CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200140001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 87
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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411?01111911EINW 24 July 1972
VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE
On 30 March 1972, the North Vietnamese regime launched a
massive, unprovoked attack by first-line-North Vietnamese Army
divisions spearheaded by hundreds of tanks and supported by massed
artillery across the borders of South Vietnam. The attack openly
and blatantly violated the agreement reached in 1954 that both
North and South Vietnamese forces remain on their own gides of
the Demilitarized Zone. It also violated the understanding to
de-escalate the war reached in the fall of 1968 when the U.S.
unilaterally ceased the bombing of North Vietnam. In one stroke,
the NVN wiped out its carefully developed and nurtured false
image of the war in South Vietnam as a civil "war of liberation"
conducted by freedom-loving, anti-imperial Southern guerrillas
with the aid of the North. As a result, new and different
perspectives on the Vietnamese conflict were revealed:
--- Many fictions assiduously cultivated by North Vietnam
stood exposed (see below).
--- The South Vietnamese government (GVN) and its military
forces responded with unexpected unity and effectiveness,
giving evidence that the initiative has passed to the
Southern forces.
--- The U.S., while holding to its unilateral commitment to
continue withdrawing its -troops from Vietnam, responded to
the North Vietnamese action with an air offensive of
unprecedented magnitude and effectiveness, both against the
North's war-making capacity and against the North Vietnamese
invading troops in the South.
- More unexpectedly, it mined North Vietnamese harbors,
including Haiphong, severely restricting North Vietnam's main
source of supply of Soviet materiel.
--- Free world public opinion, which has evidenced substantial
support for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong stand,
experienced a major reversal,
--- While voicing their continued moral support, North Viet-
nam's major allies, the Soviet Union and Communist China,
in the middle of long-sought negotiations to normalize rela-
tiOnsiwith ttfQ U.S., were clearly dismayed by the misbegotten
North Vietnamese strategy, and pursued their own wider
national interest over and above Hanoi's.
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The supreme irony of it all is that in the above respects the
reckless North Vietnamese gamble has achieved exactly the opposite
of what their offensive was designed to achieve. The North Viet-
namese are sacrificing thousands of lives lost, a significant
portion of their economic and industrial base, and whatever support
they enjoyed in the world community in a fruitless effort to
achieve domination of the South. Yet it seems they would have been
just as close to their goal if they had followed the path of
negotiation instead of embarking on the uncertain course of seeking
a military victory.
Some North Vietnamese FictiOns
The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) has now made it unequivocally
clear that the conflict is not a matter of a purely South Vietnamese
civil war, a war of "national liberation," carried on against the
Government of South Vietnam by Viet Cong insurgents indigenous to
the South. A Blitzkrieg reminiscent of North Korea's invasion of
South Korea in 1950, it is plainly a cross-border invasion, launched
by North Vietnamese regular troops. This despite the fact that the
North Vietnamese leaders --- incredible as it may seem --- still
maintain that the NVA is not participating. (Hanoi refers to its
forces in the South simply as the "People's Liberation Forces.")
The fact is that North Vietnam committed 11 Divisions to the
invasion. Even pro-North Vietnamese supporters throughout the world
no longer are willing to maintain the fiction that the conflict is
a southern civil war.
Another fiction dissipated by the aggression is the assertion
that the conflict is designed to free SouthVietnam from U.S.
"imperialism." It is amply clear that, far from seeking to retain
a territorial hold in Vietnam, the U.S. has sought to withdraw
altogether from the area. It has reduced its armed forces from
over 500,000 to less than 50,000. This massive withdrawal of
troops, in accordance with an announced schedule, with the similarly
announced promise of complete withdrawal on release of U.S.
prisoners of war should have convinced any remaining doubters of
U.S. intentions.
Yet another fiction is the notion propagated by the North Viet-
namese that "the South Vietnamese population welcomes Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese liberation from the oppression of the Thieu
government in the South." But the southern population quite clearly
"voted with their feet" and fled their "liberators" by the tens
of thousands. Even the most critical observers on the scene could
not help but note that though the NVA temporarily gained a certain
amount of territory, they retained only a small fraction of the
population inhabiting that territory. The vast majority of the
civilian population elected to live with the imperfections of the
South Vietnamese government in preference to suffering the terrorism
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characteristic of the invading regime. Over 800,000 South Vietnamese
have fled from their "liberators."
Miscalculation of Allied Reaction
The GVN and U.S. response to the North Vietnamese aggression
evidently was totally miscalculated by-Hanoi's leaders, who in their
isolation and obsession with their own distorted view of reality,
underrated the will and capabilities-of-the-South Vietnamese govern-
ment forces as well as the determination of the U.S. government and
people not to permit,a forcible takeover of South Vietnam. After
some local initial retreats, the South Vietnamese forces, aided
only by U.S. air support, withstood the combinedstrength of the
NVA and the Viet Cong (weakened by the ill-fated 1968 Tet offensive
and subsequent attrition) equipped with the best of Soviet weapons,
and have taken the initiative to regain the territory lost in the
NVA's initial surprise assault.
The South Vietnamese government itself, an incipient democracy
with difficulties typical of many in the so-called Third World, is
admittedly beset by dissension among various groups. But the
significant fact is that the dissidents are able to express their
views in elected legislatures and are working to establish a better
form of government more responsive to the competing needs and desires
of the people. Moreover, the South Vietnamese government has
gained wider popular support than ever before in opposition to the
common enemy. Whatever the internal differences and the taper-
fectiOns of their government, the overwhelming majority of South
Vietnamese reject the grim prospect of being subjected to the
ruthless rule of the North, one of the most truly closed and
monolithic societies in the world. It is significant that when
the North Vietnamese threat was the greatest in the early phases
of the invasion, the people of South Vietnam were the most united.
While misreading the temper of their southern neighbors,
Hanoi's leaders made an equally serious miscalculationin consider-
ing the U.S. response. Misled by the.patent attempt of the U.S.
to withdraw from Vietnam and to make concessions in the interest
of an honorable, negotiated settlement, Hanoi's leadership thought
they could attack with relative impunity from U.S. retaliation.
They did not foresee that the U.S. government, strongly supported
by public opinion at home, would not abdicate its essential
responsibilities, and so were unprepared for the resumption of
massive bombings of the North on a scale greater and more effective
than ever before. These bombings are striking both military and
industrial targets which contribute to Hanoi's war-making capa-
bilities. At the same time, the accuracy of the laser-guided
"smart" bombs reduces the extent of the unavoidnble accidental
damage to non-military objects accompanying the bombing of military
targets. The allegations of the NVN and its supporters that U.S.
bombing is targetted at the dikes in North Vietnam are incorrect
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and cannot be taken seriously. If they were indeed a target, they
would long ago have been destroyed, given-the-new-effectiveness
and accuracy of the "smart" bombs.
The bombings plus the equally unexpected mining of the harbors,
which have supplied some 80% of North Vietnamese military needs will
-sObnet_or:later affect North Vietnamese offensive capabilities.
The ultimate outcome of the military struggle is still uncer-
tain. It is obvious that the North Vietnamese have failed thus
far to attain their maximum objective: .a military takeover of
the South or destruction of the GVN. It also seems more and more
certain that the South will succeed in its efforts to regain most
of the lost territories. What is clear is that the North Vietnamese
have paid an enormous cost in lives, in destroyed military equip-
ment, and in bomb damage to military and industrial installations
in the North for a tenuous hold on a small bit of South Vietnamese
territpry. As of the end of June, the best available estimate of
NVA casualties in those killed, wounded and taken prisoner, since
30 March of this year, ranges between 40,000 and 45,000. It is a
measure of the cynicism and moral bankruptcy of the North Vietnamese
leadership that they show every intention of going on sacrificing
human life and property apparently in total disregard of civilized
values, obsessed with their vision-of a mandate to rule over Indo-
china and beyond.
North Vietnam's Isolation in the World Community
North Vietnam's invasion of the South has gone far to isolate
it in the world community. The mass protest demonstrations of
the late 1960's by youth and other groups in the non-Communist
world have not been repeated now that it is clear Hanoi was
responsible for the escalation of a war that had been winding
down. Communist front groups have indeed tried to mobilize
non-Communists in order to match the demonstrations of the earlier
period, but obviously have struck no responsive chord among those
outside their own disciplined ranks. Indeed they appear confused
and working at cross purposes, engrossed in their own quarrels
over prestige, to the despair of North Vietnamese representatives
abroad whose exhortations to Camffunist-and other pro-North Viet-
namese front groups have been met with an unenthusiastic response.
The free world's disapproval of Hanoi's action is evident
from the statements of influential leaders and groups throughout
the world, and from the columns of the world's major newspapers
and journals.
The realization that North Vietnam is becoming increasingly
isolated in the international Communist-community as well has
tended to be obscured by the equivocal-verbiage commcm1y used in
international Communist communications and by the compulsion of
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Communist: countries to profess unity, if not unanimityof views.
But in the case of Moscow and Hanoi, actions speak louder than
words.
Although it may be true that the nature, and especially the
timing, of Hanoi's armored onslaught on the eve of the Moscow talks
was contrary to Moscow's wishes, it is-also true that without the
massive military aid the Soviet Union -has continually provided to
North Vietnam, the current offensive couldnot have been launched,
and the Soviet Union must-bear-a heavy responsibilityfor the North
Vietnamese escalation of the war. There also can be little doubt
that, despite their evident competition for influence with North
Vietnam, both the Soviet Union and Cahnunist China for many years
saw their ideological and national interest served by energetically
supporting the North Vietnamese effort to destroy South Vietnam
and eliminate the U.S. presence from Indochina.
However, now one cannot but conclude that Soviet and Chinese
priorities have changed. Each in its own national interest has
placed a higher priority on reaching an accommodation with the
U.S. than on supporting North Vietnamese war plans. Under these
circumstances, the North Vietnamese revival of the fighting and
their clamorous insistence on continued moral and material support
may well have become an embarrassment to the USSR and China.
One indication of the importance to Moscow of its larger
priorities and of its downgrading of the North Vietnamese problem
was the Soviet response to U.S. measures to counter the North
Vietnamese invasion. Moscow maintained-a-silence of some days
concerning the resumption of bombing and themining of Haiphong
harbor and when it did respond it did so-in mild terms, much to
the dismay of Hanoi.
The Sino-Soviet conflict has become a-matter of the deepest
concern to each of these protagonists? and this seems to be the
main reason for their proceeding-with-the-summit meetings with
the U.S. despite-North Vietnam's barely concealed denunciations.
The Soviet Union has other reasons as-well for normalizing
relations with the U.S. and its European allies. These reasons
center around the necessity to avoid-a nuclear war with the U.S.
and the Soviet need for Western trade and technology to rescue
the domestic economy, which has long been stagnating and is
reaching an impasse. Thus, for good reasons, the Soviet Union
has downgraded the importance of the North Vietnamese war effort,
in favor of its own more important objectives.
Some of the propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Hanoi
illustrate their differing views. On 21 May, the eve of
President Nixon's visit to Moscow, NhanTan, the principal Lao
Dong Party newspaper in Hanoi, harshly denounced "Communists
who set national interest above the common interests of the
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world revolution and serve national selfishness at the expense of
tWworld revolution." Moscow's response-to this kind of attack
appeared in its multilingual international journal New Times
(#22 of May 1972) in an article by Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of
the foreign affairs department of the SovietParty's Central
Committee:
"Soviet policy is a truly national policy determined by the
fundamental interests of the working people of our ' country, by the
interests of the entire nation in building communism. . . .
Socialist policy never derived its strength fromIprimitive,
stereotyped patterns, and least of all from imitation of devices
and methods employed by the class enemy. . . The experience of
past years has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that any
tendency to be guided by considerations of the moment (emotional
or other reasons), to confine oneself-to-the intereStS'Of.the
present while ignoring the long-term-perspectives, has never led
to anything good. . . ." (Emphasis added).
It may also be significant that the invasion was not launched
during the Peking summit, but rather some six weeks before Presi-
dent Nixon met with the Soviet leaders late in May. It was the
Soviet Union, as the mainstay of North Vietnam's war effort, which
had to be pressured against reaching agreement with the U.S., and
the North Vietnamese did their utmost, though in vein, to prevent
the success of the Moscow summit.
It seems quite evident that Hanoi and Moscow differ on how
the Vietnam problem should be solved. While both are technically
in agreement in their public insistence that the problem will be
solved at the Paris negotiating table, most observers have inter-
preted Moscow's statements as urging immediate negotiation and
cessation of the fighting, while Hanoi has given little sign that
it will stop the bloodshed.
The trend in the Communist world toward settling differences
by negotiation rather than by the North Vietnamese method of
armed aggression was dramatically illustrated by the joint
announcement by North and South Korea concerning their negotiations
to seek reunification of the two halves of the country and their
agreement to refrain from armed provocations. This effort to
settle differences peacefully was undertaken while South Korean
troops continue to share the burden of the military conflict in
Vietnam and highlights the extent of North Vietnamese isolation
in the Commnist community. Hanoi's refusal to abandon military
means to achieve its goals is a measure of the degree to which
they are removed from today's realities.
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The Obsessed North Vietnamese Leadership
Vietnam war protesters have tried to make conventional wisdom
of the supposition that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese effort
to destroy the South Vietnamese government is ehow a just cause,
a popular rising up of sentiment in behalf of a superior ideology
and morality. Whatever the origins of these sentiments, the
current aggression should strip away any remaining illusions about
the North Vietnamese leaders-. After years of iron-handed control
by the North Vietnamese leadership, during which all spirit of
dissent and all dissenting elements of the population were elimin-
ated, the leaders have been able to mobilize an army to fight for
a cause that only a benighted leadership-can-still believe in as
the self-appointed would-be dictators of a-Greater Indochina. What
the current North Vietnamese-attack-demonstrates is that the
leadership has now been willing to be identified with the very
creed of imperialistic aggression ofwhich they accuse the U.S.,
the GVN, and their allies. North Vietnamese actions have once
more been clearly revealed as based on a creed that can only be
described as chauvinistic imperialism,- in the truest sense of
this much misused expression.
For their part the South Vietnamese have sought nothing more
than to be left alone to work out their own form of government,
free from the threat of forcible takeover whether by southern
insurgents or by northern invaders armed by the Soviet Union and
Communist China, and U0S involvement has been limited to making
it possible for the South Vietnamese people to realize South
Vietnam's aim.
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Erm yogic Tr?Irs
4 .Art0 2972
South Vietnam;
Again the
Refugees
Are on
The Roads
eight years. The refugee count, how-
ever, did not include the millions of
South Vietnamese who had fled te the
cities or were living in ramshackle
camps and had long been off the
Government relief rolls. Most of these
people had been given the standard
Issue of rice, blankets, money and tin
roofing, and, officially, they were no
longer refugees.
By conservative estimates, more
than a quarter of the 27 million people
of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
have been uprooted at least once sinee
the United States intervened in the
Indochina struggle, and half of thein
still live somewhere other than the
plut,e 11.,..y call home\ Moil of
art not officially regarded as refugees.
The Governments ,of the three coun-
tries have done as much as they
intend to do for them. And though in
sonle cases that has meant no help
whatever, these war victims are
viewed officially not as refugees but
as people who have changed addresses.
Over the years in Indochina it has
come to be generally 'accepted that al-
lied bombs and artillery have been
major "refugee?gcnerating" factors.
The reason, of course, is that the Com-
munist guerrillas have sought to en-
tangle themselves with the village pop-
ulation. American or other allied
troops, for instance, would find them-
selves under fire from a supposedly
pro-Government village and Would re-
, Vitiate with bombing and artillery. The
ni?iiic killed or chased out during
SAIGON?"Three months ago," an
American official here said last week,
"we were virtually out of the refugee
business. The next thing We knen
there were refugees all over the Place."
By the weekend, Ameriean officiab
were estimating that nearly 800,00(
South Vietnamese had been driven
from their homes since the Nora
Vietnamese offensive began more than
two months ago.
Nobody knows exactly how- many
civilians have been killed and maimed
In this latest round of fighting. In.
formed estimates range from at leas;
20,000 to as many as 50,000 'wound&
and between 5,000 and 15,000 killed
In the months of calm that pre.
Ceded the North Vietnamese attack
the number of war victims beim-
assisted by the United States and thf
Sca?th Vietnamese Government had
4.0Irri 1.41 nnr? an thts Liturct louriq
the Communists Who bad started, the
firefight.
In the latest frontal attacks of the.
North Vietnamese, however, it has
been clear to victim and outsider
alike that it was Communist troops
and Communist firepower that genera
stud the new refugee wave, The greata
est concentration of refugees?by some'
calculations more than 400,000?has
been in Danang, the first available,
haven of safety in the path of the.
North Vietnamese advance in the
northern part of South Vietnam.
For most of the refugees there was
no time to ponder ideological ques-,
tions. They simply ran south because
the house-Wrecking shells and 'file
troops were corning from the north.
At first the weather was bad for fly=
log, end it Was a few days before' al;i
lied planes began striking back.
Initially the refugees jammed into;
schools, pagodas. churches and aban-
doned buildings in already overcrowd-,
ed Danang. Many felt the safest places
were in the heart of the city, and they)
resisted efforts to move them to more,
functional quarters on the outskirtS.)
By last vveek, however, the majority!
of the refugees were living in the for-
mer American military camps in the;
Danang area.
In recent days, as the fighting has
eased in intensity, the floodtide Of
refugees has slackened, But no one.be-
heves the current round of fighting i.
over. "And the minute it :beats up
again," said one American official,
lucre amrig +n hr. more refintees."
nower._timugh_it Was sa4OSEPH D. TREASTER
the action would
thns of allied fire
thus be Seen as vie-
JAPAN intim
29 May 1972
Ap
550,000 S. Vietnamese
Have Fled Into Camps
SAIGON (Kyodo-itellter)?
More than 550,000 people in
South Vietnam have fled into
"Government refugee camps
since the North Vietnamese be-
gan their current offensive in
the South on March 29, accord-
ing to Social Affairs Minister
'rran Nguon Phieu.
'- Speaking/in a television inter-
view Saturday night the minis-
ter said this figure did not in-
clude an estimated 200,000 to
300,000 more refugees believed to
be living 'outside the camps
either with friends or family.
The big majority of the refu-
gees came from the northern
military clistrict wnere the North
Vietnamese are in control of
Quang Tri Province bordering
North Vietnam and heavy fight-i
lag occurs daily around the ford
mer imperial capital of Hue a
little farther south.
pldeu put the number of refu-
gees from the five northern pro-
vinces at 330,000, those from the
second military district in the
heavily contested Central High-
lands at 122,000, those from the
third military district around
Saigon at 74,000 and those froth
the fourth military district In
the Meking Delta at 22,000.
They were distributed among
CPYRGHT
2rit uovernment cairips. The
Government was providing 500
grams of rice per day for adult4
and 200 grams for children at a
total cost of 25 million piastres
(S25,000) a day.
Phicu said the Government
planned to resettle the refugees
on some of the islands just off
the South Vietnamese coast In
the South China Sea.
He stressed that all those In-
VolVed should understand thati
this in no way meant that they
Would be held In detention but
was intended as a Move to pro-
tect them from possible Corn-'
.thunist shelling attack's.
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CPYRGHT
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1 MAY 1972
;"\F
,
' ?
FR Er,LA CF: photograph et.
Gerard Hebert of Montreal
who spent five days in the..
heseiged provincial Capital. of
An Lin, Witnessed.: 'heavy
fighting there and ?was
?
? wqmuleti timing one of the
I tank battles. Broes,Eht safety
out of the city. by helicopter,
i en April .18. he cabled...the
I followIngstorY: ' ?*1
, - v f..
AN LOC. APRIL 18 "The
first dead North Vietnamese
WASHINGTON STAR
30 May 1972
.WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP
North Vietnam Being
i
OvESE 2E49,70a'r
\t?
tank crewman I saw had 'with' iatrartOr.-7)peli-thielt iii?-?ehaln
been chained inside lila tank. 1Inks. . .
I was photographing, one of \ f had heard of this happen-
the tanks that bud been ainer with North Vletnamew
knocked out in tile middle! tank erewa in Laos laEit
of the town in the battle and year. Still. I was surprised.
thure Wt1:1 il. body outside i? 8?411 ViOnamose soldiers
LI e tank, apparently thatuf 1 tnehrie' nlehnlitilend ' t:Int hk o ue:Irritlie it"
, the tank commander. - ?
liennintandert were not.
$;
; ono captured North Viet..
.riSmese crew tiliCf told inter- .
rogatore he had been assured
before ' he entered ,Ate Lee ,
,
,that? the town was already i
lin- North Vietnamese hands.'
Down inside w.ere two _more
dettd? Yrotil "ie';'. direct
hit by .'ren lvf'N 'inti-tank
rocket: / saw something glint
in the darkness. I felt the
man's, ankle. It was: cliUnnd
to,,the .tasids of the ;:tank
11 That 'explains why Ltw ;
litanies' moved into town at an i
1
lietriygoing ' 1.,ace 1 with.,.. 144,1
'turrets open?e-, atiel;', theiit. ' oiro i
i imanders loolettik.' idly.... Eir tituf,i
1 ni . if: they OWned ' the Place: i
: 'South Vietnamese infantry- i
; Itmen couldn't . believe thinr
1
. eyes. I
' l Unsuspecting tanks got !el
w
1 !thin 50 yards. of the ,Soutii!
1 Vietnaniele .,polittioris before'
' the? IriftentrY:tAti Sititafil SW
,ing their M72's. I saw 11
tanks and seven of thorn
were knyeked out-4" . _ .,.,?.,
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
Something terrible is hap-
pening.
North Vietnam, a country of
some 20 million persons, is
being rapidly and completely
taken apart by the cumulative
effects of the mining of its
harbors, the shelling of its
coastline and the bombing of
a wide variety of targets
throughout the country.
Nothing remotely like this
has happened since the final
days of World War II, when
the air defense and fire-fight-
ing systems of Germany and
Japan collapsed, leaving them
virtually defenseless?and yet
what is happening to North
Vietnam is different in signi-
ficant ways from the situation
in those last days of World
War IL
The full impact of Opera-
tion Linebacker has not
dawned on the American pub-
lic, at least partially because
of the old argument on the
m Haar y effectiveness of
bombing and mining. Some
opponents of the bombing ar-
gue that it is not militarily
effective?and thus give the
impression that it Is not hay-
North Vietnam.
No one, however, can read'
the bomb damage reports?
now issued daily ? without
coming to the conclusion that
the attacks are having a
devastating effect and that,
while there is relatively little
direct loss of life, the impact
on the people will be severe.
The bombing campaign of
1965-68 was also devastating,
but there are major differ-
ences that will make the ef-
fects of the current campaign,
if continued for even a few
more weeks, much more
severe.
A major dif ference, of
course, is that the port of Hai-
phong remained open through-1
out the earlier campaign.
While major efforts were
made to block the movement
of supplies after they had
been unloaded, there always
was a significant amount that
did get through. Now, accord- ,
ing to reports from both sides,
the mining of the harbors has
totally cut off the movement
of supplies by sea.
In the earlier bombing cam-
paign, different classes of tar-
gets were hit over a period
,14
evawki-nna
N/7 ij
non ot tnece 'erects reirwe
major difficulties, there was
almost always time to make
repairs or find an alternate
way of doing things. In the
three weeks of the current
campaign, almost all these
classes of targets have been
attacked in rapid succession,
leaving litle time for repairs
or adaptation.
A major, and perhaps cru-
cial, difference is that the
enemy's air defense system,
or important parts of it, re-
mained off limits most of
, the time during the earlier
. bombing campaign. Pilots
were specifically forbidden to
j attack MIG airfields or cer-
tain air defense control points.
The North Vietnamese air de-
fense system not only sur-
vived, but improved remark-
ably, between 1965 and 1968,
making the Hanoi-Haiphong
area one of the most danger-
ous places in the history of
aerial warfare.
In the current campaign,
the air defense system was a
priority target. Naval gunfire
smashed virtually every radar
station along the coast. Large
_numbers of planes were used
in the eariy raids, to destroy
0 tir.Z.Viadrearif
Ing a ma iorA11431t0Veld3 rbFeK6 Ogkolt
dar. A major air defense cen-
ter on the erstOdeluts of Hanoi
Wthi 'loathed, American pilots
don't yet ?have a free ride'
over Hanoi, but the air de-
fense system already has
been badly degraded.
t1i ii nf lagnr. And
television-guided bombs
American bomber crews have
knocked out hundreds of
bridges and probably can
keep them down. This is a key
part of the strategy of keeping
supplies from reaching the
fighting front. But this dis-
ruption of the lines of com-
munication throughout the
country also is the part of the
bombing that will have the
gri?ljnr impart nn the.
DOntliation.
There is no way of telling
how long the bombing will go
on. President Nixon clearly
indicated his determination to.
retain the pressure on the
North Vietnamese when he
permitted continued heavy
raids on the Hanoi area while
he was in the Kremlin. On the
other side, the North Vietnam-j
ese have given every indica-
tion that they intend to go
ahead with their offensive in
the South, at least until the
issue is decided on the ground
at Hue.
It thus seems likely that the
bombing and the mining epee
-
Alton will go on for at leant
another month and that vir.
tuatly insures a human dis-
aster or historic proportiem
&ride_ people of North V;et?
00140001-9
4A
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CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
18 June 1972
LOCAL HANOI RADIO
EDITS AT TROUBLES
Home Broadcasts Denounce
Crime and indiscipline
South and denouncing Ameri-
can bombing raids against the
North. The home-service broad-
casts include calls for intensi-
fied security to combat crime.
bleckmarket operations and
sabotage and campaigns on the
war front to tighten military .
cotmier defeatism
and heighten morale.
'Bad, Rioting Elements'
If there has been open op.+
position to the war in North
Vietnam, this has not been re-
Zs 10 in i'lfw 10PR
. HONG KONG, June 14?!
'North Vietnam projects abroad
an image of a selfless, dedi-
cated people and a valiant, un-
beatable army, but in broad-
casts intended only for home
consumption there are hints of
problems and pressures among
the civilian population and the
members of the armed forces.
Translations provided by a
monitoring agency of broad-
casts on the home service of
the Hanoi radio since the Com-
munist offensive began in South
Vietnam rit the end of March
give a more balanced picture
of the nation at war than the
English-language broadeasts of
the same station or the trans-
rnis.sions of the official North
Vietnamese press agency.
The broadcasts intended for
abroad concentrate on hailing
Communist victories in the
ported ny Hanoi. nut man van,
the official publication of the
Communist party, reported in
April that the authorities were,
determined to "punish bad,
rioting elements." The asser-
tion was made without further
explanation in an editorial
broadcast in Vietnamese over
the Hanoi radio.
Early in May, the Govern-
ment promulgated "regulations
on the maintenance of security
and order and on running the
economy in wartime" which
called for stepped-up "guard-
ing and patrolling to detect and
prevent crime and bring de-
linquents to court for prosecu-
tion."
, The regulations, broadcast
over the home service of di the,
Hanoi radio, said that severe!
punishment would be meted'
out to persons "taking advan-
tage of war conditions to sabo-
tage? production and combat
gan activities Ar in attempts
against life or socialist prop-
erty."
