CIA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES NOVEMBER 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 87
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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November 1971
THE UBIQUITOUS KGB
"At the rate KGB agents are flowing back to the motherland,"
quipped one magazine, "Moscow's perennial housing shortage may
soon become critical." In September Oleg Lyalin, member of the
Soviet Trade Mission in London exposed the espionage activities,
including plans for sabotage, that sent packing 105 Soviet officials.
Then, early in October Anatole Chebotarev, a reputed friend of
Lyalin's and a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Brussels,
first disappeared and then five days later surfaced in England to
give Western intelligence officers a list of KGB and GRU (special
military espionage) agents operating out of Brussels. By mid-month,
the Belgian Foreign Ministry announced that, as a result of
Chebotarev's revelations, Soviet officials would be quietly
expelled,
In England, Lyalin exposed and Her Majesty's Government
expelled, officials in just about every phase of Soviet activity
in that country: the Embassy, Trade Mission, Inturist Travel Agency,
Moscow Narodny Bank of London, Sovexportfilm, and other commercial
organizations. In Belgium, NATO circles have confirmed that
Chebotarev and his former coworkers from the Trade Mission and
such commercial organizations as Sovflot, Aeroflot, Sovexportfilm,
the Scaldia-Volga (a Soviet-Belgian "joint venture" enterprise) auto
plant, Belso, etc., were snooping around NATO in Brussels and the
headquarters of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in
Europe) in Casteau, near Mons. At this writing, it is thought
that, on the basis of information from Chebotarev, The Hague
might act to put an end to Soviet espionage activities in
Brunssum, The Netherlands, where AFCENT (Allied Forces in
Central Europe) is based.
The decisions to go ahead with the recent mass evictions of
Soviet officials from London with a blast of trumpets instead of
removing them quietly a few at a time, was undoubtedly taken in
the hope that this would shock the Soviets into behaving less
presumptuously. Britain had already announced the expulsion of
three Soviet spies earlier in the year.* And, according to the
London Daily Telegraph of 21 April 1971, the year before Britain
had demanded the withdrawal of seven Soviet diplomats (one from
the Embassy and six from the Trade Mission) and had refused to
*Daily Telegraph, London, of 22 and 23 June carried articles
descri the expulsion of three Soviet diplomats:
Dmitriy Sorokin, Lev Sherstnev, and Valeriy Chusovitin.
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accept ten others (four for the Embassy and six for the Trade
Mission). The expelled diplomats were thought to have been
after industrial rather than military secrets and the ten
refused admittance were suspected of having similar missions.
Their exclusion was a clear signal to Moscow that British
security services were not only alert to the activities of Soviet
officials already in London, but also that they had dossiers on
other Soviet officials being groomed for espionage of one kind or
another. In Moscow, the signal was either ignored or misinterpreted.
Many Western government officials have expressed the opinion
that Soviet espionage activity in Western Europe was increasing in
direct proportion to the USSR's growing economic involvement with
that area and its stepped-up propaganda and political action pro-
grams in support of the Soviet version of "European Security."
The September and October revelations cannot help but bolster
this argument. Nevertheless, based on other instances of ex-
pulsions announced so far this year, Soviet spying and subversion-
fomenting on a world-wide scale has not been curtailed because of
the KGB's stepped-up activities in Western Europe.
Signals from Kinshasa's General Mobutu have also been
misread in Moscow. Soviet meddling in internal Congolese affairs
has already twice caused the Congo to sever diplomatic
relations with the USSR. Yet, again this year General Mobutu was
forced to take action: in mid-July some 20 diplomats and non-
diplomatic staff members of the Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish and
other East Bloc foreign missions were expelled because of their
suspected involvement in the June Kinshasa University disorders
that eventually resulted in mass arrests and the temporary shut-
down of the university. The existence of a subversive student
network and the role of European Communist functionaries in
fomenting trouble within them were revealed by Bence Con olaise de
Presse on 5 August, but the names of those expelled were not
revealed.
Accra still remembers Soviet Embassy influence over former
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and how the only opposition
to the coup of February 1966 --- which was staged largely to
prevent any increase of that influence --- came from the
Soviet-trained Presidential Guard that had been set up outside of
army'control. Twenty members of the Soviet Embassy were then
expelled along with nearly 1,000 Soviet technicians and their
dependents. In 1967, Ghana was forced to expel two Soviet press
representatives from Novosti and Pravda because they were
"committing slanderous propaganda 'against the country" and
working to get Nkrumah back in power.
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This year, so far, the Government of Ghana has again been
driven to the extreme measure of ousting two Soviet diplomats.
The first deportee was Embassy Counselor Valter Vinogradov who
was apprehended in Accra with cabinet documents in his pocket.
After much diplomatic bargaining, the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry
agreed not to publicize the Vinogradov case in exchange for the
Soviet Ambassador's pledge that his staff would refrain from
further subversion in Ghana. However, as the Accra Dail
Graphic :reported on 23 July, "before this cloak and g r
episode could be buried," another Soviet spy, Trade Mission
official Gennadiy Potemkin had been caught red-handed with
secret documents ferreted out of special branch files.
Although Potemkin was not a diplomat, he was using a diplomatic
car at the time of his arrest and at first claimed diplomatic
immunity, giving his name as Butsan. Potemkin had a diplomatic
identity card in the name of Anatoliy Butsan, who left Ghana in
1966 and who had been deported from the Congo in 1963.
In late July the Sudanese Communist Party, evidently with
the advice and support of Soviet officials, staged a coup against
the Numairy regime. After being restored to power, Numairy had
the chief plotters, including the leaders of the Sudanese
Communist Party arrested, courtmartialed and executed. Some
1,500 Communists reportedly were arrested. In the face of
harsh criticism of the purge by the Soviet press, the Numairy regime
charged the Soviets with complicity and expelled the Soviet
Ambassador, Anatoliy Nikolayev and Embassy Counselor Mikhail
Orlov. Nikolayev was reportedly the only foreign envoy to have
met with the coup plotters during the brief period that they were
in power and Orlov was charged with contacting the local
Communists who staged the coup.
During March the Government of Mexico expelled five Soviet
diplomats involved in training students in guerrilla warfare.
They were Minister-Counselor and Charge d'Affaires Dmitriy A.
Dyakonov, First Secretary Boris Kolomyakov, Second Secretary
Oleg M. Nechiporenko, and member of the Soviet Commercial Office
Aleksandr V. Bolshakov. On 15 March just preceding the govern-
ment's expulsion action, Mexico's Attorney General Sanchez
Vargas announced that the Mexican police had broken up a Communist
plot against the government and had arrested 19 terrorists at
"guerrilla academies" and hideouts. The P:Zexican students had
been sent to East Germany and the Soviet Union and from there
to a military base in North Korea for training in sabotage
and terrorism. Some had received scholarships to Patrice
Lunumba University under the Mexican-Soviet cultural exchange
program. Soviet involvement in this case is vividly told by John
Barron in "The Soviet Plot to Destroy Mexico," Readers Digest,
November 1971.
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In Ecuador it did not take long for the heavy hand of Soviet
subversion to reveal itself following the establishment of
Soviet-Ecuadorian diplomatic relations in June 1970. By July of
the next year, the Government of Ecuador had to expel three Soviets
"for interference in internal affairs." They were: Embassy
Counselor Anatoliy M. Shadrin and Embassy First Secretary,
Robespier N. Filatov, both of whom left Ecuador on 6 July. The
Third, Soviet Permanent Trade Mission Chief Economist Valentin
A. Goluzin, was on home leave at the time and was not permitted
to return. Following the announcement of the government's ex-
pulsion action, Guayaquil daily El Universo reported that the
government had proof that the Soviet intelligence officials
had financed a strike planned by the Confederation of Ecuadorian
Workers (CTE), with the objective of bringing down the Government
of President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra and replacing it with
a left-wing military dictatorship, It was revealed that the
Soviets had passed money to the CTE through Jose Solis,
correspondent of TASS news agency in Guayaquil.
In Italy, Milan's Corriere Della Sera of 5 September 1971,
reported that the Soviet Commercial Attache in Rome, Ilya
Butakov, had been quietly expelled from Italy three months
previously. After his departure, security o ficials had found
out that Butakov was a missile expert who had been sent to Italy
to gather data on electronic systems in missiles and tanks.
Earlier in the year, the 19 February issues of Rome dailies Il
Tempo and Messaggero carried the announcement that Italian security pol ci Tad uncovered evidence that Valenin P. Kovanov,
Soviet Embassy First Secretary, was involved in espionage activities.
Kovanov had been officially expelled two days before.
Thus, as of the end of October, close to 200 Soviet agents have
been sent home this year to face the wrath of KGB Chief Yuriy
Andropov, who in turn must face the wrath of his chiefs on the
Politburo. The London spy purge, of course, has been the most
devastating for the Kremlin with other West European actions coming
in a very close second. There will be an element of calculation
in whatever the Kremlin decides to do in retaliation -- but the
overriding objective will be to try to sow dissension among
Western allies. Brezhnev's almost obsessive interest in the
projected European security conference suggests that reprisals
against West Europeans will not be on a scale to prejudice this
pet objective. Reprisals elesewhere would be minimal -- Moscow
risks losing too much if London's "spy purge" becomes too
popular a diplomatic gambit. The way, of course, for the Soviets
to keep expulsions at a minimum is simply to voluntarily trim their
representations down to acceptable size. Of course, to Yuriy
Andropov, espionage is an end in itself -- and, in the long run,
Soviet reaction is going to hinge on how firmly Brezhnev can talk
to Andropov.
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November 1971
SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG)
February -
October-1971:U
Count of Origin .
Type of
Country from
Month:
SSR an Name:
Assignment:
which . expelled:
AKIMOV, Anatoliy
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Ivanovich
AZAROV, Ivan
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Pavlovich
BUTAKOV, Ilya
Commercial
Italy
Petrovich
Attache
C[-IERNETSOV, Yuriy
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Yevgeniyevich
CHUSOVITIN, Valeriy Diplomatic United Kingdom
Jun
Stepanovich
FILATOV, Robespier
Diplomatic
Ecuador
Nikolayevich
FILATOV, Vladimir
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Gerasimovich
GENERALOV,Vsevolod Diplomatic United Kingdom
Sep
Nikolayevich
GOLUBOV, Sergey~
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Mikhailovid
GOLUZIN, Valentin
Trade Mission
Ecuador
Andreyevich
KARYAGIN, Viktor
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Vasilyevich
KHODZHAYEV, Yuriy
Sovexportfilm
United. Kingdom
Sep
Tigranovich
KOLODYAZHNYY, Boris Diplomatic United Kingdom
Sep
Georgiyevich
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KOVANOV, Valentin
Diplomatic
Italy
Pavlovich
KUTUSOV, Yevgeniy
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Ignatiyevich
KUZNETSOV, Georgiy
Publisher,
United Kingdom
Sep
Aleksandrovich
Embassy weekly
Soviet News
LAPTEV, Igor
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Konstantinovich
LEONTIYEV, Leonid
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Antonovich
NIKOLAYEV, Anatoliy Diplomatic Sudan
Jul
Nikolayevich
ORLOV, Mikhail G.
