit cannot today, as previously, develop "on account of increasing the number
of employees and of a high rate of increasing investments, but on account of
'their intensification through rational utilization of existing capacities,
through application of new teehhO10414do"
'Which Way
Neither the Pravda editorial nor other articles published since the plenum
provide a more precise answer as to the manner in which more efficient business
operations will be attained. The editorial of the central organ of the CPSU
only emphasizes the formula -- technology, responsibility, discipline --, stat-
ing in addition that "a new stage of development does not permit working in the
old way; it requires a new method and new solutions."
Nevertheless, both the editorial itself and all that has been written re-
cently in the Soviet Union confirm that, according to current assessments of
the Soviet leadership, solutions will not be sought in the development of the
previously announced extensive economic reform and enterprise autonomy. The
editorial, for example, commenting on the conclusions of the December [1969]
plenum, emphasizes that the ministries are the "determining link in managing
the economy." The organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU places the main
emphasis on "raising work and production discipline" and on "increasing the
struggle against antisocial manifestations, such as embezzling socialist prop-
erty, idleness, and misuse of alcoholic beverages."
We also notice in the Soviet press and publications of recent months that
texts are appearing more and more frequently whose content, as well as profu-
sion, provide a basis for the conclusion that the chances are now minimal for
implementation of the earlier announced extensive economic reform as a factor
for more efficient economic management. On the other hand, the more recent
articles confirm that in the foreseeable future only insignificant changes
can be expected, and mnessential at that, in the currently centrally directed
management of the economy, which stands out as an inviolable basis of a
socialist economy.
COBJETCHA IIPIIBPE4A AAIIAC
HE3AA030
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wnpoxe Ko11elTape 113a3Bao
je HeAanHlt yaoAmix npaa-
Ae" tiOA tt6C/OOOM 11KO tie-
HIM AOCTHriyh,IMa". 1?131lew
Tajtt 113 MocKBe jaabajy its
raj rexcT 3sant19Hor opralia
llaprrtje (OKO 2.000 pegs) no
npan nyr jaBno yxa3yje its
caAp?KUHy jow Heo6jau.be-
nor pecj)epara JIeoHHAa Spe
Atibesa Ha n.71enylsiy 1.jeHTpa 1
Hor KolniTera KIl CC 15.
aeueM6pa npowne roAHHe.
TaAa je reaepanHn cexpe-
Tap, Kaso je 3BaH1tgHO ca-
OnwTeHO, noaHeo pecbepaT
O no.R11mH`IKoj AenaTHOC:TN
IlomlTGnipoa 1UK Kn CC y
n(viacrrn Cnorblte H ylivTpa-
Inibe n0.IIITIIKe". Y KO-
je'i je, caonwTaaa yaoaHH-
gap ?IlpaaAe", 3nagajna no
:Kiba nocaehena Hatiantl3H
CTatba H nepcnewTiliaMa P23
B11TKa WujercKe nptiapeAe".
nOCAeaibit 113BeulTajH H3 Mo
case jae.?bajy Aa je y pecj)e-
pary JIeoHrLaa BpeJKrbcea Aa-
ra It owrpa KpHrrnKa HeH3-
apweiba n:laHcsrix 3aaaTaKa
H 3aoCTajalba y npaapeAa.
Mra ce KpHTIIKyje
17p;1apeAHa KpeTaiba y qe-
Tlipa roAHHe caAawlber ne-
roro piLniber n:rana (noc.reA-
na je M70). npeMa o6jas,;6e
111111 CTaTIICTIt4KIl:d rIo auit-
1ta, 3aAODOJba8ajyha cy. 0-
ciforiHa noKa3arebrl 0 Kpe-
r111,Y r111;,3'crpujcxe npol13-
r:nalbe, liaurloHa 7Hor AOXOT-
K.1. pea.irutx 3apana. CTa"i6e
110j 11-11-paalbil it CaagliOi
Kpchy re y OKt ini>_v Af1peK-
T1111a 23. itcrlrpcca KII CC o
p:, etziTKy AO 1970. 10,41rirc. YI
nnati y npownoj rOAlnnf je
y rno6any ycnewao ocrsa-
peH.
MnaK, cyACha npeMa ysoa
H11KY ?npasAe" noeaehenoM
ouenaMa nacHyna o rlpilape
.41I It HI13Y Apyrnx Hainlca
y cosjeTCKOj wTaMIIH o6jan-
JbeHtIX n0C.*1eArbHx AaHa (KO
jzt cc Taxobe no3aBajy Ha pe
cj)epar Bpexttbesa), aajy o-
CHOBy 3a 3aKJbygaK 0 He3a-
Aosobcray conjeTcxor PyKO
BoACTea caAawtbtiM Kperarbnl
ma y npaapeAH.
I4HAycrpajcKa npoi13BOA-
wit noaehana je 3a 01O 7 as
CTO (nxatrapaao je 7.3). To
je, no OueHK 1103HaBa.Rana.
Haj?Hrr}Ka crona pacra ttsa`v-
cTprijCKe 11POI130O,afbe nOC.18
AH,IIx rOA1111a, into je tillage
yseK 6anD 311a11ajno IJepit-
no OuettO P63KHV(A OOIIJ@T-
CHO OKOHOMHKe.
Join aehe je 3aocrajarbe y
nopacry npOAyKTrtBHOCrtt pa
Aa. npeAuabalba 23. KoHrpe-
ca o noaehaiby oA 33 ao 33
OACTO 3a tier roAIIHa 3.Y2-
rHO cy yrpoatena npout-ioro
An/wt,HM OCTaapeibILUa: y.re
cro nnannpaunx 6,5 Ao 7 oa-
CTO, . UPOAyKT14BIlOCT je no-
pacna 3a caera 4,4 oacro.
Y 1MHHHynoj roAHHH rcno-
peH je H TCMItO nopaCTa Ha-
U1tOHanHor AOxOTKa. 2109 je
y Ilpac TPII Marine neroro-
AI1rIJ1ber nnalia npocegHo ro
Altrtrlbe nouehan,e 113HOC11.10
BHwe OA 8 O icto, Y npowioj
ro,alrlr)1 nopaCT AOxorKa no-
crarao je 6 oilcTo.
YooAHt1'tap ,npasZe* ca-
OnwTaBa Aa je uneHylt y-
xa3ao no ,3aocTaje HIM 06-
nacr4 nprtapeAe"; 1a is
-Chop nopacr npO?yKT;:BHO-
cr11 papa H eC4;)rxKaCHOCTH
APywrueie tiporr3uoAtbe"; 3a
TIM ?H8 oACycruO ocehaiba
OATOBOp1IOCTa KOA HeKHX pa
AHHKa. Cj)aKTOp trecaaecHo-
CrH, Hapywaaalbe AHCUannm
He, iTO Ce ripe cuera Hcno-
n,aea y onaxoM OAHOCy npe
ma; n3apwen,y Apxtaunor
n.rana", Kao a ,, a cy cc no
jaBHne Tewxohe y cna6Ae-
Batty cTailoBHIIInTaa npoa3-
BOAII.Ma Crogapcrna, noce6Ho
y senrlKHM rpaAOBaMa".
