CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
ON ELIMINATING DISSENT
THE BUKOVSKY CASE: A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE
ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN
TOKYO AND MOSCOW WRANGLE OVER THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES
VIEW OF BANGLADESH
A MESSAGE FOR REVOLUTIONARIES
DATES WORTH NOTING
SHORT SUBJECTS
A COLD WINTER IN PRAGUE
USSR'S REPORTED OFFER OF CREDITS TO CHILE
A NEW YEAR'S GREETING FROM THE FCP
THE NEW ADMIRALS
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972
Shimoda Treat of 1855
Established Czarist Russia-Japanese borders and declared
Kunashiri and Etorofu Japanese possessions. The disposition was
never questioned by the Czars, nor the Soviets after the 1917
revolution until 1945 when the Soviet Army occupied Kunashiri
and Etorofu
Yalta A reement of Februaar 1945
In which leaders of Soviet Union, the U.S. and Great Britain
agreed, among other things, that the southern part of Sakhalin
(Japanese name is Karafuto) and the Kuril Islands were to be
transferred from Japanese to Soviet possession.
Potsdam Declaration of July 1945
In which the U.S., the Republic of China and Great Britain
stated that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands
of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and "such minor islands as
we determine."
San Francisco Treaty of 1951
peace treaty with Japan signed by the U.S. and 48 other
non-Communist nations. The treaty laid the basis for the eventual
return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu: Islands to Japanese rule.
Reversion of Amami Islands
Returned to Japanese control by U.S. in early 1950's.
Japanese-Soviet Declaration of 1956
Japan and the USSR signed dadeclaration on 19 October 1956
ending a technical state of war and outlining a Soviet commitment
to return Shikotan and the Habomai Chain to Japan after a peace
treaty has been concluded between the two countries.
Reversion of Bonins, etc.
On 26 June t e U.S. returned to Japanese control the
Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands (including Iwo Jima) and Marcus
Island, all taken during World War II.
Nixon-Sato A reement
Concluded 6 January 1972, at San Clemente, and provided that
Okinawa and the other islands of the Ryukyus will revert to Japan-
ese rule on 15 May 1972.
Geography (See map attached): The Northern Territories are
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islands which lie between Japan and the USSR in the Sea of Okhotsk.
They are composed of:
the Kuril Island Chain (stretches
between Japan's northernmost
main island and the southern
tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula)
the southern half of Sakhalin
(Karafuto is Japanese name)
the islands of Shikotan and
Etorofu (an important Soviet
military base)
Kunashiri (protects Etorofu
geographically from Japan)
the archipelago of Habomai
(lies just north of Japan's
northernmost island of
Hokkaido)
The Kurils were handed over to the Soviets under the terms
of the Yalta Agreement and have since been incorporated into the
RSFSR (largest Soviet republic). The remaining islands comprising
the Northern Territories were occupied by Soviet army personnel
in 1945 after Japan was defeated, Shikotan and the Habomais are
the islands to which Japan has the best claim for they are neither
geographically nor geologically part of the Kuril Island Chain but
like the Kurils have been under continuous Japanese dominion since
1798.
Etorofu and Kunashiri are claimed by the Japanese as a
northern extension of Hokkaido; the Soviets claim they are the
southernmost tip of the Kurils and thus covered under the Yalta
Agreement and the San Francisco Treaty, However, they, too, have
been continuously under Japanese dominion since 1798 and have been
traditional Japanese fishing grounds for centuries.
The Okinawa Reversion arrangements provide for:
--Transfer to Japan of full responsibility for civil govern-
ment functions which the U.S. has exercised since the end of World
War II.
--Japan's assuming responsibility for the defense of Okinawa,
including ground, air and maritime patrol, search and rescue, not
later than July 1, 1973.
--Transfer to Japan of those physical assets and properties
in the Ryukyus appropriate to the responsibilities Japan will
assume upon reversion, with provision for Japan's reimbursing the
United States for certain of the facilities' improvements and
developments effected during the period of U.S. administration and
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for costs incurred by the U.S. under the agreement.
--Application of U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security
Treaty provisions and related arrangements to the Ryukyus area
without change or modification.
--U.S. commercial interests now operated in Okinawa to con-
tinue their businesses and professions there and to conduct
business also in Japan proper, subject to applicable Japanese
laws and regulations.
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CPYRGHT
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 January 1972
Gro ykko to air Soviet p
The Russians are wooing. Japan with re-
newed vigor.
Against the backdrop of shifting political
balances in Asia, Moscow is- for one thing
-soft-pedaling its once frequent theme of
Japanese militarism.
Several other developments point toward
Moscow's seeking netiy influence in Tokyo:
0 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko at long last is headed Japan-ward
for regular political consultations. He is
scheduled to arrive in Tokyo Jan. 23.
e A meeting of the joint Soviet-Japanese
Economic Committee, which should have
been held last year, will take place in Tokyo,
in February.
C Kenzo Kono, president of the Japanese
Diet's upper house, has been visiting the
Soviet Union at the invitation of the Su-
preme Soviet, Shortly before his scheduled
departure Wednesday he had a meeting with
Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny:
Mr. Gromyko's visit will be his first to
Japan since 1966, and the joint ministerial
talks will be the first since 1969, when Jap-
anese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi stopped
in Moscow briefly en route to the United
Nations.
Though economic relations between the
two nations have spurted forward since that
time, political problems have remained in
the background. These now will come to the
fore.
The very fact that Mr. Gromyko has
finally decided to go to Japan clearly re-
flects the confusingly changing scene in
Asia.
Diplomatic observers believe that, with
the United States gradually withdrawing.
.from the region and China expanding its
influence there, Moscow seeks to avoid a
Japanese defection into a Sino?American
"understanding" that would leave the
Soviet Union out in the cold and to en-
courage Tokyo to pursue a policy of balance
in its relations with the big powers.
A related problem is that of Japanese
fishing rights in the southern Kuriles, which
used to be'one of Japan's richest fishing
areas.
