CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DC fCA, Y
RSPECTIVE
111",W?a)
Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1972
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST BLOODBATH: MYTH OR REALITY?
i
LIBYA FINANCES REVOLUTION - WORLDWIDE
PITY THE SOVIET FARMER
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM AND THE CZECH TRIALS
SHORT SUBJECTS
SOVIET-DANISH MISUNDERSTANDINGS
MOSCOW BLENDS INTO THE LOCAL SCENE
P-L IMMET CL OY.L.; .a.t.l.
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FbR BACKGROUND USE ONLY October - November 1972
VIETNAMESE COM41jNIST BLOODBATH: MYTH OR R~.AJXFY"?
From time to time controversy arises as to whether the Viet-
namese Communists would perpetrate a bloodbath if they succeeded
in gaining control of South Vietnam. The controversy has arisen
again in the pages of the press because of an essay by one D.
Gareth Porter, a young graduate student at Cornell University in
Ithaca, New York, on for his anti-Vietnam war views. The essay
once again tries to dispute the well established fact that the
North Vietnamese leadership in the mid-fifties conducted a blood-
bath in liquidating great numbers of opponents of their regime
during a "land reform" at the time. There have been other "Porters"
in the past who have similarly tried to discount or minimize the
fact of past communist bloodbaths and the possibility of future
bloodbaths.
The chief argument of "revisionist" historians like Porter
rests on the idea that the exact number of persons liquidated is
in doubt and cannot be proved. By this logic., Stalin's wholesale
liquidation of real and imagined oppositionists during his land
reform in the early thirties can also be called (and indeed for
years was called) a myth by the Porters of the time since the
exact number of his victims was in doubt and. could not be verified.
In a way, it comes down to a "numbers game": how many hundreds
or thousands have to be arbitrarily murdered before one speaks
of a bloodbath?
Other arguments of the revisionist historians are equally
specious. They cite mistranslation and misinterpretations of
North Vietnamese official pronouncements concerning such matters,
but it is hard to see how their "corrected" translations are a
warrant for believing the massacres did not take place. Also,
while discounting voluminous non-Communist testimony and research
as anti-Communist "propaganda," they, at the same time, typically
take North Vietnamese accounts, for example of the land reform,
at face value, They ignore the undisputed fact, acknowledged
even by the Communist regimes, that their mass media are used
primarily to influence opinion i.e. to propagandize, and only
secondarily to impart factual information. Distortion of facts
and. out-and-out lies by Communist mass media as well as in official
pronouncements of various kinds are familiar phenomena. While
it is quite legitimate to re-examine the historical record, it is a
patently unsound research practice (to put the most charitable
view on it) to accept only the Coimnunist version as being correct
and. either to ignore contrary views resulting from serious
research, or denigrate them as mere "anti-Communist propaganda."
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The revisionist historians' arguments are examined closely
and at length, and effectively refuted in a New York Times Magazine
article of 15 October 1972 by John S. Carroll, a U. . correspon ent
for many years in Vietnam and now Washington correspondent of the
Baltimore Sun. Revisionist views are also challenged by a number
of other persons eminently qualified to address the problem by
virtue of their first-hand experience in Vietnam and talks with
numbers of North Vietnamese who fled South from the land reform
terror. Their views, expressed in letters to the editor of the
Washington Post, as well as-Carroll's investigation, are attached
hereto. See especially also Washington Star columnist Crosby
Noyes' succinct and persuasive statement.
Reproduced as an attachment also are two sections of a book-
let, The Vietcong Strategy of:Terror by Douglas Pike, one of the
ranking experts: on North Vietnam and Vietcong. In these
sections he recounts carefully the 1968 mass murders by the Com-
munists in Hue, and painstakingly catalogues cases of atrocities
by Vietnamese Communists between 1960 and 1970. This record of
Communist terrorism is supplemented by the attached newspaper
accounts of Communist atrocities since the beginning of the invasion
launched last March. Taken together, these public accounts
provide a reliable and fairly comprehensive record of Communist
terror from which each !reader can decide for himself what would
most likely happen in the event of a Comunist takeover of South
Vietnam.
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NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
15 October 1972
AFTER WE GET OUT, WILL THERE BE A BLOODBATH IN. SOUTH VIETNAM?
1 $y john S. Carroll
What would happen if the United States cut off
all the guns, bullets and bombs the Thicu regime
needs to survive? George McGovern, who promises
to do just that if given the chance, has a scenario.
First, President Thicu and his colleagues would
clear out of Saigon. A coalition would emerge which
would initially embrace all the major elements on
South Vietnam's richly variegated political land-
scape and then negotiate a merger with the North.
Yes, there iwould be bloodshed. Perhaps, McGovern
says, sever Al hundred people might be assassinated.
This opinion was not reached casually. It is
groundefl in a number of current writings in the
press, plus scholarly publications and memos from
such authorities as Prof. George McT. Kahin, head of
the Southeast Asia program at Cornell. Taken
together, it is a fascinating body of literature, one
which attempts to uproot: much of what pre-Nixon
Admii'Iistration historians believed about what hap-
pened `.4n a. similar situation-the Communist vic-
tory Ins North Vietnam in 1:;54.
This ':revisionism has come as a response to
President Nixon's strident warnings of a blood-
bath in South Vietnam. It was, as we shall see.
developed hastily, and then eagerly seized upon
by well-meaning writers, lawyers and politicians
who wanted to believe that pulling the plug on
the Saigon Government would be morally inex-
pensive, if not free. Today at least one of the
principal assumptions on which the revisionist
history rests is not even believed by its own
author. Otters are demonstrably false.
All this ti, interesting for the effect it could have
on the elcq on and, in turn, the effect on foreign
policy. Perhaps the voters, after weighing the
bloodbath of continued war against the probably
smaller bloodbath of a Communist take-over, will
choose tJte latter. But they should do so with eyes
open. The choice should be painful.
As a pro= or anti-war issue, `the bloodbath
theory must naturally be considered along with
other questions, such as the human cost of the
bombing of North Vietnam and the possibility that
the Saigon Government will ultimately crumble
with or without our sunport. Taken alone, the
bloodbath argument says something about the
use of "history" in politics. Nixon uses the most
1 extreme accounts of past. killing to predict future
mayhem. McGovern, in spite,
of his careers as historian and
Vietnam spokesman, sweeps
the whole problem under the
rugby subscribing to shaky re-
investigations of the past, de-
signed to reach predetermined
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Before dealing with the
revisionists. we should look 1
quickly at what is being House. Yet there Is, in sup-
revised. Nixon argues that port of his underlying point;
a Communist victory would an impressive body of writ-
bring death to "perhaps one ing which says there were.
million marked for assassina- indeed,. executions on a mass
tion because they fought scale in which so-called
against North Vietnamese at- "land - reform" tribunals ad-
tempts to conquer South Viet- ministered death penalties,
Ham." He bases his argument often on the basis of death
on captured Communist docu- quotas for each village. For
ments, broadcasts and publi- example:
cations which speak of "blood Robert Shaplen, the re-
debtors," "tyrants" and "re- spected New Yorker corre-
actionaries" and on the belief spondent and author of sev-
that the Lao Dong (Commu- eral books on Southeast Asia,
nist) party of Vietnam has at- including "The Lost Revolu-
,ways consolidated power with tion," estimates that between
the use of executions and 40,000 and 50,000 people were
terror. The Nixon Administra- killed during the land-reform
tion cites any number of in- period.
cidents, such as the Vietminh's Hoang Van Chi, a North
1945-4G "coalition" period, or Vietnamese intellectual who
current reports of atrocities fled in 1955 and Is now In
in hamlets captured since the Washington with the Agency
North Vietnamese offensive for International Develop-
began last spring. But for the ment, has written that 100,000
most part Nixon aides rest died following a Central Com-
their case on two events: the mittee order raising the death
"land-reform" program in quota from one to five per
North Vietnam after the Com- village.
munist victory in' 1954 and Prof. Gdrard Tongas. a
the, mass executions in the French Vietminh sympathizer
South Vietnamese city of Hue who stayed in North Vietnam
in 1968. until 1959 and developed a
What took place after the loathing for the regime,
1954 take-over depends on wrote that 100,000 died un-
which expert one consults, der a formula of one execu-
Speaking last year to the tion per 500 inhabitants
American Society of News- "which meant easily an aver-
paper Editors, Nixon told of age of 5 or 10 per village."
"half a million, by conserva. P. J. Honey, a British au-
tive estimates, in North Viet- thority. writes that "hun
nam who were murdered or dreds of thousands of patent-
otherwise exterminated... " ly guiltless people were done
(Nixon's estimates vary. His to death in the most cruel
i
speec.res suggest that he fashion. "'
considers it bad luck, or per- Anita Lauve Nutt, now a
haps bad politics, to use the Rand Corporation consultant,
same number twice. On the says that as an official in the
number of Catholics who fled United States Embassy in Sal
the North in 1954, for ex- gon in the mid-nineteen-fifties
ample, he has used 1.5 mil- she handled "stacks" of re
lion, 550,000 and 800,000, in ports from Vietnamese fami-
that order. He is headed in lies whose relatives were
the right *iirr.^ti-n; the cor- killed in the land reform.
rect number is generally be- Similarly, Robert F. Turner,
lieved to be 600,000 to 800,- a researcher at Stanford's
000.) The President's estimate Hoover Institute, writes that
/0thVtl "i to ~4AaR9i ah ~gricial In
er than almost any to be an e n crviewed
found outside the White witnesses from "widely scat-
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tered parts" of North Viet-
nam, including two who
had actually been judges In
the tribunals. His conclusion:
"Whether the actual blood-
bath was 300,000 or 500,000
-it '.is quite clear that a ma-
jor purge did occur and that
the casualties numbered in six
digits.?'
The" late Bernard B. Fall,
one of ? the few scholars to he
.held In high regard by doves
and hawks alike, wrote:
"While jt is obviously impos-
sible to,-,,give precise figures,
the besdeducated guesses on
the sub1~ct are that prob-
ably clo3e to 50,000 North
Vietna!1 ese were executed in
connection with the land re
form and that at least twice
as Many were arrested and
sent: to forced labor camps."
- What is the revisionist re-
sponse to such a barrage of
testimony? There are several
counterarguments, the first
of which is:
Political reprisals after
1954 against those who had
aided With the French sim-
ply never happened.
This ii$ the contention of
an arti published in 1969
In Chr, tian Century and
widely repeated. The authors,
D. Gareth Porter (a junior
colleag=ue of Professor Kahin
at Co dell) and Len E. Ack-
land, rely on the absence of
evidence of a bloodbath in
reports of the International
Contra Commission, the
peacekeeping organization
set up by the Geneva Confer-
ence Ig 1954. "International
Control Commission ([.C.C.)
reports," the authors begin,
"while hot definitive, give us
a reasonable account of the
situation in North Vietnam
after the 1954 accords." On
this slender reed, the authors
base their conclusion that
nothing resembling a blood-
bath took place then.
The Publication of the
Christian Century article was
a case of rare timing, On
Nov. 3, 1969, only two days
before, Nixon had given a
hard-line television speech in
thousands" dead In "slave
labor camps.") Those who
wanted to refute the Presi-
dent made enthusiastic use
of the Christian Century
findings. Reports of the
I.C.C. were soon being hailed
as authoritative accounts
of the post-1954 events in
North Vietnam. The argu-
ment, couched in language
almost Identical- to that in
the Christian Century, was
used in quick succession by
Professor Kahin (New York
Times Dec. 6, 1969), Tom
Wicker (The Times, May 12,
1970), and Clark Clifford
(Life, May 22, 1970). It also
turned up in a book called
"Atrocities in Vietnam:
Myths and Realities" by Ed-
ward S. Herman. It was the
lead-off argument In a study
prepared by two Washington
lawyers, Charles E. Hill and
Frank W. Lloyd III, and in.
serted into The Congression.
al Record on Aug. 28, 1970,
by Senator McGovern. The
argument was used as recent-
ly- as Sept. 23 of this year,
thil time in a column by
Clayton Fritchey on the op-ed
page of The Washington Post.
Apart from the I.C.C.'s
structural infirmities - it was
the cold war in miniature
with Canada on one side, Po-
land on the other and a nerv-
ous India at the fulcrum-
thire are several well-known
reasons why the land-reform
deaths never turned up in
the I.C.C. reports. One is a
legal end run the Hanoi
regime made around the
Geneva regulations. By early
1955, the regime had made a
very significant change in its
laws to allow political re-
prisals to be carried out in
the land-reform tribunals-a
part of the civil administra-
tion which the I.C.C. could
not touch. Wilfred Burchett, power.
the nro-Hanoi Australian cor- This theme, one of Senator
respondent, who would cer- McGovern's favorites, has
tainly be the last journalist been sounded again and
to fabricate unfavorable sto- again in the literature of the
ries about North Vietnam, revisionists. To pluck out one
wrote that the legal changes example, the Hill - Lloyd
were "partly made necessary stud which Sn
e M G
a or
ow
lack of real landowners
(those who indeed could be
classed as such had of course
fled southward in 1954 and
1955) compelled Hanoi to put
on trial as 'reactionary land-
lords' men and women who
were by no stretch of the
Imagination rich landowners.
In the hands of pro-Pe-
king leaders such as th party
secretary, Troung ; hinh,
every village felt compelled
to produce its own 'quota' of
such reactionaries. Perhaps
50,000 were executed." Is this
really land reform?
Professor Kahin goes; be-
yond most others in contend-
ing that the deaths wer?+:dis-
tinct from the take-owk not
only in concept, but also in
time. He repeatedly ini?cts-
in the face of writings "which
include a textbook he himself
edited-that the death did
not take place for more',--than
two years after the end of
the war. In his Times arl.icle,
for example, he criticizes' Nix-
on for an "appalling misun-
derstanding of what actually
happened," and then goes on
to demonstrate his own mis-
understanding by stating: "It
was in the fall of 1956, more
than two years after the Ge-
neva Armistice that violence
c
occurred an a significant scale
by the no reprisals' clause y'
ern ut in the Con ressional
People's Tribunals with judg- deaths "actually took place in
ments pronounced by the connection with Hanoi's ef-
properly constituted provin- forts to mobilize the local
cial courts." peasantry and redistribute to
One needs only the most peasants land held by Ian#.
casual familiarity with the holders, not as planned re-
I.C.C. to appreciate the ab- prisal for pre-1954 activities
surdity of considering its re- nor to eliminate potential op-
ports a "reasonable account." position and consolidate coi4-
Bernard Fall provided two ii. trot." McGovern recently re-
lustrations in an article in peated much the same state-
this Magazine ("How the ment, adding that the killings
French Got Out of Vietnam," occurred two years after the
May 2, 1965). In North Viet- Communists came to power,
nam, the I.C.C. attempted to There can be no serious
inspect Haiphong's Catbi air- doubt that the land - refortn
port, the largest airfield in courts were used for pur-
the country, but permission poses beyond land reform.
was denied on grounds that The excesses, which eventu-
Catbi "belongs to a private ally stirred rebellion among
flying club." That was the the peasantry, even included
end of that investigation. In executions of people who
South Vietnam, Fall recalled were neither landowners nor
asking an Indian I.C.C. offi- collaborators with the French.
cial about a U.S. aircraft car- Bernard Fall writes that. "the
Her which was clearly violat-
ing the rules by unloading
warplanes--within sight of
Saigon's main thoroughfare.