Diplomatic
Sudan
Aug
PETROVICHEVA,
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Emilya
Alekseyevna
POTEMKIN, Gennadiy
Trade Mission
Ghana
Petrovich
PRONIN, Vasiliy
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Ivanovich .
SHADRIN, Anatoliy
Diplomatic
Ecuador
Mikhaylovich
SHERSTNEV, Lev
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Jun
Nikolayevich
SKOPTSOV, Ivan
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Vasiliyevich
SOROKIN, Dmitriy
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Jun
Ivanovich
VAYGAUSKAS,
Diplomatic
United Kingdom
Sep
Richardas
Konstantinovich
VINOGRADOV, Valter
Diplomatic
Ghana
May
Vladimirovich
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STERLIKOV, Aleksey
Petrovich
Diplomatic
Switzerland
1970
STUDENIKOV,. Igor
Diplomatic
Congo (Kinshasa)
1970
TARASENKO, Sergey
Ivanovich
Embassy Engineer
Ghana
1966
TIKHOMIROV,
Aleksandr
Vasilyevich
United Nations
1970
TSYGANOV, Vladimir
Ilich
Diplomatic
West Germany
1969
TUMANOV, Boris G.
UTKIN, Stanislav
Grigoryevich
Diplomatic
Congo (Kinshasa)
Norway
1970
VALYALIN, Fedor
Fedorovich
VASILYEV, Vladimir
Diplomatic
Attache, Soviet
Trade Mission
Congo (Kinshasa)
Lebanon
1970
YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr Commercial
Ivanovich
Kenya
YANGAYKIN,; Sergey
Alekseyevich
YELISEYEV, Viktor
Alekseyevlch
YUKALOV, Yuriy
Alekseyevich
ZAKIIAROV, Albert
M.
ZAKHAROV,
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Novosti
Uruguay
Kenya
Kenya
Greece
Kenya
Venyamin D.
ZAMOYSKIY, Lolily
Izyestiya
Italy
Petrovich
ZHEGALOV, Leonid
Nikolayevich
Press Corps
United States
1970
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ZINKOVSKIY,
Yevgeniy V.
Commercial
Ghana
1966
ZUDIN, Aleksey
Aleksandrovich
Diplomatic
Uruguay
1966
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THE RUSSIAN SECRET POLICE, Excerpts
Ronald. Hingley
Hutchinson & Company, LTD
178-202 Great Portland Street, London,
Late 1964. saw an important change in the public posture of the
KGB as the organisation embarked on an intensified publicity
campaign designed to glorify exploits hitherto shrouded in secrecy.
This involved advertising the deeds of Soviet spies who had so far
rated as unspics-as when, for instance, the British defectors
Burgess and Maclean had been paraded (in 1956) to proclaim in
all solemnity that they had never engaged in espionage.' Now,
twenty years after his execution by the Japanese, the Soviet
inaster-spy Richard Sorge had his cover blown by the Soviet
advertising machine and was posthumously created a Hero of the
Soviet Union for his wartirne and pre-war spying exploits. He also
had a tanker and a Moscow street named after hind, and appeared
frill-face on a new four-copeck stamp specially designed in his
lionour.2 Thus, from having no spies at all, the Soviet Union
suddenly turned out to have the best spies in the world, no doubt
as part of a campaign to encourage Soviet agents still in the field
after their morale had been shattered by the revelation of Pen-
kovsky's revelations, as also by the arrest of their colleagues George
Blake and Gordon Lonsdale in England, and of Stif Wenncrstrom
in Sweden. Another Soviet hero-spy was acknowledged when
Chairman Scmichastny wrote in honour of Colonel Rudolf Abel
in Pravda of 7 May 1965-the first occasion on which Abel was
officially honoured, an exchange having been effected between
him and the American U2 pilot Gary Powers in 1961.
Another exchanged Soviet spy, Colonel Konon Molody alias
Gordon Lonsclale, published a book in English, Spy, about his
professional activities after an unsuccessful attempt had allegedly
been made to trade two British-held Soviet spies, the Krogers, for
a promise to withhold these inflammatory memoirs from publica-
tion.3 Lonsdalc's crudely propagandistic saga has a certain import-
ance as the first example of such material emanating from an
avowed Soviet agent. That the entire text has been KGB-vetted
may be inferred, and it need hardly be said that the material must
be treated with caution. The same is true of My Silent War, the
more polished memoirs of the formerly English Soviet intelligence
agent Kim Philby. These received publication in 1968, five years
after the author had obtained political asylum in the USSR and
Soviet citizenship, as announced in Izvestiya on 31 July 1963- On
1. Trevor-Roper, p.24 (Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 'The Philby Affair',-Encounter
(London), April 1968, pp. 3-26).
2. Deakin and Storry, p.350 (Deakin, F.W. and Storry, G.R.;'The Case of
Richard Sorge (London, 1966).
3. Trevor-Roper, p.24 (op. cit.)
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z() 1)cccmbcr 1()(i7 the sane newspaper published an article
`Hello, Comrade Philby', quoting the veteran master-spy in praise
of Dzerzhinsky as a `great humanist'-the formula commonly
applied in Soviet parlance to successful sponsors of mass killings.
Philby's views on his own former chiefs Mcnzhinsky, Yagoda,
,Yc hov and Bcria are unfortunately not available. They would
have been particularly valuable in the light of certain circum-
stra.,.ces outlined in earlier chapters, for it was at about the time of
Philby's original recruitment that his ultimate superior Yagoda
was, according to official Soviet record, engaged in murdering or
attempting to murder Mcnzhinsky and Yczhov, his immediate pre-
cursor and follower as security police overlords. Meanwhile the
future police chief Beria was (aga. 1 .-.,cording to official doctrine)
secretly in league with Britain-the very country which his under-
ling, the still youthful Philby, had so blithely congratulated him-
self on betraying. In this context Philby's comment on his reason
for enlisting as a Soviet intelligence: agent ('One does not look
twice at an offer of enrolment in an Elite. force') 4 seems to carry a
certain pungency all of its own.
Be that as it may, the main purpose of the new publicity given to
Philby and to the KGB in general was to demoralise and intimi-
date the non-Communist world by creating the impression of an
_`ubiquitous KGB man . . . dedicated servant of an international
government', who `moves like a superior being, irresistible, among
the ill-guarded, guilty secrets of the divided West'. In this cam-
paign by the KGB various `capitalist' newspapers showed an
eagerness to co-operate which appeared to confirm Soviet claims
of western decadence in an alarming degree.
The 1zvrs1.b,a interview with Philby formed only a small part of
elaborate celebrations staged on and about 20 December 1967 in
honour of the Soviet security machine's fiftieth birthday. Along
with eminent spies, domestic agents too were honoured, including
four elderly Chckists-survivors of the anti-Leninist White Terror,
as also of the Stalinist great terror in which so many of their
colleagues had &1R-In. Probably selected for their benevolent facial
expressions, thcs, former hunters of Bruce Lockhart and Boris
Savinkov beam down like elderly uncles from the pages of Pravda
as if in assurance that all is for the best in the best of all possible
worlds. So much for the small fry. On a more august level the
crowning point of the KGB's jubilee was a speech by Chairman
Andropov in the presence of Politburo-members, including
Shelcpin and other notabilities. Shclcpin received no personal
tribute in Andropov's speech. Nor was any other head of the
4. Philby, p. xxi (Philby, Kim, My Silent War (New York, 1968).
5. Trevor-Roper, p.25 (op. cit.)
6. Pravda, 20 December 1967.
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YASAKOV, Vyacheslav Diplomatic United Kingdom Sep
Aleksandrovich
ZAVORIN, Ivan Inturist United Kingdom Sep
Panfilovich*
ZOTOV, Konstantin Diplomatic United Kingdom Sep
*An article in the Daily Mail, 9 October 1971, erroneously
lists ZAVORIN as "ZUBARIN."
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SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA'(PNG)
1766 -71:
A total of 95 officials, of whom 55 were under commercial, trade,
or other non-diplomatic cover.
Country of Origin.
Type of
country ~f~__room~m
(USSR) and Name:
Assignment:
which exp led:
ABRAMOV, Vlldimir
Trade Mission
Mikhaylovich
AGADZHANOV, Eduard
Commercial
Kenya
B.
AKHMEROV, Robert
Diplomatic
Ghana
Isaakovich
ALEKSANDROV,
Embassy employee
Italy
Vladimir Ivanovich
ANDREYEV, Igor
Diplomatic
United Nations
Ivanovich
BOROVINSKIY, Petr
Diplomatic
West Germany
Fedorovich
DOGOMATSKIKH, Pravda
Kenya
Mikhail Georgiyevich
DUSHKIN, Yuri A.
Trade Mission
United Kingdom
FEDERENKO, Gennadiy
Diplomatic
Austfia
Gavrilovich
GLADKIY, Nikolay
Diplomatic
Ghana
Ivanovich
GLOTOV, Viktor N.
Diplomatic
Uruguay
GLUKHOV, Vladimir
Aeroflot
Netherlands
A.
GLUKI-IOVSKIY,
Trade Mission
Vasiliy
Vasilyevich
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IVANOV, Nikolay Diplomatic
Iosifovich
KAMAYEV, Yevgeniy Diplomatic
Borisovich
KATAYEV, Valeriy Diplomatic
V.
KAZANTSEV,.Aleksey Novosti
N.
KHOMYAKOV,
Aleksandr
Sergeyevich.
KISAMEDINOV,
Maksut
Mustarkhovich
KISELEV, Ivan
Pavlovich
Press Officer
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
KOBYSH, Vitally
Ivanovich
KOGHEGAROV,
Yevgeniy
Mikhaylovich
KODAKOV, Vladimir
Alexsandrovich
KOPYTIN, Viktor
Vasilyevich
KOROVIKOV,
Valentin I.
KOZLOV, Yuriy
Nikolayevich
Izvestiyaa and
Ra i~io Moscow
Official of
International
Telecommunications
Union, United
Nations
Diplomatic
TASS
Pravda
Diplomatic
Mj,'VOLAPOV, Viktor Trade Mission
S.