The Russians insist 'on a .12-mile limit
for territorial waters and arrest fishing
boats found
s *W*F6prRe4ei;
By Charlotte Saikowski
.Staff correspondent of
1999/09/02 Z CIA-RD
x9
CI.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
are o ing more an a
shermen.
The Japanese also hope to make progress
on a cultural-exchange program. Technical
problems have held up a formal govern-
ment agreement, although exchanges do
take place on an informal basis.
While detailed economic talks will be left
.to the joint meeting in February, Mr. Gro-
myko is expected to bring up the broad
subject of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in
the development of Siberia.
Among the projects the Russians are
promoting are the construction of a pipe-
line from Irkusk to the port of Nakhodka,
through which they would supply Siberian
oil to Japan. They are also interested in
development of the southern Yakut coal
fields- and the natural gas on Sakhalin
Island, as well as an expansion of coastal
trade.
;;
.
Siberian pace slow
Soviet-Japanese cooperation
in'
Siberia
generally has not grown as fast as once an.
ticipated, largely because the Russians are
asking for long-term credits that Japanese
business is not in a position to give. Whether
this obstacle can be surmounted now re-
mains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the Soviet press has been soft.
pedaling its treatment of Japan of late, The
long diatribes about Japan's growing mili-
tary budget and the danger of militarism
have disappeared for the moment.
Even articles of Tokyo's currency and ex-
port difficulties with the United States seem
fairly moderate in tone, suggesting that Mos-
cow would prefer Japan to remain more
closely allied with Washington than to be-
come too friendly with Peking.
*Izvestia summary
All in all;. the current Soviet mood is
summed up by an Izvestia commentator
in these words:
"Soviet-Japanese relations have now
reached a level where both countries stand
face to face with new quantitative and
qualitative improvements of their ties. And
the only requirement for turning possibili-
ties into reality is to eliminate the obstacles
standing in the way of full normalization
and thereby open the way to genuine good-
'neighborliness.
"The objective. conditions require this.
~A%Vl 02 W 1 f , ' co r'e want it."
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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 January 1972
Stanley Karnow
Groniyko's Tri p
To Japan Eyed
SOVIET Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko is sched-
uled to visit Japan for a
week starting this Sunday,
and his trip could have a
significant impact on the
,rapidly changing balance of
power in East Asia.
The Russians and Japa-
nese are both concerned
about the' outcome of Presi-
'dent Nixon's forthcoming
trip to Peking. Thug they
are beginning to explore the
chances of an accommeda-
lion that might serve as a
'counterweight to a possible
reapprochment b e t w e e n
the United States and
China.
This confirms that East
Asia is currently shifting
Into a, complex array of
alignments that will involve
the United States, Cnlna,
the Soviet Union and Japan.
It means, moreover, that the
old designations of "free
world" and Communist bloc
have become obsolete-if,
Indeed, they ever had any
validity.
After treating them badly
for years, the Russians are
eager at present to warm up
to the Japanese. As in all'
their endeavors, the Rus?.
grans are mainly motivated
by an obsession to outf?ank
the Chinese.
THE KREMLIN'S DRIVE
to encircle China made tre-
mendous gains in the recent
war between India and Paki-
stan, which strengthened So?
viet sway on .the Indian sub-
continent. The Russian, are
also believed to be increas-
Ing their Influence in Hanoi
as a result of North Viet-
namese irritation with
China's decision to welcome'
Mr. Nixon.
Now, in an obvious effort
to tighten the noose around
China, the Russians are
seeking to reinforce their
position in Japan.
Severely Jolted by Presi
dent Nixon's move to visit
Peking without consulting
them beforehand, the Japa-
nese are currently worried
by the prospect of a U.S.; reconciliation with China
that leaves them out in the
cold.
Hence they are searching
for other links, and it would
be logical for them to cozy
up to the Russians. ,
The outstandirg issue that,
divides the Russians and
Japanese is the status of Ha.
bomai, Shikotan and ether'
Islands north of Japan The
.Russians occupied these Is-
lands at the end of World
War II and expelled their
inhabitants. '
Pointing to the return of
Okinawa by the United
States, the Japanese con.
tend that the time has come
for the Russians to give
them back the disputed Is
:lands. That gesture, they'
say, would pave the way for'
the signing of a peace treaty
between Japan and the So.
viet Union. The treaty offi.
cially ending their World
War II hostilities has never
been signed.
THE RUSSIANS REAL-
IZE that, ? by returning the
Islands to Japan, they would
make themselves vulnerable
to territorial demands from
countries as far-ranging as
Romania and China. But
Gromyko may in fact accede
to Japanese claims on the
grounds that the political,
advantages of such a settle-
ment outweigh the problems
it would create elsewhere
for the Kremlin.
Another move that Gro-
Tokyo would be to ease the. Panese in the coming week
conditions for Japanese in will therefore i n d c a t e
vestment in Siberia. The So- ' whether a marriage of con.
viet Union and Japan have ; venience is in the adfing.
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talked at length about joint,
development of the region,
but Russian terms for such
development have been too
tough to suit Japanese'
firms.
By way of improving Sovi
et-Japanese atmospherics,
Gromyko is expected to In-'
vite Japanese Prime Minis.
ter Eisaku Sato to Moscow,
and propose that Soviet Pre?
mier Kosygin visit Japan. A
visit to Moscow by Sato
would be the first trip to the
Soviet Union by a Japanese
Prime Minister.
A compact between Japan
and the Soviet Union would
have Important psychologi.
cal repercussions-at mini.
mal cost to both the Rus-
sians and the Japanese. It
would Jolt the Chinese. It
,would also arouse those In
the United States who have
warned that President Nix-
on's approaches to Peking
might drive Japan into the,
Kremlin's arms.
