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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DOGUMENTS RELATING TO THE SOVIET4EDINVASION
CZEMOSLOVAKIA'AUGUST 1968
1. From.Problems of CoMmunism May-June 1971, VOL XX. United States
Information Service.
WHO INVITED WHOM?
The question poses itself, Who invited these armies in?
. . The question was never discussed to the end; it has
not been resolved. No names have been published. When
the matter was discussed in Bratislava, Prague and
Moscow with our leaders, all members of the leadership
of the federal arid the Slovak parties, without .exceptIon,
gave their word of honor that they were not Involved in
any such demarche and had no knowledge of It. I know
of no leading personality in Czech or SloVak political Iie
of whom it could be sag with certainty he had taken
this step. . . . (Emphasis added.)
?Gustav Husak's statement, reported In Pravda
(Bratislava), Aug. 29, 19139.
[The Soviet occupation) is an act of use of force which
cannot be justified by any means. It did not take place
upon request or demand of the Czechoslovak government,
nor of any other constitutional organs of this republic.
?Speech of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister firi
Hajek at the UN Security Council, New York, Aug.
24, 1969, New York Times, Aug. 23, 11160.
IThe occupation] happened without the knowledge of
the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the
National Assembly, the Premier, or the First Secretary of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.,
?Radio Prague, Aug. 21, 1969, attributed to the
Presidium of the CPCS Central .Committee.
The PresiCdm of the Central Committee of the .Com-
munist Party of Slovakia knew nothing of any invitation
to the armies of the Warsaw Pact. We are dissociating
ourselves from everything that has been done and Is
being done except by the legally, democratically elected
leadership of the party and state.
?Radio Czechoelovalds In Slovakia, Aug. 22, 1909.
Heeding the appeal of the party and state leaders and
the Communist and working people of Czechoslovakia,
and taking into consideratioq the danger created for the
gains of socialism in that country, at that time we,
together with the fraternal socialist countries, adopted the
decision to give Czechoslovakia international aid in de-
fense of socialism. . . . (Emphasis added.)
?Leonid t. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress,
Moscow Radio, March 30, 1071.
Thousands of Communists, individual citizens, and
entire collectives of the working people, representatives
of all strata of the people and of diverse organizations,
Including members of the CPCS Central Committee and
the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party,
as well as members of the Czechoslovak government and
deputies to the National Assembly and the Slovak National
Council . . . began to turn to the leaderships of the
fraternal parties and also to the governments of our
allies, begging them in this historically grave moment to
grant International assistance to the Czechoslovak people
In the defense of socialism. . . . (Emphasis added.)
?CC CPCS, "Lessons Drawn from the Critical
Developments in the Party and Society after the
13th 'CPCS Congress," Pravda (Bratislava), Jam 14,
1971.
On behalf of our delegation, we want to express from
the rostrum of this Congress [the 24th CPSU Congress]
our sincere .thanks to the CPSU, to the Soviet government
and the Soviet people for having understood the anxieties
Of the Czechoslovak Communists regarding socialism
and their appeals for help. . . .
--Curley Husak's address to the 24th CPSU Con-
gress, Radio Moscow, April 1, 1971.
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2. DECLARATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
GOVERNMENT
The text, as issued in English by the
Czechoslovak Embassy in London, of the
declaration made on August 21, 1968, by
the Czechoslovak government.
To All People of Czechoslovakia:
Today, Czechoslovakia has been occu-
pied by the military forces of the five
states?members of the Warsaw Treaty?
against the will of its government, the
National Assembly, the leadership of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and
the people.
Thus for the first time in the history
of the international communist move-
ment occurred an action of aggression
against a state administered by a Com-
munist Party, an action carried out by
allied military armies of the socialist
countries.
The crisis has continued tnce the early
morning hours. The constitutional organs
of the republic are deeply disrupted, the
individual members of the government,
the National Assembly, the leadership of
the CommunL1 Party, the National Front
and other organizations have no possi-
bility of mutual contact nor that with
the population of the country, which has
spontaneously given them their trust dur-
ing the recent months.
The council of the members of the
government and the leadership of the
party, leading deputies of the National
Assembly and other representatives are
detained. The semilegal Czechoslovak
radio station, maintained only with the
;greatest efforts of Its employes, remains
as the last link of communication. It
Is being gradually silenced. Even under
the above circumstances the government
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
st:2
3.
DECLARATION OP THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
The text, as issued in English by the
Czechoslovak Embassy in London, of the
declaration made on August 21, 1968,
by the Czechoslovak National Assembly.
The deputies of the National Assembly
have met and unanimously agreed on the
following declaration at a time when the
government and other organs cannot
carry out their functions:
1. We fully agree with the declaration
of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of Czechoslovakia and the
Presidium:
and the constitutional organs ' together
with the leadership of the party want to
carry out their constitutional duties and
safeguard the normal life in the country.
We call on you, Czechs and Slovaks,
citizens belonging to the national minor-
ities, all citizens of the Czechoslovak Re-
public, with the following appeal:
1. We demand an immediate with-
drawal of the armies of the five states?.
members of the Warsaw Treaty?as well
as correct adherence to the treaty and
full respect for the state of sovereignty
, of Czechoslovakia.
2. We urgently demand that the gov-
ernments of the Soviet Union, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, the Polish
People's Republic, the Hungarian Peo-
ple's Republic and the Bulgarian People's
Republic issue an order to stop the armed
actions during which lives are lost and
material values destroyed in our country.
3. We demand that normal conditions
for the activity of Czechoslovak constitu-
tional and political organs be immedia-
ately created and the detained individual
members of those organs released in or-
der that they can renew their activities.
4. We demand an immediate com-
mencement of the session of the whole r
National Assembly before which the
complete Czechoslovak government can -
stand with its position toward the settle- ,
merit of the existing situation.
'
To all citizens of the country!
We appeal to you to assist in the above
demands of the government, primarily
by:
1. Showing?Just as you have already
done many times in the past?the neces-
sary statesmanlike reason, and unify-
ing your strength around the legally elect-
ed Czechoslovak government which ex-
testing against the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia by the armies of the live coun-
tries?members of the Warsaw Treaty?
and considering it the violation of inter-
national law, the provisions of the War-
saw Treaty and the principles of equal
relations among nations.
2. We demand the release from deten-
tion of the constitutional representatives,
namely President of the Republic Ludvik
Svoboda, Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik,
President of the National Assembly Josef
ists and to which you have given your
full l'rust this past April.
2i Not permitting that by any other
way another government be installed at
the head of our republic than the gov-
ernment which has been elected under
free democratic conditions and in ob-
servance of all principles of our Consti-
tution.
3.1 Urging the workers of factories and
other workshops and offices to display
theixi support of the position of the
Czechoslovak government to the head-
quagers of the occupational forces and
the vernments of the five countries of
the Warsaw Treaty.
4. Creating conditions for the preser-
vation of order.
Exclude all ad hoc actions directed
against the members of the occupational
armies. Ensure by your own means the
necessary supply of the population with
foodstuffs, water, gas and electricity in
all regions, and arrange for the safety of
enterprises and important equipment as
well as for the prevention of other eco-
nomic losses.
Dear Citizens,
We pass through difficult morrients.
The happy life of this country can be
guaranteed only by the people who in-
habit and work in it.
We believe that at this moment you
will give your government full support
and strength in the service of our social-
ist republic.
Citizens, it is still In our power to com-
plete with your issistance the great task
of renaissance which we embarked
upon in January. The government be-
lieves that with your help we will do
so without any unnecessary sacrifices
and bloodshed.
Party of Czechoslovakia Alexander Dub-
cek, Chairman of the Central Committee
of the National Front Dr. Frantisek Krie-
gel, Chairman of the Czech National
Council Ccstmir Cisar, and others in
order that they can carry out their con-
stitutional functions cntrusted to them by
the sovereign people of the country.
The delegation which we have sent to
the Soviet Embassy this morning has not
yet returned. We protest against the fact
that the National Assembly, the govern-
Smrkovsky and First Secretary of the ment and all bodies of the National
kreitbreaseceM66?714?: '6 Ae- iffffiattb 414eAC0T6M18 '1"1 fiNing out
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their legal rights and the freedom of
movement and assembly.
3. We categorically demand immedi-
Me withdrawal of the armies of the five
states?members of the Warsaw Treaty?
and full respect of the state sovereignty
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,
We call on the parliaments of all coun-
tries and the world public opinion to sup-
port our legal demands.
4. We empower a delegation of the
National Assembly composed of Marie
Mikova, Josef Macck, Josef Vallo, Pavol
Peas, Josef Pospichal and Vaclay Kucera
to enter into contact with the President
of the National Assembly Josef Smrkov-
sky, the President of the Republic Ludvik
Svoboda, nd the Prime Minister 0. Cer-
nik, in order to inform them about the
above decision and agree with them on
further procedure. The delegation will
immediately inform the Czechoslovak
people about the result of their negotia-
tions.
5. We We call on all the people not to
take any violent action against the occupa-
tional armies and not let themselves be
provoked by various forces which want
to gather proof for the justification of the
intervention and use the situation for
self-appointed actions.
Working people, citizens, remain M
your workshops and offices and safeguard
your factories and enterprises. Use au
democratic methods for further develop-
ment of socialism in Czechoslovakia! If
necessary you will surely be alk to resist
by general strik.c. We believe that we
will come out of these difficult moments
with raised head and firm backbones.
At the above meeting, the Deputy Pres-
ident of the National Assembly Josef
Vallo has likewise informed the deputies
about his discussion with the President
of the Republic in which Mr. Ludvik
Svoboda expressed his approval of the
calling of the plenary session of the
Assembly.
6. In view of the fact that the govern-
ment is primarily aware of the political
consequences of the occupation and at
the same time of its responsibility for the
proper management of the national econ-
omy, it turns to all workers, peasants and
intelligentsia to constantly iniant
contained in the declaration of ,-?
sidiurn of the Central Cornm,h of
the Communist Party of C7echry.i.,..1,.ia
adopted at today's session and sirnithane-
ously :turn their attention to the ..afe-
guardMg of the industrial produLtion,
agrictiture, transport and supplies in or-
der tO prevent a disruption of the na-
tionalieconomy.
7. The government particularly calls
on the young people?the hope of our
nations?that especially they by a digni-
fied and self-conscious calmness face the
situation which has arisen and in no case
give any pretext for useless sacrifices.