They stipulated that it was
"strictly forbidden to engage
in speculation, illegal trade or.
the sale and purchase of food
ration cards or to . exploit,
evacuated people and agenda
responsible for their transpor-
tation, or to sell them food
products, grain and other staple
goods."
Warns of Famishment ?
The regulations also stated
that security perrennal e,ho
did good work would be re?.
warded while those who de.
sorted their posts or made use
of their positions to harm the
state and people would be,
punished.
Problem's of a military nature
have been aired in Quan Doi
Nhan Dan, the armed torces
publication. An article from
the paper broadcast over the
home service of the Hanoi
radio on May 30 said that war
required that the "army make
outstanding efforts and move
forward rapidly. It said that in
order to generate a "revolu-
tionary impetus" among mem-
bers of the armed forces, po-
litical education must be
stepped up.
On June 4 a front-page edi-
torial in Quan Doi Nhan Dan
called for strict dicipline both
on the front line and in the
rear. According to excerpts
broadcast by the home service
of the Hanoi radio, it stated
that discipline must be en-
forced "conscientiously and
strictly" and brought into a
"new, better pattern in order
to suit a unit's present combat
and living conditions."
Stresses Security
The editorial stated "It Is
necessary to execute strictly
all orders issued by -higher
, echelons, to overcome resolute-
ly all difficulties and not re-
treat because of any fierce
challenge.--
The.need for security against
possible enemy landings in the
North has been stressed in a
number of broadcasts over, the
home service of the Hanoi
radio. One, taken from a
Nhan Dan editorial, com-
mended security forces in in-
land coastal and border areas
for having spotted and cap-
tured or nnnihilated "many
groups of enemy spies, com-
mandos and armed scouts." It
warned that the United States
might "brazenly launch surprise
raids and attacks against a
number of areas in the North."
A few days later Quan Doi
Nhan Dan carried an editorial
that said, that United States
imperialism had "sent armed
agents to land' in secret." It
called for the protection of ter-
ritorial waters and the smash-
ing of "all enemy sabotage ac.
1 tivities."
ORIC TIMES
6 July 1972
Enemy Is Facing Floods,
U.S. Says Denyinz Role
WASHINGTON, July 5?State fered its worst flooding in
Department officials said todayl
that there was a strong liikeli-
hood North Vietnam would be
flooded later this summer, but
they said North Vietnam's dike
system would be responsible
r, ,her than American bombing
raids.
In separate interviews, re-
sponsible State Department of-
ficers did not deny that some
bombs were falling on the
dikes. But they again insisted
that there has been no syste-
matic targeting of the dike sys-
tem, which runs throughout the
Red River basin.
In recent weeks North Viet-
nam repeatedly accused the
United States of intentionally
bombing the dikes to cause
flooding Allitriag,thp,,antriAqp
season, *Who h$AvjWatI
Last summer, when there
was no American bombing ;If
years. Administration experts
say the dikes were heavily.
damaged by those floods, and
they back up their views with
citations from the Hanoi press,
A State Department senior
official showed a translation of
an article that appeared in the
June 20 issue of a Hanoi news-
paper, Hanoi Moi. Written by
Tran Duy Hung, chairman of
the Hanoi Administrative Corn-
anittee, the article said: In
some places, the repair of the
dike portions that were dam-
aged by torrential rains in 1971
has not yet met technical re-
quirements."
"A number of thin and weak-
ental dikes which are probably
full of termite colonies and,
holes have not been detectedi
for repair," it said.
leasetrt998109$02emS
individual and locality must ac-
tively take part in the current
dike-building operation, because
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
dtnere is not mud' time bekae
the torrential rain season."
"Repair methods must be
firmly grasped in case the
dikes are eroded, eaten away,
broken through or washed over
by water," it said. "We must
organize many dike repair ex-
ercises; including cases in
which the dikes are attacked
by the enemy."
The article -also accused what
it called "the warlike Nixon
clique" as having destroyed
parts of the dike system by
bombing.
The State Department offi-
dals interviewed said that in
ir
view of the heavy a campaign
against North Vietnam, acci-
dental bombing of the dikes
could not be ruled out.
speed, and the third, wlica
to-ground missiles (lire, ?
against North Vietnamce,a
,become "undirected" a 'len the
'radar is shut off.,
I Administration f.xperts,
'studying the over-all situaticyt
jin North Vietnam, have co'-
' eluded that there is "a Itirier
:than normal probability" Iiiat
floods similar to last ye;.,r s may
strike next month.
Because North Vietnam has
charged repeatedly that the
dikes have been de-
liberately, the Ad; istration
has become sensiti% to the
possibility that wort leion
would blame the Unite. 'es.
for any flooding that ,,s.'
Therefore, the State Dc:.rti
ment has been eager to peeil?
cize any internal evidence, suc
One official said that such
as the Hanoi Moi article, that
bombing could take place under
supports, even indirectly, the
at least three circumstances.
the first, when North Viet-
namese antiaircraft guns are.
situated at or near dikes. And,
As g"
?
gaged in aerial combat, un-i
inad their ordnance to gain'
American contention that flood-
ing may occur for reasons un-
connected with the bombing.
' President Nixon and AdminrA molissmen have regu-
a t I ilietrthat the dikes are
targets for destruction.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT.
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WASHINGTON STAR
31 May 1972
Hanoi's Silence on Surn it
Reveals Fears on S 0
By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer
11tve l.mbuil to opc.,11 OR
other secret Soviet mission to
Hanoi.
One led by a Soviet Commu-
nist party secretary, Konstan-
tin Katushev, went to Hanoi
after Henry A. Kissinger's
April visit to Moscow. Al-
though details have never
came out, it seems to have
been an abortive Soviet at-
tempt to get Hanoi to negoti-
ate.
Now, the East European
sources are speculating on an-
other mission to try to reas-
sure Hanoi that the Soviet Un-
ion did not sell them out in
Moscow talks with Nixon.
A simithr visit was reported-
ly paid to Hanoi by Premier
Chou En-lai shortly after Nix-
on was in China last Febrttary.
Hanoi criticized the Nixon-
Chou talks in indirect hut very
strong terms.
Some reports say Chou only
met North Vietnamese leaders
in southern China, rather than
going to Hanoi. But it seems
certain that he spoke with
them.
Since then, however, China
has been noticeably cool to-
ward the current North Viet-
namese offensive against
South Vietnam.
Hanoi has hold its tongue on
the Moscow talks so far, with
one possible exception.
Broadcast Cited
The Associated Press said
May 23 it had picked up a
Hanoi broadcast calling Nix-
on's trip to Moscow an "at-
tempt to undermine the soli-
darity of those who support
the Vietnamese."
U.S. government rnonitors
_
?)SAIGON ? The slowness of
North Vietnam to comment on
President Nixon's Moscow
talks reveals Hanors fear that .
it can no longer expect effec-
tive support from the Soviet
Union.
The fear has been made
mere real by what Moscow
has said recently, and what it
has failed to do.
During Nixon's visit to the
Soviet Union, the Kremlin
leadership kept the Vietnam
issue very cool and secondary
in public comments.
? The Soviet statement Of sup-
port for Hanoi in the final
communique was considered
by Communist affairs analysts
here to be perfunctory.
Moscow radio broadcasts in
Vietnamese to Vietnam for the
past week have been empha-
sizing the need to negotiate an
end to the war rather than
keep fighting.
These indications of attitude
have been matched by Mos-
cow's failure thus far to do
anything about trying to get
supplies through the U.S.
mines off the North Vietnam-
ese coast.
Neither has China, Hanoi's
other main source of supplies,
done anything to try to over-
come the U.S. military actions
sire May 8.
And Peking, like Hanoi, has
ben slow to comment on the
Nixon visit to Moscow. It was
silent on the visit's implica-
tions for Vietnam.
In places like Paris and Lon-
den, East European sources
said they had nut hedid thee
A possible indirect comment
by the North Vietnamese mili-
tary newsp ape r, People's
Army, said true Communists
do not place national interests
above help to the world revolu-
tion.
Moscow has indicated that it
is sensitive to this kind of crit-
icism. It has tried to head it
off by arguing that its policies
have not changed.
A Vietnemese -language
broadcast from Moscow on
Thursday?the day after Nixon
and Communist party chief
Leonid I. Buettner, had their
song evening talk about Viet-
nam?had a very defensive
tone on this.
It said Soviet. policy "is con-
sistent with the fundamental
interests of the U.S.S.R., world
socialism and the national lib-
, era tion movement."
4 Conditions for "the anti-
i '
mperialist struggle of various'
nations depends to a great
measure," the broadcast
argued, on the satisfactory
settlement by the big powers
of major problems like nu-
clear disarmament ad Euro-
pean security.
The Soviet Union is support-
ing and aiding "the heroic,
. Vietnamese people," whose
;victories are pnrtly a result of
that "enormous support of the
U.S.S.R.," it said.
But it added that "the war
of aggression in Vietnam can
be ended only through negotia-
tions." Moscow supports "the
legitimate proposals of the
Vietnamese patriotic fighters"
for negotiations,
CPYRGHT
, Another Mosenw -broadcast
in Vietnamese the same day
Isaid "practical experience
clearly shows that the Viet-?:
Inarn problem cannot be solved' ?
iby military means."
Accent f.,n Talks
Both broadcasts seemed to
be an indirect way of saying -
North Vietnam must negotiate;
rather than simply expect ?
yid help for continuing the',
waTin view of the present in
ternational situation, the unity
of thought of all Socialist. coun-
tries has an especially impore,
tent meaning," for Vietnam,
the first broadcast said.
Comtnunist effairs analysts':
felt this qualification, making
clear that unity is of thought
rather than of action,- was par7,
ticularly significant.
Both this broadcast and the.
joint communique on Nixon's. ?
visit downgraded Vietnam to
the. status of just another
world problem being viewed,.
from Moscow along with the'
Middle East and others.
Hanoi would prefer to have'.
its struggle be given top prior-
ity in Communist thinking. ? '.
The NorlhVietnamese -
might also be apprehensive
about the basic principles of. .
relations signed Monday by,
Nixon and Communist party,
chief Leonid Brezlinev.
It said the two superpowers-
"will do their utmost to avoid
militnry confrontations."
With the United States de.,
termined to maintain Ith naval:
and aerial strength around: ,
North Vietnam, this pointed to:..
a lack of intention by the Sovle. ?
et Uaion to interfere.
! The principles niso talked
about "the recognition of the
security interests" of enclte
other. While primarily direct.,
ed to direct nuclear threats,
this could be read in Hanoi as
signifying Soviet acceptance of. !
tne American rote in V/CLTIOMt.
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CPYRGHT
14)11711111(1 EVallS and Ro'bert, Novak
WASITIMOIT POST Moscow4-Ia no.1 Schism
11i Jn )972
CPYRGHT
EVIDENCE of a deeply
significant. schism between
Hahn' anti Moscow has now
become inesenpable in fra'.?<
;
no's vituperative outpour-
-a ings against the Kremlin for
consort i lig with President
Non.?'this Nunther One
gruel, 'dioliard thug of the
world," in the words of a
senior North Vietnamese
commentator writing in the
June ;1 issue of the party
newspaper, Nhatf Dan.
. A !though lin noi's fury
against the Soviet Union is
pnrtially cloaked in innuen,
dos and .subtleties, there is
no mistaking its meaning.
by inviting Mr. Nixon to
Moscow, particularly after
',Soviet , shipments of war
? supplies were blocked by ?
the mining of North Viet-
nam's, harbors, the Kremlin.
Is playing the U.S. game of
splitting the world Corn-
Mudst movement.
Thus, on May 21, the day
:before Mr. Nixon arrived in
Moscow, the North Vietnam-
ese army oewspaper
charged that "wherever ne
sets foot, he carries out
counterrevolutionary acts."
By permitting the President
to "set foot" in aloscow, in
short, the Kremlin was an
accessory before the, fact in
one of the most heinous
crimes of communism,
counterrevolutionary activ-?
ity.
Developing the charge of:
counterrevolution4 the IVIay
21 polemic accused the So-
viet Union of putting its
own "naaional interests".
?.over those of the world rev-
olution iti (i.e following
thinly veiled doctrinal ser-
mon:
"Communists always con-
.sider the revolution of each
nation an inseparable part
of the world revolution.
They never act .national in-
terests against the interests
of the world revolution nor
place private national inter-
'ests above the common in-
terests of the world revolu-
tion, much less serve their'
own national selfishness."
? The only way to deal With
Mr. Nixon's latest offensive
In Vietnam is by "a relent.;
less attack against the U.S.
imperialists."
But what, did the Soviet
Union do? Hanoi hurls- the .
.accusation ' in Polemical
terms: ,.
"By ignoring the tolerat-
ing , the U.S. imperialists'
crimes, one cannot repel'
their aggressiOn. By showing
weakness, one cannot pun-
ish their aggreasivenest." .
ADDING INSULT to in-
jury, another nrticle In the
tightly controlled North Via
?
etnanlese' party newspaper ?, terests of world socialism
bonsted that although the (communism)."
Reminding Hanoi that ?it
aaVietnameso people have' ? ?
?be
Owes much to the "enorv en fighting "for thousands
Mous stipport" of the Soviet'
? : of yettM" they ''do not begUnion in the' 10-year wnii
? oi pcace . ind security 6 '
..against the South,, Radio
their enemies. The implien-...
. Moscow sang the praises a.
tion by 'inviting President .
the Vietnamese Communista.j
Nixon to Moscow, the Soviet , 'but added a pointed warn-
Union became a suPplicant. . lug: "The war of, a ggreSsiOri '
Nowhere in these vellede. in Vietnam can be ended:.
attacks against the Russians ., only through negoti a tithis
did the North Vietnamese . . . practical experience
publish the facts concerning ' clearly shows that the Viet-
Mr. Nixon's summit. trip to ' nam problem cannot be.
Moscow or 'discuss the solved by military means."
agreements- that emerged. More pointedly, a lengthy'
But the Russians them- May 26 article In New:
selves in a ?cotinterattack ' .Times, signed by a deputy
aired to North Vietnam over chief in the Central Cont.!
the Soviet overseas radio, at , mittee's foreigh Affairs De-'1
tempted. to 'put the' Nixon ? . partment, strongly defended -
visit in perspective and . the Kremlin's refusal to?
blunt the ariti-Soviet over "mike a military response to
tones of Hanoi's Propagaii. '?. the U.S. blockade of North
da. ' . . . . 'i ' Vietnam. . . . ' ?F,
bit May 25, in the middle The ? strength ' of 'Interns-7
of the Moscow ..suinmit, tional tommunism, . New.-:
Radio Moscow . invoked Times said, "has never lain,
"Leninist principles" in de- tri primitiveness and sic co-'
tense of the Kremlin's stra- type nor in an identical rep,.
tegic decision to weleofne .. etition of . the inelloOn
Mr. Nixon despite escalation (armed force) used by 'h 1
of the Vietnam war. class enemy." In an or, a ee-t
. "Peaceful coexistence" dented rebuke, the ail,.
with nations of different pa-, atta6ced ilanoi's "Inne7uri .
laical systems, the broad-. and extremely arbita, a
cast in Vietnamese stated, is , terrn?etation" ' of ? laif--.. ow's
' not only essential to prevent, supposed duty in the ;oaf, ot
? world war but also ''?in coin- , the Nixon-imposed bloei 1de ?
Plete conformity with the in-
CPYRGHT KEW 'MC TIMES
20 June 1972
SOVIET INDICATES
COOLNESS IN HANOI
Hints at Differences Over
improved Ties With U.S.
By HEDRICK SMITH
NIKOlal V. Foogorny.
The tenor of these reports,
in Tass, the Soviet press agen-
cy, and Izvestia, the Govern-
ment newspaper, routinely re-
affirming solidarity and calling
for negotiations, sharply under-
scored how sharply Mr. Pod-
gorny had toned Down Soviet
pledges of support for Hanoi
and criticism of the United
States hi comparison with his
last trip to North Vietnam in
October.
At that time he declared that
Moscow would "resolutely sun-
gorney was reporteo to have
pledged that the Soviet Union
would "continue to render all
the necessary assistance" to
the Vetnamese struggle against
"imperialist aggression" and
sincerely wished them "fresh
6uccesses."
Frankness, Not Unanimity
There was no mention of
unanimity. Instead, there was
a reference to the "comradely
frankness" of the talks, a nor-
mal euphemism for disagree-
ments. The absence of a joint
dais wno normany
top Soviet Leader', wr!rf._ rt-?
mier Pham Van
Defense Minister Vo
Giap. Their ahsenef2 ccm;(i ;ilso
have signaled y arty
strong personal OV o
Moscow's willingn: to :11ay
host to Mr. Nixon ? r
respond to his mina-,
hong harbor with tom. ',en.
The Soviet press gave .
dication whether, as .
sources had said he would. -
Podgorny had tried to perso,,...,a
port' the Vietnamese against
MOSCOW, June 19?The 50- the United States "until full
viet press today provided indi- victory" with aid on three
cations of unresolved Soviet- levels?military, political and
North Vietnamese differences diplomatic. A joint statement
over Mokc
tions air" altakaettaaREtaq% VtiO9ititmelY: d
its first reports on the special By contrast, during his visit
mission to Hanoi of President from June 15 to 18, Mr. Pod-
statement was also seen as an''FI.,-,
indication of continuing strains. in Indochina to open the wa3
No specific mention was for a resumption of peace nego
made of military air and, unlike tiations.
last fall; no senior military fig- The Soviet reports today
. lar el repeated over the Hano
Aungtsw0tfotUdikii5Soriotiebostes the two sides a:
R
Missing from the group ar joining in a demand that Wash
- senior North Vietnamese off i- Ington "resume constructivt
tlaks in Paris" and end immedi-
ately all air attacks on North
Vietnam and Alismicived
ports. But th-eta- 'Was no refer-
ence to remarks attributed to
President Podgorny in press re-
ports from India that the Viet-
nein negotiations in Paris would
resume soon.
Briefing Isn't Mentioned
The Soviet reports did not
touch on what was widely pre-
sumed to have been Mr. Pod-
gorny's primary mission ? to
brief the North Vietnamese
leaders on the results of the
meetings with President Nixon
in Moscow last month and to
patch up differences stemming
from Moscow's decision to go
through with the summit meet-
ing.
0414401)04044974
North Vietnamese Army news-
paper accused the Kremlin of
having showed weakness to-
ward the American President
and of having put dts own "na-
tional interests against the in-
terests of the world revolution."
The charges did not mention
Moscow by name but it was
clearly the target.
Five days later, on May 26,
Novoye Vremya, a Communist
party weekly on international
affairs, carried a sharply word-
ed and unusually explicit rebut-
tal written by Vadim V. Zagia-
din, deputy chief of the Central
Committee's department for re-
1, tions with other Communist here.
CiggiR79411 94A0002 gay4 tdrf at the United
c
:ow was shirking its socialist resume the work of the Paris
conference on Vietnam each
s's
i seriously and
duty. It argued for proceeding
with the summit meeting in the
Interest of major achievements,
such as an agreement to limit
arms, through the policy of
peaceful coexistence, Commu-
nist terminology for better re-
latioas with the West.
Hanoi Demands Talks
PARIS, June 19 (Reuters)?
North Vietnam today followed
up President Podgorny's pre-
diction of a speedy resumption
of the Paris peace talks by de-
manding that the United Stales
return to the negotiating table
Thursday as usual," the North
Vietnamese delegation said in,
a statement.
HANOI, North Vietnam, June
10 (Agence France-Presse)
The North Vietnamese Governr
mcnt today broke its silence'
Over the visit by President Po&
gorny, Issuing a laconic comr
muniqud stating that he haq
been on a "nonofficial" mist
&on.
The clear indication was that
he had not met Premier Phan?
Van Dong.
CBRBTIAN SCIENCE MONITCEt
21 June 1972
?1Pl0ntatic
' ?
10ACK ?
Hanoi is in a state os mplorna Lk. alloaa a,
duced by the visit of presidential adviser
Henry Kissinger to Peking and the visit of\
Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny tod
North Vietnam.
Perhaps the clearest indication of this
Is the change in the plans of Hanoi's chiefs
negotiator, Le Due Tho, who left Paris for
a leisurely visit to Bulgaria, only to cut it
short before its announced duration had
expired, and to rush home for consultations
amid signs of growing friction with its allies.
When passing through Moscow, he was
met by a party official of such low rank
as to suggest that the Kremlin was being
deliberately, offensive. In Peking, the Chi-
nese leaders took advantage of this to score
a point over the Russians by arranging
a "very cordial" meeting for him with Chou
En-lai.
But the ? continuing restraint in Peking's
public utterances about the war, after reg-
istering its formal protest that the bombing
was getting too close to China's borders,
makes it clear that the Chinese leaders, too, :
favor a compromise settlement.
Podgorny's announcement after his visit
to Hanoi that the Paris talks would be re-
sumed "soon" meant that he had prevailed
upon the North Vietnamese leaders to make
the concessions that would make the re-
sumption possible.
They made the concessions unwillingly, as
is indicated by the evidence of disagree-
ment between them and Podgorny in the of-
ficial communiqu?n his visit. This means
that he had managed to mobilize the doves
ne crlances are, tnereiore, Inat more
rapid pru ;Tess will now be made toward a
peace set lement. The constellation of forces
suggest :hat the progress will be rapid
enough t bring peace to Vietnam before
the American general elections in No-
vember.
It is th combination.of the three separate
forces for peace, in Moscow, Peking, and in
Hanoi in .elf, that makes this outcome like-
Tho ckocy cr,"cp,i in Hanni hv what it
sees the "betrayal" of its interests by
both .loscow and Peking has obviously
weakeaed the hawks and made it possible
for the doves to begin moving toward a set-
tlernelit.
The bitterness with which the Hanoi press
has d anounced, almost openly, the Nixon
visits to ootn reking and u, Moat.a,w ha.
now Cven way to a pained silence, which
sugge,-ts that it sees little point in resisting
its alles as well as the United States. The
almost transparent hint in the Hanoi press
after the 'Moscow summit, that the "major
powers" were ganging up on smaller coun-
tries iike Vietnam, is now being translated
into the hard language of politics.
What it all amounts to is that Hanoi's
"big brothers" are, in spite of their pro-
testations to the contrary, trying to impose
a settlement. The signs of this were evident
at the beginning of the year, when Hanoi
first complained that the .big powers were
trying to "bully" the small countries. This
coincided with the announcement that the
North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow'
had a "frank" exchange of views with Mr.
Kosygin, the Premier, which indicated that
Moscow had begun putting really heavy
Pressure on Hanoi.
Few people in the West were prepared
to accept at that time the evidence suggest.
ing that this pressure, combined with pres-
sure from Peking, was real enough or could
prove powerful enough to make a difference.
Some skeptics still stick to this view. But
the Podgorny and Kissinger trips are the
culmination, not the beginning, of the Nixon
grand design to end the war in Vietnam
by summitry in Peking and in Moscow.
Hanoi is still capable of a show of force,
In the North Vietnamese leadership to do
partictilarly in the Saigon area, but the what the the Soviet Union wanted, and that he
pose of any such operation would be to
has lerA Fitine 4:Q46 I isInCdr4:01
peace fact-Ai-than-he found Zni isiffiVIrthew p9/09i021gtGIAADP79401*9414090200
negotiations.
CPYRGHT
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NEW YORK TINES
1. July 1972
HIGH-LEVEL TALKS
'llall BY 2 KOREAS
ON REUNIFICATION
.North and South Agree to,
Avoid Armed Incidents and
Seek 6etter Relations
It Th 4 Arvid/lied rte.
WM., south Korea, Tues.
'day, July 4?North and South
Korea have held top-level meet-
ings in Pyongyang and in Seoul
to discuss problems concerning
Improving relations and terri-
torial reunification of the 'coun-
try, South Korea announced to-
day. -
They agreed, among other
things, to refrain mutually from
armed provocations and to in-
stall a hot line between Seoul
and Pyongyang 'in order to
prevent the outbreak of unex-
pected military incidents," an
announcement said.
The announcement was made
simultaneously in Seoul and
Pyongyang, the North Korean
Capital,
Tension Ratted
Sped/lit? The Nem. 'York Times
WASHINGTON, July 3?The
announcement of new contacts
between the two Koreas was
preceded by months of reduced
tensinn
NEW YORK TIMES
[nary negotiations between the
Red Cross societies of North
and South were carried on suc-
cessfully.
The Red Cross talks, officially
aimed at humanitarian goals of
establishing contacts between
members of divided- families,
and eventually at . reuniting
them, have had important po-
litical implications. Each side
has used the 10 months of Red
Cross talks at Panmunjom as a
means of sounding out the
other's intentions. ?
The two sides at the Panmun-
jom sessions, which began last
August, have agreed on an
agenda for substantive negotia-
tions, which are to he held
alternately in Seoul and Pyong-
yang. ,
. In recent months, Premier
Kim Il Sung of North Korea has
voiced an interest in contacts
not only with South Korea but
with Japan and the United
States, seemingly looking to-
"Ward an end Of his country'S.
long, self-imposed isolation.
; He has given interviews to
'Japanese and American corre-
spondents, and said last month
that .he would be willing to
meet with President Park Chung
Hee of South Korea to discuss
Issues.
1 Concern Over Allies Noted
Many . Western diplomats
have speculated that the deci-
sion to begin contacts was in-
spired in both Seoul and Pyong-
yang by parallel concern that
their principal allies?the United
States in South Korea's case,
and China and the Soviet Union
in North Korea's?were heading
,toward a period of conciliation
in which they would be un-
willing to go to war in support
of the interests of either Korean
state.
President Nixon's trip to Pek-
ing last February came as a
shock to North Korea and was
believed to have heavily influ-
enced Premier Kim to enlarge
his country's foreign contacts.
The South Koreans, with their
economy expanding and their
political situation relatively'
stabilized, had already begun a
policy of seeking contacts with
East European Communist na-
tions.
Tensions between the two
Koreas have been high for most
of the post-Korean war period,
and have been marked by prop-
aganda exchanges of, extreme
,Invective. In the peak year,
11968, there were hundreds of
casualties from clashes along'
the dimilitarized zone and in'
coastal areas where northerni
agents were infiltrated.
But despite -the tensions, both
sides have always called for re-
unification as a primary na-
tional goal. The South Koreans
have generally insisted on ful-
dillment of the United Nations
Genefal Assembly call for free
elections in both North and
South and on formal renuncia-
tion by Pyongyang of any use
of force to achieve unification.
? Federation Is Held Possible
But recently, South Korean
officials have said that they
could envision some kind of
federation after a long period
of gradual improvement in re-
lations. President Park has said
that discussion of political
problems such as unification
should come at the end of a
three-stage program: First,
agreement on humanitarian
questions involving divided
families, then nonpolitical mat-
ters such as trade and commu-
nication, and finally political
questions,
That ,ifiline appears ,noti
much .differrnt from rreent
stiggeMions made in the N,orth
Korean press calling tot grad-
ual improvement in thn n*(15.
phere. to he followed by a con-
federation of the two Koreas
in which each side would itimin.
?tain its own form of govern.