Thus the rapanese an(;,
the Russians are in a posi.`
Lion to counter the Sino-`
American romance with a
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SAIGON POST
20 December 1971
gavlogs Stand Pat
By WIRATMMO' SUKITO
NUSANTARA The agree. island before M're1i 1973. later Japan aces that i,% irir.
ment for returning Okinawa The number- will rise to 600 ?luence in Asia is being resto-
Island to Japan - the in :dart h 1973 at the curl or. red: But through the return of
Okinawa Ileversiron Pact- Japan's Fourth Defense Bull. Oklnaws aas agreed to by
signed in Tokyo and Washing due Pr??urani? both governments the middle
Inn last July 17 by . Koiehi President Nixon recently of h.st year, the return does
Alchi and -William Rogers, urged the U.S. Senate to rati. not mean that Japan will
was ratified on November fy the agreement in order to assumr respnosibility for
10th by the U.S. Senate, re* improve U.S. relations whir Asia's security. Tue US has
quiti+rg a two third majority Japan, When tile agreement not turned Its back on Japan
vote In do so. An exchange of Was discussed in Senate, Seri Relation% are thawing with.
Instruments of ratification William Fulbright, cuairruan China. So without creating a
will soon be held In Toky.i Of the Foreign RelationsCuui confrontation between China
between Japan and Lite' U.S. mince, warned that failure and Japan, the isla id of Oki-
Under article IX of the.ag-` to ratify the agreement could nawa will be returned to
reement the' ?"? return cause fundamental dauurrge Japan.
of Okinawa (..rid other Ryu? to U.S, Japantse relations.
kyu Islands) to Japan will "As i% known, at the end of For Japan, the return of
come Into effect two months the Pacific war, Okinawa O.Iuawn wi'l . inspire the
after the exchaii a of the do- was a scena of major filth- demands for the return of
cunlent?i of ratification in ling, following the landing of suulh Sakhalin and the Kuri.
Tokyo. This, means that nest U.S. troops near Kerania on le islands occupied by the
year Japan will assume re%. 2G March 1943. When the US Soviet Union since the end
poniibility on the Island; but gained complete control of of the Pacific, war even
under the Japanese.U,S. Se. the island mail Japaneie its thmrgh Moscow and Tokyo
curity Pact which in 1970 istance? broke on 23 June enteico into a 10 year non.
was extended fur another ten 1945, the U.S. and lost 12.281 trg+tressiun ag, cement In 1941
years, the U.S. is permitted to men, killed or wounded. It (tire purpose r.1 this agiec-
statron 50,000 American per. can he imagined how much- 'lent was to prevent Japan's
sonnet on Okinawa for com. the U.S. sacrificed to capita- attack Of Russia while Russia
bat purposes with the "prior re the island. was at War with Gel many
approval of the' Japaooso ill Europe and Russia agreed
goVerumeDt. Okinawa became important to attack Japan white
to the U.S. after the Korean not Japan was at war u Ilh the
war broke out in. 1950 in con. US and Br itain in the Pa.?ifie.
The Okinawa' Reversion neciion with The Cnld War. At the aconference(d?ti
Pact is one of the logicni con. With China, At the end of tare
last decade there was a hint February 1945);. President
St:rluenres of ilia Peace Trea?
ty with Japan signed in San that the U.S.would hand over Roosevelt made a concei?l?)n
its Asian security res onsi? to Stalin When he agreed that
Francisco on Sept. 19;1. p Soviet so.errignty over Rus.
bility to Japan which has Sian territories seized by Ja.
According to ASAHI SHIM. revived as a strong Asian pan In the by
DUN (November 9) which nation. war of 194(-1903 would be
quolert defense sources, soon restored. including over the
after the return. Japan . will After Japan surrendered to
CPYRGHT
possible. Nevertheless, the
S?ivletUnion did not attack
Japan immediately 1) c-co lisp
the 1941 non-aggression pact
would canse emharras~n?ent.
In July 1945 Japah?asked the.
Soviet Uninn to mediate its4
confliet with the'U.S. (Pull
Britain) In end the Pacific
war, but the Soviet Union'
refuted and informed the
U.S. and Britain or the Ja-
panese request. Yet the- Sn.
viet Union still dirt not at-
lack Japan. Only`aftcr_Japan
had no hope to wih? the war
did the Soviet Union launch
an attack on 18 August 1945
which resulted in the easy,
capture. of South Sakhalin
and' the Kurile Islands. (Pre.
silent Truinal, who realized'.
,the U.S,,could rlereat Japan
`ivithuut? Soviet participation
warned` the ilosviane not to
Occupy the Kurile Islands but
the Russians reminderl the
U.S. of the Yalta agretnient
that the fact that Kurile Is-
lands were to he handed over
to the Soviet Union.)
When we compare how the
Soviet Union wor South Sa.
khaltn and Kurile Islands with
how the U.S. w.,n Okinawa,
we see that the Soviet Union
wanted onlyto kin the cream
from the milk. It was with
the underaitandtng that rho
Soviet Union would already
have attacked', JS lion be] 01-C
the U.S. attacked Okinawa
that the U.S. made the cones.
fuse l~p~"OV~d t1R+aun~tel~a~6lAa49~98/~~s:tWIA ~ 0 q~~~ a Kurile ISlsradS,
at the Sov a i1nlun 1.1 th
e
 CPYRGHT
U.S. sacrifice 141prcnied-F%R-@Jgf-?tt 1J9,P9JAP/, 2 : Prime A-RD ~P79 01194A0002002 chairman 10001 lac ;~apanese
viCetnen In Okinawa first. khalin) to Japan. According toed him that he would con Socialist Party Narita visited
N
l
onethe
ess the U.S. finally
returns , Okinawa to Japan
while the Suvjet Union does
not want to return the Kurile
JAPAN TIMES
28 October 1971
Wei vC.fLt ," se-SrJv e Re1~iozs
2 Opposing, Reports on Northern Territories Mystifying Public
By MINORU SHAiIZU
Will the Soviet Union, which
is desirous of better relations
with Japan, change its strong
attitude toward the question of
the northern territories?