He was told that "officially
[emphasis Fall's] we have not
been informed of the pres-
ence of the aircraft carrier,"
Recently I spoke by tele-
phone with Gareth Porter, co-
author of the Christian Cen-
tury article which popular-
ized the I.C.C. argument. He
said then he was soon com-
ing out with another article
to prove Nixon wrong, but
this one would be based on
different evidence. He ac-
knowledged that the original
I.C.C. approach' Is weak: "I
don't chink I'd want to base
the argument on the I.C.C. re-
ports at this point."
The second thrust of the
antibloodbath argument is as
follows:
There were executions but
they were connected with
land reform-not with the
Communists' assumption of
bath specter, (This time th In the Geneva Agreement. Record c ntends that- the In the north." In another ar-
figures were *ro ro c d For ~ ea ti~~Mre G Ri i71$eQrlr 21 E~'pOO1 so far as to mis-
.dered" and "hundreds of ish an rep ace by the that -- land reform. The quo a oseph uttinger on the
n timing' nlthnt,nh A"tfinnnr Ig
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admirably clear on this point.
Buttinger and other histori.
ans believe the deaths began
'not two years after the take-
over, but in some provinces,
slightly before the 1954. vic-
tory arid, after a hiatus to
stem the southward flow of
refugees", again in 1955. The
violence', was slowed by the
regime in the summer of 1956
when widespread unrest be..
came apparent, but the change
in policy' came too late to
prevent the peasant rebellion
that fall-hich, it should be
pointed out took a good part
of the No h Vietnamese 325th
Division put down,
the turisionist arguments:
Tle number killed was
probably only 10,000 to 15,-
000`-=and that may be high..
The Influential Christian
Century article uses the 10,.?
000-15,000 figures and at..
tributes them to Buttinger.,
However, it is also pointed
out that Buttinger's "sympa??
thies lay' with Diem," as if to
suggest that he may have
been overstating the misdeeds
of the North.
Among; the historians who
are most` respected in this
country, s Buttingcr provides
the lowest estimate-and the!
lowest 1i3- far, as we have
seen. It is a fraction of the..
figure used by Bernard Fall.
and Robert Shaplen and a.
smaller'. fraction still of the
figures provided by Gdrard
Tongas,' Hoang Van Chi,
Robert Turner and P. J.
Honey. It should be re-
garded as a minimum not a
maximun>. There is and prob-
ably never will be any way
of knowing the extent of the
killing in North Vietnam or
the exact manner In which it
was carried out. There is no
doubt, however, that a great
many people died. If the Com-
munists take control in South
Vietnam and do not execute
large numbers of people, It
will be a very real departure
from past practices. If by that
Another popular theme of
the revisionists Is that the po-
tential victims are elements
Vietnamese society might well
be better off without:
General Thieu and his as-
sociates are the ones who are
threatened.
Sen4tor. McGovern himself
has probably done more than
anyone else to spread this be-
lief. Again and again he has
declared that the sacrifices
in Vietnam have been for the
purpose` of saving Thieu. Re-
cently he said on television
that if Thieu and some of
his frieinds feel endangered"
they could be granted asylum
in the United States. As for
less f;prominent South Viet-
namese, he has explained what
happ4ns when the Commu-
nists-'attain power:
lien they take over a
village, they don't assassi-
nate'the people there. They
set up a school and a road
system and a tax system.
They just move in and take
over. They don't kill the peo-
ple, even though the village
may have been indifferent or
hostile . . ."
Again, consider the land-re-
form tribunals. Many people
did not live to enjoy those
roads pnd the schools and the
peopik executed were not
generals and prime ministers.
To suggest that the
bloodbath primarily threatens
Thieti, Ky, the militarists.
corrupt politicians and other
unsavory characters is mis-
leading. One must - assume
that `the big operators have
taken out life Insurance poli.
cies in the form of emergen.
cy escape routes and Euro-
pean bank accounts. What the
bloodbath theorists are talk-
ing about is the literally mil-
lions of people who have
,openly supported the Govern.
ment by working as civilians
in the national, province, dis-
trict, village or hamlet ap-
paratus. or in the military,
or for the United States.
new wave, again started by
Gareth Porter of Cornell. Por-
ter has now circulated his
new paper, which attacks the
bloodbath theory as being
based on "propaganda and
careless scholarship," and
then, relying on the party
newspaper Nhan Dan and
other official North Vietnam-
ese publications, concludes
that only 800 to 2,500 persons
were executed during the land
reform.
Porter contends that, for
one thing, Hoang Van
Chi mistranslated North Vi-
etnamese documents and
speeches. The most serious
case, he says, is Chi's trans-
lation of the 1956 speech in
which Gen. Vo Nguyen Gap
discussed the mistakes com-
mitted in the land reform pro-
gram. Giap admits that the
sources as "official documen-
tary evidence," or "the actual
historical record." In these
impressive-sounding sources
he has found little evidence
of a bloodbath. Hanoi has
not accused itself of murder;
therefore, it is innocent.
Apart from the historical
arguments. McGovern bases
his antibloodbath faith, on
his judgment of what the Com-
munists intend to do today,
not what they did 18 years
ago.
In July of 1969 he said his
then recent visit to Paris had
been helpful in making Tills
assessment. "When I suggest-
ed to Hanoi and N.L.F. *a..
tional Liberation Front)
gations that some Ameridtns
fear a bloodbath during' or
after an American witt'lr
drawal," he said, "they re
party "executed too many plied that just the opposi
people." according to the Chi would happen-the killin
translation-but Porter says
this should have said meKely
that there was an "unjust
disciplining of innocent peo-.
pie." Chi also says the speech
contains an admission that of-
ficials "resorted to terror."
Here again Porter says the
translation is wrong; it should
have said, used excessive
repressive measures." These
are two of eight examples.
At best. Chi seems guilty
of failing to explain that his
translations are not literal.
At worst, his work is "fraudu-
lent," as Porter asserts. But
even if one reads Giap as
translated by Porter, it is
hard to believe that he isn't
using elliptical language to
describe terrible events. Chi,
and others who speak both
Vietnamese and English, say
that loose translations are
frequently used In dealing
with Lao Dong party jargon,
which is often euphemistic.
"Unjust disciplining" does
mean executions, they say,
just as "excessive repressive
measures" means terror.
There remains one other
disturbing aspect of the
Porter paper. After criticizing
others for making use of
would stop . . . as for re-
prisals against those Vietila-
mese who have stood with
our forces, they said that it
would be in the self-interest
of any regime to try to brpad.
en its support and unify. the
country, which would call1not
for reprisals but accom
tion." i
This August he said, Any
administration comingV
into
power has to consolidate ilts
position with the people,
don't do that by just v
spread killing and terror;,';
With the notion of a bene
olent, all-embracing coaiolon,
McGovern has come up ith
a particularly American .lo-
tion to a Vietnamese p
lem. Franklin D. Roosevef "s
part of our tradition, pit
theirs.
It is true that Ho Chi Minh
himself publicly repudiated
the excesses of the land-re-
form program, but the repudi-
ation was not necessarily
sincere. It was made in 1956'
at the time of the peasant
revolt, and was thus ex-
pedient. Writing about the W
pudiation, Ralph Smith of The
University of London con.
..ur, -'- .-Y ul~
eluded that the results of the
doubtful that anyone would debris from the first wave of of propaganda, he repeatedly re-
be able to *ppoved 0-or Release 18'99LQ9/02 :eClALR[RNpO*$94A4r2 Jv TI Tmpaign were,
again, even know, about them what is shaping up as the official Hanoi publications for si a and were some-
for certain. _ the truth. He refers to these thing "no one in the party's
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Politburo can seriously have
wished to change."
The Administration's reply
to those who say the
Vietnamese Communists have
changed their ways is simple:
Look at Hue.
"We saw a prelude of what
would happen in South Viet.
nam when the Communists
entered the city of Hue last
year," Nixon said In 1969.,
"During their brief rule there,
there wal a bloody reign of
terror in hich 3,000 civilians
were cIu ed, shot to death
and buri In mass graves."
Thei fare several detailed
studie;of the Hue killings.
The Jjie best liked by the
White House is by Douglas
Pike, an officer of the United
States Information Agency
who has written extensively
on the N.L.E. He concludes
WASHINGTON STAR
28 September 1972
CROSB''Y S. NOYES
that in addition to the initial
executions of civil servants,
police officials, military men
and community leaders, there
was an ominous phase dur-
ing which the Communists
thought they could hold the
city forever, and set out to
shape it to their liking.. .
"Orders went out," Pike
writes, "to round up what one
prisoner termed 'social nega-
tives"' Pike estimates that 2,-
000 died in this period, in-
cluding a significant portion
of the intellectual community.
He describes the destruction
of a prominent "community
leader" and his family. Not
only was the man executed,
but so were his wife, his mar-
ried son and daughter-in-law,
his young unmarried daughter,
a male and female servant,
their baby, the cat and the
goldfish.
If Pike's analysis is sound,
denly "re-education" lists be-
came liquidation lists. Ack-
land concludes that the deaths
were a result of the destruc-
tion sown by an army in re-
treat.
Whether the Pike studyF
proves that Communist rule
would be a bloodbath, as the
Nixon side insists, may be
open to debate. Yet in reading
the Ackland study, which tries
to refute this idea, one can
hardly be encouraged by the
treatment accorded the peo-
ple of Hue, even prior to the
"army in retreat" period. Is
there any reason that those
killed for not showing up at
meetings, or for being "par-
ticularly unpopular," would
have fared any differently if
the Communists had cot
trolled the entire country ar4
not just Hue? "A revolution."
Mao Tse-tung once said, 'tia
not a dinner party." ^
CPYRGHT
Communists .Wouddn'f Be .MercAftal its the South
It Is verb reassuring Indeed
to he infnrr/red by a variety of
Wnshinglon? armchair experts
on Vietnam that predictions of
a "hloodh th" If the Commu-
nists takmovcr Inthat country
are n`' mth that need not be
taken sci ffusly by anyone.
This convenient finding -
which is frnade in support of
Gcorge McGovern'. proposals
to surrender South Vietnam to
Communist rule - holds that
President Nixon had it all
wrong when he estimated In
1971 that perhaps a half-
millinn penpfe were extermi-
nnted by the North Vietnam-
ese after they took over from
the French in 1954.
Still a n o t Ii e r Vietnam
"scholar," one Gareth Porter
of Cornell University, has
come, forth to chnltcngc the
authority for that estimate. Its
origin, he says, was a hnnk
the events in Hue portend
brutal social engineering un-
der a Communist regime.
The counterargument to
Pike comes from Len E. Ack-
land, the co-author of the
Christian Century article,
who lived in Hue during 1967
and returned after Tot to re-
construct the occupation in
Gia Hot, a precinct of 25,000
residents.
Ackland agrees that there
were some blacklist killings
at first. He writes that during
the first week and a half, the
deaths included executions of
people "as examples" for fail-
ing to report as ordered to
meetings, as well as killings
of selected individuals "be-
cause they had been particu-
larly unpopular with Hue's
population." The mass deaths
came, Ackland goes on, when
the Vietcong were being
pushed out of the city. Sud-
tries - or how many within a
]tow relevant what happened
may he to what would happen
in South Virt:nnm if the Com-
munists took over there. Mir-
ever many were exterminated,
it might be pointed nut that
these were people who elected
q-
ans were
how many Russ
uhllshcd In 11161 by a North uldated by Joseph Stalin due- itfany others in addition to
V I e t n a in e s o exile named ing the 19,10s. There are no tIoang Van Chi have reached
the conclusion that he did not
; 1U." C
h1 which was ti-
IIenn
F
,
e
r momen
v
ctory.
reliable figures -- and much
nnneed by thod',j{nis,IVki4 t=rHmiiAralc9t~a ltltQ}AQlrlli!!8/fl') _t Xt~ J 1 lYQ ?~'Tl_ dAf1NYR')f1MflNl d fAAtlldr mntea
e account, the Intention n
which was plainly not histori-
cal nccitrary, but propaganda
of;ahi?t Nnrlh Virtnam . "
1lnanr l`nn ('hi hiin:jt?T'1orar ~,'ase
basic directive! dechtes, "'we must dc-
?But in the provinces of Binh Long,
north of Saigon, and. Binh Dinh on the
central coast, virtually every enemy-
occupied village has a tale of horror.
Officials give these examples:
Binh Dinh Province, a Commu?
nis organized "people's court"-with
30 villagers forced to participate-
con Acted a group of government
wo ers and policemen of being "en-
em' s of the people." As many as 45
per ons were executed, and the others
n eyewitness said 'those Con-
de tied to death were marched to a
ne by sand bank where digging their
gra es was "quick and easy."
another part of the Province, a
Vie Cong guerrilla. chief led three
me -also convicted by a "people's
ystcm sn as ter meet the requirements
n rrpres: ig and purging undesirable
letncnts a d preserving power."
"Rcprc ion" is a cover-all for
ublic tri s, executions and imprison-
nant, terr r and revenge. Decisions on
ifs or de th are vested in the Party
ndres wh dig in after the army has
clown through. There are delicate
ynonyms and amusing Annamcsc
tang phr ses for the customary death
cntcncc y a people's court. That
formal ju gment in Vietnamese isdict
-- "to en tho existence of." But it can
be transla ed more humanely -- for the
car -- as a ly tat cho:."to solve a pro-
birm on he spot," And in hearty so?
clalist idi rn - which might have made
Marx scr, tch his haemorrhoids in em?
barrassnt t - the message of demo-
cratic jus icc can be presented as "to
cancel", 'to sleep with the worms,"
"to puns, i severely," "to go diving for
shrimps" "to punish with a fully ex-
tended m," "to feed him copper
cr*ndy."
A typ ?n1 security directive for the
Que Son district stipulates: "Each area
of activi should establish a record of
reaction vies who should be arrested.
Specific cases must be submitted to
courts f r trial. Death penalties will be
given b the court to heighten the
ride of ho revolutions movement." t'v 2 death sentences
99 td ~3ill~.d~P-~9r,r0cfitl-94A0~Qj~rr condemn
tio
s
a
n
nism or ascism, what's the diffcrcnce7 had to be read to the people, and I had
them and then ,bayoneted the bodies
"many times."
Another 45 officials and soldiers
were reported to have been buried
alive in Tam Quan district.
The Viet Cong are said to have be-
headed a policeman in Bong Son vil-
lage and strung up his body in front
of the military-police headquarters to
avenge the death of a Communist
soldier.
The full scale of terrorism may never
be known. In Binh Long Province, for
instance, the protracted fighting for An
Loc has made it impossible to deter-
mine the fate of many government em-
ployes. Says one official:
"We may have to replace 40 per
cent of the officials in Binh Long. We
simply do not- know how many were
taken away or executed."
CPYRGHT
(issued to liberators operating in e
Sa Dec special zone) that "a general
specific norm must be set for success-
ful eliminations": two to seven execu-
tions, and 15 to 20 "warnings" In each
sub-ward; "death quotas" of two to
five, and 10 to 30 "warnings" for de-
signated city Inner-areas.
To facilitate court procedure, death
sentence forms, already approved,
signed, stamped and scaled, have been
distributed to commissats of the
liberation forces, leaving convenient,
blank spaces for the names and crimps
td be legally filled in.
Errors, the Party bravely concedes,
do occur.""For instance," one penitent
provincial report discloses, "in some
areas we killed entire families, teem
agers and even friendly personnel. We
have put, more emphasis on killing
than on indoctrination of culprits.
Consequently, this has badly affected
the prestige of the Party."
Finally, if we lack reports of the
current people's trials in the liberated
villages around Quang Tri, we have the:..
testimony of But Cong Tuong, a Viet:
cong defector, who was chief of Prom
paganda, Culture, Teaching and Educa?
tion for Ben Tre and who reports a
"purge movement" trial in Tan Liao
village:
"I had to write down different mo.
