CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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rral n A 0177-TTInT TAIT T /lit TT NT
THE PANAMA CANAL ISSUE: FACT SHEET
March 1973
Background of Treaty Negotiations
The United States operates, maintains and defends the Panama
Canal under the terms of the Treaty of 1903, as amended in 1936
and 1955. This agreement granted in perpetuity "all the rights,
power and authority. .which the U.S. would exercise if it were
sovereign" in the Canal Zone. This aspect of the treaty has long
been an emotional issue in Panama and an irritant in U.S. - Panama
relations. The riots in Panama of January 1964 brought to a head
this long-standing dissatisfaction and caused Panama to break
diplomatic relations with the U.S.
Less than four moths later, in April 1964, relations were
reestablished and negotiations were undertaken to revise the treaty
relationship. Three draft treaties were negotiated between 1964
and 1967. In part they would provide for the U.S. to relinquish
its sovereighty over the Zone, for operation of the canal by a
U.S. - Panamanian authority, for increased payments to Panama to
come from tolls revenue and for political integration of the Zone
with Panama. Another major provision would give the U.S. an option
to build a new, larger, sea-level canal in Panama, and other pro-
visions dealt with defense arrangements. Ratification of these
treaties was pending when, in 1970, the Torrijos government formally
rejected them.
In October 1970, after a meeting between President Nixon and
President Lakas of Panama, the White House reiterated that the U.S.
was ready to discuss treaty relations whenever Panama was ready.
These -discussions began in late June 1971 and came to a standstill
in March 1972.
Importance of the Canal to Panama
The canal is a prime source of revenue to Panama: approximately
one-third of Panama's GNP (almost one billion dollars) is
attributable to the canal, the Zone and other U.S. installations;
almost fifty per cent of Panama's foreign exchange earnings from
exports of goods and services derives from direct payments from
these same sources; nearly one-third of Panama's employment is
attributable to the canal; Panama's per capita income of almost
$70i) iS: the highest in Central America and -the fourth highest
in Latin America.
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Importance of the Canal to the U.S.
As one of the world's most strategic waterways, it has been
of vital importance to U.S. national defense. It has been used
for rapid and flexible deployment of military forces and for
accelerated transport of vital raw materials and military supplies.
U.S. flag vessels make up more than one-sixth of the canal's
commercial traffic and more than 70 per cent annually of all
trans-Isthmian traffic either originates or terminates in U.S.
ports.
Panama Treaty Objectives
Panama seeks categorical territorial sovereignty and legal
jurisdiction over various activities in the Canal Zone. It also
seeks substantial increase in its share of canal profits, as well
as greater indirect benefits through the opening of the Canal
Zone to Panamanian commerical enterprise, increased use of
Panamanian products and services in the canal operation and
employment of more Panamanian citizens at key managerial levels.
U.S. Treaty Objectives
The U.S. seeks continued control and defense of the canal under
a treaty arrangement that will include: the right to administer,
operate and defend the canal for an extended period of time;
clear provisions which would permit the expansion of the capacity
of the canal to meet international shipping needs, either by
the addition of third locks for the present canal or the con-
struction of a second, sea-level canal; a treaty-binding guarantee
that the canal will remain permanently open to all world shipping
at reasonable tolls on a non-discriminatory basis; due consideration
for U.S. security interests in negotiating the duration of a new
treaty.
2
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
12 June 1972
A Modern Treaty for the Panama Canal
Address by Ambassador David H. Ward1
The story of the Panama Canal is well
known to Americans, and it is one in which
we rightly take considerable pride. The canal
enabled ships to reduce the length of their
voyages, sometimes by as much as 8,000
miles, thereby appealing to our liking for
efficiency. Patriots were equally pleased by
the construction episode. We conquered the
jungle and the mosquito, where the French
company had lost a fortune and 22,000 lives.
The canal enterprise was, and remains,
unique. While it affords us special benefits, it
likewise presents special problems of a po-
litical nature. These problems must be ad-
dressed constructively if a sound relationship
with Panama is to continue and if we wish to
keep alive the possibility of building a new
canal in Panama in later years. We would be
unwise, and do not wish, to ignore legitimate
nationalist aspirations in Latin America. For
these reasons we are negotiating a new
treaty with Panama.
Any discussion of the problems we face
today must begin, but by no means end, with
a discussion of the convention of 1903. This
treaty, although amended and reaffirmed in
1936 and 1955, governs the U.S. presence in
Panama much as it did when the canal opened
in 1914.
The treaty is 69 years old, and no one need
be reminded of the great changes in the
Made before the Pan American Council at Chi-
cago, III., on May 12 (press release 115). Ambassa-
dor Ward is Special Representative of the 'United
States for Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations.
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world generally, and in Latin America in
particular, that have taken place since that
time. In 1903, because of various problems
including those concerning health and sani-
tation, it was judged necessary for the
United States to hold a 10-mile-wide zone
under its control for construction and opera-
tion of the canal. Accordingly, the 1903 \
treaty provides that the United States can
exercise all rights and powers in the Canal
Zone it would possess if it were the sovereign
and can exercise these rights in perpetuity.
The treaty thus stops short of an explicit
grant of sovereignty to the United States.
The builders of the canal set out to create
a community with the necessary government
services and utilities in which the large labor
force could live and work in good health and
good order. This task was accomplished as
part of the process of building the canal, and
that community exists today. At present, we
have the necessary stores, housing, power
and water facilities, courts, police, post of-
fices, schools, hospitals, and the like, all under
U.S. ownership.
The Canal Zone is thus in many ways in- ,
dependent of Panama and outside of its legal
control. This fact has caused friction with
Panama. The physical aspects of the zone
have also been a cause of difficulty. The zone
bisects Panama, adjoins Panama's two larg-
est cities, Panama City and Colon, and occu-
pies land that Panama would like to use for
urban expansion. The two deepwat?r ports of
Panama are in the zone, and travelers from
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western Panama must pass through the zone
to reach Panama City, which they are of
course free to do.
Panama is paid an annual annuity of about
$2 million for the canal and received in-
directly, through U.S. purchases and pay-
ment of wages to Panamanians, about $167
million in 1971. This is about 65 percent of
Panama's total foreign exchange earnings
and the basis for about 35 percent of its gross
national product. The direct payment is con-
sidered inadequate by Panama on the ground,
among others, that tolls, which have never
been raised, could be increased to finance a
much greater payment.
Canal Zone operations today are under the
overall supervision of the Secretary of the
Army. A major general in the Army Corps
of Engineers serves in the zone in a civilian
capacity as Governor of the zone and Presi-
dent of the Canal Company. He is responsible
for the governmental functions in the zone,
the operation of the canal, the management
of the housing and commercial services pro-
vided for the employees of the company, and
the like. A U.S. court and a U.S. attorney
also operate in the zone.
About 12,000 Panamanians and 4,000
Americans work for the canal operation. Ap-
proximately 7,500 Panamanians and 40,000
Americans live in the zone, and residence
therein is limited to U.S. Government person-
nel and their families. About 13,000 of the
Americans are military personnel stationed
in the zone, and they and their families share
the schools and hospitals run by the Canal
Company.
This is the present situation. Panama be-
lieves it to be outdated and is pressing for the
right to govern the zone, for an end to the
provision whereby the U.S. rights continue
in perpetuity, for full ownership of a good
part of the lands in the zone, for a greatly
Increased annuity, and for certain limitations
on U.S. military rights. Panama is not, how-
ever, seeking the right to operate the canal.
These matters have been under discussion
for some years, and in 1967 negotiators of
the United States and Panama reached agree-
ment upon three draft treaties to replace the
1903 treaty. These treaties were never rati-
fied by Panama and were consequently never
submitted to the U.S. Senate.
In 1971 negotiations resumed, and since
the 1967 draft treaties were formally re-
jected by Panama, a new basis for agree-
ment is being sought.
Broad Principles for Hemisphere Relations
Before reviewing the approach which the
United States is taking to some of the specif-
ic problems presented by the negotiations, it
is worth noting that the Panama Canal, al-
though in many respects unique, is not an
isolated foreign policy problem. Instead the
U.S. approach to the negotiations springs
from broader principles which we apply to
Panama generally and to our other relations
in the inter-American system and in ' the
world.
President Nixon, in this year's foreign
policy report to Congress, recognized that al-
though our relations within the hemisphere
have a special durability, it is time to lay the
basis for a more mature political relation-
ship.2 He stated: "Henceforth a sense of
hemisphere-wide community (can) be sus-
tained only on a new, more realistic basis."
His report also observes that the problems
in our Latin American relationships are ba-
sically political and that the hemisphere is
composed of nations increasingly assertive of
their individual identities and less amenable
to U.S. tutelage than in the past. Hence our
policy is to eschew efforts to dominate and
instead seek a mature partnership with Latin
American nations, recognizing the limits on
our ability to solve every problem that arises
in the hemisphere. This policy is exemplified
by four major themes laid down by the Presi-
dent. These find expression in our policy con-
The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9 appears in
the BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1972; the section entitled
"Latin America" begins on p. 358.
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cerning the Panama Canal enterprise and
Panama generally, and are as follows:
?First, a wider sharing of ideas and re-
sponsibility in hemispheric collaboration.
?Second, a mature U.S. response to politi-
cal diversity and nationalism.
--Third, a practical and concrete U.S. con-
tribution to economic and social development.
--Fourth, a humanitarian concern for the
quality of life in the hemisphere.
These broad principles of course require
sharpening in the specific case. In particular,
a careful assessment of our national interest
in the canal must be a primary guide to the
course of action to be followed. Traffic pass-
ing through the canal continues to increase,
and the U.S. portion of this traffic has been
rising in absolute terms and as a percentage
of the total. In 1970, 14 percent of total U.S.
oceanborne trade passed through the canal,
as compared with 10 percent in 1950. The
canal is also of considerable military signifi-
cance and is used by all but our largest naval
ships and for logistical purposes. Our most
important national interest in the canal en-
terprise is thus to insure that the canal re-
mains available for our commercial and naval
shipping.
Panamanian Aspirations and 11S. Interests
With these general and specific concerns in
mind, the President has determined that a
great deal can be done to meet legitimate
Panamanian aspirations without jeopardy to
our national interest in the canal.
Referring again to the four themes of our
Latin American policy, the first theme?a
wider sharing of responsibility--is exempli-
fied by the agreement of the United States
to the assumption by Panama of greater and
greater responsibility for the civil govern-
ment of the Canal Zone. Supporting services
such as grocery stores and restaurants would
be operated in the zone by Panamanian en-
trepreneurs, and Panama would make use
of zone lands in ways consistent with U.S. re-
sponsibility for operation and defense of the
canal. Panama would also play a greater role
in defense of the canal.
The second point?a mature response to
nationalism?is also met by the proposed
changes just mentioned and by our agree-
ment to set a date in the next century when
Panama would have an option to terminate
the treaty if a satisfactory new arrangement
could not then be negotiated. This will end
the perpetuity provision, which has been a
substantial cause of dispute over the years.