There were two missions to
Moscow recently within a single
month. They have returned
from Moscow with two opposing
views concerning the Russian
attitude toward the northern is-
lands issue. One is that the
Russians have begun to adopt a
flexible' policy line while the
other is that their attitude re-
mains unchanged.
The former view was er--
pressed by Kenji Miyamoto,
chairman of the presidium of
the Japan Communist Party,
who visited Moscow toward the
end of September. The other
was expressed by Tokusaburo
Kosaka, a Liberal-Democratic
Dietmen, who visited Moscow in
the middle of October.
The problem of the northern
territories, is an important issue
pending since the restoration of
diplomatic relations of the two
nations in 1956, In the Japan-
Soviet joint declaration of that
year, the Soviet Union promised
that two islands, .liabomai and
Shikotan, would be returned to
Japan when a peace treaty was
concluded between the two
countries, Subsequently, in 1960
when the new Japan-U.S. Seeur-
to Jdpane%e Foreign dli.dster sider the Japanese islands to ~Mtescow, tbeSoviet Untun told
Takeo Fukuda, when visiting the north(furreturn to Japan) bins that the lsianda in the
the Soviet Union as Mlnimcr once the U.S. returns Okina. north cannot ha d1.cussed
fur Agriculture and Forestry, wa. But when in July the any wore:
ity Treaty was concluded be- Security Treaty.
tween Japan and U.S., the, this statement by Miyamoto
Soviet Union sent a memo- was received as a sensational
randum to the Japanese Goverfi-- indication of bright prospects
ment stating; that it would not for the return of the northern
return the islands to Japan un- territories.
less the American forces with-. The JCP? launched a colorful
drew from Japan. campaign in early October
Japan, on the other hand, as- through its organ "Akahata,"
Berlin ; that. not only 1Tabornail claiming that Miyamoto's Mos-
and Shikotan but also Kunashiri cow visit had achieved a great
and Etorofu are inherent terra-? success. However, it was short-,
tories of Japan, has been strong- lived.
ly demanding that the Soviet A mission of LDP Dietmen,
Union return them to Japan. including Kosaka returned with
Ritter Confrontation t h e had news. They said,
When we mentioned the report
The Russians have been reite- by Miyamoto to N.N. Rodi-
rating that the territorial issue nov, Deputy Foreign Minister of
concerning Kunashiri and Eto- the Soviet Union, he simply dis-
rofu has been settled. More- m i s s e d it as a misunder-
over, they have proposed condi- standing and the: Russians did
tions for the return of Habomai not change their attitude to-
and Shikot.an. ' Thus, a bitter ward the issue of the northern
'confrontation has continued be- territories."
tween the two nations for over
10 years. Kosaka's Report
In a press interview held im- In an interview, Kosaka told
mediately after his return from This writer: "The Soviet Union's
Moscow, the JCP chairman attitude toward the issue of the
said that Soviet Communist, northern territories remains
Party leaders would consider' stiff. The Russians do not rec-?
the return of Habomai and ognize Miyamoto's view."
Shikotan after the signing of a Government leaders, in-
peace treaty between ' the two eluding ?'r^oreign , Ministry ' offi-
nations and also that they cials, are of the opinion that it.
would take up the return of is unthinkable that the Soviet
Kunashiri and Etorofu as a dip- Union had adopted a flexible at-
lomatic issue following the titude toward the northern ter-
termination of the Japan-U.S. ritories at this time.
CPYRGHT
What appears to be most
strange is that the JCP has not
shown any reaction to Kosaka's
report, remaining quiet. The
JCP . should clarify whether
;?tiyartoto's report is true, since
it publicized it as a great
achievement.
On Oct. 19, , the Foreign Min-
isters of Japan and the So-
viet Union exchanged telegrams
congratulating each other un
the 15th anniversary of . the
signing of the Japan-Soviet
Union joint declaration and re-
joicing in their friendly rela-
tions. There has been great im-
provement in the two nations'
relations through the expansion
of trade and cultural exchanges
during the past 15 years. But
the two nations' confrontation
concerning the issue of the
northern territories has been
hampering their true friend-
ship:
Government and LDP leaders
as well as the people at large
are. now turning their attention
toward the issue of the rarthern
territories now that the return
of Okinawa is scheduled for
1972.
Consequently, if the Soviet
Union persists with-its adamant
attitude toward the issue, it will'
cast a dark cloud over the cur-
rent amicable atomosphere in
the Japan-Soviet relations.
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February 1972
ON ELIMINATING DISSENT
In the Soviet Union, January was a very bad month for the
voices of reason and the defenders of human rights and constitut-
ional legality:
5 January: One-day trial of Vladimir Bukovsky, out of which
came one of the harshest sentences ever given a
Russian dissident. (See "The Case of Vladimir
Bukovsky," this issue,)
12-13 January: KGB raids in Lvov and Kiev resulting in the
arrest of at least thirteen Ukrainian dissidents,
apparently on suspicion of nationalist activity,
The arrestees are said to be held under an arti-
cle of the Ukrainian criminal code that prohibits
the distribution of "deliberately false fabri-
cations defaming the Soviet state."
Five Ukrainians were reportedly arrested in Kiev,
among them the literary critic Ivan Svitlichny.
The Ukrainian underground samizdat publication,
Ukrainsl Visnyk, has name SSvitlichny as one of
several intellectuals whom the KGB is trying to
discredit,
Eight other arrests were reportedly made in Lvov,
including former TV journalist, Vycheslav Chorno-?
vil, Chornovil, in his 30's, was first arrested
in 1967 after he had compiled and circulated as
samizdat a documented account of KGB methods used
in mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in the
mid-1960's.