143 3aaul9Hor CaOnuTeH a,
06jaBbeHor npe IreKa AaH,
BHAII cc Aa npowne roAHHe
ceAaM 3HaHajHax 11HAyCTpaj
cKlix rpaaa (To je Hajaeha
6poj y nocneAlwim roAHHa-
Ma) Hiije OCTBapIO nocraB-
bene nnancKe 3aAaTKe. ,i(Be
HHnycrpajcxe rpaae - Meca
ci raca - noA6auane cy
nnall 3a 41ITaua 4 noeHa, a
lteby rpanaaa Koje 3aocra-
jy Hana3e cc H upHa McTa-
:iyprnja, xertnjcKa aHAyCTpH
ja H HHAycrpllja ApaeTa, ue-
nyn03e H natrapa.
14 weer peny6nuKa (cue
cpeAH,oa3HjCKe) Taxobe HH-
je ocraapnno nnaa: Typxe-
craH (nnaH je ocrBapeH ca
94 oAcro), Y36exaCraH (98
oncro), Ka3axcTaH a A3ej-
GeprtaH (99 oAcro), Tauann-
craH (99,4 oAcro) H Ktlpra-
3Hja , (99,6 OACTO). r i
BCJIHKe c.naGocru y
t'paAtaN
rIOU05rty na,Krby upHana-
411 IICTHUa1I,O yBp$HfIK4
HnpaBAC" Aa je nnellyNt moll
cTaronao .BCn11KC cia6oCTI1
Y 06.llacTIl Karurranllc wirpa;t
H.e". Ta ogcaa je, image. bit
Aa npxcyTna a y He ManoM
6PojY YBOAHHKa o6jaB1beHl4x
npe nnenyMa, nocucheuiix o-
BOj Terta, K8O H Y HH3y Apy
'rax Han/lca y coajeTCnoj
wTaMn1I. HeAaeH0 je,'Ha npH
Mep. Ha crpaiwuaMa Hr1paB,
,i(e" aicaAeaan TpanearbiKOa
yKa3aO As ce AaHac Y CoB-
jeTcKoM Case3y acroapeMe-
IIo rpaAlt AD" nyTa Bawe
o6jexaTa Hero wro je exo-
HOMCKH uenHCxoAHO H Aa Ta
KO ?LHPOK 4I1OHT" yCJIOB-
rasa Ayr POX rpaAtbe Ho-
Brix o6jeKaTa, wTO je 3Ha-
gajaH CraKTOp cnope TexHo-?
notuxe anoaaUHje COBjeTCKe
npaspene.
AKaJteMHK Tpane31bHKOa
Je, nopen ocTanor, H3HeO Aa
y COBjCTCKOM CaBe3y on no
geTKa pa3paAe Hose TexHo-
AOWKO-TexiugKe I1Aeje AO
Ibene peaJI143auilje y cepaj-
cKOj npOH3BOAH=H 'npobe y
npocexy 8-12 roAHHa (iTo
je HexonliKo nyra Ay,Ke He-
re y pa3BajeHHM npHBpeAe
Ma), a Aa POX rpaAH,e cpa-
6pHna no nocrojehaM TCX-
HOAOHIKHM nOCTyngHMa Tpa
je a no 8 roAHHa.'(HeAaBHo
je jeAnit cosjeTCKH AnpeK-
TOp 143jaBH0, KpI1TIIKyjyhM
cnopy rpaAH,y: ?KaA npecc-
meMo Bpriuy Ha CaeganoM O-
raaparby Hose cca6paxe, no-
AenHMO OAAHKOaalba 3acnyIr
HHM rpaAliTeibltMa, cba6pHKa
je gCCTO Bch 3acrapena a
tiepaunon aJwa.")
YBOAHHgap ?npaBAe" Ta-
nobe HarAarrlaua H OCyAy
iL4cnyafa Aa cy AaHac IIoBe-
harbe e(j)axacHOCTH .i pYw-
TBerre npot13I)OAibe it nprlMe-
Ha caspearctie Tcxuo~torilje
,,Kn,y911H npo67P1fit conjeT-
cKe npiiapcAc"; Aa cc ona
Aaaac He Monte, Kao paHHje,
pa3BtrjaTH ?Ha pagyH nooe-
haH.a 6poja 3anocnernix is
BItCOKor TeMna nosehalba y-
nararba, Bch Ha pagyH me-
He HHieH311(1HKauHje pauH-
OHaJIHHM KopawhetbeM no-
Crojehax Kanaumera, 11pH-
MeaoM nose TexHatre".
KojHM nyrreM
Hit ynoAHHK npaBA(f,. a
Hit Apyrn HanHCH o6jal;Jb1e-
HH nt1 W nneHyM01 tie `jt y
n,pOUH3HIfjH OAiOBOp 11; KC-
Am he ce Iiagau noCTHlt)t e-
ctMncacHHje noc ioBarbe f-
BOAHHK EAeHTPanHor op r,,,,,
Kn CC jeAHHO IICTltge op-
MYZY - TexHonoraja, oAro-
BopHOCT, AIICUHnariHa -
KOHCTaTyjyhrt Y3 TO ?ne HO=
Ba eTana Pa3BHTKa He' A03-
so,>basa,Aa ce paAH Ha CTa-
pit HagHH, no 3aXTeua Hoan
MCTOA H Ilona pewerba".
14n'K, H CaM yBOAH)IK, a
it cue wTO cc y Coajexcjcon
Case3y rlawe y noc eAn e
apeae, nornpbyJe Aa cc, ripe
11a CItAawhI,IIM OHHeilaMa COn-
jercxor pyxonoACTHa, pewe-
Iba iiehe Tpa7KHTH y pa3a11-
jarby paHHje Hajan;benor
wllper rrporpaaa pecbo?Me H
ayroHOMaje npeAy3eha/VuoA
HHK, rra nptiMep, K01Vpe lTa-
pniwyha 3aKJbygKe AeueM ap
CKor. nnei yMa. acrllge ` '.cy
Mt111fCTapcTaa ?OAJIYR(yjyhO
Kaprlna y ynpaan.ainy'"eno-
HOMHKOM". Opran I.UK; Kn
' CC rna9HH aKueliaT C7'aBJba
na "nonchatbe paAne i ripo-
a3BOAne AlICUnnnaHe" r Ha
?noaehaibe GopGe ca aura-.
ApywraeHriM nojauaia.,,L Kao
uITO Cy paaa iageii,e cGlplja'
JHCTHgKe czOjtiHe, 3a6jrza-'
eaH,e z toynorpe6a aaxo eA
HHx nnha".! {qa
ripliHeralto join Aa Cep; no-
CnC'Atbrrx MecegH y 'coajeT-
CKOj wTa%tna H ny6nHK$f.ta-
jarita cite gewhe nojaair;` Kjy
TeKCTOBII gllja CaAp)KHHa.`,,'1
a 6pojHOCr, Aajy Ocaoar.,3a
3aKJbygalC no cy cane ?'ptft-
IHlMaine wanes 3a cnpopo-
benic paHHje Hajan.'beuor 'wit
per nporpama peciopMe t(ao
yc,OBa 3a eCf)axacnaje np -
Bpcl)iraalbe. HanporHS, 1?f H
pi ilainrcu nornpbyjy Aa cc
y ,tor ie i o upeMe gory o-
gea:aoara cOMO ire3Harne npo
Metre, a TO He 6HrHe, y Ca-
AawtbeM 1ACHTpanr1300ar10~11.