Treaty provisions to insure the continued
right of the United States to make use of
the canal would of course survive any such
termination.
The third theme?a concrete contribution
to economic and social development?is ex-
emplified by our willingness to turn over to
Panama substantial zone land and port
facilities which are no longer needeli for
operation or defense of the canal, to open up
certain retained lands to Panamanian de-
velopment, and to raise the level of com-
pensation to Panama by a substantial
amount.
The fourth point?a concern for the qual-
ity of life in the hemisphere?is served by
almost all of the changes that we have pro-
posed to make and by the new relationship
which will result from a new treaty.
The United States has, as does Panama,
certain affirmative requirements of its own
in the new relationship, and these spring
generally from the national interest in the
canal mentioned earlier. It is our position
that a U.S. Government agency will continue
the functions necessary to the actual oper-
ation of the canal and the conduct of govern-
mental activities that will eventually be
assumed by the Government of Panama. Tolls
would remain under the control of Congress.
The transition from a U.S. government in
the zone to one that is generally Panamanian
should be an orderly and deliberate one, and
rights necessary to an effective operation of
The canal will be needed. The United States
must also retain the right to defend the canal.
This will require the continued maintenance
of military forces in the vicinity of the
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canal. Finally, we seek a definitive option
either to expand the existing canal by the
construction of a new and larger lane of
locks or to build a sea-level canal in Pan-
ama. Further explanation of this latter
point is appropriate.
Future Increases in Facilities
In 1970 the Presidential Commission head-
ed by former Treasury Secretary Robert
Anderson, who has since 1964 also been the
chief negotiator in Panama treaty matters,
concluded that the best site for a sea-level
canal in Central America was about 10 miles
west of the present canal. This site is outside
the present Canal Zone, and new treaty
rights would be required. The Commission
recommended that a decision on the $3 billion
canal be made at a date sometime in the fu-
ture when the existing canal begins to show
signs of becoming overburdened. The canal
would have an initial capacity of 34,000
transits per year and could be expanded to
accommodate in excess of 100,000 transits.
This compares with the current annual usage
of 14,000 transits and with the maximum
capacity for the present canal of 26,000 tran-
sits. The Commission recognized that the
great cost of the canal might make full amor-
tization of its expense impossible but con-
cluded that it had considerable political and
military advantages.
There has been much discussion of danger
to the ecology from a sea-level canal. The
Commission concluded that the risk of ad-
verse ecological consequences appeared to be
acceptable but stated that long-term studies
were needed and that tentative provisions
should be made for a freshwater barrier in
the midsection of the sea-level canal.
Another possibility is expansion of the ex-
isting canal by the addition of a third lane
of larger locks. It appears unlikely, however,
that this need to expand capacity will become
pressing until around the end of this century.
There is some concern on the part of the
Government of Panama that construction of
a sea-level canal would create serious eco-
nomic dislocations?a long period of inflation
during construction, followed by a drastic
decline in employment and business activity
in general when construction terminates and
lock canal jobs are eliminated in the change-
over to the sea-level canal.
An exhaustive study of the potential eco-
nomic impact of a sea-level canal by the
Stanford Research Institute in 1969 con-
cluded that this problem of adjustment is one
of manageable proportions. Over the long run
a sea-level canal would attract more traffic
than the existing canal, and the phasedown
in employment would thereby be lessened.
The institute concluded that after the adjust-
ment, period the growth of Panama's econ-
omy would continue at a higher level than
would be true had the sea-level canal never
been built. The sea-level canal would thus be
a new and expanded facility to replace a loek
canal that will eventually become obsolete.
When it is considered that more than a third
of Panama's gross national product flows
from canal operations it is readily apparent
why the creation of a new canal, with greater
capacity, will be a tremendous long-term ben-
efit to Panama.
Our approach to our treaty relationship
with Panama thus reflects the constructive
and forthcoming attitude that the United
States has taken toward Panama in other
matters. Panama has long been one of the
highest per capita recipients of U.S. develop-
ment assistance in the hemisphere, and this
assistance, together with benefits from Canal
Zone goods and services, has helped sustain
a record of economic growth over the past
decade that is one of the highest in Latin
America. Congress has recently increased
Panama's sugar quota and has provided $90
million in loans and grants for the construc-
tion of the Pan American Highway through
the Darien Gap.
Both through our treaty policy and in these
other programs the United States has sought
to foster a relationship in which the proc-
esses of change and national development
can take place in an atmosphere of mutual
respect and cooperation. We seek a mature
and reasonable partnership with Panama
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which will endure for the benefit of both par-
ties and world commerce. We recognize Pan-
ama's aspirations to play a greater role in
canal affairs and to assume responsibility
THE SUN
18 February 1973
The L.
at the Canal Zone...
for the government of the Canal Zone. At
the same time we seek full recognition
by Panama of the national interest of the
United States in the reliable, safe, and effi-
dent operation of the Panama Canal.
d its clients:
will look
Tie new U.S. ambassador to the U.N.,
John A. Scali, scheduled to present his
credentials Tuesday, won't even have
!ime to warm up the chair vacated by,
fleorge Bush before the hottest political
aot;ito seen here in years lands in his
This is going to be a special six-day
?::ecurity Council session in mid-March
n Panama City, designed by the Pana- '
naidans to put pressure on Washington"
)r a new Canal Zone treaty.
The ostensible purpose of the meeting,
es described by the Panamanian foreign
aioister?Iuan Antonio Tact, is "a con-
? 'ddration of measures for the strength-
of international peace and seen,-
ity and the promotion of international
)oPeration in Latin America." In plain-
word, the invitation to the UN's
important body is to permit the
atin Americans all airing of their var-
?,uh complaints against the United
, ates.
Pressure on U.S.
"A Security Council meeting should
it be conceived as a means for bring-
g' pressure on bilateral issues." Mr.
ahli warned in the course of the Secu-
3,- Council meeting that approved of
Panamanian request for the special
ision, What he did not say, but U.S,
Ssion people admit in private, is that
ls type of pressure could only prove
:be c puk6igeitive,a.,
why tv.rtursy-todw
gry Congress.
i:\ LOUIS IIALASZ
rfre only consolation for Americans
ating in the U.S. mission here is con-
.?.ted with the new Cuban-American hi-
thig agreement. People here believe
President Nixon's contention not-
hstanding, this deal is only an Intro-
tion to further changes in U.S. reta-
ils with Castro's Cuba. And if that is
case, the Cubans will not be too eager
exploit the anti-U.S. propaganda field
Panama City. In fact, sources familiar
h Latin American developments in the
speak of backdoor Cuban hints
ht from the beginning that the Pan-
la, move had never,really' been to Ila-
na's liking. .
The Panamanian project was carefully
'!pared and exquisitely timed: The
ineil session will take place during
only month when Panama's ambas-
!or to the U.N., Aquillino E. Boyd, is
,sident of the council.
That the Panamanians will say was
ide clear by Ambassador Boyd as
g as nine years ,ago when, at the
le of the Canal Zone "flag riots," he,;
)ke in a Security Council session
led to tackle the crisis. "The Amen-
population [in the Canal Zonel has
vays been characterized by its hostil-
.,?-toward the nation and people of
anima," he cried, adding that "North
nericans living in the Canal Zone
lieve it is a fief of their own which
n- be handed down Indefinitely from
Divides the country
-for was he less indignant recently
en he complained that the zone
.. a real enclave which is foreign' to
national jurisdiction and which di-
its our territory into two parts," thus
:ating "a dangerous and potentially
dosive situation."
ilven though the "Zonians"?as Amer-
.ns living in the semi-exterritorial
of the canal are called?are known'
for tbeir discriminatory attitude toward
Panamanians and though there is a
generally shared feeling here that the
granting of a truly equitable new Canal
Zone treaty by Washington has long
been overdue, Mr. Bush valiantly ,
defended the process of "active bilateral
negotiations" presumably in progress ,
between the U.S. and Panama and re-
futed the charge that the zone would be
"a colonialist enclave."
Nevertheless, the echo of charges of
U.S. colonialism is likely to be lona in a
Security Council'Whose composition this
year .is the least friendly toward the
United States in the history :of the
United Nations. "
Most nations against U.S.
The two Latin American countries on
the council, Panama and Peru, will not
only be joined., by most other hemi- :
!hers to sons, and who have a coin- spheric countries that undoubtedly ')
s PACOMIRAlitholehearted
[eig@e 1901,3409ybc2iPpdisATRIbiorib-0 9440 i the March
5
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support of the council's African and
Asian members?Guinea, the Sudan,
Kenya, India and, perhaps with less
fervor, Indonesia. Likely Soviet and Chi-
nese reactions do not leave much to
imagination, while the Yugoslays are
fully expected to align themselves with
the most fiery line the Third World
could offer. The Austrians have already
made clear that their overall posture is
that of total neutralitv. Even though the
Australians* have lately been making
friendlier noises toward Washington,
their support of the U.S. is not likely to
be wholehearted under the new, leftist
Whitlam government. Thus the U.S. can
only count on the support of Britain, and
to a much lesser degree, on that of
France.
This picture ts so potentially explosive
that many Latin American delegates are
having private doubts about the advisa-
bility of the whole idea, even though
their group, speaking through the Co-
lombian ambassador, Augusto Espinosa,
formally expressed "sympathy and soli-
darity" with the Panamanian request
and unanimously agreed to support it.
"So far we only agreed to support the
request for a special Security Council
meeting," said the Argentinian ambas-
sador, Ortiz de Rozas, adding that there
was no overall Latin American under-
standing about the specifics of the ses-
.
sion due in March.
This Latin American caution was un-
derlined in a tacit way by the Peruvian
ambassador, Javier Perez Cuellar, who,
while representing one of Latin Ameri-
ca's "progressive"?that is, new leftist
?governments, nevertheless restricted
himself to the contention that a Security
Council session in Latin America "is not.
a matter of disturbing the action of the
regional organ."
OAS was omitted
The reference was to the fact that the
Panamanian idea had not been pro-
moted through the Organiation of
American States whose heE,dquarters
is in Washington and of which, of
course; the United States is the most
important member. ?
Ambassador Boyd does not keep it a
secret that the omission of the OAS was
intentional. "The 'realpolitik' sense of
Latin America did not recommend it to
Panama to present its case to the OAS,
and we tried to' avoid this channel," he
said in an interview. What he meant
was rather plain: Since a Panamanian
request would have been blocked by
Washington in the OAS, he simply
avoided going through it. "New York is
230 miles from Washington," chuckled
Mr. Boyd. "Just imagine how it would
be if OAS headquarters were in PanamE
City," he added.