Among important issues to
he resolved would be the status
of the 40,000 American 0i:tops
based in South Korea, ti,hder
the flag of the United .Nailons
Command, and South Karen's
defense relationship with the
United States. In the past, Pre
-
mice Kim said that withdrawal
of American troops was a pre-
condition for better North-
South relations, but more re-
cently in interviews he has
been less demanding.
First Direct Negotiations
The Red Cross talks aroused
considerable international In-
terest when they began last
summer because they marked
the first time representatives
of the two Koreas had met in
-their own country on bilateral
matters since the Korean war,
which ended in 1953.
Both Governments have been
under some pressure to im-
prove contacts and respond to
,the strong pull of Korean na-
tionalism, which has remained
'strong despite 35 years of Jap-
anese occupation, from 010 to
1945, and 27 years of division
following ? the end of World
War H.
The South Korean 'enders
have argued that this effo,
eseotiate might lort!,.en the
totalitariaram ,)f North
'sorea. The North Koran lead-
. ? s by holding out tile hope of
yntual unification, may feel
it this could produce a
()setting of Sul' I tiils with
CT United States ait:i Japan.
5 July 1972 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
Text of the Joint Korean Communique
SEOUL, South Korea, Tues-
day, July 4 (Re. uters)?Pol-
lowing is the text of a joint
North and South Korean corn-
muniqud made public simul-
taneously in Seoul and
Pyongyang today, as issued
in an official South Korean
Government translation:
Recently there were talks
held both in Pyongyang and
Seoul to discuss problems of
Improving SoutWbstnitaVed
tions and unifying'-t-he di-
vided fatherland.
Director Lee nu itaic or tne
Central Intelligence Agency
of Seoul visited Pyongyang
from 2 to 5 May, 1972, to
hold talks with Director Kim
Yong Ju of the Organization
and Guidance Department of
Pyongyang. Second Vice Pre-
mier Pak Sung Chul, acting
on behalf of Director Kim
Yong Ju, also visited Seoul
from 29 May to 1 June, 1972,
to hold further talks with di-
FofjigrIalt ealf9?9/0W02
o common esire
achieve peaceful unification
of the fatherland as early as
possible, the two sloes in
these talks had frank and
open-hearted exchanges of
views, and made great prog-
ress in promoting mutual un-
derstanding.
In the course of the talks,
the two sides, in an effort to
remove the misunderstand-
ings and mistrust and miti-
gate increased tensions that
have arisen between the
reached full agreement on
the following points;
[1]
The two sides have tie:
to the following principi
for unification of the fathei-
land:
First, unification shall be
achieved through independ-
ent Korean efforts without
-being-ettbfeet-te-ewtere
position or interference.
Second, unification shall be
achieved through peaceful
South and the North as a re- means, and not through the
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transcending differences in
ideas, ideologies and systems.
[2]
In order to ease tensions
and foster an atmosphere of
mutual trust between the
South and the North, the two
sides have agreed not to slan-
der or defame each other,
not to undertake armed prov-
ocations whether on a large
or small scale, and to take
positive measures to prevent
inadvertent military inci-
dents.
[3]
The two'isides, in order to
restore severed national ties,
promote mutual understand-
ing and to expedite independ-
ent peaceful unification, have
agreed to carry out various
exchanges in many fields.
[4]
The two sides have agreed
to cooperate positively with
each other to seek early sue-
cesS of the South-North Red
Cross talks, which are under
way with the fervent expec-
tations of the entire people.
[5]
The two sides, in order to
prevent the outbreak of un-
expected military incidents
and to deal directly, prompt-
ly and accurately with prob-
lems arising between the
South and the North, have
agreed to Install a direct tele-
phone line between Seoul
and Pyongyang.
[6]
The two sides, in order to
implement the aforemen-
tioned agreed items, solve
various problems existing be-
tween the South and the
North/ and to settle the uni-
fication problems on the
basis of the agreed prin-
ciples for unification of the
fatherland, have agreed to
establish and operate a
South - North coordinating
committee co-chaired by
rector Lc Ru Ralc and Di-
rector Kim Yong Ju.
[7]
The two sides, firmly eon.
vinced that the aforemen.
tioned agreed items corre.
spond with the common as.
pirations of the entire peo-
ple, who are anxious to see
an early unification of the
fatherland, hereby solemnly
pledge before the entire ICo-
rean people that they will
faithfully carry out these
agreed items, upholding the
desires of their respective
superiors.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 July 1972 "
Pikis up the pieces in Korea
The sudden and dramatic agreement be-
tween the two Koreas this week earnestly
to seek reunification, after 27 years
of total separation marked by sporadic
fighting and steady verbal abuse, is as wel-
come as it is important for history present
and history future.
It is hardly coincidental that the over-
tures between the two capitals of Seoul
and Pyongyang followed close behind
President Nixon's visits to Peking and
Moscow. In the family of nations, as in
the families of men, strong and positive
examples set by the higher levels in the
hierarchy influence those at the lower
levels to act positively.
The agreement between the two major
Communist capitals of the world and
Washington to look beyond differences in
social, political, and economic systems,
and to put ideologies to one side, is re-
flected in the agreement between Seoul
and Pyongyang. Thus the establishment
of a hot line between the two Korean
capitals to prevent any military flareups
along their joint border. Thus their set-
ting up of a joint coordinating committee
to "unify the fatherland." Thus their dec-
laration of intent to reunify on a national
basis in such a way as :to transcend
differences "in ideas, ideologies, and
systems."
It will not be easy. Those ideological
differences are great. The virulence of
propaganda. hurled against each other
during 27 years of division has left scars,'
bitterness, and suspicion. And there are
practical problems to be 'compromised. Hanoi to Saigon is shorter than via Paris,
South Korea hipiCtitffirittei3RinkReiggfire 1 gefinitt02 MwR40 Prialt1194A0002%
vised elections in both countries to elect
an all-Korean Legislature. North Korea,
with a population of 13 million against its
southern neighbor's 31 million, wants to
cut both sides' armed forces to 100,000
men each, then follow with a confedera-
tion, in which each side would retain its
own government and its own social and
political systems. It will take time, pa-
tience and 'determination to achieve the
necessary compromise. -
In favor of success is the deep desire of
the Korean people to be reunited. This is
underscored by the continuing effort of
the International Red Cross to arrange for
reuniting divided families, an effort that
has gone on for years without results. If
that work begins to bear fruit, as now
seems more likely than ever, the opening
up of communications and eventually a
flow of people across the long-sealed bor-
der would start a process difficult for
either government to halt.
The new moves toward reunification
have a world significance beyond the
Korean peninsula. The point will not be
missed in the two Vietnamese capitals
that the desire of their respective big
power patrons for a? relaxation in world
tensions only begins at the top interna-
tional level. It extends down to their own.
It is to be hoped that North and South
Vietnam, recognizing their rapidly dimin-
ishing capability to play Peking and Mos-
cow against Washington, will ponder seri-
ously the precedent of their Korean broth-
ers to the north. The direct distance from
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1
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THE - COMMUNISTS
OPENLY- CROSSED THE DMZ
CPYRCAND BLATANTLY ATTACKED ...
A
N March 29, 1972, several North Vietnamese regular unzt have
openly crossed the DMZ and attacked the Republic of Vietnam outposts,
In an attempt to occupy the territory of South Vietnam below the demar-
cation area.
The DMZ. the symbol of a reasonnable solution for the two Zones pen-
ding a negotiated formula for the eventual peaceful reunification of Viet-
nam, is being trampled by the Communist North Vietnam who,. in so
doing, has violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements as well as the 1968 secret
understandings on the cessation of the American bombing over North
Vietnam.
The 'invading forces include the elite infantry Divisions 304, 308 and
324B, supported by 6 other infantry regiments ,_3 artillery regiments, ex-
tensive anti-aircraft units, one tank regiment and one surface-to-air mis-
sile regiment. The North Vietnamese invaders also used MIG planes in
support of their offensive. Columns of Russian made PT. 76, T. 55, T. 54
tanks moved down openly along Road No. 1 to attack the RVN outposts
south of the DMZ. The strength of the Communist forces is later estimated
at around 15 divisions including a Farming Sites a No. 2. and 3 and Work-
ing Sites a No. 5,7 and 9.
At the Cambodian frontiers bordering the provinces of Tay Nil:1h,
Binh Long and Phuoc Long, the enemy supported by long range artillery
and T. 54 tans massively attacked the province of Binh Long, meanwhile
in the tri-border area, Vietnam ? Cambodia ? Laos, bordering the pro-
vinces of Korai= and Pleiku, a North Vietnamese division attempted to
attack the province of Kontuzn.
In these three areas, fierce and bloody fighting has taken place in the
past months and is still continuing, and the RVN troops have inflicted
very heavy losses to the enemy. But the civilian population have suffered
much harm caused by North Vietnam indisaiminate shellings into the
densely populated areas. More than 650,000 people have had to take refuge
in more distant areas.
This is eloquent evidence that North Vietnam is the real aggressor
and the NLF was created for the only purpose of misleading world opinion.
The objective of the North Vietnamese leaders, when ordering the in-
vasion of the RVN territory, is to occupy the two provincial capitals of
Quang Tri and Thua Then in order to use them as capital for that which
the North Vietnamese Communists have been forging for a long time, the
so-called Government of the National Liberation Front, and as a gate for
their domination of the whole South Vietnam.
This open invasion of the Republic of Vietnam is a campaign that the
North Vietnamese Communists have prepared for a long time and which
they called the 1972 general offensive, general uprising and general revolt.
That proved the Communists do not advocate peace, they do not seek to
end the war by negotiations, but they on the enn t
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CPYRGHT
the pursuit of the. war and the annexation of South Vietnam by force and
by military victory.
The Vietnamese people and troops are determined to win over the
communist aggressors and wipe them out of the Republic of Vietnam
territory.
A MEASURE OF DESPERATION...
THE regular Army of North Vietnam has launched an attack on South
Vietnam, supported by massive quantities of Russian and Chinese arms
and equipment, including tanks and giant guns.
The South Vietnamese are containing the multiple thrusts across their
borders, and in some areas counter-attacking and inflicting heavy defeats
on the North Vietnamese. Thus despite the tremendous resources of regular
soldiery and equipment that the North Vietnamese war-makers have
thrown into this invasion, they have been thwarted by the defence forces
of South Vietnam from attaining their initial objectives.
? No doubt the invasion will continue. In the totalitarian society of the
North nobody can protest against the terrible losses of men. Appreciating
? how vital has been, the aid given to South Vietnam over the years by
the United States, Australia and other free-world nations, Hanoi will try
to sustain its aggression in the hope of 'weakening the resolve, of South
Vietnam's friends and stirring the flagging support given to the Northern
communists by their friends outside Vietnam. In particular Hanoi hopes
to influence the United States Presidential Elections, to further their
? peace plans.
In the meantime the South Vietnamese people and government de-
serve the congratulations of all freedom-loving people., The support for
South Vietnam is fully vindicated. The return of Australian ground troops
does not arise since the South Vietnamese are con fent that they can
handle the attack from the North themselves. But in view of the Russian
and Chinese provision of huge quantities of modern war materials, anied
air support and economic aid will still be needed on a large scale. The
Australian government should be willing to cosder sympathetically any
request for air and naval support, as well as increased economic and arms
assistdnce. ?
The fraudulent nature of the leftwing propaganda campaign is now
-clear. The internal insurgency in South Vietnam is now no more than
a minor irritant because of the progressive reforms of the South Viet-
namese government. The communist leaders in Hanoi have been forced
to abandon the pretence that there is an. internal war against the South
Vietnamese government by domestic dissidents. The Viet Cong, always
buttressed by Hanoi, has so withered on the vine that war by proxy is
no longer possible and the North Vietnamese communists have been re-
duced to outright invasion.
? Thie fir a wen,znro nf their desperation.
1
Professor David AMSTRONG
Chairman of The Committee
of THE FRIENDS OF VIETNAM,
AUSTRALIA
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171invasion of its own ally's territory, for by Hanoirs definition South
Vietnam belongs to the Provisional Revolutionary. Government of South
Vietnam (PRGSVN) and only one-fifth of it is still g temporarily occu-
pied a by the GVN. It would be pretty torturous thinking to believe that
Hanoi's 15 divisions are needed to g repel the t? aggression coming from
only one-fifth of ? the territory of South Vietnam. That this hardly makes
sense is no deterrence to Hanoi's friends abroad who recently go so far
as to request that the Soviet Union increases arms shipments to Hanoi
so as to strengthen Hanoi's killing capacity. .1t is thus -clear that the
Government of Vietnam and the anti-war groups abroad are agreed om
at least one point: the strength of Communism in Vietnam does not
reside in the revolutionary fervor of the Communist troops native to
South Vietnam, rather it is the direct translation of Russian weaponry
engaged in a classical confrontation 'where Hanoi's troops merely play
the role of cannon fodder. In the resulting clash of steel the revolutionary
war of Hanoi appears in its naked garb, a full-scale invasion, ideologically
motivated, in which the Soviet Union expects to put the world in front
of a fait accompli with Hanoi acting as a willing proxy.
CCNDMN ThONVA510i
he troubled and tragic states of Indo-China ? the Republic of
Vietnam in particular ? are struggling to cope with enormously difficult
problems. They face a North Vietnam which remains determined to im-
pose by force on the South a government of the North's choosing. North
Vietnam has launched its regular forces in attacks in great strength out-
side its own borders into the Khmer Republic and Laos as well as into
South Vietnam.
North Vietnam is supported in this by extensive aid from the Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries, and from China. The bulk
of this aid, much of it in the form of the most modern weapons, now
comes from the Soviet Union.
g I emphasise that what we are watching now is not a g people's up-
rising a. It is not a civil war. It is an invasion af one country by another.
The great bulk of North Vietnam's regular army is now? deployed in the
South.
a Why has North Vietnam persisted in this war policy?
? It is not for lack of alternatives. The peace proposals put forward
by President Thieu and President Nixon on 25th January this year offered
the opportunity for the people of South Vietnam, on whose behalf the
North Vietnamese claim to be acting, to determine their own future
through elections conducted by an independent commission and under
international supervision. President .Thieu offered to resign prior to these
elections. But the communists are still not prepared to face the test of
elections. ,
O Why did the North act when it did? No doubt a number of factors
were involved in the timing. There is some evidence that Hanoi wanted
to attack earlier, in the region of the Central Highlands, but that its plans
were disrupted by South Vietnamese and United States pre-emptive ope-
rations. Another factor was probably the weather ? suitable 'for cam-
paigning while providing some cover from air attack. Another may have
been a wish to demonstrate, t_
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the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and China,
that it is Hanoi which deterrntnes events in Indo-China. Yet another fac-
tor, which was evident at the time of the unsuccessful Tet offensive in
1968, appears to be a deliberate attempt to exert pressure on United States
opinion, and through . it on the United States administration. They are
mindful that this is a Presidential Election year.
It also seems clear that a compelling reason for the invasion at this
time was an assessment on the part of the North Vietnamese leadership
that South Vietnam was doing too well.
= Hanoi needed to disrupt the consoli4ati6n that has been going on
in the Republic of Vietnam, both within its armed forces (ARVN) and
in its society generally: and to act before South Vietnam became too
tough a nut to crack. Their offensive had been foreseen: but it is one
thing to foresee events and another to live through them, preserve one's
balance, and, in circumstances where the aggressor naturally has the
initiative, to withstand them.
= The South Vietnamese forces have suffered reverses. There may be
further setbacks before the situation clarifies. But it is worth remem-
bering the experience of the offensive of Tet 1968, which showed the
importance of reserving judgment on the outcome of the fighting. In
1968 hasty judgments allowed the communists to make great propaganda
gains, although subsequent events showed that Tet 1968 had, in fact, been
a major setback for the communists, both in terms of military casualties
and of damage to their org-arisation and infrastructure in the South.
= On behalf of the Government, I condemn the invasion of the Repu-
blic of Vietnam by North Vietnamese regular army units. It has been
launched, and could only have been launched, with massive support from
the Soviet Union and China. I believe the overwhelming Majority of Aus-
tralians have deep sympathy for the people of the Republic. of Vietnam.
They were fighting courageously in defence of their country even before
their allies came to their assistance with ground troops. They have con-
tinued to fight with great courage notwithstanding that the ground troops
of their allies are being withdrawn.
= We are continuing with our civil aid. We are despatching urgently
needed supplies to assist them in coping with the flood of men, women
and children fleeing as refugees before the advance of the invading armies.
? If the South Vietnamese fall before this onslaught not only will it
be a sad day for all who believe small countries and their peoples should
be free to determine their own government, but the repercussions of their
fall will reverberate in the South-East Asian region for years to come..
NIGEL BOWEN
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
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HATEVER: the outcome of the Communist offensive in South
Vietnam may he, the record of the past four weeks has robbed Hanoi and
the local Viet Cong of any pretence of playing the noble role of Libe-
. .
rators ? in the South.
For despite setbacks suffered, the 'resistance of the Southern Armies
. ,
and the refusal of the civilian population to rise in support of the Red
In-
vaders- clearly -show the true sentiments of most people in the South.
_
These sentiments are fear of and hatred for the aggressors.
. . . -
No army kept together by American money and driven by Saigon's
whip, as the red have claimed, would have fought as well as the Southern
soldiers have fought so far.
And no downtrodden and grossly exploited people would either flee
from its presumed liberators or refuse to rise in their support as the South
Vietnamese have done, despite Viet Cong efforts to call them to .1.-.:?volt.
CLEAR LESSON
The lesson is clear : South Vietnam can only be >
from the North .or flee to the South. They chose the South, despite all
the misery and suffering they will undergo as refugees. And, also, despite
claims that the Thieu Government is a harsh and oppressive tyranny.
By -walking away from the >
from the North or flee to the South. They chose the South, despite all
the misery and suffering they will undergo as refugees. And, also, despite
claims that the Thieu Government is a harsh and oppressive tyranny.
By 'walking away from the ? liberators ?, the people of Quang-
Tri are virtually ? voting with their feet ?. Similar popular referendums
in recent history were: the fleeing of masses of Dutch, Belgian and
French people before invading Nazi hordes ; the exodus from the East
German ? socialist paradise >> which compelled the Soviets to 'build a
wall to keep the East German population from running away to the
West ; and the flight of thousands of Hungarians in 1965 and Czechs
in 1968 from Soviet tanks.
App
BANGKOK POST
NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION
OF SOUTH: ? UNPARDONABLE DEED
I7
1 I-1-E invasion in force of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese armies
s unquestionably a deed of unpardonable aggression. What do the North
fietnamese want to prove? They want to discredit the Government of
Nguyen Van Thieu as well as the United States. They want to fulfill the
reOlitiPs* Relrerestesi 9/99Y091022:cti*FDP51)101194K001120611f0
kith and kin.
301-9
CPYRGHT
Lir T KUrl I
Ap
provedAeRvIRstSitalgUMMISMIMPe-sOiUgh4PeCUPP 4ppo1-9
drawn from the territory of the South Vietnamese in order that the Repu-
blic of Vietnam may be able to carve its own destiny without interference
by any force outside their territory.
REDS CAN'T BE TRUSTED
There is no question that the North Vietnamese who are dyed-in-the-
wool communists are violating the principle of self-determination which
is the keynote to peace and prosperity not only in Asia but in the rest of
the world. South Vietnam wishes to be free. It does not 'want to crook its
knee to any outside power be it American or North Vietnamese. There-
fore, the invasion of South Vietnam will serve only to emphasize one fact:
that the Communists can never be trusted.
The transgression on the life, land and treasure of South Vietnam by
the North Vietnamese is exactly what would be the case if the North
Koreans were to cross the demilitarized zone and disturb the peace, pro-
gress and prosperity of South Korea.
PROTEST CALL
? With such an aggressive neighbor as Communist North Vietnam, how
can we feel secure and happy in this part of world?
Therefore, I call on all free peoples to protest vigorously against the
violation of covenants and the plighted word which has been perpetrated
by the North Vietnamese in recent weeks. Let us all uphold with all the
strength of our collective will the principle of self-determination.
THE WHOLE NATION
IS UNITED AND OF
ONE MIND...
Sen. JOSE J. ROY, Chairman,
World Anti-Communist League
CPYRGHT
Ap
N the last few days, the North Vietnamese Communists have used three
divisions of regular troops, identified as Divisions 304, 308, and 324B.
with the support of three artillery and anti-aircraft regiments, one heavy
armored regiment and many surface-to-air missile units to openly cross
the Seventeenth Parallel and invade the Republic of ?Viet-Nam at the
border area with North Viet-Nam.
This belligerent and aggressive action on the part of the North Viet-
namese Communists represents a blatant violation of the 1954 Geneva
Accord of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory, and reveals that coun-
try's scheme of a military takeover of the Republic of Viet-Nam. North
Vietnam is not interested in seriously negotiating a solution to the war
MilatisraieIF??bOYM :ittAe-REIVAt 1,000b16 2botii0 0 01
peace. ?
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A
CPYRGHT
For the reasons detailed above, the National Assem ly o e epub
id
of Viet-Nam solemnly proclaims to the nation and to the world:
First, We vehemently condemn the act of open aggression of the
North Vietnamese Communists as they send their troops across the border
to invade the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam, blatantly violating
the 1954 Geneva Accord of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory.
Secondly, We denounce the cruel action of the North Vietnamese
Communists as they indiscriminately shell our cities, causing much suf-
fering and loss of lives and property to our innocent compatriots.
Thirdly, The whole nation is united and of one mind in firmly sup-
porting the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam as they fight and
smash the North Vietnamese invasion, protecting our independence and
territorial integrity.
Fourthly, We urgently appeal to the United Nations and all ;the
peoples of peace loving nations in the world to support the legitimate,
struggle of self-defense of the people and army of the Republic of Viet-
Nam, while at the same time to apply every necessary measure aimed
withdraw all their troops and cadres to the North of the 'Seventeenth
at forcing the North Vietnamese Communists to ?top their aggression and
Parallel.
Saigon, the 4th of April, 1972
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
MANIFESTO
by The Political Port3e5
of South Viet 'Horn
Ap
FTER a full examination of the situation as created by the North
Vietnamese invasion of Quang-Tri Province, the political parties present
' at the session of April 5, 1972 of the Joint Committee of Vietnamese
Political Parties hereby resolve:
1. To severely condemn North Viet-Nam for having launched its
regular troops across the Seventeenth Parallel, violated the status of the
Demilitarized Zone and attacked the province of Quang-Tri, thus once
more violating in the most flagrant manner the Geneva Accords of 1954
of which North Viet-Nam was a signatory.
2. To request that Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the two Co-
Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, condemn North Vie tnam:s
aggression committed against the Republic of Viet-Nam and force North
Viet-Nam to withdraw to its territory all the military units just brought
across the Seventeenth Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone, as well as.
all the forces infiltrated into the Republic of Viet-Nam since the begin-.
fling of the war.
3. To request that the international Control Commission acknow-
ledge the invasion of North Vietnamese troops across the Seventeenth
Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone. In case International Control Com-
mon' keeps its silence in the face of the brazen invasion b
priameihigartBekease litEnti09/a2NaGlArRERZ941104AIN III" C
Geneva Accords, the International Control Commission should dissolve
itself for reasons of partiality and impotence. a
01-9
CPYRGHT
Lir T KUrl I
A
4. To request that the Government of the Republic of _Viet-Nam
ppromed FrizEtRaktase dailelaillniaECIMILIFM94119alsAWW(M400
other side has not called off its aggressive actions in violation of the
understandings that they themselves have agreed to in exchange for the
1.968 cessation of bombings over North Viet-Nam.
5. To request that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam make
ready a punitive action plan against North Viet-Nam in case the latter
refuses to withdraw its troops north of the Seventeenth Parallel and to
? respect the Demilitarized Zone.
6. To urgently appeal to the members of all political parties included
within the Joint Committee and to all compatriots to heighten their vigi-
lance so as to avoid being hoodwinked by the Communist propaganda
into disrupting our ranks while at the same time positively .participating
in the efforts to help refugees generated by the border fighting and the
families of our cothbattants being engaged in the border fighting..
7. To ardently salute the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Viet-Nam and to support to the full the units that are fighting
heroically at the Demarcation border and on the other battlefields.
COMMUNIST INVASION CONDEMNED BY
WORLD OPIIVION
1-9
...In the past month Hanoi has been openly sending regular North Vietnamese
Army units, armed- with tanks and heavy artillery, directly aocross the demilita-
rized zone into South Vietnam. This is an invasion in the true sense. It is a clear
violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, in which North Vietnam explicitly under-
took to respect the demilitarized zone and the integrity of South Vietnam...,,
SIR KEITH HOLYOAKE
Foreign Minister of New Zealand
? The British Government are.. in no doubt that the North Vietnamese. by
conducting a flagrant invasion of the territory of the Republic: of South. Vietnam,
are acting in violation of the Geneva Agreements.,,
.... The present invasion to the South Vietnamese territory showed clearly
to us that Hanoi had chosen the way of force to achieve its goal.*
ADAM MALIK
Foreign Minister of Indonesia
Communist North Vietnam's attacks against South Vietnam in the past few
days had been prepared for a long time, when the Paris peace talks were still
in progress. This testified to the usual Communist trick ?of using the so-called
peace negotiations for propaganda purposes, with a view to make the outside
world believe that the situation was calming down.
CHOW SHU KAI
Foreign Minister of The Republic of China
. The violent military offensive unleashed by the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. to the south of the 17 th Parallel in the so-called ? Demilitarized ? Zone
on March 29 against the Republic of Vietnam shows once again the warlike
character of the ruling group of Hanoi, which, despite the Geneva Accords of
1954, has not hesitated to deliberately launch open aggressions against three
countries of former Indochina and to maintain permanent subversive activity
throughout our whole region.
LONG BORET
Minister of Information
of the Republic of Khmer
e The Government of Belgium finds that the offensive launched by North
Vietnam and by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the escalation of
all forms of military activity now taking place are contrary to the objectives of
negotiated settlement.
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.... In this outmoded expansionist venture, North Vietnam has received mas-
sive support in military hardwares from another major power, without which the
present offensive could not have been carried out. ....
THANAT KHOMAN
Special Envoy, National - Executive Council
Delegation Chief .of Thailand
. The grave escalation of the war in Vietnam had started by a massive inva-
sion of regular troops from North Vietnam. This constituted a North Vietnamese
violation of the Geneva Agreement.. ?
SCHMELZER
Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
The recent large scale communist assaults on South Vietnam were most
deplorable and might even reduce hope for peace in Indochina. The escalation of
Communist offensive was taking place just at the time when other countries inclu-
ding Indonesia were striving for a peaceful solution to the protracted- crisis in.
Vietnam ;.
DOMO PRANOTO
House Speaker of Indonesia
The Republic of Korea expressed the sincere desire of Korean Government
that North Vietnam immediately withdrawn her armed forces back lo the North
in cessation of her flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.
The Government of Japan deplores the intensification of fighting caused
by the inassive invasion by North Vietnamese forces across the DMZ into South
Vietnam and hopes the fighting will end as soon as possible, the Geneva Agree-
ments will be respected, and fruitful talks will take place at the Paris negotiations,
The North Vietnamese aggression constituted an action which trampled
over the Geneva Agreements about Indochina. Therefore we strongly condemn
the North Vietnamese aggression,
? Journalists, Politicians,
? Students and the World Anti-Communist
? league in Indonesia.
