CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 108
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
OCTOBER 1971
-- ` THE BERLIN AGREEMENT
- ,,,,SHIFTING THE UNITED NATIONS SCENARIO ON CHINA
ELECTION IN URUGUAY: CHALLENGE FROM THE LEFT
_--.---'=;;pSAMIZDAT: THE UNOFFICIAL SOVIET PRESS
DATES WORTH NOTING
SHORT SUBJECTS
SOVIET LEADERS PACK TRAVELING BAGS
CZECH UNDERGROUND MAKES ELECTION PLEA
MORALITY - SWEDISH GOVERNMENT STYLE
CHILE'S FREE PRESS IN DANGER
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ELECTIONS IN URUGUAY; 'TIS CHALLENGE FROM THE LEFT
1. Early this year, after several months' preparation, some
seventeen political movements and parties in Uruguay formed the
Frente - lio or Broad Front electoral alliance to support their
own leftist candidate in the presidential election scheduled for
28 November 1971. Of the groups making up the Front, the most
prominent include such traditional leftist organizations as the
Communist Party's front organization known as the Leftist Liberation
Front (FIdeL), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist
Party (PSU) and the Revolutionary Movement of Tram uav (,WO), plus
dissident factions from both the Colorado aac Blanco parties, which
have been the governing parties of Uruguay for more than one hundred
years. In composition and goals the Broad Front is strikingly
similar to the Popular Unity Front of President Salvador Allende
of Chile, and there is little doubt that the Uruguayan leftists
hope to follow his example and use similar methods to eventually
establish their own brand of socialism in Uruguay.
2. Since, by realistic estimates, the Broad Front is not
expected to win this election, I
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and thereby to attract the additional support it will need to pose
a major challenge in the 1976 elections. (Although there will
doubtless be public boasts of impending victory by Front supporters,
privately they are probably bearing in mind that in Chile Allende
ran for the presidency three times before he finally, if narrowly,
made it on the fourth try.)
3. Allende's victory in Chile, and the subsequently renewed
popularity of the united front concept facilitated the formation
of the Broad Front which the Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) views
as a potentially powerful force that will give impetus to attainment
of its own objectives. Although the coalition is putting up non-
Communist candidates for president and vice-president and the
Communist Party will probably remain-discreetly in the background,
it is certain to be the dotnuuu':ri-1 influence behind-the-scenes,
through.its own front groi (.F:deL). Already the influence of
the more extreme left is evident in such Front proposals as rejection
of the '.'dictates" of the International Monetary Fund, nationalization
of banks, and a moratorium on external debts. (Along with the Communist
Party of Chile, the Uruguayan party is one of the largest, best organized
and best financed parties in ', .tr. America. It has made modest but
steady political gains in the past fifteen years, due in large part
to the steadily deteriorating economy of Uruguay during these years.
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Nevertheless, because of its size,'discipline-and strong leader-
ship, other leftist parties feared-domination by the PCU and
therefore resisted its overtures to set up a political front until
the Popular Unity front won in'Chile a year ago.)
4. Although some experts have estimated that the Broad Front
could not win even twenty-five percent of the vote, conditions in
Uruguay have deteriorated sorapidly in recent months that if this
trend continues at the same accelerated pace, the Front could soon
gather significant, additional-support. The present goverment
should therefore be urged to take stringent, emergency measures
both in relation to Uruguay~s economy and its internal security.
(For three years President Jorge Pacheco has staked the future of
his government on~the two policies of economic stabilization and
uncompromising repressionof the Tupamaros, tine most effective
urban guerrilla organization in Latin America; it is trying,
through violence, to bring about a socialist revolution in Uruguay.
Not only has the government's economic program been increasingly
compromised by rising prices and wages, shortages, bankruptcies
and factory closings, but its policy of repressing terrorism was
badly undermined in early September by the successful prison break
of practically all of the Tupamaros under detention.)