KURITSYN, Yuriy
Vasilyevich
Uruguay
Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
Lebanon
Kenya
United States
Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
Kenya
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LADYGIN, Anatoli Attache/Press
I Information
Officer
Uruguay
LAPUSHENKO, Instructor
Nikolay
Ivanovich
LAVRUSHKO, Igor P. Technical Expert
LEBEDEV, Sergey Diplomatic
Mikhaylovich
LEMZENKO, Kir Trade Mission
Gavrilovich
LOGINOV, Vladimir Engineer on
A, Trade Mission
MALININ, Aleksey Diplomatic
Romanovich
MAMONTOV, Yuriy Trade Mission
Leonidovich
MAMURIN, Leonid Commercial
Aleksandrovich
MATUKHIN, Georgi Trade Mission
G,
MATVEYEV, Viktor TASS
Ivanovich
MATYUSHIN, Anatoliy TASS
Nikolayevich
MEDNIKOV, Viktor Labor Specialist
Nikolayevich on TDY
MESROPOV, Valeriy Commercial
Moiseyevich
MONAKHOV, Diplomatic
Konstantin
Petrovich
NETREBSKIY, Boris Novosti and
Pavlovich Diplomatic
Norway
Italy
United Kingdom
United States
Argentina
Thailand
Uruguay
Ethiopia
Ghana
Mexico
Norway
Italy
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RANOV, Nikolay
Aeroflot
Cyprus
KEVIN, Valentin
Aiekseyevich
ROZHKO, Gennadi A.
RYABOV, Yuri:
Diplomatic
Trade Mission
Inturist
United States
Italy
Argentina
Ivanovich
SAVICH, Boris
Trofimovich
SAVIN, Ni.koiay
Andreyevich
SERGEYEV, Vladimir
Yefimovich
SHARAYEV, Vladimir
Ivanovich
SHAROVATOV,
Vladimir
Semonovich
SHELENKOV, Albert
A.
SHPAGIN, Mikhail
Mikhaylovich
SHEETS, Vladimir
Commercial
Diplomatic
Labor Specialist
on TDY
Interpreter at
Soviet Permanent
Exhibition
Embassy Employee
Diplomatic
Trade Mission
Diplomatic
Belgium
Switzerland
Mexico
Ethiopia
Ghana
West Germany
Uruguay
1966
Fedorovich
SILIN, Boris A.
SIMANTOVSKIY,
Attache's Driver:
Diplomatic
Ghana
Congo (Kinshasa)
1970
Oleg
Vladimirov.ich
SMIRNOV, Leonid
Vasilyevich
SOLYAKOV, Leonid
Dmitriyevich
Diplomatic
Kenya
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NOMOKONOV,
Vladimir P.
NOVIKOV, Mikhail
Technical Expert
Ethiopia
OBOLENTSEV, Fedor
R.
OBUKHOV, Aleksey
Aleksandrovich
OGORODNIKOV,
Anatoli T.
OREKHOV, Boris
TASS
Diplomatic
TASS
Pravda
Libya
Thailand
Belgium
United States
Mikhailovich
ORLENKO, Vladimir
Ivanovich
OSHURKOV, Ignor
Pavlovich
OVECHKIN, Vladimir
Yevgenyevich
PASHKOV, Y.V.
PETRIN, Boris M.
PETROV, Ivan
Yaklovlevich
PETRUK, Boris
Georgiyevich
PODKILZIN, Boris
Doorkeeper
Commercial
TASS
Technical Expert
Diplomatic
Official of
International
Telecommunications
Union, United
Nations
Instructor
Diplomatic
Ghana
Greece
Ghana
India
Cyprus
Ghana
Congo (Kinshasa)
1970
POPOV, Nikolay
Sergeyevich
PUCHKOV, Aleksandr
Nikolayevich
Diplomatic
Press Officer
for World Health
Organization,
United Nations
Ghana
Denmark
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security machine so honoured, excepting only the organisation's
first: two chiefs: Dzcrzhinsky and Mcnzhinsky, the saintly and the
unobtrusive Pole. Thus Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria were passed
over in silence apart from an oracular reference to political adven-
turers in the NKVD who had once committed unlawful acts,
attempting to remove the State security agencies from the Party's
control. In stressing the primacy of Party over police, Andropov's
statement was especially typical of post-Beria etiquette for KGB
Chairmen. Characteristic too was the devotional language in
which Andropov referred to the typical Chekist as `a man of pure
honesty and enormous personal courage, implacable in the
struggle against enemies, stern in the name of duty, humanc and
prepared to sacrifice himself for the people's cause'.a Such was the
post-Stalinist projection of the KGB officer-that of a., jovial padre
with a core of steel, an image rcinforctd by the numerous hagio-
graphics of the butcher Dzcrzhinsky which began to flood the
presses.
In the summer of 1969 the KGB brought off yet another iiotableT
coup by prevailing on the British government to exchange the
Krogcrs (Soviet spies who had received long prison sentences in
Great Britain in ig6i for their part in the Portland Case) for a
British lecturer in Russian, Mr Gerald Brooke, who had been
condemned to five years' imprisonment in 1965 by a Moscow
court for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Since his release
from the Soviet Union Mr Brooke has -published newspaper
ow his arrest and trial came about.21 At the
articles describing how-his-
behest of NTS, the Russian anti-Soviet organisation of which men-
tion has been made above, he had smuggled into the Soviet Union
certain material concealed in a photographic album and dressing-
.case. He was, accordingly, guilty as charged, though the possi-
bility cannot be discounted that the mysterious `George' (who
had recruited him to carry this compromising material to Russia
in the first place) was an agent provocateur acting on behalf of the
KGB. Be that as it may, the KGB appears to have set itself from
the start to use Brooke as a human lever to extort the release of
the Krogcrs. As part of this campaign he was deliberately pro-
duced in emaciated condition during one of his wife's visits, and
was also prevailed upon by his captors to write to some London
newspapers urging the Krogcrs' release in exchange for his own.
\Vheii these tactics failed, the prisoner was threatened witha new
trial on the more serious charge of espionage. He was informed
that this would be backed in court by the evidence of the formerly
English KGB spy Philby (now resident in Moscow), who would
testify that the NTS was in the pay of British intelligence. These
newly concocted espionage activities related to conversations be-
21. Brooke, passim (Brooke, Gerald, Articles if 'ThePeople (London),
3, 10, 17 and 24 August 1969.)
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tween roo ?e an certain other prisoners in a concentration camp
sick-bay at Potma. Here he was surrounded by other patients who
paraded anti-Soviet views, but who appear from his own dcscrip-
tion to have been agents provocateurs, even though he himself appar-
ently did not recognise them as such. Had the Soviet authorities
persisted with the new charge of espionage, Mr Brooke could con-
ceivably have faced a death sentence. In the end, however, the
British government capitulated to this long sequence of threats
from the K.G13 by agreeing to release the Krogcrs. Right or wrong,
the decision would appear to put all British visitors to the Soviet
Union at hazard during the foreseeable future. So far as the history
of the KGB is concerned, the episode is an instructive illustration
of the extravagant lengths to which the organisation will go to
rescue its agents from foreign imprisonment.
Valuable fprthcr confirmation of certain features in KGB
methodology -is provided by a recent defector to the West,
Anatoly Kuznctsov. On 24 July 1969 this well-known Soviet
novelist happened to travel from Moscow to London in the same
plane as the released Gerald Brooke. On arrival he eluded the
personal escort provided by the Soviet authorities, sought refuge
with a leading British daily newspaper, proclaimed his intention
of emigrating from the Soviet Union and published articles in the
British press describing the particularly close surveillance which
the Soviet political police maintains over all Soviet writers. 'in his
own case this had included ostentatious shadowing by agents, the
bugging of his flat, the recording of his telephone conversations
and sundry attempts at `provocation'. On one occasion a certain
student had sought him out and delivered a tirade against the
Soviet Union, describing it as a Fascist country, after which Mr
Kuznctsov found himself in trouble for failing to report the inci-
dent to the authorities. On another occasion a young woman in-
formed him that she had been instructed to become his mistress,
and to report all his activities on pain of expulsion from the insti-
tute at which she was studying. Kuznctsov also confirms many
accounts by previous Soviet defectors when he speaks of the pro-
longed and elaborate vetting process to which all Soviet citizens
are subjected before receiving the rare and coveted privilege of
foreign travel. Out of every fifteen members of one Soviet `delega-
tion' on which he had travelled, at least five were under KGB in-
structions to report on the other members' behaviour, apart from
which each member of the party was obliged to supply a political
report on himself and his fellow-travellers. Kuznctsov also des-
cribes how he had compromised himself in various ways in the
past by failure to co-operate fully with the KGB,, but had then
decided to work his passage back by simulating a degree of docility
sufficient to qualify him for an exit visa. He had therefore pan-
23. Kuznetsov, passim (Kuznetsov, Anatoli (A. Anatol), 'Russian Writers
and the Secret Police', 'The 'Sunday Telegraph (Lond.on)., .10..August 1969).
24. Nabokov, p.263 (Nabokov, Vladimir; ea ch ; 'Memos . ' an 'Autobio g ra h
Revisited, revised edition (New York, 196b).
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dered to official conspiracy-mania by inventing an imaginary plot
by certain fellow-writers to bring out a new clandestine literary
journal, and had then clinched his return to favour by promising ?
to write a novel about Lenin.23 Such methods finally took him to
London and put him in a position to start a new career as an
dmigrd writer.
The tactics employed by Mr Kuznetsov to effect his escape have
incurred sporadic criticism from-Western writers not themselves
subject to comparable pressures-an example of self-righteous
censoriousness such as is all too easily engendered in societies free
froril totalitarian police control. So far as the present study is con-
cerned, Mr Kuznctsov can only be saluted for his success in extri-
cating himself from the long line of literary victims of the Russian
political police-the list which also includes such illustrious names
as Alexander Radishchev, Alexander Pushkin, Nicholas Cherny-
shevsky, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Isaac Babel, Osip
Mandelshtam, Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn:
As is stressed by Vladimir Nabokov, himself in youth a potential
victim of Russian police terror, Russian history can be considered
from two points of view: `first, as the evolution of the police .
and second, as the development of a marvellous culture.'24 That
these strands are intimately intertwined, and that the second can-
not be understood without an appreciation of the first, was one
reason for attempting the study now concluded. Though its pur-
pose has been to record the past, one prediction of the future may
be risked as a parting word: that between the completion of this
book and its appearance in print new scandals will have further
enriched the annals of the developing Russian political police.
That the final epitaph of this gigantic and historic organisation
will not be written by anyone now living also seems probable.
Conclusion `
In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to describe the
operations of Russian political security organisations while quot-
ing sources of information in detail, as is particularly desirable in
a field of study so riddled with obscurities and difficulties of various
kinds. An attempt will now be made to sum up certain aspects of
the material in a manner somewhat more speculative and wide-
ranging. This discussion will take the form of a general comparison
between the two main historical phases concerned: the Imperial
and the Soviet.
One striking difference between the imperial and Soviet secret
police lies in the sire of the organisations concerned, in the num-
ber of personnel involved, and in the extent of resources allotted
to political security operations. During the centuries the Russian
secret police has expanded from relatively tiny beginnings until it
has come to swamp and penetrate every corner of society-
possibly the most impressive example of the working of 'Parkin-
son's Law' on record. Of all the organisations concerned, Peter the
Great's Prcobrazhcnsky Office-perhaps the first true Russian
political security force-holds pride of place for the economic and
efficient use of resources. As stated above, it conducted political
security operations throughout late Muscovy and in the first
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yonovsky Guards=could be co-opted to an unlimited extent to
effect arrests and act as couriers. Since then a gradual but inexor-
ably sustained expansion in security personnel has been observed.