In fact, one of the formal U.S. argu-
ments against the Panamanian project
is based on this avoidance of the OAS,
which "represents a slap in the face of
' Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter," regulat-
ing regional arrangements, as one U.S.
source remarked. Comparison is made
with the Security Council's special ses-
sion last year in Africa in Addis Ababa,
which ?had been arranged through that
continent's regional body, the Organiza-
tion of African Unity.
Keeping the lid on
A Security Council committee set up.
to deal .with meetings away from head-
quarters went into a two-week closed
huddle right after the formal approval
of the Panama City project to discuss
and draw up the specific agenda that ?
should govern the forthcoming session.
Latin American diplomats, working with,
their colleagues from other lands, are
trying to sort out the many subjects that
they would, and the others they would
not, like to talk about. The general hope
is that by some kind of understanding
the lid could be kept on and the explo-
sive session gotten over with so that
U.S.-Latin American relations would not
suffer a serious setback.
Whether such a bottling up could be
safely engineered IS another question,
and many people here, aware of both
the Latin American complaints and
emotionalism, doubt that it could.
As Ambassador Bush already pointed
out "the prospect of the [Security Coun-
cil] meeting is stimulating a heated
propaganda campaign in Panama." If
such 'a heated atmosphere compels the
Panamanian spokesmen to put on a
good show for the benefit of the home
audience to get a kind of emotional
satisfaction out of the tight-fisted Yan-
kees, it is more than problematical
whether representatives of other Latin
American countries, nursing a great
variety of hurts, both real and imagina-
tive, could afford not to follow suit.
?Chats with 'Latin American sources '
even on the most cursory examination
reveal a bewildering variety of com-
plaints. Some of these deal with directly
"colonial" type of problems and are
certain to receive full African and gen-
erally Third World sympathy. Thus,
Venezuela could complain about the still,:
colonial Dutch and French Guyanas;
Guatemala about British Honduras; Ar-
gentina about the British Falkland Is-
lands, or the black independent Carib-
bean countries about the French ter-
ritories.
The French can anyway be sure of
coming under fire for their atomic
tests in the Pacific by the Andean
seaboard nations of South America', -
while the Soviet Union would probably
be scored for: its refusal to ratify a
Latin American denuclearization treaty.
A most damaging accusation may be
brought up by the Panamanians them-
selves, who mutter that the U.S. Is
clandestinely transporting atomic weap-
ons through the Panama Canal?an ac-
tion specifically prohibited by the treaty
which it has ratified.
Control over natural resources
But perhaps the most bothersome as-
pect of a runaway council session in
Panama, at least in U.S.-hemispheric
relations, would concern the Latin Amer-
ican claim for permanent sovcrelty
over natural resources. This is the cus.
tomary U.N. jargon for charges of eco-
nomic, "neocolonialist,'? exploitation to
which the Latin Americans claim fii7
are subjected at the hands of An.eriean
private 'companies. Chile's President
Salvador Allende already gave a good
taste a this problem to the General
Assembly last fall when he addressed it
during his short New York stay in
December, when he accused it and
Kennicott Copper with both subversion
and capitalistic exploitation.
Such charges are likely to? be joined
by Peru and Ecuador, who would voice
their claims for national sovereignty
over 200 miles of the coastal waters to
protect their main food supply against
alleged exhaustion by the American
fishing fleet.
And if, despite the hijacking deal,
Cuba were in, talking about the U.S. mili-
tary ?base on its soil in Guantanamo, or
demanding independence for Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands from Amer-
ican colonialism, the fur will really fly.
These are the rather awesome pros-
pects of a special Security Council ses-
sion in Panama next March. It is impos-
sible to gauge the political residues of
the encounter and the impact it may
wind up having on U.S.-hemispheric
relations. The only thing observers here
are certain about is that the show will
be worth watching.
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Ii Globo
Rome, 10 January 1973
Pittermann: The Dialogue between Socialists
and Communists Plays into Soviet Hands
DT. Bruno Pittermann, President of the Socialist International,
yesterday attacked the Kremlin for having suppressed political
parties in communist bloc countries while appearing to promote ,
socialist-communist fronts in the West, as in the case of Frances
In his end-of-the-year speech regarding relationships between
communism and socialism, Pittermann declared that "In the Soviet
press, a dialogue is encouraged. The Socialist International
has left to the individual parties the free choice of deciding if
and with which communist parties they want to carry out such
discussions, since these discussions are possible only in democratic
countries, where the communist parties enjoy the same rights as the
others."
4
"In the countries where only the communist parties are in
control there can be no discussion between the communist parties
and the social democratic parties because the adherents of democratic
socialism are oppressed and persecuted as enemies of the State.
This situation makes unbelievable all communist statements that they
grant legal equality to social democratic parties to represent the
workers' interests."
"As long as this right is not also recognized in the countries
under communist domination, this statement, which applies to democratic
areas, can only be interpreted to mean that communists recognize the
legal equality of democratic socialism only where they do not have the
strength to rule unilaterally."
Pittermann continued "If the CPSU allows the French Communist
Party and other communist parties to pronounce themselves in favor of
the multi-party democratic system, while in the USSR and allied countries
the domination of the communist party alone is maintained, either the
ideological base of the communist parties will no longer be shared,.
or such statements are considered by the CPSU as tactics to facilitate
the transition to the Soviet system."
"Certainly, despite the differences in the political systems
(recognition of the legal equality of parties in democratic countries
and refusal to recognize this equality in the countries dominated
by the communists), situations develop in which, even though the
departure points differ, they lead to analogous conclusions such as
demands that the Vietnam war end or for the convocation of a
European security conference." -
"The differences in viewpoint", Pittermann added, "show up in
actual performance, for example?as. vgatas
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of man and the sovereignty of .all European states in particular.
Here the USSR could provide convincing proof of the credibility of its
intentions, if it were to put an end to the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
They remain incredible if the Soviets look for a scapegoat for a
mistaken decision (Shclest) but continued to support the results of the
mistaken policy. They remain non-credible if they recognize the legal
equality of democratic socialism only where they do not at present
have the power to impose a communist monopoly, but maintain it with
an iron hand where they have such power."
Pitterrnann: ii dialogo
socialisti- comunisti
fa ii gioco sovietico
VIENNA, 9. ? H dr. Bruno
Pittermann, presldente dell's In-
ternazIonale Socialists*, ha at-
taccato tert 0 Gremlin? per ave.
re soppresso I partIti politic' nel
Pees! del Wince comunlsta men-
ire sembra voter favorire frontl
soclalcomunIsti in Occidente.
ro-
me avvIene In Franck'.
Nella sua relaziorte di fine an-
no sui rapporti fm a comurtismo e
socialism?. Pittermann dichiara
ch e c nella stampa dell'URSS at
invita alla discussione. Linter.
nazonale soeialista ha lasciate
ai pmpri partill libera facoltb di
decidere se e con quell retrtiti
voglinno midurro In.
discietalonl, poteltb questa di-
seievittoil Mom poe.thill same?
nei Piles( democratic', dove
partiti comunisti hanno gli stes-
si diritti dcgli altri.
Nei Paesi dove dominano I so-
li partiti cornunisti non pub esi-
stem alcuna discussione tra par-
Litt comunisti e socialdemocra-
poiche i fautori del soda-
lismo democratic? vengono
pressi e perseguitati come nemi-
ci dello state. Questa situazio.
no rende non credibili butte le
dichiarazioni di parte comunl-
sta, second? cui I comunisti con-
cedono l'uguaglianza giuridica
partiti del socialism? democra-
tic? nella rappresentanza degli
interessi dol lavoratori.
Sine a quando cib non verra
riconosciuto anche nei Paesi po.
sti sotto dominazionc comunista,
questa dichiarazione, the ? vale
per l'ambito della democrazta.? '
pub essere Intesa soltanto not
sense che I cornunistl ricono-
scone rugunglianza giurldica del
socialism? democratic? bolted?
dove non hanno la form di de-
minare da soli s.
e Se II PCUS -- ha continuato
Pittermann ? permette al par-
tite comunista francese e ad al-
tri partiti comunisti dl Proles-
sant per II sistema democrati-
c? di phi partiti, mentre nel-
l'URSS e nei suoi Paesi &knit;
view mantenuta la ? dominazio-
ne del partite unto? comunista.
apart+. o la base ideologica del
partiti comunisti non 6 pie co-
mune, oppure tali dichiarazioni
vengono considerate dal PCUS
come manovre per facilitare ii
.pa4saggio al sistema sovietico s.
Certo, nonostante In dive:lil-
t& dei sistemi (riconoseimento
deli uguaglinnza gitiridiefl net
Pntdemoeridlei e While dl
rleettmeere lIg1111101011141
110i liaCni (J111111114 dal MI1111111-
Rd). sl manifestant, situazioni.
In cui. pur essendo differenti I
punti di partenza, vengono trai-
t? cenclusioni analoghe: come
per la richiesta della fine della
guerra nel Vietnam, o per la
rAmvoca z i one di una conferenza
suite sicurezza europea.
Le differenze dei punti di vi-
sta ? ha detto encore Pitter-
mann ? risultano nell'esecuzio-
ne. come, per esempio per quart-
to concerne II rispetto dei di-
ritti dell'uomo e specialmente la
sovranita di tutti gli stati euro-
pei. Qui l'URSS potrebbe fomi-
re una prova convincente della
credibilita delle sue intenziont,
se pene.sse fine all'occupazione
della Cecoslovacchia. Si rimer*
non eredibili se si cerca un ca-
pro espiatorio per una decisione
'sbagliata (Scelest: n.d.r.) ma
continua a trantenene i risultati
della politica stmgliata. SI
mane non credibili se si rico-
nosce l'uguaglianza giuridlca del
socialism? democratic? soltanto
dove attualmente non si ha la
forza di knporr il monopello
del comunismo, ma lo si man-
tiene ferreamente dove se no ha
le forte.
4
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NEW YORK TIMES
30 January 1973
Western con unists embarrassed
b ettar of "ailed Czech's wife
By Richard Davy
. A challenging letter from
Czechoslovakia to the world
conmumist. movement has been
distributed by Australian corn-
-monists after the West European
parties shied away from it. Only
the Brit ish Communist: Party
mentioned it briefly in the
- Morning Star on December S.
The letter is from Mrs. Anna
.SabatoVa, wife of Dr Jaroslav
Sabata, .a leading Czechoslovak
theoretician of the Dubcek re-
form period of 1968. In the wave
of trials last year he was sen-
tenced to. six and a Ilalf years'
imprisonment.
It is an important. letter and
could embarrass the French
Communist Party in the March
elections. 'Apart from exposing
details of the trials and the sup-
pression of dissent in CzechoSio-
vakia it calls for a form of coin-
tnunism in which democratic
rights would be assured not only
For the working classes but also
for other Sections of the
PUP ulation,
Professor Sahara, a communist
since the age of 19, stood by
these ideas at his trial, maintain-
ing. that klarxism must adapt to
the conditions of tidvanced in-
dustrial societies, that it must be
based on democratic principles,
and that Marxists must be will-
ing to work with non-Marxists
even after the struggle for
power.