5. Although direct participation of the Tupamaros in the Front
is unlikely, the terrorists wouldprobably not work actively against
a group that seeks to weaken the government-'which they also oppose.
The Front, on the other hand, will probably capitalize on its claim
that it is the only political group capable of communicating with
the Tupamaros and therefore of ultimately bringing an end to their
violence. While the Front will very likely have the support of
Tupamarosympathizers who have no other electoral alternative,
Tupamaro terrorism couldcreate a backlash of feeling against the
Front and a consequent loss of support for it.
6. If the Broad Front does make a credible showing in this
year's election, then, just as the-success of the Allende's Popular
Unity Front in Chile proved to'be an example to the Uruguayan left,
the Uruguayan experience would encourage disparate leftist groups
in other countries to reconcile their differences sufficiently to
form a popular electoral front and to choose and try to elect
candidates for high office.
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CUADERNOS DE MARCHA, Montevideo
March 1971
ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION OF FRENTE AMPLIO DISCUSSED
The precedents, conditions, and reflections that have led to the for-
mation of the Frente [Ampliol make up a long, ramified filament system,
like roots in the past. It is a topic for study that does not lend it-
self to simplications. But the proposing and organizing of the Frente
Amplio is a much more definite and precise process on which it is possible
to write very accurately and concisely, thus avoiding the whole annoying
problem of modesty and overevaluation.
The proposal to form the Frente was formulated by the Christian De-
mocratic Party on 23 June 1968, exactly 10 days after the emergency secu-
rity measures had been introduced, which later became a permanent system.
The measures had been adopted in the middle of a wild inflation, as a re-
sult of the climate of disaster created in the immediately preceding weeks
by the Acosta and Lara scandal, devaluation and faithlessness, all this
added to the frustration of the year of Gestido's administration.
Some thought at that time that the security measures were a tempo-
rary phenomenon. In the opinion of the Christian Democrats, they meant
a positive confession of impotence of the old political systems. At that
time, it fell our lot to state it publicly, on behalf of the party, in a
television message containing the essence of the diagnosis:
"The fact that this economic policy is maintained and the manner and
conditions in which it is maintained oblige usto recognize that behind the
economic crisis there is a political crisis. And that we shall not over-
come the economic crisis, if we do not overcome the political crisis. A
crisis of Uruguayan democracy, a crisis of Parliament, a crisis of the
electoral system. But substantially a crisis of the political parties.
"Today, everybody admits it. It suffices to recall some facts to
realize that this crisis of the parties is especially deep-seated.
"First fact. The Colorado [Liberal] Party had criticized that eco-
nomic policy severely for 8 years. The people believed that they were
voting against it when they voted for the Colorados. They viewed with
amazement all the feelers, contradictions, forward and backward movements
in the past year. And now, since November, they see that the same policy
that existed previously is being established again with determination and
firmness. This is causing tremendous confusion and tremendous frustration.
A few Colorado deputies have gone so far as to shout out in distress that
the citizenry was being cheated.
"Second fact. The Colorado Party is supporting the government,
saving its ministers in the'Chambers, voting for essential laws, but it
is not defending the policy., Deputy Cigliutti, Senator Vasconcellos, Se-
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President o ruguay was
t.ion, a few days ago, against the government's economic policy, and he made
statements to the press that imply a very harsh, very bitter criticism of
this policy. On the other hand, if there are those, outside the Colorado
Party, who are in agreement with the broad features of that policy, voting
in the Chamber obviously does not reflect this. The votes are lost among
the smaller-scale political oppositions. We thought and everyone thinks
that parliamentary support of the government should stew from the convic-
tion of the members of parliament. Today we are witnessing a divorce be-
tween conviction and votes.
"Third fact. The executive branch, which is becoming more and more
separated from its political bases, forms its cabinets with men from bank-
ing, big business, and is showing itself to be increasingly more loyal to
its economic line, tied in with international agencies, which are being
consulted much more and informed much more and listened to much more than.
the legislature.