8. yVe call on all people to face the
arguments about the necessity of military
action ?from abroad by securing of the
proper Management of production and
Maintenance of calmness and sound rea-
son. The government appreciates the
support of all international progressive
forces all over the world which has been
given to our socialist republic in today's
difficult situation. ?
4. Excerpts from the communique on Soviet-Czechoslovak talks 23-26 August
1968 between the Soviet leaders and the Dubcek leadership which had been
spirited to Moscow in the wake of the invasion:
"During the talks in a free, comradely discussion the two sides
considered questions relating to the present development of the inter-
national situation, the activization of imperialism's machinations
against the socialist countries, the situation in Czechoslovakia in the
recent period, and the temporary entry of troops of the five socialist
countries into Czechoslovak territory....
"Agreement was reached on measures aimed at the speediest normali-
zation of the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Czechoslovak, leaders informed the Soviet side on the planned immediate
measures they are carrying out with these aims in view....
"The troops of the allied countries that entered temporarily the
territory of Czechoslovakia will not interfere in the internal affairs
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
"Agreement was reached on the terms of the withdrawal of these
troops from its territory as the situation in Czechoslovakia
normalizes...."
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TASS STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE
OCCUPATION OP CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Text in Pravda and Izvestiia, August
21, 1968.
TASS Is authorized to state that party
and state leaders of the Czethoslovak
Socialist Republic have requested the
Soviet Union and other allied states to
give the fraternal Czechoslovak people
immediate assistance, including assistance
with armed forces. The reason for this
appeal is the threat posed to the socialist
system existing in Czechoslovakia and to
the constitutionally established state sys-
tem by counterrevolutionary forces that
have entered into collusion with external
forces hostile to socialism.
The events in and around Czechoslo-
vakia have more than once been the sub-
ject of exchanges of opinions by leaders
of the fraternal socialist countries, in-
cluding the leaders of eczechoslovakia.
These countries are united on the prem-
ise that the support, strengthening and
defense of the peoples' socialist gains are
the common international duty of all the
socialist states. This common position of
theirs was officially proclaimed in the
Bratislava statement.
Further exacerbation of the situation
in Czechoslovakia affects the Vlid inter.
ests of the Soviet Union and the Other
socialist countries and the security inter-
ests of the states in the socialist common-
wealth. The threat to the socialist system
In Czechoslovakia is at the same time a
threat to the foundations of peace in
Europe.
The Soviet government and the govern-
ments of the allied countries?the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Peo-
ple's Republic, the German Democratic
Republic and the Polish People's Repub-
lic?proceeding on principles of indissolu-
ble friendship and cooperation and in
conformity with existing treaty obliga-
tions, have decided to meet the above-
mentioned request for giving the fraternal
Czechoslovak people the necessary aid.
This decision is in complete 'accord
with the right of states to individual and
collective self-defense, as stipulated in the
allied treaties concluded between the fra-
ternal socialist countries. It also com-
plies with the vital interests of our coun-
tries in defending peace in Europe against
the forces of militarism, aggression and
nritancbIttm, which more than once baye
planned the peoples of Europa into war.
_
!. on Aug. 21 Soviet military units, aloug
%tith military units of the abovemep-
tipned allied countrics, entered the ter-
ritory of Czechoslovakia. They will he,
immediately withdrawn from the CS;
ffR. as soon as the threat to socialismS
achievements that has developed in Czech-
cislovakia, a thrcat to the security of
countries in the socialist commonwealth,
is eliminated and the legal authorities
Mid that the further presence of these
military units is no longer necessary.
The actions undertaken are not di-
rected against any state and to no extent
infringe upon any state interests. 'They
serve the purpose of peace and are dic-
tated by concern for strengthening it.
The fraternal countries firmly and reso-
lutely oppose their inviolable solidarity to
any threat from the outside. No one shall
ever be allowed to break off a single link
from the commonwealth of social states.
6. Excerpts from the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee document:
"Lessons Drawn from Critical Developments in the Party and Society after
the 13th CPCZ Congress" --approved by the CPCZ Central Committee Plenum
December 1970.
This general out:....he of the critical development in the party and society of the
CSSR confirms that the process of subversion initiated by the rightwing and anti-.
socialist forces seized the entire field of public and political life--the economY,
the ideology, and foreign policy. In AuguSt 1968 there emerged in Czechoslovakia
a clear-cut couwterr:Nolutionary situation, and our country reached the brink of
,civil war. The question of who would prevail emerged on the agenda in all sharpness.
Sither tl.,;.cic,:nterrevolution, drawing support from international reaction, mould
coviletc its pernicious work or the socialist forces would succeed in warding
off the counterrevolution and in defending the cause of socialism.
CL:Imunists and noncommunists who realized the deadly danger threatening our
sccialist system asked the leadership of the party and state to take a determined
stand against the counterrevolutionary forces and to come out in defense of the
achievements of socialism. These urgent appeals were contained in many resolutionS
and letters addressed to the CPCZ Central Committee. They remained without
reply, however. At the time when the counterrevolutionary forceS, striving to
seize power, in Prague and in other places switched to open attack, the rightwing
repreSentatiVes in the party leadership assured the public that "everything was in
order" and that "the process of renewal and democratization was successfully
developing."
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Thoecands eaf Communists, indiVidual citizens, and entire collectives of the working
people, representatives or all the strata of the people and of diverse organizations,
inoluding members of the OPCZ Central Committee and the Central COmmittee of the
Slovak Communist Party as well as members of the Czechoslovak Government and deputies
tc the National Assembly and the Slovak National Council who realized their class,
national, and international responsibility for the fate of social4em in Czechoslovakia
ardevecle nought a way out of the grave, critical situation. Because the rightwing
part of the -1-.:rty did not want to adopt any measures which would:frustrate the
counterrevolutionary overthrow and ward off a civil war, they began to turn to the
leaderships of the fraternal parties and also to the governmentsof our allies,
begging them in this historically grave moment to grant international assistance
to the Czechoslovek people in the defense of Socialism.
Thoy did so in profound conviction that their class brethren would not leave
Czccalowfikia a- the mercy of the counterrevolution which threateped bloodshd_and
0:ey eould prevent our country from bcing tern out of the socialist community.
Objective asSessment and clarification of the causes and the interrelations of the
profound crisis in which thG crcz and all our society found themselves in 1968
Irrefutably prove that the international forces, paralyzed by the policy of the rightwing
representatives in the party leadership, were incapable of mobilizing and of stopping
the frontal attack of the'counterrevolution. ? In this situation it had to be decided
whether one should wait until the, counterrevolution evoked a fratricidal strugele in
which thousands of people would die and grant international help only afterward, or
whether one Should come in time and prevent a bloody tragedy even at the price of an
initial lack of understanding at home and abroad. The entry of the allied troops into
Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 prevented such bloodshed, and was therefore the
necessary and the only right solution..
A thorough examination of the facts relating to conditions in our party and in the
whole country before August 1968 and in the later period confirms that any solution
whicf id not include immediate outside help from the Soviet Union and other of our
allies could have had no hope of success in conditions whereby the activity of the
party was paralyzed and the Czechoslovak state system was on the brink of disintegration
any other sclution would not have led to saving socialism in Czechoslovakia.
'The entry of the allied forces of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was
an act of internationalist solidanity which corresponded both to joint interests of the
Czechoslovak working people and the international working class, of the socialist
community and the class interests of the world communist, movement. By this internation-
alist action the lives of thousands of people were saved, the.ieeternal'and external
conditions for their peaceful and calm work were safeguarded,,the Western borders of
the socialist camp were strengthened, and the imperialist circles' hopes for a revision
.of the results of World War II were foiled.
OPC3 Central Committee rejects an abstract concept of the sovereignty of a socialist
as ie spread by bourgeois propaganda to deceive the masses, and it holds positions
vhich, in the question of sovereignty, are in line with the class and international
aebetance of a socialist state.. It therefore considers the entry of the allied troops
. into the CSSR as fraternal ineernational assistance to the Czechoslovak people.
The international action of August for saving socialism in the CSSR created a firm back-
ground for the Czechoslovak communists who, thanks to this assistance, were able to
fully develop their own political struggle againtt the counterrevolutionary, anti-
socialist, and rightwing opportunist forces and eeercome, through political means, the
counterrevolutionary threat to the cause of socialism in the CSSR.
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The true recognition of the entire background of the actual situation in 1969 and of
all the motives for the entry of the allied troops into the CSSR hhed the right light
on all the lies, calumnies, and willful distortion of th, facts abOut the August events
as they were made up and spread by our dom'estic reaction, the rightwing opportunists,
and foreign bourgeois propaganda.
The profound and correct understanding of the true purpose of thee events is at the
same time the decisive prerequisite for the creation of a sound pellitical atmosphere
in our country, for the strengthening of the ideological unity of the CPCZ and its
united action on a Marxist-Leninist and international base.
After the entry of the allied forces, Alexander Dubcek, Oldrich Clirnik, Josef Smrkovsky,
Frantisek Kriegel, Josef Spacek, Zdenek Mlynar, Stefan Sadovsky, Oestimir Cisar,
and Vaclav Slavik deepened their betrayal of the interescs of the party, the
Czechoslovak people, and the international communist movement and took a further
gamble: In the course of the night of 20-21 August 1968 they pushed through, in spite
of principled opposition and disagreement from the Marxist-Leninist portion in the
party leadership, a nonclass, anti-internationalist proclamation of the Presidium of
the CPCZ Central Committee, the publication of which had catastrophic consequences.
er
After this perfidious act, Alexander Dubcek dissolved the meeting of the Presidium.
of the CPCZ Central Committee. With his knowledge and behind the back of the party
Central Committee, there was convened by the Presidium and by part of the city party
committee in Prague--which was a well-known stronghold of the rightwing--the illegal
extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at which the rightist
opportunists wanted to assume full control of the party leadership and, above all, to
proclaim a general struggle against the Soviet Union and mobilize all domestic and
foreign anti-Soviet and anticommunist forces.
Following 21 August, the antisocialist forces turned the statement of the CPCZ Central
Committee Presidium--which in its substance was an unparalleled antiparty act--into
their shield. The rightwing blackmailed thousands of members and officials of the
party and compelled them to take their guidance from this statement. They pointed out
that the communists must implement the decisions of the Central Committee Presidium
of their party in a disciplined way. With the help of this statement, they fully opened
the sluices to anti-Soviet hysteria and set moving the avalanche of chauvinism which
made its outward appearance in Gham patriotic appeals and slogans. An incredible
disorientation arose because the counterrevolution deliberately, with the help of the
communications media, evoked a headless panic. It turned upside down all basic terms
and values. That which was legal was declared illegal, while all illegal acts of the
counterrevolution were given the semblance of legality.