Also believed arrested in Lvov was another literary
critic, Ivan Dzyuba. Dzyuba was a cosigner, along
with Chornovil and author Boris Antonenko-Davydo-
vich of a letter dated 21 September 1971 (which
circulated in samizdat) written in defense of
Valentyn Moroi. Moroi, historian and author, was
arrested in June 1970 and in November of the same
year was sentenced to nine years imprisonment, the
period to be divided between prison and enforced
labor in a "strict regime" camp, and to five years
exile --- a total fourteen years. Moroz, was
charged with "writing several literary-publicist
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articles on questions dealing with the preservation
of the nation's cultural and spiritual values"
(i.e., Ukrainian nationalism).
16 January: The KGB raided the homes of nine Moscow dissidents
to confiscate sacks of books and papers which they
said "were needed for an investigation in
progress." Reliable Moscow sources said the KGB
took over 3,000 documents, articles, clippings,
tapes and booklets, including a. copy of George
Orwell's "1984" from the apartment of Pyotr Yakir,
Yakir, a young historian regarded by the KGB as
the leader of a loose group of dissidents who call
themselves "The Democratic Movement," has been
quoted as saying that the KGB told him that only
the reputation of his late father had protected
him from arrest for "anti-Soviet deeds." Yakir's
father, Major-General Iona Yakir, was liquidated
in Stalin's 1937 purge of the General Staff and
then "rehabilitated" under Khrushchev,.
18 January: An article in Izvestiya attacked Valeriy Chalidze,
cofounder with rey Sakharov of the Soviet "Com-
mittee for Human Rights," for his allegedly
"nefarious" meeting in Moscow with U.S. Congress-
man James Scheuer. This was the first critical
comment on Chalidze to have appeared in the Soviet
press; the article merely referred to him as "a
certain V.N. Chalidze."
19 January: Reports of additional arrests and searches in the
Ukraine gave rise to speculation that the militant
stand assumed by the Ukrainian Communist Party
against Ukrainian nationalists may have triggered
a nation-wide crackdown. The Ukrainian KGB chief,
Fedorchuk, is reportedly one of those in the
Ukrainian leadership who favors harsh treatment
of the voices of dissent, whatever their origins.
Among those whose homes were searched 19 January
was Ukrainian author Viktor P. Nekrasov, who
first gained fame with a popular World War: II
novel, "In the Trenches of Stalingrad." Nekrasov
came under sharp attack in 1963 for favorable
comments he made on life in the West in an
account he wrote of his travels to the U.S.,
Italy and France, "Both Sides of the Ocean,"
19 January: In Moscow, the KGB took in for questioning and
detained mathematician Yuri Shikhanovich and
astronomer Kronid Lyubarsky. Other arrests were
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reportedly feared. Shikhanovich's name appeared
among the names of 95 Soviet mathematicians who
in March 1968 signed a petition protesting the
arrest of poet and mathematician Yesenin-Volpin,
a strong supporter of the human rights movement
who had been incarcerated in a mental institution.
February: ??
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CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON POST
16 January 1972
U.S. Recalls Attacked Aide From Russia
A' U.S. Air Force attache
reportedly assaulted by Rus-
sians at an airport is being
reassigned to the United
States, the Pentagon said;
yesterday,.
A Defense Department!
spokesman said Capt. Elmer
L. Alderfer, 33, was enroute
,;from the Soviet Union.
He Is being assigned to the
Air Force Institute of Tech-
nology at Wright-Patterson
''Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio.
His.-parents five In Telford.
Pa.
The State Department said
Friday that Alderfer, an assis-'
tant attache at the U.S. Em-,
bassy in Moscow, was attackedi
by more than a dozen Rus
Glans, Jan. 5, at the Riga air-'
port. At the time, Aiderfer+,
was visiting Riga on a trip ap-
proved by Soviet officials, the.
State Department said.
The U.S. Embassy in Mos-
cow on .an. 6 orally "strongly
protested this violation of di-
plomatic Immunity," a State
Department spokesman said.
The embassy's complaint,
citing the failure of local au-
thorities to prevent the as-
sault on the U.S. officer at al
1 public airport and the failure
to arrest the attackers, was
rejected by the Soviet foreign
ministry pending investiga-
said.
The spokesman said another
protest was lodged with the
Soviet Embassy In Washing-
ton Jap. 10, but no reply has
been r ceived.
He $aid the United States
considers the incident serious
and does not intend to let it
drop. (More often, however,
the attache Is retained in his
post until such matters are
resolved.)
NEW YORK TIMES
16 January 1972
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
SCHEUER DECRIES OUSTER BY SOVIET
LONDON, Jan. 15-
-Repre-sentative James H. Scheuer, the
ronx Democrat expelled from
the Soviet Union on the ground
of "Improper activities," said
here tonight that his ouster was
"pointless and drrational" The
step apparently was designed'
to discourage Americans from
private contacts with Soviet
citizens.
Mr. Scheuer, who arrived
here from Leningrad, denied
that be had carried any material 1,
for distribution in the Soviet'
Union and that he had sought
to encourage Soviet Jews toI
migate to Israel. He said he~ tour of educational i
ad th-e- 6nnr mr.ntinaa with! remained there I
...
scientists wno nau u=n U UI .U "ended Wednesday.
the right t4 emigrate but that Explaining his private con-
such meetings "are not against tacts, Mr. Scheuer said that he
the law." ` had carried with him the names
"It you call sympathetic con- of six or seven Jewish scien.
cern with the plight of such tists denied permission to emi-
grate subversive activity, to Israel and the names
people as of those Jews jailed after Lenin-
then I am guilty," he added ;grad trials last year at which
Ina telephone interview from they were accused of having
his hotel. 1plotted to hijak a Soviet air-
Visited with 'Study Groups -liner.
He said the names had been
Mr. Scheuer, who represents !provided by several sources In
the heavily Jewish 22d Congres- New York, including Leonid
sional District in the Bronx, Rigerman, who emigrated t
went to the Soviet Union as the United States from the
a member of it Congressional' Soviet Union last year after
kstudy group for a two-week' long struggle. claiming Ameri
can citizenship.
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WASHINGTON POST
13 January 1972 CPYRGHT
Police in Moscow Detaiii.