"Because the President disagrees radically with prominent persons
and influential leaders in his own party, or because he believes that they
cannot give him a base for governing, he is floating about with backing or
parliamentary support in an atmosphere of instability that is doing the
country serious harm.
"The big parties have lost their capability of representing the
will of the voter on the real problems being debated, and they have ceased
being useful instruments of government. And this is not by chance. This
is because years ago -- favored by electoral legislation and by the lema
law they became large voting cooperatives without common authorities,
without a common program, without any basic unification factor. And that
is now irreversible. The government association does not function, not
by chance but rather because it cannot move backward in the process of
several years."
And the answer to the diagnosis, the only possible one, which is
the Frente,solution, came immediately:,
"In view of that, we must state that it is possible, however, to
make a different policy. But, what happens to those of us who talk about
that policy? What does the public see of those of us who maintain that
it is necessary to govern on radically different bases, of those of us who
talk about implementing the agrarian reform without delay, of those of us
who talk about putting basic foreign trade items in the hands of the state,
of those of us who talk about making a controlled handling of exchange at
least for basic items, of those of us who talk about maintaining the buying
power of wages at all costs, of those of us who talk about so many topics
agreeing on the expressions? What does the public see? It sees us atomized,
pulverized, divided up among various parties, paralyzed frequently by party
discipline, and it realizes that this does not shape up a government solu-
tion. It does not form a different real possibility.
"It is imperative, in our opinion, to make that different policy.
We say that there even is more than one policy in opposition to the one
being implemented by the government.
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 Annrov B I P-11J 9fO9/ : j(QIA~R P379uVM4M@ ~ DO040W114s,
an y virtue TO
tat fact we come here today to ask publicly about this
which is one of the main ideas of this message: Is it or is it not possible
in this serious national emergency to unite around a minimum common program,
to join efforts to propose and support a different policy solution?
"That is to say, are those of us who disagree with the present line
capable of drawing up a minimum common program and of uniting our efforts
to defend and support the replacement of the present policy with a different
one?
"Because if they continue to see us totally dispersed, incapable of
supporting a different policy, the public may believe that there is no so-
lution and that we shall continue from election to election rotating the
big parties in the government, until total destruction is reached. And
the country cannot endure this course much longer."
Then the party called on the Chief Executive firmly to bring about
the dissolution of the Chambers by means of Articles 147'and 148 of the
Constitution and to hold new elections.
"It does not seem to us that we can afford the luxury of waiting
4 more years to consult the people, while we continue to deteriorate," the
message said.
This solution, which was about to take concrete form the following
year at the time of the censure against Peirano, aimed at a complete re-
statement of the political base, in order to face up to the crisis:
"We reaffirm our faith in that democratic policy that makes the
people the judge. But, in order for this judgment to have meaning, poli-
tical truth is-required. And that is another basic point. That is what
we are calling for. Beyond old party disciplines, he who agrees with the
:broad lines of the present policy must of necessity support the government,
must support it in the Chambers, must stake everything on it and spend him-
self with it, and must answer to the people. And the government must know on
whom it can count and the people must know who supports it. And those who
propose a different policy must agree on a minimum common program and stake
everything against the government to change the policy, to provide another,
different solution. Without going through this political truth, popular
elections have no meaning and there is no democratic solution.
"It may be said: what happens then to the big parties? Many great
decisions have been taken in Uruguay disregarding the officials of the big
parties. Dividing them transversally, in a certain way. In 1933, the coup
d'etat confronted Blancos [Conservatives] with Blancos and Colorados with
Colorados. The 1942 reform likewise. The establishment of the collegiate
system likewise. And the latest constitution reform, within the memory
of everyone, was by the agreement of Colorado and Blanco groups against
Blancos, Colorados and other political groups. It is nothing new for men
of various parties to rally around a real problem to provide it with a
real solution required by the country, when the whole party cannot pro-
vide those solutions.
"But those were temporary solutions and this is a much more perma-
nent problem.