On the basis of the proclamation of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, the
rightwing forced the adoption of similar statements on the government, the National
Assembly, and otherstate and social organizations. The rightwing opportunists and
counterrevolutionary forces extracted these nationalistic and anti-Soviet statements
through moral terror and even threats of physical violence.
The counterrevolutionary role of the communications media culminated after 21 August in
a tornado of chauvinistic demagogy to prevent Czechoslovak citizens from seeing the
correct dividing line of the class struggle. At the same time, this demagogy was to.
arouse in our country and in the state the impression that what was involved was a nation-
wide patriotic movement. Many honorable communists and honest citizens of our republic
succumbed to such an atmosphere. Through the fault of the overall misinformation
and the deeply mistaken declaration. of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee,
these people were unable to speedily discern the real truth
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Somc of them perpctrated acts which were contrary to their real cpnvictions. They
gradually convince tl?emselvea, and are convincing themselves, of the correctness
of the allies' international aid; they are sincerely sorry for their attitudes
and acts at those times, and by honest work are exprossing their Sllegiance to the
calm of sOcialism.
. Excerpt from "Theses on the 50th Anniversary of the Founqing of the
CPU; Half A Century of Struggle for the Interests of the Workers
Class and the Peoples of Czechoslovakia," Rude Pravo, 2S March 1971.
V
The Political Crisis and the Counterrevolutionary Attempt of the 'Antisocialist Forces
To Achieve Radical Change of Social-Political Conditions in th,:. aSSR (January 1968-
April 1969) '
20--The January plenum of. the CPCZ Central Committee was an .expression pf_the necessity
for solving the growing crisis in the party and the society. Its purpose was to
eliminate :rem tp activity of the party and its leadership all that hampered the
consistent implementation of Leninist principles, all that prevented the further
development of the socialitit society. In this spirit the results of the January
. plenum were welcomed by .the majority of the party and the people.
The new CPCZ leadership wee incapable of making use of the support of the majority of
communists who for years had been striving to improve the party's work. By its
Irresolute and unprincipleminded procedure it freed the scope for a revisionist,
opportunist trend in the party, for a purposeful and gradual attack against the founda-
tions of the principles of our social system, which finally resulted in the counter-
reveiutionary attempt of the antisocialist forces to effect a change of social-political
conditions in the CSSR. Some of the party leadership went over directly to the positions
of rightist-opportuniteand nationalism.
21--The counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia oriented itself toward the use of political,
Ideological, and economic methods for the destruction of the foundations of the socialist
system and the gradual takeover of power over a long period of time. Under the slogans
1t,0iva1," "new model of socialism," and "socialism with a-human face,", the destimc-
tiensof socialist values and a revision of the basic principles of socialism were
carried out and the party and the entire social system was systematically disintegrated;
our friendship and alliance with the USSR were destroyed.
The rightist revisionist forces in the CPCZ gained supremacy in the party leadership.
Owing to them the ideological, political, and action unity of the party was undermined
and its leading role in society crippled. The communications media, including the
party ones, gradually changed over--with certain exceptions--to the services of rightist
opportunism and reaction. The majority of the people, including a considerable number
of party members, lost their bearings in the situation. The action program approved
by the 1968 April plenum reflected opportunist concessions and contained revisionist
formulations, especially in basic questions of the party?s leading role in society.
Revisionist forces inside the CPCZ formed a second center in the party. Their endeavors
culminated in the staging of the nationalist and anti-Soviet so-called Vysocany Congress.
In their struggle for positions of power, the revisionists joined forces with the
ppenlyentisocialist forces, the defeated remainder of the bourgeoisie and the petty
bourgeois elements. The Domestic onslaught of the rightist forces was closely bound
to the anticommunist centers and 'received their all-round assistance.
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'The rightist and antisoCialist forces gradually disintegrated all. the spheres of the
public and political life--the party, state, the entire politicai4:system, economy,
ideology, and our fraternal relations with the socialist countries. The foundations
of the international security of our country were threatened. ATAugust 1968 the
counterrevolutionary development achieved such a state that our OUntry stood on the
verge of a civil war.
22?bevoted and honest communists?Marxist-Ieninists?waged a tremendously difficult
fight to save socialism in our country. The majority of honest ,,orces devoted to
socialism nevertheless remained split; there was no party leader hip that would
organize and direct them.
port of the party leadership did not want to dopt any measures
could thwa/t the counterrevolutionary putsch and ward off the civil war, the
.1.7mbers of the party, the Central Committee, the government, andlthe National Assembly
ap,-,ealed to the leaderships of the fraternal parties and the govElpments of our allies,
asking them at his historically grave moment to grant the Czechoslovak people
international help in the defense of socialism.
The CPSU and the other fraternal parties followed with concern the grave threat to
the positions of socialism in Czechoslovakia and warned the CPCZ leadership at
conferences andoneetings against the growing counterrevolutionary danger. After ,
exhausting all political possibilities, in a situation When the domestic revolutionary
forces were incapable of warding off the concentrated counterrevolutionary onslaught,?
the socialist states decided, on the basis of the request of many communists who had ."
the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia at heart, in favor of the only possible
solution in the given situation and sent their troops into our fatherland.
The entry of the allied troops was an act of international aid. It corresponded to
the common interests of. both the Czechoslovak working people and the international
workers class, the socialist community, and the world communist movement.
The timely entry of the armed forces of the fraternal countries into the CSSR pre-
vented a terrible tragedy; it also granted support to the domestic Plarxist-Leninist '-
forces and aided the necessary political differentiation in the party and the society.'
The revival of Narxist-Leninist principles in the domestic and foreign policy of the
CPCZ and the CSSR progressed in a stubborn struggle igiinst the rightist and counter-
revolutionary forces, which continued trying to prolong and intensify the critical
period. The historic ; - struggle in the party and the society culminated at the
1969 April plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee.
8. Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev's address to the 24th Congress of the Comainist
Party of the Soviet Union, 30 March 1971.
No small place in the international events of the recent years was occupied by the
political crisis in Czechoslovakia. There does not seem to be any need to set out the
factual aspects of the matter as' they are well known. Let us therefore dwell on
certain, more important--from our point of view--conclusions to be drawn from Uhat
happened.
The Czechoslovak events reminded us yet again of the fact that the internal antisocialist
forces which have survived one way or another in the countries that have begun building
socialism can, in certain conditions, become more active and even embark on direct
counterrevolutionary action in the hope of obtaining outside support from imperialism. -
which for its part is always ready to band together' with. such forces. /n this connection,
clearly manifested was the danger of rightist revisionism, which under the guise of
-"improving" socialism seeks to emasculate the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism.
and clears the way for the penetration 01' bourgeois ideology.
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The Czechoslovak events demonstrated convincingly how important it is to constantly
strengthen the leading role of the party in a socialist society and to continuously
perfect the forms and methods of party leadership and apply the cNative
approach to the solution Cf the creasing problems of the development of socialism.
It was clear to us that this was not just an attempt by imperialism and its henchmen
to overthrow the sociallet re4ime in CzeehOslovakial it warn also On attempt to deal
a blow to the positions of socialism in Europe as a whole, to crepe favorable conditions
for an attack on the socialist world by the most aggressive forces:of imperialism.
Heeding the appeal of the party and state leaders and the communist and working people
of Czechoslovakia, and taking into consideration the danger created for the gains of
socialism in that country, at that time we, together with the fraternal socialist
countries, adopted the decision to give Czechoslovakia international aid in 'defense
of socialism. [applause] Under the extraordinary conditions created by the forces of
Imperialism and ceunterrevolution, we were pledged to this by our class duty, our
loyalty to. socialist internationalism, and our concern for the interests of our states
and for the fate of socialism and peace in Europe. -
The plenum of the CPU Central Committee, in a document "Ldssons of the Crisis
Development," provided, as is known, the following assessment of the meaning of the
collective aid Of the fraternal countries. I quote, comrades: The entry of the
allied troops o4five-socialist countries into Czechoslovakia wasan act-of
international solidarity meeting the common interests of the Czechoslovak working
people as well as the interests of the international communist movement. This
internationalist act saved the lives of thousands of people and insured the internal
and external conditions for peaceful anq tranquil labor. It strengthened the
western frontiers of the socialist camp: and destroyed the. hopes of the imperialist
circles td revise the results Of World. War //.
We fully share the conclusion which was drawn by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
The experience of life has again convincingly demonstrated that the fraternal unity
of the socialist countries is the most reliable barrier in the path of the forces which
are trying to attack and weaken the camp of socialism, to subvert and bring to naught
the socialist achievements of the working people. The peoples of the socialist
countries clearly demonstrate to the whole world that their revolutionary gains will .
not be given up, that the frontiers of the socialist community are inviolable and not
to be encroached upon.
We are sincerely glad that the communists of Czechoslovakia successfully coped with
the trials which befell them. Now the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is approaching
its 14th congress, which we are convinced will be an important new stage along the
road of strengthening the positions of socialism in Czechoslovakia.
9. Excerpt from the speech of Gustav Husak on 1 April 1971 at the 24th congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
We are sincerely pleased to be able to convey to you, delegates to the 24th CPSU
Congress, and to all Soviet people ardent fraternal greetings from the Czechoslovak
communists and from all our people. The congress' of Lenin's party, which
was the first to translate into reality the ancient dream of the oppressed and
exploited, always arouses the profound-interest of all those who fight against
capitalism and imperialist aggression, for the just cause ofpeace, for democracy
and socialism.
The Soviet people, under the leadership of its Leninist party, have covered a new
stretch of their, heroic path. They have overcome difficulties and obstacles, and
with dedicated, Creative work have achieved outstanding Successes in the national
economy, in science, technology, education, and linjeRgrftvggortan
palgge:
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progress.
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The Czechoslovak communists a* C1t1Z2I f ..4:.
homeland to whom socialism hasbecome the meaning of life, haveifattentively familiarlv
themselves with the prospects which you are charting for yourse14ss at the present
congress, and they follow the proceedings of your congress with xceptional interest.
The Czechoslovak people value the enormous successes which you hive attained and pay
tribute to all those who, through their devoted everyday work, ;lie fulfilling the
immortal legacy of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. We are all aware of whet immense signifi-
cance your successes are, not only for the Soviet Union, but als6 for us, for
Czechoslovakia, and the other fraternal socialist countries, antVfor the progressive
and peace-loving forces of the world in general.