In the late eighteenth century perhaps only a few dozen or score
were so employed, but under Nicholas I the figure soared to some
ten thousand, including the Corps of Gendarmes. Further expan-
sion occurred after the foundation of the Okhrana and Police
Department in i 88o. It becomes increasingly difficult, however,
to estimate the precise number of persons working for the secret
police at any given Moment, since so many gradations of bribed,
bullied, blackmailed or terrorised part-time informants were to be
found in the middle reaches of police operations-between the
inner ring of full-time salaried police officials or agents, and ordin-
ary citizens liable to be summoned for questioning at any time
and under an obligation to denounce any manifestation of
political opposition which might have come to their notice.
If one asks how many Soviet-not to mention foreign-citizens
are in some sense working for the Russian secret police at the
beginning of thc- 1970s) it must be answered that the reservoir of
potential KGB informants includes practically the entire Soviet
population, though dotards, infants and rustics are less likely to be
so employed than town-dwellers in the prime of life. Those who
encounter Soviet citizens, whether on Soviet or non-Soviet soil,
would be well advised to regard all their contacts, however
amiable, smiling and sympathetic, as potential KGB informants-
not necessarily willing ones-owing to the obligation liable to be
placed on all Soviet citizens to furnish detailed political reports on
their conversations with foreigners. On this elementary fact of life
many western governments now warn businessmen and others
travelling to the USSR, apart from which diplomats posted to
Moscow necessarily receive detailed and intense briefing on the
highly sophisticated and persistent techniques of espionage to
which they arc certain to be exposed. Owing to the growing refine-
ment of `bugging' devices, many foreign embassies in Moscow and
other Communist countries maintain elaborately constructed safe
rooms in which, it is hoped, conversations and transactions of a
particularly confidential nature may take place without the
danger of eavesdropping by KGB and Soviet military intelligence
operatives primed with the latest scientific devices.
So far as the ordinary tourist is concerned, he would be wise to
allow for.thc possibility that any Soviet hotel room, restaurant
table, taxi, train or aeroplane which lie occupies may be `bugged'
-though of course even the KGB's huge resources, and seemingly
unslaked appetite for trivial information, do not extend to the full
recording and processing of all remarks uttered by all visitors to
the Soviet Union at all times. It is the possibility-not the cer-
tainty-of such surveillance which should be allowed for.
Now under-employed since the restrictions on terrorism or-
dained after Stalin's death, Soviet intelligence by no means con-
fines the collection of information, whether abroad or on home
ground, to political, military and economic matters, though these
6
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endemic feature of the Russian, and perhaps of all political police
organisations, has been the inability of the authorities to work out
any , stable chain of command or system of administration.
Repeated switches and changes of balance arc, perhaps, an
essential when one is administering what is, after all, potentially
the most dangerous institution in the State-dangerous to its own
masters as well as to its enemies.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the KGB seems, at the moment of
writing, to show greater signs of long-term stability than any
preceding Russian secret police force. Yet these words could easily
be ' belied by events through-sudden unforeseen developments
occurring between the preparation of this study and its appearance
in print.
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naturally receive high priority. The private lives of individuals
also form an object of scrutiny, particularly as such investigation
may create an opportunity for recruiting agents through black-
mail by threat of exposure. It is also a common KGB practice to
compromise potential foreign informants by various techniques-
not least by the `provocation' of individuals earmarked as particu-
larly vulnerable. This has frequently involved the photographing,
if necessary through one-way mirrors, of the victim in an embar-
rassing posture deliberately engineered and implying or recording
some combination of drunken, drugged, homosexual or hetero-
sexual misbehaviour.
By contrast with the treatment of political prisoners under the
Third Section and Okhrana, the political police of Soviet times
has de facto, if not de jure, generally acted as detecting, arresting,
imprisoning, judging and sentencing authority in political cases.
These functions arc, moreover, retained to a large extent by the
present-day KGB, although determined attempts are now made
to impart a veneer of legality to political security proceedings by
creating the simulacrum of trial by independent courts. Thus the
secret police still occupies, at the beginning of the 1970s, a domin-
ant position never held by Third Section or Okhrana-and this
despite a significant though by no means total retreat from insti-
tutionalised terrorism as practised under Stalin.
It is above all in the creation of systematic political terror on a
nationwide scale that the Soviet police system may claim to have
advanced far beyond its Tsarist prototype. Unless he was extreme-
ly lucky, an ordinary unheroic citizen of Imperial Russia could
confidently expect to escape persecution on political grounds by
keeping his mouth shut, by abstaining from officially disapproved
activities-and perhaps by changing his religion. The essence of
Stalinism was to destroy such possibilities, leaving no haven of
security even Ibe the most timorous and tcrroriscd. In the deliberate
intimidation of the entire population, in the wholesale saturation
of society with spies and informers, and in the systematic use of
pre-emptive arrest to forestall possible trouble by immunising vast
sections of potential trouble-makers in advance-in a!l these
techniques the Imperial police lagged far behind the Soviet .. .
and this despite the earnest pioneer efforts of certain Tsarist police
chiefs born before their time, among whom Actual State Council-
lor Liprancli and General Strelnikov have been given special
mention above.
All improvements and changes in techniques notwithstanding,
certain devices have remained common to both phases of the
Russian secret police. Prominent among these has been 'provoca-
tion'-the procedure of destroying hostile political organisations
and individuals by subjecting them to undercover police agents
posing as sympathisers. This method, so successfully pioneered by
Rachkovsky and Zubatov in the Imperial period, has continued
to the present day as a staple feature of Soviet practice. Another
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7
 25X1C1Ob
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November 1971
VIETNAM PULLOUT
SOME FACTS ON U.S. D1SEM=,NT ' IN VIETNAM
at the peak of U.S. military involvement (mid-1969) there
were more than 543,000 American servicemen in South Vietnam including
97 combat battalions and support troops, plus a vast air armada;
today there are under 200,000 American servicemen in Vietnam.
-- the present withdrawal plan calls for U.S. troop strength
to be at or below 184,000 by.the 1 December reduction deadline;
it is anticipated that President Nixon may step-up the present
14,300 monthly withdrawal rate of U.S. servicemen to 20,000.
- only one Navy aircraft carrier (the 85,000-ton nuclear-
powered Enterprise) is now on station in the Gulf of Tonkin where
three carriers were in constant operation at the peak of the fighting;
the U.S. Navy has already transferred 1,400 other craft to the
South Vietnamese.
-- the U.S. Air Forces's peak force of 35 squadrons of attack
jets (a squadron normally has 18 planes) has been reduced to 12;
this includes withdrawal of all 16 squadrons of F-100s, formerly
the backbone of the air war in Vietnam.
-- the entire Marine air wing, with 10 attack squadrons has
been withdrawn.
-- although a few Americarr:,have stayed on at the DMZ fire bases
to tend complex optical and radar equipment, the South Vietnamese
are substantially defending their own northern border for the first
time since heavy North Vietnamese infiltration across the DMZ began
in 1966.
-- the gradual turnover of 16 newly-built U.S. radar sites to
the South'Vietnamese has caused Saigon papers to discover that the
radar sites are under surveillance by a Soviet intelligence-gathering
ship off the coast of South Vietnam; sometime in June this year, the
intelligence ship was added to the Russian trawlers monitoring
American aircraft carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin.
-- Vietnamization has become tangible - in the communiques,
the casualty lists, the combat outposts - to the point where it
is clear that the South Vietnamese are taking back control of their
country; if some of their reactions are frustrated, even hostile,
their "withdrawal symptoms" are human and understandable to some
degree.
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-- the U.S. is not pulling out irresponsibly, nor abruptly;
in addition to the time, political energy, money and lives already
spent in South Vietnam, it is estimated that American economic
aid will have:to continue for the next 10 years. Necessary
spending will'start with about $700 million for the first few
years and end;up costing the American taxpayer about $4 billion
over the decade. It is easy to shrug this off because America
is rich but America is also beset with serious domestic problems
to which monies spent in South Vietnam might have been applied.
-- U.S. ';'Operation Retrograde" encompassing the distribution
and disposal of vast stores of U.S. weapons and other materiel
now amassed in. Vietnam is an instructive reminder of the myriad,
practical ways in which Asian allies are receiving U.S. assistance.
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lifE WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1971
CPYRGHT
To End Involvement in Vietnam"
Last Tuesday, largely unnoticed, Mr. Nixon made
what may be his most important statement on Viet-
nam. By the time he goes to Moscow next May, he'
said, the United States will have "end[ed] American
involvement in Vietnam ... or at least have made
significant progress toward accomplishing that
goal."
Three aspects of this statement were distinctive.
First, he spoke. of ending '{American involvement,
a phrase which surely goes beyond ground combat
forces into the uncertain but negotiable area of ad-
visers, logistical personnel,' "residual force" and
"supporting air," Second, he defined the ending of
involvement as a "goal," which it properly is; pre-
viously he had tended to discuss his war aims in
terms of bringing about a certain political, result
in Vietnam. And third, he inched closer to setting
a specific date for ending the American involve-
ment. By May, he said, "we trust that we will have
accomplished that goal, or at least have made
significant progress" toward it.
In short, President Nixon has lent his personal
authority and prestige to a public pledge to remove
the United States from the war, perhaps within
seven months. Though he left himself a large loop-
hole ("substantial progress"), he has gone further
towards doing what the bulk of his responsible crit-
ics have long pleaded with him to do: set a reason-
able final limit on American participation in the
war. This is surely the thrust of his words.
Now, we realize that Mr. Nixon strongly urged us
all not to "speculate" about what he will say in his
ong-scheduled Vietnam report on Nov. 15. In the
joint interests of communicating with our readers
and of encouraging the President to proceed along
he path he now appears to have chosen, however,
we will press cautiously on.
Two broad developments permit, if they do not
require, Mr. Nixon to leave the war.
Inside Vietnam, events thoroughly justify the
onclusion that the United States has given South
Vietnam that "`reasonable chance" to survive on its
wn. President Thieu, freshly re-elected by an emi-
nently Vietnamese electoral process, is seated more
irmly than ever; Saigon has made "great progress"
owards representative government, Mr. Nixon ob-
erved last week. Ambassador Porter recently told
the Vietcong: "Of the 300 or so district and province'
capitals of South Vietnam, you do not hold a single
one after these many years of war and your best
military efforts. You are, in fact, further from mili-
tary victory than ever." Politically, he said, the.