The unwillingness of the
French communists, among
others, to publish the letter
shows their reluctance to bring
these questions nut into the open
and to challenge the doctrines of
the. Soviet Union, thus casting
some doubt on their commitment
to a democratic alliance with the
Socialists.
The letter says, in part:
Dear Comrades, .
After careful consideration I diii
starting to Write this letter a few
hours after: the court passed sen-
tence cm the last member of illy
family, my 21-year-old daughter
Anna. She :has been sentenced by
the Brno regional court to three and
a half year in prison. The sent.
et1CCS on my, other children and on
my- husband' are also unconditional
ternis of inlprisonment.
it may perhaps Seenl strange that
individnai Czechostoted.
presumes to acidlc:ie. soch an impor-
tant forum as the central commit-
tees and the membership of com-
munist and workers' parties
throughout the world.
I have decided on this Step
because in my cotintry, CzeCho-
slovalcia, there are no official
quarters at the present time to grant
criminals. Relatives and friends.
liad to show their idento;? cords
both in the politic corricloo; of the
regional court and outside.
. The atmosphere around ail the
'trials held in Prague and Brno in
the Summer months was marked by
an encleavottr to keep the proceed-
ings as secret as possible, although
they were officially annourwed as
public trials.
me a hearing Th foreign
That tournalists were not
. ...
I have seen all my children prit?o admitted will be known to you. Rut
in prison,...
I find myself as you probably do not know that
mother in a unique and exceptional admission to these public trials was
situation. Therefore in these the granted to only one close relative
most grievous moments of my per- of each defendaot. .
sonal life, I am guided in what T In formal matters - the bench
do by my maternal feelings, my followed the rules ; the defendants
honour as a citizen and by the firm could speak as they considered
necessary. MI who have berm on
conviction which has led me for 25
years to work for socialism in the tsricailmaisi-t l
e ir.
siveci.7 supporters or the
rail ti of the Commonist Party o
Dr Wolf, the chairman of the
I am unfortunately ;aware of the
complications which.mae drt,e tor bench, said in his speech stating
me, despite all the Irroclionations the grounds - for the verdict :
about internationalism, as a result " Neither the bench as a body nor
of this public statement, I risk the allY individual member has formed
possibility that I. too, may be the opinion that the men here corO
at-rested as a result of this act. I view] were enemies 01 socialism."
have nothing; to however... . That is to riay that these commit-
My husband. Dr laroslar Saba( a. IthitS were Cnildern"ll for bulding
different p olitical views, which, by
a conommist ;ince the ;lee of 19,
words of mouth and in writine,
la-as head of the psyelioloey depart-
they made known anion them-
ment at the J. F. `Porlcvne Unt?
SI and to ? few dozen others
versity, until Spring 1968,
the autumn of 1968 secre-
of similar political persuasion. .
he . .
then until
tary of t Erno reeional party f' My husband himself wrote some
committee. Later, until his arrest theoretical papers. for instance the,
on November 20, 1.97 be wa mi-
Material for discrission known as'
t, s
ployed as an iron worker with the
firm. nzenyrskii - Prumyslove
Stavby lie has been sentenced to
six and a half years In prison.
This university teacher?a corn-
noinist- beloved by his students--
who for 13 -years also lectured at
the university on Marxism-Lenin-
ism and prepared many of his
students for joining the party, has
now !wen nine niont1i ji detention
under ci-mcliiiims which, out or
consideration for the present hold-
ers of power in Czechoslovakia, 1
lyill not describe iti7detail.
I will say only that my husband,
against: doctor's orders (in 1964 he
soffered infarct meOcardia, and as
a result he suffers - from chronic
inflammation of the stain-melt and
duodenal ulcers), had to do heavy
manual labour up .to his arrest
because he could get no other joh.
In prison in May, 1,972, he had ir
heart dttack. . .
In this letter I should like to
describe some of the circumstances
that arosc during the court hear-
Jugs which I attended personally.
. The building where the court
sat was guarded :is if the men on
trial were a gang: of hardened
io speak mit on matters concern--
Me convieted coomumisFr. soctU
ists and other citizens. The same
right' belongs to democratic public
opinicm in the world concerned
With upholding basic human rights.
The international communist and
workers' movement must find a
common platform based on the
Substance and not on the super-
ficial aspects of events in Czecho-
slovakia. In this connexion one
must ask : why is the armed entry
by night or the allied troops on
to the territory of Czechoslovakia
denoted aS " International aid ",
while disagreement among many
communist and left-wing Partles-,/s
regarded by our authorities as in-
terference M (ma internal affairs,
which, as distinct feom " inter-
natrimal aid ", is something in. and undesirable, .
Why can the people of Czecho-
slovakia learn nothing of these
expressions of disagreemeot from -
the legal press in this country ?
And I poi A further question : Why
were these trials kept secret if they
were Justified ?
Finallyt would add : not only '
CU the pint ests? or. commumst and
left-wing oreanizations., including
anti-imperialist public opinion,
alter the hard fate of Illy Czecho-
slovak prisoners. I am convinced
that now more than ever before
It is the task of the day to work
out and clarify political questions
ori a higher theoretical leVel
the Little Action Pi-ogramme Within the communist and Ivor-kers'
in which lie tried to find common' movement itself. We need
ground between comnumists and, especially to clarify how the power
those socialists who do not hold i w011 by the working class is to he
ItiarSiSt views but support the Implemented further in the socialist
socialist order in Czechoslovakia. ; countries. In my view, it is not
I would also point our that the logical to argue that these are
" Little Action Protiramme " eic- issues solely concerning the parties.
pres!idy .tatos (hot drtion of governing in countries where
mitionalizat inn In Vehroar:,,?, Odic, power has been won by the working
was a ne. essays, and liod itt boot class tinder the leadership of the
VI)jCIithere can be no discossion. communist parties.
It is not true that my husband or Ti Ls essential that communist
any cif the convicted communists parties aud their allies in countries .
favoured bourgeois democracy. All Ivhere the Imurgeoisie still rule
In a man are unequivocal sup- should be given prospects that Will
porters of socialist democracy make socialism attractive to other
based on the interests of the broad- strata and groups of the population
est masses and also controlled by beside the working class. One
the masses. My husband has always cannot make use of allies only
stressed as a matter of principle the during the fight for power and the
need for control from below, that first phase of building socialist
is by the will of the people. Society. In the interests of the .
Many communist and similar
parties of the left, trade unions. world communist movement they
must be assured of all democratic
and people of democratic, 'anti-rights also in the later period, that
Imperialist opinion throughout the
Ivorld, are justifiably _concerned,- is-in the stage of socialist develop.
about. the series of trials in Czecho- . ment which Czechoslovakia, for
slovalcia. I am convinced that the example, has now reached : and in
comthunist and workers' parties, these rights
individual communists and Marx-niv,not merely tor-
ists and all other advocates ofmilhly,ex.ercisedi
socialism have an inalienable right .
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THURGAUTil ZEITUNG, Frauenfeld
6 December 1972
'PRAGUE RELEASES JAROMIR MASARYK TO AUSTRIA
Exactly 7 months to the day after his forcible removal from
Austria to Czechoslovakia, Jaromir Masaryk was given permission by
the Prague authorities last weekend to leave for Austria. With
this case, small, neutral Austria showed how fearless stubborness
can pay off, even against a stronger communist neighbor state.
Here are the antecedents, at the beginning of May of
this year, Masaryk, an exiled Czech, drove from Vienna to the
Austro-Czechoslovak border, to pick up his wife, a native of Eng-
land, who had visited Masaryk's mother in Brno. He himself could
not enter Czechoslovak territory. Masaryk went on foot to the
no-man's land between the Austrian and Czechslovak border guards.
When a car with numerous Czechoslovak soldiers appeared there, he
ran back, but was shot and seriously wounded. Masaryk was able
to drag himself back into Austrian territory, but he was pursued.
by Czechoslovak border soldiers, knocked down, and brought back
to Czechoslovak territory.
Various protest notes from the Austrian government against
this serious infringement and demands for Masaryk's immediate re-
lease were not heeded by Prague. Party chief Husak even described
this clear case of violation of sovereignty and kidnapping as a
,"completely legal act," and spoke of a "provocation and insult
to the socialist system."
Now Vienna got tough. The Austrian government resolved to
restrict relations with the CSSR to an "absolutely necessary mini-
mum." The following weeks and months showed that this was not
just tactical lip service, visits by ministers which had been
planned before were cancelled, diplomatic and other contacts were
boycotted. At trade fairs held in the CSSR, no official Austrian
representatives appeared, cultural events were cancelled, the
sports activity between the two neighbors as much as came to a
complete standstill, even tourism was limited -- voluntarily by
many Austrians. Various attempts at "reconciliation" from Prague
were rejected with the stereotyped statement: first reparations
for the kidnapping and border violation by unconditional release
of Masaryk.
Now Prague has at last given in. The clear success of the
line of firm principle taken in this case by Austria is particular-
ly valued in diplomatic circles in Vienna, since Masaryk was not
,even an Austrian citizen, but an emigrant from the CSSR with a
:foreign passport.
Before Masaryk left Vienna on Tuesday with his wife, to
return to their adopted country of South Africa, he wrote to
thank the Austrian government. The Viennese foreign ministry says
it is now satisfied: "Only now are we ready to normalize our rela-
tions with the CSSR again."
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WASHINGTON POST
18 February 1973
MOSCOW?The Soviet
'Union in entering a 'critical
period of bitter cold with In-
adentrate now cover to pro-
ifiltat ft delicate winter wheat
crop that the country need
tor agricadural recovery.
Thew ye,ar that Communist
TifIrty leader Leonid T. ,
Brozhnev has called decisive
for Vie five-year plan seems
off to a bad atoll%
There WW1 no snow cover
At All by ;Ian. 1 in the
rittraine t1ie. cent ral
pra-aian boo& earth re?liaii,
where most. of the patinven
60 1111llin11 nereFi Of winter
grain 13 planted. 'Phey could
not even scrape together
enough snow In Moscow to
provide the traditional troi-i
ka rides during iitliusrian
kin'alilei Wheal, Crop
acesTkiew Threat
Frani( Crepeau
mr,c1tttat
winter" ealebrationa that
nao-k rho year's 'LULU
Lack of snow wasn't so
bad with the unseasonably
warm temparatures of No-
vember and December. But
now temperatures all along
the grain belt are plunging
to from 5 above to 22 de-
grees below 2ern-- d only
about two U)] C; of has
fallen,
Pcports 111[4 provinelal
per,: indicate that What
snow has fallenlvas whiimed
off try bigh Winds. Farmers
woold like A good ix ifyItle3
of snow to insulate the
sprouted Winter grain from
killing frost hnct to provide
moisture for next spring.