We are commemorating this year the 50th anniversary of the founding of the CPCZ. We
realize anew, all that the glorious party of Lenin has meant and accomplished for
the CPCZ from its very origin; how deep and ancient are the roots of friendly
relations between our nations. The birth
and first steps of the activity of the CPCZ enjoyed the immedi?te assistance of
Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The CPSU also helped our party later on 4p molding itself into
a force capable of leading our people to victory over the bourgaliisie.
The Soviet Union and its party became a firm support for our Czechoslovak people in
the period of the Munich diktat as well as during the enslavement of our homeland by
Hitlerite fascism. Our nations will never forget that it was the heroic Soviet
Army which liggrated Czechoslovakia, thus rescuing our nations from fascist perdition.
[applause] In the struggle for our freedom, there were righting, side by side with
the Soviet Army, Czechoslovak units commanded by Army Gen Conrad! Ludvik Svoboda,
who is now President of the Czechoslovak Republic and is today
a member of our delegation.
In this joint struggle the firm friendship, sealed by joint bloodshed, was maintained.
All of history- convinces us that the Czechoslovak communists always attained successes
in the struggle against capitalism and in building socialism when they nurtured close
and comradely relations with the Soviet communists. _
Every weakening of relations was to the detriment of our party and of our nations.
We convinced ourselves again of this fundamental truth in the 1968-69 crisis years
when the antisocialist forces of society, together with the rightwing opportunist
and revisionist forces within the CPCZ and the all-round assistance and support of
international reaction, attempted the overthrow of the socialist system in
Czechoslovakia, which as its logical consequence would have led to the threatening
of the .socialist position in Europe and to the revision of the victories of World
War II.
These aims were thwarted only thanks to the timely international assistance rendered
by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
On behalf of our delegation, we want to express from the rostrum of this congress our
sincere thanks to the CPSU, to the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet people for
having understood the anxieties of Czechoslovak communists regarding socialism and
their appeals for help.
This international assistance saved our country from civil war, from counterrevolution,
and helped to safeguard the achievements of socialism.
We Czechoslovak communists can confirm from our own example the correctness and
wisdom of the ideas of Vladimir Ilich Lenin on the role and responsibility of the
Communist Party under the conditions of building socialism. ,Our experiences .confirm
that a great threat to socialksm always arises when under the slogans of so-called
improving and so-called reforming of socialism; disunity and loss of the capability
for action by the party leadership takes place; when socialism loses its revolutionary
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content; when the party surrenders its leading role in society; when under the
influence of petit-bourgeOis opportunism it becomes ideologically divided, organi7,a
tionally destroyed, and incapable of united action; when the priOciples of derocratl
centrallam are being denied; when the claas principles of the saiaalist state are
-ignored; and When proletarian internationalism is replaced by the 'hysteria of
nationaliam and chauviniam.
In Czechoslovakia such a separation from fundamental Leninist principles and also from
the general requirements for building socialism took place. In 1968 the fundamental
cause of the crisis development and the gradually increasing counterrevolutionary
advance and its dimensions and depth threatened not only the revOlutionary achieve-
ments of the working class, but the very existence of the socialist system.
. ,
WO have also eonvinced ourselves from the histories of the revolutionary movement and
from the recent history of our party that the communist advanceuard, the working
' class, must never lobe sight of the fact that even after assumi4 power the defeated
forees hostile to socialism never cease to be active it society.'
I'D realize their designs, they aeck allies, identify themselves with diversionist
imperialist forces, and arc willing to take any risk and adventure should a situation
arise in which socialism wauld find itself internally weakened. The farcen af
reaction and irterialism have learned from our Czechoslovak example that the well-
known conclusions--the declaratian af the six fraternal parties made in Bratislava
in 1968 on the necessity of an international defense of socialist gains--was not'
merely declarative. They have learned that they will meet the resolute resistance
of a united international solidarity wherever they would want to overthrow the
socialist system by means of a counterrevolutionary offensive.
The plans of imperialism and reaction .in Czechoslovakia durinL the 1968-69 period
failed completely. There can be no d5ubt that the detachment of Czechoslovakia
from the alliance of socialist states--which was their aim--wauld have been a victory
of imperialism and the loss and defeat of the forces of the world revolutionary and
anti-imperialist mavement. In contrast to it; the safeguarding and strenithening
of socialism in Czechoslovakia has strengthened the pasition and self-assurance af
revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces in their struggle with imperialism.
From aur experience it is possible to draw an unequivocal conclusion, namely that a
socialist state is a sovereign state under the'condition that the power of the work-
ing class headed by the communist party is firm, indestructible, and inviolable.
When there arises a serious threat to it and when, as a result of a counterrevolution-
ary affensive, it finds itself in danger this results in the sovereignty af the
socialist state itself being endeangered since a'danger of dependence on imperialism ,
arises.
10. Fac(n-pt from Gustav Husak's address to the 14th Congress of the
Czechoslovak Conmumist Party, 25 May 1971.
The Czechoslovak events in 1968 reaffirmed the truthfulness of the Leninist precept
that unless it has a principleminded and firmaleadership which stands unreservedly
on positions of Marxism-Leninism, even the largest revolutionary force becomes
a'dispersed mass ineapable of organized action, and, under the onslaught of counter-
revolutionary forces, may under certain circumstances suffer defeat.
An objective analysid of the development in this period confirms that had-it not been
for_the_timely international assistance of our closest socialist allies
the power of the worAers class and the working people in our country would
have suffered a defeat whichyould have had inestimable consequences not only for our
people but for peace in Europe and would have led to the threatening of the positions
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Prcm the rostrum of our congress we want to reaffirm the evaluatipn of 21 August 1968
,A as was unanimously approved in December 1970 by our Central Committee and supported
by the whole party. The entry of the allied forces of the five scialist
countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of international solidarity
which correspondedto both the common
interests of the working people and the international workers c3aNs'and the socialist
community, and to the class interests of the world communist movement.
Through this international action the lives of thousands of peoplp?were saved, the
internal and external conditions for peaceful and quiet work were'pinsured, the western
border of the socialist camp was strengthened, and the hopes of the imperialist circles
to revise the consequences of World War II were frustrated. -
At our lith congress we are concluding a criSis-riddin and complicated period. ,On
oehalf of our whole party and the great majority of th working Seople, we want to :
express our sincere thanks to the CPSU, the Soviet Government, the Soviet people, you
personally,'Comrade Brezhnev
and the other socialist friends from the fraternal parties whose first secretaries
are present today . Pthat in a difficult situation they understood the '
fears of the Czechoslovak communists for the cause of socialism, the request by many
party and state functionaries, by many communlsts and collectives of working people
for assistance, that this international assistance saved our country from civil war
and counterrevoaution, and that the achievements of socialism were defended. -
The rightwing majority of the party leadership tried to hide the truth about the '
international assistance rendered by the allies, which permitted open treason against
the Marxist-Leninist policy with the well-known statement by the Central Committee '
Presidium of 21 August 1968. This act of breach of faith greatly harmed our country
and the interests of the international communist' movement. Primarily because of this .
statement and its dissemination by all communications media, an atmosphere of unbelievable
disinformation and of chauvinist hysteria was created at a difficult moment, and under '
the pressure of mass psychosis even many communists and honest citizens succumbed, and
they then committed deeds which very often contrasted completely with all their previous
work for socialism arid their convictions. '
The entry of the allied trolips multiplied the power of our domestic forces, who were
determined to defend by political, means the achievements of Socialism in Czechoslovakia
and to create a'firm hinterland for development of the broad mobilization of the working
people for the struggle to overcome the counterrevolutionary threat. The signing of the
protocol between the Soviet and' Czechoslovak representatives in the days-of 23-26 August 1968
in Moscow strengthened the security of the healthy forces. It became a mighty impulse
for the growth of political Self-Confidence and capability for action by the party,
the working class, and the whole of our society,
11. Excerpt from Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the 14th Congress .of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 26 May 1971.
Comrades, your present achievements, your confidence in the future, are based on the
fact that the party has mapped out the correct way, which meets the vital interests
of the multimillion masses of the working people in towns and villages. They are
convinced of this through their everyday experience. They show their loyalty to the
Communist Party and their trust in its policy in the most convincing manner.-with
deeds and creative labor. This is precisely why the'countryis economy, which had
been thoroughly shattered and in essence brought to the brink of crisis by the
revisionists, the so-celled. improvers of socialism, was restored in a short time and
is moving confidently ahead.
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Dear comrades, we have already had occasiorL to speak about the fact that the
learned by your party from the sharp skirmishes with the class enemy are 51gnific7,
not only for the .further development of Czechoslovakia but also pr other socialis
countries and for other communist parties. Your 'experience again reminds us that the
sacred duty Of communists in soeialist countrieS is to strictly follow, in all
activity conneuted with building the new society, LetlinIS behests, the revolutionary
wiser-co or his great teaching, and to give a decisive rebuff. to any attempts to dis-
tort and falsify Leninism or any manifestations of opportunism.
This experience repeatedly confirms and warns of the great danger of complacency, the
great necessity of indefatigable vigilance toward all forms of hostile activity by
the enemies of socialism. It teaches understanding of the necessity of waging a con-
sistent struggle against the subversive actions of international imperialism. It show
the Importance of strengthening the leading role of the Communist Party, its links
with the wide masses of the workinng people, of constantly improving the style and
method of party work in educating the masses, of consistently developing socialist
democracy.,
Life has again convincingly -confirmed that the force of socialist ihternationalism,
the fraternal cohesion of socialist states and their unbreakablesolidarity and
mutual support were, are, and will be of the greatest value for communists of social-
ist countries, for their reIdable support and powerful Weapons in the struggle with
-terrible enemies.
Tempered in class battles, the CPCZ is confidently leading the working people to
new achievements in building socialism. The Ozecheslevak:Socialist Republic today
stands before the entire world as a strong link in the great alliance of the
people building a new life, and no pee will ever be able to sever Czechoslovakia
from the socialist camp.
No one will ever be able to break out brotherhood and our friendship.
12. SOVIET NEWS, London.
12 May 1970
ioNt . of Sovict-ezechoohnet Treaty of -
CPYRGHT
Friciiii3Eilig, Co-olocrailaii zrag L'I urag al Assistance
,,,,,._ ,,,,,.,,,i ,,,,,?,,,,,,, tort of the 7ro,2ty of Friirre,!thip, Co .-/poraliozn and
Mntnal Arsistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Czechogovak Socialist Republic, Which was signed in Prague
on May 6.