Vietcong are similarly disabled. We realize well that,
such judgments as Mr. Nixon's and Mr. Porter's are
not indisputable. But we see no reason to dispute..
them. The important point is that the administra-
tiori itself chooses to portray deve1 .gents in Viet-
nam in a way indicating that the ;:fission
there has been successfully accomplished. We could,
not agree more.
Outside Vietnam, of course, the President's forth-
coming -trips to Moscow and Peking have entirely;
altered the international context of the war. That
Peking and then Moscow invited him can only mean
to the Vietcong and Hanoi that their principal allies
.have other and larger fish to fry, as indeed they
have. It need not mean a Chinese or Soviet sellout
of their Vietnamese clients. It unquestionably!
means a judgment in Moscow and Peking that their;
clients are now within striking distance of a deal'
which they, the patrons, believe ought to be
.grabbed.
What kind of a deal? Back in August, Mr. Nixon.
said: "The record, when it finally comes out, will:
answer all the critics as far as the activity of this,
government in pursuing negotiations in established!
channels." Now, 'this could merely mean that the
record will show that the Nixon administration gave'
it an honest try. Or it could mean that something is
brewing, perhaps something which is intimately tied
into Mr. Nixon's larger dealings with Peking and
Moscow. By the nature of so delicate and difficult
a diplomatic undertaking, it would be impossible
at this point for any but a very few insiders to
know. What is clear is that the President, when he
talks about "ending American involvement" and
claims that his negotiating record will "answer all
the critics," is taking upon himself a tremendous
responsibility to produce positive and conclusive re-
sults well in advance of his rendezvous with the
electorate a year from now. He is creating his own
political imperatives and this is perhaps the strong-
est assurance he could be expected to give at this
point in time of his determination to deliver on-
his promises.
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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1971
CPYRGHT
For the Record ? . .
X1.5. Disengagement
And ,Asian S ability
From an address by H. E Nobuhika~
Ushiba, ambassador of Japan to. the U.S.,
before the City Club of Portland, Oregon,
September 24:
How the American strategy evolves, fol.
lowing the "winding down" of the Indochina
war, and with the application of the Nixon
Doctrine, is probably the most important
single element in the equation of future
Asian stability. Indeed, the American stra-
tegic posture will undoubtedly affect
China's future outlook.
It is a foregone conclusion that the United
States will soon' be disengaged from any
combat responsibility in Vietnam, probably
by sometime in 1972. The Nixon Doctrine
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
20 September 1971
has put Asia and the world on notice that
the United States-while maintaining its
treaty commitments and the umbrella of its
nuclear deterrent: --wi11 not again commit
American troops to the defense of friendly
states, except in cases of massive aggression
in which the vital interests of the United
States are threatened. According to the Doc-
trine, America will provide material assist.
ance, when requested, to threatened nations
which accept ultimate responsibility for
their own defense.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
WHERE URSa WILL M A K`E
I 1~ %03& 11 L'Am S STAND" iN, ViETNAM
Indo-China war will be over
for most American soldiers in
1972. But not for all. Job al-
ready is being cut out for those
who will remain.
Now becoming clear is the shape of
U. S. military power that President Nixon
intends to maintain in South Vietnam-
perhaps for several more years.
By December, U. S. strength in Viet-
nam will be down to 184,000. According
to Pentagon projections, this figure will
drop to about 45,000 toward the end
of 1972.
After that, unless the White House
changes signals, American forces will re-
main at roughly that level until two
U. S. objectives in Vietnam are achieved:
? Release of all prisoners of war held
by the Reds in Southeast Asia.
? Development of South Vietnam's
military capability to defend itself
Among the first major American
bases built in Vietnam, Da
Nang's - big port and airfield
facilities will support opera-
tions in endangered Northern
Provinces.
U.S. spent 142 million
dollars to transform the
sandy Cam Ranh Penin-
sula into a deep-water
port, a first-rate airfield
and a 17,000-acre supply
center.
With its airfield, helicopter pads and sup-
ply depots, Long Binh is heart of the
American military complex clustered
around the capital of Saigon.
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CPYRGHT
Three enclaves. By the time U. S.
forces are reduced to 45,000 men, most
GI's will, with virtual certainty, be con-
centrated in three American enclaves:
Da Nang in the north, Cam Ranh Bay
in the central sector and Long Binh in
the south near Saigon.
Each already is a key base with air-
fields, nearby port facilities and vast
stockpiles of war materiel. As the U. S.
combat role winds down,
they will be used to speed.
training of South Vietna-
mese troops, to funnel sup-
plies to Saigon's forces and
to confront the Commu-
nists with what military
experts term an "active
defense,"
U. S. ground troops as-
signed to the so-called "re-
sidual force" will be drawn
in the main from major
units still in Vietnam: the
Americal and the 101st
Airborne divisions, one
brigade of the 1st Cavalry
THE WASHINGTON POST
16 October 1971
Division and one squadron
from the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment.
Other Americans will
come from the 9,500 U. S.
advisers now working with
South Vietnamese units.
Some of the 500 Air Force
and Navy planes and near-
ly 3,000 helicopters that
are presently stationed in
Southeast Asia will furnish air support.
Main responsibility of American infan-
trymen in the future will be defensive-
to guard Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and
Long Binh from Communist attack.
Still some casualties. U. S. officers
emphasize, however, that American GI's
still will fight and suffer casualties. To
guard the bases, they say, heavily armed
patrols will have to sweep the areas
around the enclaves, and they are certain-,
to run into the enemy.
American military men concede that
the concentration of GI's into three en-
claves will increase the danger of Red
assaults. According to _.Col. John O. En-
sor, deputy commander of the Cam Ranh
Support Command:
"As the level of combat drops in the
field, our fixed bases become more at-
tractive targets to the enemy. We must
expect that the Viet Cong will begin to
center his attacks on our enclaves."
For all the danger, new construction
at Da Nang, Cam Ranh and Long Binh
promises relatively comfortable garrison-
type duty for most Americans assigned
to the U. S. residual force.
New recreational facilities at Long
Binh, . for example, include a $425,000
theater, a $425,000 swimming pool- and
a $153,000 craft shop.
Cam Ranh Bay already has two skeet-
shooting ranges, tennis courts and a
marina equipped with powerboats for
water skiing.
A special-service- officer expresses
American intentions to remain in South
Vietnam this way: "We don't plan to
build expensive new facilities just to
tuna them over to the Vietnamese."
CPYRGHT
.S. -Orders
Vie" 1,1 ullout.
Units
. Associated Press
back into small and scattered
fighting yesterday and the
U.S. Command in Saigon is-
sued orders for 12 more army
units with a total strength of
4,650 men' to return home be-
fore Christmas.
The cutback was the second
largest to be announced at one
time since the United States
conflict in mid-1969.
It was exceeded only last
July 1, when the U.S. Com-
mand announced that 40 units,
with an authorized strength of ~
6,095 men, were pulled out of
combat to prepare for rede-
ployment.
CPYRGHT
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U.S. NEWS F1 WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971
CPYRGHT
U. $. COMBAT ROLE IN VIETNAM -FADING FAST
/-TROOP STRENGTH: DOWN 60%
59r 900
American troops
in Vietnam
July Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. April Dec. Dec. NOW
196511966 11961 1 1968 11969 11910 11971
WHERE U. S. FORCES REMAIN
In South
Vietnam's
four
military
regions-
Bulk of
remaining
U.S. combat
troops
Combat
forces
nearly all
withdrawn
Relatively
--d/- few fighting
If President Thieu wins big, as expected, his opponents
will certainly charge fraud. If he falters, there could be a
wholesale upheaval of the entire machinery of provincial
government and a sweeping military shake-up as well.
CASUALTIES AT 6-YEAR LOW
A 14.592
4,221
American troops ,X/1
killed in combat
(projection)
t Source: U.S.military officials
Copyright ? 1971. U. S. News & World Report, Inc.
fire-support bases over to the South Vietnamese. American
forces have moved back to three enclaves near the coast.
The U. S. pullout is also affecting its advisory efforts.
Formerly, teams of American Army advisers were out
with every South Vietnamese battalion. No more.
WAR FRONT: STILL HOPE Advisers now serve only with regimental and division-
The military picture appears not too grim over all, com- level staffs. The number of men in such teams has also
pared with what is found on the political and economic front been trimmed. A division advisory team that formerly had
That is true despite the steady pull-back from combat of re s. - 40 Americans makes do today with perhaps half that number.
mainin U. S. forces. This is not necessarily bad, in the opinion of some Arneri-
g cans. Says one: "There's not much a young American captain
At the peak of the U. S. involvement, American troops in .or major can tell a South Vietnamese battalion commander
South Vietnam numbered 543,400. That force included 97 who has probably been in combat against the Viet Cong
combat battalions plus all their support troops and a vast and North Vietnamese for nearly 10 years."
air armada. Mostly, the U. S. advisers co-ordinate air strikes and help
U. S. forces are now down to 27 front-line battalions, and with arrangements for helicopter and other supply support.
these have been pulled out of major combat operations. Weakness in the air. The South Vietnamese Air Force
Total American strength is down to 219,000 men. is considerably less advanced than the ground forces, although
The regular armed forces of South Vietnam number ap- important strides have been made. In three of the country's
proximately 525,000. four military regions, South Vietnamese airmen are now in
At one time there were. four full U. S. infantry divisions charge of the important Direct Air Support Centers which
and an armored cavalry regiment plus support troops in control all tactical air strikes in the country.
Military Region Two, the Central Highlands area. Strength Over the past two years, Saigon's Air Force has expanded
then was about 200,000, half of whom were front-line men. from 23,600 men to 42,000. By mid-1973, the force should
Now there are only three U. S. combat battalions of per- level off at about 50,000 men.
baps 3,000 men in the area. They aren't out looking for the There's not much that can be done to speed up the Viet-
enemy. One unit guards convoys that move along Highway namization of the air war. Nearly two years is required to
19 and the two others protect the Tuy Hoa Air Base and train a young Vietnamese high-school graduate to become a
the big port and air-base complex at Cam Ranh Bay. qualified pilot.
Reds play waiting game. Says an American military At Nha Trang Air Base, about 8,000 men will be gradu-
spokesman: "Obviously, the South Vietnamese have had to ated this year as tower controllers, aircraft mechanics, com-
spread out their forces to cover the territory once occupied munications specialists and fliers. However, only through
by U. S. units." So far, neither the North Vietnamese nor the actual experience can they be trained to do the technical
Viet Cong have made any major pushes to fully test how jobs required-and that takes time.
determined the South Vietnamese are. At Pleiku Air Base in the Central Highlands, Lt. Col.
A drive in Military Region One, below the Demilitarized Robert L. Nicholl, as a U. S. advisory-team chief, has watched
Zone in the Northern end of South Vietnam, is seen as t a e e take over #rom the Americans. Since No-
likely. ~4pp1 6edcFe1rtReIe>s'e 1990/090"2 PACl b ' f 1a!iy! 814~A~6)IflOt8~0 1~@m0~ltt>Za bare field,
4
543,400
,(peak)
\\1111 Soo
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CPYRGHT
they have built a four-squadron tactical wing into what U. S.
advisers consider a first-rate outfit.