Le Cercle des Etudiants Liberaux de l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles s'eleve
de. la facon la plus formelle contre les actes inqualifiables d'agression contre le
peuple du Sud Vietnam perpetres par les forces armees nord vietnamiennes en
contradiction aviec les accords de Geneve de 1954..
The Philippines ? Vietnam society has been saddened by the news received
here that several North Vietnamese regular infantry divisions, supported by tanks,
artillery and surfpce-to-air missiles, had crossed the DMZ and invaded the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Vietnam.
The open aggression is not only a condemnable violation of the 1954 Ceneva
agreements but it would irreparably further divide the Vietnamese nailer% which
.
has been at -war for more than a quarter of a century.
t Unable to overthrow a legally-elected government by subversion and in-
surgency within the country, the North has had to resort to a full-scale invasion
in its efforts to impose totalitarian rule and deny liberty to its southern neigh-
bours...
I am at a loss to understand why the protesters were so quiet when the
North's invasion was in full cry.
. Why are they not demanding that Hanoi stop the war in Vietnam? Perhaps
the invasion by North Vietnam is what they agree with..
McCREADY
Defense Minister of New Zealand
4... The Hanoi Regime has been damned by all, freedom and peace loving
? peoples of the world due to-its evil deeds of aggression and kitting. The Buddish
Association of the Republic of China therefore, calls on all buddhist brothers of
the world to condemn the North .T'otnamese Communists' aggressive move and
render without reservation our spiritual support to the South Vietnamese people
?
PAI SHENG ?
Director-General of the Buddhist
Association a the Republic of China
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. Regardless of how the crisis in Vietnam is resolved, we note that Hanoi
has bexpwilling to _s_acrifice thousands of its_ troops onGly to_aa DtisfyP79 tile Kremlin
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Harlan Nusantara
(Indonesian Newspaper)
A North Vietnam is waging a war of aggression in the South. It explains
everything. For years people have tried to make us believe that the South Viet-
namese people ? oppressed by a military dictatorship ? were instinctively revol-
ting and, with armed force, were demanding independence.
. Something has dispelled that idyllic view: The Communists in the South
are imposing terror. They torture, they murder, and they are responsible for
provocations and attacks. They resort to those barbaric actions because they
haven't succeeded in convincing and in rallying the people..
LE RAPPEL
(Belgian paper)
. Though Hanoi keeps denying that its troops are fighting in the South of
the divided country some 50,000 members of the North Vietnamese People's
Liberation Army have crossed the demarcation line..
ARBEITER ZEITUNG, VIENNA.
A- Hanoi had sent its troops to 'overtly cross the 17th parallel and the demili-
tarized zone (DMZ) regardless of the 1954 Geneva Agreements since it realized
that communist underground elements left in the South had become impotent
before the gallant fighting spirit of the RV N government and people.
Communist North Vietnam will bear full responsibilities for the sufferings
and mournings it has caused to the civilian people both in South and North
Vietnam..
FRENCH-VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP
ASSOCIATION.
, I wish the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam can resist the North
Vietnamese invasion. Your victory is our victory.
CARLOS ROMULO
Foreign Minister of the Philippines
. Why such an overt invasion and why no*? It must be assumed that Hanoi
well understood the success of Pacification and Vietnamization within South
Vietnam. If both were allowed to continue uninterrupted for another year, then
the Viet-Cong might I be completely finished as an internal threat and South
Vietnam might become the strongest military power in Southeast Asia.
Sir ROBERT THOMPSON
The Times of London
We severely condemn communist offensive which violated agreements signed
by Hanoi itself. We pay hommage to valiant ARVN and courageous Vietnamese
people under President Thieu leadership which crush this offensive as they crlfshed
the 1968 Tet offensive..
ARGENTIN? VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATION '
? We strongly condemn the violation of the DMZ committed by communist
North Vietnam because it was in violation of existing agreement. With this large
scale invasion of South Vietnam territory by North Vietnam it became clear that
North Vietnam is the real aggressor while the so-called NLF in South Vietnam
was created only for the purpose of misleading world opinion. In this connection
we should support the struggle of the South Vietnamese people who are defending
their sovereignty from this communist invasion. North Vietnam should withdraw
immediately her armed forces from South Vietnam and if it failed to do so and
continued with its policy of aggression then she will have to bear full respon-
, sabilities for any consequences brought about by her own action ..
?
MUHAMMA.D HUANG
Chairman of the World Anti-
communist League, Indonesia.
Hanoi has shown its real face, that of an aggressor... This flagrant violation -
of Geneva Accords... shows what would be awaiting South Vietnam if the Com-
munists from North had their hands free.,
GAZET VAN ANT WERPAN, HOLLAND.
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forces, a myth so long cultivated by Hanoi? ?
Ot While the Amerricans have chosen disengagement in an irreversible manner,
the other side increases its own engagement. How can one, then, fail to con-
clude that Hanoi envisages no other solution of the drama than the annexation
of South Vietnam ? either by placing a reunified Vietnam under its one control
or else by imposing in Saigon a communist regime?
COMBAT, PARIS.
* We condemn unequivocally the brutal invasion by the regular forces of Hanoi
across the DMZ and into other areas of the territory of the Republic of Vietnam...
FREDERICK STOCWELL
Society for Individual Freedom.
The Free World must maintain a defense shield, against communist aggression
in the face of the current open invasion of South Vietnam by Cbmmunist North
yietnamese forces.
The Communist had made a big mistake militarily and politically in launching
an invasion of the South and they would suffer reverses on both counts..
SEATO Secretary General.
Gen. JESUS VARGAS
'We demand Hanoi authorities to immediately withdraw their aggressive
troops from South Vietnam and put an end to the killing and to embark on
serious negotiations to settle :.he conflict..
THE FRENCH COMMITTEE FOR SAFEGUARD
OF FREEDOM IN EUROPE,
4. Nous elevons une protestation formelle contre l'invasion ouverte du Sud-
Vietnam par les troupes du Gouvernement d'Hanoi. La preuve est faite que les
communistes du Nord veulent annexer purement et simplement le Sud-Vietnam
tandis que la population Sud Vietnamienne est determinee a ne pas se retrouver
sous la houlette des communistes et de leurs complices du Viet-Cong. .
-COMITE FRANCAIS POUR SAUVEGARDER
LES LIBERTES EUROPEENNES
The Young Democratic Labour Association calls upon the Australian Govern-
ment to assist South Vietnam in a greater military capacity in its endeavour to
protect itself from blatant aggression from North Vietnam..
YOUNG DEMOCRATIC LABOUR ASSOCIATION, AUSTRALIA
* No fair minded person can.be in any doubt whatsoever about the cause and
the nature of the latest offensive in Vietnam. The undeniable truth is that it is
the result of a full scale invasion by the regular Armed Forces of North Vietnam,
in flagrant and brutal violation of the Geneva Agreements. This is a callous and
calculated aggression that pays no attention either to international law or human
suffering. It could be perpetrated only by a Government that is impervious to
moral outrage.
The fact that the North Vietnam has had to use regular troops is proof of
the failure of their guerilla activities in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong have
proved in this invasion a force of no significance. The people of South Vietnam
have, by their actions during the last few weeks of the invasion, demonstrated
their loyalty to the democratic regime in Saigon.
The morale of the people of South Vietnam remains high. I have no doubt
that they are fighting with high courage for the cause of free peoples every-
where. The British Government supports totally the action of South Vietnam, and
condemns the invasion of that country by the North. N.
IAN SPROAT
Secretary General of the All Party
Anglo-Vietnamese Parliamentary Group.
* Vietnam is again wracked by intense warfare as the result of a massive
Vietnamese invasion of the South.
'No amount of rhetoric or use of euphemism such as ? People's Liberation .
or ,* Viet-Cong Liberation Movement N, can mask the reality that North Vietnam
has again openly violated solemAiaRr
ase mato= irhtftql5 i lies no in what is happening
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Approved
dweumwtookranztothairodoie,avekNorth Vietnam
In the North fled from their liberators x. to an uncertain future in the South,
w Today, even as the North Vietnamese claim to w liberate * areas of the South
as part of their latest offensive, new refugees are again in flight. They flee not
North but farther South .. farther from their * liberators.,
KENNETH B. KEATING
.S . Ambassador to India.
w General Giap is indulging in illusions if he counts on a crumbling Of the South
Vietnamese regime. The failure of the TET Offensive in 1968. has shown that the
South Vietnamese population ? even if it is not satisfied with the present regime,
which is a consequence of the war ? is not at all disposed to accept domination
by the North.
The South Vietnamese army now is infinitely stronger and more pugnacious
than it was a few years ago, and it is obvious that Washington will not fail to
react in the face of this sudden re-escalation of the conflict.
w In trying this Poker bluff, Hanoi has, taken a calculated risk that May cost,
it a very high price.*
MICHEL VOIROL
Combat
The great majority of the soldiers in the fierce battles at Bastogne near
Hue, and at An Loc, demonstrated outstanding morale which surprised the skep-
tical observers
DIE WELT
German Newspaper in Hamburg
To mount the present attack, it has been necessary (for. Hanoi) to drop
the fiction that the war is? being fought by the Viet-Cong. The offensive is an
undeniable invasion across the Demilitarized Zone.
NEW ZEALAND HERALD
,NOW IS THE DECISIVE TIME
N short, our troops from all arms in the front line and in all the battlefields
are valiantly fighting to destroy the enemy and to hold every inch of our
land, and they are fighting with high morale.
In the rear, our people are providing support to the Army and ore deter-
mined not to let the Communists take over any land and kill people, disrupt
the pacification and development program and the security which all our
people and armed forces have brought back to the country since many years.
Today, I earnestly call upon
? All the combatants from the Army, Navy, Air Force at the front
line to continue to destroy the enemy and to secure our borders;
? All the troops, cadres, members of the Peoples Self-Defense Forces
at the rear to maintain firm the territorial security, to maintain stabi-
lity in the rear, to implement the laws correctly and to preserve the
Community Pacification and Development endeavor.
I earnestly call upon people from all walks of life, the peoples' repre-
sentatives in the provincial towns to do all that con be done both spiritually
and materially to further increase the support to the front.
I earnestly call upon the press to praise and widely publicize the brilliant
victories of our fighting men and not print false, inaccurate or exaggerated
information which is detrimental to the fighting spirit in the front and the
polAtisvr stability_ in the .rear.
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Once we win, everything remains;
Once the Communists win, everything is lost.
Now is the decisive time for the loss or the survival of our nation. The
actual fight is the decisive fight for the loss or the survival of the people
of SYN. To let the Communists occupy two provinces of Central Vietnam
or two provinces of the Highlands does not mean that we only lose those
provinces. It does not either mean a communist limited military victory.
A communist global military victory will lead to a political solution
which is totally disadvantageous to South Vietnam.
Consequently, at any cost we should prevent the Communists from
obtaining a military victory, we should also not let the Communists free to
force us to accept any disadvantageous political solution.
All our people and troops are determined to win over the Communist
aggressors, and we will defeat them.
I believe that they will be defeated.
Excerpts from the Address of
President NGUYEN VAN THIEU
to all the People, the Combatants
and Cadres on the situation at the
Demarcation Line, April 5. 1971
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1 Appr vulkorJNeffe &949,T9I0 6Cimprc93-19:i1ino.p012csokitooxic E N C ,
No. 55
June 20
1972
TALKING PAPER
OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANS
Facts on the Current North Vietnamese Invasion
1. QUESTION: What preparations did North Viet-Nam make for the
offensive which began March 30?
ANSWER: The decision on the offensive and invasion was made long in
advance. The NVA built roads across the DMZ and accumulated huge stocks
of supplies and war material in three major areas focused on the South Viet-
namese provincial capitals of Quang Tri in the north, Kontum in the Central
Highlands and An Loc just north of Saigon. The war material included
hundreds of T54/55 and PT76 Russian-supplied tanks and 130mm, long-range
artillery pieces which are useful primarily for offensive warfare.
2. QUESTION: How did the offensive begin?
ANSWER: The NVA offensive began on March 30 with intensive long-
range artillery and rocket fire against South Vietnamese defensive positions
south of the Demilitarized Zone followed by a massive invasion on the grounci
by regular NVA troops. On April 5 the NVA opened a second front against
Binh Long Province north of Saigon. They opened the third front in the
Central Highlands against Kontum on April II.
3. QUESTION: Why did the NVN forces make such rapid progress during
the first few days?
ANSWER: Attacking forces always have a certain advantage of surprise
by picking the time and plaice to fight. The NVA launched a broad frontal
attack across the DMZ in blatant violation of agreements which had been
largely respected since 1954. They picked a moment when unusual weather
inhibited air support and resupply for ARVN forces. They utilized long-
range artillery and tanks on a scale unprecedented in the Indo-China war.
Despite these advantages, the NVA after the first several days had advanced
only 16 kilometers. The South Viet-Nam armed forces dug in and held along
the Cua Viet River, the first defensible line below the DMZ.
4. QUESTION: How many NVA troops have invaded South-Viet-Nam since
the spring offensive began March 30?
ANSWER: At the outset North Viet-Nam openly committed ten of its
thirteen regular divisions to the invasion. Two divisions were operating in
Laos. Only one unit -- infantry division 325C -- was within its own borders.
Elements of this division crossed the DMZ on May 22.
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5. QUESTION: Have the SVN forces counterattacked?
ANSWER: Yes, SVN Marines carried out three heliborne/amphibious/
ground operation raids behind NVA lines in Quang Tri Province on May 13
and 24 and on June 8. ARVN troops recaptured Firebase Bastogne and re-
occupied high ground west of Hue. In fact, every front has seen local counter-
attacks which have forced the enemy to halt, regroup, and fall back. SVN
Air Force planes and naval ships have also struck at the enemy in every
theater.
6. QUESTION; What is the record of the ARVN as a fighting force?
ANSWER: The most eloquent testimony for the ARVN is its record.
After a maximum effort over a period of two months by ten regular NVA
divisions supported by independent regiments, Viet Cong units and other
elements, the NVA has not taken any one of its major objectives, which
POW's revealed to be An Loc, Konturn, and Hue. As with any army anywhere
in the world the record of individual ARVN units varies. The Third Division
and the 22nd Division, which absorbed the brunt of the NVA invasion across
the demilitarized zone and in Konturn, are being reconstituted. On the other
hand, soldiers and elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions with airborne and
ranger units in An Loc have held longer under siege than the French did at
Dien Bien Phu.
7. QUESTION: How have the South Vietnamese territorial forces
measured up in conventional warfare?
ANSWER: South Vietnamese territorial forces, known as the RF and
PF--for regional forces and popular (local) forces--were trained to protect
their homes and villages against Viet Cong guerrilla attacks. Yet, according
to American advisers, they are standing up against NVA regular forces even
when outnumbered. They are highly motivated--as one would expect since
they are defending their own homes--and have a thorough knowledge of the
terrain in which they operate. They are often the first to make contact with
enemy units. Their job is to hold the ground until regular army units come
to their support. In some instances these units have outmaneuvered, out-
fought, and even driven off their NVA attackers before help arrived from
regular ARVN forces.
8. QUESTION: What are the comparative losses of military personnel
on both sides?
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ANSWER: Official GVN figures show enemy forces as having
lost 33,000 killed in action during April and May compared with 12, 000
friendly forces MA. The GVN figures also showed 34,000 ARVN and
territorial forces wounded and 15,000 missing in action during the same
period.
9. QUESTION: How many NVA soldiers has South Viet-Nam been
holding as POW's, and how many have been captured during the current
offensive?
ANSWER: On March 30, 1972, when the North Vietnamese offensive
began South Viet-Nam was holding about 9,000 North Vietnamese soldiers
as POW's. As of June 15, more than 250 additional NVA soldiers had
been captured. This figure does not include NVA and VC soldiers who
have rallied to the side of the GVN (Hoi Chanh).
10. QUESTION: How many South Vietnamese citizens have fled south-
ward from Quang Tri and other areas of SVN entered by NVA troops or
occupied by Viet Cong forces?
ANSWER: As of June 15 there were estimated to be 808,100 war
refugees in South Viet-Nam. More than half a million--509,100--fled
southward from Quang Tri and other areas of Military Region I, to escape
the invading NVN army and the fighting. Another 169,400 fled the invaders
in western SVN to coastal areas of MR II in central Viet-Nam. In MR III,
where An Loc is located 82,700 persons left their homes to evade the North
Vietnamese; and in MR IV, the Delta region, 46,900 persons chose to leave
home rather than come under communist control. Of the total, 691,200
are being housed in refugee camps. The rest are living with friends and
relatives until they can return home.
11. QUESTION: How is South Viet-Nam financing the cost of caring for
the war tefugees?
ANSWER: The GVN as an emergency measure has increased taxes
on luxury items such as cigarettes, beer, imported liquor, restaurant
meals and theater admissions for the specific purpose of providing funds
for refugee relief.
A portion of the costs is financed through the sale of donated
American produce on the Vietnamese market, i. e. --counterpart
funds. However, numerous Vietnamese volunteer agencies such as
Buddhist associations, the Cao Dai Church, Catholic relief associations,
businessmen, boy scouts, local Red Cross chapters, etc.
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have made an all-out effort to raise funds and supplies to care for the
refugees. University and high school students have plunged themselves
into relief work. Thousands have opened their homes to the homeless.
In addition, substantial contributions in food, medicines and cash have
come from Australia, Canada, Taiwan, West Germany, New Zealand,
Great Britain and the Republic of Korea.
12. QUESTION: How has the invasion affected the GVNT s pacification
program?
ANSWER: Pacification is judged by the attitudes of people and
their confidence in the GVN to provide security in their daily lives.
The degree of apprehension among the Vietnamese rural and urban
population is directly proportional to the proximity of combat. Where
there is no serious combat, apprehension and damage to pacification is
slight. The example of Hue following the fall of Quang Tri is illustrative.
The loss of Quang Tri to the communists and the massive influx of refugees
caused near panic among the citizens of Hue. Yet as soon as the newly
appointed commanding general of Military Region I demonstrated his
ability to restore order and protect the city, panic subsided, people
returned to their normal lives, and many who had fled the city returned
to their homes.
13. QUESTION: What has been the record of VC terrorist incidents
in 1972 compared with previous years?
ANSWER: With extensive fighting going on it is difficult to sort
out the purely terrorist type incident from military combat, but a record
on abductions is a good index. In "normal" years there has been an
average of 6,000 abductions. In 1968, the year of the TET offensive,
the figure was over 10,000. During the first five month's of 1972 there
were 6,000, an annual rate even higher than 1968. People abducted may
be used for work details, forced to fight for the communists, moved into
areas the communists control, or they may be held for several days,
given an intensive communist indoctrination, and then released to carry
out propaganda activities in their villages or suffer reprisals if they
fail to comply.
14. QUESTION: What is the actual population of areas of SVN that
have fallen under NVA communist control since March 30? What
percentage of this is of SVN's communities?
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ANSWER: Before March 30 the communists controlled only seven
hamlets with fewer than 20,000 South Vietnamese citizens. Since the NVN
invasion and as of May 31, an additional 1,157 hamlets with 575,000 people
had come under their control. This is approximately 3 per cent of the
total SVN population. The communists now control 1,164 hamlets out
of 12,032, or 9. 7 per cent of the total number of hamlets. Only 14 out
of 272 districts have been entirely occupied by the NVN. There are large
unpopulated areas along the western fringes of the country under no one's
control.
15. QUESTION: How valid are the communist claims to having established
"revolutionary governments" in the conquered areas?
ANSWER: Communist broadcasts have claimed the establishment
of "revolutionary administrations" in several districts and a number of
villages. Only in Quang Tri, immediately adjacent to North Viet-Nam,
do they claim a province level "revolutionary committee" is functioning.
The names of its leaders have not been announced.
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the South Vietnamese
government,which passed out guns to the populace for self defense,one of the
first acts of the communists is to pick up all firearms from the people.
16. QUESTION: How have the North Vietnamese treated the SVN
population in areas which have come under their control?
ANSWER: Qua.ng Tri is the only province to come under NVA
control. Some 250,000 of the Province's 320,000 people moved southward
to escape the invading army, leaving only 70,000 who remained voluntarily
or were trapped by the NVA. Since the communists took over on May 1,
several thousands more have escaped on foot or with the help of SVN
marines who made daring sorties into the areas. In interviews with
newsmen some of these escapees say the communists have impressed
every able-bodied individual into forced labor battalions to harvest rice,
dig weapons caches and build bunkers for the NVA. The penalty for trying
to escape, if caught, is death. The escapees also say individuals are
compelled to wear different color identity tags indicating whether they
are pro-communist, neutral, or pro-GVN.
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6
17. QUESTION: What steps did the United States take to assist South
Viet-Nam in countering the North Vietnamese invasion'?
ANSWER: The United States Government immediately denounced
the invasion and ordered U.S. naval and air reinforcements to support
its South Vietnamese allies, promising to consider all options short of
reintroducing American ground troops or use of nuclear weapons. On
April 16 U.S. aircraft raided military supply depots in Hanoi-Haiphong
area. On May 8 President Nixon announced his decision to interdict
supplies to the DRV--that is, to mine all entrances to North Vietnamese
ports to shut off supply channels by sea, and to use air power to halt over-
land deliveries from other countries needed by Hanoi to keep its offensive
going.
18. QUESTION: Have the U.S. actions hurt Hanoi's military efforts?
ANSWER: Yes, Nhan Dan, Hanoi's official communist party news-
paper, tacitly admits serious damage to North Viet-Nam's transportation
and communications system and to her industrial production capacity in
a three-part series of articles published June 1, 3 and 5. The articles,
signed by Hong Ha--a pen name meaning Red River--discussed the DRV's
tasks under wartime economy. They urged the North Vietnamese people
to accept ever greater sacrifices and exert ever greater efforts to prosecute
the war in the South. On June 8, one month after the mining of seven
North Vietnamese ports, Vice Admiral William P. Mack--who directed
the mining operation--said the blockade has cut the communist war-making
capabilities radically. He cited the following as evidence: anti-aircraft
fire, surface-to-air missile launchings and short battery fire--all intense
during the first month of the interdiction campaign--dropped off markedly
in May. There is reduced highway traffic throughout the country. On
the same day Lt. General George Eade, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans and Operations, told newsmen: The interdiction campaign has
virtually isolated Hanoi from outside sources of supply and continues to
destroy stockpiles of fuel and war material already in the country. North
Viet-Nam imported about two million short tons of war material in 1971.
Since May 11 it has received practically nothing. Railway shipments from
China are almost completely stopped as a result of the destruction of
bridges and the sealing of a railway tunnel near the Chinese border.
U.S. pilots report some truck traffic from China, but nothing close to
the magnitude of the previous rail shipments.
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19. QUESTION: When will the effect of the mining be felt by the NVA
offensive action in South Viet-Narn?
ANSWER: The immediate results are most apparent in the tie-up
of NVN supply lines; but the combined effects of the mining and air strikes
on the offensive are already being felt in the South, particularly in fuel
supplies for NVA tanks and trucks used in logistic support for the invading
forces. Monsoon rains also play a role in slowing down the offensive.
The continued NVA artillery fire against cities like An Loc and Kontum
(which has been slowly declining) shows that the NVA had laid in a massive
supply of ammunition in preparation for the invasion. It may be some weeks
yet before the full effect is felt by NVN's invading forces.
20. QUESTION: Did President Nixon offer on May 8 to withdraw remaining
U.S. troops from Viet-Nam, and, if so, under what conditions?
ANSWER: On May 8 President Nixon said the United States"will
proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Viet-Nam
within four months" on these conditions: "First, all American prisoners
of war must be returned. Second, there must be an internationally supervised
ceasefire throughout Indochina. Once prisoners of war are released, once
the internationally supervised ceasefire has begun, we will stop all acts of
force throughout Indochina."
21. QUESTION: How many American military personnel are left in
South Viet-Nam?
ANSWER: As of June 8, 1972, there were 61,900 U.S. military
personnel in SVN. There were another 42,000 naval personnel manning
ships offshore. The President has stated that Arnerican troop strength
in SVN will be reduced to 49,000 by July 1, that is, 500,000 less than the
ceiling established for U.S. forces in Viet-Nam in 1968.
22. QUESTION: Did the Peking and Moscow Summit talks between the
U.S. and the PRC and the U.S. and USSR make any contributions toward
resolving the Viet-Nam conflict? If so, what were they? Were there any
secret agreements concerning Viet-Nam?
ANSWER: First, there were no secret agreements concerning
Viet-Nam at either Peking or Moscow. In each of the two summit meetings
there were extensive conversations concerning the Viet-Nam conflict.
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The views of both sides are summarized in the final communiques.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the talks toward the resolution
of the conflict was in clarifying each power's viewpoints. As Presidential
adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger said in a Kiev press conference: "When
two great powers deal with each other, one of the best things they can
do for each other is to make absolutely sure that they understand each
other's point of view. What actions they then take, based on the under-
standing of that point of view, only the future can tell:' In his address to
the Congress of the United States immediately upon his return from
Moscow June 1, President Nixon said: "I emphasize to you once again,
this Administration has no higher goal--a goal that I know all of you share--
than bringing the Viet-Nam war to an early and honorable end. We are
ending the war in Viet-Nam, but we shall end it in a way which will not
betray our friends, risk the lives of the courageous Americans still
serving in Viet-Nam, break faith with those held prisoners by the enemy,
or stain the honor of the United States of America."
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24 July 1972
MOSCOW'S LATEST TREATIES
Just as Egypt has always been the key factor in Soviet
strategy aimed at a permanent presence if not domination of the
Mediterranean, so now India and Iraq appear to be emerging as two
key factors in Soviet designs on the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf. Since May 1971, the USSR has signed "treaties of friendship
and cooperation" with all three and, while the provisions in each
are different, each to some extent guarantees the Soviets the
kind of presence they are after. On the other hand, without the
exercise of a considerable degree of diplomatic flexibility and
subtlety (traits for which Soviet diplomacy is not famous), the
treaties could turn out to be disruptive factars in Moscow's
relations with the signatories as well as with their neighbors.
Why's of the Treaties
* * * * * * * *
The new treaties are the first that Moscow has signed with
countries that are neither neighbors of the USSR nor Communist.
She has had treaties of "friendship and good-neighbor relations"
with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey off and on since 1921. And with
the Warsaw Pact countries and with Finland she maintains and
consistently renews treaties of "friendship, cooperation, and
mutual assistance" --- all of which bind the signatories to the
canons of the Brezhnev Doctrine, There are those who see the
latest treaties signed with Egypt, Iraq and India as a calculated
move to extend the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine into the
Middle East and onto the subcontinent and into Southeast Asia.
It is apparent that with the Egyptian and Indian treaties,
Moscow was the instigator while it is suspected that Iraq asked
for her treaty. The Soviet approach to India is seen as reflecting
Moscow's concerns with the Sino-Soviet border disputes and the
politburo's eagerness to get Indian political support for its dealings
with China. India, on the other hand, viewed the treaty as a means
of discouraging Soviet aid to Pakistan (to say nothing of
guaranteeing military support for India) should the Indo-Pakistani
crisis heat up --- as indeed it did.