: For the USSR, the treaty was signed by Leonid Brezhnev, general
i
1 secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, and Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council
of Ministers, and for Czechoslovakia, by Gustav Husak, first secretary
of the central committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
. and Lubomir Strougal, Chairman of the Government.
rrIlE Union of Soviet ,Socialist between the peoples of the two states ing of socialism and communism, mid
-4- Republics and the CzechOslovakand laid a firm foundation for the also the fraternal mutual assistance
further consolidation of fraternal and all-round co-operation between
Socialist Republic,
friendship and all-round co-operation them, based on the teaching of
Reaffirming their loyalty to the alms between them, , Marxism-Leninism and the immut-
and principles of the Soviet-Czecho- Being profoundly convinced that the ible principles of socialist inter-
slovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual inviolable friendship between the hationalism, accord with the pars-
Assistance and Postwar Co-operation Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mount interests of the peoples of
tancluded on December 12, 1043, and . ... and the Czechoslovak both countries and the entire socialist
rinleas Ge11099/09162tddC -------- 1494A000300080001 -5
prolonged
which play 11
Argrer0 struggle against fascism and further Reaffirming that support for, and
development of friendly relations deepened in the years of the build- the consolidation and protection of,
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the socialist gains achieved at the
cost of the heroic efforts and
selfless labour of each people, are
the common internationalist duty of
socialist countries,
Consistently and unswervingly,
corning out for the strengthening of
the unity and cohesion of all the
countries of the socialist common-
wealth, .based on the community of
their social systems and ulimate alma,
Fully resolved to observe strictly
the obligations stemming from the
Warsaw Treaty of FriendshiPt
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance
of May 14, 1955,
Stating that economic co-operation
between the two countries is facili-
tating their development and also the
further improvement of the inter-
national socialist division of labour
and socialist econorhic integration
within the framework of the Council
,for Mutual Economic Assistance,
' Expressing the firm intention td
enhance the cause of strengthening
peace and security in Europe and
throughout the world and to oppose
imperialism, revanchism and hillia.
tarism,
? Proceeding on the basis of the
aims and principles proclaimed in the
United Nations Charter,
And taking into consideration the
echievements of socialist and corn'
,nunist construction in the two coun-
tries, the present situation and the
'prospects for ail-round co-operation,
as well aa the changes that have
taken ? place in Europe and through-
out the world 81nce the conclusions
of the Treaty of December 12, 1943?!
Have agreed on the following: ? ,
ARTICLE 1
The high contracting parties, in
accordance with the principles of
Internationalism, shall fur-
ther strengthen the eternal and
unbreakable friendship between the
peoples of the 'Union of Soviet Sod,"
alist Republics, and the Czechoslovak.
Socialist Republic, and shall develop
all-round co-Operation' between the
two countries and render one another
fraternal aid and support, proceeding
on the brlis of mutual respect for
state sovereignty and independen,:k
equeity. and n^,r7.-traterfercace in Grt
another's internal affairs.
ARTICLE 2
The high contracting parties,
proceeding on the basis of the prin-
Ciples of friendly mutual assistance
and the international socialist divi-
sion of labour, shall further develop
and-. deepen mutually -beneficial
bilateral and multilateral economic,
scientific and technical co-operation
With the aim of developing the
national economy, achieving the
highest scientific and technical level
and efficiency of social production,
and improving the material. wellbeing
of the working people of their
countries.
The two sides will contribute to
the further development of economic
ties and co-operation, and to the
socialist economic integration of
member-states of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance.
ARTICLE 3
The high contracting parties shall
further develop and expand co-oper-
ation between the two countries in
the fields of science and culture;
education, literature and art., the
press,, radio, the cinema, television
public health, tourism, physical cula
ture and other fields. ,
ARTICLE 4'
?
. The high contracting parties shall
further facilitate the expansion of
co-operation and direct tics between
organs of state power and public
organisations of' working .people
the object of making the peoples of
the two states better acquainted with
one another on a reciprocal basis
and bringing them closer together.;
ARTICLE 5
The high contracting parties,,
expressing their unswerving determin-i
ation to advance along the road of
building socialism and communism,
shall undertake ,the necessary,
measures to defend the socialist
gains of the peoples and the security'
and Independence of both countries,'
Shall strive for the deeelopment of
AU-round relations among the state.
of the socialist community and shall
net in the spirit of consolidating their
amity. friendship and brotherhood.
AILTICLE 6
? The high contracting parties
prnrecri from the assumption that'
the Munich Agreement of Septent-
iiiv ;:fl, MX was reached under the
bt ea?Ir a war or neerefefleo and tho
use of. for against Czechoslovakia,
was a' component part of Hitler
Germany's criminal conspiracy
against peace and a flagrant viola-
tion of the principal standards of
international law, and, therefore, was
invalid from the very outset, with
sH the consequences stemming from
this.
ARTICLE 7
The high contracting parties, eon-
sistently promoting a policy of
peaceful co-existence between states
with different social sysems, shall
make every effort to safeguard inter-
national peace and the security of
the peoples from encroachments by
the neeressive forces of imperialism
and reaction, to lessen international
tensien, to stop the arms race and
to achieve general and complete Ws.
arm' ent and the final abolition of
eelon alism in ail its forms and
mini cstations, and to render support
to equntries that have become freefrom colonial domination and are
advancing along the road of strength-
ening Their national independence and .
sovereignty.
ARTICLE -8
. The high contracting parties shall
priss jointly to improve the eituation
anti ensure peace in Europe, to con-
soldate and develop co-operation
among European states, to establish
good-neighbourly relations between
them and to create an effective system
of European security on the basis
? of the collective efforts of all
Europenn Mates.
ARTICLE 9.
The high contracting parties declare
that the immutability of the state
frontiers in Europe, formed after the
Second World War, is one of the main
prerequisites for ensuring European
security. They express their firm
determination to ensure, jointly with
other member-states of the Warsaw
Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation
and Mutual Assistance of May 14,
1955, and in accordance with it, the
inviolability of the frontiers of the
member-States of that Treaty, and to
take all the necessary measures to
prevent aggression by any forces of
militarism' and revanchism. and to
repel the aggressor.
ARTICLE 10
If one of the high contracting
parties is subjected to armed attack
by some state or group of states, the
tither contrncting pnrty, viewing this
I s an tank against itself, ?shall
immediately afford it every assistance,.
including armed assistance, and shall
also support It by all means at its
disposal in implementation of itslight
to individual :or collective self-,
defence in accordance with Article 51:
of the Charter of the United Nations.
The measures taken on the strength
of this Article shall be immediately
reported :by the high contracting
parties to the United Nations Security
Council and they shall act in accord-
ance with 'the provisions of the United
Nations Charter.
ARTICLE 11
Me high contrneting puttien ehall
Inform each other and consult with
each other on all important inter-
nntional questions' involving their
Interests and shall act on the basis
of their common position, agreed upon
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In actordance with the Interests of
both states.
ARTICLE It
The high contracting parties declare
that their commitments under exist-
ing international treaties are not In
conflict with the provisions of the
present 'Treaty.
NEW YORK TIMES
7 May 1970
CPYRGHT
ARTH;LE 13
The prelent Treaty is subject to
ratification and shall enter Into force.
on the day of the exchange of. the
Instruments of ratification, which is
to be carried out in Moscow at the
earliest possible date.
AII.TICLE 14
The treaty is concluded for 20 years
and shall be automatically prolonged
for the next five years
the high contractinfl partif-,
notice of abrogation 12 month
the coitespondlng peried sexpite-:
Dtlif1'-'? In Prague on May 0, )470.
Itt twoconies, each in the ftlislian
and Cstigh languages, both texts belnd
equallr AuthenUt, ,
?Soviet-Czech Pact Signed;
' Backs Brezhnev Doctrine
PRAGUE, My 6 (Reuters)-1
.echoslovakia and the Sovictl
lion today signed a new trea;?
of friendship that endorses.
so-called Prezhnev Doctrine
ed to justify the 10'3 nv
m by Warsaw Pact nations.
The text of the treaty, made
blie by C.T.K., the Czech?.
ivak press agency, was signed
Leonid I. Brezhnev, the par-
leader, and Premier Aleksei
Kosygin for the Soviet Un-
1?. and by Dr. Gustav Husak,
party chief, and Premier
botnir Strougal for Czecha.
igtvekta.
The signing came on the first
visit to Czechoslovakia by the
iKrenilin leaders since they or-
dered the 1968 occupation, to
stop the reform movement un-
der Alexander Dubcek.
, The preamble of the treaty
ihas the paragraph: ?"The de-
fense of socialist achievements
that were gained by the heroic
efforts of the people of each
country is the common duty of
socialist countries."
The defense of socialism Was
the justification, Mr; Brezhnev
gave. for the .intervention, He
'said Mr. Dubcek's democratiza-
tion movement had endangered
socialism.
Infortted sources said there
was concern by other East Eu-
ropean allies of Moscow about
the treaty, which not only al-
iudes to the right of Interven-
tion In another member of the
pact, but commits Czechosio-ii
vakla to possible /military sup-
port. to the Soviet Union out-
side Europe.
This is provided for In Article
10, which says that in the case
of "armed attack against one
of the high contracting parties
by any state or group of states,
the contracting parties will re-
gard it as an attack against
themselves and will immedi-
ately extend all assistance in-
cluding military assistance!'
The article did not limit this
assistance to Europe, and is
likely to spark speculation
about a Czechoslovak commit-
ment to any further deteriora-
tion of relations between the
Soviet Union and China.
Article 2 says both sides will
contribute to the further de-
velopment of economic integra-
tion among the members ot
Comecon, East Europe's trading
market. ? ? j.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY July 1971
SaviE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATV
Under slogans chosen by the Czechoslovak Central Committee for the occa-
sion, Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders held another cheerlesa.celebration, the
25th anniversary of the Soviet "liberation" of Czechoslovakia which wound up
with the 6 May signing of a new 20-year joint treaty of "friendship, coopera-
tion and mutual assistance." The treaty is like a burial rite, a final gesture
to mark the end of the Czechoslovak experiment which started with the ascendan-
cy of the Dubcek leadership in January 1968 and which was ended by the Soviet
invasion in August 1968.
While this treaty closely resembles other USSR-Warsaw Pact treaties, the
few additions and perbaps the deletions, are significant. The key new para-
graph is the long-feared incorporation of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited '
sovereignty. TheirSoviets would doubtless like to incorporate this feature
into all future treaties with the East European Communist regimes. How or
whether the Brezhnev Doctrine is included in the initialed but still unsigned
Soviet-Rumanian treaty will be of special interest and will be of immediate
and extreme concern to all Communist regimes.