Aaparonaaoa pyKoaobeu.y
npaapeno11, noje cc IIcru- -
qe KBO HenprUcoCrlonena o-
CHOBa COU)1ja.1i1cTii Ke eno-
Hoiialce. C. BYJJ4I.,A
Approve or a ea
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
BORBA, Belgrade
5 February 1970
Soviet Economy Today
"HOW TO IMPROVE WORK DISCIPLINE"
by Sl. Vuj i ca
Strict Measures Are Being Demanded Against Poor Workers, Shirkers, and Drunkard
Reports from Moscow say that a central Soviet trade union forum several
days ago proposed to collectives "that they,take strict measures against all
violators of work and state discipline." The trade union forum "suggests to
collectives that they wage a sharp struggle against shirkers, workers who
frequently change employment, and especially drunkards." It proposes that
the question of poor workers be discussed at meetings of collectives, that so-
called disciplinary courts try them, that they not be given or that they have
taken from them "passes" to vacation places and health sanatoriums, that they be
removed from the list of people who are to get apartments, that they be deprived
of bonuses, and, finally, that they also be excluded from the trade union.
This proposal was issued to producers at the last plenum of the trade
union which examined the conclusions of the plenum of the CPSU Central
Committee held in December 1969 on the status of the economy, when, accordipg
to reports from Moscow, Brezhnev severely criticized shortcomings in the
economy.
Educational Work and Penalties
The proposal of the trade union forum to the collectives is not new. The
recent PRAVDA editorial, devoted to conclusions of the December plenum'of the
CPSU Central Committee on the economy, in addition to stressing the necessity
"for increasing state and production discipline" as an important measure in
achieving the goals, also suggests "increasing the struggle against anti-
social manifestations, such as the pilfering of socialist property, shirking
work, and the misuse of alcoholic beverages."
"Progul'shchiki," as they call shirkers, poor workers, in the Soviet
Union, have for a long time been the subject of severe criticism and the
subject of editors of the central Soviet newspapers, but especially PRAVDA.
The editor of PRAVDA, suggesting measures in regard to the struggle
against work indiscipline, assigned first place to "the need to create in
collectives an atmosphere of general intolerance toward absenteeism, toward
shirking, lagging in production, and poor work."
Suggesting measures, as the editorial stresses, for the honest and
conscientious fulfilling of obligations to society" and for "an irreproachable
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
respect for work discipline" -- the editor of the central party organ especially
stresses the importance of ideological-educational work of party and other
organizations and the application of penalizing measures.
"Honor Lists" and "Lists of Shame"
In the Soviet economy, solutions for preventing indiscipline on the job
were sought primarily in educational and punitive measures, or in in com-
pelling conscientious work from the worker by means of so-called progressive
norms, the significance of which the editorial calls attention to this year.
It is known, for example, that "honor lists".are employed extensively in enter-
prises and establishments in the Soviet Union as a means of stimulating the
worker to do a better job. In addition, "lists of shame,"reserved for loafers,
slackers, and violators of work discipline, were used until recently. Or
again: on the pages to TRUD, the party secretary of a Donbas [Donets Basin]
enterprise suggested broader use of the educational measures which his
collective is employing--the writing of letters to the families of outstanding
and of poor workers.
And. Other Suggestions.
The arsenal of educational measures which is being used and the significance
of which the forums and editorialists are now particularly citing is very
extensive: from the conducting of lectures and the writing of articles to the::"`
conferring of transferable banners to collectives and individuals and the
conferring of honorifics, such as, for example, "Communist shock worker."
The list of punitive measures also is extensive.
Whereas in the efforts to improve discipline the forums and editorialists
concentrate on educational propaganda work, administrative measures, and pro-
gressive norms, i.e., exorcizing discipline "from the top," individual Soviet
economists are suggesting that solutions be sought elsewhere. They are con-
fronted with the facts that neither "lists of shame" or "honor lists" nor
compliments and penalties, honorifics and banners, have yielded the desired
results. Individual economists emphasize, as a priority, the necessityr for
more rapid and more consistent implementation of the previously announced
program of economic reform.
In the efforts to improve work discipline, the proprietary attitude toward
work, and the fulfillment of planned tasks, they concentrate on improving the
system of economic management through economic methods and incentives. In
other words, they are in favor of creating those conditions of economic manage-
ment in which each producer and every collective would be somewhat more directly
materially interested in better work, in self-disciplined and prompt completion
of an obligation.
Nevertheless, judging from recent editorials which interpret the conclusions\
of the December [1969] plenum, the principal solution for better work and
discipline will also be sought in the future predominantly in educational and
punitive instructions.
Approved or a ease
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
BORBA, Belgrade
`,i' February 1970
KAEO
PAABY
Y
3axruebajy ce ouiiupe nrepe z pocuub ',iomux pagxuica,
aa6ymauauia u uujauau a `; . ;,
. ueHTpaJuti t COBjercIH em3,atincanHH cbopyM. jaBJbajy
11313CnITa-m n3 Moc cue, npenopy~nto je ripe neEm jjax 1co-
'7ex'I'imHnfa ?Aa npeAY3MY ourrpe Mepe nPOTIBY CBIrX npe-
xpuntnaLla paAHe H APJKatme AHclpmn me". QfHAi xanHH
cbopyaM ?cyrepinue Ro.neRTnaIB14a Aa noneAy omTpy 6op6y
ca 3a6ymanTmia, paAHllt,in Koji '4ecTo .1eibajy 3ano-
c icibe m HaplrilwTO nnjalnvm!a. OH npeAJfaxce As ce o no-
umm paAlnfuWMa pacnpaBJba
Ha cKynoBI4Ma xoneKTNBa, Aa
Ifni CyAe TaKO3BaHM AHCfjII-
fl mHCKH eyAOBH, Aa HM ce
fie ;Aajy, mint oAy3MY. nyT-
joKe" (ynyTld 3a oAMapaJIH-
mTa it caHaTOpnjyMe. Aa ce
6pHwy ca cn:ncxa Jbyjpt Ko-
jtf he A06TVAH C'ranone. Jm-
fnasajy npenfifja m, Haj3aA,
Aa Cc HCKJbyge H H3 CnHAII-
KaTa.
OBa npenopyxa npo143BO-
ba'ituta Aoaera je 1Ha nocneA-
IbeM n ieny y CHHAHKaTa
RoJIl je pa3MaTPaO 3aKJby4-
xe nJleffyMa IJeHTpaasor Ko-
annera KIICC OA Aeue%f6pa
npbmne mAlme 0 CTalby Y
nprnpeAH, B:aAa je, npeMa
N3BeurrajHMa I43 MocRBe,
Bpe,i u ea ourrpo RPHTHKO-
nao c.la6ocTH y npNepeAH-
BacrrTHx paR n
Ica3He
TTpenopyKa ci1HAHKaJIHOr
4fopYMa xo:1eKTIuBHMa Hnje
nova. H y HeAaBHOM yBOA-
Infxti ,.TlpaBZte" nocneheuoM
3ax.7by41211Ma AcueM6apeKor
n ieny:lfa UK KTICC o rrpH-
npezlf. Y3 IICTlfualbe Heon-
\co,ZC1oCTII ,nonehalba Jip2KaB-
Ii'' 11 np01On0;1IIC AncuHnJrN-
Ile" xao 3Ha'tajlta Mepa 3a
nocru3albe YUHR,a cyrepmue
cc - ?not3chame 6op6e ca
a11Tt11pyiwJTBeJI1tM noj-Ba-ma,
Rao faro cy pa3Bna'teibe Co-
fjHjaJn4CTm-me cBojHne, 3a-
6ytuasatbe, 3JloynoTpe6a. an-
KoxoJrHHx attha".