 Approved FoR Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A0002001100014 PYRGHT
to write them in such manner that
they would be approved by the peo-
ple. The condemnation had to stir the
people so that they would shout, ask-
ing for the death sentence ... The
condemned were immediately shot
and buried in a mass grave. Their fami-
lies were not allowed to bury them:-'
NEW YORK TIKES
4 August 1972
Enemy Is Said to xecute
Hundreds inSouthVietnam
Allied Officials Describe Slayings of
Government Aides in Binhdinh -.--. ,
Thousands Reported Imprisoned
C YRGHT By JOSEPH B. TREASTER CPYRGHT
NP~1%1 to The New York rim,,
i SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Aug. 3 -- Allied intelligence of.
c a s say that Communist po-
litical officers have publicly ex-
ecuted hundreds of Saigon Gov-
ernment officials and Impris.
oned thousands during their
occupation of Binhdinh Prov-
ince, on the central coast of
South Vietnam.
The allied officials say that`.
they have confirmed the deaths,
of about 250 persons through!
eyewitness reports and have
additional ~informatlon that
r1? Now York limn/A,, . 4, 1977 !
(leads them strop W1
Ithnt the total number of dead
1111 atwulf !.
People who have escaped)
av inpointed three large
prison camps in the rugged,
Anlno alley of central South:
Vietnn, which are said to
hold n )out 6,000 persons, the
official, S say.
The main victims of
the en ty were said to be ham-
let an village chiefs and their
deputl s, pacification workers.
policemen and militiamen. But
teaches, doctors, nurses and
,minor dministrative staff work-'
ers, a well as some soldiers,
were mong those reported Im-
prison d.
Lengthy interviews with peo-
ple w o lived in northern Binh-
;dinh wring the nearly three
month of unchallenged Com-
munis occupation , generally
corro rated the findings of
the intelligence officials.
The reported executions In
Binhdi h appear to be the most
slzabi deliberate assault on in-
dividu Is connected with the
Saigo Government since the
massy res In Hue. during the,
1968 unar New Year Offen-'
sive hen, according to allied
offici s and independent jour-
nalist, , more than 2,600 people;
were ilied.
So American officials see
the eported executions in
Bin id h as a sample of the
ing over South Vietnam by
force.
Such violence, these officials
say, especially would be ex-
pected if a Communist victory
were "sudden and decisive."
Other American officials,
however, say that history
would suggest that a sudden
and decisive victory "just isn't
in the cards for either side."
These officials feel that if
the North Vietnamese Commu-
nists were eventually to gain
control of South Vietnam
through a gradual political set-
tlement, they might well adopt
a conciliatory attitude toward
their former opponents in
hopes of uniting the country.
But those who most firmly
-subscribe to the "bloodbath
theory" are convinced that any
kind of enemy take-over would
result in the execution of many
officials in the Government in
Saigon.
Some Americans with con-
siderable experience in study-
ing North Vietnamese and Viet-
cong affairs say that they have!
been surprised by the particu-1
larly harsh tactics of the Com-
inhdinh province
which has a long history of
party activit
where some of the o a eex-
ecdtions were reported.
Hundreds Shot to Death
The enemy gunned down sev-
eral hundred South Vietnamese.
civilians who tried to flee from
their control in Quangtri Prov-
ince, the northern most prow
ince in South Vietnam, and
they used the same tactic at
Anloc, but apparently killed
fewer civilians there.
American intelligence of-
ficials believe that these slay-
ings were more likely to have
been the outcome of local bat-
tlefield decisions than the re-
sults of high-level policy, as
.the reported executions ap-
'parently were, .
Government troops began to
disrupt Communist programs in:
northern Binhdinh with a coun-'
teroffensive late in July. With-
In two weeks, Saigon's troops
had re-entered the principal
town In each of the three
northern districts -- frloalnhon,
Tamquan and Hoaian----and had
encountered little resistance. In
the last several days, though,
the enemy has been striking
back, and large sections of the
area remain contested.
The territory In northern
Binhdinh was captured byj
Reveng Suggested North Vietnamese regulars.
They sugg st that some of But after they had secured the
the reported illings may have area they withdrew and left
hr-%n inspire by a sense of administration of the "liherat-
revenge tow d former party ed" communities to local Corn-'
members wh , for one reason munists, some of whom had
,or another. hive worked with been living in the mountains
the Saigon Go ernment In recent for years.
years. Anothe possibility, they + installation of Officials
say, is tha the reported
killings repres.nt some sort of The Communists are believed
Interparty con lict, perhaps be- to have installed chiefs and
tween northe and southern administrative staffs in each of
factions. the villages and 138 hamlets
While a fe's executions have in the three districts.
been reporte in the . other According to allied intelli-
areas capture by the North gence officials and residents of
northern Binhdinh province,,
Vietnamese I their currcn2 of. this is how the Communistg
fensive, there his hcen nothing proceeded:
of the magnit de or the events Communist security officers,
reported in B hdinh. had compiled dossiers on every,
This is so, uthoritative offi- one in the region. They quickly
cials say, b, use the districts classified the population into
In Binhdinh f I rather suddenly several catagories according to
- in a few ays as compared physical capabilities, financia
with a few eeks in Quangtri position, occupation, age an,
- and man Saigon Govern-
ment official wore "caught in - and ta the Commu Saigon'.
place." d tG Gov ovhes the er r nment in Saigthe all of northern Those who had worked'
orked di-
I After irh P vireo In April, rectly for the Saigon Govern-
ment were brought before
nearly three onths passed be- "peoples' courts," denounced as
fore Government troops tried "tyrants," and condemned t
to retake th territory. Thus, death or sentenced to prison.
left alone, the Communists were Relatives of the Communists
able to oa out their pro- were often offered jobs in the
grams in so a detail among administration of the hamlit,
the more th 200,000 people while relatives of Government
of the region. employes were watched clos^ly
In most of he other captured restricted in movement an
full
ti
h
fi
ng never
area, t
s
e
y d peeial indoc
F 'RD I rprb L'tLr~ h~I ever, in Locnninh dls r. 000 `~# -2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00200110001-tPYRGHT
In organizing the "people's
courts," the Communists would
assemble 30' to 40 persons to
the entire hamlet of several
hundred. The courts were held
during the clay and the night,
usually outside administrative
offices or schools but some-
times on a road or in a rice
field.
'Frozen With Fear'
Sometimes the residents were
urged to join in hurling charges
against the accused. But In
other cases a death sentence
was Toad, while the people
stood-in tie words of it farm-
er-"frozen with fear."
In many cases, there were
fewer than half a dozen vic-
tims In th rtpcrtrd executions
in Blnhdirli. This Is in contrast
to the killings in Jiur, during
Tet, yr hen scores of people
were herded together and shot
as the'Communists apparently
tried eliminate the entire
1community of Saigon Govern-
ment Workers and anti-Corn,
NEW YORK TIN FS
6 Aurpist 1972
rnunistlcaders. 18 n I. e evening, lull ,
American Intelligence offt?~ ment officials were reported to
dais say that the Communists, have been killed and buried in
appear to have been generally! Andnng hamict.
more selective' in their kill-j I in another instance, 42 po-
ings In Binhdinh than in Tine in 41cemen and Government work.
1OG8, intending them as "nhjent ers, including an officer, Tran
lessons" to discourage future Van Luc of Dinhbinh, were said
cooperation with Saigon and to to have been shot to death on
reinforce loyalty to the Com- the outskirts of Vinhphungg
munist side. 1hamlet at about 9 P.M. May 27.
For this reason, the tntdll- were reported burled in
They
a sandbar nearby.
genre officials say, only the Rifle fire was the most com?
worst "tyrants" were killed. m?n method of killing, but in-
Others were given stiff prison teliigonce officials say that a
terms ranging up to 30 years,
hamlet chief and 46 other vii-
end still others -worn required isga *nd hnmirt officials and
only to attend intense political- soldiers were buried lAlive ck1 SAUth
Indoctrination courses for were of Tanthanh hamlet sometime
month or so. where they were In May.
expected to learn that the sal- 't'hey at., sold that a police-
vation of the Vietnamese lay man, a pacification worker and
In Communism. an assistant village chief had
Despite the general pattern been stabbed "many times
of small-scale executions re. with a bayonet affixed to A.
ported, the intelligence officials)
said that they had sketchy de- rifle (after they had been shot
tails on a few mass killings., Iheforo 1,000 people at the Aft,
For example, they say. on May! phong village sports stadium
Vietnam CPYRGHT
'Shoot Him!'
Saidthe.',
PeQple
thu province on the central coast of
oath ,yriewam. Allied officials say
ey have eyewitness reports confirm=
g the death of about 250 persons
r nd other Information leading them to
eltove that the total number of deaths
in the vicinity of 500. in addition,
6 officials say, escapees have told
hem that about 6,000 persons are be-
g held in prison.
Some American officials here regard
thti reported executions in Binhdinh
province iIa arc example of how the
Communists would behave If they Wc-
seeded Ifl taking over all of 5odth Viet-
nam. Many of the officials say that the
term "bloodbath," whielh has been used
SAIGON-- On the evening of May by President Nixon in describing such'
n eventuality, is too tniotionally
500 pcgplo in the hthhnlet of Bittlh- ?harged and probably Is not what
thuong fin northern Binhdinh province ould happen. "But I don't think any
and recited a list of "crimes" they said easonahic person doubts that there
bed been committed by Nguyen Xuan mould be a large number of South
Phong, the Social Affairs Commission- ictnamese Government officlald
er of Hnaiduc,villnrc. As Mr. Fliong, llled," one American official'. said:.
his arms tied behind him,, knelt on I'd say it would be a few thousand.'.':jl
the road that nuns through Binh- The widespread feeling is that after
ehuong, the chairman of the Iioaiduc take-over the Communists would bb
p'eople's Revolutionary Committee elective In their killing. as they.gen-
asked the crowd: "ta this man worthy rally appear to have been in IStnhdinlu
of being shot dead?" tncrican specialists in Vorth Vietna?,
According to an eyewitness report cse r-:tl Vietcong affairs say they,
received by American Intelligence offi- vote'., expect the Communists to g
risk and made public last week, the iier key officials who had been par,
people' replied: "shoot him dread." icularly effective against them and
Thereupon a youth stood in front!of ho appeared reluctant to cooperatd,
W. Phong and put three rifle bullets Ith the new governmcnL The Idea
.Into bin chest. ould be to get rid of the trouble-
Mr. thong was one of several bun- akcrs and Impress others that they
Bilged tn1gon Government officials re- ad better snap ]no line, as rippcars.tO
May
On May 21, the Intelligen a
officials say, an unidcntifi d
South Vietnamese military
liceman was beheaded in Bon ?
on and his body was hang d
in front of the military-police
`station there.
JI According to allied Intell-
gcnce officials and northe it
'Binhdinh residents, the charg s
that brought the death penal .y
were usually vague but relic t-
rd the Communists' puritanical
nliture and their intoleran e
for "crime" against their own
pgoplc.
Those who (lied were repo -
ctf1?y pceused of taking brib s.
violating unmarried worn n,
making love to wives of "rc
lutionary cadre," capturing a d?
killing "legal agents of the ??
olutinn," and providini inf r?
mation to the "enemy.' S e.,
were reported also cited S.
simply 'corrupt" and "d ?
tnecring" over the people.
American Intel itcrice o c ,
past week they have re
that in the
celvcd information that some Commu?+ CPtYRGFi1
nist operatives have been directed t
"eliminate" Saigon Government offI
cfals who might be able to tdentif
them In the event of a cease-fire. Th
targets would be primarily members 01 ,
the south Vietnamese intelligence serv
ice and national police.
The Communists in the Vietnam W
have always employed terrorist tactic
niming at eliminating specific leader
to weaken the Government side an
at times, tossing random hand grenade
to intimidate the population and di.
courage them from standing with th
Government.
According to allied officials, the
was a surge in terrorist Incident
across the country with the start
the North Vietnamese offensive in la
March. By the Grid of July, 2,762 SOt'
Vietnamese civilians and officials we
-
reported to have died In these In i
dents. The total for all of last ye V.
was 4,000, down from an average f,
about 6,000 for each of the th e
earlier years.
By comparison, the number
deaths In Binhdinh may seem sm 1.
But there, as would probably be e
case in any noncontested area, randc ii
terror might hove had a negatl e
effect for the Communists. Inste
ift the "liberated areas," the Coin ?
rusts carrlhd out their killings w h
tlraiberate calculation, hoping to ma
Acli one an object lesson.
, I -JOSEPH IL TREA
ported to have been cxecut t aver e c je in
Communfata d l~>~ l i -r el i 4' ? ' Ah , . 79-01194AO0020011 OOO1-2
btottths that they had unchallenged you would also have the revengb'
.. ,
--- co-parl ^1 11W11,
 ApprovedRFor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2CPYRGHT
SAIGON POST
25 August. 1972
r\ 1
The NV'/VC. forces who
occupied nbrtbern Binli Dinh
executed,A tot :,l of 1,700 mili-
tia and cdre personnel and
have centrated some 7,000
thu An Lao and An
morc%
Huu s}t?~as.
Conftrary to earlier reports
there was no semblance of
a trial and the victims were
summarily executed as the"
l
0 ell
r~!_ j rr'l-~j a Ll~, 12
By QIIANG MMIN11
Dinh and to t ismiss iesc
CPYRGHT
lived, before an deci o
in 195 to go to North Viet-
am. Dien said ? they went
o school togethar.
Dien said Nhan returned
a the province about two
csr-t ago. Thoy haven't soon
ach other since Nhan left
he hamlet 18 Scars ago,
Dion also disclosed that
any of the VC eadres in the
coupled areas in the provin-
e are women who also left
outh Vietnam in. 1954 and
ave returned with the NVA
nvasinn fnrenr,
iin_J -r, Ana n':ill
When the NVA/VC forces
(copy an area; 'they imme-
iately try to organize ? the
i cal administration. -This is
olluwed by mobilization' of
rocurement of" - supplies
nd the third and last act)_._
ity is political indoctrina.
t on which they .'call etrai:
Ing.D
According to Dien, govern
Cant militia and cadres who'
fuse political indoctrination
ro killnd outright ; cadres
it]' pro-Communist leanings
the result of small tow
gvisips and ltatreds.
a The p.)Iicc authorities
have the records,* the con
gressman said when asked I
a tally,has been made of th
executions,
Dierr makes frequent visit
to his cpnstiticncy; lie arri
ved two days ago fro n hi
And he was ono o
last trl
.
were fingered by the VC witb
9 vo cc r :tnr.rr v?!:) min l
let :i:r. S~ .t i. r i,. ' t i.r t,r.t' t
some in3tinces by bein;
buried ative. ciitionn in ffoai An wi,cr
rva than n score of civil
m ire
This was disclosed Wednes-
serva~its were strung up by
day by 1)cpu,y Le Van Dien, the feet and their throats cut.
congressman from one of the ?f3osom Fri?rtw
northern Binh Dinh district,
in an interview In the Lower Deputy Dien also identified
House. tho' VC equivalent of Provin
t)epuiy Dien's revelations co Chief Ii.Bihh Diuli as
wore considered significant Nguyen Xich Nha') whom ho
In view Rf reports in the described as his aboson
\Vo,tcrn =press tending to friends when they parted 1
minimize the .cope of Com- years ago.
munist atrocities (luring their According to Dien, ? Nhan
occapatiain of n ?rthern Binh was a_ hamlt-t ' cadro i
Dinh Blob, where they both
WASHINGTON STAR
14 August 1972
Massacre in Binhdinh
' It Is a fervently held article of liberal
faith that If the United States will just
get out of Indochina. all will be sweet-
ness and light among the Vietnamese
people, North and South, Communist
and non-Communist. Those who chant
this doxology Ignore the execution of
thousands of Vietnamese and flight of
tens of thousands more when the Com-
munists took over in the North In 1954,
They Ignore the mass graves containing
ties UT Me murr calculatutt fulgil U!
terror which has taken place at Btnh-
dinh province on the central coast of
South Vietnam the past three months.