While the youngish-looking South Vietnamese pilots are
rated as "hot shots," often as good as their American fighter-
bomber counterparts, ground support isn't up to standard.
Vietnamese crews take as long as three hours to ready a
fighter-bomber for another mission after it has returned from
a strike. American ground crews do the same job in one hour.
With the tempo of ground combat now at a record low,
the South Vietnamese are able to handle about 80 per cent
of the 3,500 air strikes being flown monthly.
Should there be a sudden return to large-scale fighting,
however, Saigon would be hard put to provide even a frac-
tion of tine fighter-bombers and helicopters thrown into action
by the U. S. at the height of the war, in 1968 and 1969.
Then the U. S. Air Force had 21 squadrons made up of about
400 fighter-bombers available for attack. In addition, the
Marines and Navy threw in hundreds more.
Now that the Marines are gone, the Navy has greatly re-
duced its missions over South Vietnam. The Air Force is
down to five attack squadrons, about 100 supersonic F-4
Phantom jets.
By way of comparison, the South Vietnamese have only
six jet attack squadrons. They are equipped with the A-37
Dragonfly jet and the F-5 Freedom Fighter jet. Three other
)squadrons fly the reliable but 20-year-old A-1 Skvraider.
.
propeller planes. South Vietnam's other transport, Liaison,
reconnaissance and gunship units add up to 15 squadrons,,
a total of about 500 fixed-wing planes.
The South' Vietnamese have 14 squadrons of about 350
helicopters. At its peak, the U. S. Army's helicopter force
numbered more that, 4,000. Despite the troop pullout, the
U. S. still has nearly 3,090 of its 'copters in South Vietnam.
Even with a planned build-up ' to perhaps 500 helicopters
in two years, the Sot}th Vietnamese will have to learn co op-
erate without the luxury of great fleets of helicopters to air-
lift troops around.
U.S. NEWS E WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971
To nun the country, feed its population and pay for nec-
essary imports, South Vietnam, in the year ended June 30,
1971, received about 600 million dollars in U. S. aid. About
220 million of this was used to buy fertilizer, fishing nets,
chemicals and electrical equipment considered vital to the
economy.
Cloudy future. There seems to be little planning for the
day when GI spending will end.
Many tens of thousands of Vietnamese working for the
U. S. military will soon be out of work. Although a number
have gained valuable technical skills, it's not clear how the
civilian economy will be able to use their talents.
Foreign investors have hardly found South Vietnam a
promising place to put. their venture capital. The Saigon
Government has done little to attract - vspects.
A. new, presumably much more liberal. foreign-investment
law has been long in the works. It has yet to be passed by
the legislature.
In addition to the 'direct-aid contributions, the U. S.
through its military and civilian agencies, has supported
most of the country's utilities and public services.
American Army engineers have widened and paved a
new highway that now. links many Mekong Delta towns to
the Saigon market. In the Northern Provinces, where U. S.
CPYRGHT
Marines and Army troops ranged widely for years, all-
weather roads link once-isolated districts and modern bridges
span streams and rivers.
The U. S. maintains and operates a network of ports and
airports used by the civilian economy, but at no cost to the
Saigon Government.
When the United States ends its military presence here,
South Vietnam will find itself responsible for these facilities
for the first time.
Says one expert: "As the tempo of the war slows down,
there is a desperate need for budget planning and attention
to fiscal problems; there must be a new sense of priorities."_
Another authority estimates that American aid will have
to continue for the next 10 years. Necessary spending for the
first few years is estimated at about 700 million dollars. Af-
ter that, it could taper off to perhaps 400 million a year.
Projected economic-aid bill for the next decade: 4 billion
dollars.
? Mostly, the mood of Americans from one end of South
Vietnam to the other reflects a sense of finality. They feel
the U. S. has done all it can to prepare the South Vietnam-
ese to keep their country afloat. The way most Americans
sum it up: "What happens from here on out is up to them."
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5
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BALTIMORE SUN
10 September 1971
s ii, -'72 Cut To 40,000
vange In Vietnam
Is Predicted
V.y CHARLES W. CORDDRY
4.141?tcto71 Bureau of The Sun
'rashington - Government
iinrces predicted yesterday that
,'te military situation in Viet-
,ani will favor a substantial
i)ccd-up in American troop
. 'ith(Irawals-possibly by close
o 50 per, cent-when President
ixon announces the next phase
raid November.
some sources consulted freely
orccast that the American
rou,) strength would be down to
ice 40,000-range in mid-1972,
instituting the long-promised
slaisory group with certain nec-
s;,.u?y support elements. The
?:rrcnt strength is about 216,000
:,,d is to be at or below 184,000
si;gin the present reduction
ieadiine, December 1, arrives.
"most Difficult War"
in looking ahead to the Presi-
'oni's next move, and recalling'
.is 1:,elicf that the war will not
;+n election issue next year,
1:scrv-crs noted Me assertion in
s address to Congress yester-
CPYRGHT
a', rest en wou c oose, in mt -
handle the withdrawal process ! November, to announce a "date
CPYRGI-
from Vietnam.
He has refused to do that:
linking the final withdrawal to
negotiations for prisoner release
and the readiness of the South
Vietnamese to handle their own
defense-saying list April 7 that
setting .such a date would" "serve
the enemy's purpose and not our
own."
Meanwhile, the United States
Is in the process, of removing
elements of.the Americal Divi-
sion-one of the two, divisions
(there 'is also a separate bri-
gade) remaining in Vietnam
and, it' was learned, considera-
tion is 'being given to withdraw-
ing -in a-month or so an F-4 jet
squadron that previously was
slated to leave next spring.
The latter is one of but five
such squadrons remaining in
South. Vietnam.
ing to a conclusion the longest from the point of view of his
an most difficult war in its ndrninistration's prospects and
history." from the military point of view
Discussing the outlook for the in Vietnam.
South Vietnamese armed forces, The present pullout phase
a high-ranking officer recently calls for removing 100,000
in Vietnam said that what re. troops in seven months up to
mains to be done by the Ameri- December 1, for an average
cans ,will leave them with the monthly rate of about 14,300.
wherewithal, if they have the An increase to about 20,000 a
viii[" to go it alone, month-close to 50 per cent--=-for
Mr. Nixon has not come to the following seven months
,, ips with decisions on the next .the
reduce the force to the
withdrawal phase, informed 40,000-range by mid-1972, should
i
h
ere,
sources said, but t
s no I Mr. Nixon decide on, a with- I
question that the U.S: forces will draws[ phase of that duration.
be "substantially disengaged" That could have the U.S. con-
itext summer.
Next Summer Tar?.e,t mitment down to the advisory
Since it is clear that the target role prior to the Republican Na- i
is to get down to the "residual" tional Convention, and officials
force of advisers, with certain -have- portrayed ? the- advisory
support troops, next summer, role. as one that, itself, would go
one of the chief decisions Mr. on diminishing,
Most sources doubted that the
CPYRGHTNEW YORK TIMES ?4-
'
20 July 1971
Sneciai to The Few York Times
VUNGTAU, South Vietnam,
July 13-The United ?: test
Navy is building 16 radar sites
for surveillance of ship move-
ments along the coast of South
Vietnam and plans to give them
to the South Vietnamese Navy
by next spring.
, The first of the sites, on a
mountain peak here 50 miles
southeast of Saigon, has re-
cently been turned over to the
South Vietnamese.
A Soviet intelligence-gather-
ing ship, meanwhie, has been'
spotted off the coast of South
Vietnam and is presumably
watching the new installations.
Only.a month ago the intel-
ligence ship supplemented a
11d ix i a1 1 fS
U. . -1 V
years kept a close eye on the
carriers operating in the Gulf
of Tonkin, according to United
States NaV-v pilots.
According co, tg -
United States naval officers,
the radar installations will "en-
hance the coastal defense and
counterinfiltration capability of
t"r::a Vietnamese Navy."
Interception Is planned
Supplementing the radar
sites, surface craft are to be
assigned to identify and inter-
cept any unidentified ships.
One United States naval ad-
who asked not to be
viser
,
th oar
named, said here that the
Tne radar sites are being
built under contract with th
m, s
R.M.K.-B.R.T., the America
construction consortium, ar,
veers.
Running from Hue, below th
demilitarized zone, to Hondo
island, near the Cambodia
border, the 16 radar installs
tions are strung out on hig
hills and mountain peaks flea
the sea and. on islands alon
the southern coast.
Thre American advisers an
to be placed at each site as i
opens to make sure the Sout
Vietnamese become famili
'with the equipment. The Amer
scans will stay at the rada
system has a "multitude of pur- because it would give away to sites "for only a limited perio
poses." He refused, however, the other side a good idea of of time,"
9
Vietna nee PYRGHT
Nine of the 16 sites span
and Japanese petroleum compa-
nies are expected to bid for ail
rights, perhaps late this year
T71 "I.J -- elftep-+4e
presidential elections early in
October.
It is understood that foreign
ail companies are eager to get
some assurance from the South
Vietnamese Government that
security will be provided before
they begin drilling.
A spokesman for Rear Adm.
Robert S. Salzer, commander of
United States naval forces in
Vietnam, said that he "couldn't
Russian try r e 'r R Ie'S 'af?99/ Fl` SCI 4My011
4A000300010001-2
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U.S. NEWS E WORLD REPORT
19 July 1971
VIETNAM PULLOUT
CPYRGHT
doned Arsenals Ths Time
SAIGON
While Americans debate the pace
of the U. S. troop withdrawal from South
Vietnam, a massive pullout of another
kind is taking place.
Billions of dollars' worth of American
military equipment-from shoelaces to
50-ton tanks-is being hauled out, no
longer needed in Vietnam by the dwin-
dling force of GI's.
One top U. S. official here calls the
operation the most elaborate military-
property-disposal drive in history."
The U. S. already has shipped out of
Vietnam more than 1.4 million tons of
surplus supplies, valued at about 3.5
billion dollars. Officers estimate that up
to 2.5 million tons remain, about half of
which will be given to the South Viet-
namese Government.
Basic goal of the program: to save
the American taxpayer money by avoid-
ing costly mistakes of the past.'
Walking away from it. After World
War II-and to some extent after the
Korean War-the U. S. discarded over-
seas vast: stores of weapons and other
materiel. Much of this abandoned arsenal
weathered away. Some made rich men of
the traders-many of them former GI's-
who rehabilitated the castoff gear or sold
it as junk.
American commanders are determined
to avoid a similar situation in Vietnam,
where U. S. forces are being cut from a
1969 peak of 543,400 men to about
45,000 by the end of 1972: According
to a military-supply expert in Saigon:
"There aren't going to be any junk
islands filled with rusting equipment
after this war. We are going to bring
the stuff back."