To understand what the treaty means, not merely what it says, a glossary
of Communist euphemisms and circumlocutions might be useful for non-Communists
While the Brezhnev Doctrine, of course, is not mentioned, every good Communist
will recognize that notorious doctrine in these words from the Preamble:
"Confirming that the support, consolidation and protectionof socialist gains
achieved at the price of the heroic efforts and selflese labour of each people,
A common internationalist duty of socialist countries..." (our underlining).
any Communist country, if not itself the victim of Soviet-ordered inter-
cntion, is obligated to assist Soviet forces to dethrone a neighbor or attack
"deviationist." This proviso implicitly strengthens the possibility of Soviet
acl/enturism in international disputes, the current quarrel with Communist China
being the most immediate example. Earlier treaties had described the relation-
ship to the USSR as according to "principles of socialist internationalism."
These "principles" which are also mentioned in Article 1 of the new treaty, are
understood to mean that binding decisions will be handed down by the CPSU to
other Communist Parties. That principle and its domestic counterpart "demo-
cratic centralisM," are a basic control weapon of the CPSU and continually un-
der attack by Yugoslavia and by dissidents in many non-ruling parties.
Article 10 includes the obligation of each party to consider an attack
on the other as "an attack against itself," to offer "every assistance, in-
cluding armed assistance" to the other regardless of the quarter from which
the attack is mounted. The Warsaw Pact treaty and other Soviet bilateral
treaties with its Satellites expressly limit mutual defense obligations to
Europe. By omitting this limitation in the current treaty, the way is open
for use of Czechoslovak troops to assist the USSR anywhere in the world,
Communist China being the outstanding possibility at this time.
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Another net./ addition is Article 4, which provides for direct "ties be-
tween bodies of state power and the public organizations of working people...
sanctification for close Soviet 'inspection, and even supervision, of Czecho-
slovaks at every level. It undoubtedly means the presence 'of a Soviet advi-
sor in every key area. of Party and government and the type Of "shadow"
government which prevailed in the pre-Dubcek era.
The Soviet Union apparently thought better of consecrating a "mutual
friendship treaty" with agreement for armed occupation of the "friend's" ter-
ritory. Without public sanction the military occupation may be considered
somewhat extra-legal but that is a nicety of little value to the Czecho-
slovaks. By omitting any mention of troops the USSR has avoided any awk-
ward precedents in the wording of treaties following future occupations.
or.
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF POST-INVASION CZECHOSLOVAKIA
I. Communist Authors
1. Garaudy, Roger. La Liberte'en Sursis, Prague 1968.
Paris, Fayard, 1968. 159 p. Garaudy presents a collegtion of
previously unpublished texts by Alexander Dubcek, Ota Sik,
Radovan Richter, Frantisek Chamalik, etc., which shed light
on the ideological and social background of the events which
led to the intervention of the Warsaw Pact powers in August 1968.
Garaudy's introduction discusses the Czech economic *lel and
describes the attempts towards a new socialist democrakcy,
which was destroyed by the Russian intervention. Garaudy
summarizes the invasion of Czechoslovakia as "a crime against
hope, a crime against socialism, a crime against the future."
2. Garaudy, Roger. Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme.
Paris, Galftmard, 1969. 318 p. "It is no longer possible to
remain silent," begins Garaudy in this highly interesting book
about the crisis of the communist movement. The author, at
the time of publication still a member of the Political Bureau
of the French Communist Party's Central Committee, comes frankly
to grips with the deepest problems which concern him as a
communist. This study is a radical break with orthodoxy and
poses the problem of the communist movement's future, with
severe criticism of Soviet-style socialism.
3. Littel, Robert (ed.). The Czech Black Book. London,
PallNall, 1969. 314 p. (prepared by the Institute of History,
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) New York, Praeger, 1969. 303 p.
An abridged version of the Czech original, Seven Days in Prague,
which was a reply to the calumnious Soviet White Book, this
collection of exciting documents selected by Czech historians
gives a day-by-day, even hour-by-hour, account of the first
seven days after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.
4. L8101, Eugen - Grunwald Leopold. Die Intellektuelle
Revolution; HintergrUnde and Auswirkungen des "Prager FrUhlings".
Wien, Europa Vig, 169. 307 p.; Dusseldorf, Eon, 1969. 309 p.
The volume is composed of two separate parts; the first, written
by E. L8b1, "Wire alle sind Tschechoslovaken" (We all are
Czechosldvaks) deals with the problems of the Soviet state which -
according to the author - is not a socialist state; and with the
model imposed by the Soviets on other communist parties, a model
which, despite post-Stalin changes, was only a milder form of
dictatorship. Some reflections en a socialist humanism are included.
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In the second part, "21 August 1968," Leopold Grunwal analyzes
the fundamental incentives of the Russian interventi ? in
Czechoslovakia, which caused the "gravest crisis" of unism.
The main reason was, in Grunwald's opinion, the Soviet leadership's
fear of a general contamination originating in Czech? lovakia of
t
all the Warsaw Pact nations, thus endangering the Sov et power
positions in Eastern Europe.
5. London, Artur. L'Aveu, Dans l'Engrenage du Proces du
Prague. Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1968. Artur London spent
some forty years in the communist movement. He was jfst 14 when
he joined the Czech communist youth organization. Five years
later, in 1934, he was sent to Moscow and in 1936 to Spain.
He participated in the Spanish Civil War and was decorated in
the French Resistance. After World War II he returned to his
homeland and became Deputy Foreign Minister (1949-51). The book,
the story of his persecution and arrest, is an upsetting human
document, dhe very similar to those published by the Hungarian
ex-communist, ex-political prisoners. It includes intresting
passages on the intervention of some French communist leaders
on London's behalf.
6. Mnacko, Ladislav. The Seventh Night. London, Dent.
New York, Dutton 1969. 220 p. The author, a prominent Czech
journalist and writer, was personally acquainted with the leaders
of Czechoslovakia. He uses as a point of departure the 7 nights
following the Russian invasion to give an account of the turmoil
within the Czechoslovak Communist Party and government from the
February 1948 takeover to the liberalization program of Alexander
Dubcek in 1968. The book is an intriguing inside view of how
the Stalinist system works.
7. Petkoff, Teodoro. Checoeslovaquia - El Socialism? come
Problema. Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes. Teodoro Petkoff
is an economist, a former member of the.Venezuelan Congress and
a member of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Comunist
Party (and of its Politbureau until April 1968). Cnce a guerilla
fighter, Petkoff is now the leader of the left-wing faction of
the Venezuelan C. P. He renounces the armed struggle and battles
for the recognition of a "diversity of socialist types and roads."
The book is an intelligent reappraisal of the course of events
in Czechoslovakia, beginning with the application of the Soviet
economic model in 1948 and its disastrous effect on the national
economy. Continuing with an analysis of the Novotny era and
the period of reforms, he ends with a condemnation of the Russian
invasion.
8. Tigrid, Pavel. La chute Irresistible d'Alexandre Dubcek.
Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1969.
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9. Tigrid, Pavel. Le Printemps de Prague. Paris? Seuil, 1968.
The best book-length survey of the pre-invasion perio4 based on
the author's running analyses in Svedectvi (Czech emigre magazine
in Paris).
II. Non-Communist Authors
1. Osley, Anthony. Free Communism? a Czech Experiment. London,
Young Fabian Pamphlet, 1969. 35 p. This short stu y',..:deals with
the impossibility of liberalization of the existing Ommunist system.
2. Schwartz, Harry. Prague's 200 Days. New York, Praeger, 1969.
3. Tatu, Michel. L'Heresie impossible: chronique du drame
tchechoslovaque. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1967-1968. A collection
ordispatthes to Le Monde by their Vienna correspondent; the ablest
journalistic coverage of the events.
gip
4. Wechsberg, Joseph. The Voices. Garden City, N. Y.:
Doubleday, 1969. A brief, sensitive account of the "underground
radios," by the Central European correspondent of The New Yorker.
5. Windsor, Philip and Roberts, Adam. Czechoslovakia 1968:
Reform, Repression and Resistance. New York, Colombia University
Press, 1969. 200 p. The voluMe contains two essays by two members
of the London School of Economics. "Eastern Europe and the Detente"
is a history of the invasion of Czechoslovakia which, according to
Windsor, resulted in replacing democratic centralism with the rule
of factionalism. Prof. Roberts study, "Invasion and Resistance,"
discusses the revolutionary spontaneity of the civilian population
and the passive role of the army during the critical weeks in
August 1968.
6. Zeman, Z. A. B. Prague Spring: A Report on Czechoslovakia.
London, Penguin. New York, Hill and Wang, 106-9. 167 p. The author,
a native of Czechoslovakia and now a professor of history at
St. Andrews University in Scotland, spent several weeks in
Czechoslovakia in April 1068. The study is a summary of his
personal observations and of talks with people he met: state and
party functionaries, intellectuals, workers, men on the street.
It offers some historical background and relevant passages from
speechesx manifestoes and articles. The study presents a fair
picture of the reform movement and an excellent analysis of the
Czechoslovak experiment. The chronology of events covers a
period of time from June 1967 to August 1968.
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III. Extensively Reviewed Books
1. WASHINGTON POST, 1 April 1971.
cpyRGHT Courage in Czechoslovakia
One quotation from each
author will demonstrate
how contradictory their
judg nents about the mean-
ing of the events they ob-
served can be.
To the distinguished New
York Times reporter, Tad
Szulc, the Czechoslovak
Spring and its anticlimax,
the Soviet invasion,
"marked the beginning of a
fundamental metamorphosis
of Communism . . . if not of
its ultimate collapse."
Allelic( Solomon, a French
physician turned journalist,
saw tho formal confirmation
of the Soviet occupation as
the curtain falling "on the
most tragic chapter of Euro-
pean history since the end
of World War II."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE 1VORLD WAR II. By
Tad .Sizalc.
(Viking. 503 op, $14) ,
PRAGUE NOTEBOOK: The Strangled Revolution.
By Michel Salomon. Translated from the French by
Helen Enstis.
(Little. Brown. 361 PP.. $8.951
THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXPERIMENT: _1968.1969.
By Ivan Svitak.
(Columbia. 243 pp.. illustrated. $10.95)
Reviewed by Josef Korbel
The reviewer, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Inter-
* national Studies at the University of Denver, is the author
of several books including Communist Subversion of
' Czechoslovakia, 1038 - 1948.