Binhdinh fell quickly to the North
Vietnamese In early April and It was not
until July that ,Saigon's forces launched
a serious effort to retake It. So the Com-
munists had plenty of time. There was
no need to hurry, as there was In Hue In
1968, when American and South Viet-
namese forces counterattacked within
the bodies of more than 2,600 South
days of the city's fltll.
Vietnamese civilians murdered at Hue Accordin to I tellt ence reports and
during th9~i.~ -8~6'teef fl h' &eftt I 9999Q.9iti@2poC PP9 Q11t441i0iOO0
should have o difficulty whatsoever In the Communists were extremely me-
glossing over the.less numerous casual- thodical. They rounded up hamlet and
are given art Indoctrination
Course of 10 Mays to ono
Montt) '..v ile those wilh
C.-. .....:K,rrTCarc t ;)tr~Ls
from one tnout': to dares
months.
Dien said the NVA/VC.for-
ces captured a total of 5,000
and' -3,700 cadres. Of that
number, 1.000 militia men
mad 700 cadres were execu?'.
ted.
T e rest, for all Uien?
kno ?s, are still undergoing'
ctra ning. in small grniij)s
3n t e An Lao and An Huu
are . lie spid that a grou;.p
of ' such #traineess were)
liberated listweek b% an
AR .helicopter operation.
If cortflrmed that ahunri-
reds or women (rere ra,)ed
bylt e NVAV'V'C during the
acct n: `inn or northern Binh
:-riY,: a: ',\".''+ntaT 'V`tit3 a4:7tS+fi
to cl.3se one of two taiks44??
to ga her supplies or abooif
troo morales.
Di n talked to three wonjen
who c!)oso to aboosID lrgiwr
mor le. They said' they were
assi .ed to a houio where at
an a )pointed time, NV.t'C
troo s came in and violated
the
Din said that sts a rosull
of t eso atrocities, the pe r
;pie f Binh Dinh. ,toddy ai
ino ab3oluteiy ; anti-Cdtijt
CPYRGHT
X00110001-2
14
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00200110001-9PYRGHT
CPYRGHT
village chiefs, Pacification workers, po-
licemen, militiamen, teachers, doctors,
riur?ses, clerical workers, literally anyone
who had had any connection with the
Saigon government. "People's courts"
executed several hundred (perhaps as
many as 500) and shipped an estimated
6,000 others off to "people's prisons" In
remote areas of the Communist-held
Anlao valley. Most of those killed appar-
ently were executed by rifle fire but
others were burled alive, beheaded or
hacked to pieces.
None of this represents any new de-
parture In tactics on Hanoi's part. Aside
from the general massacres In the North
in 1954 and in the South during the 1968
Tet offensive, the murder and kidnaping
of South Vietnamese officials has been
NM YORK TIMES
t bee 1972
m
CPYRGHT
g Sep e
belcctor Tells of A'T rssacre Iy
Enemy at Quangtri
RAK'1I1 to Tisr New Totk TIm01 Viet amC9e t;ommunist9 con',
ISAIGON, Snuth victnam, side cd them to be followers of
Sept. 8-A c ec o t nemv. That Is wily they oil
North Vietnamese Arm said to- h d to bo kUled"
day that his unit had ginned c ambush was widely re
down civilian men, women and p ,d as it was taking place,
m- ht t some news-ncn su ,gested
Vietna
children and south vil!ans
eso seldic without
thl from k fl d trlnndvcrtcntlyhabecausel
s n
City in lake April, Lion gt they .d and a had Mingled with fleeing
rl ;
t
tn
.
g
Qu
s ices.
earlyy May. k 1 t -eA Rise o it newsman's
1 Tho defector. Le Xuan Thuy,
? civato Thug
rlvato first ?classl a tfun today, F
22-year-old p
who had served.as a radio oprr-~ : ""The Civilians and the rol;
?-
presente-l 3ht 1110M'e a to bo destroyed by order'
h
e
formal pecan conference In t
national pn2ss center hero by r tho North Vietnamese Coni
ers of the south Vietnam nists because they were flee
offic -
. _ ... r fat( _
uth toward the enemy."
so
dexnr what Appeared to he A e Unite,jd States Dep'lttntent
nr:vatA ., vi le. Anserihed the incident
part and parcel of Communist "libera-
tion" since the war began. In the past
four and a half years, nearly 25,000 South
Vietnamese civilians and officials have
been executed by the North Vietnamese
Communists and the Viet Cong.
There have, of course, been atrocities
on the Allied side. But anyone who is stilt
prepared to maintain that a Communist
takeover In South Vietnam would not
lead to a bloodbath of major dimensions
Is simply Ignoring the evidence at hand.
A politician like Senator McGovern,
who advocates a quick and unilateral
American withdrawal from Southeast
Asia, need look no farther than the shal-
low graves of Binhdinh province to see
where the policies he advocates would
lead those who have placed their trust in
the United States.
BALTIMORE SUI3
8 August 1972,,
McLSSicere
iliafS
i
v
~o f c
reported
ar
ad-
li
tary
mi
erday that U.S.isers and other eyewitnesse
stimated Igo to 2,000 Sout
ietnamese died last April.
o 30
"adeliber to NorthsVietnam
ese Army massacre of helples
civilians.
The. action was said to bay
taken place near the M
Chanh River bridge on Route
when thousands of refuge
fleeing from Quang 'Fri w
caught in the open by Co
monist artillery fire. ,
'rhuy said that nis u,?~ ?. r. --_.
,matntntned an am bus pn t ? w mesoc massacre of helpless
for six nays its .,?s,:..,.....,..._
nisi troops assaulted and even- an estimated that as many
,unity captured tha pmvknce 2,000 persons had bmn?
that those Who rnovca song,
private 00 and 600. Private Tbuy sal
enemy
ward were our hat he could not offer a f tgnre
Thuy_ said., ,_t_ elvlBnfl and,, c., for 9.59 dead have beer
Military, auto m ., cGUWncu b~ for remain
ietfl nmes_euCommunists, amese searching
._ .. -~,?mlicablY ....,
t
rr1va
ho
tt
- __
ItnkllCS 1n uro ,?Vcrfl aa,uyt .
.
vietnamese Government mos main reason for Ills dcf do
_...., t ,., horn thn an
edl
c
q
110 condo tea: ,,.,_ -- nt. n: ,,
' ~y~
Ill , ~ SCI
mavlnr nn
'" w
i Y
did
ft . of all social sit a.. c u[ctnameso ra o
all fired At becauso rho 140 rt civilian deaths.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Women and children
A State Department press;
officer, John King, said the
estimates of deaths were
probably closer to the higher
figure of 2,000 noncombatants,
composed mainly of woman,
children and older people.
lumn of
He said another co
refugees was caught five days
earlier 0 few miles south of.
Quang Tri April 24. He gave
no cstimatcs of the casualties
in the earlier Incident.
According to official reports
received by the State Depart-
Price
ment., Maj. Donald L.
and Maj. Robert F. Sheridan
of tilt U.S. Marine Corps sa
the" had seen the civilians'
brought under fire by 130 mm.
their
artillery shells fired over
heads with delayed action
fuses.
two Marino advisors
Th
e
said that "literally shredded
the refugee column."
'41t was the worst sight I
have ever seen," Major Sheri.
dan reported: "It was a sacre-',
: CIA-RDP79-01 ~ 94AOOO2OO11OOO1-2
Washington in--A Statie,bc-
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
SAIGON POST
10 September 1972
L1~ icy V
SAI(I UNV AP =t'he nvern.
nlrn put 01 display Rr ay
a North V'ietnam?se defector
Vietnamese fleeing from
Quang Tri city last April a nd
LcXuaii Th,iy.a 22-year-old
about one year in the North
Vietnam& p :army, said ? the
Highway One slatightor 'Vag
a major factor in his dcct.
sign to defect to the South
Vietnamese,whinh he acco'n.
plisilcd on July 31 In Thua
Quang Tri.
The amb,rsh on Highwav
one between April 28 and
May 3. ju+t before and after
front and in greater detail
when the South Vietnamese
high % ay at the o..d ..f June,
In. August. the U.S. S ate
Dol)ar.rnont c allcd the i , ci.
Vietnamese army mns5acra
of helpless civilians, and
estimated that 1,000 to . 2,000
nonmilitary refugees were
By 11?CIIAEr; PUTZEL
vivors and Insprction
of the sight In floated
the figure was more likely
bete n 2110 and Grso dr?art.
Thuy, at a news conforo-ice
sponsored by the 4nigon
command, refused to estimate
the number killed but said
there were toes ,many to
counts.
The defector said ho was it
radio operntor with the 4th
battsllun, 2nd regiment, North
Vietnarneso 321L11 division,
which took up positions 100
to 150 yards from the High.
%vay on April 28.
The Next' day, lie said, the
battallion comulandcr told
his troops that anyone moving.
South`fronl Quang Tri was
the enemy,
'Vetry, 1-1orrihia'
Thuy said many
soldiers and civilians
were fleeing down
the Highway, and the North
Vietnamese opened fire with
til.mm and 82mm nlortarsand
with automatic rifles.
,The people were moving
on bicycles, motorblkos and
buses,, he said, allut no one
was able to escape-*
?rr.ng mist hn rind otho.L
on the highway later. alhvas
very horrible. Many were
killed, including old people
children and pregn:cnt
women. The dying were
screaming and begging fur
water.
,Soldiers stripped the carp-
scs, taking watches, rice,
money and clothes.*
Dragged, Shot
The defector saitt his felinw
soldiers dragged some survi.
vors from shelors along the
road, ordered there to move
out of the nrea, lhr.n shot
them as. they fled.
Asked it the South Viet-
narneso soldiers and civilians
moved in separate groups on.
the highway or whether they
were bunched together, Thuy
said they were Soinetilhe%
separsrtc and at r?thcr tunes
intermingled. But no dlstine..
tion wHs m:i'Ie, ho said, bo?
cau.e'the order was to shoot
at anyone rnnvirg south,
Two North Vietnarneso snl.'
dicrs put on civilian clothes
found on the highway. took
bicycles from the ambush
site and started riding toward
Quang Tri city, Tbuy ' said.
CPYRGHT
~y
UUtJ
...a..ln.r torn n nrn.a'
'overod by another unit, and
were shot to death by their
own troops. The defector
didn't elaborate on 'why the
soldiers tried to go north or
why they pretended to be.
civilians
Executions
Thuiy said on two occasions
in Quang Tri provi.uco he
witn9s,ed the oxccrition of
couples who were said to be
servants of the Saigon regime
The first time, he said- a,
woman fonnd in a vil:.:lag?
was shot by her captors a^d
her husband was beheaded
shortly afterward on another
occasion,-a man and wife
were attempting to flee to
Thua' Thien after Qua-)g Tri
had fallen, and they were
shot after they had tried to
stay behind when the pro-,t
vincc fall, Thuy said-
A military spokesman s;cld
the news conference ?r was
called_ because there ad
been cnnsidornblo publi ity
about the Highway nc
ambush and . They, as;: a
witness, as qualified it
speak about the Incident."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
16
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002001100~h'-YIRGHT
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
W1l"11113 TOIi STru;l
&' opteribor 1972
Red 'Defector
Tells S. Viets
Of Massacre
. SATG1N (API -The gov-
day a North Vietnamese defec-
tor y:ho said he was involved
n a` masmcre 0 South
arnese fleeing from Quang end of June.
ri City last spring. Thuy, at a news conference
Le Xuan Thuy, 22, served sponsored by the Saigon com-
abrntt one year in the North mind, said the victims were
Viettinnceso army. lie said the
Highway 1 slaughter was a
major factor in his decision to
defect to the South Vietnam-
ese July 31.
'The ambush on Highway 1
between April 28 and May 3
was reported at the time by
news en on the northern front
and t greater detail when the
Soutl Vietnamese retook that
't'hi,y enirt hi, and nlher snl-
diers in his unit went up on the
highway, later, "It was very
horrible; Ahoy were killed, ii
eluding old people, children
and pregnant women. The
dying were screaming and
begging for water. Soldiers
stripped the corpses, taking
watches, rice, money and
'clothes."
The defector said his fellow
Soldiers dragged some survi-
vors from shelters along the
rand; ordered them to move
out of the area, then shot them
as they [led.
a battalion commander told
his troops that anyone moving
south from Quang Tri was the
enemy.
Thuy said many soldiers and
civilians were fleeing down the
highwAy, and the North Viet-
names,p opened fire with
61mm ;r'ind 82mm mortars and
with automatic rifles.
SAIGON POST 1
16 Augu 1 1972 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
r 7. F1.11
Witnewes fell Of NVA. Nassaual
Of Civilis ff~eaflug Frol 0. ir!,
CPYRGHT
corps a ce s have pro v c
fycwilness fccnunts of t c
North Viet 1* pmcse slaughl r
Of about 2.0 person, tool .
ding sick and elderly oft its
And children, who sought o
rice fioul the 'Communist
Invasion of Quang Til lost
April.
The nctcounts furnish IT
by Major Robert F.;Sherid n
and Mnjor',Donatd L, I ci o
make it clear that the. Nor h
Viclnameso option was de (-
berate.
.1Vo just said there a d
couldn't helicvo It,' sa d
Major Sheridan. aThn N?'r It
Vietnam Army It-,:w wh it
they were doing.. They it, d
f~ r'lvard observers who Wo 0
prnbnbly within a couple if
huhdtod mhtcrs from It n
ro1tigeeg. Theso would h;,10
seen thst there were no w, -
pon%. no velticiea, and irtdc d
hardly any men at all exec it
very old ones, i nser'1 to ha o
tsone respect for the Na'r h
^'otnarn Ar ny with raga d
to their allege ~.t,,~'
toward the laca osulattu
but this was just crimin 1
.By NICHOLAS BUGGiERIIlfliered with the buries of
IPS COric poi1CICrit WoiOen,ol i men and children.
f.' Rive rtwa I li r_ nn Anrll
Maj rs Sheridan and Price
were embers of U.S. Nari-
na ad isory train assigrlert
to a S mill Victnamr-se batta.
lion t yang to stem the int.
list C nimnni-t xwerp ? into
Quan Tri provi,ice frrim pos.
illons not far front the scene
of the massar, e.. The Arncri-
cans' nd their V'atnamese
comp pions p rye i,,werless
to do nything but watch the
horrif ring sprr,' icle. They
say tt ree of four foreign
eorre. pondents were with
their earn, ano soma ti-_-k
,booth pictures of be car-
nage.
Thin assault on th-! help-
less r fngees apart-ntty began
on Al ril 21 when they boar-
ded . variely o' vehicles,
incluw ing three-wheeled Lam.
brett , and nivilian and
military trucks at a point on
Illgil ny number one.