Lack or snow cover plod
penetrating frosts last win-
ter started the Soviet Union
(town the road to the worst
lee?vest since :11469. Only il
WASHINGTON POST
1 February, 1973
million tons of grain worn
reaped, more than 20 million
:tons below .plan.
' Enough snow could yet
fall to hold the Winter kill
or grain to the normal 10 or
20 per cent. Last winter the
.Russians had to reseed
about one third of the crop.
Winter grains normally
'provide about 40 per cent of
the Soviet grain crop. A
summer drought. over vast
areas in 1972 completed
what Soviet official:3 called
"'once in a century" crop
,failure and led to 'purchaso
of some $2 billion worth of
grain in the West, much of
it from the -United States.
In an effort to recoup, So..'
Viet planners have set 1973
agricultural and grain tar-
gets that. most Western ex-
ports consider unreahstic.
Lack of Machines
SovietCre
e
IVIOSCONV, Jon; 31 (All ?
:Pravda said today thal lacka-
daisical production of farm
implements may jeopardize
..the fruvial spring sowing and
;announced dismissal of a top
supply official for "violating
.state, discipline."
The Communist Party news-
, paper observed in a front-page
-.article that "the struggle for a
good harvest is waged not. only
in I he fds"1 but in factories
and supply organizations as
well.
It added that farmers will
need 48,000 new tractorized
solvers, 53.000 cultivators, 18,;
500 fertilizer spreaders and
"many thousands" of other
pieces of equipment for thisi
vear's spring ipiaming.
The spring field work is all
the more important this year
because of a disastrous fall
harvest, which forced the So-
viet Union - to buy nearly $2
billion worth of grain, most of
it from the United States.
Production of tractors and
fertilizer spreaders - is going
fairly well at plants in Minsk,
I Kharkov. Chelyabinsk, Altai
The 1973 plan calls for a:
12.6 per cent increase in
gross agriculture produe-
tion. That follows two years
in which tiro percentage
showed a net deficit and
compares with an annual'
average growth of 4.3 tier
cent over 1971-75.
For grain this year, plan-
ners call for 197.4 million,
tons, a figure never before
achieved and 10 million tons'
above the record harvest of;
1970. The planners need
perfect year to achieve that
goal.
The chaos of the 1972 her;
vest and wheat weather ot.
back fall planning and best_
estimates are that farmers
planted about 10 million
acres less of winter grain
than planned.
zind Riga, Pravda said, but
"the plan is jeopardized" by
poor output of a factory in No-
vosibirsk scheduled to pro-
duce 22,000 sowers this year.
In a brief separate note on
the hack page, Pravda said a
top supply official, Sergei V.
Shevehenko, had been re-
lieved of his post for
"violating state discipline."
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THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
13 February 1973
1,:ri al Strauss an
eNpert on Soviet
agriculture, on the
latest grain crisis
Istate of Soviet agriculture has
.1 again become a hi L;11iY POI ii ical
subject. With rising living standards,
consumers are clamouring for more of
the most valuable foods such as fruit
and . vegetables. -meat. milk, butter,
cheese and eggs. Following the dis-
missal of some important but essenti-
ally technical officials. the crisis has
now claimed the Minister of Agricul-
ture himself. The Minister. V. V.
MaIskevich. was a veteran of many
-battles in the past. [Ie. was .1thrtish-
clicv's. personal hth? noire and dis-
missed by him in 1961.. only to be
reinstated Within a few months of
iShrlishrliev's fall. The fact that he has
boon replaced by D. Polyanski, a mem-
ber of the izovernine body of the Com-
munist party. indicates the importance
attached by the top leadership to the
-situation.
In the main European grain-growing
areas of the Soviet Union a combina-
tion of excessive winter frosts, slimmer
drought and bad harvesting weather
has cut wheat siipplie,, and reduced
the total grain harvest by 13 million
tons below its 1971 level which Was
itself not particularly favourable. The.
Government was able to offset the
whole shortfall in its home supplies by
buying wheat on the world market
hut this depleted the large stocks held
in Canada and the United States and
has had dramatic repercussions on
world grain prices. The clonal- price
of American wheat in Rotterdam is
more than half up on a year ago ;
as tar as Britain is concerned. the
-increase was even steener because of
the devaluation of sterling since June
1972. The price of other types of
grain, simh as maize. has risen roughly
in the same proportion.
In a country of the dimensions of
the Soviet Union. with its extreme
continental " el ima to, local crop
failures are more the rule than the
exception. Usually they are offset by
good harvests in other parts; cats-
strophie conditions in all ecain-erowing
areas occur relati VP ty rarely. The last
time this happened was in 1963. Last
year, the harvest suffered most in the
main grain-growing areas of the Euro-
pean Soviet Union and fairly good
mons were obtained in Kazakhstan,
Siheria and the Urals.
The large fluctuations in weather con-
ditions and crops were one of the
reasons why the Soviet planners chose
five years as the time span for the
original FiveYear Plans, because good
and bad harvests were expected to
cancel out over this period. Sinee the
middle sixties, crop production targets
have actually been set in the form of
five-year averages: in the plan period.
1966-70. grain production just managed
to beat its target of 167 million tons
for the period as a whole as the result
of an exceptionally good crop in 1970*
In the light of past. experience. the
target for the current period 1971-5
was by no means over-ambitious ; the
average grain output of 195 million
tons was about one sixth up on 1966-70,
compared with an increase of well over
a quarter between 1961-5 and 1966-70.
As the crop in 1970 was 186 million
tons, the target appeared well within
reach. but 1971 produced only 181 mil-
lion tons and last year's- official total
was 168 million tons. With two years
out of five already gone, grain output
during the next three years would have
to acerage 209 million. tons in order
to fulfil the plan. This looks at the
moment most unlikely.
The last occasion when the Soviet
Union faced a severe grain crisis was
in 1963, when output plummeted by
almost in quarter to only 1071 million
Ions. This disaster discrddited
Khruslichey who was the acknowledged'
architect of the country's agricultural
reconstruction after. the death of Stalin
and contributed to his fall a year later.
The immediate damage was minimised
by massive grain imports' from the,
West but the expansion of livestock
production was hampered for years
its 1962 level was not regained in total
until 1965 and the national pig herd
(which was most severely affected by
the disaster) exceeded its 1962 size
for the first time in 1971.
The present setback is not nearly so
serious but Soviet agriculture stilt
suffers from a relatively low volume of:
production per head of the population,
generally accompanied by hikgli coSts, -
periodical food difficulties and 111?ited
raw material supplies for important
consumer industries. Thr long yearn 0f
neglect and exploitation of the land
have created ail enormous backlog of
investment needs: (hiring the past three
years capital investment in agriculture
was al the order of ?22,000 unit Ii ons.
But output in 1971 was no higher than
in 1970. and in 1972 it actually fell by
more than 4/ per cent. Even though
this was largely due to had weather, it
means that in spite of the increase in
capital investment Soviet agriculture
remains far too dependent on a cap,
ricious and severe climate.
- Yet it is difficult to believe that the.
recent change of Ministers will lead te-
a radical change in policies which have
been pursued ever since Stalin's death
twenty years ago. The Soviet Govern-
ment. will probably continue to pour
more resources into agriculture, even
though the return may remain for
some time depressingly low, in spite of
the difficulties in the harvest field,
supplies of most types of food through
the public trade system (with the
exception of vegetable oil) have actu-
ally gone up in 1972, though there is a
substantial unsatisfied demand for some'
important foodstuffs. But the Soviet
consumer, who has had to be patient
for so long, will again have to accept
jam tomorrow for some years Ithrcr
than he could fairly have expected,
2
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alRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 February 1973
U'3 LI
? itiy Leo Gtuliow
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science .Monitor
t ?
a ?
Moscow
Agriculture ? after last year's crop failurein Russia ? has edged out heavy industry and-.
cOnsUrnerism as the main. -concern of Soviet
economists. ! ? . .
Western observers placed the total cost of '
the harvest failure and its effect on the
tonorn y at 20 bIllhTh rubles ( $24 ) . This .
the equivalent of 1 ruble Out of every 10 that
vAll be :i?pent in the Soviet Union this year: ?
tow the weather threatens to repeat last,
jrear's toll of the Winter grain. High-rankingi
Politburo member Dmitri S. Polyansky has.
been placed in charge of the Ministry . of ,
!, Agriculture to !cepa with the situation. ; ? !I
!, jWhat dein; can he take? "
;Geography, weather, a.nd climate account .
'kir most of the trouble. Russia's population ?
? used to be concentrated in a relatively fertile',
? wedge, narrowing from the Ukraine .? and
? Central European Russia toward the "far tip
Otthe wedge at Vladivostok., ? j ? " ?
' ,This area produced grain surpluses when
Russia had a smaller population to feed. But
even this fertile region seemed subject to
drought at least once every decade,
" As the population increased, as it turned
astray! from farming to Industry,, and as it
spread into inhospitable northern areas (the
latest being the new Siberian oil and gas
fields), it made greater food demands upon:
.the limited amount of fertile land in the south.
Of all the many newly developed regions,
'only One the plains of Kazakhatan in
Central Asia ? provided a substantial add!-
Mon to the country's farniland.
t ,Beyond the natural limitations of geogra-
phy, climate, and weather, however, Soviet
agrictilture suffers manmade deficiencies. If
'the kremlin considers the problem suf-
ficiently urgent, Mr. Polyansky may be able
;to give agriculture a higher priority and shift
resources to correct the ;manmade defk,
?
,ciencies. ? ? ? ? ? .1
? ?The first item on the agenda la to improve
agriculture's mechanical equipment. Despite
great advances in supplying .Soviet farmers
witkmachinery, United Statet farm.era haVe
almost 2% times the number of tractors and
trucks used in Soviet agriculture, end. 86
'percent more grain combine. ?
? The average Soviet tractor luta to serve
More than four times as Much acreage an the
_ &uric an. a ? more oyLr... _out _of_ !levy [Le
APProNtWeVitki,70-ga. itelWitOKUa frOA
? .
ft,77 0ncr-r-74-41.1
? 4.-?47-^-"7-)----
Rostov tells how lack of it few pounds of spare
parts stalled 160 heavy tractors twit autumn.
Farm-reps:tr.:then workera complain of lack
Of lifts and other tools.
Orders have already gone ont to step up the
supply of spare parts for farrn machinery,
? The head of the Russian Jitopublie farm-
machinery supply association was dismissed
for "violation of state discipline' - a cfrave
thrirea m-rn hofnre Mr. P 1.ntr to,*
over the farm ministry. And it is obvious that
Mr. Polyanr?ky is put g on the heat to
correct troubles that have plagued farm-
machine operators for years.
Mineral fertilizer problems also demand
attention. Output has grown rapidly qua-
drupling in a decade, though still only about
75 percent of the amount spread on American
fields. The trouble is not ao much quantity as ,
quality, however, The farm receive too little
phosphate in ratio to nitrates,? sometimes
only half the desired proportion,
, But the most urgent need, as Western
observers here see it, is for incentives.