And Ivan Svitak, who
Identifies himself as a
"Marxist philosopher, social-
ist humanist, and Czechoslo-
vak citizen," expresses the
conviction that "the Czecho-
slovak experiment fowl-
tiered on its efforts to ac-
complish the impossible: the
Europeanization of Russia
and the humanization of So-
viet Communism."
The brave men and
women who carried The flag
of freedom and economic re-
form through the streets of
Prague and Bratislava dur-
ing the exhilarating spring
of 1968, were sure that they
were writing the last and
final chapter in the history
of Marxism-Leninism. Most
of them were active Party
members and they recog-
nized the predominant posi-
tion of the Party; they
wanted to preserve the so-
cialist system of economy
and they proclaimed their II-
delity to the alliance with
the Soviet Union. Intellec-
tuals, as many of them were,
sensitive to national tradi-
tions and the need for social
progress and 'human dignity,
they believed deeply in the
reconeiliatiArkar eau
entiy
personal freedom and one
party rule.
Their admirable enthusi-
asm, unconcerned with the
realities of the situation,
even led them to, the convic-
tion that they were acting in
the interests of the Soviet
Union when they planned to
establish "socialism with a
human face." Ultimately,
the face had to be smashed,
but it shined unexpectedly
foe a few months even in
the presence of Soviet
tanks, when not only intel-
lectuals and political re-
formers but masses of
young people and workers
defied the brutal forces of
the invaders.
It is against this sketchy
background that one can set
out to evaluate . the three
books under review. Szule
and Solernon, both report-
ers, made full use of the ex-
traordinary circumstances
In which many leaders of
the liberalization movement
were anxious to talk to them
about matters that must
have been considered top se-
cret in a one-party system.
Both authors accepted some
of the statements they heard
uncritically and both fail to
set them in proper perspec-
tive.
Solomon's treatment is an-
ecdotal and episodie? a dis-
jointed collection of essays,
lacking in integration and
466MeAtt4V
dercurrents responsible for
the events he witnessed. In
the second part of him book,
he has sonic of the reformist
leaders explain the causes
of the "Spring"; but at that
time they were carried away
by enthusiasm and being in
the midst of the fire, inevit-
ably and understandably
lost their sense of propor-
tion.
Sztile has a deeper under-
standing of the historical
quality of national upheav-
als. Czechoslovak Marxist
philosophers were the first ?
Westerners living In a Com-
munist society to apply mod-
ern critical analysis to so-
cialism in their attempt "to
wed socialist concepts of so-
cial economic justice with
the West's traditions of po-
litical, cultural, and scien-
tific freedom." He sees the
Prague events as "a revolu-
tion in the deepest philo-
sophical sense." This is as
good a summation of the so-
ciological complexity of the
Czechoslovak events as any-
one can offer.
Szule also puts the events
In an explanatory historical
setting going back to Czech-
oslovak politics during the
War and proceeding to
sketch their vicissitudes
after the War?the brutal
period of Stalinization, of
purm,_79(11194A00030008and belated-
Stat-*404
Ettamater human dignity
CIABDR .
itlEhumanization of
4 society. Ile advocated unity
dimension by compd.' olive
"flashes" which throw a
light on the developments In
the other Communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe,
-though this ambitious un-
dertaking leads him nem-
sarily to oversimplifications.
The author is thoroughly
familiar with the theme of
the Spring which, however,
is frequently obscured by ci-
tations of scores of unimpor-
tant (and unpronounceable)
names. Ile collected an enor-
mous quantity of informa-
tion, but a more judicious
sifting of materials would
have let events speak even
more eloquently and con-
vincingly for theniselve
For instance, a sentence
a b o it t Czechosiovkia, "in
which the written word com-
mands more littention than
tanks," goes to the very
roots of her history, the
glory of her Spring, and the
humiliation of her defeat by
Soviet armies; but the sen-
tence is lost In the massive
presentation of details.
Svitak's book is a work of
different caliber. He was
one of the most active per-
sons in the liberalization
movement and his work
consists mainly of articles
and speeches he wrote dur-
ing the Czechoslovak Spring
and a few lectures he deliv-
ered post mortem in the
United States, where he
found refuge. Of all intellec-
tual leaders, his demands
for change were most radl-
cal.
Presenting them with a
professorial pedantry, as if
enunciating eternal truths,
he was not, only critical of
past Stalinist totalitarian-
ism but also suspicious of
Dubcck's leadership, in
which he saw another elitist
group that sought only lim-
ited objectives. He pleaded
for "democracy not democ-
ratization"; for a multiparty
system, not just a change of,
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CPYRum
between mutually depend-
ent intelligentsia and work-
ers and, adjusting Marx (his
teacher) to his own ltidiviti.
tudistic, tion?M arist im-
ages, be condemned all
CotumunIst parties as anti-
Marxist.
To him the Spring was a
revolution against alienation
of the Individual in an in-
thistrialized society, a con-
flict between two interpreta-
tions of Marxism. And he
believed that real Marxhan
can be attained only
through uncompromising
protection of human rights
and opposition to the Com
munist Party. A philo-,o
Wier, drawn into the arena
of politics, lie igloo eit
own dictum that "(he politi?
elan's greatest shill is to de-
vide what is rtbalisile at iI
given moment anti what Is
utopian." l'herein Iles
explanation of Svitak's
even his less radical rot-
leagues'- defeat; IlicY iII
derestimateit or forgot 00
Ian bear 10 111
The three awl,. I
U story of the lati,,,,Italtle
coura:,e of a wow!)
%Vitt ;.
Vie 1.1.1
altiO pri)VIII.? lo !AM
?IjoIlilt'f.iI y!',oviet
power and policy
CPYRGHT
2. Shawcross, William.
Dubcek. Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1970.
CPYRGHT 4' WILLIAM SHAWCROSS
Relatively unknown before the Soviet
Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August
1968, Alexander Dubcek suddenly
emerged as a courageous, charismatic
leader in the violent struggle which ended
In his fall. In this first biography of Dub-
cek, William Shawcross explores the
enigma of the politician who altered the
image of European communism more
dramatically than anyone since Stalin, the
man who believed in "socialism with a
human face."
The account of Dubcek's attempt to
reconcile communism and democracy?
and his failure to do SQ?provides a re-
vealing commentary on the nature and
future of European politics. It is a com-
mentary that goes to the heart of many of
the critical political issues of the day:
economic development, civil liberties,
separation of powers, national sover-
eignty. Against these themes an exciting
human drama of a sort "glimpsed other-
wise only in novels," as The Listener put
??tik?LeAagapkyluaol-awa?zuNI-ei.port-ertivrrirel?
OpeitIRGHrTan who was at once a sincere
idealist and a wily political strategist,. a
dedicated Communist and a civil liber- William Shawcross writes about East
tarian, a nationalist and a man steeped in European affairs for the London Sunday
A DmrAraditiparcRMMLIIItit Veittii2n.? C IA-R Bior3-01194A000300080001 -5
The culmination of this drama is one of
the great power struggles of modern hi ;-
tory, one with a most tragic and movir g
end.
Dubcek is based on pioneering re-
search throughout Czechoslovakia, in-
cluding interviews with politicians, wilt-
ers, students, workers and friends of
Dubcek. Interweaving personal accoun s
and documentary evidence, ShawcroE s
vividly portrays Dubcek's early life ard
his father's restless search for the ideal
society, first in America and then in tt-e
Soviet Union; the involvement of fattier
and son in the Slovak national uprising
against the Germans in 1944; Dubcek s
years as an independent Party official;
the strange, unstable coailtion that
brought him to power; the way in which
his unique abilities and inescapable
weaknesses brought about his fall; and
his years of further humiliation and fail-
ure following his deposition.
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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
9 August 1970
CPYRGHT
Ditheek birogrfrpher
v J11,1.1,04 SITAWCIIOSS,
whose biography of 114r.
Thibrek is to be published by
Wrillenfeld ne.x1 week?the
second anniversary or lite
Soviet. invasion or c,cchosto-
volcia---more or less sttimbled
Into the task.
Now 24, he went in for the
Diplomatic Service examina-
tion after Hon and Univer-
sity College, Oxford, and
came second in the short list
of successfid candidates.
With splendidly unprece-
dented cheek he persuaded
lite Foreign Office to grant
him a year's leave before
joining them, so that he
could study as. a sculptor at
fair,
the St. Martin's School of Art.
In the middle of the courso.,
he and his sister Joanna?
now on the way to becoming
a doctor?went to Prague fop
a holiday.
The Russian invasio
aroused in him an intens
sympathy for the Czechs. 0
his return to England he
chucked the Diplomatic Ser-
vice and has since been back
to Czechoslovakia about 20
times.
That he is the son of the
man who prosecuted the Ger-
man war criminals At Nurem-
berg in 1946 has been a help
to him in his researches for
the Dubcek book.
IIis next project: a volume
nn Hungary.
3. Weisskopf, Kurt. The Agony of Czechoslovakia '38/'68.
Elek, London, 1968.
The Agony of Czechoslovakia '3 8P68
CPYRGHT - KURT WEISSKOPF
15 March 1939- The German Army marches
into Prague
21 August 1968 -The Russians Invade
Once more this small nation, just
beginning to work out its salvation, has
found itself threatened with brutal and
soul-destroying tyranny.
Kurt Weisskopf is one of the few jour-
\-- .lists of Czech origin now working in
London who was present during the
German rape of Czechoslovakia and has
kept in touch with the country ever since.
It is a dramatic coincidence that he
should have been completing his politi-
cal memoirs at the very moment when
the Russians suddenly invaded. This
book will give the world, stunned by
Soviet perfidy, a deeper understanding
of a nation's sufferings.
The first part of the book is a vivid
description of, Czechoslovakia in the
months leading up to the Western
powers' betrayal of the country to
Hitler at Munich. The author, then a
young trade union official, tried to alert
his friends and political colleagues to the
dangers of German territorial ambition
and Nazi infiltration, only to encounter
blind optimism, complacency and an
unjustified faith in foreign allies. This
inside story of the tragic disintegration
of a highly civilized country throws a
revealing light on the background,
Mr Weisskopf revisited Prague in 1945
and what he found in the liberated
country, the surviving friends he talked
to, gave him an insight into the dis-
enchantment with democracy which
contributed so strongly to the Coin-
munist take-over. His later visits, in 1966
and 1967, enabled him to give a devastat-
ing first-hand account of what the Czechs
call 'the era of deformation': the
bizarre and depressing tyranny Inas-
nuerading under the title of 'Socialism'
and associated with the name of
Novotny.