Maj r Price said the North
Vletn meso tronps ambushed
the c lama on the ii?gliway
nnct r Iced It with srninll anus
Ff Ih lb~!AW 99/O91102
voy a c own to pieces, he
said, n.i 1 ilia road and
21130
civilin
c!fpior
North
fire f
Ifignw
was 11
prima
ciuer?I
hoer
and
pansir
the of
childr
red -i
from
backs
The
there
paint.
refug
pons.
the
ride.,
: 6
ail vi'lagc just off UUriutt
th.,ltsaiids' of other
is fleeing from the oc-
p uvinco we o hit by
Vietn iniom artillery
irtricr south, an the
,y,
r S'eridan gold; alt
o worst sight I have
cen.n
id file rerugee.s were
by small children and
people, many or the
stooped from arthritis
noble to walk more
feA, meters Without
g for a vest. Some or
I people were carrying
n'or belongings gathe-
i, timikets suspended
olps slung across their
American officer said
'were no. South Viet.
,e` spld?lers among,the
,es and ni-'sign of sea.
A few of the men ap-
d to be rnornber% of
People's Self Defense
He said that In the In-
Is Ito wftno.+sed the
ces ' had no velhtrloss
lna. Ahnut one kilnin td.
north or my Chanh brItI $?
Major Sheridan mill hi~ could see a North Vietnntrinsii
regiment firing 130mnt. Art-'
Ilery shells with 'rarablo.,
time , fuses over Ihi
haads or the refugees'
The shells exploded betwee4
0 a d d0 meters above tilt
rcr,i co column, tearing.'ih1ll,
ref!: ces limb from llmb.
((I lib NorthVlcthamesc aFlit
lery kept firing on the Irspi.
ped cfugcss the entttO? dayI
a1 o counted the s110111
con ng In by huntlreds.When"i
lire victims fell under th0:
leer ,Ic uvcrlrcad.hlas.,therd
was . no one to, irici{
up file w~rin l~ :1
Wh n an explosion blew
a h e In the rcfugcc.culumtt
111n% following prossd o
over the broken tiridir.a,;
Thee was no strong ennuih}
to d more than move duiublyf
On.. )
1[ or Sheridan said lllij
Sou h Vietnamese hlarinewl?
Will: hill wept at the carnage
In a gcr, grief and fru-
tion over their inability `t
do ything. [To said tine .
gay all their rood and murk
to t ose refugees who,. cam
stu7 bling and staggerlnr, oout
of t e murderous zodo of
fire
It jor Sheridan said he was,
una lc to estiinale the. !ill,!'
led by North Vietnan'ese,
r,,~jj((~~.~~o lla ~Pcf }fir n o incident
-KU I'' / y-o'~i1 440 o it E T April 2c1i
am his own os`tinn tr' nnt 311. Ito could only ttny
171
 CPYRGH IAPProved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000200110001-2
CPYRGHT
NEW YOIU.K TIMES ..
10 September 1972
Attack on Re) ogee Camp
Near Danang Is R N-sc r e
Vietcong Raid Is Said to Have Killed 20,
Wounded 94 and Left 200 Families
Harxteless--U.S. Jets Bomb North
CPYRGHT
I MY The Auxiikd Trea
I SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sun.
any, Sept. 10---A Vietcong dem-
cked South Vietnam's biggest
efuged camp yyesterday, taking
heavy toll in life and prop-
rty.
Reports from the camp,
*filch Is on the northwestern
edge of Danang. said that 20
3efurees were killed. 94 were
wounded and 200 families left
Homeless after undergoing a
barrage of mortnrsr rocket-
propelled grenades, rifle fire and
~xplosive charges.
4 One Government militiaman
Also was reported killed.
t! The attackers were said to
Lill: ldlu
n the lightly' guarded Cam
mpnund, once a Unit.
tifd Sta t s Mnrlne supply base,
thout losing a man.
The A tnckcrs also hit two nd-
`ohiing outh Vietnamese militia
outpost but there was no im-
ritediate e word on casualties or
damage at these sites.
It wa the closest ground at-
tack to Danang, South Viet-
nam's Bond largest city, In
more th n a year, although the
northe port city has been a
target frequent sheiiings.
The fugce camp houses
more th n 50,000 civilians who
fled Qu ngtri Province, which
lasso rrun by enemy forces,
WASHINGTON POST
25 September 1972 CPYRGHT
Hanoi sFor.cea Renew
CPYRGHT
Assaults iii the North
j tier Nana DlepR ___
$AItcON. Sept. 24--Commu-. ern uangnga Province sold'
teong and North Vietnatn-
)ptat forces hsekc by tanks 4. troops killed more than 40
hn4 heavy artillery. renewed et ?ilgns whin they apparently
thNtr a;sattlls Sunday along; r ustd to
1 6110. i. I , '
tacks in Quanittln and Quong?
Ifhose
enounce the.SM?
ant. i 0,
more than 100 ci.
gated them,, ' 1
ho expressed' anti-'
t feelings were at.
T e : North Vietnamese i and
Iv Ntcong then planted explo-
The camp Is built on white
sand flats just off Route I and
contains hundreds of dilapi-
dated military hnrracks. It was
.tconsidered too large to be oc-
cupied by the South Vietnamese
'Army after United States troops
withdrew from Danang.
in the air war, American jet
Iplanes carried out more than
310 strikes across North Viet-
nam yesterday, but the raids
cost two planes and an airman
Is missing, t c United States
command sail
A Navy A-7 crashed from un-
~inown causes 15 miles north-
east of Vinh and the pilot is
nlssing, the command said.
Other sources said Initial re-
ports indicated the plane may
Ave hbeen hit by lightning.
2 Bail Out Near Carrier
A Navy F-4 was hit by anti-
aircraft fire after attacking a
supply convoy 32 miles north
BALTIMORE SUN
5 October 1972
of Vinh, the command said. The
jet handed bacl: toward the car-
rier Snrator-,, but was unnbie
to make a te,ading. The crnw-
men hailed out two miles from
the carrier and were rescued
by a helicopter.
The latest losses raised to 88
the number of United States
lanes reported by the United
lanes
command downed over
North Vietnam since the start
of the enemy offensive on
March 30. The command lists
97 airmen missing over the
north In the same period. The
Defense Department lists 37 of
the 97 missing as captured and
prisoners In the fort along
with 388 other airmen captured
before the March 30 offensive,
The main raids were directed
against the northeast rail line
connecting Hanoi with China.
Rail Bridge Is Attacked
The Air Fotte said F?4 Phan.
;trims Attacked the Vuchua nii-
CPYRGHT
T I i Ong raids
etC` , . I
leave 100 mss i
By The Aesoctrttcri'Prea$ fighter-bombers flew on" 120
At least 100 civilians were raids over the North Tues ay,
reported missing yesterday in compared to 280 the previous
the aftermath of Viet Cong day, the command reported.
attacks on 2 fishing villages The U.S. command In Saigon
along South Vietnam's north- had refused toconfirm'or deny
ern coast. Whether they were reports by informants-that the
.abducted or had defected was F-1i1's, which came back to
not known, field sources said: llndochaoa lost week, had been
e United States retorted withdrawn from 'a combat role
that F-111 swing-wing jets re- after the loss of one in' the
turn d to war action yesterday !North last Thursday. _,
afte being withdrawn front But the Pentagon in Wash-
co at because of the loss of lington acknowledged that the
one lane .last week over Nortb F-111's'~ had been withdrawn
Viet am. and said they'rEhtrped to conic
phonu Lorna dissipates bat yesterday with,new attacks
Tie U.S.-cmi-imand ordered on North Vietnam.
ed-up B-52 raids in the step) Following the Washington re-
n region, where an he port, a U.S. command sltoke's-
Saig) up.
sur a in battlefield activity in man.. finally did acknowledge
race t days has marked tho that the F-Ill's did return to
late t Communist Come d combat but added he had no
"hi t point." immediate report on their mis?
At erican bombing raids pion.
I
t
d
l
t
th
n ano
eve
opmen
,
e
her
war cut by more than half
bee e, of bad weather' result- nuclear-powered aircraft car?
ins from Typhoon Lorna, rfer? Enterprise arrived off
-
'
n s
g
i ?
c
ssid,'3 , ' ..... . .. ,.
... -.- ' coc an older rtshi_p~. Despite
proved m ft uR 7 s Ir11 AOQQ t~r.Jirfii!f~l.1;it~rxicnrir~i
coast abnu midnight ucs ay.
nfflelit wire6a sold the ht-
gat provinces were part of a
harassing operation slimed at
destroying the Saigon govern?
'meat's credibility In protect-
Ing the population It clailns.jt
controtb.
The fighting hick arrested
thoussndh,'~bf, new, refugees
and ono' -iftasshcre'lWaa r .
ported.
ltefugeit4 'from 'a CnmriStt-`
d
th'-
t I
blot-occupied distri
The Thailand-based U.S. well south of the ticm;irr;,tinn
 CPYRJibroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
CPYRGHT
none, officials snid, sonic of
the Enterprise's 75 ` Jets flew
raids in South Vietnam.
In the northern region of
South Vietnam, the coastal vil-
lages of Xtiynn 'rill, and Xuycn
Phuoc, which together have.
Shnut 10,000 people, were at-
tacked by Viet Cori; sappers
before dawn,
About 18 civilians and 2 mili-
tia soldiers were killed and it
civlIhmn wounded, with 0 at;
the attackers ola+o slain. tint Ali
least 100 of-her villa;era we're,
listed as missing. and local
officials were trying to dr.tcr-
mine witefiter they had hrenl
kidnaped' or' had accompanied
the invader's willingly.
Activity frequent
The Viet Conl, frequently oh-
duct civilians to work as imr-
ters, laborers or evert' as sol-
, died:,
The 2., villages ore. on .in
importan , rivet'arst.u: ry nr;,r
Ilo[ An, tlir tlrtang 'Nntn lu?nv-
ince e:tpilsfai aalsutlt 7A roii"t i
south of l1 Nang. The ar a is
one wherry Vicl. Cont, ar.livily
remains fretptrnt aand. whavn
Saigon govermnent accurity
'n.v never hren nirnttl!.
gaol An llrclf will, hii, by o
11-round mortar attack simul-
taneously with the assaults on
the 2, ,.tjllagges, and 6 civilians
and I rioldicr were wounded.
Sixty miles farther south, an
explosion in a school kilted I
person and wounded 19, the
Saigon military command said.
Althoragh considerable enemy
activity, is still being reported
In the north, senior U.S. cam-
manderl say the Communist
forces there are now largely in
a defense status followhlg
,months of heavy fighting and
`the emphasis Is now on the 1d
military region, which includes
Saigon and 11 surrounding
provinces.
WASHING'lO N POST
7 October 1972
Vietcong Raid, oii Fission Kills 1
From Ness DIRratches "When you get to be my
DANANG, Oct. 6-A 71- age, you don't get so excited
ar?old Scottish woman ab it things."
ye
missionary conceded she
was "jittery" during a Viet.
cong attack on an isolated
leper colony and orphanage
near here early today. "But
it certainly wasn't ? panic,"
she added.
Acording to Alrk. Stilly
Ifaverson, who has been In
Vietnam for 12 years for the
United World Mission:
he attack, carried out by
an estimated four Commu-
nis terrorists, killed one
loot an tuberculous patient
an left 20 patients seri-
ou y wounded..
rs. Ilaverson was the
oni European at the sea-
sid. colony of wooden
sha ks and concrete dormi,
.tor es when the raiders
crept down rugged cliffs to ,
CPYRGHT
the leprosarlum and set off
nine satchel charges, de-
stroying one building, wip-
ing out a generating station
and damaging seven other
buildings.
Lepers' homes and hospt-
tat wards were blown up In
the Happy Haven complex,
which houses 100 lepers and
50 orphans. The colony,
built with the help of U.S.
servicemen, 1s operated by
the United World Mission of
St. Petersburg, Fla.
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19
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
CPYRGHT
Contents
I
Overview .........................
I
II' Doctrine and Programs .........
5
III
Hue: A Case History ......................................
23
IV
Technology of Terror ...................................
43
Appendix: The Record ..................................
55
Glossary of Vietnamese Terms ....... ...... .........
Map of Hue Major Body Finds: Inside Back Cover .
83
By Douglas Pike
21
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 CPYRGHT
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Chapter III: Hue
he city of Hue is one of the saddest cities of our earth,
not simply because of what happened there in February,
1968, unthinkable as that was. It is a silent rebuke to all of
us, inheritors of 40 centuries of civilization, who in our
century have allowed collectivist politics to corrupt us
into the worst of the modern sins, indifference to inhuman-
ity. What happened in Hue should give pause to every civil-
ized person. It should be inscribed, so as not to be forgotten,
along with the record of other terrible visitations of man's
inhumanity to man which stud the history of the human
race. Hue is another demonstration of what man can bring
himself to do when he fixes no limits on political action and
pursues uncautiously the dream of social perfectibility.
What happened in Hue, physically, can be described with
a few quick statistics. A communist force which eventually
reached 12,000 invaded the city the night of the new moon
marking tha new lunar year, January 30, 1968. It stayed
for 26 days and then was driven out by military action. In
the wake of this Tet offensive, 5,800 Hue civilians were dead
or missing. It is now known that most of them are dead.
The bodies of most have been found in the past 20 months,
in single and mass graves throughout Thua Thien province
which surrounds this cultural capital of Viet-Nam.
Such are the skeletal facts. the important statistics. Such
is what the incurious world knows, if it knows anything at
about Hue, for this is what was written, modestly, by the
world's press. Apparently it made no impact on the world's
mind or conscience. For there was no agonized outcry. No
demonstrations at North Vietnamese embassies around the
world. Lord Russell did not send his "war crimes tribunal" to
Hue to take evidence and indict. In a tone beyond bitterness,
the people there will tell you that the world does not know
what happened in Hue or if it does, does not care.
The City
Considered by Asian standards, Hue is 'not old, less than
t,: o centuries. The ancient imperial capital was Hanoi. A
dynastic breakup in the early 1800's afforded a powerful
court noble the chance to seize the mantle of power, which
he did. He proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long and went
on to become one of Viet-Nam's most =famous rulers. One of
Gia Long's first acts was to move the capital far to the
south, to the banks of the meandering Perfume river half
way between Hanoi and Saigon. There he settled his court
behind the newly-built walled fortification now called the
Citadel. Inside his artisans erected buildings, working with
sketches of the nalrh provi qe, shoot and wound
the hamlet chief and-hisYieputy.
July 17,1969-A grenade is thrown into Cho Con market,
Da Nang, wounding 13 civilians, most of them women.
July 19, 1! 9-A communist unit attacks the Chieu Hoi
center in 17inh Binh province killing five persons, including
two women and a youth, and wounding JAI. civilians.
July 18, 1969-Police report two incidents of B-40 rockets
being fired into trucks on the highway, one in Quang Due
province in which three civilians were wounded and one in
Darlac province , hich killed the driver.
July 19, 1969-Communist seize and shoot Luong Van
Thanh, a People's Self-Defense Force member, Tan Hoi
Dong, Dinh Tuong province.
July 30, 1969-Communists rocket the refugee center of
Hung My, Binh Duong, wounding 76 persons.
August 1 , 1969-A sapper team detonates a piastique
charge at the base of an electric transformer tower in Saigon,
cutting the line.
August 5, 1969-Two grenades are thrown into the ele-
mentary school in Vinh Chau, Quang Nam province, where
a school board meeting is taking place. Five persons are
killed and 21 are wounded.
August 7, 1969-Communist sappers set off some 30 sepa-
rate pki.stique charges in the U.S. Sixth Evacuation Hospital
compound, Cam Ranh Bay, killing two and wounding 57
patients.
August 7, 1969-A series of explosions is detonated out-
side an adult education school for Vietnamese military in
Cholon, killing eight and wounding 60.