In Egypt, Moscow pressed for a friendship treaty because of
fears that, following Nasser's death, Sadat might well drift a
bit from the "anti-imperialist direction" in his approach to
foreign policy. Sadat, on the other hand, wanted concrete evidence
of Moscow's intentions to continue its military and economic
maintenance program and its diplomatic support of Egypt in the
Arab-Israeli crisis.
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As for Iraq, she may well have looked to a treaty of mutual
support with the Soviet Union as a means of enhancing her reputation
among the radical Arabs, enhancing the regime's status at home,
getting more Soviet military goods and help with her oil industry,
and finally as a useful political lever in the troubled Iraqi-
Iranian relations. Thus, with Iraq viewing herself as possibly
having the most to gain, in the short run anyway, the Soviets were
able to set several preconditions such as guaranteed access to
Iraqi ports and airfields, broader Communist participation in
running the government, and a commitment to consult with Mbscow
before launching any military undertakings.
Differences of the Treaties
Soviet President Podgorny has said that the three treaties
"represent a new, practical embodiment of the strengthening link
and expanding interaction of world socialism with the forces of
national liberation." Not quite so. A review of the published
texts of the three treaties showsmarked differences in approach.
The Indo-Soviet treaty, for example, makes no mention of Soviet
military aid to India while Article 8 of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty
says that both parties "will continue to develop cooperation in
the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements . . ."
In contrast, Article 9 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty says that
both "will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening
of their defense capabilities": clear implication that the Soviet
Union gets access to military installations on Iraqi soil. With
Egypt and Iraq, it is a matter of coordinating foreign policy
approaches, while with India it is a matter of "mutual cooperation."
Lip service is given to India's "nonalignment" whereas Soviet
influence in Egyptian and Iraqi internal affairs is implied by
their cooperation with the Soviet Union to preserve their "socio-
economic gains." Whereas no mention is made of Indian or Egyptian
natural resources, Article 5 of the Iraqi treaty takes note of
"cooperation.. .in the working of oil and other natural resources."
The treaty fails, however, to commit the Soviet Union to anything
specific in its economic "cooperation" with Iraq.
Reactions to the Treaties
The Soviet-Iraqi treaty has not done much to enhance the
latter's reputation with some radical Arabs. Libya's former chief of
state Qadhafi not only vociferously denounced the Soviet-Iraqi
treaty as anti-Islam treachery, he also withdrew his ambassador
from Baghdad. Following the treaty announcement, Syria has
become noticeably cool to both Iraq and the Soviet Union and is
reportedly actively trying to reduce the Soviet military
presence in Syria.
2
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Despite Soviet attempts to reassure the Shah of Iran that the
Soviet-Iraqi treaty cannot become a disruptive element in Soviet-
Iranian relations, the Iranian head of state remains wary. His
misgivings will be borne out if he sees the Iraqis getting
sophisticated, more modern weaponry and if Soviet naval squadrons
start berthing at the head of the Persian Gulf. From Moscow's
standpoint, Libyan and Syrian coolness are tolerable and probably
interpreted as a passing phase. Soviet-Iranian relations, however,
are much more precariouSly balanced and Tehran's reactions to
closer Soviet-Iraqi ties could well be a long-term worry for
Moscow.
As a result of the Indo-Pakistani war, India has emerged as
the unchallenged leader of the subcontinent. Some of India's
neighbors see the Indo-Soviet treaty as signalling Soviet take-
over of the subcontinent by proxy. But, if the Soviets in their
haste to spread their own influence, fail to give India the voice
she feels she deserves --- India's sense of goodwill towards
Moscow could easily reverse itself. For example, if India finds
that the Soviets are meddling in internal affairs in Bangladesh ---
as they were known to have done during recent student disturbances
in Dacca --- such meddling is open to interpretation as, at the
very least, a violation of the spirit if not the terms of the
Indo-Soviet treaty.
The Soviet quest for naval bases for its Indian Ocean fleet
as well as the expected increase in the Soviet naval presence in
that ocean, near Indian shores, will irritate Indian sensitivities
over potential outside interference. In time, India may well
decide that as the undisputed power on the subcontinent, she is
secure enough not to have to depend on such intimate bilateral
relations as are implicit in the lado-Soviet treaty.
The Soviet-Egyptian treaty cannot but have raised hopes in
Cairo that the USSR would somehow break the deadlock with Israel
and Soviet failure to do so cannot help but foster Egyptian
resentment against the USSR. Persistent criticism of the USSR
by some Egyptian officials and outspoken journalists in recent
months have been indicative of increasing Soviet-Egyptian dis-
agreements which, from Moscow's point of view could suggest that
the treaty is actually- fostering a deterioration in Soviet-
Egyptian relations. In the long run, for the Soviets this treaty
may well be diplomatically the most troublesome of the three.
Whatever misgivings some in the Soviet leadership may have
concerning the long-range benefits to be derived from these three
treaties, there is every indication that the majority views them as
highly useful for two very basic Soviet foreign policy aims: to
maintain a great power role in the Mediterranean and to establish
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the Soviet in the same type of role in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the
Soviet search for additional durable ties with strategically
important countries in both areas will intensify rather than
diminish, With each willing candidate that the Soviets approach
and/or possibly win over (such as Malta, Bangladesh, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ceylon, or others) the real question
will be how to ensure that the Soviet presence takes forms that
are tolerable to the security of all.
4
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U-' Y RGHT
CPYRGHT
BASLER NACIIRICHTEN, Basel
17 May 1972
Damaskus gegen einen Pakt mit Moskau
Spielt Syrien
the chin esische Karte?
Der sowjetische Vcrteidigungsminister Marschall Gretschk6 beendete seinen
im ganzen Nahen Osten mit grosser Aufmerksamkeit beobachteten
gen offiziellen Besueh in Syrien und flog von Damaskus welter nach Kairo.
Pie Befiirchtung, nach Aegypten und Irak werde such die syrische
Regierung einen langjahrigen Freundschafts- und Bcistandspakt mit der
Sowjetunion schliessen, hat sich jedoch nicht bestatigt.
Von unserern Korrespondenten
auch den amerikanischen Prasi-
denten Nixon bci seinen bevorste-
Gretschko hatte mrnrend seine
Aufenthaltes in Damaskus nahezt
pausenlos mit Staatsprasident Gene.
ral Asad, dem syrischen Premiermini-
ster, Aussenminister unci Verteldi-
gungsminister konferiert. Er konnte
seine Gesprachspartner jedoch offen-
kundig nicht davon Oberzeugen, ciass
em n Vertrag nach dem Muster der
.Abkommen mit Agypten und
Irak im Interesse des Gastlandes lie-
ge. Weder aus amtlichen noch aus
den inoffiziellen Angaben nach der
Abreisc des sowjetischen Gastes gcht
hervor, dass sich das syrisch-sowjeti-
sche Verhaltnis in nachster Zukunft
intensiviercn wird. Beiruter Sowjet-
kreise zeigten am Sonntag denn auch
dcutliche Enttaischung Ober Verlauf
und Ergebnis der Gretschko-Mission
in dem Nachbarland.
Wahrend der Anwesenbeit :des
Moskauer Verteidigungsministth iin
. Damaskus war aus Ostblockquellen
in der nahostlichen Nachrichtenborse
. Beirut durehgesickert, der Kreml:b6-
trachte den Abschluss eines PalC.'ts
mit Syrien als vorlaufigen
? SchluBstein seiner vorderorientali-
schen EinfluBsphare. In Moskau
schcint man damit gerechnct zu
ha-
beb, gestiltzt auf gesiehcrte' langfri-
stip Positionen in den drei wiehtig-
sten arabischen Hauptstlidten
Bagdad und Damaskus nicht nur
eine ?Pax sovietica) diktieren, son-
nencten uesprecnungen mit bre-
schnew, Kossygin und Podgorny mit
einem zum kommunistischen Em-
fIuLccth gcIze,det Nahon
Osten konfrontiercn zu kortnen. Der
Widerstand des Prlisidenten Asad
und seiner Regicrung verdarb den
Rtissen zunachst dieses Konzept.
Uebereinstimmend erzielt wurden
nach syrischen Quellen die
schon wiihrend des geheimgehaltenen
Beauches von Generalstabschef Ge-
ne* Chakkur grundsitzlich verein-
baften neuen Waffenlieferungen. Sy-
tier" wird demzufolge urtter anderem
Sm3-Raketen erhalten und durch
weitere moderne Sowjetwaffen sein
.Sfeherheitsbedtirfnis gegen den nur
rund 40 Kilometer vor seiner Haupt-.
stadt stehenden israelischen Gegner
besSer als bisher stillen konnen. Es
kOnnte sich jedoch erfolgreich gegen
cinen politischen Preis ftir diese
wehren.
Staatschef Asad hat ftir diese Zu-
rilekhaltung irn Urngang mit den
Sowjets vor allem zwoi Grtinde: Die
Ruissen sind in Syrien womoglich
noch weniger popullir als in Aegyp-
ten. Alles, was mit den sowjebischen
Rtistungslieferungen zu tun hat,
wird daher hierzulande soit langem
iiusserst geheim gehalten. Selbst hohe
Regierungsbeamte, deren politisehe
Zuverlassigkeit ausser Zweifel stcht,
mtissen sich auf abentetierlichen Urn-
wegen .aus der westeuroptiischen?
Presse Ober den Umfang der roten
Waf fenhilfe informicren. Spricht
man amtoene vertreter der syrIschen
Regie'rung auf die Sowjethilie an,
bekommt man zur Antwort, das
,d LaL ,cgeiubr don Igr-cli
ein wesentliob grosseres Sicherheits-
,bedilrfnis als andere arabische Swa-
ttcn, habe aber gegenwiirtig keine
anderen potentiellen Waffenlieferan-
'en. Zweitens ist Damaskus von sei-
nen Verbtindeten Aegypten und Li-
hyen in der ?(Fiicleration Arabischer
Republiken? (FAR) offcnbar ein be-
sonderer Part zugcdacht. Das Land
soil eine wichtige Rolle bci der In-
stallicrimg eincr net= Art ?Schau-
kelpolitilo> zwischen zwei ausserara-
bischen Wehten spielen. Wiihrcncr
Aegypten gezwungen ist, ganz auf
die sowjetische Karte zu setzcn,
spielt Syrien den chinesischen
Trumpf. Das zcigte sich deutlich in
der Behandlung des Gretschko-Besu-
ches durch die gelenkte Damaszener
Presse. Sie berichtcte verhaltnismiis-
sig zurtickhaltend Ober die Gesprii-
che des Moskauer Castes, wiihremi
seiner Anwesenheit aber erstaunlich
detailliert tiber die bevorstehende
Reise des Damaszener Aussenmini-
sters nach Peking.
Die Sowjets verhehlten in Gesprii-
chen mit westlichen Bcobachtern am
Wochenende nicht ihre Enttiiuschung
Ober dicscs (cDoppelspiel Syriensa. ,
Die Araber erwiesen sich, so filgten
Ostblockdiplomaten hinztt, immer '
molls als gsohwierige Verbilndete*.
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CPYRGHT
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BASLER NACHRICHTEN, Basel
17 May 1972
IS SYRIA PLAYING THE CHINESE TRUMP CARD?
Soviet Defense Minister Marshal urecnico endea his four-day official
visit to Syria, a visit which was followed with great attention through-
out the Near East, and flew from Damascus to Cairo. The fear that the
Syrian government, following Egypt and Irak, would also conclude a
long term frienship and support pact with the Soviet Union, proved un-
justified, however.
During his stay in Damascus, Grechko conferred almost uninterruptedly
with State President General Asad, the Syrian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister
and Defense Minister. But evidently he was unable to convince these officials
that a treaty modelled on the agreements with Egypt and Irak would be in the
interests of their country. Nothing in official or unofficial statements
following the departure of the Soviet guest indicates an intensification of
Syrian-Soviet relations in the near future. Soviet circles in Beirut showed
on Sunday that they too were plainly disillusioned with the way the Grechko
mission in the neighboring country went and with its outcome. While the Soviet
Defense Minister was in Damascus, the news seeped through in Beirut from East
bloc sources that the Kremlin regarded conclusion of a pact with Syria as the
final move, for the time being, in its Near Eastern sphere of influence. With
its long term positions assured in the three vital Arab capitals of Cairo,
Bagdad and Damascus, Moscow seemed to count not only on dictating a pax Sovie-
tica, but also on confronting President Nixon during his forthcoming discussions
with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny with a Near East belonging tothe Communist
sphere of influence. As of now, the resistance of President Asad and his govern-
ment has spoiled the Russian plan. According to Syrian sources, Final agreement
was reached on the new weapons deliveries that had already been agreed upon in
principle during the secret visit of General Staff Chief General Chakkur. Under
its terms Syria will receive, among other things, SAM 3 rockets, and thanks to
additional modern Soviet weapons wi11 be able to meet its security requirements
against the Israeli opponent. That opponent is only about 40 kilometers away
from the Syrian capital. And yet Syria successfully avoided paying a political
price for that assistance.
Chief of State Asad had two reasons in particular for his reserve in
dealing with the Soviets: if anything, the Russians are even less popular in
Syria than in Egypt. Everything having to do with Soviet arms deliveries has
therefore been kept very secret in this country for a long time. Even high
government officials, whose political reliability is above doubt, must resort
to elaborate roundabout ways to learn from the Western press about the extent
of Red arms aid. When Syrian government officials are asked about this Soviet
aid, they reply that their country has considerably higher security requirements
vis-a-vis Israel than other Arab states, and yet has no other potential source
of weapons supply at present. Secondly, Damascus is evidently assigned a -
special role by its allies Egypt and Libya in the Federation of Arab Republics.
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CPYRGHT
Ampteavpdf gicAcAusGt lAWQR/caliociArR 9A3-191.Q1 OMAN (PM 41%1914
"seesaws' policy started between two non-Arab powers. While Egypt is forced to
play everything on the Soviet card, Syria plays the Chinese trump. This was
clearly seen in the way the controlled Damascus press handled the Grechko vi-
sit. The Moscow visitor's talks were reported with comparative restraint, but
during his visit the press gave amazingly detailed coverage to the forthcoming
trip of the Syrian foreign minister to Peking.
On the weekend, Soviets conversing with Western observers made no secret
of their disappointment over Syria's "double game." East bloc diplomats added
that the Arabs are proving to be increasingly "difficult allies."
DER BUND, Bern
17 May 1972
Approv
Kommunisten in der Bagdader Regieru
Moskau verlangt seinen Preis fiir den sowjetisch-lrakIsehen Paki 110
A. Beirut. Zwei KoritnNisten, die, Zen-
tralkomitce- und Politbilro-Mitglieder
Abdullah El-Amir und Makram El-Tala-
bani, sind seit Anfang dieser Woche Mit-
glieder der am Sonntag ilberraschend urn-
gebildeten Regierung de Militardiktators
t General Achmed Hassan El-Bakr in Irak.
Das Paradoxe darin ist, class die irakische
Kommunistische Partei offiziell noch im-
suer verboten ist und Hunderte ihrer Mit-
glieder hingerichtet wurden oder ohne
orderitlichen Prozess in den Zuchthausern
?v?-ttecken.
,k Die Ernennung zweier KP-Politiker zu
Ministern ohne Geschaftsbereich ist die
, Erffillung einer Klausel des auf 15 Jahre
befristeten Freundschafts- und Beistands-
paktes, den Staatsprasident El-Bakr und
Ministerprasident Kossygin im April in
Bagdad unterzeichnet hatten. In dieser
Klauscl verpflichtete sich die irakische
Regierung, die Verfolgung der Kommuni-
sten zu beenden und ihnen eine politische
Willensbildung im Rahrnen der regieren-
den Partei ?Baaths zu gewahrleisten. Der
Umstand, dass bisher weder das formelle
, Parteiverbot aufgehoben wurde, noch die
inhaftierten Parteimitglieder aus ihrer
teilweise jahrelangcn Haft entlassen wur-
: den, lasst jedoch darauf schliessen, dass
das irakische Militarregime die Betati-
gungsmoglichkeit fiir die Kommunisten
in engen Grenzen zu halten bestrebt ist.
Die beiden kommunistischen Minister
ha'ben denn such nicht viel mchr als Alibi-
funktion. In Bagdad sind namlich such
die Kabinettsmitglieder nur Erftillungsge-
hilfen der obersten Fiihrung. El-Amir und
qTalabani haben zudern nicht ,einmal
em Kabinettsressort. Bagdader politische
Kreise bezeichnen sic denn auch als
gstaatlich bezahlte Politpensionare?.
Keine Sowjetunterstiitzung fur die
Kurden mehr
Das Kabinettsrevirement, das den bei-
ed re rReVatre 1999/09/1,2pc-C I A-
ora ionspos en verha , ist der ira -Belie ?
3
Teil eines politischen Geschaftes mit der
Sowjetunion, bei dem die Vorteile ein-
deutig auf seiten Bagdads liegen. Der
Kreml hat sich laut Beiruter Gewahrs- ,
leuten auf exilirakischer und kurdischcr
Seite verpflichtet, die kurdischen Auto-
. nomiebestrebungen im Norden Iraks kiinf-
tig nicht mehr zu unterstutzen. Die Kur-
den kiimpfen seit iiber 50 Jahren fur ei-
nen unabhangigen Staat oder doch fur die
politische und wirtschaftliche Autonomic
innerhalb des arabischen Iraks. Thr An- ,
Mirror ist der heute liber 70jahrige Ge-
neral Mustafa Mulla El-Barzani, der ?
ohne Kommunist zu sein ? in Moskau aus- ,
gebildet wurde und nach dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg Oberhaupt einer kurzlebigen
Kurdcnrepublik im aserbeidschanisch-per-
sischen Grenzgebiet unter dem Protekto-
rat Stalins war. Die Kurden lieferten der
irakischen Regierung zehn Jahre lang
blutige Kampfe, und erst Militardiktator
El-Bakr machte diesem kraftezehrenden
Ringen scheinbar em n Ende. Er gewahrte
den Kurden Autonomierechte und er-
nannte El-Barzani zu seinem Vizeprasi-
denten. Das kurdische Misstrauen blieb
jedoch so gross, dass sich der Kurden-
fiihrer weigerte, nach Bagdad zu gehen
und scin Amt anzutreten. Er blieb lieber
in seinem Hauptquartier Hadsch Umran
im unzuganglichen gebirgigen Norden
des Landes. In letzter Zeit kam es spora-
disch zu neuen Gefechten zwischen iraki-
schen Regierungstruppen und kurdischen
yartisanen. ? , ? ,
El-Barzani hatte den sowjetischen Mini-
sterprasident wiihrend (lessen Aufenthal-
tes in Irak zu einem Gesprach in sein
1-1a.uptquartier eingefaden. Kossygin igno-
rierte jedoch die Offerte und verpflichtete
sich gegenilber den arabischen Gastge-
bern, die Unterstiltzung der Kurden ein-'
zustellen. Seitdem preist Radio Moskau
den antiimperialistischen Freiheitskampf
des kurdischen Volkes fiir seine legitimen
RDP7944194A0 002001 4000
ten auch keine sowjetischen Waffen mehr
1-9
CPYRGHT
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DER BUND, Bern
17 May 1972
COMMUNISTS IN THE BAGDAD GOVERNMENT
As of the beginning of this week, two communists, members of the
Central Committee and of the Politburo, Abdullah El-Amir and Makram
El-
Talabani, have become members of military dictator General Achmed Hassan
El-Bakr's Iraqi government, which was restructured unexpectedly on Sunday.
The paradoxical element in this situation is that the Iraqi Communist
Party is still officially banned, and hundreds of its members have been
executed or jailed without due process.
The appointment of two communist party politicians as ministers
without portfolio is the fulfillment of a stipulation in the friendship
and assistance treaty, limited to 15 years and signed in April by the
President of the Republic, El Bakr and Premier Kossygin in Bagdad.
The Iraqi government committed itself in this clause to cease persecuting
the communists and to guarantee them influence ,in the determination of
policy within the framework of the ruling Baath Party. The fact that the
formal ban of the communist party has not been repealed as yet, and that
arrested party members have not been set free from their, in some cases
year-long, imprisonment, raises the thought that the Iraqi military regime
is trying to keep the possibility for action by the communists within
narrow limits. Therefore the purpose of the two communist ministers is
not much more than a mere excuse. In Bagdad, even Cabinet members are only
assistants executing orders of the highest leaders, and El-Amir and El-
Talabami do not even have an area of responsibility. Political circles in
Bagdad therefore call them "politicial pensioners paid by the state."
No More Soviet Support for the Kurds
The restructuring of the cabinet which helped the two communists.
obtain decorative positions without influence, is the Iraqi portion of a
political deal with the Soviet Union, in which the advantages lie clearly
with :Bagdad. According to reliable sources, exiled Iraqi and Kurds in
Beirut, the Kremlin has committed itself to cease supporting the efforts
of the Kurds in the north of Iraq for autonomy. The Kurds have been fight-
ing for more than 50 years, for the establishment of an independent state,
or, at least for political and economic autonomy within Arabian Iraq. The
now 70-year-old General Mustafa Mulls. El-Barzani is their leader; he was
trained in Moscow without having been a communist, and after World War II
he was head of a short-lived republic of Kurds under the protectorate of
,Stalin, in the Azerbaidjani-Iranian borderland. For ten years the Kurds
fought bloody battles with the Iraqi government, and only the military
dictator EI-Bakr has seemingly put an end to this energy-consuming struggle.
He granted autonomous rights to the Kurds and appointed El-Barzani as his
vice president. However, the Kurds remained so suspicious, that the leader
of the Kurds refused to travel to Bagdad to take up his office. He preferred
to remain in his headquarters, Hadi UMran, in the inaccessable mountainous
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north of the country. Lately, new fights between Iraqi government troops
and Kurd partisans have flared up sporadically.
El-Barzani invited the Soviet Premier for talks at his headquarters,
while the latter stayed in Iraq. Kossygin, however, ignored this offer
and committed himself vis-a-vis his Arabian hosts, to cease supporting the
Kurds. Since then, Radio Moscow no longer praises the anti-imperialistic
struggle for freedom of the Kurdish people to obtain their legitimate rights,
and the Kurds no longer receive Soviet weapons.
GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
15 April 1972
Moscow: still busy making friends
CPYRGHT
Alexei Kosygin's visit to Bagdad last
week ? the first ever by a Soviet Premier
to Iraq ? marks an astonishing improve-
ment in relations between the two coun-
tries after a long period in the shadows.
The greater degree of cooperation be-
tween the two nations initiated during the
February visit to Moscow of Iraqi "strong-
man" and deputy chairman of the Council
of the Revolution Saddam Hussein, was;
consolidated last Sunday with the
signing of a treaty of friendship and co--
operation. There can be no doubt that
this pact represents another success for
the Soviet Union in its bid to strengthen
its influence in the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf. .
The treaty is also an indication that the
Kremlin, set .on its guard by anti-Com-
munist repression in Khartum and
Cairo's momentary flirtation with Wash-
ington, wants to increase and diversify its
alliances in the Arab World.
The text of the Bagdad agreement is
virtually identical to that signed between
the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971,
except that this earlier pact spelled out
greater involvement by the two signa-
tories in the Middle East conflict, in the
military sphere, and in constructing and
defending Egyptian Socialism.
But if the Egyptian-Soviet pact falls
squarely into the frame_work of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the agreement with Iraq
testifies to Moscow's concern with assur-
ing its presence in the Persian Gulf, which
harbours the world's largest oil reserves.
In a transparent attempt to upstage
China in this region and rival the United
States, which is well established in Turkey
end Saudi Arabia, the USSR already main-
tains diplomatic relations with the United
Arab Emirates.
It was unable to do as-much with Qatar
and Bahrein, but it does have a port of
call in Aden for its warships from the
Indian Ocean, while its fishing vessels sail
at will through the Gulf, thanks to agree-
ments with Iraq and the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of South Yemen. Some of
these vessels on "special missions" have
been sighted regularly at the entry to the
Persian Gulf and the Red.Sea.
As part of its design to secure its
position in the region, the USSR, while
maintaining good relations with Tehran,
seeks at state level to exercise a tri-
partite mediation mission ? along with
Damascus and Bagdad, whose own rela-
tions have improved ? between Kurds and
Arabs to maintain peace in Kurdistan.
And finally to eliminate differences be-
tween the Beath and Communist parties
so as to pave the way to a "national front"
in Iraq.
Success of such a policy would be cer-
tain to strengthen the hand of the "pro-
gressive" Arab oil producers in their
dealings with Western petroleum inter-
ests ? particularly the Americans. The
treaty just signed in Bagdad also repre-
sents an important card in the Soviet
hand only weeks before the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Paradoxi-
cally, evert though Saddam Hussein is
soon to visit Paris. Europe, which is the
main user of Iraqi crude oil as well as the
petroleum products of the Persian Gulf,
remains a virtual spectator in a part of the
world that is vital to its Interests.
CBRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972
CPYRGHT
Soviet gains in Persian Gulf
. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit
to Iraq and the signing of a 15-year Soviet-
Iraqi friendship treaty have manifold
meanings, but the most immediately sig-
nificant are these:
The Russians have gained an important
toehold in the Middle East oil industry,
and they have greatly strengthened their
position in the Persian Gulf.
Mr. Kosygin's visit was timed to co-
incide with the formal inauguration of the
Soviet-financed North Rumeila oil field,
and is now owned by the Iraq National
Oil CoMpany. Not only the Russians but
other East European countries will pre-
sumably be major purchasers of crude oil
from Rumeila. As Soviet tankers ply the
gulf, Soviet warships are likely to be
frequent visitors to Iraqi ports.
The treaty with Iraq is similar to those
that the Soviet Union concluded last year
with Egypt and India. Both sides under-
take not to join alliances without consult-
ing the other, nor to allow bases hostile -
to the other to be established on their
endWait, CORN ciAttgra#4**Acierigitib
CPYRGHT
AO* Otectif Fot ROVISV19/139IO2:
ably vague, but undoubtedly it means
more Soviet arms aid for Iraq.
The Persian Gulf states in general and
Iran in particular may feel considerable
concern at Iraq's opening the door to a
Russian presence in this strategic water-
way. Since the withdrawal of the British
military forces from the area at the end
of last year, Iran has sought to fill the
leadership role in the gulf. Iraq is tradi-
tionally jealous of Iran, and by signing
the treaty with the Soviet Union un-
doubtedly hopes to enhance its own posi-
tfe- rnitegtemicrootrimpuiti-9
sians have cultivated good relations with
Iran in recent years and sought to re-
assure the Shah as to their intentions by
emphasizing that the treaty with Iraq is
not directed at any other country.
For the Soviet Union, the new treaty is
clearly part of an overall strategic pattern
of winning friends and strengthening ties
around the periphery of Asia. It comes at
a time when the United States once again
has its attention focused on Indo-China
and the war in Vietnam.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972
CPYRGHT
Moves in east, south, and west
Soviets push interests in Asia
;t( qtates is deeply occupied
in Souincast ,;.e new North Vietnam-
ese offensive, the Soviets are rapidly ad-
vancing their own interests at Asia's south-
ern and eastern limits.