. Scherer for an Hour
By Robert G. Kaiser
Waahlnaton Post Forelen Service
police detained an American
congressman for nearly an~
hour tonight after telling his
Soviet hosts they were look-
?ing for a criminal disguised as
a foreigner.
he congressman, Rep.
James H. Schcuer (D.N.Y.),
said after the incident he was
sure it was no accident, though
he couldn't say for certain why
he was detained. The most
likely reason, Schcuer said,
was his interest in the status
of Jews in the Soviet Union.
Schcucr was having dinner
tonight in the apartment of
Prof. Alexander Lerner, a
Soviet Jew and computer spe-
cialist who lost both his job
and his Communist Party
membership when he applied
,for permission to emigrate to
Isreal.
Until last October, Dr. Ler?.
ncr served as director of the
department' of large-scale Sys-
tems in Moscow's Institute of
Control Sciences and was also
professor at the Science and
Technical University.
It was the first time that a
visiting U.S. congressman was
detained in the Soviet capital.'
The incident coincided with)
,the opening in Washington of
a Soviet arts and crafts exhibi-
tion at the Corcoran Gallery.
'(Story on Page E1.)
It recalled the earlier coinci-
dence of Yale professor Frede-
rick Barghoorn's arrest in Mos-
cow in October, 1963, at a
time, like the present, when
there were signs of imminent
improvement in Soviet-Amerl-
can relations.
,ton, State De-
[In Washing
partment officials refused to-
comment on the incident, say-
ing they were awaiting details
Soviet desperado in the neigh-
borhood in the gui~;c of a for-
"
would therefore have to take
.into custody anyone looking
like a foreigner. Scheuer said
he was with a group of about
half a dozen Jewish scientists,
and he was the only obvious
outsider.
"I showed them my Diners'.
Club card, but that didn't im-
press them," Schcuer said in a
light-hearted mood afterward.
"I showed them my Ameri-
can Express card, but that
didn't impress them either. I
showed them my air travel'
card stamped 'international' I.
,told them with that, Kosygin
could fly to Buenos Aires. but
'even that didn't impress them.
I showed them my congression-
al I.D. card, with my picture
on it, and they said, 'oh, artists
can make those up.' "
Scheuer said his passport
would identify him beyond any
doubt as a United States con-
gressman, but that he had left,
it in his hotel room. The police,
he reported, said they would
have to take him to the hotel
to find the passport.
Instead, according to
Scheuer, the police took him
and the 26-year-old son of his
host (who speaks English) to
"the pokey"-a neighborhood
police station.
"They put us in a little room
with one light bulb, Schcuer
said by telephone tonight.
"We were in there about half
an hour, 40 minutes. All of it
up to now had been Informal,
not too serious. Now, this first'
iirutenant drew himself up
Ad made a speech-now it's
a United Nations' session, and
be asked Vladimir (the 26-
year-old) to translate every
sentence to me.
"I wish to inform the con'
pressman; he said. pausing
tip AV%. Magill tA all. .11 1.
.,men visiting Moscow. We have.
found that there is a Congress
And we think you are that
r cuer.
With that, the police agreed
to release him, Schcucr said.
They offered to take him and,
Young Vladimir back to the
Lerner apartment, but the
congressman decided he should
first see someone from the
U.S. Embassy here. The police
had allowed him to call Cie
embassy from the station.
So the police got Scheuer a
taxi, he related. and went with
Vladimir to his hotel, where
several embassy p e r s o n n e l
were waiting.
After telling their store, the
two intended to return to their
dinner at the Lerner apart-
ment, but the police again
picked up Vladimir to grill'
him about what he told the
Americans," Schcucr said, "I
waited for him another hour,,
Scheuer added. But lie did
eventually get back to Lerner'sl
apartment, from which he talk
ed to this correspondent by
telephone.
For once, the Lcrncrs had
some exciting news to convey
to their friends In Chicago.
~ Schcucr said he didn't see
how the arrest could have.
been an accident. The arrest.
ing officers had sufficient evi-
dence that he was an Ameri-
can congressman, he said. "It
they didn't know what that
meant, they could have picked
up the phone and called head
quarters to ask," he added.
He noted that he had raised
the question of the position
of Jews In Soviet society In
several meetings with Soviet
officials during the past 10
days. lie is here with a House
education subcommittee. lie
also had one three-hour dis.
cussion on the Jewish question
with Alexander B. Chakovsky,
editor of the important week-
men, two policemen appeared t
hat we have made extensive ly Literary Gazette, 'and him.
at Lerner's apartment at about self a Jew. All these discus-
8.30 p.m. and We have found that relaxed and friend.
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 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
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NEW YORK TIMES
19 January 1972
Tighter Soviet Internal Security. Is Seem
By IIEDRiCK SMITH
MOSCOW, Jan. IR--Western
diplomats believe that the So-
viet Union is tightening Inter-
nal security and seeking to
shore up !Ideological vigilance
among So'ie_t citizens to offset
possible side effects of its pot.
Icy of rcldxing tensions with
the West. ,
They cite indications that So-
viet security agencies are en-,
gaged In a campaign against'
domestic dissidents, especially
those having contact with for-
eigners.
Some diplomats consider this
no more than one of the peri-
odic "vigilance campaigns"
that the Kremlin sanctions
from time to time. Others sus-
pect that the security agencies
may be intending to deal a
more crippling blow to major
elements of the dissident move-
ment, which has functioned
here for several years.
Conviction, Arrests, Rnlde
Since a call in December to
ICoironunist party members for
greater vigilance al*ainst the
dangers of subversion and hos-
tile propaganda from foreign
travelers, residents and radio
stations, there have been the
following developments:
Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a 29-
year-okl dissident, was con-;
victcd Jac. 5 of anti-Soviet
agitation god propagandizing'
and given ,the maximum sen-!
tence, seven years in prison
and five in rxile. His summary
one-day trial was used by the
newspaper Vechernaya Moskva
to warn of the dangefs of hav-
ing chntact with foreign cor-?
respondents here.