August 13, 1969-Officials in Saigon report a total of 17
communist terror attacks on refugee centers in Quang Nam
and Thua Thien provinces, leaving 23 persons dead, 75 in-
jured and a large number of homes destroyed or damaged.
August 21, 1969-Communists infiltrate Ho Phong, Bac
Lieu province, and kill three People's Self-Defense Force
members, wound two others.
43
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CPYRGHT
August 26, 1969-A nine-month-old baby in his mother's
arms is shot, in the head by terrorists outside Hoa Phat,
Qum- Nam province; also found dead are three children
b--10 een ages six and ten, an elderly nman, a middle-aged
n _,an and a middle-a' ,ed woman, a told] of seven, all shot at
least once in the hack of the head.
September 6, 1969-Communists rocket and mortar the
training center of the National Police Field Force in Dalat,
killing five trainees and wounding 26.
September 9, 1969-South Vietnamese officials report that
nearly 5.000 South Vietnamese civilians have been killed by
communist terror during 1969.
Septc,nber 20, 1969-Communists attack Tu Van refugee
center in Quang Ngai province, killing 8 persons and wound-
ing two, all families of local People's Self-Defense Force
members. In nearby Binh Son, eight members of a police
ofilcial's family are killed.
September 24, 1969-A bus bits a mine on Highway 1,
north of Duc Tho, Quang Ngai province; 12 passengers are
killed.
October 13,1969-A grenade is thrown in the Vi Thanh
City Chieu Hoi center, killing three civilians and wounding
46; about half those wounded are dependents.
. October 13, 1969-Communists kidnap a Catholic priest
and a lay assistant from the church at Phu Hoi, Bien Hoa
province.
October 27, 1969-Communists booby trap the body of a
People's Self-Defense Force member whom they have killed.
When relatives come to retrieve the body the subsequent
explosion kills four of them. _ ?
Statistics (See Chart Below)
In May, 1967 the GVN-U.S. began employing nev and
more sophisticated s)-sterns, some using computers, for the
collection and 2. 1a1ysis of statistical data, including data on
terror incidents. Under the new systerns, categories were
changed some what and therefore the pre-1967 figures below
are not strictly comparable to those later (hence the drop
in total number of terror acts for 1968 and first ten months
of 1969).
With respect to the general matter of the Viet-Nam war
and statistics, experienced writers in the mass media, the
academic community and in government have learned, often
from personal and bitter experience, not to try to quantify
the Viet-Nam war. As a result they reflexively eschew sta-
tistics, not because they do not recognize them as a valuable
too], but because they know the conditions and circumstances
under which they are collected make them. at best, untrust-
worthy, and at worst, dangerously misleading. With respect
to terror acts, the data proccessing system is chiefly depen-
dent on reports from the 2500-village countryside, a shaky
base indeed.
Like most people in developing societies the Vietnamese
are not great record keepers and particularly are not keepers
of precise numbers, usually seeing no need. (Belief in the
imperative need for figures, indeed simply to become sta-
tistics-conscious, seems to be a characteristic that develops
as does the society.) Beyond this unperceived need to collect
statistics of any sort, including. those on terror, there is in
Viet-Nam a fog of war which by its disruptive naturevirtual-
ly prohibits systematic and patient collection of data. War is
often responsible for the destruction of such data as has
been assembled. This is the case, for example, of records of
land surveys. title deeds and other legal documents on Hold-
ings in th Mekong Delta, a jurist's nightmare, one which
the courts will be sorting out for a generation.
Thus in Viet-Nam there is the triple problem of indiffer-
ence to the collection of statistics, inability because of war
to collect them, and incomplete reporting even when collected.
Therefore this chart is to be treated cautiously. Its benefit,
if any. is simply to suggest the scope and general order of
magnitude of communist terror acts over the years; the
error probably is not more than plus or minus 25 percent.
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 Approved For Release 1999109109 ? CIA-RDD7a-0419420MAT0001-2
Year
Terror Act;'
A:scssin!io s~ Kidnap :acs'
AttacO
1957 to 1960
NA
1,700 (est.)
2,003 (est.)
Negligible
1961
NA
1,300 (est.)
1,318
NA
1962
20,000 (est)
1,118
1,1,18.
5,484
1963
25,280
827
1,596
3,735
1964
21,733
516
1,525
15,500
1965
18,300 (est.)
305
1,730
.15,200
1966
15
000 (
)
732
1
810
3
est.
,
,
,
1967
t
)
23
000 (
707
3
357
5
es
.
,
,
,
1968
617
9
5
389
759
8
,
,
,
1969
10
765
202
6
6
289
,
,
,
1970
473
7
4
126
5
791
,
,
,
(7 mos.)
This table was updated a, ll4' manuscript was going to print and covers
the period through July 1976.
1. Includes sabotage, h;trrassing fire, visits by armed pro-
paganda teams to villatgr ?, "VC War Bond" sales, confiscation
of food, but not the otl,'-r acts of terror listed in subsequent
columns.
2. Until May 1967 the figures are for assassinations of gov-
ernment officials only, and not killings of other civilians
(records were kept only on officials and even these are in-
complete.) Based on a 1964 study it probably is safe to con-
clude that for every official Vietnamese assassinated, at least
four non-officials were killed.
3. As in the case of a::issinations, the only records of kid-
napings kept prior to *iay 1967 were kidnapings of gov-
ernment officials; in light of a 1964 study, it is safe to con-
clude that for every government official kidnaped, two
non-government persww were seized. The GVN reported
to the ICC in 1966 thc,~'? kidnaping figures (government and
non-government) total'-d: 1962, I.Q,QQO_;-1963, 7,200; 1964,
10,450; 1965, 11,500.
45
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 Approved For Release I 999/09/0 79-0119 gP;N;x, 11;72
PITY THE SOVIET. FAFZMER
There has been a tendency to blame this year's poor showing by
Soviet agriculture almost wholly on the weather. Granted, the
extremes of climatic conditions in the USSR of the past few months
have been the most horrendous of the last quarter century. But
climatic adversities cannot explain why Soviet agriculture which
gets the world's largest inputs of labor (nearly one-third of the
Soviet labor force) and financial investment (over the last 20
years a capital investment of some $600 billion and today about
one-fourth of all investment in buildings, structures and equip-
ment) is unable to meet consumer needs and is gradually trans-
forming the Soviet Union from a grain exporter into a grain
importer. The main message in the attached Backgrounder and
accompanying press reprints is that as long as Soviet agriculture
continues to operate under its present system of collectivization,
as long as the Soviet "economic model" persists, so long will Soviet
agriculture remain in its present precarious condition.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY October-November 1972
Perhaps indicative of Soviet sensitivities about the plight of
agriculture in the USSR is the leadership's preoccupation with
"overtaking the U.S." in farm production. Last November, for
example, Soviet Premier Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet that "the
general volume of ... agricultural production in the USSR in 1975
will exceed the present level of ... agricultural production in
the United States." However, the way things are going at the moment,
the Soviet Union looks to be unable to overtake its own agricultural
production rate for the next several years --- let alone by 1975.
In the Soviet Union, national Farmers' Day is celebrated on
October 8th. This year in Moscow the weather was gloomy and skies
overcast. It was fitting backdrop for the officially announced
estimates that came over radio and TV to the effect that this year's
grain harvest will come only to about 167 million metric tons.
Officials emphasized that this harvest will be roughly at the
average level for the previous five-year plan. What the officials'
statements ignored was that this year's harvest will fall about 30
to 35 million tons below what their planned target was for this year
and about 25 percent below last year's harvest.
Granted, one of this year's biggest bogeys has been the weather.
First, winterkill damaged about 10 percent of the winter crop. Next,
scorching weather cut sharply into the harvest of the breadbasket of
European Russia as that area went through its hottest, driest summer
in 26 years. Finally, harvesters in the late-grain-ripening areas
of Siberia were faced with a cold, wet autumn harvest season and a
race against frost to get the grain cut. Chances are that because
of extreme dampness and the slim possibility of fully drying the
grain, the Siberian area crops will have an unusually high spoilage
rate. Tus, despite official forecasts of a healthy 167 million
ton intake, the tonnage of actually useable grain will be something
far below that figure.
Even though climatic conditions this year have again exposed
the fragility of Soviet agriculture, weather cannot be blamed for
most of the ills that continually plague that sector of the economy.
Weather does not account for irrational planning practices, tractor
and tractor parts shortages, the insufficiency of combines for
harvesting, inadequate storage facilities, and the ever-too-low
fertilizer input. Bad rural roads and lack of adequate transport
continue to hamper both fertilizer delivery and grain collection.
All this in spite of the enormous investments that have been poured
into agriculture, particularly during the current five-year plan.
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Agriculture is probably the saddest victim of the Soviet penchant
for forcing growth by heavy doses of investment aimed at increasing
the quantity of production as quickly as possible without regard to
efficiency or quality. In fact, there is nothing that sheds more
light on the use of resources under the "Soviet economic model" than
an analysis of its agricultural methods. Soviet investments in
agriculture (using American prices at 1970 purchasing power) were over
$50 billion in 1956-1960, over $270 billion during the 1960's, and
are scheduled to surpass $260 billion during the current five-year
plan. In other words, during the course of 20 years agriculture will
have received close to $600 billion in capital funds. This figure
does not include investments in farm supply industries such as
chemiE Ts or highways or central warehouses. This extremely high
cost of Soviet agriculture goes far beyond the subsidizations pre-
valent in any Western country.*
In addition to the tremendous capital fund investment that Soviet
agriculture has been getting, the farm sector now gets about one-
fourth of all investment in buildings, structures, and equipment.
And lately, deliveries of fertilizer, spare parts, fuel, and electric
power from industry have been increasing,; But despite all this
attention, the farm sector cannot keep up with demands arising from
new consumer programs and Soviet grain buyers have again been forced
to scrape the barrel for imports from the Americas, Canada, and
Western Europe.
Mist experts stress that Soviet agricultural returns would be
greater if investments were made in intensive improvement --- in
quality, in technology, in skilled labor, in yield per acre and
weight per animal --- rather than as is being done in more con-
struction, more acres, and more head of livestock. But Mr.
Brezhnev has put his money on gross expansion. Yet today, in spite
of some expansion, agriculture continues to be the weakest and least
productive sector of the Soviet economy and its huge collective and
state farms, the most poorly managed and inefficient organizational
form in the country. Nearly one-third of the labor force is still
employed on farms and the cost of producing grain and meat is still
far above world market prices.
During 1971, even with their second largest crop in Soviet
history, the USSR was forced to buy heavily on world markets. At
this writing, purchases of grain from Western markets for delivery
in 1972 and 1973 are over 27 million metric tons (valued at $1.8
billion) and can be expected to increase. Payments must be in hard
*In the United States, for example, agriculture in 1970 invested
$5.8 billion. Capital stock at the end of 1970 was valued at $66
billion after depreciation and at $145 billion undepreciated.
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currency and will not be offset by Soviet grain exports which bring
in either soft currency from East European clients or practically
nothing, as in the case of Cuba or Bangladesh.
The forecast is that in the short run the Soviet Union will be
able to finance its foreign grain purchases without trouble through
gold sales and cutting back on other hard currency imports. But in
the longer run, when payments of principal and interest begin to
fall due, the chronic Soviet trade imbalance with hard-currency
'trade partners will become ever more severe. Western experts say it
is highly questionable whether the Soviet Union will be able to
:recover soon or fully from its current agricultural setbacks.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2 CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Soviet Fear Over Harvesi ?x
Rises as First Snow .Falls
NEW YORK TIM&
25 Septombor 1972
MOSCOW, Sept. 24--As the
BY THEODORE SHABAD
S lxl to The NM Tork TImei
The whew harvest is only
one-third completed in some
key areas, but the first snow
of the season was reported
today. -
Union continued to stir politi-
cal controversy In the United
States, a new urgency appeared
to creep irrto front-page har-
vest reports in the Soviet press
from northrrrn Kazakhstan, one
of the prin$ipal theaters of op-
erations in:*;what has been por-
trayed he fe' as the "battle for
.grain."
Press reports painting a cha-
otic situaon In the Urals, Si-
beria and Kazakhstan have
been the sole source of Infor-
mation. o the harvest for
Western . n wsmen because So-
viet authortics have prevented
them from traveling to the
areas for a trst-hand appraisal.
All travel jr faforeigners must
WASHINTON POST
20 September 1972
RussInns, from Leonid 13rezhncv to a'
Muscovite! with a few apple trees
arbu,Sd hi suburbnn rincha, this has
been a lnlrsy month. The fall harvest,
one of the biggest events in the year
for the Soviet Union, has been poor.
The consequences or its failures will
be (pit all year.
It Is difficult for Americans to imag.
1ne the slgnifir;~nrc of the harvest in
Soviet life.. ,inrlL,ing by the press. it
in front of potato stores as a
result of press reports that an
unusually hot summer has re-
duced the crop in the Moscow
region, a major producer of
potatoes, which am a staple In
the Russian diet.
The ueucs have prompted,
officials t go on television
with appe s 'against hoarding
and ~rith a surances that extra
shipments of potatoes from,
Byelorussia and the Baltic re-;
publics wit provide enough,
'potatoes to all.
"There a some Muscovites,"
'Deputy Ma or Leonid V. Derir;
(bin told to vision viewers re-
centiyy, "w despite the obvi-
ous facts.s I1 believe the cap.
ital will ru short of potatoes
and now s ek to stash away
their own s pply,"
Asserting that such panic
buying wa "totally unjust'-.
fied," Mr., cribin said that
Government storage facilities
were far sup riot to those avail.
able In Mos ow homes and he
warned bu purchasers of,
spoilage. ;
The first now from Kaza.
khstan was ported In Pravda,'
the?Commun st party daily, un=
der the head ne "Time Is press-
Ing the grai farmer."
Alluding t the lateness of
patch from Tsellnograd; In the
heart of the Kazakhstan wheat
lands, said:
We are In the last 10 days
of September-that says every.
thing. And the first snow
should be a stern warning."
" The report depicted misman.
agement and poor organiza-
tion, with wet wheat being
gathered under drizzly skies
and being refused by grain ele.
vators lacking the necessary
drying equipment. Although
thousands of trucks from cities
have been commendeered for
the grain areas, more appeared
to be needed.
Pravda said that the Chelya=
binst. region, with -a commit.
ment to deliver about one mil-
lion tons of'grain to the Gov.
ernment, had met only 30 per
tent of its goal so f'?r.
"A large part of the crop is
still In the fields or is waiting
to be threshed," Pravda said.
Under the Soviet system of
agriculture, collective and state
farms are expencted to deliver
fixed quotas to' state agencies
for marketing through Govern-
ment channels. The rest of, the
crop may be retained by the
farms for their own needs, In-
cluding livestock feed and seed
stocks.. This year's deliver
quota is' 78 million tons out of
the planned harvest of I9-
Bullion. n
CPYRGHT
Ba4. --HarvestThreatens Soviet cononl
Y
CPYRGHT 1)
y T
(1 t1t 1- e, B1(.nglilt g, Inefficiency
CLOP S(tbota r er& 1
4
"7'41 sunrnrrr has bisrn capri?
cfoulr find difficult."
-Pravda
illy Robert G. Kaiser
W4'-iInrtlnn Pnsl. rnr?lan 3orvir?