U. S. officials are equally determined
that no equipment or scrap metal falls
into the hands of the Communists. "We
don't want the scrap to be made into
bullets and fired back at us," says one
military source.
Code name given to the disposal pro-
gram is Operation Retrograde, a com-
plicated exercise in supply and flemand,
screened by computers to insure that
surplus equipment goes where it is
needed mcApproved For Release
Sliding scale. Under a priority sys-
tem, U. S. troops remaining in Southeast
Asia get first call on all surplus. Next
come the South Vietnamese armed
forces, then other U. S. allies in Asia,
followed by American
units in other parts of the
world and in the U. S.
After these primary
needs are filled, equip-
ment goes to such second-
ary ` customers" as the
U. S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the
World Health Organiza-
tion, or South Vietnamese
Government departments.
Even U. S. federal prisons
and Indian reservations re-
ceive excess supplies. The
leftovers are sold to civil-
ian bidders, usually for
scrap. Since 1967, these
surplus sales have totaled
nearly 21 million dollars.
Vietnam commanders
emphasize that Operation
Retrograde saves the U.S.
military-aid program money by supply-
ing Asian allies with used equipment
instead of more costly new gear. Cam-
bodia now is an important recipient.
At Long Binh, near Saigon, U. S. Army
trucks, cleaned and repainted, wait in
neat rows to be picked up by troops
from Thailand. Rifles and radio equip-
ment are being shipped to South Korea
and Taiwan.
As of June 1, South Vietnam had re-
ceived more than 1,600 surplus artillery
pieces and tanks, 835,000 small arms
and other weapons, 45,000 trucks and
jeeps, 575 airplanes and helicopters, and
43,000 radios.
A major U. S. problem is how to
avoid giving the South Vietnamese ma-
teriel they do not need or do not know
how to use. Says one American officer:
We don't want to hand the Vietnam-
ese maintenance and training nightmares
by rushing them into using equipment
that is too sophisticated at this stage."
About 60 per cent of the 400 instal-
J o td tIltW-lRb f1t0k194A 0 6b.1' O'1'eZmpty. You don't
billion dollars-have been given to South
Vietnam or are in the process of being
turned over. Most of these are small
camps. All so-called permanent struc-
tures on the bases are in fact ternpdrary.
One 'supply officer observes: "They
were designed so that, ideally, when the
last American gets aboard an airplane,
the building collapses."
Getting Operation Retrograde under
way was not easy. An officer oxplains:
"We had no guidelines, and few if
any precedents to go by. We've had to
play it by ear. But we've learned a lot,
and now things 'are, working fairly
smoothly."
Volume of materiel moving out of
Vietnam, officers claim, nearly equals
that which came in when the big U. S.
build-up began in 19G5. The.79th Mairy'
tenance Battalion stationed at Long
Binh alone received and processed near-
ly 900,000 items between last November
and mid-June.
"At one time," says the battalion com-
mander, Lt. Col. Byard W. Rite, "we
had literally acres of gulls, trailers,
trucks, small arms and communications
gear waiting to be checked in, cleaned
and shipped out."
Checking out. As each American
unit is ordered to "stand down" from
combat, it immediately returns to the
nearest supply depot virtually all sup-
plies and equipmeni except the clothes
on the backs of GI's. Tanks, armored
personnel carriers and other vehicles clam-
aged in combat often have to lie drag-
ged in.
If they can be repaired, Wey are.
Otherwise, they are stripped of puns, en-
gines, transmissions and axles and sold
for scrap.
To meet American import ; e;; :lations,
all pieces of major cctuipracia shipped
to the U. S. are first cleaned with high-
pressure hoses on sites resembling giant
car-washes. Then most equipment is sent
to Da Naiig, Cam Ranh Bay or New-
port, a U. S. Army port outside Saigon,
to await shipment. Says Sfc. Carl Chris?
ner at Ngwport headquarters:
"Ships used to come out to South
 C,QK rid For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300010001-2
cc a ship leave the Far East empty
any more..'
Inventory control for surplus goods in
the Far East is located in Honolulu.
Various depots in the Pacific region han-
dle different equipment. Tracked ve-
hicles from Vietnam go first to'Sagami,
Japan. Small trucks and jeeps are ship-
ped to Taiwan..
Computer decisions. Heavy-duty
trucks, generators, electronic and corn-
munieations equipment, and some arms
and medicine go to the Second Logis-
tical Command on Okinawa, where a
bank of six computers-rented for $117,-
000 per month-decides what equip-
ment goes where.
From July, 1968, through April, 1971,
the command disposed of 938 million
dollars' worth of equipment-more than
2 million different items ranging from
10-cent cotter pins to $15,000 trucks.
Savings to U. S. taxpayers from the
Okinawa operations are estimated at
about 310 million dollars a year.
Wrecked or damaged vehicles also are
shipped to Okinawa for repair-provided
that repair and transportation do not
exceed 65 per cent of the cost of a new
vehicle.
Ill 1968, the command repaired 463
trucks: This year, the total should reach
2,730 and next year, 5,058.
Realizing the risks' involved in the
selling or giving away of surplus Govern-
ment property, U. S. officials have set
up complicated safeguards to prevent
fraud or profiteering. For example, the
U. S. has the right to check back for up
to two years on property turned over to
the South Vietnamese Government to
make certain it has not been sold on the
civilian market.
Scrap metal also is sold on the condi-
tior. that it cannot be resold, a regula-
tion designed to keep it away from
Communist countries.
Gathering brass. One item the U. S.
does not sell to anyone is brass shell
casings. They are so valuable they are
gathered after each battle-sometimes
by villagers who are paid 40 cents for
each 2.2 pounds of brass they turn in.
Despite the safeguards against fraud,
no supply authority here claims the sys-
tem is foolproof. One official says:
U.S. NEWS E WORLD REPORT
19 July 1971
VIV na ullout
Not only the U. S. is pulling
up stakes: Other "free world"
!lies-with 70,000 men-have
concluded that their own mis-
sions are nearly completed.
America's combat allies' in Vietnam-
I'hailand, Korea, Australia and New
Zealand-are following the U. S. lead
in withdrawing troops from the war.
Thailand, with a division of about
11,000 men in Vietnam, will pull, half
of its force out by the end of this month.
'lie remainder are likely to follow later
this year. That was announced on July 8.
Korea is now proposing to withdraw
part of its 50,000-man force-the biggest
Allied contingent supporting the U. S.
and South Vietnam. Both. Australia and
New Zealand have already made re-
ductions, with more to come.
"Static" positions. At the peak of
their involvement, the Allied nations-
Approved For Release
Eroh
"\Wo have claboi: to machinery set up
to prevent the unauthorized use of our
excess material. We're trying to prevent
thievery and diversion, but who knows
how successful we are?"
About 450 civilians, representing com-
panies in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore
and New Vork, are permitted to buy sur-
plus. Agents for or from Communist
countries are excluded. Most of the bid-
ders are well-established businessmen,
yet one Saigon trader says: "Sonic are
only as honest as they have to be-and
as dishonest as they can be."
Some shady dealers have been barred
from further bidding after trying to bribe
officers or rib the bidding.
Not all scrap is piled in disposal
yards. River boats and barges sulk by
the enemy are sold on condition that
buyers pay the costs- of raising them.
Says Col. Norman J. Le Mere, com-
mander of the Property Disposal Agen-
cy in South Vietnam:
"This is a business. It's our job to got
the very best return we can from our
sales for the U. S. taxpayer."'
CPYRGHT
ADE
loosely grouped into the Free World involvement in Vietnam began wr a
Military Assistance Command-fielded a mobile Army hospital in September,
total of nearly 70,000 men, exclusive 19(34, and grew to two infantry divisions
of U. S. forces. Those remaining are with their supporting artillery and supply
manning defensive positions described by units, plus one Marine brigade. The
officials as "static." U. S. picked up a major part of the bill
This command grew out of U. S. hopes -more than 1 billion dollars to date.
in 1964-65 that many nations-particular- The Koreans also insisted on being
ly Asian-could be mobilized in a show of equipped with some of the best U. S.
battlefield solidarity against Communist arms, including the M-16 rifle, and the
aggression in South Vietnam. That is latest in communications gear.
what happened in Korea when the South How effective have they been? ROK
was invaded by the Communist North in officers claim they have expanded their
1950. Fifteen countries from Europe and area of control from 1,300 square miles
the Far East sent combat units into action in early 1965 to 7,500 at present and
in Korea under a United Nations com- have more than doubled the number of
mand. South Vietnamese under their protection.
But no such widespread international The Koreans, who are acknowledged
rescue mission was mounted in Vietnam. to be tough fighters, have won a variety
The Philippines, Nationalist China and, of battle honors. In a long series of en-
Spain provided small semimilitary units gagements, they claim to have killed
-but restricted them to noncombatant 35,406 of the enemy, with losses tq
duties. In the case of Spain it involved their forces of 3,254 men killed and 7,334
seven Army doctors. wounded. Discussions are now going on
Those that did send combat troops: between South Korea and the Saigon
South Korea. The Republic of Korea's Government that are expected to lead to
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the withdrawal of one Korean division
before June, 1972.
Thailand. The Thai division of 11,000
men-all volunteers-operates in Bien Hoa
Province east of Saigon. Civic-action
projects, more than combat, are their
main missions. Contacts with the enemy
mostly has been minor. The Thai have
suffered fewer than 40 dead.
Testimony before a U. S. Senate com-
mittee last year indicated that, under a
secret agreement signed in 1967, the
United States has paid Thailand 50 mil-
lion dollars a year to cover costs of its
contribution to the Vietnam war.
Australia. A team of 30 Army advisers
began Australia's assistance to South
Vietnam in 1962. Transport planes and
bombers followed.
In 1965 ground-combat...units were.
introduced, and by 1968 the total Aus-
tralian commitment in the conflict had'
grown to a task-force organization of
more than 8,000 men.
Australians have seen their share of
action. For its part in the 1966 battle
of Long Tan, one company received the
U. S. Presidential Unit Citation.
Since first coming to Vietnam, the
Aussies have suffered "slightly over" 400
dead and "several thousand" wounded,
according to their records.
Recent cutbacks have reduced the
Australian force by 2,000 men.
New Zealand. From a detachment of
25 Army engineers in mid-1964, the
New Zealand forces in Vietnam grew to
a peak of 800. Officials claim that this
number is no mere token contribution-
that in relation to New ' Zealand's total
population it is one of the largest in
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 July ' 1971
GIs
South Vietnam.
An artillery battery and two rifle
companies made up the main muscle of
the New Zealand force. Most of the time
it served with the Australians in an
Anzac command. Now New Zealand's
force has been cut back to, 280 men.
One distinction Anzac officers make:
"We paid our own way." Neither country
got military support funds from the
U. S. Both paid for all supplies and
equipment the U. S. provided.
Beiind the pullout-. Each of the
four Allied countries makes the same as-
sumption: With the help provided, the
South Vietnamese have grown strong
enough to cope with the Red threat.