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"we are convinced that the solutions to the ruguaya
divide the big parties necessarily transversally, because they no longer
represent solutions. This problem is very permanent and of great dimen-
sions. For years, we have been revolving around this pin of the economic
crisis, without being able to free ourselves from it and we shall not be
free of it in any way for a long time."
The message was not a mere expression of opinion, but rather the
start of a political operation on which there was to be patient insistence
for 3 years. Copies of that text were presented to representatives of the
political groups identified as opposition and formal interviews were re-
quested, some of which were held and others could not be obtained or turned
into informal talks.
The idea began again to be treated systematically during 1969, and
in December of that year we took advantage of the offer of an interview in
Marcha to restate the proposal publicly, putting forth then more details,
particularly with regard to program.
We answered the question of whether the crossroads of the nation's
politics might give rise to a great popular front as follows:
"It can, and in my opinion it must, give rise to a common front.
The economic crisis and the reply to the economic crisis, the dictatorship
and the reply to the dictatorship are the major political problems at
present. And they will not be solved in one spell or in one term of go-
vernment administration. They will occupy the country for a good number
of years.
"How are we to move forward, if we do not join the maximum backing
of the people in :support of a political force capable of performing the
task? It is necessary to remove from command the White and Colorado po-
litical right, the economic oligarchy, and the foreign powers that are
attempting to manipulate us like something of theirs. But, in order not
to incur anarchy and the conflicts of the last few administrations, we have
to pull the country out of the crisis by transforming it thoroughly by
democratic ways and in a truly national and popular direction. And this
is not done without coordination of programs and actions, and without the
massive backing of organized people.
"That is the great task. If we advance in that direction, the suf-
ferings and bitter experiences of this Pacheco period will not be lost.
If we confuse the people, if we attempt to make the people forget, if,
when we draw and set up a government, we again let government and opposi-
tion votes and subservient and combative votes be turned over and added
together, we make a mockery of the suffering of the people and we post-
pone the solution of the nation's problems."
After recalling the 23 June message, we added:
"Someone once described us as ingenuous because of this proposal,
alleging that groups of the same political party, diametrically opposed
in the very serious events of this period, will, however, join their
votes in the long run. I do not now want to talk of probabilities. I am
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 A 3~ '1. ~. Y. :c wasn't always so. This sri rust
Of south American nations, and a country
co :;,.regarded as the Switzerland of the
Southern Hemisphere, used to boast a
high standard of living, political stability,
and social mobility of a broad order.
Eut those days of heady enthusiasm
over Uruguay have vanished. Uruguay
today is a nation of fear and uncertainty.
The Tupamaros, the urban guerrillas,
have grown increasingly strong in, the last
two years, are practically a paraiiel gov-
ernment to established authority invested
in President Jorge Pacheco Areco. The
daring escape of 106 Tuparnares from a
Montevideo jail through a newly dug tun-
nel is evidence of Just how strc ici the
Tularnaros have become and how. efec-
tive they can be. But evc!n more anpres-
ive is the grip of terror in which their
ic.:vities have placed the bulk of the
tiruguayrn population. Bel;r:ld the oivth
of the Tupamaros is the steadily =orscn-
il,,; picture of Uruguay's econor.y a,1c.
political structure.
T"-.,- economy has sll'~~4 i C: sec :aa~; . ..1C'
Past 20 years and Uruguayans tc.
only a small evidence of their orlce strong
.,conomic position, Ururruav may still be a
1111ddie-class ration, but i;, i.i faded ;toddle
si,ildlcd with debt and an
inflation- ; s;iral that has eaten away most sav-
~~; 0f L e brobjc i sterns from s0-
ci11i woiffare schemes, arlopted at a time
-1 ~e..: Z..IC wheat wen-, prime exports,
.1+:d Uruy-uay's rln,.ncial coffers were full.
ibday Ur,,, Mur:v can no longer pay for the
iii.cu y 01 social w ifare in which people,
or