He describes in detail the causes of the
change of leadership in 1968 and dis-
Cusses the extraordinary rapidity with
which the people, after years of totali-
tarian indoctrination, embraced their
new-found freedom. He analyses the
new government's Action Programme
and gives the first full summary in
English of this important- document.
Then he follows the exciting develop-
ments of June to August, up to the
return of the Czechoslovak leaders to
Prague after the Russian invasion, while
the world anxiously watches the out-
come of the 'compromise' arrived at in
Moscow.
This is a book by a man passionately
committed to Czechoslovak freedom;
who has seen many of his friends in
historical and psychological, of the Czech politics disappear in the Nazi
1968 upheaval. holocaust, others vanish in the Com-
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among the country's new liberal leaders.
It is both a political narrative and a
personal testimony.
KURT WE1SSKOPF was born in 1907,
a doctor's son in an industrial town in
North Bohemia, and became a socialist
revolutionary at an early age. After grad-
uating in law and economics at Prague
University, he was employed as eco-
nomic research officer in the progressive
Private Employees' Union, and in this
capacity met many of the Czechoslovak
leaders of the future. When the Ger-
mans occupied Prague he escaped to
Britain at_ul joined the Czechoslovak
army in exile. He fought in France in
1940 and took part in the invasion of
the continent in 1944. He returned to
Britain in 1945 and worked as a railway
porter, a filing clerk and a stallholder
in a street market before entering his
present occupation of financial and
economic journalist. He took British
citizenship in 1949 and lives in London
with his English wife, whom he married
In 1940. This Is his first book.
6
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4. Rodnick, David. The Strangled Democracy Czechoslovakia
1948-1969. The Caprock Press, Lubbock, Texas, 1970.
CPYRGHT
PREFACE
This study of the Czechs and Slovaks is the result of two visits my wife and I
made to Czechoslovakia, one in 1948 and the other in 1969. In 194.7 we had
-spent seven months doing research in the Czech and Slovak Unit of the Columbia
University Project in Contemporary Cultures in New York City. By NoVember we
had become convinced that the internal situation in Czechoslovakia Was soirncertain
that, if we were to continue our researches there as we had planned, then We would
have to hasten our arrival. In December 1947 we obtained a year's visa, and with
the help of the late Ruth Benedict secured a grant from the Social Science Research
Council. We arrived in Prague in late January 1948 and remained for ten months
until the end of November.
During these ten months we visited 53 cities, towns, and villages in ?hernia,
Moravia, and SloVakia, where we talked with 492 individuals on an aver* of two
to four times. These included 71 farmers, 87 workers, 138 artisans, shopkeepers,
clerks andopminor administrative officials, and 196 doctors, lawyers, engineers,
teachers, officials, factory managers, and former wealthy businessmen. We visited
schools in town and country from nursery school to university level, including
apprentice classes in six factories. Through the cooperation of the Ministry of
Education, we were able to observe 70 classrooms and to visit with some 2,132
pupils and students from the ages of 3 to 22. Of these, we interviewed 608 more
intensively on their family life, attitudes, and problems.
An original manuscript covering our field studyin Czechoslovakia was never
published, but from the vantage point of those findings we were able to foresee the
Prague Spring which arrived in the first seven months of 1968. In the fall of 1969
we returned to Czechoslovakia for two months and experienced the feeling that
we were resuming where we had left off in November 1948.
Most of the following chapters were part of our 1949 manuscript with the
exception of those segments dealing with events and observations since 1948. We
have added nothing to our original observations and hope that the reader will agree
that they are still timely: despite Communism, the cultures of the Czechs and
Slovaks have changed very little.
My wife has been as interested hi compiling this manuscript as 1.
She was with me on the Columbia University Project in Contemporary Cultures,
accompanied me on both trips to Czechoslovakia, and has spent many hours sifting,
typing, and editing materials. We both feel that its subject matter touches us all
as human beings.
' 5. Remington, Robert A. (ed.). Whiter in Prague: Documents
on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis. The Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, Eng1aria7-1969. The original sources
compiled in this volume, many of which have not previously been
available in English, will allow students of communism to examine
more closely both the substance of change in Czechoslovakia prior
to Soviet intervention in August 1968 and the subsequent disarray
in the international Communist movement, Robin Remington has
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7
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CPYRGHT
selected documents to show, first, what was actually happening
in Czechoslovakia before invasion. How had what George Modelski
calls "Communist culture" with its own literature, syTbols, and
ritual behavior declined in Prague? This section includes major
statements on such questions as freedom of the press,the role
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Czech-Slovak constitutional
federation, the importance of interest groups within d'Communist
state, and the controversial Action Program of the neO,Dubcek
government. The second and third sections of the book contain
papers on Czechoslovak liberalization and orthodox reponse.
The documents show increasingly concerned Soviet and Zast
European reactions, pressures put on Prague, and negotiations,
which, failing, led to invasion. The book's fourth Section deals
with the invasion and the split in world communism. It shows
postinvasion justification from Moscow combined with deviant
reactions from other Communist parties. Specifically, documents
demonstrate where parties normally so far apart as the Chinese
and the French stood in relation to the invasion, and they discuss
reverberAions in Yugoslavia and Rumania, Cuba, North Vietnam, and
Italy; The text includes six cartoons from Czechoslovak journals,
seventy-two documents, and thirty-five commentaries by Robin Remington,
who is Research Associate in Communist Studies, M.T T Center for
International Studies
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LE MONDE1 Paris
2'May 1970
CPYRGHT
"'THE CONFESSION' by Costa-Gavras"
After the last picture has faded away and after the words "The End"
have disappeared from the screen, the viewer is left nonplIsed and mute
for a brief-instant, as if suspended between the nightmare1Which he has
just been through and a daily reality that slowly recovers its bearings.
That just about describes the emotional force. of this ilm, its power
of suggestion, to the point where it shakes up our nerves and wounds our
7conscience.
"Z", Costa-Gavras' preceding film, was a political pamphlet which
took the form of a tale of adventures. "Adventure" however completely
disappeared from "L'Aveu" [The Confession] and the pamphlet became a
tragedy, the tragedy of a man placed in contradiction with his most
intimate certainties, with his faith in an ideology which he never ceased
to serve and in whose name -- by some monstrous irony -- he was forced
even to deny hiftelf.
This is an authentic tragedy. Its hero is Artur London and "The
Confession" is directly inspired by the book which he pUblished in France
2 years ago, under the same title.
Artur London had been a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
since his youth; he fought in the International Brigades during the
Spanish Civil War; he joined the French Resistance soon after the armistice
and the Nazis deported him to Mauthausen. In 1951, Artur London was vice-
minister of foreign affaires of the Czechoslovak government. He held this
high office when he was arrested in Prague, held incommunicado, interrogated
and tortured for 22 months, and finally sentenced with 13 of his friends --
including Party Secretary-General Slansky -- on charges of "conspiracy
against the state." Sentenced to life imprisonment (11 of the accused were
,to be executed), Artur London was rehabilitated in 1956.
The film tells the principal episodes of London's imprisonment and
trial. Minutely and pitilessly, Costa-Gavras describes the means used by
the police machine to get the prisoner to confess (to "confess" what --
since he is innocent?), to force him step by step to feel that he is guilty.
What we are presented with here is a long series of days and nights running
into each other, a kind of abstract eternity, in the course of which his
shouting guards forced him ceaselessly to run around the few square yards of
lis cell, to sleep in "regulation position," to lap his food like an anithal,
Lo begin a hundred timeth over to tell his life's story under the pretext that
`le was wrong about some details.... What we see here is the systematic
iestruction of the vital forces, the intelligence, the memory, and the
reason of a human being. When truth and logic no longer make any sense,
when physical exhaustion is added to terror, humiliation, and total solitude,
even'the most courageous individual winds up by condemning himself. London
'confessed, just like all of his comrades. The trial could begin but it is
more like an "investigation" and it constitutes a grotesque parody of what
one normally understands by a trial.
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"The Confession" is essentially a political film and, beyond the crimes
committed by the hangmen of the Stalinist power, it denou4ce5 the perversion
of Communist ideals. But it never challenges the greatne0 and nobility of
this ideal. In his book, Artur London constantly states at he remained
faithful to Communism (at least to that faith of Communi4,which the Prague
Spring brouzu :Alt once again) and this fidelity of the aOrhor to the faith
of his youth is one of the keys to the film. To make surhat there will
be no misunderstanding, to make the dividing line between,dOntempt and
respect 'perfectly clear, Costa Gavras included in his tale Some parentheses
which come 10 years after London's release and which enablp the latter to
review his state of mind at the moment he wrote his book.f'
The film's last image
It takes,us back to Prague
.just invaded the capital.
seen writing the following
Have Gone Mad."
perfectly illustrates the significance of this
, but this time in 1968. The Russian troops have
On a brick wall, students and workers can be .
slogan in huge letters: "Lenin, Wake Up! They
Far from contradicting "Z", "The Confession" prolongs Costa Gavras'
preceding film The same menaces threaten the liberty of man on the right
and on the left and we know very well that political police officers used
(or are still using) Kafkaesque methods not only in the country of Kafka...,
From the strictly cinematographic viewpoint, "The Confession" in my
opinion was better than "Z". In this latter film (which won prizes in
Hollywood and elsewhere), there were some elemes of complacency which per-
haps were motivated by the manner in which the subject was treated and by
the characters (the "colonels" being considered here as buffoons). But in
"The Confession" everything is simple, serious, and painful. There are no
concessions here, no gratuitous effect. The movie is fastpaced, thus pre-
venting this tight nightmare from turning to monotony. In Jorge Semprun,
the scenario writer and author of the dialogues, Costa Gavras has found a
valuable collaborator and in Yves Montand, gaunt, bruised, fighting step
by step against his ultimate end, he has found a peerless character inter-
preter,. We can guess that both (the same is true of Simone Signoret who
plays the role of London's wife) were directly concerned with the theme of
"The Confession" and some of their personal emotion is expressed in the
movie.
The oppressing and. pain character of "The Confession' vill perhaps
prevent this movie from being as successful as "Z". That would be
infinitely regrettable.
*Ambassade,'Beirlitz, Images, Montparnasse, Pathe-Orleans, Convention,
C 2 L Versailles.
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CPYRGHT
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LE MONDE, Paris
2 May 1971
1 e cinema PAR JEAN DE BARONCEW
t.
r