There is expectation here that the Soviet-
Iraqi 15-year treaty signed in Baghdad
April 10 may be followed by one with Syria.
A Soviet-Turkish friendship pact, follow-
ing Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny's
scheduled visit to Turkey April 11 to 18,
might also be brewing.
If so, this would be the boldest Soviet dip-
lomatic advance yet into what Washington
used to call the "northern tier" states ?
which United States administrations, be-
ginning with that of President Truman in
1946 and 1947, sought to erect as A barrier
to Soviet influence.
By 1958?when the Iraqi revolution dashed
the U.S. plan of an anti-Soviet Baghdad
Pact including Arab states anchored on Iraq
?Moscow already had leaped over Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan, where U.S. influence
was strong, and was concentrating instead '
on the Arab states of Syria and Egypt.
Today, West Pakistan?after losing East
Pakistan in last December's war with So-
viet-backed India to the new secessionist
state of Bangladesh?finds itself in direct
economic and political trouble.
Pakistani President Zulfikar All Bhutto
faces breakaway movements in Pakistan's.
Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan regions,
and a rising wave of protest over India's
failure to release about 90,000 Pakistani
war prisoners.
In Iran ? where President Nixon is due,
.to stop May 30 and 31 for talks with Shah
NIuhammad Reza Pahlavi after President
:Nixon's Moscow visit ? Moscow has an
-improving image and growing economic
:investments.
Possible topic
!: One of the points that President Nixon
:and the Shah might discuss is the real mean-
ng of the new Soviet-Iraqi pact ? and the
tmeaning of whatever new Soviet-Turkish ar-
4.angements might come out of this week's
:podgorny visit to Turkey.
4. Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin returned
',from Baghdad to Moscow April 10 after
signing the 15-year treaty with Iraqi Presi-
dent Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr.
Earlier, Mr. Kosygin attended the inau-
guration of Iraq's Soviet-backed North
Rumeila oil field. Arrangements were an-
nounced for first tanker deliveries of Iraqi
crude oil to the Soviet Union during a forth-
coming new Soviet naval visit to Iraq's
Persian Golf ports.
The Soviet-Iraqi pact provides for politi-
'eel, cultural, and defense links?like the old
:Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact and its
.low-feeble successor, the Central Treaty
*Organization.
Along the lines of last year's Soviet-Indian
and Soviet-Egyptian treaties, both Iraq and
the Soviet Union pledge themselves not to
6
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allow each other's territory to be used for
hostile bases.
Interest expressed
Interest in Iraqi oil, and Iraq's apparent
Interest in substituting Russian for Western
technology for developing it, is expressed in
clauses on economic, scientific, and techni-
cal cooperation.
In his speech at the North Rumeila oil
ceremonies, Mr. Kosygin promised Soviet
help to Arab peoples to "free their wealth"
from "Western monopolies."
Neither Mr. Kosygin nor the treaty text,
however, referred directly to Israel, accord-
ing to Baghdad Radio reports. Article four
of the treaty does say both states will con-
tinue fighting "imperialism, zionism, and
colonialism."
Analysts here believe use of the word
"Zionism" spells continued Soviet refusal to
promise publicity to fight Israel.
Treaty scorned
The anti-Soviet Beirut newspaper Al-
Hayat said the treaty "ignores the libera-
tion of Arab territory."
The state radio of Col. Muammar al-
Qaddafi's Libyan regime scorned it as "a
new pact of the imperialist type." After
a Moscow visit by Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein al-Takriti in February, the Libyan
Government condemned signing of Arab-
Soviet pacts as reviving "imperialism" and
as a violation of the Arab League charter?
which pledges preservation of independence
and sovereignty of member states.
The Soviet commitment to Iraq's defense
is less rigid than that to Egypt in the May,
1971 Egyptian-Soviet treaty.
Before the 1967 Arab-Israel war, Moscow
was Iraq's main arms supplier. It replaced
some of Iraq's 1967 aircraft losses.
From 1968 to 1970, Iraq bought tanks?
armored cars, transport planes, and heli-
copters from France.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 August 1971
CPYRGHT
Soviets t rust into k sia's flank
New pact stiffens Indian alliance
With dramatic suddenness, the Soviet,
Union has moved to bolster its influence in
turmoil-riddezi southern Asia.
It has signed a 20-year treaty of peace,
friendship, and cooperation with India.
which, in the opinion of diplomatic observ-
ers here, seeks two broad goals:
? To deter an outbreak of hostilities be-
tweeh India and Pakistan by making clear,
which side the Soviet Union would back.
? To consolidate the already solid Soviet
position in India in the face of Washington's
diplomatic rapprochement with Communist
China.
Article 9 of the treaty provides that the
twa4sides will consult in the event of attack
on either country by a third party and "take
appiopriate effective measures" to ensure,
peace and security. It also provides that in
the event of an armed conflict involving one
country the father signatory will not give the
third country any assistance.
Western diplomats believe that this.
article also gives the Russians leverage to
? put pressure on India to prevent a conflict.
, However, if ho$tilities were to break out be-
tween India and Pakistan, Moscow ,has
. pledged itself not to help Pakistan.
? Sequel to U.A.R.? accord
The treaty was signed in New Delhi Aug.
9 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko and Indian Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh. Mr. Gromyko immediatelyt
hailed the pact as a document Contributing,
' to stronger peace in Asia. ? -
?
! Significant in an historical'context; this is'
the second time in three months the Ras-
, sians have adopted long-term commitments
with non-Communist bountries. In May they
signed a 15-year treaty with the United
Arab Republic. The Soviet Union is ,thus
moving vigorously to formalize and consoli-
date its relations with nonaligned countries.
It is generally agreed here that in the
. subcontinent Moscow's role has, bee* one..
of a pacifier. Because conflict and hostility
. merely invite Chinese involvement, the Rus-
sians have a strong interest in maintain-
" ing stability in the region..
Since the Tashkent Declaration of 1966?
which put an end to the Indian-Pakistani
war, the Russians have sought good rela-
tions with all countries in aoUth Asia, inelud.
Ing Pakistan, although their primary influ?
ence and investment is in India.
In this connection, what will now be close-
ly watched is Pakistan's reaction. Some ob-
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7
serversacir thid aasitiamiluhe
Appro e itse : CI
closer ties with Peking. This would lead to a
polarization of the area which the Russians
have sought to avoid.
Diplomats think the Russians, however,.
concerned about an outbreak of war, had to
weigh the risks of polarization against the
gains of securing their interests and voice
in India.
New Delhi, for its part, apparently wanted
an increased commitment from the Soviet
Union in view of the latter's policy of balanc-
ing its relations as between Pakistan and
India. In this despect the treaty is seen to be!
a victory for the Indians.
'Status quo backed
It is also suggested that in Article 10
India has recognized Moscow's present ob-
Iigations to Pakistan. Under this article,
each party declares it has no commitments
, and will not undertake any commitments
;with other states that may cause military
damage to the other party. This seems to
confirm the status quo.
, Poliical observers note that the treaty
differs from the Soviet-U.A.R. pact in many
.respects, a fact that reflects Moscow's dif;
fere nt relationship wih India. The Soviet-
411s?caff 10E1
.ing India far more freedom of' maneuver
and independence,
The New Delhi pact, to cite another con-
trast, states that the U.S.S.R. respects In.,
dia's policy of "nonalignment." This term
is not spelled out in the U.A.R. treaty,
although Egypt considers itself a nonaligned
nation.
Other provisions
?
Other provisions of the Soviet-Indian,
treaty call for regular contacts on major
international problems and a pledge to
strengthen economic, scientific, and techni-'
cal. cooperation. The agreement will come..
int; force only after ratification.
Meanwhile, since the tragic events in East'
Pakistan, Moscow has been scrupulously
correct in its relations with both New,
Delhi and Islamabad. In April Prtsident
Pocigorny sent a message to President.
Yahya Khan in which he expressed concern,
a
well as hope for a "peaceful politic
settlement."
While measurei have been urged to stop,
the repressions, Pakistan has not been cone.
demised outright.
The,Soviet press treats the two halves of.
Pakietan as one country, referring carefully:
f "Mitt+ rini?24.4. /I --- ? -???19, ?__???? a????
9
W?-?-?-?-?2?-??-?7?ZW7.. rZW?71.=?f:W...
M1.1Wi..1?1?1/A111=Sr..W...E?W NIV SSSSS 1.1.1?T?r..W
?
AciPpYsYckft or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200140001-9
1 The treaty announcement came against
the teeming backdrop of Delhi's largest-ever
rally supporting the ruling Congress Party.
An estimated 1 million people poured into
the capital over the weekend to join a Con-
gress-sponsored show of national solidarity.
The treaty news was greeted by jubilant
shouts. "Hindi, Russi, bhai bhai" ("Indians,
Russians, brothers").
Four points for talks ,
Speculation preceding the treaty focused
on the Bangle Desh issue, touchstone of cur-
rent Indian domestic and foreign thinking.
Talks between Indian officials ahd M.
Gromyko were slated to cover four points;
'Ban& Desh; socioeconomic strains caused
:by the refugee influx; the Chinese-Americah.
thaw, and separate Chinese and American
assurances of support to Pakistan.
Indian anticipation wa limited to a joint
communiqu?not a treaty. But concern that
the Russians would propose Tashkent-style
negotiation were floated mainly by pro-West
elements. After weeks of weathering blis-
tering attacks on their ineffectual foreign
policy, government circles now feel vindi-
cated.
Hope that the Russians would consider
India a worthy junior partner in restoring
the balance of power upset by the Chinese-
American thaw was tenuous. But founda-
tions for strengthening Soviet-Indian rela-
tions were laid soon after the visit of U.S.
presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger
to Peking. Mr. Kissinger's trip was cited
here as a triggering factor in the Indian
invitation to Moscow. Indians think the first
hint of Pakistani belligerency dates from
the Kissinger trip, giving the impression
that China would back Pakistani pugnacity
and that American reluctance to weaken
the thaw would prevent American opposi-
tion to the Chinese stance.
Visit not isolated ?
India sent former ambassador to Moscow
D. P. Dhar posthaste to meet Kremlin
leaders with minimum fanfare .for a top-
level mission. -
'There is little doubt that the urgency ex-
pressed in the Dhar-Moscow mission found
responsive echoes in the Kremlin. Prompt
Soviet acceptance of the bid for bilateral
talks Is seen here as recognition of the need
for both countries to make' public long-
standing ties.
Mr. Gromyko's visit is not an isolated epi
-
Bode but an important first step toward a
probable new perspective in India's foreign
relations. Relations with the United States
are heading for a new low.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told massed
crowds Monday that the treaty does not
mean the end of nonalignment but the
strengthening of India's hands. Indian initia-
tive in arranging the Gromyko visit is not
being concealed here.
New Delhi now feels assured of Soviet
backing on Bangle Desh but will probably
heed Moscow's advice to avoid giving Paki-
stan excuses to escalate rumblings of war.
Speculation now is focused on prospects
of Soviet help in tackling refugee-care costs
,and general deepening of economic. relit;
`Mons. Mr. Gromyko so far has neither ac-
cepted nor refused an invitation to. visit
refugee camps.
HINDUSTAN TIMES
10 August 1971
WAS TM
CESS
* M0
CPYRGHT
'? . Mr Gromyko was net exrig- When the gloss is removed are obviously the two countries,
,
gerating when he described the ,,hat 'Aands revealed is a M.., ingainst which India would need:
Iiinde-Sov let Treaty of Peace, .ear mutual security treaty.; ,t a "ex edible .deterrent" against '
Friendship and Co-operation as [Although the Treaty might not) "ari attack or a threat thereof".
La "most important landmark"Aquite commit India to a formal l tThe text of the Inclo-Soviet
,whose . significance "cannot be:lor automatic military alliance ITreaty Is strikingly similar t9
!overestimated". ? Mr Swann i,with the Soviet Union, thero,! ithe text of the UAll,-Sovirt
(Singh was more blunt in des- ,Is absolutely, no doubt that in Treaty signed last May. The
,cribifig the pact es. a . "Treaty tentering into a security, an.; ? global reactions may , not be
i"credible.,.deterrent to any world's two superpowers India, We have often argued thatl
;powers that may have aggres- has abandoned non-alignmenti(non-alignment ceased, to be a
sive designs on our territorial find wii1 in the eyes of Many 1 ,??,ey
1 as such with the- end
'integrity and sovereignty". He ithird countries be regarded IICIM"4
Jr of the cold war in a bi.,polar.;
. T? t f ? Peace ihaving aligned itself with the
1 world and the emergence of,
la Non-Aggression" and a angement with ono of that' very &Similar. ?
rr
calico
-against War and one that would !and
bloc. The United States,
-strengthen non-alignment ? ,"a and other western powers wills
,dynamic polies, which can bo: iinterpret it as such and China,
adapted to. AMPrCilfedttF9ialge*Onlgralga
itions". 1.even it
multi-polar power constel1a-1
tions. Thereafter, non-align-)
meat could only. be regarded
ilkaRDP79101494
independent oreign
9
rather than a policy in
;.The Indo-Soviet Treaty, how-'
lever, entails alignicie-tt withi
ithe Soviet Union which is
kilinged against the Ui?'`,A3tates,
fend, more acutely, C11 -.a. Twoi
!years ago Mr Brezhn. made,
in proposal for collectiv
!s?ity in Asia. This imme,.
?ioused a lifting of eyeb:.
liround the world. India
;questioned this idea and Sovift
?spokesmen were quick to ex-,
iplain that all that had beeni
'intended was regional economic
vu-operation and the renuncia-
tion of force in the settlement
of disputes, or peaceful co-1
ktt!ifi Obviously it is col-
40.044ity9 of *a trort0
,positive kind that Mr Swaran:
'Singh Is now promoting In.? 'the stalemate in Vietnam and
suggesting That APPfbiretleftOrgReleaser 1t999?09421:
Treaty prove a Tatterni Ale public opinion. It would7
for similar treaties between ilike to seek a rapprochementi
Sedia and other ? countries in,' ,with China, which cannot seri.'
this ,region". Would this tee( :ously threaten it for at least
ilude a similar treaty with th& ;another decade or more.
'j And And collective- security: Ipite . the ? growing detente in
whom?_.., (Mr NCbrt ;Europe the. -United States'
wilted this question when in principal . contender . for global
195f1 President Ayub Khan Isupremacy during the seventies%
'proposed joint 'defence between iremains the Soviet Union whit s
,India and Pakistan.) ;is sought to be prevented from
For more than two years ithrusting south to the oil rich
sow the Government f India ?areas of West Asia and Northi
has from time to time stated it ;Africa and, down to the Indian
,s
'
willingness to open a dialogue Ocean.' Hence the importance.,
with Peking. This sentimen0 of West Pakistan ,in American.
.
.was reiterated in Parliament) 'strategic thinking *and Pre-
last ay eit when Mr Swaranj "sident? IThron's ? military'anti.
Singh said that if. necessary; ;'political support to President
.India would be willing to Xahya Khan's regime. despite
"create cenditione for this' ;its possible distaste for ? what
purpose. given a ,favourable i ;has happened in East Bengal:
Chinese response, But all along i ;Washington's complete insene;
there haa been a fear off )litivity to India's thinking
Chinese support to Pakiittin In this. rnatter.and Dr Henry Kis-
the event of a crisis in Indo-4 :singer's reported statement to
Pakistan relations. This fear i ;Mr L. K. Jha that India must
, has continued to haunt policy-' mot count on i positive Aisle-
makers In Delhi with rising' !rfean response should China
;tension ?between India and Pak-i ;intervene in favour of Islamael
istan over Bangle.' flesh.' Mr 'bad in any Indo-Pakistan ?con-;
Swaran Singh in fact made! 'filet has probably m1stekenl31
'reference to this in his speech'. :added to the Governmett of;
on the occasion of the* signing, ;India's sense of loneliness ?n,1
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. He he -Bangle Desh issue , audi
'told Mr Gromyko that his visit iencouraged' It to seek securit
"coincided "with developments' iaseurences from, 'the Sovie
in this part of the world which; alnion. which Moseoay has. beest'?
are a matter of common con-. Tiacif?offer leiainst the' back.);
cern to both our countries and 'ground of its own global intere.
could jeopardise peace and.; eats. The United States has
security." For its pail, the,; pushed India much further;
Soviet Union. is locked in an: ; along than where' it rnigh
ideological and nationalist-: 'have ventured on its own. And
territorial power struggle with'?,,L?ttch 'has been the dismay aV,
'China. The signs of a Sino-TIS.t ? (American support. ? to Pakistani'
!thaw have caused some unease, 'in recent aYeeks that?Delhi has:.
in Moscow which is accordingly( :lodged a? diplomatic protest
ianxtous to buttress its own. with Washington over, these(
'position. It has quite eXpectedly.r acts?. .
:turned to India as among the In Our judgment the?GoVernel
'countries on which it can: itnent has overreacted to the
:nnrhor itself in Asia. The r(prospect of an 'Indo-Pakistan ?
;United States, in turn, is beingj 'conflict, the possibility' and:
?impelled ,to withdraw frclln; :scale of .hinese interventiorC
,Indo-China and the South-East tin any such event, and tile
iAsian mainland by virtue of :American attitude towardi
'Pakistan. China'e global inter" nra
CIA4RDP79491,19444009 ogiviota
.'and it would not lightly vene eueked, into the Sine-Sovie,
ture to ? launch on a major, reonflict? Whether it ; hee ??1
'trans-Himalayan war, to 'Pull'
;Islamabad's chestnuts out of st
(revolutionary fire. Were it to.,
!do so, India has ten mountain
;divisions poised to Meet just,
esuch a, threat, 'And In Aso reel
;mote possibility of their being
'overwhelmed, the seperpoweriel the preparations may have(
;especially .the Soviet Union 4 Ibeen hastened by more recoe
;could not afford to standby,: ;developments, It is surptising
idiy in _their own global, triter-, ,
. ? 'that the Prime Minister shoul
tes s. n P ? not havd thought fit to give
(situation of real.' crisis, Soviets Parliament or the countrY the
!support would have been forth-4 llightest inkling of such a pro
coming
withoutt I
.;found change despite nur4rous
,opportunities for doind so.
!whether in the External Affairs
IMinistry's annual report Or In
ithe course of parliamentary
Idebates or other public) pro-
notincements. There it 4" coin-
teidence of interests between
India and the Soviet Union in
;Asia. Even otheiwise, we
(would welcome a strengthening
(of the close and cordial eco-
nomic and political tics that
subsist between the two coiAn-
itrics. But we do regard Intilit
a potentially great power,
:and certainly a major factor
:in Asia which is neither $o"
.weak nor even so lonely as,
(to accept any arrangement that
;might reduce it to the status,
,of being anything less than
;equal in Its relations with any
!other country. The Soviet Union
;needs India as much as India
;needs the Soviet' Union. There
ils also no reason' to suppos
that this country cannot secure
!an honourable resolution of I
(differences with China or place
return gained any leverage in
'flexibility .over Bangle' ,pe.
remains to, tie seen. ,
It is quite clear that a Treittl
of such far-reaching Implica
tions could not have been negol
tinted overnight even ti !nigh:
If was merely soughte r,
!Pakistan politically,, a firmer,
enunciation of the earlier. Pod,6!
,gornr thesis might have
Now it is quite conceivable;
that the Indo-Soviet treaty will
?
antagonise China, bring Chine
and Pakistan even nearer, and
;widen the gulf between India
and the West. President NI:aired
foreign policy report to Con-)
tgress last March expressed a
US interest in ensuring tha
'the sub-continent did not be-
come a focus of great powe
conflict. It added that American
;activities in the area would be
'kept in balance with those of;
:the other major .powers
icernecl, namel?, the Soviet
Union arid ? China, which it;
tatated had' "legitimate" inter-',
(ests in the area. But It wertt,1
on to assert that.,"nci outsidel
?power ,has a 'claim to predomi-
'tient influence In the region."
In View of this declination thsi
'Americater may, for other
naaenseaatea?,,avaelisa:Latiet Its relations with the United
!strengthen 'Pak/gait r States on a more rational end
:and the RC') group to countorl ;mature footing. These .objec-
the Indo-Sctviet tives must Still be pursued a
the Indo-Soviet %Treaty :Migh' ;that India'S foreign and domes
;Nvell mark' the, bpginrihlz.,.of ,tie policies -remain completely
new cold war in .:thts,I.pat*'oCindependent and are guided b
the world ;3with.:' the') national Interest and arc)
zeye of the ,ateette; Could .ft Le; ;not overshadowed by the gl
;that India has entered-. into, sq Lbal ? intercits of howsoeve
liking-term ODMIX4itment , ouS ErklAy .jrnergavort,
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,ANNIMMINNIMIMINSIMI.16,fl P16, ?WilbilbooNeft
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HINDUSTAN TIMES
10 August 1571
I Text of Ind
CPYRGHT
Soviet treaty
INEW DELHI, Aug. 9?The fol-
lowing is the text of the treaty
of peace, friendship and co-ope-
rsition between the Republic ot
India and the Union .of Soviet
!Socialist Republics:
Desiroue of expanding and con-
solidating the existing relations of
isincere friendship between them,
Believine that the further deve-
lopment ot friendship and co.
operation *eta the basic national
Interests of, both . the States as
twen as the interests of lasting
;peace in Ada and the world,
I Determined to promote the con-
tolidation of universal peace and
security and to make steadfast
efforts for the relaxation of in-
ternational tendons and the final
elimination of , the remnants of
colonialism,
' Upholding their firm faith In
the principles of peaceful co-
existence and eo-operation ? be-
itween States with different poll.
tient and sociel systems,' .
Convinced that in the world to-
day international ? problems can
only be solved by co-operation
and not by conflict,
, Reaffirming their determination
to abide by the purposes and
principles of the United Nations
harter,
' The Republic of India on the
one side, and the Union of Soviet
;Socialist Republics on the other
side, have decided to conclude
'the present treaty for which put..
,poses the following plenipoten-
ttiaries have been appointed: ?
1 On behalf of the Republic of
India: Sardar Swaran Singh, Min-
ister of External Affairs.
? Oraibehtilf of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics: Mr A. A.
Gromyko, Minister .of Foreign
Affairs who, having each present-
ed their ? eredentials, which are
found to be in proper -form and
due order, .have agreed as fol-
lows:
. Artide. I .
" The high contracting parties
solemnly declare that enduring.
peace and friendship shall prevail
;between the two countries and
etheir peoples. Each party shell
respect the Independence, mover-
eighty and territorial integrity of
? the other party and refrain tram
;Interfering in the other's internal
!affairs. The ,high contracting par-
1 ties shall continue to develop and
consolidate the relations of sin-
cere friendship, good neighbourli-
ness and comprehensive co-opera-
tion existing , betWeen them on
the basis of the aforesaid prin-
ciples, as well as those of equality
and Mutual benefit,
? Article II
Guided by the desire to contri-
bute in every possible way to
ensure enduring peace and secu-
rity of their people, the high con-
tracting parties declare their
determination to continue their
efforts to preserve and to streng-
then peace in Asia and through-
out the world, to halt the arms
race and to achieVe general and
complete disarmament, including
both nuclear and conventional,
under? effective international ?con-
troL
.Article III
Guided by' their loyalty to the
-lofty ideal of equality of all peo-
? ples and nations, irrespective of
race or creed, the high contract-
ing parties condemn colonialism
and raclalisns in all forms and
manifestations; and reaffirm their
determination to strive for their
linal and complete elimination.
The high contracting parties
shall co-operate with other ?Statee
to achieve these aims and to sup-
port tho just aspirations of the
peoples in their etruggle against
colonialism and racial domination,
. Article IV
The Republic of India respects
the peace-loving policy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics aimed at strengthening friend-
ship and co-operation- with all
nations.
The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics reepects India's policy
of non-alignment and reaffirms
that this policy constitutes an im.
portant factor in the maintenance
of universal peace and interna-
tional security and in the lessen-
Ing of tensions in the world.
Article V ?
? Deeply interested in ensuring
'universal peace and security, at-
taching great importance to their
mutual co-operation in the intr.
iational field for achieving these
alms, the high ccintracting parties
will 'maintain regular contacts
with each other on major ? inter.
national :.problems affecting the
?interests of both the Statea by
means of meetings and exchange
of views between their leading
stateemen, visits by official dele-
gation's and special envoys cif tho
two Governments, and . through
diplomatic channels. .
Article VI
Attaching greet importance to
economic, scientific and technoe
logical co-operation between them
the high contracting parties will
continue to consolidate and ex-
pand mutually advantageous and
comprehensive co-operation in
these fields as well as expand
ti ade, transpert- and communica-
tions between them- on the basis
of the 'principles of equality,
mutual benefit ' and ?mot-favour.
ed-nation - treatment, subject to
the existing ' agreements and the
special arrangements 'with conti-
guous countries as ? specified in
the Indo-Sovlet trade agreement
of Dec. 20, 1D70.
Article VII ?
-The high contracting parties
than promote further develop.
matt of ties and contacts between,
them in the fields of science, art,
literature, education, publics
health, Press, radio, television..
cinema, tourism' and sports.
Article VIII
In accordance with the tradie'
Mond friendship established be.;
tween the two countries each of
the high contracting particle
? solerrinly declares that It shalt,
not enter into or participate in'
any military alliance directed
against the other. party.' ?
Each high contracting party,
undertakes to abstain ? from any
aggression against the other part7.
and to prevent the u of its
territory for the commission of
any act which relight inflict
tar)' damage on the other high
contracting party. .
Atticle IX ?
Eadh high contracting Party
undertakes to abstain from pro-
viding any assistance to any ,third
party that engages in armed con-
flict with the other party: In the.
event of either party being suis-,1
Jected to an attack or a threat'
thereof, the high contracting par.
ties shall immediately enter into si
mutual consultations in orcier to.4
remove such threat and to take
appropriate effective mei:mires to
ensure peace and the ,security of
' ?
? ?,;
their countries.
? Article X
? Each high contracting party ,
solemnly declares that ?it than/
not enter into . any obligation,...
secret or public, with one or Moro 4
States, which is incompatible with
this treaty. Each high contracting ,
party further decleres that no
obligation exists, nor shall any
obligetion be entered into, be-
tween itself and any other State
or States, which might causal
military damage to the other ?
party. ? , ?? .
. Article XI
? This' treaty is concluded for the
duration of 20 years and will be I
automatically 'extended for each.,
successive period of five years
unless either high contracting
party declares its desire to termie
nate it by giving notice to the
other high contracting party 12
months prior to the expiration of:.
the treaty. The treaty will bo
subject to ratification and will
come into force on the date of
the exchange of instruments a,
ratification which will take place
in Moscow within one month of ?I
the signing of this treaty.
? Article XII
Any difference a interpretetion
of any article or articles of this
treaty- which may arise between
the high contracting partici, will;
be settled Winter-idly by raerful
means in a Anirlt of mutu -I res..
pect . and understanding.
The said plenipotentlarlen heve
signed the present treaty
Russian and English, all '..exts
being equally authentic rind have
affixed thereto their scale.
? Done in New Delhi on the ninth
des, of August in the year ono
thousand - nine hundred ? and
seventy one.
On behalf of the
Republic of India
(Sd.) 'Sweren Singh
-Minister a External Affairs.
? On behalf of the
?