?IfporyJbn>atW ', KaKO 7
CoBjereKoM Case3y Ha3HBa-
jy 3a6ymame, Jtowe paAtm-
Ke, Beh Ay7Ke BpeMetfa Cy
npeAMeT ourrpe KpHTHKe m
ysoAHlf'tapa ijenrpaiHHx co-
BjeTCRnX JtICTOBa, a noce6Ho
?npaJlAe".
YBoAtnllfvap TIpanAe". cy-
reptnuyhH mepe 3a 6op6y
npOTHB pane HeAumumAx-
He, Ha uppo Mecro je cTa-
BHO ,HeOnXOAHOCT Aa Ce 'Y
KOAeicTNBH3fa CTBOPH aTMO-
cxpepa cBeomure HeTpneJbH-
BOCTH npe5ta n3ocTajamy ca
nocna. npeMa 3a6ymasaiby,
3aoCTajaiby y IIPOH3BOAIbH
H JlolueM paAy.
Cyrepuuryhs afepe 3a, KaKo
cc y yBo .m1 y Harnamasa,
?nourreHo m caBeCKO HCIty-
ibasatbe o6ase3a npeMa APy-
mTBy" It 3a ?6ecnpeKopHo
nomronafbe pa`,tHe AHcx.w-
nJIHHe", - yuoAinf'iap uen-
TpaJxHor naprnjcKor opra,a
noce6Ho ncTn'Ie 3Ha'iaj II-
AejRo-Bacnrn'Hor paAa nap-
TI4jCxt4X H .lpyr xx opralix-
3at(Hja it nplfnieHy Ka3He-
HHX Mepa.
,,Ta6 ne nonacTVi"
H ?Ta6,ie cpaMa"
Y c013jeTCK0i npI1BpCAI1 Cy
Cc pelueli,a 3a oTK.'ia)baibe
1ICAl1CVI1nn111 C Ha paAy y.-
rJIaBIIoM Tpammaa y Bacf-T-
HMM H Ka3HeHHM MepaMa,
ruin naK y n,HMOpaf3afby
paAHHSa ma caeecrau paR
nYTeM TaKO3BaKHX npOrpe-
ctmtm1X 4JOpMN, Ha 'In H 3Ha-
Yaj, cirpehe nay ynoAin-x
oae roAlmei
IIo3Haro je, Ha npHMep:
Aa cc y CoojercxoM Case3y
y npeAy3ehnMa H yCTBHOBa-
Ma urnpoico xopncTe ?Ta6ne
nogflCTH" Rao CpeACTBo 3a
noACTHUaibe paAHHKa Ha 6o-
JbH paA. ,I(oHeAanuo C'y Y3
one Roplquhene H Ta6Jte
cpaMa", pe3epBHcaue 3a ne-
IbHBue, 3a6ymaHTe, npexp-
innoue paAHe AmetmmIm e.
Ann over: Ha CTpaH'HljaMa
,,TpyAa" napTHjcKH ceKpe-
Tap npeAy3eha H3 floi6aca
Je npeAJfarao untpe xopHUr-
heH,e Bacm THe Mepe xojy
np;1Men,yje H,eros BonerrirB
- rrHCaU,e nncaMa nopOAH-
naMa. HCTaK'HyTHx it JIOunlx
p Ftma.. ,
L! Rpyrr npeA.Io3I
ApceHaJi BacrwlrHHX Mepa
Koje cc KOPMCTe If Ha '11011
3Ha%Iaj caAa noce6Ho yxa3yjy
CkOpyMH H yBOAH119ap11 Je
BeoMa wHpoK: oA oJ pJKaBa-
H,8 npeAaBaiba m nncaibh
4Jfanaica, na Ao noAeJte npe-
'ia3HHX 3aCTaBa KOJIeKTHBH-
Ma x nojeAHH$NMa H AO-
ae.ne notiacmfX 3naiba. Rao
Ha npMMep ,yAapHHRa KO-
MyinlCrI1 1 or paAa". 14 cKa-
JIa Ka3HeHHX Mepa je TaKo))e
umpoxa.
AOK tbopyMH H yBOAHHYa-
pH Y HanopHMa 3a no5oJb-
maibe AHCLIHn'JfHHe 1IeHTpaJI-
HO MecTO AajY sacmrrHO
nponaraHAHOM paAy. ate--'
HLtcTpaTHBHNIN Mepa to x
nporpecHBHHM HOPMaxa, TO
jeCT HcTep1Ban,e AilcultaJlll-
He OA03ro". noje,Inni VoB-
jeTCKH eKOHOMHCTif eyrepif-
my Aa cc peufen a rpalxe
Ha?APyroM Merry. CyoReHH
Ca `INibeH141;aMa Aa Hit ?Ta-
6Jie cpaMa" N ra6Jze nofia-
CTH", HN nox8a.fe it xa3Ne.
rlo%Iacii'a 3Baiba 11 3aCTaBe
H4CY AarH rKeJbeHe pe3yJi-
Tare - nojeANHIi eKOHOMI1-
CTt1 Rao npl1O[HTCTHO IICTn-
Yy Heoummocr 6pJtcer H
1oeJieAnHjer cnposobclba Pa
mijt' npoK.TaMoBnuor fIpo-
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se3a
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CIIHTHHM 11 Ka3HerFrHM OA-
peA6axa.
CA. BYJHIWA
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
LE MONDE, Paris
it January 1970
U.R.S. S.
S'INSPIRANT D'UN RAPPORT DE N. BREJNEV
Pravdacritique sverement I'organisation de I'economie
to
Moscou. - La ? Pravda . consacre mardi ma-
tin son editorial au bilan de Is reunion pleniere
du comile central, qui s'est tenue le 15 decembre
Bernier et de is session d'hiver du Soviet supreme
reuni a Is meme epoque. Deja, depuis quelque
temps. Is bruit courait a Moscou qu'un important
rapport avail alors ate presents par M. Brejnev.
L'editorial de Is ? Pravda . Is confirms entie-
rement, on dressant un.sews requisltoirs de' 1a
geslion economique en U.R.S.S. On se souvient
qu'a In tribune du Soviet supreme, MM. Baibakov
et Garbouzov, respeciivement president du Gos-
plan et ministre des finances, avaient eux-mimes
mentionne toules sortes d'insuffisances et presence
pour l'annee.1970 un budget at un plan fortement
empreints d'austerite. M. Brejnev, selon la
Pravda -. aurait critique les ? methodes d'orga-
nisation - en.vigueur dans 1'economie ^ovietique.
De notre corresp. particulier
ALAIN JACOB
L'editorial de 1'organe du comite
central rappelle. mais avec une
vigueur indite, quelques-unes des
lacunes les plus graves. Les in-
dustries de la siderurgie, des mi-
nes, sont mises en cause pour
n'avoir pas reallse leur plan en
1968. 11 est dit encore, que des
reductions lnjustifiees du cheptel,
de la volatile, ont entrains a des
difJicultds dans i'approvisionne-
ment de la population en produits
d'dlevage, en particulfer dans les
grands centres industriels ?.