Soviet ideologists talk of bringing the
countryside up to the urban level ? another,
way of saying that the farmer is low man on
the totem pole.
Much has been done to raise his living
? standard. Television sets, radios, washing
machines, nurseries, a guaranteed minimum
wage, and old-age pension plans have greatly
Improved the peasants' lot.
? Nevertheless, the collective farmer still
earns only about 76 rubles a month (about
$1,000 a year), compared with the average
nationwide wage of over 130 rubles monthly
($1,000 a. year).
State and collective farmers augment their
earnings with income from their small
private garden plots and limited private
livestock raising. Westerners cite the higher
efficiency of this restricted private farming
? another tribute to incentives, for the;
farmer can charge whatever he can get for
his privately raised produce.
If this private farming were allowed to
grow substantailly, however, 4 would bring
about a sharp rise in prices of farm products,
which the cities could not afford. Even if it
were so inclined, the kremlin could not take
this line without imperiling the economy.
The problem, therefore, is to raise state
rewards for the, farmer in hope that this
would pay off in higher productivity. In the
past, when the government has raised collec-
tive-farm payments ? as it did in 1965 when it
nr044744,(01Y0 Wean GO Itbir
a spu ou put. ? ?
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The difficulty Is that the country has little
to offer the farmer at a time when the
economy is slowing down after the crop
failure. Some kind of pump-priming incentive
may be called for. Whether it can be afforded '
at this time is doubtful.
One reform already under way and de-,
signed ' to free famers' Initiative , Is the so- ,
called "Zveno" system. The "Zveno" (liter-;
ally: link), smaller than the brigade which is!
the most common unit in farm work, is also
called an "unassigned mechanized team."
The team is given, a plot of land, ma-
chinery, and general goals, and left largely to
work on its own initiative. Whereas brigade
workers are paid by the job and the time put,
In, the "zveno" is paid according to. the
harvest results obtained, usually without a,
ceiling on earnings.
TIME MAGAZINE
19 February 1973
Agriculture Scapegoats
The U.S.S.R.'s perennial agricultur-
al crisis has once again taken its toll in
fall guys. This time the Kremlin abrupt-
ly removed Vladimir Matskevich. 63,
as Minister of Agriculture. A two-time
loser, Matskevich had been fired from
the same job in 1960 for "mismanage-
ment," then shunted off to be chairman
of Nikita Khrushchev's much criticized
"virgin lands" project before being re-
stored to the agriculture ministry five
years later. Earlier this month lzvestia
reported that Sergei Shevchenko, the
ministry official in charge of farm ma-
chinery, had also been discharged for
"violating state discipline"?Soviet jar-
gon for quarreling with the boss or gross
incompetence. Sovietologists predicted
other top agriculture officials would also
lose their jobs. ?
Although the Soviet Union's capri-
cious weather and its inefficient collec-
tive farm system are the basic causes
Mr. Polyansky has been considered an
advocate of the unassigned-teams, which up
to now has been introduced gradually, halt-
ingly, and experimentally,
Finally, with the need to develop feed crops
for the livestock which may be depleted in the
wake of the low harvest last year, the
Agriculture Ministry seems to be paying
more attention to high-protein feeds.
Corn, which former Premier Nikita S.
Khrushchev, introduced on ,a wide scale, is
gating. more prominence, although it ' is.
unlikely that Mr. Polyansky will repeat Mr.'
Khrushchev's miStake ' of ,spreading it into
regions climatically unsuited.'
The American farmer Roswell Gaiat has
nterested the ,Agriculture Ministry in devel-
oping sorghum ' plantings, and other feed
crops will be introduced on a wider scale also.
for crop failures, such scapegoats
as Matskevich and Shevchenko serve
handily to divert public discontent away
from top Kremlin leaders. And short-
ages in 1972 of basic foodstuffs pro-
vided ample grounds for discontent, as
citizens queued for bread in major So-
viet cities last fall (TIME, Oct. 30). A re-
cent Soviet statistical report showed
that grain production fell 30 million
tons below expectations in 1972, while
the potato crop was down 14.5 million
tons. That disaster forced the Soviets
to contract for $2 billion worth of ag-
ricultural products from the U.S., Can-
ada and other countries, temporarily re-
lieving shortages.
Prospects for the 1973 harvest look
almost as dismal. A virtually snowless
winter has deprived huge areas in cen-
tral and western Russia of the snow
cover that ordinarily protects grain
from killing frost. Massive planting
this spring is scarcely expected to make
nn for the damage to winter wheat,
Which might force the Krepilin to turn
to the West again for heavy imports of
grain.
Matskevich's successor turned out
to be First Deputy Premier Dmitri Po-
lyansky, 55, who has had overall policy
charge of agriculture for several years
in the Politburo, but now assumes dai-
ly operational control of the Soviet
Union's $100 billion investment in
farms. Some specialists view his ap-
pointment as a demotion. They spec-
ulate that it may be a canny move to
unseat him from the Politburo altogeth-
er, reflecting an obscure Kremlin power
struggle.
"If Polyansky accomplishes any-
thing," says a top U.S. State Depart-
ment expert, "it will have taken a mir-
acle." English Kremlinologist Robert
Conquest thinks that Polyansky, a for-
mer prot? of Khrushchev's, has been
maneuvered into a position of "succeed
or else." Says Conquest: "Since he can't
succeed, he will be the next fall guy."
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THE TIWS London
5 December 1972
7.17?
-1 "i
After tile Soviet UrliOil'S IYad
harve.;t this year one is forced
tfl coqclude that the, svorldi
cannot afford Russian commti-
nism much longer. What the
Russians do to themselves is
their own affair. with or with-
out the five principles of peace-
ful coexistence. but the COntill-
vine inefficiency of their -,ide??
oloeical agriculture could havc!
serious consequences for the
rest of mankind.
.gne ic the almost inevitable!
inerease.-in ,the price of. bread:
?in this enuntry due to their
recent large grain- purchases
oVerSeaS. To that extent the
-housewife hi Britain will have
to subsidize Russian ineffi-
ciency.
The long?term consequences
chuld be; calaroit-ous. In spite of
the so-called green revolution?
the ghost of Malthus could once
aeain be raised.
The reaS011S arc plain to sees
In the thirties, western Europe
and other deCiciency areas were
fed from three geographical
reglons, Latin America, North.
Amerit'a imd eastern Europe
includine, ,the Soviet Uninn.
`Latin America led with about. 9
rrnllion metric- tons of grain a ,
year, and North America and
eastern Europe each exported
about 5 million tons.
Today, for Malthusian re-
ons. !tin Latin America is barely
'self-sufficient. The .Soviet
Union. and much of eastern
Europe. must now import vast
quantities of grain from time to
time not so much because of
poor weather but because of
the adverse influence 'of Marx-
ist thought on agriculture.
-
This as the conelusiOn of
Alt' Orville Freenum wilco he
? 1:7,, st",
was the United States Secretare that
of Agriculture. Anv reader who
doubts this should look at the
much improved North Ameri-
can performance. Grain e.xports
have been increased 12 'times
and more in less than four
decades, and in spite of greater
home consumption.
As Mr Freeman wi-ote in
Foreign Affairs .Quat4erly five
years ago, there has, been no
contest in agriculttere. " The
United States, with scarcely 6
per cent of its people still on
the '.farm, is feeding 200 million
Americans. GO million Indians
and- the equivalent of at least
another 100 million people. in
other parts of the world.
pean and Iapanesc require-
Che Soviets, by
c'enl)ilsl, petits have also risen.
with close to half of their
labour force still tied to awl- .But as Mr Freeman warned
as long ago 25 1967, it has
culture, are importing grain to
become much more difficult for
provide bread for their people.
the United States to achieve
If we were as fat-ahead of the
:any abrupt increases ?in produc-
Russians in the space race as
we are in t,s;riculture, we wonld tion to meet additional demand.
At that time '11- Lester Drown,
bY now fie running a Shuttle
an econotnist in the US Depart-
service to the Moon." Mr Free-
. man ment of Agriculture. calculated
was hardly exaggerating.
The United States this year that the foreseeable North
American grain s
expects to harvest about 260 urPlus was all
that stood between an expand-
million tons of maize and wheat
compared to the,5m.iet harvest ,ing world and starvation.
/7, 4-1h 11 f:?."
'
the increasing StIr11111o`i
became politicaliy erribarrasmne
for- a time. 'Millions of tons of
excess grains were held in cex?
pensive storage, and sowing
was cut back, but in the sixties
the embarrassment -.became a
blessing when the Indian mon?
soon a.gain failed. Altogetheit
President Jehnson provided
nearly 13 million tons.
Since then 'World constimp-
tion has gradnally increased,
and not only because of larger
populations. The high-protein
diet- -cif North Americans re-
quires about one ton of grain a
person a year. Most of it as
cattle and poultry feed. Elmo-
J
has adjusted to crises. although
the cost in human terms has
not been 'calculated.
This .is the reason why
suggest tliat the World C11111101
11111ch longer afford Russian
yoMmunisin. or rather the ide-
ological straitjacket which con-
tinues to paralyse Russian agri-
culture.
But what can ,be dtme ? 'The
Soviet Union is a super fvwcr,
.and while it ca it divert "leuffi-
cient foreign 'exchange from
other urgent requirement s
presumably depend?upon NotatA
American grains to? maintain
the ideological pnr.ity of its
farmers.
- ?
Yet the Russ4an leaders must'?
be embarrassed by their,
dilemma. They have sought for--
eign help - in indumry. and
might now be prepared to
admit that Marx after all was a'
citY boy who knew nothing
about farmiae. They inieht jusr
be puaded to import Amcri-
can - agricultural know-how
rather than grain. y
have a suggestion shoule
hiS prove to be the case. The:.
riext time the Uilited States-.
- Australia -Ind Nev: Zealand ",c'-e,li"tcs a gram deaf.. ?it
of 167 million tois. ouictly make condi-
The world has been s'aved have become secondary 2 ?Soi.); snotlip
i
from periodic famine not so- pliers. The green revolbt as it did with ndite that a-
ion has dm',
much by the free market- c.on i helped. Nevertheless 'because grcatcr effort be made to irn..