Whether that hope proves out, there
seems little doubt that this mission is soon
to wind up.
CPYRGHT
E singer gets
' terms
By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
President Thieu would have no objections
to a moderate step-up in American troop
withdrawals from South Vietnam if the
losses of troops were compensated for by
adequate U.S. material aid.
This is ': ,v view Mr. Thieu expressed to
Henry A. 1 issinger, President Nixon's top
security adviser, during a meeting between
the two here Sunday, according to informed
sources in the South Vietnamese capital.
Dr. Kissinger, who just completed a three-
day fact-finding visit to Saigon, declined to
comment on the substance of his 2%-hour
talk with President Thieu.
But it was understood that he asked Mr.
Thieu's opinion on a variety of subjects, in-
cluding the new seven-point Viet Cong peace
plan. And Tin Song (Living News), a news-
paper that closely reflects President Thieu's
views, said Messrs. Thieu and Kissinger
spcnt a "lot of time" discussing the troop-
withdrawal question.
Constant review
"The point of view set forth by President
Thieu is that the United States can with-
draw troops at any rate, but he emphasized
that we believe the United States will not
withdraw in an irresponsible manner," the
paper said.
The withdrawal program is under con-
stant review, and the United States is ap-
parently considering some moderate step-
ups in the withdrawal rate, which is run-
ning at about 14,300 men a month.
9_
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SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR FUTURE ARMED FORCES
South Vietnam is moving toward a military establishment of 1,100,000
men. The army's field force has now reached 427,500 of its scheduled
strength of 450,000 men. The field force will be organized into 10 infantry
divisions and one airborne division. -
The Regional Forces, comparable to the United States National Guard,
are formed into about 1,000 companies trained and equipped to assist the
field army within their home regions.
Strength of Supporting Forces
The Popular Forces, with a lower scale-of equipment, are organized
into 7,000 platoons and are trained for village security. The total
strength of the two forces will be about 500,000 men. The Peoples's
Self Defense Forces, composed of boys and older men, is to be employed
as a home guard.
Of the 50 squadrons planned for the air force, 37 are now active.
and more than 34,000 of a planned total of 45,000 airmen have been trained.
The air force is scheduled to have 1,200'aircraft.
Naval strength will be 1,600 vessels and 40,000 men. The United
States has already transferred more than 1,400 craft to the South Vietnamese.
The Government, assisted by Americans, has organized a,training
program that has graduated 108,000 men from a wide variety of service
schools ranging from the War College to a school for dog handlers.
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November 1971
MOSCOW AND THE ARAB WORLD: A'TURNING'POINT?
The USSR, as the only major power bordering on the Near East,
believes its national interests require that this area fall within
the Soviet sphere of influence.(The activist assumptions of Communist
ideology obviously demand something more.)/ T-o,this end, the USSR
has steadily expanded its influence following the withdrawal of
Britain and France from the area. The key to Soviet expansion has
been Egypt. When Nasser was seeking financial support to construct
the Aswan Dam, Moscow proved more than willing to provide the funds.
More important, the Soviet Union also agreed at that time to arm
and train Egyptian forces for their confrontation with Israel. The
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which Nasser's successor,
Anwar Sadat, signed with Moscow in May of this year may have marked
the apogee of Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Two months after the treaty was signed, the local Communist
Party in neighboring Sudan attempted to seize power. Bulgaria, known
for its role as Moscow's proxy in the Arab world, was implicated in
the coup attempt. And the Soviets found themselves in the embarrassing
position of having praised the coup (in the Moscow weekly New Times
and in the pro-Soviet weekly Link in New Delhi) during the sz
period before Nimeri was restr to power. The failure of the coup
was in part a result of Egypt's prompt support of General Nimeri which
paved the way for government reprisals and the subsequent destruction
of the Sudanese Communist Party. By coming immediately to Nimeri's
aid (There are conflicting reports of the extent to which S'oviet-
equipped Egyptian troops participated.), Sadat made it clear that
despite Soviet military aid and the 15-year treaty, Egypt would
continue to play an independent role in Arab politics and would
not countenance a Communist state on its borders.
The Soviet Union has probably had few illusions about the short
range potential of Communism in the Arab World. Moscow has been
reminded on more than one occasion of the basic incompatibility
between Islam, with its fatalism and its strong emphasis on the
family, and Communism. However, the events surrounding the Sudan
coup have probably also cast doubts on the ultimate rewards of
supporting Arab nationalist governments.
Two other developments related to the Sudan incident of July
probably served to strengthen Soviet doubts. China was quick to
exploit Moscow's dilemma in the Sudan. The Peking Peo ie's Daily
of 27 July reported that Sudanese armed forces had cruse an
attempt by .a "clique" to overthrow General Nimeri. On 15 August
the same paper conveyed to Nimeri China's support for Sudan's efforts
to "preserve her independence and to cope with all forms of pressure."
The latter message also offered development aid.
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On 20 August in Damascus, leaders of Egypt, Syria and Libya
approved the constitution of a Federation of Arab Republics. The
constitution emphasizes that Islam is the official religion of
the Federation and that one-party governments are the order of
the day.
Since 1956 Moscow has given clear, if temporary and tactical,
pre.edence to establishing close relations with nationalist Arab
regimes, In so doing, it has found itself on several occasions
in the position of helpless witness to the destruction of Communist
apparatuses and agents in which it had also heavily invested. The
Communist Party in Egypt has been banned during the entire 15 years
of Soviet presence. Soviet agents of influence in the Egyptian
government are currently on trial for treason., In the Sudan, as
a result of the abortive coup, the strongest Communist party in
Africa has been destroyed and its leaders executed, despite (on
this occasion) Moscow's protests and threats. In Syria and Iraq,
where there is a large Soviet military presence, the Communist
parties are illegal but tolerated. Recognized Communists serve
in the respective Bath Party regimes of both countries; this is
permitted, largely, to appease the Soviets.
However, it is not only the local Communist parties that
understand they can no longer depend on the Soviet Union to support
them or save them when they get in trouble. The younger generation
of Arab radicals, who grew up with Nasser's aspirations and Nasser's
promises ringing in their ears, and who today have risen in the
ranks of the military and have taken power in certain countries,
are eager to fulfill their political dreams. The watchword of the
radicals is Arab unity and revenge against Israel. (Sadat,'whose
base of power rests in part on Egyptian army support, is not
immune to the pressures from this group) Arab radicals, who
have become disenchanted with Soviet counsels of patience and
restraint, are increasingly looking eastward to China.
Thus, the price the Soviet Union is paying for its support
of "national bourgeois" regimes is the alienation of that very
group normally most responsive to Soviet blandishments. Particularly
galling to Moscow is the fact that China is moving to exploit this
radical group at Soviet expense.
Fifteen years of expanding Soviet influence in the Arab world
may have reached a turning point this sumner. The'sudan affair
served to increase Arab suspicions and to dampen Moscow's enthusiasm.
Nimeri's reprisals against local Communists over strong Moscow
objections resulted in an acrimonious exchange between the two
countries, the expulsion of the Soviet Counsellor and the Bulgarian
Ambassador, and almost caused a break in diplomatic relations
between the two countries. In Egypt, following the ouster of the
pro-Moscow group from the government and the events in the Sudan,
the prevalent mood of the government and the military is more anti-
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Communist than ever. The Egyptians recently announced that following
President Sadat's trip to Moscow, he will talk with President Tito.
The latter is known to be concerned about the effect of Soviet
initiatives on Egypt's "non-aligned" posture.
The delicate relationship between Moscow, Arab nationalism
and Communism has been upset, although it has not necessarily been
broken. Moscow is undoubtedly trying to digest and evaluate the
events of this summer in terms of their meaning for Soviet Near
East policies. Will Moscow in the future continue to give the same
priority to support of national Arab regimes at the expense of
the local Communist and the radicals? Will it continue its current
outsized military investment in Egypt? Or will it exert pressure
on Egypt to arrange a modus vivendi with Israel -- and how much
pressure is It capable of exerting? What new tactics can Moscow
devise to protect its stake in the Arab world from Chinese encroach-
ments? The answers to these questions are not yet apparent. However,
Sadat's trip to Moscow and Belgrade, as well as UN discussions of
the Arab-Israeli issue,may provide some clues as to Soviet inclinations.
Meanwhile, the recent visit of sik left-leaning Israelis to the USSR
as guests of the Soviet Peace Committee is an indication that Moscow
intends to open a channel of communication to the other major party
in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300010001-2CPYRGHT
SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
September 1971
r~j t c ~R.adica' za lion Of .:r I~"
Am old fluttinger
The attempted coup in. Morocco, the putsch and
counter-putsch in Sudan, the eviction- of the fedaycen
..from, their bases in Jordan and the subsequent
conflict over the future relations bctweeir-the gucf-:
rillas and Amman, are events X411 h were not directly
li~ikcd to one another but 711 served to substantially
heighten the tension in the Arab world ' aiid had a
generally radicalizing effect.. This' is most clearly
shown by the case of the Libyan leader Colonel
Ghadhafi, who had as hand in all those bloody
events, even if only peripherally. In the process lie
drew his chief ally, Egyptian President Sadat, into the
turmoil and prompted him to take a harder line. - '
In view of Ghadhafi's premature support for the
Moroccan rebels, Sadat hoped at first to exert a
moderating influence on his Libyan. colleague. But
after 'a meeting in Marsa Matruh he let himself be
pcr'suaded so far by his junior partner that the three
heads of the "planned Libyan-Egyptian-Syrian federa-
tjpn issued a very ? sharp communigtt~ -in which. they:
expressed their concern at conditions in Morocco:
Ghadhafi then played the role of the leading
opponent of the "leftist'.' coup in Khartoum. He even
went: so far as to have two' leaders of the Sudanese
"revolution," an-Nur and Hamadallah, taken from a
British aircraft and' arrested. At the same time in
Tripoli there was a coordination of the"iivailable
Libyan, Egyptian and Sudanese military forces which
obviously played an important or e*en decisive role
in triggering the' ct7unter-putsch in Sudan. Sadat
accepted in silence his junior partner's radical move
with regard to the British` airliner. Shortly thereafter,
in his speech to the Egyptian party congress, he
praised the enthusiasm and energy of the young
Libyan revolutionaries. who, as he said, have con-
firmed-his faith' in the "Arab revolution." In the
question of what the Arab states could do to "punish"
King; Hussein for his moves against the Palestinian
guerrillas and force him to observe the treaties of
Cairo and Amman, which guarantee the fedayeen
freedom of movement in Jordan, Ghadhafi once more
took the initiative in that he called a "summit
meeting" in Tripoli. After initial hesitation Egypt
quite suddenly agreed to this step.
In, all three' cases a similar sequence may be
observed: Ghadhafi makes a strong move; Sadat
seems to hesitate at first, with the intention of urging
the :Li I 'ppJ"4pr l