Ces insuffisances sont mention-
n?es dans une critique d'ensemble
du style de travail et des metho-
d-es de gestion. a Nous sommes
engages, ecru 1'a Pravda, dans
un edtape qui ne permet plus de
travailler d 1a maniere ancienne
et qui implique de nouvelles md-
thodes et de nouvelles solutions. ?
La session d edecembre du co-
mite central des critiques de deux
ordres. Les unes ont trait a ce que
1'on pourralt appeler Les dd-
faillances des indlvidus : tendance
t ge de la propriete
$ ii
kisme, gasp
de 1'Etat, et mAme ivrognerle. Une
autre serie de critiques, phis fon-
damentales, vise l'appareii lul-
mdme de i'economle, les c instan-
ces superflues n, lea bureaucra-
tisme ? de certains organismes, le
desordre ? regnant dans telle ou
telle biranche, par example dans
les transports ferroviaires. Plus
predsement encore, ]a Pravda
designe les ministeres comme les
maillons les plus defectueux, les
moans efficaces de 1'economie
nationale, en leur reprochant en
particuller de a ne pas faire
confiance aux entreprises ? ou
dadmettre, comme dans la cons-
truction ou 1'industrie chimique,
que a de vastes installations
soient paralysdes pour uen longue
pdriode n.
Le congris ajou'rni ?
L'Editorlallste de la Pravda,
suivant d'assez prt s, semble-t-il,
'le raulibrt de M. Brej'.sv, en
arrive presque it mettre en cause
lea mdthodes de fonctionnement;
du parti lui-meme. Il est indis-
pensable, ecrit-il, d'y a developper
largement la critique et l'auto-
crilique u, d'amdiorer le travail
du contr6le populaire, de faire
preuve de plus d'exigence A 'dgard
des cadres en Be montrant intran-
sigeant lorsque tel ou tel travail-
leur refuse de tirer les lecons de
la critique, de Be perfectionner,
porte systematiquement atteinte
a la discipline du parti et de
1'Etat.... La responsabilitd? de ces
insuffisances, toutefois, incombe
aux Individus lut6t qu'aux struc-
tures, puisqu'il est dit que, a dans
la derniere pdriode, le parts, le
comite central du P.C.U.S., ont
fait des efforts considdrables
pour deployer I'initiative des
hommes, creer un climat de con,
fiance. permettre tt chacun de
manifester ses capacitds sur le
plan de la profession et de I'orga-
nisation n.
L'impression gdndrale est que
la session de decembre a dt6
l'occaslou d'un tres severe exa,
,men de conscience, rendu indis-
pensable par une situation afar
mante dans i'dconomie nationale.
Ce qui est finalement fn 'cause,
c'est 1'immobilisnie, le laisser-
aller, la scldrose de I'appareil de
1'Etat. On peut penser qq e diver-
ses mesures seront prl pour
rectifier S>], et lit queiquek-ins des
ddfauts les plus graves ~d0noncds
par M. Brejnev. Mais A'il nest
pas impossible qu'un tneyail de
revision plus fondamehtal :ait std
amorce. 11 expliqueraiit pgtam-
ment que Von ait.jilgd d4ressaire
de s'accorder un nouveau delat
avant la convocation du prochain
congres du parts. Celui-cfS comma
on le salt, dolt normalement Be
tenir dans le tours d$" l'annde
1970. Rdcemment encores on esti-
mait qu'll serait rduni "au prin-
temps, afin de suivre ou de prd-
ceder de peu les ' cerdmonies
:marquant le centenaire de la
naissance de Ldnine, au moss
d'avril. Selon de bonnes sources,
sa convocation ne "it plus
ddsormais envisages avg0t l'au-
tomne.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0 CPYRGHT
LE MONDE, Paris
31 January 1970
La discussion du rapport de M. Brejnev
CPYRGHT
LES DEFAILLANCES DE L'ECO IE SOVIETIQUE
POSET MAINTERANT UN PUODLEE POLITIQUE
Moscou. --- La rapport presents par M. Leonid
Brejnev, Is 1$ decembre derniel, au comite cen-
tral du parti communists fait, depuis Is debut
du mois de janvier at jusqu'tl Is fin de fevrier.
!'objet do discussions dens lea cellules du parti
De notre corresp. particul.
ALAIN JACOB
do nouvelles entreprises, etant quel-
ques-unes,des causes principales do
to trine.
Si 1e diacoura de M. Brejnev n'a
pas ate rendu public, lea themes
essentials -- du moins an ce qui
concerns la situation interieure -
an ont ate repris par ]a Pravda, le
13 janvier, dons un long editorial.
Ce texts dressait un severe requi-
sitoire de to gestion economique an
U.R.S.S. at denongait de graves ]a-
cunes dana 1'organisation des bran-
ches lea plus diverges de for pro-
duction at des services (le Monde
du 14 janvier).
Le secretaire general du pant a
illustre soar expose de quelques
examples particuliorement eloquent!.
Denongant is desordre regnant dons
lea transports ferroviaires, 11 a ra-
conte comment des grues an, prove.
nance de la R.D.A. at destlnees au
port d'Odessa avalent traverse toutes
lea gares du Transsiberien pour
aboutfr a Vladivostok avant quo qui-
conque ge preoccupe de leg remettre
sur le bon chemin. Critiquant d'au-
tre part lea tendances au . triom-
phaliame it a evoque le cas
d'exploitations agricoles dont cer-
taines realisations avaient ate citeds
on exemple, mais dont on devait de-
couvrir ulterieurement que Is cheptel
avait diminue dons des proportions
considerable!.
Beaucoup plus toutefois que leg
insuffisancea ou lea difficultes de
1'agriculture, ce sont lea methodea
de for gestion industrielle qui ont
6te critiquees. Suivant Is vocabu-
laire marxiste, M. Brejnev aurait de-
veloppe le theme salon lequel ? lea
rapporta do production , freinent ac-
tuellement an U.B.S.S. Jos forces
productive! Ainsi 1'accroissement
de to prod.uctivite au cours des der-
nieres antes serait-il sensiblement
inferieur ace qui avait ate prevu
an 1966 par Is vingt-troisieme
congres, . 1'irresponsabilit6 des or-
ganes ]a -dispersion des investis-
sements: to retard dens la creation
Comma on 1964
Salon des indications concor-
dantes, 1'expose do M. Brejnev a
ate accueilli de maniere tres posi-
live par lea membres du comite cen+
tral. D'aucuns auralent vante Is cou-
rage at to franchise de 1'orateur.
Oubliant peut-titre certains discours
de M. Khrouchtchev, its auralent
mime pretendu quo Von an avait
pas entendu de parell depuis Lenine.
Pourquoi le secretaire general
a-t-it fait ce discoura ? Certain ape-
cialistea estiment quo. to situation
economique eat plus mauvaise encore
qu'a l'automne 1964 au moment ou
lea difficultes du mime ordre contri-
buerent a to chute de M. Khroucbt-
chev. Ii faut toutefois preciser quo
lea circonstances ont beaucoup
change depuis cette epoque at que
des causes identiques n'enlraineront
pas necessairement lea mimes effets.
Grace a on caractore collegial. 1'ac
tuelle direction eat beaucoup moins
vulnerable que no 1'etait l'ancien
premier secretaire. It n'empeche que
lea defaillances do 1'economie ont
prig une ampleur suffisante pour
poser un probleme politique. On s'en
serait apergu, an particulier. dons
lea mois d'octobre at novembre der.
niers, an tours de diverges reunions
ou etaient a la fois examines lea
resultats de 1'annee 1969 at fixes lea
objectifs du Plan pour 1970.