MOSCO}v, ,Sept 19-For millions of
fly approved in
est Is always page-]
in the Soviet press,
mphasis given to it,
after both a' bad
summer has struck,
spaper readers as
tinual exhortations to
o get the crop in,
with the travel ban
on newsmen, has
preted as an indica-
deed. Western esti-I
e ranged 10 to 20,
on tons, but no offi-
ave been published
act of the presumed
y the consumer, with
ood crop indicator,,
have been forming
viet newspapers have been filled for
wreks with exhortations to bring in a
good crop. '('revision repeats the mes-
rpge. "Don't Iosc a SI11I;Ir stalk, a sI11gk
Rrain'," Pravda's main headline urged
the other clay.
?re.ns of thousands of mrrlinnry citi-
zens we pressed into dutv'te help with
,the h rvrst. Thousands of trucks ;ind
boxes
work
fIrl'ds,
The
the r.
press
are diverted from their normal
o help move the crop from the
exhortations are serious. So is
tensive IPpor'ting ill the Snvlet
bout. mistakes, had management
and r rn ihicvrrv (hat ]tavc hirid'r'd
the h. west. flat Ihr nrljnr problem
V-11191. [MV.) it yuar ngo now
this y
,
~
~
r
t
ha.r bee
rApiprrev4etdt FerrReleas '199
10
A0is' 0a
9/O2rs, ADDR79 1194400'Oi
a,1i?r4
oC the nntion's leaders for some time. may It yr liven, 'this year nature sah- Lettuce Is rare and selling
the reaping,, and thrrshine began a few.
weeks ago.
The ramifications of an Inadequate
harvest are vast They begin with 'he
gloomy lank on the face of a Saturday
gardener in a villacc near ilinscow who
dug up )it,,; potato patch last weekend,
Ile found that a ,,tin,-,y mother nature
hid, given him a small harvest of
shrilnkcn, unappetiZml* slstlds.
In Moscow's Central Mar-,
ket, where farmers sell the
produce from their private
plots of land, prices hwn
shot up. Cauliflower that
cast abo'rt PO ceills a pound
(nt the inflated official ex.
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In state shops, some limits
havq been imposed on the
quantity of pnlators each
customer ran buy at one.
time. Lines for pniatncs-a
staple in the starchy Russian
diet..-are Common. arid the
potatoes themselves Are
small.
The situation In the prove,
laces is undoubtedly worse,,
because Moscow has the,
highest prinrily in the Conn
try for consumer gnorlk of
all kinds. For example, Mos-
cow's butcher shops always;
have meat In sell, but the
state stores in some small
towns haven't sold fresh
meat for five years. (Such
towns get their meat from
farmers' markets. Private
pints produce more than a
third of the food eaten in
the Soviet Union.)
Dread Waste.
Officials have assured the
public several times that
there is no cause to fear a
bread shortage, hut. the press
has also carried articles
criticizing people who waste
bread.
The government has al-
ready taken steps to assure
the bread supply by con-
tracting for vast quantities
of foreign wheat, mostly
Americlin and Canadian. By
Western, est.imate, the Soviet
Union will spend 51.5 billion
or more nn foreign grain
purchases. At this level, the
poor harvest becomes an im-
portant factor for the entire
Soviet economy.
The Soviet Union operates
on a five-year plan whose
parts are all interconnected.
The plan for this year fore-
saw production of about .:90
million'tnns of grain. West-
ern experts here predict the
harvest will he. 20 to ?.0 mil.
lion tons short of that goal.
Western scholars assume
that the five-year plan (Ines
not slimy much margin for
error. When a crucial factor
like the harvest falls so far
belpw expectations, adjhist-
menls throughout the econ-
omy are probably inevitable.
The first of these may
come in the hard currency
budget. If the Soviets do
spend more than $1.5 billion
for grain this year, far more
than they had planned, they
will have to cut hack other
purchases of foreign goods,
or perhaps sell off some of
their vast gold reserves.
(The Soviet ruble is a
"soft" currency - it isn't
traded on international
money markets, and West-
ern businessmen won't ac-
cept it).
. The principal product the
Soviet Union now seeks
Abroad is modern technol-
ogy. So a had harvest can
hinder the modernization of
this country's enormous but
uncompetitive ecnnnmy,
though this may be the sine
gle most Important goal that
the Soviet leaders have set
for themselves.
Rrrzhnev and his col-
)eagues may well feel that
this is an undeserved trick
of fate. Their plan was not
unreasonable, assuming rei-
atively normal wrather. But
the weather hrre has hrrn
wildly abnormal since last
winter. and it has frustrated(
the country's farmers in al-
most every imaginable way.
First the weather was dry
and extremely cold. The
winter wheat harvest was
unsuccessful. The ground
was dry when planted, and
got drier as .July and August
became months of drought.
Then, when the harvest
began, heavy rains In many
sections ruined much of the
crop.
Leap Year
Even relatively carefree
crops, like apples, did poorly
this year. One Muscovite re-
ports that his friend's little
rchard in the country
didn't produce it single
apple, not one." This same
man explained the bad
weather with A typical piece
of Russian folk wisdom:
"It.'s a leap year - leap
years Are always bad."
if nature was the princi.
pal cause of the poor har-
vest, it was not alone. The
Soviet press has provided
abundant, vivid. examples of
agricultural mismanagement
and malfeasance In recent
weeks.
The reports detail cases of
had maintenance of machin-
ery, inefficient Allocation of
resources, lack of official
foresight and imagination,
"In the Sverdivsk adminis-
trative district," Pravda re-
ported, "there is a good crop
of potatoes, but they can't
be harvested properly
there aren't enough sacks to
hold them. The district
needs three million sacks,
but has been promised only.
900,600."
In another report, Pravda
disclosed: "In the Ukraine,
gain elevators' capacities
are smaller than the amount
of grain harvested in some
districts . Thousands of
railroad freight cars are not
fit for the transportation of
grain ... " In one section of
wheal -growing Kazakhstan,
the newspaper "Rural Life"
reported, "more than 500
trucks have not been re-
paired on local farms, The
local repair shop has not yet
fixed 70 truck engines sent 11
to it last June .
At the same time, motor
pools in big cities including
Moscow, were depleted to a
fraction of their normal size,
And thousands of trucks
were shipped by rail.tn help
with thhe harvest-especial-
ly in that same area of Ka-
zakhstan.
One of the biggest scan-
dals of the harvest season
was reported by Komsomol
skaya Pravda, whose corre-
spondent in Kazakhstan saw
dozens of new, 11.5-ton
trucks parked on & ,road and
decided to find out why they
were not in use.
Spare Parts
The trucks, ho learned,
had been shipped from the
factory that made them on
flat. cars. They arrived to
cheers from the local popu.
lation, and men got into
them to drive'them off the
train. The first one would
not start. Neither would the
second, third, fourth -=- or
Any of them, apparently,
there were more than 60
trucks, and Important parts
had been stolen from every`
one, the paper reported, al-
though the shipment was
supposed to be-guarded the
entire way.
A local official told the
journalist that the trucks
could not he repaired, be
cause the stolen parts were.
simply not Available in that
part of the country.
The press has also re-
ported special incentives for
farmers and local trading of,
ficials to get more potatoes
Into the state warehouses.
this year. Farmers are being
offered 5 per cent higher
prices for all potatoes they,
deliver Above plan, and pure
chasing Agents are being
tempted to find more pota-
toes to buy with bonuses of
a full month's salary or
more.
One subject that the press
has not mentioned Is the So-
viet government's extensive
purchases of foreign grain.
Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow
taxi drivers will tell you,
squandered Soviet gold on
Canadian wheat. Perhaps
Khrushchev's successors
don't want to be remem-
bered similarly. Whatever
the reason, the Soviet new
media have never reportse
the $750 million grain dell
with the United States, or
Moscow's other grain pur-
Chases,
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 1,70111TOR
13 September 1.972
am Ing preals refcm-m
By Paul Wohl
Written for The Christian Science Monitor
The in ' 12 9 lip, 110W believed
by Western experts to be even more severe
than previously anticipated, may catapult
the Soviet Union into major agricultural
teforms.
Western specialists, who had earlier esti-
mated tie Soviet grain harvest at around 170
million tens. Instead of 195'million called for
by the pI:"~n, now think the crop may not even
reach 160 Educed tons.
They dt duced this figure from an article by
Politburo alternate member and Byelorus
scan Panty Secretary Pyotr M. Masherov in
I3yelorusskaya Pravda of Aug. 19.
Rains, which delayed) the harvesting In
Siberia and North Kazakhstan, have daunted
hopes of a late but abundant yield in these
eastern regions. Heavy frost and snow may
hit the fields before the grain can be brought
In.
The spply of potatoes, another staple, also
will be vpry tight this year,
Clintntt. b1.1111ed
Officit ly the setback Is attributed to' the
vagarieaqof the climate, but low farm labor
productii' ty compounded the unfavorable
weather nditions.
Poor 1itbor productivity in the countryside
Is not We fault of the farm workers. It Is
caused by the unwieldy setup of the collective
and stated farms.
Accoling to economists Michael E. Brad-
ley and M. Gardner Clark, writing in the
spring Issue of the British Journal Soviet
Studies, the average size and labor force of
Soviet and American farms compare as
follows:
U.S. Collec- State
farms tives farms
Acre pttr farm 351.6 26,508 99,578
Workci per farm 1.9 606 635
Work; on farms as huge as the collective
and state farms takes on an Impersonal
charact4r. The peasant. 'is no longer inter.
ested In ithe land, and management becomes
so enmp1la-ted that effective supervision of
labor Is nearly impossible.
Soviet farm managers and economists
have come tip with various proposals to
subdivide and decentralize the large farms.
The most successful and ? popular ex-
perimental approach has been to place a
small acreage, approximately the size of the
average American farm, in the hands of two
or three families for several years.
Fret'dotn,ex pandcd
These "leaseholders" are given equipment
and Co MpVedeFlott Rtel>l se 11999/09/02: C1
allotted Mild. These so-called Independent
mechanized teams - the Russian word Is
zveno, or link - have brought encouraging
results wherever they have been tried.
Only a few hundred zvenos have been set up
thus far because Communist dogmatists fear
that they might let in capitalism by the back
door. I3utt the zveno system has supporters.
The strongest zveno advocate is Politburo
member Genady 1. Voronov, formerly pre-
mier of Russia proper.
In the past, Mr. Voronov's suggestion to
introduce zvenos on a larger scale has been
overruled. A speech he made two years ago,
championing the zvenos, was published only
in a small provincial journal.
Soon thereafter he lost his position as
premier of the Russian Federation though he
remains a full member of the Politburo.
Recently the idea has again come to the
fore. Its favorable discussion in Pravda and
Izvestia, against the background of this
year's grain calamity, may point to a larger
application of the zveno system.
' Russian consumers, meanwhile, are not
expected to feel the present crop failure as
severely as the one of 1963-1964, which
preceded the ouster of former Premier Nikita
S.Krushchev.
The party and government have boldly
decided to Import enough food grain to keep
the public's breadbasket filled, at least in
metropolitan areas. While the people are
urged not to waste grain, nowhere have they
been admonished to tighten their belts.
Another favorable factor is the party
leadership's decision of last year to concen-
trate on meat and dairy farming rather than
on field production.
Larger units preferred
Concentration on meat and dairy farming
has the advantage in Soviet conditions that it
lends itself to production in bigger farm
units, which the Communists prefer.
The farm predicament Is likely to come up
at the party Central Committee session that
will precede the meeting of the Supreme
Soviet on Sept. 19. Once again General
Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Is expected to
present the main report.
His recent swing through the eastern
territories indicated concern for the weak
spots of Soviet agriculture: Its extreme
dependence on the vagaries of the weather,
its immobilization of a huge labor force, and
the built-in handicaps to labor efficiency and
management.
Solutions sought
It can hardly be expected that Mr. Brczh.
nev will scrap all the time-honored tenets of
Communist
agriculture. Buuttq hae~and, his
Aidi?t~tyt6i Yir~~i`tG3i t`M~t1e'i 66 ~oy4c e?fel4l2
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The big imports of food grains to tide the
Soviet Union over a difficult winter show that
the Kremlin is keenly aware of the possibility
of political repercussions at home.
While these imports may lead to a raising
of eyebrows by Moscow's financial experts,
for the public at large they are a sign that
their leaders are taking practical measures
to cifehion the Impact of the crop failure and
that reforms of agricultural policy may be on
the way.
CHR7"TIAN `'CIl'.NCF 1"011ITOR CPYRGHT
.7 September 1972
11uroDeT t
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
t. Violins
There are problems down on the farm in
dastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union
his year.
Czechoslovakia, whose daily bread anyway
lepends largely on Soviet grain, and I-luri-
ary have both had small crises of their own.
In parts of Czechoslovakia, continuous rain
storms flattened crops, with heavy losses,
Combifren hogged down In ' .': ud, and linrvest
rrorker4had to fall back on grass mowers and
,ven srfhen.
It wn the sane in home of Hungary's
I' X crop-heavy Trans-Danubian areas.
Thanks o a .July rainfall twice that cf the
country's yearly average, these areas had
their most difficult harvest of the century.
Government agencies had to mount h.
initjor rescue operation, including it rail-lift,
o move combines and drying units cross-
country to stricken regions, and brigades of
WeekeitgJ helpers from the towns,
Had Weather Invariably exposes the contin-
ued ta?ealm'ess of the collectivized farm
organization. It still In 111-equipped to, cope
with such dire emergencies as the elements
can offer. It still Is seriously under-mecha-
nized.
Thus Czechoslovakia, for example, one of
Eastern Europe's Industrial leaders, is stilt
talking: of "widespread mechanization" of
agriculture by 1900-0115. " -
Now, however, a?grave nbw problem looms
eVor more sharply for these countries. 1" or
centuries their Iargs rt work force has been on
the land. But now they face a shortage of
able-bodied farm labor.
Postwar industirializntion and urban
growth Increasingly have lured younger folk
to the towns. The big state farms and
collectives have Increasingly been left to, an
'This sociologlcttl trend Lnov,'n to moat
t,r the modern world. Tint In 1hn r,?tce
(ai Aoinloantly a~ gneiss countries of Fo:1,rn
iiltiropo It now In er.usinsf more concern 111 ;n
any other factor in nbr'cult:ure.
Czhechoslovakla lead 2% million form
workers 25 years afro. Coilectly iriition 7,R18
intensified Jnswitrlaiization reduced the
number to about a million, Another quarter
million are expected to leave by the inid-
The average farm worker's age already
xceeds 40. In the Czech lands, 25 percent are
ver 00 years of age,
Mechanl-,atlon has come nmvhere neat to
etching up with thI:, labor drain.
Two-flfiiis of Hungary's cooperative iar'nl
rs are at pension age. Only I In 5 e' no
copcrative's new members Is Around 20
'wcnty-five percent or all agricultural ;'r..ic-
rs are over 05, compared with only 9 T' -i i.en
n Industry.
Recent surveys sou;-tit to discover why so,
ew youngsters an,, tliravm now to farming
nd how to improve rural life In order to
rsuade more to rci sin there.
Sociologists had no difficulty In providing
nswcrs:
Long, rrduou-t working hours (inclu(Iing
:30 a.m. rising to tend the family's private.
lot), disparitic.i in pay compared with,
ndustry, Inferior fringe benefits. and lack of
lie amenities and facilities which Jndustrlal~
reas enjoy.
Though It in "heresy" to the fathers,
sung tors would gladly rellnquisli the pri?'
ate plots In return for permanent and settled
.ash incomes and the same social security'
or agriculture as Industry.
"Modern village youth no longer Is pre-
ar'ed to go home smelling of the stable or to
at sandwiches sitting on a feedbox,", the
survey found.