-
enlY as the freedeln of Ameri- of lATalthus and Marx much of prove Soviet agriculture.
can science and native shrewd- the world still depends upon Every erain, shipnotenieu ocfottillide
ages. The Homestead Act of basket, a situation of potential -10,0 '01cOct.-":11,?4Pr'Ontitiocictitisbts'. cntomolo.
ncss which the system encour- the North American In-cad lie
gists. plaut geneticists and ?-
leges and the Department of ilal,:lople.rp.i--infs't4fitcocr'e' ik"vtist-i d States 1.)eoartment of
1862,. the Hatch Act of 1837, the
research of Land Grant Col- danger.
experts employed by .the
Agriculture, the Extension Ser failures coincided with Indian Agriculture. Given the oppor-
'
iy --
vice and price supports have famines" One. can arue that"' - ?
ty the should surely make
created an American cornuco- ,
u
the Nlaitnuisan ghost has een
t. posib1c for the wcst to live
pia. raised mti1y times. and that the .7
Myth has been siirpassed by world still mIrvives. ceclajoiy fields.itinw i.,ng to do in other
- ?
reality. and to Pleb an extent
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AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA, Calcutte
25 December 1972
?THE SOVTET UNION'S
perfeernance On the ag?
ricultural front this year, as
also on umpteen occasions in
the past, smacks of doctri-
naire policies yie1c1ir had
harvest,. The onus of ration-
alising the had performance
Is on the authorities at the
Kremlin, but it is certainly
net on Marx or his Das Kapi-
tal. It is surprising, however,
that some sophisticated poli-
tical observers have made
the - fa.cile conclusion that
Iffra
'cal Agriculture
after the Soviet Union's bad
harvest this year "one is
forced to conclude that the
world cannot afford Russian
communism much longer."
'Isn't it the same kind of
siinplistic observation, also
often made by others, that
after , what America has
done to Vietnam it would be
difficult for the world to
afford capitalism much lon-
ger?
?
In the name of Marxism
or Communism, the ? Soviet
scientists nnd manag,ers have
been perpetuating their in-.
.efliciency. And by continuing
inefficiency of their "ideoloe
gical agriculture" the men of
affairs at the Kremlin are
only allowing their embar-
rassment to pile up. The
embarrassment would, more-
over, be .matched by world
resentment owing to the in-
evitable outcome of all this,
that housewives in otherl
countries would have to sub-
sidise Russian inefficiency.
AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA, Calcutta
9 January 1973
[LETTERS TO T
Sir,?Your third editorial un-
der the caption '
Agriculture' (December: 25-26)
makes both amusing and inte-
resting reading, particularly the
flinching attempt tO redeem the
Marxtan doctrines on peasantry
and his disciples' interprctaton
and application of tine into
prnctice. Soviet Union's bad
harvest is not entirely attribu-
tal:,1 e to the vagaries of weather
and it is easy' to make a searle-
goa - the seitl-itists and ma-
nn gem, as indeed Stalin used to
make and. I presume, the Soviet
rulers still continue to make, ?
In spite of deStalinization ? for
it eminently suits the 'icleo-
m niac' rulers of the Soviet
State to lay the entire blame at
the door of "bureaucrats" in or-
der to save the pristine purity,
of their ideology and the infalli-
bility of the party. The king
can do no wrong and the party
cannot commit any mistake.
Soviet ideological agriculture has
been chronically sick ever since
the ill-conceived "collectiviza-
tion" was forced upon the pca-
(! frij
J4 i
IN
First Five-year Plan some forty-
five yea rs ago when Stalin, be-
ing inspired by the theoretieian's
and founder's dogmatic zeal, de-
cided to turn the peasants into
Sta te- controlled proletarians. TO
gauge the magnitude of the ogre-
rian tragedy, one must look
again at the monstrous costs of
collectivization. "Of all Soviet
innovations", observed Eugene
Lyons in his famous book 'Wor-
kers' Paradise Lost', "this is the
one for which the people paid
most and received least" (page :
202). Stalin himself told Chur-
chill that collectivization took
more lives than the war.
Farming is a creative process.
calling for deep interest and lov-
ing care. But the peasants have
never resigned themselvces to
their communized fate. They
work for the state as little and
as indifferently as they can. In
1965, Soviet Russia farmed 75
per cent more crop land than
the USA, using four times as
many farm wrokers, and produ-
ced less than half as much'
grain, for a population nearly
'20 per cent larger. More than
SSilt
sn ry. 40 per cent of the labour force
,in fact, the disaster started
of the USSR is on land, corn-
' with tbe implementation tbe
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The price of bread in England'
and salife ether countrieS is
already higher than in the
recent past and the import
of fooclerains from the West
by the USSR is bound to be
on the increase for anSr
length of time in the Prture.
Soviet imports of foodgrainS,
by having this unpalatable
impact on, say, British bread
price, would exasperate 4
whole range of countries the
goodwill and confidence of
whom the USSR can ill afford
to ignore.
pared with about 7 per cent In
the USA. But the Soviet prob-
lems are those of deficits, the
American those of surpluses.
Grain production in the USSR
per inhabitant is at about the
1910-1914 average. John Strohm,
an American specialist who
studied the problem on the spot
in ,the USSR, wrote in 1964:
"A good Illion's farmer can
work ten times the acreage, feed
twenty times as many hogs, take
care of thirty times as many
chickens as Russian collective
farmers. One U.S. farmer fecda
himself and twenty-seven otherS
with a high protein diet; one
Soviet farmer feeds himself and
four others with a 75 per cent
starchy diet."
A few years ago the Soviet
economic journal 'Voprosy Eko-
nomiki' calculated an annual
loss of 250 million man-hours
throngh absenteeism by Some
700,000 collective farmers. This
does not decidedly imply that
Russians are hopelessly inferior
farmers. Before the revolution,
scratching the soil with primi-
tive plonghs, they fed the coun-
try and generated huge exports.
Even now in the "private sec-
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tor" ? the concession made by
Stalin, unwittingly to provide a
sort of laboratory test of the
validity of private against pub
lie farm ? the farmers have
ouiproduced the collective fields.
on a spectacular scale. The pea-
sants who perform wretchedly
on the public land perform ama-
zingly well on their own plots,
and they derive more income
from it in the open market. Ac-
cording to the Govermnent's
own figares Woprosy Ekonemikl,,1:
1960), private plots with a mere
3 per cent of the nation's sown r:
acreage accounted for 30 per :
cent of the cross harvCst, other
than grain; 40 per cent . of all
caltle-breedinr, CO pc cent of
'the country.:4 potato crops, 40
per cent of all . vegetables and
milk and WI per cent or all meat
'products. And flu, peasant family
draws ils food ? 90% of pota-
toes, 801i of vegetables, almost
all of its milk, eggs and meat,
not from. Atte socialized farms
but from its own plot.
? The debacle of conimunistic
experiment in agriculture is bY
now too well-known to bear
repetition of further analysis.
Raman nature and economic
laws hardly conform to the ideo-
1,0eal Frai t,d a ck FA. The ineffi-
ciency to which you attribute
soviet had harvest is built into
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
11 December 1972
the structure of ideological agri-
culture, or for the Matter of that
ideological economy Itself. It
foreign policy can afford to ig-
nore ideology, it is imperative
for an economy to eschew It.
Finally, the only feasible solu-
tion for the agricultural disas-
ter, as the leaders know fully
wonld be to return to
some form or private farming.
This they will not, because they
dare not, underiake. Totalitarian
industry and political life, they
have ample -!,reazinif : trailAtelleVe,.
could not survive aide by side
with a free agriculture!
.NOW AR11SiNe ,THREAT
F WEDESPR.EAD gm-KJ/NCI:7
Drought, flood, war halted a
promising growth in food pro-
duction. Also, people are in-
creasing faster than crops. Up-
shot: want instead of plenty.
World food production, which ap-
peared healthy and growing only a few
months ago, has suddenly shrunk close
to the Point of global crisis.
No mass starvation is reported?but
there is widespread hunger, with belts
being tightened in many countries. Au-
thorities warn that another poor crop
year in 1973 could be disastrous.
Behind this development are atrocious
weather, political disruption and evi-
dence of governmental bungling. In
many areas the setback has canceled
gains of the "green revolution" that Used
new seeds and modern equipment to
bring a sharp increase in agricultural
output.
Result: Food production in many poor
countries did not improve enough this
year even to keep pace with the rise in
population, let alone raise the quality of
.substandard diets.
After a decade in which the world's
supply of grain rose twice as fast as the
population grew, per capita grain pro-
duction in 1972 dropped about 6 per
teitent 1'11;1. kete8V4CFROZglv4hAig
The unexpected decline in crop yields
is stepping up demands on agricultural
stockpiles held by the United States,
which has managed to escape serious
losses in the rapid reVersal of farming
fortunes.
"Worst in 100 years." Russia was
hit first when a vicious cycle of insuffi-
cient snow cover, a late spring, drought
and autumn rains slashed grain produc-
tion to some 30 million metric tons short
of target. Soviet officials call it "the
worst harvest In 100 years."
Rather than reduce food consumption
as it has in the past, Russia chose to buy
an estimated 27 million tons of grain
from the West?most of it from the U. S.
Experts suspect China also may be
having farm troubles this year.
American agricultural officials say a
reported drought in _corn and wheat
fields of North China and a similar lack
of rain in rice areas of South China
are bound to reduce output.
Visitors to China report the people
look better fed than ever, but appear-
ances can be deceiving. A U. S. farm
expert observed:
"Any crop shortfall is a serious matter
in China, because their population in-
creases something like 12 to 15 million
people a year. They have to keep pro-
ducing more food just to stay even."
For about 12 years, China has relied
largely on Canada and Australia for grain years, and food production had risen ev-
11919/69#02 IretAr-RDP719-014949%000200TPG001-7
im orts have avera ed more than 4 mil- Riots and h di P h
breakdown of some key irrigation fa-
' But this year, China also has pur-
chased 400,000 tons of wheat and 300,-
000 tons of corn from the U. S.?the first
such trade between the two countries in
23 years. Market rumors abound that
Peking is .seeking more American grain
if the price is right.
India: poor crops. India is another
country believed to be headed soon for
the world grain market to replace food-
stuffs lost in a poor crop year.
When 1972 began, Indian officials
proudly announced that they had built
up reserves of more than 9 million tons
of food grains. Henceforth, they asserted,
India no longer would need the cut-rate
"food for peace" shipments from the
U. S. on which the country had relied for
many years.
India, like several other underdevel-
oped nations, was delighted at increased
production from new "miracle seeds"
that multiplied rice and wheat yields.
Nature, however, crossed up both the
Government and farmers. The summer
monsoons came to India some weeks
late, and rainfall was lighter than nor-.
mal. Grain yields could fall as much
as 20 million tons short of needs,
and reserve stocks already have been
halved.
Experts point out that India was due
for a bad crop year, since the country's
traditional "famine cycle" runs five
oar ng. ower s ort ages,
lion tons a year.
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duties and burenticra tic errors have
further worsened India's food situation.
Riots over food prices and hoarding al-
ready have broken out in at least two
States.
International grain traders say that
India will have no choice but to come
to the U. S. for wheat to feed a popula-
tion growing at nearly 3 per cent a year.
Reports persist that India will need at
least 2 million tons of grain.
Some top Indian officials, however,
vow that they would rather starve than
-"beg" from the U. S. Relations between
the two countries have been strained
ever since the Indian-Pakistani War over,
Bangladesh.