11 exists an U.R.S.S. une ecole
importante reunisaant aussi bien des
chefs d'entrepriae que des econo-
mistes at quelques fonctionnaires qul
font une critique fondamentale des
methodes de preparation at d'execu-
tion du Plan. Celui-ci, disent-iis, eat
trop souvent etabli a partir d'infor-
mations fausses ou irrealistes quant
aux realisations anterieures at it
1'etat d'avancement des programmes.
at ?dons lea assemblees plus wastes, comme Is
Conseil des syndicats. qui sest tenu cotta semaino
i Moscou. La presse participe au debat par toutes
sortes d'editoriaux at de reportages.
Souvent, par exemple, on affirme
quo tells usine ou tel atelier nouveau
entrera an service au printemps
alors qu'il ne, commencera reeliement
a fonctionner quo six mots plus tard
an moins. Quanta 1'execution des
objectify du Plan, else ne Pout titre
assuree dons ces conditions quo
par des coups do collier desordonnes,
particulierement au quatrieme trimes-
tre de l'annee. exigeant des efforts
demesurea ou d'un prix exorbitant
de la part do to main-d'couvre at
accessoirement du materiel. Encore
ces efforts no suffisent-ils pas tou-
jours. Danz lea cas m@me ou lea
obligations du Plan sent . Presque >
rempliea, c'est trop souvent par Is
jeu do procedes plus ou moins regu-
liers conaiatant, par exemple, a
puiser excessivement dons lea res-
sources de 1'entreprise bu a presen?
ter sous une denomination determi-
nee des produita d'une qualite infe-
rieure.
Ces vices de fonctionnement no
tennent pas seulement a des ne-
gligences indlviduellea, mais pro-
viennent an rea]ite du systeme lui.
mime. Si lea dirigeants de 1'6co.
nomie. a tous lea niveaux, ne mani-
festent pas suffisamment Is sens do
lours responsabilites, c'est parce qua
ce systeme (crainte de sanctions
aussi bien qu'absence de stimu-
lants) ne lea Jr encourage aucune-
ment. -
M. Brejnev auraft repris a son
compte quelques-une do ces argu-
ments. Peut-titre s est-il egalement
preoccup6 du. sentiment populaire.
e Rpres tout, noun disait un ami, 11
eat tout de mime embarrassant din-
viter lea gene a Peter le centenaire
de la naissance de Unine cinquante-
trois ans apres let revolution sans
titre capable de Ieur fournir du sau-
cisson a volonte. * Formula images
-- car on trouve du scruciason dons
lea magasina de Moscou - macs qui
resume asset bion Is contrasts entre
Is ? triomphalisme . courant de to
propaganda officielle at to penurie
de nombreux produits de consom-
motion courante. voire seu a ent
lour mauvaise qualite ou lour carac-
tere demode.
Un changement
d'or'ientation I
Est-ce a dire quo Is pl6num de
d6cembre annonce uno ore nou-
velle, un changement radical' da po-
litique ? En ce sujet comma isit d'au-
tres, it faut revenir sun Is passe
pour situer 1'evenement , dqns son
veritable contexts. Use pantie au
mains des difficultes que.connoit
actuellement 1'econoinib sdyetique
vient d'orientations definies ou prin-
temps 1968, a I'6poquo oh furent
ressenties Is plus vivement lea
craintes dune contagion en'.U.R..S.S1
des transformations en cours er:
Tchecoslovaquie. Dens f'esprit qui
conduisit a I'invasion - du rnois
d'aout, des gardedous furent; niic an
place pour 6viter que lea refcr!a0:;,
economiques ne se developpent dana
des directions analogues R ce11ei
que M. Ota Sik definissait ` a "rn
que. On a donc freine, ninon hlo-
que, de cotta maniere un procersus
considers comme dangereux.
L'heure eat venue de juqer cotte
politique - at ceux qui an out et"
lea auteurs - a sea resu.ltats. )a
cola dons to perspective du canards
que lea statuts du parti font obbga-
tion an Principe de reunir crate an-
te. Ce n'est pas a'avonturer daps
des speculations gratuites que do
voter, dons ce contexte, que le nom
do M. Brejnev eat beaucoup plu4
directement lie que celui de M. Xor
sygulne a ('invasion do la Tchccc
slovaquie, alors qua to president do
conseil sovietique continue a inc_or-
nor pour so part. a tort Ou a raison,
lea promenses de la reforms 6conn-
mique.
De 1a, deux hypotheses. La pre-
miere veut que I'on tire a 1'heure
actuelle to legon des erreurs con'-
mises depuis dix-huit mois at que
to vole, dosormais ouverte aux pro-
moteurs do to reforme, on premier
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 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
CPYRGHT
lieu a M. Kossyguine, pour pour- ceux qui auraient pu critiquer I'ac-
suivre sans entraves lour experience. tuelle direction at dont Is secretaire
Certains indices ont pu faire penset general emprunte deliberement Is
qu'il on stmt question. langage. Ce serait une maniere pour
Une seconds hypothese toutefols ]a premier pereonnage du regime,
eat pour 1'instant considetee comma et pour ceux qul ]ui eont le plus
Plug ?itiitilRtbliiblti~ ks roppoll Jtfit j4feeh!oJ 8p gwdof in ?t9fttf ?diftel
sent+ pqr M. Brejnev constttueratt` de 1a s tuation, de consenttr divers
uns operation beaucoup plus tac? ejustements rendus Indispensables
tique quo atrategique et n'annonce- par lea evenements, mail on prenant
Tait pas en realite do changements coin qu'ils ne debordent pas vers
profonds. 11 aurait ainsl pour but des orientations jugees ? revision-
de coupes 1'herbe sous Is pied de nistes .. Notons encore une foie quo
la solidarite' collegiate de la direc.
tion du parti s'accorderait assez bien
de ce schema, dans la mesure ou
elle falt par nature obstacle et de
brusquer changements. Lee echos
quo Yon regoit d'autre part des
}ohf9eill go E811UItt+ on Ran j6ne
to pays thontrent quo Is rapport du
15 decembre donne lieu it des dls-
cussions beaucoup plus formelles quo
sinceres. D'aucuns an concluent quo,
at Important qu'ait its 1'expose de
M Brejnev, u nest pas I'occasion
d'un v ri a e e a .
Aussi bien, la Pravda u 13 Ian-
vier prenait-elle soln de,t,~,~~~gg quo
? Is style leniniste et lea Ethade!
de travail etablies dans paxd of
wont revcies Justifies S. C ~Qtclae,
610616iI411.1 efumi ii a ;:1i for
encore. Is style du travail f'.R. ' m its.
rer at non changer... + 'dtait une
manure d'indiquer lea mites du.
de16 desquelles no sour ant allot
Its mires on cause.
ALAIN';",1 4001L
X10 .
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400110001-0
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 January 1970
CPYRGHT
Vle C022 1amei'i1 CPYRGHT
Higher wages are little consolation to Russians
when goods are scarce and of poor quality
By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Recently I asked a Russian friend what
he wanted most in the 1070's. "A car," he
replied without hesitation.
His answer was literal. But it could also
be taken symbolically, for Russians today
yearn for a materially more abundant life.
They are ready for a consumer society,
though the immediate future does not prom-
ise them one.