"It is educated and has been brought up on
iclcvision. But long farm hours prevent It
::,,king part In amusement tend cultural
wionitics the same nc townsfolk And today's
concluded onu rclittr't "are
rvitruing the same rights,",
Vast European governs; o tn, however,
;' l1 ore focus ' ;' their prioriti nl oil : cIustri-
ulizittlon.
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
T"P.' r!G()NOMiST .4;VPTr'Mnt1,a 16#1972
Russia
Brezhnev's battle
for bread
The Russian press in recent weeks has
had a wartime look about it. Every-
where tkcre is talk of "winning the
battle." };von sober Pravda tries to con-
vey the excitement, highlighting dis-
patches ftf'om its front-line correspon,
dents in Siberia and Kazakhstan, car-
rying articles full of military metaphors
and splashing pictures of war her6cs
and their assault vehicles. No, not
tanks, combine harvesters : the battle
today is for bread.
This year's harvest has had to com-
pete against the natural perils of a
frosty winter followed by a very dry
summer. The damage done to the crop
in wester. Russia makes the yield from
the new ranaries of Kazakhstan and
Siberia or vital importance. But, judg-
ing from ;its eager shopping for grain,
from the; United States, Canada,
France aril Australia, the government
seems to be preparing for the worst.
The problems of this year's harvest
are a stage in the protracted battle to
modernise farming, and to, put agricul-
ture, which even today employs more
than a riarter of all Russian workers,
on a pa with industry. The struggle
has been going on for nearly 20 years.
Khrushchcv tried to restore the balance
by shock tactics, the magic of maize
and th mass reclamation of virgin
lands. incc he disappeared from the
scene tfie battle has been less spec-
tacular lout not less expensive : farming
is to aChcorb 21.5 per cent of total
capital investment in the current five-'
year plat(,
CPYRGH 'w YORK TTrTS
10 Aufytiit 1972
't'argets have become more realistic
than they were in K.hrushchev's day.
The aim for 197t-75 is an average
yearly grain crop of 195m tons com-
pared with 167.5m tons to the previous
five years. 't'otal agricultural output is
in yo u l) by about 21 per cent over the
same pcrio . Or at least that is the
plan. Altho gh Russian farming output
has, on a rage, been' rising steadily
over recent years, the increase -m pro-,
duction d s not correspond-.to the
money you ed in.
This ap arently - unbridgable gap.
hrtwecn wi at goes in and what comes
out has lc westerners to suggest two
alternative ourses for Russia's planners.
The first i that Russia should follow
the exam le of nineteenth-century
Britain an rely on industrial exports
to pay for large part of its food. But
the analo does not really apply.
Britain, at that time, could afford this
policy front its sale of manufactured
goods ; the Soviet Union is still mainly
exporting aw materials. Its problem
is not h w to pay for foreign
food but . ow to increase its own
yield from is land.
Mr Bre.hnev has several times
admitted tI at it will take many five-
year plans o overcome the difficulties.'
Ile has al made it plain that the
basic probl is not so much bread as
grain for livestock and a resultant
major exp nsion in meat and dairy
farming. T is is where the deal with
the United States, with its emphasis on
animal fe d-stuffs, comes in. But
a change in approach is needed.
Hitherto t e outside world has pro-
vided Russ' with stopgap supplies in
years of ba harvest. If Russia's plan-
ners could phick up the courage to
accept the ccessity of regular outside
raise Soviet-American trade
unprect'dentcd heights.
(1~>~~jt PllRC11AS Tlt rforst was compiled by
+;ilai L LHI leading dcpartmcnt officials on
the basis of recent talks with
F GRAIN FROM us , private commercial dealers ne.
gotiating with with the Russians and
nd
of reports from Moscow indi-
t L~~~~~Q eating a bnd Soviet harvest this
~fnil.
MAYTOTATlic spring harvest was called
By IWRNARD GWVFRT7.MAN a "disaster" by mnny officials
51?*' It to The New Yott TIM" ,and it was reported from Mos-
tV ' _- v today that Leonid I. Drezh-
Agriculture Department esti- n , the Soviet Communist
mated today that 1.110 Soviet pn y leader, had held a new
Union tvn A Pc 11 a _ S'c
_ -8 11I jt r
dollars tV0 rR]1 rT~Rlr/PRRI c1DS
from the United States over the
next 12 months. Tliis would
5
rearing programme would be enlarged
beyond the scope of present plans.
The second suggestion put out by
westerners Js that Russia should shift
its farming towards smaller holdings
and more private enterprise. This, -too,
is an unlikely development. It is true
that in their recent efforts to boost farm
production the Russians have paid
greater heed to financial incentives.
Prices for farm produce were, raised,
bonuses were introduced and wages
have gone up on both . state and
collective farms. But over the past 20'
years the unmistakable trend is away
from smaller units of production and
private holdings towards larger estates
under closer control. In 1950 there
were some 125,000 collective farms.
By now these have been merged into
33,000 larger units, each kolkhoz
averaging Moo acres under cultivation.
Despite present troubles and past
failures, Russia's agricultural planners
have not altered their ends and hardly
their means. They are still banking on
more equipment, more- fertilisers, and
on land improvement and' a bigger
electricity supply, ' to bring them
closer to western levels of productivity.
How far they still have -to go is
reflected in manpower figures. In 1970
no less than 26.4 per cent of the total.
Soviet labour force was still employed
in farming ; this was twice the French
and five,times the American proportion.'
Without a radical change in -this pat-
tern, and the plan for 1975 forecast' a
proportion still as high as 23.1 per
cent, Russia will continue to be sort-.
ously handicapped in its economic race
with the west. But this is the long-term
problem. Mr Brezhnev's mind is no.
doubt on more immediate issues:
Russia's last disastrous harvest, in 1963,
preceded Nikita Khrushchev's fall.
projection of a billion dollars in
sales goes far beyond the $200-
million in grains that Moscow
agreed to purchaseas part of a
$750-million three-year deal an-
nounced by the. White House on
July 8.
Department orriclals said that
about $500-million of the bal.
lion-dollar sales would probably
be in wheat. This indicates that
Moscow is anticipating short-
!falls in its chief crop, vital to
the bread supply that Is
staple of the Soviet diet.
the Agriculture Department e
'mated.
Department officials said that
an American company, Cook
Grains of Memphis, had just
about completed arrangements
for the first sale of soybeans to
the Russians-one million tons,
valued at about $100-million.
These products are used ins
producing animal feed. Soy-'
beans in particular are valued
for their high protein content,
useful for the growth of cattle.
o tie o al w 11 Under the current Soviet five-
f0A_aA i4 is C I -16 ~ ~04Ja100JW2 p1 n, Moscow ls
d` J/O~
~
c_ cv r ent y in an F. fort to r
committed to a 25 per cent In-,
oats and soybeans
barley
e
,
,
,
y
r the hnn?rst. [Pace 9.1 crease in protein consumption,'
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
CPYRGHT
through an increase In the
amount of meat and dairy prod-
ucts In the Soviet diet.
Inbalance of Trade
The large sales to the Soviet
Union will cause a severe Im.
balance in trade between the
two countries. Last year, the
United States exported about
$t25-million to the Soviet
Union and Imported about half
that amount. The disproportion
will grow with the extensive ag-
ricultural purchases as well as
With a ttep-up In Soviet pur-
chases American Industrial
equipment for a truck factory
Because of this anticipated[
trade imbalance. Moscow will
have to find ways of paying for
its purchases. Under the origi-
nal $750-million three-year
deal, the Administration,
through the Commodity Credit
Corporation, had agreed to ex-
tend a maximum of $500-
mil-lion in credit.
Agriculture Department of
ficials said that the additional
purchases would be paid for
"privately," meaning, in most
cases, by cash.
Gold Sales Possible
Some officials here believe'
that the Russians may have to
sell gold on the world market
to cover the heavy agricultural
purchases.
It is believed that under thel
terms of the deals, some of the:
farm products will be deliv red
by third-country ships andFthe
rest by Soviet and American
ships.
The Russians, aware of the
'trade Imbalance, have beer
seeking to persuade the United
States to participate in joint
efforts to exploit the untapped
oil, gas and metal resources of
Siberia.
This was a major topic dis-
cussed by Commerce Secretary
Peter G. Pcterson and Mr.
Brczhnev when they met two
weeks ago in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Peterson was there as
head of the American dclcga-
tion to the first session of the
newly created Soviet-American
commercial commission,
So far, American companle~~
have expressed an Interest In
such joint vcntures,?but the
Government has been Wary of
a drain on Government credits
that would be needed for such
large undertakings.
The Soviet Union would
probably be able to sell Its
products more successfully In
the United States if a trade
agreement Is signed and It re.
ceives regular tariff treatment.
But such an accord has been
help up pending resolution of
the lend-lease negotiations to
taifla +1'a t..?.:ap URlen's
World War IT debts.
WASTNGTON POST CPYRGHT
15 August 1972
V
juerts Say soviets Face
isaster in Grain Harvest
By Murray Seeger
Loa An?ele* Times
MOSCOW-Revelations of
.new gra n pure nsc. an new
cy)mestic indicators here sug-
gest that the Soviet Union is
facing n dlsastro-is agricul-,
tural year this year.
"It appears that their crop
losses will be phenomenal,"
one analyst observed.
Other observers noted that
the country's crop problems
started cjlring the winter
when there was little snow to
nourish : the winter wheat
crop. Tfie summer growing,
season I*s seen record tempe-i
matures 'pnd a drought.
"Their, grain Is ripening all
at the same time," one expert
said. "Usually, they move their
machines from the south to
fthe north and east as the crop
[develops. This year, it has
come on all at the same time
land they cannot follow their
schedules."
Last week, the official press
revealed that Communist
Party leader Leonid Brezhnev
held an unusual meeting of
the party Central Committee,
agricultural officials and Im-
portant editors to discuss the
grain harvest.
Editors Included
Although the substance of
meeting has not been dis-
ci sod, diplomatic observers
sa d the unusual inclusion of
e [tors in such a meeting sug-
g sted that the party was pre-
p ring to tell the p'hlic of a
m jar short fall in the i'72
1 m output.
,, -oviet authorities admit
ti y do not have enough mod-
on harvesting equipment to
met their annual needs. The
n wspaper 'Rural Life re-
p rted lest week that 21,000
tr icks were being sent to the
A tat' region ? in southwestern
R ssja to help bring In the
to at harvest.
"The harvest front Is speed-
II transferring to the east of
t country," the newspaper
s. d. "The fate of the crop of!
1 2 will be settled there in
c rated days and hours. All
e orts must be exerted for
s cessful conducting of the
h rvest and Increased grain
sa es to the state.""
Ithough Russia has often
h d major crop failures In the
p st, the '1972 problem Is espe-
11 acute because
and government leaders have,
been conducting a campaign
to increase the supply of meat
to the people.
The grain purchases outside
the country must therefore in-
clude more expensive fodder
grains as well as bread grains
In order for the leaders to
keep their promise of a better
diet for the people.
Butcher Cattle
An alternative to spending
valuable hard currency or
gold for grain would be to
butcher the nation's new de.
veloping cattle herds prema-
turely.
"I don't think they are pre-
pared politically to do that,"
one Western observer said.
It was reported earlier this
month that the Soviet Union
Ihas decided to buy about 10
million tons of wheat and 4
million tons -of feed grains
from the United States for do.
livery next year,
One million tons of soy'
beans were also believed to..
have been sold to the Soviet
Union. It Is estimated that
these purchases from the
United States
CPYRGHT
some $900 million. The Soviets
were granted the right to, buy,
as much as $500 million worthl
on three-year loans at Sll per{
cent Interest.
Sales now being arr nged'
are expected to be largely for
cash since It would otherwise
use up In one year all the
credit made available by the
U.S. Commodity Credit Corp.
The soybean sale must befor
cash.
In addition to the purch4ses,
from the United States, it.ivas:
learned here, the Russlanp
have recently completed:, it
grain purchase deal with
France and tried unsucce.
fully to make a big buy,_ MO
Canada. i
Canadian officials said they
were approached by Soviet:
grain buyers twice In recent
weeks but had to turn tco~wn
the bids because Canada's
ports are operating at ca city!
to deliver a current coract
to Russia for 5.2 million tong,
of grain worth $330 million
cash. '
The French deal Is for I mil,,
lion tons, half wheat and halt
barley, to be delivered In thel
coming year.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY October-November 1972
The last member of the Soviet Embassy's unwelcome trio finally
departed as Anatoliy A. Lobanov, one of three Soviet diplomats whose
recall the Danish government suggested in April, left Denmark on
31 August. The three diplomats in question First Secretary Lobanov,
`.Chard Secretary Anatoliy N. Illarionov and Attache Mikhail K.
Makarov, were charged with committing actions incompatible with their
status.
On 7 April the Danish Foreign Ministry informed the Soviet
Ambassador Nikolai G. Egorychev that the Danish government would not
expel the free-wheeling "diplomats" if they would quietly leave the
.country. The Soviet Ambassador rejected all allegations of wrong-
doing on their part and none of the accused diplomats made any
apparent move to leave his post.
But what the three had been up to is well documented in the
Danish press. Makarov attempted to bribe a member of the Danish
Folketing (parliament), known for his anti-European community
views by offering to underwrite the expense of publishing and
distribution of an anti-Common Market pamphlet. Makarov also tried
unsuccessfully to buy an Asian Embassy's diplomatic code; his fellow
diplomat, presumably Illarionov, posing as a Latin American, then
.offered the Asian diplomat ten thousand kroner for the code. All
this unwanted publicity forced the two men to leave during the summer.
:Lobanov remained in Copenhagen and the Soviet Ambassador indicated
that he had no intention of ordering Lobanov's departure. But
parliamentary inquiry to the Danish Foreign Minister concerning
Lobanov's status seems to have precipitated his overdue departure:
Five months after the fact, the last of the miscreants left the
Danish scene. Ambassador Egorychev remains behind to handle another
"misunderstanding" in Danish-Soviet relations.
The latest incident occurred in early September when a Danish
fishing trawler in international waters picked up a Russian trying
to flee across the Baltic to Sweden. Shortly after the rescue an
armed Soviet naval vessel came alongside the Danish trawler which was
then boarded by pistol carrying Soviet sailors. The hapless Russian
was forced to leave his refuge. The Danish Foreign Ministry says
it is investigating the incident and intends to officially protest
to the Soviet Union.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2
MOSCOW BLENDS INTO THE LOCAL SCENE
An unusual story has filtered out of Burma -- one which
Moscow's TASS correspondent there would not file to his hometown
newspaper. The story concerns TASS correspondent Yuriy Grigoriev's
conversion to Buddhism. According to several newspaper accounts
Grigoriev, a thirty-three-year-old newsman , returned to Burma for
the second time in October 1971 as a correspondent of the official
Soviet news agency TASS. In April of this year Grigoriev was
ordained a Buddhist monk, assumed a Burmese name for himself and
his wife and daughter who also became converts. One of the more
intriguing aspects of this story is that Grigoriev's conversion
ceremony was attended by various members of the Soviet embassy, an
uncommon official blessing at best. One might surmise that Moscow
had given its approval for its own political reasons. The
Vientiane newspaper Xat Lao viewed the episode with due skepticism.
"As is well known most Soviet diplomats and news correspondents
assigned to perform duties abroad are members of the communist
party who do not believe in God. The ideals of the communist party
is their religion. Therefore, there have been doubts whether
Grigoriev had resigned from the party before he became a Buddhist
monk; whether he really had faith in Buddhism; whether he just wants
to serve propaganda purposes; whether he wants to spy; or whether
he wants to destroy Buddhism."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200110001-2