Thirteen Ukrainians were ar-'
rested last week in Kiev and.
Lvov for nationalist activities.]
The 13 included Vyacheslav
Chornovil, a journalist jailed
In 1967 after having prepared
an account of political trials
In the Lfl raine, and two liter-
ary critcs, Ivan Svitlychny and
Ivan Dzyuba.
The homes o nine Moscow
dissidents were raided by se-
curity, police Jan. 14 as part
of an investigation of suspect-
ed "anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda." More than 3,000
documents, articles, clippings,
eluding a copy of Orwell's
"1984," were reported taken,
from the apartment of Pyotr
Yakir, a historian regarded bye,
the police as the leader of the,
loose group of dissidents who;
call themselves the Democratic
;Movement.
Further Arrests Feared
Two of the nine, Yuri Shi-
khanovich, a mathematician,
and Kronid Lyubarsky, an as-
tronomer employed at the
Chornogolovka Institute of
Solid State Physics near Mos-
cow, were called in subse-
quently for questioning and de-
tained by the K.G.B., or secret
police. Dissidents say that they
fear further arrests.
Agents in Kiev searched the
apartment of Viktor P. Nek-
,rasov, a noted Ukrainian au-
thor. He gained fame with a
popular World War II novel,
"In the Trenches of Stalin-
grad " and was sharply at-
tacked in 1963 for favorable
comments on life in the West
in a book, "Both Sides of the
Ocean," his account of a visit
to the United States, Italy, and:
France.
In an attack on the activities
of visiting American Congress-
men, the Government news
;paper Izvestia charged yester-
day that Representative James
H. Scheuer, Democrat of the
Bronx, had been following in-
structions of the "American
Secret Service." It contended
that four intellectuals whom he
met were ."the kind of people
relied upon by those across the
ocean" who plan to create sub-
versive organizations "the aim
of which is to incite Soviet
citizens to come out against
the existing regime and Soviet
Government." The Soviet Union'
expelled Mr. Scheuer last Fri-'
day. accusing him of "Improper
activities."
LOSE Ineir 33511
The four men cited by Izves-
tia were V. N. Chalidze, a phys-
icist who is a member of the
small Soviet Committee on
uman Rights, and three Jew-
ish intellectuals who have lost
their jobs since they applied to
emigrate to Israel, Aleksandr Y.
Lerner, a computer specialist,
and his son, Vladimir, and Vik-
tor 0. Polsky, an electronics
specialist who formerly headed
a laboratory.
Diplomatic observers empha-
sized that the steps taken re-
cently were still very minor
compared with the purges of
the purges of the thirties or
;even later crackdowns. and
'Moscow Intellectuals insist that
the general atmosphere is a far
.cry from the Stalinist period.
Nonetheless, the latest ac-
tions are widely regarded as
the most pronounced internal
security tightening in at least
a year and perhaps longer. The
last notable crackdown was the
trial in Leningrad in 1970 of
Jews and others accused of
having conspired to hijack a
Soviet commercial airliner.
The latest wave of police ac-
tion was preceded in November
by a speech by the Ukrainian
party leader, Pyotr Shelest, urg-
ing party workers not to le
the policy of detente weaken
their ideological vigilance.
There was also an article last
cal stnihple with the west be
cause of the policy of peacefu
!coexistence. The article sal,
Western countries sought t
use detente to try to undermin
socialism through political an
from arrests or raids In kee
Ing with the comparative
moderate policy of allowin
many Jews to emigrate afte
bureaucratic delays provide
that they do not take awa
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WASHINGTON POST
26 January 1972
CPYRGHT
Vladimir Bukovsky's Harsh Sentence Was the First Sign of...
A New Soviet Crackdown on Political Dissent
Otful Of it 130.10
cal police crackdown is in the frosty Moscow
air this January. A series of arrests, harass-
ments and articles in the official press have
provided a steady stream of "crackdown" sto-
ries for the Western' news organizations
here-the single most attentive audience to
the confusing spectacle of political dissent`.
in the Soviet Union.
Abrupt changes in the political tempera-
ture recur periodically here. Old hands can
remember dozens of them. For newer ob-
servers the process is bewildering and fasci-
nating. Bewildering because it Is so hard to.
know what such a crackdown really means.
Fascinating because it revives one of the
basic questions about this society: How does
it change, and why?
By actual count, the current crackdown
has directly touched less than 35 people (as-
suming its full dimensions are known, which
is proble'matical.) Nineteen of these were ar-
rested In the Ukraine on charges of national-
ist agitation, perhaps in connection with the
arrest of a Belgian tourist in the Ukraine at
the same time.
The others affected by the crackdown are,,
mostly Moscow dissidents, friends of Pyotr
Yakir, the 43-year-old son of a Soviet general
killed in a Stalin purge, and now Moscow's
most active political renegade. Yakir's col-
league Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to
seven years in prison and five more in exile,
By Robert G. Kais?r
"Abrupt changes in the
political temperature recur.
periodically here. Old hands
can remember dozens of them.
For newer observers, the pro-
cess is bewildering and fasci-
nating. Bewildering because it
is so hard to know what such a
crackdown really means. Fasci-
nating because it revives one
of the basic questions about
this Society: Ilow does it
change, and why?"
a harsh punishment which was the first sign
of the new crackdown. The 'apartments of
Yakir and seven friends were searched. The
Moscow correspondent of the London Times
from public criticism. -
nored by the Soviet press for most of a year,
several of the biggest Western chanceries in,
ence says it is wrong to look for such an
elaborate explanation. "Evens In the freest
One Westerner with many years experi-
and woefully depressing picture of medieval,
Russia, Its cruel princes and wild Tartar in-
poaiF~KTsYYlkii s?'F~u~/09/024 CCIA- ilea ~`~~A, ~n il.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
ous references to the arbitrary and silly use
of state power, Rublev's tormented debate
bout an artist's role in society.
t troubling, the film is an Indi-
vidual and unusual work, a piece of creativ-
ity unstilted by party line or official dicta..