Visible pro;; ress has been made in the
past 10 years. The average Ivan Ivanovich
now is better clothed and housed. His wife
fusses with eye makeup. His daughter wears
miniskirts.
But his grumble is 'that, while he earns
more than ever before, there is little to
buy. He is a more sophisticated spender
these days, often scorning the shoddy prod.
ucts on store shelves and waiting patiently
for better-quality goods,
Anyone traveling in the Soviet Union can
see at a glance the standard of living re?
mains behind that of every industrialized
nation of the world.
Figures tell story
In Moscow one sometimes searches far
and wide for such ordinary items as pencils
with erasers, washcloths, writing paper,
gloves. Streets are relatively empty of
passenger cars. Restaurant service, gradu-
ally improving, still can be a frustrating
experience.
Soviet figures themselves graphically tell
the story. As of the beginning of 1969 there'
were 3.7 watches and clocks for every
family (four persons). But there was a
radio or radio-phonograph for only every
1.3 families, a camera for every 3.3 fam-
ilies, a television set for every 2.2 families,
a vacuum cleaner for every 10 families, a
refrigerator for every 4.3 families, a wash-
ing machine for every 2.3 families, a sew-
ing machine for every 1.6 families, a motor-
c;'cle for every 12.5 families, and a bike or
motorbike for every 1.7 families.
For the second industrial power in the
world, such facts are a growing embarrass.
ment and concern. The Soviet leadership
would like to demonstrate that a Commu-
nist system alone can provide a just,
abundant society for all. The growing ur-
gency of this goal in fact is what impels
the Kremlin to seek accommodation with
the West. How fast it can begin to divert
priorities away from defense into consumer
production depends, for one thing, on how
soon agreement can be reached with the
United States on a strategic-arms limitation.
For the near future. the Soviet consumer
will go on waiting in line.
Slowdown stun n
Reporting to the Supreme Soviet recently,
Planning Chief Nikolai K. 1aibakov showed
n general slowdown of the economy in
1%) and failure of factories and farms to'
meet many plan targets. Planned industrial
growth in 1970 is set at 6.3 percent, the low-
est peacetime growth rate since 1923.
Mr. Baibakov promised Russians 'that in
1970 for file third year running, production
of consumer goods is to grow at a faster
pace than the' output of capital goods-the
former by 6.8 percent and the latter by 3.1
percent. Nonetheless, heavy inchistry con-
tinues to goat the lion's share of invc::tment.
The shift of resources into consumption ap?
pears to have slowed. There will be no big
push in 1.970 except in agriculture.
Higher `goals are set for consumer-goods
output in 11)70, especially in such itcros'as
fabrics. clothe:', and shoes. But Mr. Baiba-
kov also told the Supreme Soviet, however,
that the public demand for furniture, re-
frigerators, passenger cars, and some other
goods "will not yet be fully met."
Car outlook disappointing
The passenger-car outlook is especially
disappointing to Russians, but as planners
;view h:ioritics there are things more needed
t)tan private cars. The 1970 target calls
for production of .348,000 automobiles,
including the'first batch of 30,000 small cars
from the new Fiat plant in Togliatti. This is
less than half the original goal of 700,000 set
for 1970, suggesting there are considerable
T ~ ~;?? rti .1?jJl 1'Crl;4Iai 'd,, Jr ( 1j'I:'r ( ,,
COL N ir"i L5
GCS
Des lots, I'vuvraq;c do ! nrt?r Ga?
raudy se transforms en tin ri'qui-
sitoire. Soitis le titre sans equnvn?
slug du . d',i,v
rC?
tauration ell J'clieeo io.:iduie.
Puts it prend d'autre;s exemples.
La Fini ii de d'abord, ? oft, c.it-i ,
vet lieu d'essayer de regirgner 1rc
graride ttiasse swine du part! a alit
rustle politigeec, unc lutte fraction.
ficiiC ct systriutatiquc cst rncncc
avec tes pitissartts rrtoycns que
confcsrc l'appui sovictigtte ,,
L'Autriclic ensulte, oil ilrejnev
aecontplit la proniesso de tratisfor?
met en groupuseules ](,s partis
coninzunistes qui oscraient sonte.
fir Les Tchcqucs contre it dil:rat
de Moscou. L'Autriclic oil fun creel
autour de Mill. Fischer et Marek
llais les dirigeants sovietiques
n'en ont pas nioins tree des re-
vues a leur enders devotion.
En abordant les cas do 1'Espa?
!tine et do la GrZcc, fie, er Ca-
xattid~r laucb de: accetZtQrtg etc
qu'oi1 peut ailer Aioscou contre
ceux qul . n'identifient pas I'at?
tachewent a I'Union sovietique
avec uno souwission aveugle a
ses dirigeants actuels ,.
Pour punir le parti j commit.
piste espagnol do sa !idle pour
sots fndependance, ils i 'kcsite.
rent pas, apres la eonicwzee de
]Hostess, d changer d' ;c'r-Jc R
1.,?;7arl '1c Vrar;.,
PH,is (a Ir,t de i,:. g'ic;ni ti7i pa?
g,f pug do trgttle an ,
Id fUrrlort sovititigrte ttis;.tes au.
fpog 4t A4 41VAI10tof holiV41alil re
t-011 1114 i+'rar,co, volcf glte, pour to
prrnriGrc. foil, an debut clc Jan.
Her 1970, is tnini:?trc ddii Affai.
r+'s etratgcres de t+'ranc*5,. opca
Bravo, est rest a tloscou par un
tacc?ntil'igtfe des ?f ffaires . citran.
pmts. Les fascistcs espatlr is ne
rl :sirruticut nil ]cur joie ncurs
PL (,,?) Quclr11csioicr3ptus
turd, on plcine grcr, des IIIrecurs
lies ASt+rf?le?~z, Ic:i ih +::r'
a rlCi Gr-
;htu dr.;t ;ces a hf. ?.?r hi ,.,:..
'f!' P' r?!sett? :, rr J?
dcs , .. ` I' ` i.i r'.?
rru.r, des pays mrn1:.,rs oils haste
de'Varsor.ip: dr- is Paiogne.
Cc
a is r'::r, > to:r' tr;:tG&
'quo la !."Gr"im il'ct parti con,
munistc cyant do I'orgaitisatioii
d'unr, SOC 4 T1 WOVw uld
such an ordinance was obvious to a ecolo ca usttu. a sec t t o would
oriented personnel familiar with the tributary system.,. stress the construction of contour ridges to keep ft-
on the plateau, in the escarpment, and. in the valley. _ ? .location-area soils .in situ.
Referring to Mazabuka District on the plateau,. ,. The core of the program of intensification was a
Bainbridge and Edwards reported that "The amount '' two- or four-cr6p rotation supplemented by the use
of run-off, coupled with sheet and gully erosion
that takes place during the heavy rains, is quite,
frightening." With much of their grass cropped right
down to the roots, dambos along the upper reaches
of rivers like the Lusitu are increasingly subject to' .
abnormal flash floods. In the escarpment country.- .
leading down into the valley, the same authors refer
to air photographs that "show clearly the denu-
.of cattle manure, applied on departmental demon-
stration gardens and on the holdings of Peasant
Farmers and Native Authority. Improved Farmcr?
The first ten Peasant Farmers were selected by the
District Commissioner in 1959. After receiving credit
'from a revolving fund under the DC's jurisdic4pn
for their equipment and cattle needs, they beca"ine
the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture.