. e Union of Soviet Soeialist
.ApU)IiC$.
,(Sd.) A A. ( irorsyko*
Minister of Foreign -??.ffsirs.-,
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11
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
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BALTIMORE SUN
11 August 1971
India
fl PRAN SAIIILIRWAL
Neu> Delhi Burton oi The Sun
New Delhi?The Indian public
and its representatives in Par-
liament welcomed yesterday
what they considered an "alli-
ance" with the Soviet Union.
t "Nothing in recent times has
1,electrified) the people so much
' as signing" of the 20-year pact
1
;of friendship Monday, the Indian
'minister of external affairs,
Swaran Singh, told the Indian
.Parliament yesterday. and East Germany.
The minister declared that the Some members called the
pact represented no deviation signing of the treaty a "red-let-
from India's non-alignment. In a ter day in Indian history." And
listless six-hour debate on the there was general criticism of
treaty in the Parliament, mem- , the United States and the west-
hers gave the treaty massive! crn powers in their relations
support not for what the treaty with India. ?
said but for what it meant in Members said the U.S. ap-
view of threats of general war prapch to India has always been
by the Pakistani president A. M. 'partisan toward Pakistan. ?
Yatlya Khan, if India continues A spokesman from the ruling
to support the East Pakistan Congress Party said that the
Bengali rebels. Soviet Union has always been a
A typical interpretation of the "true friend of India" in many
treaty in the Indian press yes- of the critical times faced by the
terday was: The Soviet Union nation. They said in all the
will come to India's help in cage wars, including the Sino-Indian
an attack or threats of an war of 1962 and Indo-Pakistan
attack by Pakistan, China or war of 1965, it was Russia which
any other country." came to the aid of India.
Members of Parliament inter!. Soviet Neutrality
preted the treaty to mean a de-
fense alliance between two na-
tions. They expressed hope and
expectation that the Russians
elcornes Pact Of Friendship
With Soviet
will come to aid India in case oi States cut off anus d id la Lotk
war with either China or Paki- Indian and Pakistan, hurting
stan. rakistan iiitne, iiIv UKCaviet
I Riren Mukherji. the leader of 'Union mediated the conflict.
the pro-Moscow Communist par- Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Hindu
ty of India, asked the govern- leader of the orthodox Jan
ment "to shed our approach of Sangh party, welcomed the
ld fat ow that wo hva
+hie trnaty hpeause it won India a
?a n
treaty." He asked the govern- friend at a critical juncture. It
ment to extend recognition not , indicated India was not friend
-
only to the Bengali nation provi- less as in the Sino-Indian war of
sional government but also to 1962. The pact will also check
North Vietnam, North Korea Pakistan's aggressive designs
against India, he added.
Mr. Vajpayee ridiculed the
government's defense of non-
alignment and said non - align-
ment was not sacrosant at a
time when international rela-
tions were being forged for
"naked self-interest."
? Mr. Singh admitted that tim-
ing of the treaty during a period
' of tension with Pakistan has
been such that "even those who
, want to oppose it know that the
, people are behind it" and dare'
not oppose it.
He also assured the Parlia:
ment that the pact would not
"restrain" India from taking
unilateral action in East Paki-
stan or continuing the support of
the Bengali rebels. Not even the
Soviet Union can restrain India
The United States gave India from exercising Its sovereign
ernergeticy arms aid in 1911 rights, he said. -
while the Soviet Union remained I It was not a defense pact nor
neutral. In 1965 the United, a military alliance, Mr. Singh
a'd. By tl,e proviaion of mutaal
consultations, the pact only pro-
a fraincwork within which
two nations could take steps to
maintain security.
This provision - makes the
friendship treaty different from
the IiInrcaw Pari nod other mili-
tary pacts as there is no clause
for automatic commitment "of
armies by either side, "Mr.
Singh asserted.
In reply to a question, the
minister said that anything in
the perpetual Sino-Soviet friend-
ship treaty which is inconsistent
with Indo-Soviet friendship pact
is "not binding."
No vote was taken on the
treaty, because the Cabinet has,
the constitutional power to rati-
fy it on its own.
Nevertheless, the government'
still took the treaty to Podia-,
ment for debate.
Little Opposition
Of the eight major parties in
the country, six extended their
support and only two?the con-
servative Swatantra and the
Socialist party?opposed it.
Speaker after speaker of all
'political sentiments used the de-
bate to criticize the U.S. policy
of shippings arms to Pakistan
'after March 25, when the civil
war erupted in East Pakistimi
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UPYRGHT
aiRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 May 1971
elicate
CPYRGHT
sparain in Cairo
By Geoffrey Gothic!'
Qverseas news editor of
The Christian Science Monitor
Soviet President Podgorny and Egyptian
.President Sadat are shrewdly trying to get
the measure of each other in their talks in
Cairo.'
Mr. Podgorny will want to discover the
effect on the Soviet investment in Egypt?
military, economic, and political?of the re-
cent purge of those in the Egyptian leader-
..ship generally deemed most pro-Soviet. ?
.? Mr. Sadat will want to reassure the Rus-
sians that what has happened is no cause
for Moscow to weaken its support of Egypt
lir tl) try 4) put the kid oodc., lihn RA
restore to power any of the men Whom he"
has ousted.
If in the i...?ocess, Mr. Sadat can give the
Russians the impression that their backing.
of any move from within Egypt against him .
would be at their peril, he will probably,,
.seize the opportunity.
, It can hardly be a coincidence, that the
front page of the leading 'Cairo newspaper,
Al-Ahram, carried alongside a report of Mr.
Podgorny's arrival in Cairo a report on the
' Egyptian Prosecutor General's statement,
.that the "mastermind!' behind this month's
alleged plot to depose President Sadat was
, former Vice-President Ali Sabry.
News report cited
Mr. Sabry has long been considered the.
most pro-Soviet of the men at the top in
Egypt. He was dismissed from office at the
beginning of the month and since mid-May
has been in detention.
Ai-Ahram, writing of the first round of
talks between Mr. Podgorny and Mr. Sadat,
Another base for Mr.
Sabry's friends until Mr.
Sadat's purge was the
newspaper ?Al-Gomouria.
Through its columns ear-
lier this year Mr. Sadat's
willingness to reopen the
Suez Canal before total a settlement with Israel
dent Sadat. Mr. Vino-
Israeli withdriwal from
acceptable to Egypt
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said that two facts had already emerged.
First, the Soviet Union had renewed RS
pledge of political, economic, and military
support for Egypt. And second, ,both Presi- '
dents reaffirmed their commitment: to work -
for the liberation of all Arab territories 0e;...
cupied by Israel. ,
This was in keeping with the amenities
.,which attended Mr. Podgorny's arrival in?
the Egyptian t,c-a-pital. Mr. Sadat was at the;
airport to welcome him and embraced him...
There ,was also a 21,gun salute, together:
with the cheering crowds and banners which
Egyptian officialdom can usually produce
as the occasion demands.
? All facets of the Soviet Union's involve-
reipni in Rgypt arc. rpfloPtpri in the team
that Presi..kert 1\felgormy has brought with
him. In putting Mr. Podgorny in charge of
the delegation the Kremlin is honoring Mr..,
Sadat by making the talks a genuine sum-
mit, with president talking to president.
Mrbers of 'party
At Mr. Podgorny's side are: Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, his coun-
try's highest foreign-policy expert; the First
Deputy Defense Minister, Gen. Ivan Pay-.
lovsky; and Boris Ponomarev, secretary of.
the Soviet Communist Party's Central Com-
mittee.
The latter's inclusion in the Soviet dele-
gation can probably be explained by the
disrupting effect which President Sadat's
purge has had on the bureaucracy of the
Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's single-
party organization.
Ali Sabry's main power center within
Egypt had long been the ASU. Mr. Sadat
has dismissed Mr. Sabry's friends from the
ASU machine and has announced his inten-
tion of rebuilding the party organization
almost from scratch.
Sinai was vigorously chal-
lenged.
Another of Al-Gom:
houria's arguments was
that Mr. Sadat was naive
to put so much trust in
?the United States as a
'benign influence to secure
Interview run
On Thursday, Al-Gom-
houria carried an inter-
view with the Soviet Am-
bassador in Cairo, Vladi-
mir Vinogradov, who is
participating in Mr. Pod-
gorny's talks with Presi-
13
CPYRGHT
`SI ST-I
that he believes "it is pos-
sible to achieve a political
solution" inythe .Middle-
East "if efforts are
stepped."
The way to a just settle-
ment, he said, depended
to a large extent on a
strong Egyptian position
and on convincing Israel
and its supporters of the
strength and capability of
I" 1
A -?- " 1 "A A111 11 A111
the Egyptians.
Mr. Sadat's present ef-
forts are concentrated on
? getting the United States
;to use its? good offices to
persuade Israel to match
the concessions which
in Egyptian eyes ? have
? already been offered by
? Cairo in the interest of a
settlement. ?
Soviet view
To the Russians, this
would be tantamount to
peace under American
auspices. They would pre-
fer peace underL Russian
auspices?which could be
represented as having
been achieved through
joint Soviet-Egyptian mill.
tar)' pressure on the Is-
raelis.
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
29 May 1971
Friendship sealed?on paper
CPYRGHT
The Soviet Union likes to see things written ? contracting parties is subjected to an armed
down in black and white. Whenever its friends attack . . . the other party, implementing the
have taken unilateral action and Speculation has inalienable right to Individual or collective self-
followed sooner or later, Moscow has felt the need defence in accordance with the Article 51 of the
to set the record straight .once and for all. This UN Charter, will immediately render It all-round
has been the case in Eastern Europe many times. assistance with. all the means at its disposal,
With some significant differences the 15-year including military."
"Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation"
, ?
If the treaty marks no change in relations,'
6etween Egypt and the Soviet Union falls into . why was it necessary at all? The clause ?dealing
this category. It comes against the background of with consultation on matters of interest and with
President Sadat's purge of plotters, many of coordinating policies gives a clue.. ,The extent of
',whom were senior officials known to be sympa- Mr Sadat's purge and Moscow's muted reaction
.thetic to the Soviet Union. At the same time the indicated that Russia's direct influence on Egypt's
rapprochement between Cairo and Washington . internal affairs is limited. It did not know fully
had 'encouraged Mr Rogers to take a direct what was going' on and it wai not consulted.
personal lead in trying to guide Egypt and Israel There are also Indications that the contents of Mr
towards peace. The Soviet Union must have been Sadat's exchange of letters with 'Mr Nixon and
apprehensive that its massive economic. and ,Mr Rogers were being kept very largely among
.military investments were at stake. Worse still,v themselves. The Soviet Union is seeking in this
the geographical and military facilities it had in, treaty some right to a share in the secrets of
Egypt, if threatened, could have undermined the Cairo's goings on both Maid? the country and in
? Soviet Union's global strategy. President its middle East policies. ,The Soviet Union mutt__
Podgorny's visit was primarily to find out what' alse hope that it will now be in a better position
, had happened. But both he and President Sadat to ensure that Egypt does not strike out on Its
had compellingreasons for keeping,things as they ? own, militarily, or indulge In negotiations harmful
were. What better way of showing this than ' to Moscow!s' long-term interests. .
through 'a treaty? ? The treaty and an accompanying communiqu?
The published clauses of the treaty suggest ' said the search for peace would continue, But it-
nothing more than "a further 'concrete expression may make the search tougher. The two sides have.
. of the relations which have brought us together . strengthened their relations and Increased
over many years "?to use Mr Sadat's words. The. . responsibilities just by putting their 'terms In.
'points about mutual non-Interference, cooPera- ,writing. The Egyptian side has a new dipidmatie.,
tion in economic, cultural, and other fields, corn- card to play and this may make it harder, to get
. mitments ? not to join anti-Soviet alliances, and 'negotiations ' with Israel going again or to open'.
pledges to pursue socialism at home are all either the Suez Canal as part of an overall peace
' old hat or ambiguous enough to afford a way out settlement. The main danger is that the polarisa-
, if needed. The military clause is, essentially , tion between Egypt and Israel and their patrons
defensive' and connected with tralling ifl supplied . may be hardened., It may cause Israel to press for
arms (though Israel will dot like the sdund of the further military guarantees from the United :
. clause "with a view to Strengthening Egypt's ,Itates?and push the potential conflict up on to ?
? capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggret- a' higher plane. But it would. pay both sides to
'sion as Well as increasing its ability to stand up regard this treaty as marking the conclusion (as
? to aggression "). This stops well short of ,the far as can be told) of IV,Ir Sadat's probationary.,
si:ar clause ih the "Treaty of Friendship,,Co- .period as absolute ruler of Egypt..For whatever _
operation and . Mutual Assistance" signed by is ;in the treaty, it remains on paper. In moments.
:Rununia and the 3oviet_Uolon last. ,Ailgust,' for of stress such treaties often become no more than.,
'exawromecjahorigeiease 19a9i061102 IiieflAWPRZ9-Q1 1 94A00Q?001 40.001 79
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THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
30 May 1971
CFS(5(61P1oap
THEEgYP ?
"Friendship Treaty" just
signed in Cairo is a natural by ,
product of? that savage counter-,
coup in which President Sadat'
recently imprisoned or inunobil--
ised those plotting to unseat him. t
Some of the plotters were held to '
be Soviet prot?s and the Xrern-,
in must have been pressing Sadat
hard for something to save Bus. ,
sin's face as well as Russia's vast
Strategic and ecnnomic laiest4
1'44 itt% ,
This the treaty has now pro.
vided. But it does no more than
formalise an existing situation..4
CPYRGHT
'Indeed, one passage?where thei
tmo sigratories PrnrniP "non-
interforonce" in orarli nthprit
internal affairs?can only be
regarded as a plus for Sadat.,
Egypt is hardly likely to interfere:
in Russia's domestic politics.
As to the general prospects for ,
a Middle East settlement, Sadat
is a peace-maker, and ,anything',,I
which strengthens his litersonal
position, as this treaty does, can
only help thoso prospects in the
long
Moitnwhilos ithe ht s diseontilled
rivals at home, the Russians have,
learnt how deceptive those sleepy
eyes of Anwar Sadat can be, ,
RN YORK TIMES
23 MAY 1971 CPYRGHT--
Text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
Signed by Soviet and Egypt
Following, as transmitted
in English by Tass, the Soviet
press Ggency, is the text of
ie Soviet-Egyptiap treaty of
friendship signed' in Cairo
yesterday:
The Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and the United
'Arab Republic,
Being firmly convinced that
the further development of
friendship and all-around co-
operation between the Union
of ;Soviet Socialist Republics
.and the .United Arab Repub-
lic meets the interests of the
peoples of both states an&
helps strengthen world peace,
Being inspired by the ideals,'
of struggle against imperial-
ism, and colonialism, and for
the freedom, independence
and social progress of the
peoples,
Being determined to wage
persistently the struggle for
stronger international peace
and security in 'accordance
with the invariable course of
their peaceable foreign policy,
Reaffirming their allegiance
to the aims and principles of
the United Nations Charter. .
Being driven by a delsire to
consol kin te ti nd strengthen
tire traclilio al relations 41
sincere "ftA pirowedefr or
the two states and peoples
through concluding a treaty
of friendship and cooperation
and thus creating a basis for
their further development,
Agr- ed on the following:.
Article I
The high contracting par-
ties solemnly declare that un-
breakable friendship will al-
ways exist between the two.
countries and their peoples.
They will continue to develop
and strengthen the existing
relations of friendship and
all-around cooperation be-
tween them' in the political,
economic, scientific, techno-
logical, cultural and other
fields 011 ,the basis of the
principles of respect for the
sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, noninterference in the
'
internal affairs of each othe7,
: equality and mutual benefit.
Article 2
" The. Unien of Soviet
cialist Republics as a socialiq
state and the United M.A.)
Republic, which has set itslf
Urn Mm of re, nisi ruet
anclety along socialiNt Ihes,
Re I easel 999109/02:
all fields in ensuring condi-
tions for preserving and fur-
ther developing the social
and economic gains of their
peoples.
Article 3
. . ?
Being guided by the ideals
of freedom and equality of
Ali the peoples, the hip,h con-
tracting parties ,eondenin irn- , The high contracting psr-
Being uided by a desire
to contribute in every way
-toward Tnaintaining interna-
. bona! peace and the security
of the peoples, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United Arab Republic will
continue with all determina-
tion to make efforts toward
achieving and ensuring a last-
ing and fair peace in the Mid-
die East in accordance with
'the aims and principles of the
United Nations Charter.
In pursuing a peace-loving
foreign policy, the high con-'-'
tracting parties will come out '
for peace, relaxation of inter-
national tension, achievement
of general and complete dis-
armament and prohibition or
nuclear and other types Of .1
weapons of mass destruction.'
Article 4
all their forms and manifesta-
tions. They will continue to
come out against imperialisni,
for the full and final elimina-
tion of colonialism in pursu-
, anco of the 1.N. declaration-
' on the granting of independ-
ence to all colonial countries
and peoples, and wage un-
swervingly the strugr,le
against racialism and apart-
heid.
. Article 5 ?
The high contracting par:- -
ties will continue to expand ?
and deepen all-arounn
operntion and exchange of
experience in the economic
and scientific-technological
fields?industry, agriculture,
.water conservancy, irriat ion,
development of nautrai re-
sources, development -4
power engineering, the trzi
ing of national personnel am,
other fields of economy.
The two sides .will expand
trade and sea shipping be-
tween the two states on the
basis of the principles of mut-
:nal benefit and most-favored
? nation treatment.
Article 6,
Cirk-iRDPe1151101119'4A10002001i40001r-9romoto 0?-
15
CPYRGHT
A dF R
pprovc or
operation between them in
th
the fields of science, arts, lit-
erature. education, heal' '
services, the press, radio, :
television, cinema, tourism,
physical culture -and other"
fields. '
The two sides will promote -
wider cooperation and direct ?
connections between political`
and public organizations of .
working people, enterprises,
culutral and scientific institu-
tions for the purpose of a
deeper mutual acquaintance
with the life, work and
achievements of the peoples ,
of the two countries. . ?
Article 7 ? ?
Being deeply interested in ?
ensuring peace and the secu-
rity of the peoples, and et-::
taching great importance, to e
concertedness of their actions r
in the international area in
the struggle for peace, the.:
high contracting parties will,'
for this purpose, regularly
consult each other at differ-
ent levels on all important
questions affecting the inter-
ests of both states.
CI CEISC
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In the event of develop-
ment of situations creating,
in the opinion of both sides,
a danger to peace or viola-,
?tion of peace, they will con-
tact each other without delay
In order to concert their po-.? ?
sitions with a view to remov-
ing the threat that has arisen -
or reestablishing peace.
'
Article 8
In the interests of strength-
ening the defense capacity of .
the United Arab Republic, the ?
high contracting parties will
continue to develop coopera- ?
tion in the military field on
the basis of appropriate
agreements between them.
Such cooperation will provide
specifically for assistance in .
the training of the U.A.R.
military personnel, in master- ?
? ing the armaments and equip-'..
'ment supplied to the United
? Arab Republic with a view to
? strengthening its capacity to.
eliminate the consequences
of aggression as well as in-
creasing its ability to stand
? up to aggression in general.
Article 9
Proceeding from the aims .
and principles of this treaty. -
Each of the high contract- ,
ing parties states that it will
not enter into alliances and ,
will not take part in any,;
'groupings of states, in ac.,
y-tions or measures directed
against the other high con-
tracting party.
Article 10
? Each of the high contract-
ing parties declares that its ,
commitments under the
existing international treaties
are not in contradiction with '
the provisions of this treaty-'`
and It undertakes not to
enter into any international '
agreements incompatible with
it.
Article 11
The present treaty will be
operative within 15 years
since the day it enters into
force.
If neither of the high con-
tracting parties declares a
year before the expiry of this
term its desire to terminate
the treaty, it will remain in
force for the next five yearp
and so henceforth until one
of the high contracting
parties makes a year befo
the expiry of the curre
-five-year period a writte
warning on its intention tia
terminate it.
Article 12
The present treaty is sub-
ject to ratification and shall
come into force on the day
'of exchange of ratification
,
instruments, which will talr place in Moscow in the nea - ,
est future.
The present treaty is done
In two copies, each in Rus-
sian and Arabic, with both
texts, being equally authentic.
Done in the city of Cairo
on May 27, 1971, which Cor-
responds to 3 Rabia as Said,
1391, liejira.
For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
N. PODGORNY.
For the United Arab Re-'
.public.
ANWAR SADAT.
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THE HERETIC'S HOMECOMING
Yugoslav President Tito, responding to a Soviet initiative,
visited the Soviet Union from 6 to 10 June. Soviet media gave
extensive coverage to Tito's visit., playing up the warmth of
his reception and the prospects of further Yugoslav-Soviet
cooperation. On the day of his arrival in Moscow, Tito was
given the Order of Lenin, the first time in his long and
controversial career as a Communist, dating back to the 1917
Bolshevik Revolution, that he was so honored by the Kremlin.
Before he left Moscow, Tito became the first foreigner ever to
he awarded a Soviet marshal's sabre. Despite this ostentatious
wooing of Tito and the openly warm response on the part of the
Yugoslays, there is no indication that significant new agreements
were reached that would change the basic positions of either
country.
Ever since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, a constant
factor in. Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union has been
Belgrade's adamant insistence that such relations be based on
"mutual recognition of the principles of full sovereignty,
independence, equality, mutual respect and noninterference in
internal affairs for any reason whatever." As the only sovereign
nonaligned Communist state in East Europe, Yugoslavia has also
demanded of the Kremlin recognition of these same principles in
party-to-party relations.
The lowest points in Yugoslav-Soviet relations have
invariably stemmed from Soviet policies and actions in direct
disregard for these principles, such as the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Yugoslays had followed the
exciting days of the "Prague Spring" with high expectations that
a moderate Soviet reaction to Czech attempts to find their own
democratic way to socialism would signal basic changes in Kremlin
policies that could lead to a democratization of the Soviet Union
itself and a general easing of world tensions.
Tito himself played an active role in trying to influence the
Kremlin leaders toward moderation. There was shock and dismay
in Belgrade when Soviet tanks rumbled into Prague in August
1968 and Yugoslav-Soviet relations reached their lowest point
since the break with Stalin.
Then, just three years later, the man who advocated the
"limited sovereignty of states in the socialist commonwealth",
found it necessary to go to Belgrade and pay lip service to
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Yugoslavia's "sovereignty, independence, and equality." The
task could not have been pleasant or easy for Brezhnev. Further-
more, warming up to the maverick Communists in Belgrade risked
encouraging feelings of independence and nationalism in the other
Communist states of East Europe. It could also add to the already
confused and divided situation existing among many Communist
parties by providing further stimulus for those "naive and misguided"
nationalists who, disdainful of Moscow's leadership, seek their
own roads to Socialism. It could, in addition, further inflame
nationalistic and liberal elements in the ethnic republics of
the USSR itself. Clearly, in taking this initiative, the men in
the Kremlin must have been motivated by reasons they considered to
be of the highest priority to Soviet foreign policy objectives --
reasons that extend well beyond even the broadest concept of
bilateral Yugoslav-Soviet relations.
True, Moscow fully appreciates Yugoslavia's strategic
geographical location, its hundreds of miles of Adriatic coast-
line, ideal for naval bases adjacent to the Mediterranean, as well
as Yugoslavia's location astride air and land routes from Europe
to the Middle East, The Kremlin also appreciates the fact that
Tito has recently celebrated his 80th birthday and that once his
charisma and forceful leadership have left the scene his successors
will be faced with difficult political problems in keeping the
six Yugoslav republics and various nationality groups united. In
the post-Tito era, good relations with Yugoslavia could facilitate
broader Soviet contacts with Yugoslav leaders and might even
provide an opportunity for a greater degree of Soviet influence in
Belgrade's future policies.
The above factors were undoubtedly considered by Brezhnev and
. his foreign policy advisors. However, in view of the major risks
involved, other factors, broader in scope and more vital to Soviet
interests, probably played the decisive role in Brezhnev's courting
of Tito. The basic decision appears to have been made in line with
"a sweeping program for world peace" presented by Brezhnev to
the 24th Congress of the CPSU, just five months before he went to
Belgrade. The overriding concern of the CPSU at this congress was
the problem of China and the need to consolidate the Soviet position
in Europe.
Brezhnev's "peace program" emphasized "peaceful coexistence"
between the Socialist and non-Socialist camps, to include
specifically, "detente in Europe" and "the convocation of an all-
European conference"; the "conclusion of treaties banning nuclear,
chemical and bacteriological weapons"; "invigoration of the struggle
to halt the race in all types of weapons"; and "mutually advantageous
cooperation in every sphere with other interested states."
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To lessen the possible negative consequences of embracing
Tito and engaging in detente with the West, Moscow, in a move that
appears to many Westerners as a puzzling contradiction, also
laid the groundwork at the 24th Party Congress for a concerted hard-
line campaign for ideological unity in the communist camp
subsequently has included some of the strongest attacks against
"revisionism" and "separate roads to socialism" that have emanated
from the Kremlin since the days of Stalin. A central thesis in
this campaign appeared in the main journal of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, Kommunist (issue No. 3, February 1972), entitled,
"The Falsifiers of Scientific Communism and Their Bankruptcy."
The vehemence and scope of this Soviet drive against both
"right-Wing" and "left-wing" revisionism was such that some
responsible Western observers predicted a Kremlin move to
formulate a new Comintern or Cominform. It does, indeed, reflect
the duality of current Soviet policies that this concerted drive
against "revisionism" reached its highpoint only after Brezhnev
had gone to Belgrade where he acknowledged the continued validity
of Yugoslavia's independent form of Socialism and policy of
nonalignment.
Underlining Yugoslavia's determination to make this acknowledge-
ment a reality and to remain politically independent and nonaligned,
at Yugoslav insistence the joint communique issued at the conclusion
of the Tito visit made no mention of "proletarian" or "socialist
internationalism" or "socialist commonwealth," terms which had
been defined by Moscow since the Brezhnev Doctrine to rationalize
its political hegemony over its East European satellites.* Perhaps
more striking evidence of Yugoslavia's continued nonalignment was
provided when, just two days after Tito's return to Belgrade, the
USS Springfield, a modern cruiser of the NATO Mediterranean Fleet,
dropped anchor at the Yugoslav Adriatic port of Dubrovnik for a
three-day visit.
*Last September the Soviets had been able to persuade Tito to
refer to "proletarian internationalism" in the Communique issued
after Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade. The disappearance of this
phrase from the latest Communique may seem to be a small point --
but for the Yugoslays it is a very important one.
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IWASHINGTON POST
14 June 1972
cl ?
3ovte s Court Tito
CPYRGHT
In Detente Irive
? By Robert G. Kaiser
WaShirigion Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, June 13?Pres-
ident Tito of Yugoslavia had
planned to be in Poland
today, but instead he is at
home in Belgrade. The Poles
are most anxious for Tito to
pay them a visit, but they
asked him please not to stop
News Analysis
on his way home from Mos-
cow, as Tito suggested. War-
saw, it seems, would prefer
a separate, diplomatically
distinct Tito .visit. They'll
get one next week.