A shortage of food is ,rated the most
critical of many problems plaguingBang-
ladesh, which has received some 925 mil-
lion dollars in foreign aid this year, about
one third of it from the U. S.
Authorities fear that as many as 200,-
000 people may starve this winter in
Afghanistan due to drought and Gov-
eni ment neglect.
Cases of starvation have been reported
in Indonesia, where the rice crop is ex-
pected to fall about 425,000 tons" short
of demand of 12 million tons.
Cambodia, which once exported rice,
is forced to import half a million tons
of it in 1972 because of bad weather
and disruptions by military operations.
fri Burma, the rice crop dropped by
an estimated 30 per cent this year. In
addition to poor weather, observers
blame inept distribution and low farm
prices set by the Government.
U. S. food shipments to South Vietnam
have doubled this year, but local de-
liveries still are erratic because of poor
transportation equipment and Commu-
nist success in cutting supply lines.
Laos has an annual rice deficit up-
ward of 100,000 tons, even though 60
per cent of the population grows its own
food. The U. S. has pumped in about 25
million dollars in foodstuffs in the last
five years.
Floods in Philippines. While farm-
ers in some countries had to contend
with war or drought, the Philippine Is-
lands were struck this year by the worst
floods in their recorded weather history.
Damage is estimated at 450 million dol-
lars, including the loss of 75,000 tons of
stored rice.
On top of the flooding, Filipino farm-
ers began experiencing trouble with new
types of rice which had promised to
make the country self-sufficient in that
crop.
In 1971, the Philippines had to ha-
port rice for the first time in three years
?some 450,000 tons. Imports are ex-
pected to be almost doubled this year.
ase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7
? Nations of the Western Hemisphere carry-overs. American farmers have
have not been exempt from crop prob- about 170 million acres in food and
lems in 1972, either. feed grains and. still have another , 60;
Drought and other weather setbacks million-acres they -could .use for p'rodu&
are expected to cut Brazil's wheat crop lion if needed.
to half this year, forcing a sharp in- . The U. S. Department of. Agriculture
crease in imports. The same factor is caus was expected to announce its 1973 feed-
ieg Uruguay to raise its grain imports 'grain program in early December. In-
by some 25 per cent. formed soiiri:es..said- the prdgram Would
In Chile, just about every type of food be designed to permit farmers to expand
is scarce, Production on farms and planting of crops in biggest demand?
ranches has plummeted while extremists ;with the twin aims of raising farm in-
seize land, destroy crops and kill live- come and trimming part of the 4-bil,
stock. Some of the produce that does lien-dollar cost of the Government farm
come off farms rots in warehouses, be- program.
cause the transportation and distril3u- 'Increasing calls' for grain are expected
tion networks break down, to cut world wheat stocks from this
Observers believe that Chile has summer's 50 million tons to less than 34
enough food to maintain its people on million tons by next July. That would,
spartan diets until next spring. Reports be the slimmest reserve in seven years.
from Santiago say that unless the Marx- As shown by the chart on this page,
ist-dominated. Government straightens rising demand for wheat has brought
things out by then, widespread hunger sharp increases in prices. Total U. S. agri-
will become a serious possibility, cultural exports are expected to reach
While countries short of food resort nearly 10 billion dollars this marketing
to imports for survival, some nations year, far above the old record of 8 bil-
that traditionally produce surplus crops lion dollars in the preceding year.
are having problems of their own. This country's net farm' income for
Australia, one of the world's major 1972 is projected close to 19 billion
wheat shippers, has been undergoing a dollars?another record.
drought that has cut production by Gloomy U. N. report. But while
nearly one third. Reserves are the lowest American farmers prosper, a report from
in several years, and grain traders specu- a United Nations agency shows that
late that Australia may have trouble many people elsewhere are short of food.
filling all its export orders. The U. N.'s Food and Agricultural
Organization says that, for the second
Same as 1971. Canada, another big
grower, expects 1972 wheat production consecutive- year, the world's underde-
to be the same as 1971 despite a 10 per veloped countries arc falling behind in
cent rise in planted acreage. Canadian the race to match food output with grow-
wheat stocks are declining for the fourth i'T". PePulatiens. ,
straight year as part of an intentional These less-developed nations, surveys
cutback, but added acreage should raise show, increased their food production
production again in 1973. ?this year by only about 1 per cent while
Canadian authorities also are -buying .4 per cent growth is needed to feed the
huge new railroad cars and upgrading population and upgrade diets a little.
tracks to carry heavier grain loads for "This is extremely serious," declared
export. Officials arc reported consider- Addeke H. Boerma, director general of
ing adding storage facilities in Vancoo_ the Food and Agricultural Organization.
ver, the nation's main port, to 'handle "One can regard the failure of a single
shipments to Russia and the Orient. year as exceptional. But two failures in
Although not hurt to the extent of successive years . . . cannot be shrugged
,many countries, U. S. farmers also are ofF as a temporary misfortune."
having weather trouble. Prolonged au- U. N. experts esi innate that roughly
tumn rain and snow have delayed har- Ille-Janie number of pmple remain un-
vest of corn, soybeans and grain sorghums dernourishcd today as there were 10
in several States, causing losses estimated years ago?between 300 million and 500
as high as a million dollars a clay. million. Up to one third of the people in
Strong U. S. position. Despite these the less-developed countries suffer from
problems, however, the U. S. finds itself malnutritiori, authorities. repqrt,. ., , ,
in a strong position to meet growing ex- . Principal victims: children wider -the
port demand for food. . . . age of 5, whose physical and mental
This country's grain production for the growth can be retarded by lack of essen-
marketing year ending next June 30 is tial protein and calories.
expected to drop by 16 million tons from The U. N. investigation disclosed that,
last year's record of 235 million tons, on. global' basis, aVerage 'daily consump-
largely because of reduced acreage. Total tion of calories and proteins changed
.supplies, however, are up because of big little between 1965 and 1970.
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An average American, the study
showed, still receives 86 per cent more
protein and 90 per cent more calories
per day than people in some countries
pf
Need for upgrading. International
agricultural experts say farming prac-
ttices , in , underdevploped . countries must
be upgraded quickly. They especially
urge land reform to provide production
-incentives, plus a big infusion of modem
technology and equipment.
In parts of Asia, it still takes about
70 people to match the output of a
single American farmer.
Agricultural-exporting nations ,such as
the U. S., Canada, Australia and Argen-
tina cannot meet world food needs for-
ever,. U. N. authorities warn; '
Officials assert that if 1973 brings
crop reversals on the scale of 1972, the
result could be mass famine. (END].
4
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200070001-7
THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST POWER, (Book)
by Brian Crozier, London 1970
IVOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
F ED ER ATIO N (IVIDF)
The WIDF has never been as effective as some other front
organizations, for it has been under communist control from the
start, and no non-communist body of any standing has ever
joined it. It was founded in Paris in December 1943 at a com-
munist-convened Congress of Women. The WIDF was expelled
by the French government in Janua?ty,4,95I and movcd.N,,tha,.,,
Soviet sector in Berlin.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
JOURNALISTS (IOJ)
Founded in June 1946 at a Congress in Copenhagen, the IOJ
initially represented nearly all unionized journalists of the
world. As usual, the Communists captured the key posts, and by
195o all non-communist unions had withdrawn. In I952, the non-
communists re-created the International Federation of Journalists
(IFJ) which had merged with the IOJ in 1946. The original
headquarters were in London; now they are in Prague.
WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
(117FSi 'V)
The headquarters arc in London, although the Secretary-
General works from an office in Paris. The WFSW was founded
in 1946 at a conference in London, organized by the British
Association of Scientific Workers. Most of the official posts are
held by Communists.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC
LA 117YERs (IADL)
Many non-col ?rot nist lawyers were among those who attended
I mccting of the Association in October 1946 in
Paris. 'fhe association was expelled from France in 1950 and set up
headquarters in Brussels.
INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION
ORGANIZATION (OIRT)
The last of the 1946 crop, ? the OIRT was founded at a con-
ference in Brussels. It has since transferred its headquarters to
Prague. In 1950 the British Broadcasting Corporation set up a
rival body, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which all
leading- non-communist organizations have since joined, having
deserted the OIRT. In effect, the Organization is now a semi-
governmental one, since most of its affiliates - are radio and
television centres in the communist countries.
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE
MOVEMENTS (FIR)
The FIR incorporates an earlier organization founded in Paris
in 1947, the International Federation of Former Political Prisoners
of Vascism . The earlier body was founded in Vienna in -
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Vienna?the founding place?in 1932.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1973
NOTEWORTHY EVENTS
March 10 Czechoslovakia The 25th anniversary of the
death of Foreign Minister
Jan Mhsaryk. Mhsaryk was
found dead below his office
window and the communists
claimed he had committed
suicide. During the 1968
"Prague Spring" the un-
censored Czech press pre-
sented a considerable amount
of eiridence that he had been
murdered at the Soviets'
behest.
March 15-21 Panama UN Security Council Meeting.
Panama is host to a meeting
which is billed as an
effort "to strengthen peace
and security in Latin
America in accordance with
the UN Charter." Panama
has been actively seeking
international support for
its position in Canal treaty
negotiations with the
United States, and is
therefore expected to raise
the issue during the
meeting.
April 3 USSR "Doctors' Plot" explodes,
1953. Pravda announced the
release of nine doctors
(six Jewi?h) who had been
arrested and charged in
January 1953 with the deaths
of Andrei Zhadanov and other
Soviet luminaries. Stalin's
death on March 5th saved
them from execution and
saved Soviet Jews from
another pogrom.
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April 4, USSR Soviet officials in
1972 Stockholm refused to issue
a visa to a Swedish Academy
representative for travel
to Moscow to present the
1970 Nobel Prize for
Literature to Alexander
Solzhenitsyn. On 9 April
the author issued a state-
ment to a group of Swedish
correspondents that the
refusal put "an irreversible
and final ban against any
kind of presentation of the
Nobel Prize on the territory
of my homeland." Solzhenitsyn,
unable to collect his prize
money or royalties, or to
publish in the USSR, is now
surviving through the charity
of his friends. Recently
a number of Western authors
offered to give him their
uncollected Russian royalties,
but Soviet authorities have
turned down such offers saying
Solzhenitsyn is a "rich man."
April 9-14 Norway World Conference for Support
of Victims of Apartheid and
Colonialism. About 200
participants are expected
at this UN-OAU sponsored
Conference.
April 13 USSR-Japan
2
In 1941 the Soviet Union and
Japan concluded neutrality
treaty which was in force
until USSR declared war on
August 8, 1945, six days
before Japan surrendered.
USSR asserted its sovereignty
over the Kuriles and
Sakhalin Islands. The Soviet
Union has not signed a peace
treaty with Japan and still
holds the Northern Territories.
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