At first,. each Peasant Farmer was restricted to a
20-acre holding. While building this up, he was sup-
posed to follow a four-crop rotation, involving equal
acreages of maize, sorghum, cotton, and a gipen-
manure crop. Supplemental manure (at three ons
per acre) was to be applied annually to halfp
acreage planted in grain, with each farmer told, to
build up a herd of twenty cattle to meet his ox traQ
tion and manure needs. The NA Improved Farmers
had much smaller holdings on which they could
receive a one pound sterling bonus per acre, pro-
vided they followed a simple, grain-legume rotation
and manured half the grain plot each year.
If actually practiced, the recommended measures
most likely would have been effective in maintain'
ing soil fertility and preventing erosion. I3gwc'ver,
the degree of acceptance by the farmers has been
minimal, No ordinance prohibiting cultivation 4h-
:. in 25 yards of tributary beds was enacted. EYcn
if it had been, it is unlikely that enforcement world
have been possible. Throughout their known #lis-
h"~bagks, except for occasional shade and fruit trd+s,
elation of the protective strips of woodland along
the stream banks and the spreading of the cultiva-
tion away from the streams up the steep slopes."
Without a protective cover, flash floods each year
'.,,in order to cultivate the fertile alluvial soils. After
relocation and the loss of Zambezi and delta ll-
luviums, these soils became even more desirable,
with tributary-bank clearing extended throughout
much of ' the valley. While those Tonga involved
were well aware of the resulting dangers of erosion,
they saw no option but to continue as in the past,
.since no acceptable substitute for riverbank cultiva-
remove more of the soil, with the authors estimating tion was presented to them.
that within ten to fifteen years "there will no longer While contour ridging was not actively opposed,
be sufficient soil left in the escarpment to carry the d the Native Authority was unwilling to back it pub
present population." In the valley, flash floods pc-.. licly through its own regulations. Well aware that,
riodically sweep the now unprotected banks of the the valley residents did not really understand the'
major tributaries. When the Lusitu rose to record, basis for contouring, the Native Authority did not
heights in a matter of hours in March, 1963, the' --wish to associate itself with a potentially unpopular
extensive riverbank areas under cultivation since .measure, since their support had always been low,
relocation were severely eroded. Clearly, this would .. especially after this relocation, which the NA coun-
not have occurred if the riverine fringe vegetation' - 'cilors and chiefs had been pressured into supporting
had not been systematically removed through the . - .by .the central government. Though 'some .1,230
16
 mile~lel~ iQ dpFo4 tf ~I R /A~b28us C~AtI iD#'a7a9- 1iik9t A1i00u~#Qi~'k11~Ofl4~(yct to be
under the jurisdiction of agricultural staff members _ -settled. On the other hand, I. expect all available
by October, 1964, they never received popular un land to be utilized within the next ten years unless
derstanding, let alone sufficient support to provide' there is a major reduction of population or a change
for their maintenance. A year later, construction in agricultural techniques. In the highly favored Lu-
of the ridges apparently stopped in the Lusitu area, '-situ area, the surplus population is already crossing
and thereafter I recall seeing only occasional ref into the previously unsettled Mpcndcle-Mutulan`
ganga area. Although no one in my own Lusitu
crences to them in agricultural reports. Though I do
not know how these ridges are faring today, some 'study. village had joined this movement by 196
Lusitu farmers broke them down in connection with -some of the men had begun to clear distant gart.,:;,
the cultivation and extension of their gardens. -dens on the far side of the Lusitu. In all cases, no
Intensification in the valley has fared no better intensification was occurring; rather pioneer farmer
as a degradation control device. Out of a. total dis- .' were simply re-establishing the same extensive sysr.-
tr?ict farming population of well over 10,000 men, tem of bush fallow cultivation.
to the best of my knowledge there have never been Although. the problem outlined in the last few
,more than 25 Peasant Farmers and 75 Improved paragraphs is a severe one, it is not my purpose in
Farmers. Moreover, the degree of intensification this paper to propose possible solutions. Rather I
among these has decreased, if anything, through . wish to emphasize, in closing, that what we are
the years. According to the Agricultural Assistant dealing with here are two incompatible systems ,of
at. Lusitu, in 1965, those wishing to become Rural ,:,-agriculture. One, proposed by the Department of
Council Improved -Farmers wanted to grow unro- Agriculture, is satisfactory from an ecological pc{int
tated cotton. In 1967, most Peasant Farmers had ? of view, except that it is not acceptable to the far n-
sown cotton or maize in plots that they were sup- ing population. The other, while satisfying to the
posed to plant in green-manure crops. In the Kayuni' farmer,. has serious, indeed catastrophic, ecological
block of the Lusitu, the most enterprising of the implications under present population conditions:
.five Peasant Farmers was monocropping cotton '. The problem is to design a compromise system nc
during afour-year period, after which he planned ceptable to all involved.
to carry on a ' cotton-maize rotation. He had also ' Throughout Africa, research stations have tended
stopped applying manure, although here the reason, to develop new-techniques without taking into con-
as with other progressive farmers, was the break- sideration the total context within which the farmer,
down of his Scotch cart, for which it was literally -for whom these techniques are designed,' lives.
impossible to get parts owing to -the Rhodesian Ecologists, I think, tend to make a similar mistake
crisis. Moreover, he had substantially increased his when they propose alternative land-use systems
acreage with twenty acres now planted in cotton without asking the questions, "Can these support.
and nine in maize, versus only three in sun hemp the existing human population, which, after all, is
and one in groundnuts during the 1966-67 season. the ecological dominant in the area?" Or, "If not,
As for the application of manure at the village is there an alternative way of life available for the
level, no one in the village that I have been ob- . people, which they are likely to accept?" If, for
serving over the past ten years' had applied it dur- example, cattle pastoralists are to be driven out of
'ing the previous season or any other season. The an area to be used for game cropping or conserva-
same applied to any form of rotation. Indeed, I doubt lion purposes, the same concern must go into plan-
that it is an exaggeration to state that no more than 1 -,ping an acceptable future for them as relates to
per cent of the valley farmers have ever ? regularly '., other communities within the habitat. Failure to do
practiced either animal manuring or crop rotation. this is not only morally indefensible, but is also ,apt
The present relocation areas just cannot support to be politically unacceptable. In other words, a
the existing population under these agricultural technical or ecological solution to problems of cnvi-
practices. In South Mwemba, the population has ronmental degradation is not of much use unless it is,
exceeded the carrying capacity of the land, and is ".. understood and implemented by the relevant pecxple
once again subject to periodic food shortages that at the local and national levels.
are bound to get worse with time. To prevent this,
the government has. decided to again relocate ' at BAINBRIDGE, W. R., and A. C. R. EDMONDS. Northern Rdio-
desia Forest Department Management Book for Gwe- te,
least 6,000 people, and it is only a matter of time South Choma and Mazabuka Districts, 1963.
before this resettlement occurs. Elsewhere, the sit- SCUDDER, T.' The Ecology of the Cwe,nbe Tonga. (Kariba
Studies, Vol. II), Manchester University for Rhodes-
uation is still within the control of the local popula- Livingstone Institute, 1962.
tion, since exhausted fields can still be replaced by . "The Economic Basis of Egyptian Nubian Labor
Migration" A Symposium on Contemporary Nubia, ed.
uncultivated land around the margins of the reloCa- R. FERN12A. HRAF Press, New Haven, 1967.
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