Josip Broz Tito, just 80
and the newest recipient of
the Soviet Union's highest
honor, the Order of Lenin,
seems to be ending his ca-
reer with unprecedented re-
spect from all quarters, in-
cluding his old adversaries
in the orthodox Communist
world. His comings and
goings have not always been
so carefully orchestrated.
His visit last week to Mos-
cow, which prodeced no dra-
matic results, reconfirmed
the new understanclIngs Tito
has reached with the heirs
of Stalin?who regarded
him as an enemy. The Sovi-
ets went even farther than .
they had last September,
when Leonid I3rezhnev went
to Belgrade, to demonstrate
tolerance for Yugoslavia's
special brand of commu-
nism.
The final communique re-
fleeted Yugoslav positions :
on all important points. It ,
reiterated Soviet under- '
standing ? that Yugoslavia
was on its own path to so-
cialism. Last September, the
Soviets persuaded Tito to
refer to "proletarian inter-
nationalism" in the coinmu-;
nique after Brezhnev's visit, ?
a phrase typically used only
by Moscow and its satellites.
Last week that phrase disap-
peared from the commu-
nique. A small point, per-
haps, but one taken seri-
ously by the Yugoslays.
It is arguable that the
Russians are happier with
Tito than they were last
September, because in the
interim he showed a firm
hand to wayward Croatian
nationalists. The Soviet.
press praised him on this
count before he arrived last
week.
Nevertheless, the funda-
mental differences of policy
THE NEW YORK TIMES
11 JUNE 1972
Order of
Lenin to a
Former
Pariah
and attitude which nave
tong separated Moscow and
Belgrade still exist. The So-
viets have obviously decided
to accept these differences,
and to bestow all the sym-
bols of warm friendship on
Tito despite them. The ques-
tion remains, why?,
Embracing Tito's unortho-
dux policies?and an em-
brace, plus kisses, is just
what the Yugoslav leader
got here' more than once?
may not be easy to explain
to the satellites of East Eu-
rope, as Yugoslays here
? point out. The leaders of Po-
land and Hungary, to men-
tion two, might be Inter- ;
'ested in such blessing for '
their own unorthodoxies in '
the future.
. The Soviets are obviously:
prepared to take this' risk:
(and Poland's courting of
Tito suggests that it may be.
real.) What do they get in .
return?
First, as diploinats and-,
- other observers here note,:
they win friends in Yugosla-
via, perhaps hedging against
the post-Tito era, whenever
it may come. From the Yu-
goslav point of view, Brezh-
nev's new reasonableness is.
merely a sensible recogni-
tion of the realities. Yugo.-
slays seem impressed by.
Brezhnev's calm, rational
approach to foreign policy,
and they are happy to see it
applied to them.
In a broader sense, the,Sre
viet position improves the:
Soviet Union's image at an ;
important moment in Euro-
pean history, on the appar-
ent eve of a European secu-
rity conference. The Soviets
. are aware that their inter-:
vention in Czechoslovakia in
1968 had disastrous conse-
quences on Moscow's stand-
ing in other world capitals.
- It certainly helps overcome
memories of Czechoslovakia
to see Brezhnev kissing Tito:-
at a Moscow airport.
' The Yugoslays believe the r
new rapprochment with
Moscow is more than sym-
bolic. They now expect sig-
nificant economic agree-,,
ments to be signed before -
the end of the year; for inst-
ance, and they hope for
long-term development of
.- Soviet-Yugoslav trade rela-
tions.
The Yugoslays have seri-
ous and immediate needs '
?for investment capital and
technological assistance and
they are looking to Moscow
to provide both, as well as
markets for Yugoslav con-
sumer goods.
If these Yugoslav expecta-
tions prove , justified, and if
' Moscow adheres to its prom-
ises to respect Yugoslavia's ?
independent path to soc.al-
ism, then Tito's visit to r ''-
cow?perhaps the last
make as Yugoslavia's presi-
dent?may seem morc
portant in the 'future I hs it
does today.
dared, "I shall shake my little finger
and there will be no more Tito," the
tributes of the current masters of the
Kremlin must have seemed sweet in-
deed, especially since he was able to
?
keep firmly to his own political line.
No sooner had President Tito of
Yilgoslavia landed last Monday in Mos-
cow for his first visit since Soviet
troops rumbled into Czeclaoslovakia in
1968, provoking his most recent pcditi-
cal clash with Moscow, than he was
hUstled Off to a Kremlin ceremony
Where he was honored with -the Order
of Lenin. He was praised for participa-
tion in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution
arIA rr,nn fnr onntrihIltintts tn Snviet-
MOSCOW?To a man once vilified
ealercld919/09PO2VPAIRD107
t e pas .
-For Marshal Tito personally, it was
Yugoslav friendship. No one uttered
by Moscow AusocroVettvFlegaiRel
and an agent df Ainerican imperialism
Sind of whom Stalin once angrily ? de- ?
a vindication of ,Ms ludepuodat for-
eign policy course and a dcmonstra-
tion of his durability at 80.
For the Soviet party leader, Leonid
13rezhnev, and the other Kremlin rul-
ers, President Tito's arrival constituted
a tacit, though belated, acceptance of
the Soviet triumph in Czechoslovakia
and a demonstration of the present
nOrmalization in Moscow's ties with
Belgrade after the post-1968 chill.
For the long run there was a more
delicate balance.
With Europe moving into an era
of detente, Moscow wanted to draw
Yugoslavia back toward closer coop,Ith:-
1 W ran "6- -
_and ew _sra from affiliation with the
9-01484A0002004r400044t, as
well as to bolster its influence among
President Tito's potential successors.
YRGHT
PYRGH-
Marshal Tito saw the trip as an op-
portunity to renew Soviet acquiescence
for his tionaAgcxvi,taNk..)=KA
own brand onallullitedia`g ?yell' as to
bolster his own party apparatus which
has been under strain from nationalist
tensions in Croatia.
The public emphasis was on friend-
ship, harmony, and mutual dedication
to Leninist principles; but for all the
cordiality, Marshal Tito and Mr. Brezh-
nev talked like men on two different
wave-lengths in their speeches to a
Kremlin banquet Monday and later in
the week.
While Mr. Brezhnev was claiming
that the new mood of East-West de-
tente sprang from the increased might
of Communist states and was talking
big-power politics. Marshal Tito cred-
ited the "substantial" role of the non-
aligned states in promoting peaceful
coexistence. He dwelt on the need to
meet the "aspiration and desires of
the younger generation" and to "bridge
the gap" between rich and poor na-
tions?categories that make Mcscow
uncomfortable because it gets lumped
with the Western powers.
Moreover, after a midweek over-
night trip to the La tviart capital of
Riga, Marshal The found occasion to
vaunt Yugoslav economic
meats to to workers at a Moscow ball-
bearing factory Friday. Not only did
he claim that Yugoslavia's system of
worker self-management socialism had
produced one of the highest growth
rates in the world, but he ticked off
statistics likely to make Soviet work-
ers envious-170 radio sets, 100 TV
sets and 42 cars per thousand of popu-
lation?and he invited them to come
see for themselves.
"Our frontiers are peaceful and
open?crossed by more tourists each
year than we have population," he
said in outlining the benefits of Bel-
grade's policy of nonalignment and
friendship toward virtually all nations.
When it came to writing the joint
communique at the end of the week,
this bold language was muted. The
communique spoke of a "cordial,
friendly and frank" atmosphere. In
the Communist lexicon the word
"frank" was a tipoff to continuing
differences. But the differences were
not made public.
Instead there was a catalogue of
topics Vietnam, the Middle East,
disarmament ? on which Soviet and
Yugoslav views largely coincide, and
there were routine references to past
agreements that have been taken as
affirming Yugoslavia's; ri:ht to pur-
sue a policy on nonalignment and ide-
ological independence,
The language, in fact, was consider-
ably less clear-cut than a similar Tito-
Brezhnev declaration issued last Sep-
tember, and there was no immediate
indication whether President Tito had..
gotten promisApprovedchorge
Soviet markets, as some of his aides
had hoped, in order to reverse the with Prime Nlinister Eisaku Sato, who is
unfavorable shift in Soviet-Yugoslav exec-a:led i 1.1,? Lir& th fetg weeks,
ledtaeet991/09/02r.: CIA-RDP79-DialiV4A,epffiA9A1 k in
,Vdidates
Nonetheless, among the thousands to succeed Sato?Foreign Minister Takeo
who flocked to watch the maverick
Yugoslav leader being driven to Vnu-
kovo airport in an open limousine with
Mr. Brezimey at his side, there were
some Muscovites who privately re-
spected him as "a fox", deftly playing
off East and West until the end of his
career.
The real question was whether his
deftness and his subtly maintained in-
dependence would become more of a'
model for other East European states
in the new era of detente in Central
Europe, or whether Moscow had suc-
cessfully signaled to its Warsaw Pact
allies that Marshal Tito was a special
case, now carefully contained?and
that the example 1'7 hart better re-
member was C7.7.1- ?
In his talks with Japanese officials,
Kissinger emphasized that relations with
Tokyo remain the basis of U.S. foreign
policy in Asia. And he insisted: "We are
Fukucla and Minister of International
Trade and Industry Kakuei Tanaka. In
addition, the Japanese Government de-
liberately arranged for Kissinger to meet
with members of the opposition Socialist
Party as well as with scores of busi-
nessmen, journalists, scholars and offi-
cials representing virtually every politi-
cal point of view in Japan. Given these
circumstances, it seemed unlikely that
the swift-moving Kissinger would in-
dulge his penchant for flying off 5ecretly
to some other capital just because he
happened to be in the neighborhood. In
fact, his Japanese hosts had crammed so
many appointments into his three-day
visit that the Nixon Administration's lead-
ing swinger was left with little time even
for ilightelubbing in the Ginza.
SOVIET UNION:
Wooing an Old Adversary
not casting Japan adrift." (That theme Compared with the coolly correct re-
was also tm(lerscored by U.S. Secretary ception given President Nixon when he
of Health, Education and Welfare Elliot first touched down in Moscow last
Richardson, who told a session of the month, the welcome that Soviet leaders
influential Japanese-American Assembly bestowed on Marshal Josip Broz Tito
in Shimoda, "Japan continues to be the last week was downright fervent.
United States' prime ally in Asia.") Though he had been notably absent for
But for their part, the Japanese made the Nixon arrival, party chief Leonid
it dear that they wanted more than a Brezhnev was on .hand at Vnukovo Air-
mere ego massage. Instead, they expect- port to plant a comradely kiss on the
ed "substantive discussions" and specific Yugoslav President's cheek. And while
guidance as to what role Washington en- Mr. Nixon was sped into town in a closed
visions for Japan in Asian defense. They car, Tito was driven slowly in an open
also wanted a line on U.S. thinking re- I:mousine along a route lined with bun-
garding China: how rapidly and in what dreds of thousands of cheering Musco-
ways the U.S. plans to cultivate relations vites. To show that they harbored no ill
with Peking and whether the U.S. strate- feelings toward the man who broke with
gic commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's Na- Stalin and the Soviet bloc almost a
tionalist regime on Taiwan is really solid, quarter of a century ago, the Soviet
At the same time they wanted to be leaders presented Tito with their court-
filled in on the Peking and Moscow sum- try's highest civilian award, the Order
mit meetings to reassure themselves that of Lenin.
President Nixon had not made secret Given his long and stormy relationship
agreements that might leave Japan out in with Moscow, however, it was doubtful
the cold, that the crusty old marshal was overly
Suspicion: Kissinger 's task was made impressed by this show of friendship. In
all the more difficult because the Japa- fact, since the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
nese regard him as the prime architect slovakia in 1968, Tito has been warier
of many of the policies that have strained than ever of Russian objectives. Just last
U.S.-Japanese relations. They pointedly summer, concerned over rumors that the
note that Kissinger does not have a single Russians might intervene in Rumania,
recognized expert on Japanese affairs on the Yugoslav President reiterated his
his staff and sonic of them even charge determination to defend his own coun-
him with indulging in a "love affair" with try's independence against "anybody."
China?a suspicion reinforced by occa- By last fall, Yugoslav-Russian relations
sional Kissingerian remarks contrasting were so strained that Brezhnev traveled
. the alleged elegance of Chinese culture to Belgrade in an effort to assure Tito
with what he sees as the stiffness and that the "Brezhnev doctrine," under
commercialism of the Japanese. Thus, which the Soviet Union claims the right
many Japanese leaders viewed Kissin- to intervene in Socialist-bloc countries,
ger's fence-mending visit as an oppor- did not apply to Yugoslavia.
tunity to educate Mr. Nixon's chief In Moscow last week, however, Tito
foreign:policy adviser on the tremen- made it plain that these assurances had
dons importance of japan in the global not been enough to erase his suspicions
scheme of things. of Soviet intentions. "No threat to in-
s t
As part of that educational zess dependence, wheresa and under -,t, a.
leeise199910942 oe.% , e
09-01194A000s20044110Mmay wid
CPY
CPYRGHT
his o t. ata Kremlin banquet, "should :
be tolerated." In response, the Soviet
leaders reportedly gave him private
promises that they .had no designs. on
Yugoslavia. To sweeten the pot, the -
Russians were expected to hold out the
possibility of increased Soviet investment
in Yugoslavia and improved trade re-
lations between the two countries.
Goals: In taking such a conciliatory
line, the Soviets had a number of objec-
tives in mind. They wanted Tito's stamp
of approval on the Soviet-American sum-
mit accords and on their proposal for a ..
European security conference?both of
which the Marshal did endorse during -
iS S ay fri ). co e a s
wanted his agreement to the establish-
ment of Soviet bases in the -Adriatic?a
proposition that Tito has repeatedly re-
jected in the past. Beyond that, the
Soviets were anxious to improve their
long-term ties with Yugoslavia in the
hope that they will be in position to
exert increased influence in Belgrade
after Tito, now 80, passes from the scene.
Until that time, however, it seemed un-
likely that there would be any funda-
mental change in relations between the
two countries. "Important differences
still remain," commented a Yugoslav in
Moscow last week. "We still have our
own theories and our own Yugoslavian
path to socialism."
TIME
19 June 1972 -
COMMUNISTS
Heretic's Homecoming
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
mined than ever, at least in part because
YUgoslavia'S independent bra MI Ur
Marxism exerts an unsettlim, i"fl..
ence upon the rest of Eastern Europe.
Moscow is also motivated by a de-
For years he was reviled as an arch-
traitor of Communism, the heretic who
destroyed the unity of the Marxist faith.
But last week, in a dramatic culmina,
tion of a historic reversal of Soviet pol-
icy, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito
was treated to arhero's welcome in Mos-
cow. At a state dinner in Tito's honor,
Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev
did not even allude to the earlier dis-
agreements that led to the 1948 break
between Stalin and Tito. Instead. Brezh,
nev praised Tito for "your friendly at-
titude toward our country." In perhaps
the most ironic turnabout of all, Tito,
who reached 80 last month, was award-
ed the. Order of Lenin, the highest So-
viet decoration, which is reserved for
the Communist faithful. It was more or
less as if Pope Leo X had conferred
Rome's blessings upon Martin Luther,
Twice before, the Soviets have made
major efforts to win back Yugoslavia,
but each time those overtures collapsed
because of troubles within the East blot:.
This time the Soviets seem more deter-
sire to consolidate its position in Eu-
rope as a preparatory step to the Con-
ference on European Security. Owing
to the growth of Soviet seapoWer, Yu-
goslavia is strategically far more impor-
tant than ever to Moscow, which wants
a riLval base on the Adriati" fQr it. ships in in the Mediterranean. The Sovi-
ets also seek to reassert their former
"elder brother" status in Yugoslavia so
that they will have a direct influence in
the maneuvering that is bound to fol.- -
low Tito's death or retirement.
The Yugoslays are fully aware of
the Russian motives. Nonetheless, they
believe that the timing is promising for
improving relations with Moscow with-
out sacrificing their own unique polit-
ical and economic system. The Yugo-
slays would like to sell more goods to
Russia in return for technical equip-
ment and raw materials. Now, they feel,
the Soviets could not put undue pres-
sure on them for political concessions
without jeopardizing Moscow's policy
of detente with the West.
140001-9
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3
AliialagiFalaggfig4099/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002)00140001-9
SHORT SUBJECTS
JUST FRIENDLY SUBCONTINENTAL MEDDLING?
New Delhi questions whether those monthly Soviet-sponsored
press parties are a matter of public relations or a matter of
monkey business. The attached reprint of an article from the
New Delhi Organizer of 20 May cites several cases of known Soviet
attempts to bribe Indian journalists and to warn them against
publishing anti-Soviet commentaries -- all of which do little to
ease India's sensitivities about foreigners meddling in their
internal affairs.
In addition, India cannot be too elated over apparently
justified Bangladesh suspicions that the Soviets had a hand in
helping the Bangladesh Student Union (the Bangla Chhatra Union)
come out the winners inTaast-spling's stormy student elect ions
In Bangladesh, student politicians are taken very seriously
because the campuses have spawned and spearheaded many important
movements, including the agitation for independence from
Pakistan.
Sources in Dacca say that the pro-Moscow faction of the
Student Union never has had the popular following that would
have permitted it to score the sweeping victory it achieved
in universities in Dacca, Rajshahi and Mymensingh in late May.
In fact, they say, during the late 1950's and through the 60's
its members (then the East Pakistan Student Union) did the
students and people of Bangladesh a disservice by acting in
such an irresponsible fashion as to invite a crackdown against
the whole student movement of which the Student Union was only
a small part. In the late 60's the Union had split into pro-
Moscow and pro-Peking factions and were not really reconciled
until the pro-Peking faction decided (despite Chinese aid to
Pakistan) to support the Bangladesh independence struggle?
They say in Dacca that it has been with the Bangladesh Student
Union, and especially its leadership which retains a warm spot
for Peking that Soviet "cultural" officers in Dacca have been
the most active. Active, in fact, to the extent to having given
a financial subsidy to the Bangla Chhatra Union for the purpose of
fighting the elections. Some in Dacca are even going so far
as to suggest that the Soviets, actually uncomfortable with
Sheikh %jib's moderation, saw the undercutting of his party
affiliate in the universities as a step toward strengthening the
pro-Soviet National Awami Party with whom the Student Union
group is affiliated.
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200140001-9
ORGANISER, New Delhi
20 May 1972
SOVIET BID TO BRIBE INDIAN PRESS
CPYRGHT
? NEW DELHI.? An impression i. training
ground that ever since the signing of the 20-
year Treaty, Soviet Russia has begun to treat
this country as its domain. There are a number
of pointers to confirm such an opinion.
Recently a number of
MPs have written to the
Prime Minister .complaining
of p-olitical interference by
some Russian diplomats in
our internal matters. They
have asked for a probe into
the incidents they have
mentioned in this context.
For example, it is said
that Shri Morozov and Shri
V. I. Gurgenov of the USSR
Information Centre in Cal-.
culla have recently tried
to influence the editor of
"Sat ya jug", a Bengali
newspaper' published from
Calcutta, and supporting
CRI(M) policies. Large
financial assistance was
offered by the Russian dip-
lomats to this paper to
persuade it to lend support
to ti-v, CPI.
They also warned the
editor against publishing
anti-Soviet articles. When
.the said editor refused the
? said Russian offer, he was
' reportedly threatened with
consequences ,which might
even lead to the closure of
the paper by the Gov&ii-
ment of India. This means
that the Russians took the
- hacking of the. Government
in the matter for granted.
Again, Shri A. A. Fill-
? penko of the Madras Infor-
mation Mice of the Rus-
sian Embassy is? reported. to ,
have visited Kerala some-
? tune back and met a num-
ber of editors and publi-
shers. The mission was
aimed at enlisting support
of Indian journalists and
intellectuals to write arti-
cles in favour of the Soviet
Union.
Shri Filipenko wanted
articles and material pre-
pared-by the Russian Infor-
mation centre to be publish-
ed in as many journals and
newspapers as possible, of
course, on fancy payments.
I3ut he was told by the per-
son l approached that what-
ever material he wanted to
be published could be ac-
commodated, but as paid
advertisements.
Even otherwise, a study
of pro-Russian articles or
propaganda material ap-
pearing. in a number of
:newspapers, partieularly ?n
?some regional papers, stiew,
that Russians buy space ,at
regular editions rather than
putting out advertisements
in special supplements.
Shri Filipenko, it is. stet-
ed. had to face- hostile ques-
tions when he tried to in-
fluence "Deepika", -a Catho-
lic daily and, "Chandrik,'",
a journal operated by the
Muslim League in Calicut.
There -may be many .sueh
examples which have not,
come to light, ?
1
An Indian employee of
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the USSR Information
Centre at Calcutta, who is
a member of the local CPI,
and against whom a few,
criminal cases are pending,
is busy doing public rela-
tions for the Russians. This
particular employee was ?
involved in a scuffle with a
member of the CPI(M) in
which he is stated to have.
stabbed the CPI(M) man in
the back, causing him grave
'injury
But in spite of his tn-
volvement in criminal cases
which are pending against
- him at the Kharclah police
station, this inployee con-
tinues to w.,,k in, the Rus-
sian Embassy without being
challenged by the local
authorities.
Obviously, Russians have
influenced the local authori-
ties so much that they do
not take any notice of the
Activities of this 'efficient'
employee of the USSR In-
formation Centro
In. Delhi,. wo,. almost
every month, the USSR (In-
formation Centre throw
grand party where a big
crowd of journalists?and
others who parade as jour-
nalists. or -even those Who
do not pretend as such?are
.invited and . drinks flow in,
gallons. ?
CPYRGHT
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U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
12 June 1972 CPYRGHT
WHY THE
ON GROUND WAR/117
A new spirit?part willing-
ness to fight, part confidence
Reds can be whipped--is found
on major battlefields visited by
James N. Wallace of "U. S.
News & World Report." Still
ahead: difficult days for Saigon,
and no guarantee of survival.
Top Allied officers?once privately
pessimistic over South Vietnam's chances
of military survival?now are starting to
predict . openly that the tide could be
turning against the Communist "go for
broke" offensive.
Is this just another case of misplaced
optimism?
American commanders have been mis-
led by South Vietnamese performance
in the past. On more than one occasion.
expectations of victory have been erased
by lightning success of the enemy on
the battlefield.
No responsible commander believes
Hanoi has yet been defeated. Heavy
fighting?even clefeat-dcould still come
at An Loc, Kontum or Hue.
' New spirit. Yet, from air-conditioned
conference rooms in Saigon to stifling-hot
front-line command posts, a new confi-
dence is replacing the despair that was
so prevalent just a few weeks ago when
South Vietnamese troops, deserted by
their commanders, fled in panic? from
Quang Tri Province. The reasons:
? Saigon's long-denigrated Army bas
proved it has the ability?when it has
the leadership and the will?to hold on
against seemingly impossible odds.
? American air power, still essential.
to South Vietnam's military survival, is
stiffening Saigon's willingness to fight.
, ? Hanoi is suffering tremendous bat-
tle casualties. U. S. warplanes and Navy
ships have cut the flow of Soviet and
Chinese mar supplies into North Viet-
nam to "close to zero," according to
U. S. Defense Department officials.
? Most significant, perhaps, South
Vietnam's vteorLle are 1ajr do-
term ilia tioiAP PACK@ LIfft?Eiggi tffe
been seen in earlier years of fighting.
CD TA FM Ls icQril
Tir7i'Mhst7]
'Visits to the three "hot spots" in South
Vietnam provide a closer look at what's
behind the official optimism.
ON HIGHWAY 13 NEAR AN LOC
Tho bloody slugging match along -this
rocket-scarred highway and in the dev?
astated provincial capital of An Loo a
?few frustrating miles to the north is
dramatic evidence of the shift in atti-
tudes and determination seen elsewhere
in South Vietnam.
An Loc, GO miles north of Saigon,
hardly is a town any longer. It is a bat-
tered rubble licap, looking more like a
borabed-out German city in World War
II than it once sleepy trading center for
nearby rubber plantations.
The town was not even a particularly
significant military target, except as an
obstacle to the quick Bed thrust toward
Saigon, which some military analysts be-
lieve was one of Hanoi's early goals in
the current invasion.
But, under siege, An Loc became both
a Symbol and an example of how the
newest phase of the war is being fought.
An idle boast. The Communists,
who evidently wanted An Loc as a pro-
vincial capital for their "liberation
front" government, proclaimed in early
April that it would be captured within
a few days. South Vietnamese President
Nguyen Van Thieu, stung by the col-
lapse of his forces at Quang Tri, ordered
the town held "at all costs.'
The fight for An Loc, which started
April 7, turned into a house-to-house,
bunker-by-bunker contest. Air strikes
were ordered on houses as close as 50
feet to South Vietnamese positions.
When Communist soldiers fled to neigh-
boring buildings, Saigon troops shot
An Loc undoubtedly would have fall-
en quickly except for massive U. S. air
support, military experts believe. The
Communists had overwhelming superiori-
ty in artillery, much of it captured from
South Vietnamese forces farther north.
An average of 2,000 rounds of artillery,
rocket and mortar fire poured down on
An Loc every day. Some days, more
than 7,000 rounds slammed in.
19tV09Y0128i:VMORDP09-011.394
shelling has been U. S. air power, includ-
1
ing the most concentrated 11-b2 bomb-
ing of the entire war-21 strikes within
5 miles of the town's besieged garrison
in a Single 24-hour period in mid-MaY.
Trading punches. On one recent
day, described by field commanders aS
fairly typical, Communist gunners fired
2,100 rounds. at An Loc, nd were hit ht
turn by 150 air strikes-13-52s, fighter-
bombers and helicopter gunships.
On Highway 13, where a drive to re-
lieve An Loc' creeps forward with ago-
nizing slowness, criticism is heard that
South Vietnam's troops are too depend-
ent our American air power. A U. S. ad-
viser complains: ?
"They do not pesh out hard enongli
on the ground. They figure every tree
line is full of the enemy, so they wait
for it to be arc-lighted [the code name.
for B-52 strikes]. They want to walk to
An Loc through bomb craters."
But military observers emphasize that
air power alone did not save An Lac
from, early capture. The decisive factor
a.as that tLc dcf..,_?dera, unlike there at
Quang Tri, did not break and nm from
artillery barrages. A similar will to stand
under fire, these experts .stress, would
be equally decisive elsewhere.
13oth sides have taken pi m loss-
es at An Loc, which some officer. e-
mits, be the most costly single battle et
the war. South Vietnamese dead and
svounded have been estinuiteii at 40 to
50 daily. The entire Fifth Division de-
fending the city will have to iw "com-?
? pletely overhauled," sources reec: t.
But Hanoi has lost at Aii the
equivalent of an entire infantry di,?ion
!?more than 10,000 killed and wounded.
The Communists' Ninth Division was
reported so badly mauled lett it has
merged with two other units.
Has the effort been worthwhii
Very much so, say Allied oil Ac-
cording to a ranking South Vietnalei.?,e:
"Hanging onto An Loc has been a
big morale booster. It proves that, mai,
for man, we are as good as the enemy."
Equally important, says this officer;
An Loc shows the vital importance
of the commanding general, his staff
and his American advisers staying in
the midst of battle. The panic at Quang
A:PiaMan tOnsiv#.-sraNialiv-i9sermsniglIder ougtc."n-
U1-)Y1-