Muscovites have been flocking to see It, and
the film is said to be opening all over the
country.
c+J
HOW DOES one movie-or one small
wave of arrests and harassments--affect the
spirit of a Soviet citizen? For an outsider
living here, that is the most Intriguing but
most unanswerable of questions. The party
ideologists apparently fear something, akin:
to the "Prague Spring" of 1968, but what
could bring that sort of phenomenon to the
Soviet Union? What are the signals that a
Soviet intellectual feels most strongly, that
can make him change his ways of thinking
and living?
Recent Soviet history suggests that the
one really powerful signal is terror. Stalin
kept "foreign" influences out of the Soviet
Union by enforcing appalling penalties on
those who fell under their sway. Soviet art,
music and, literature shriveled to the point
of death under Stalin, because artists were
afraid to challenge the official standards.
The terror ended in the early 1950s, and
by the late 1950s the poetry readings which
gave birth to the dissident movement had
begun. Pasternak finished "Doctor Zhivagb,"
Solzhenitsyn published "One Day in the Life
of Ivan Denisovich." Voznesensky and Yev
The Soviet Union is not.
shutting itself off from the
outside world. Intourist, the
state tourist organization, is
working hard to reverse a de.
cline in the number of tour.
ists here in 1971 . The
,Soviet government is courting
other countries ardently, and
shows every indication of a
keen desire to be admired by
outsiders . . ."
tushenko brought life back into Russian po-
etry, a few directors partially revived the
.Russian theater and movies.
The mood has relaxed and tightened In
turn, .but Stalinism has not reappeared. New
boundaries of permissable behavior have
been drawn, far outside the tiny circle lm-
posed by Stalin (though still woefully short
of anythin'" that would be acceptable in the
West). Soviet Intellectuals have occupied the
AA
anew territory that has been opened to them.
"Andrei Rublev" sems proof that the Rus-
sian creative impulse is alive and strong, if
hidden much of the time. It Is hard to see
how the political police could restore the old
sterility and ? silence-unless the Stalinist
terror was restored too.
The KGB and the government can control
the most obvious manifestations of intellec-
tual life. They can ban books, movies and
plays, jam foreign broadcasts. By threaten-
ing to deprive people of jobs and privileges,
.they can also control open expressions of
unacceptable opinions. They are doing all of
these regularly. But this is not the same as
the complete subservience of the intellectual
class, which the terror did maintain. '
Without complete subservience, some de-
gree of courageous (if foolhardy) open dis-
sidence seems inevitable. Even a foreigner
can quickly learn that numerous Soviet in-
tellectuals are frustrated by censorship and
a heavy-handed bureaucracy. This corre-
spondent has had several startling experi-
ences with responsible Soviet officials,
trusted members of the Communist Party,
who indicated unhappiness with censorship
or controls on foreign travel. The police are
as unpopular a group among the Soviet In-
telligentsia as they are with the American
intellectual left. If thoughts like these are
widespread, a tiny fraction of those who
-share them are likely to act eventually on
their beliefs. Such action is dissidence In the
contemporary Soviet Union.
cvr
A SOVIET citizen contemplating active par
'ticipation in the dissident movement might
well be deterred when he hears about Vladi-
mir Bukovsky's harsh prison sentence, or
-the raids on the apartments of Pyotr Yakir
and his friends. Probably because of arrests
and stiff prison sentences In the past, the
dissident movement is smaller today than if
,was in the mid-1960s.-
At the same time some startling things
have happened in this country. Jews havit conducted successful sit-ins In official of
fives. Scientists' protests have forced the re
lease of a prominent biologist from a mental'
hospital. Alexander Solzhenitsyn lives
openly and is writing a new book.
The Soviet Union is not shutting Itself off,
from the outside world. Intourist, the state
tourist organization, is working hard to re.
verse a decline in the number of tourlst,'
here In 1971, a decline attributed to 1Vestert'
reaction against Soviet treatment of Jewil
and perhaps dissidents. The, Soviet. govern'
ment is courting other countries ardentlyr
and shows every Indication of a keen desirr'
to be admired by outsiders. The tolerance oft
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CPYRGHT
Solzhenitsyn and the decision to permit sub.
dtantial Jewish emigration seem to be evi,
dence that the Kremlin now.responds to for
sign opinion In a way Stalin would have
laughed at.
None of this is liberalism. From a liberal
point of view it may not even be hopeful. So'
Viet Intellectuals may be willing to IM.
within the current boundaries, permitted at"
occasional "Andrei Rublev" and their pri?
vate frustrations, but nothing more. Eaci
year, no doubt, a few will be unwilling, wil'
join the active dissidents, and will probably
end In jail. There isn't even a hint that tht
great mass of citizens cares about censor
ship, foreign travel or civil rights.
Brezhnev and his colleagues may havt'
achieved a new status' quo-ahead of Stu
lin's, well behind Khrushchev's at his mos
liberal, and by all appearances stable. Per;
haps its susceptibility to foreign pressure It
a weakness that will lead to change, but tha
"is only speculation. The Soviet Invasion of
Czechoslovakia seems to confirm that nt
amount of foreign- disapproval could dis
suade the men in' the Kremlin when then'
are really afraid.
6
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
February 1972
1943: Born; parents were respected Communist Party
members.
1960: Expelled from Moscow High School No.59 where, in
his senior year, he publ.ished'Martyr, an underground
magazine of humorous satire in protest against the
repression and injustices of the Soviet system.
1961-1962: Enrolled at Moscow University and studied biophysics
for a year in spite of an official ban against his
ever studying in a Soviet university. When his
identity was eventually learned, he was expelled
and then worked as handyman at a museum, while con-
tinuing to meet with a group of his contemporaries
for evening discussions against the system they all
opposed. (This group is considered the forerunner
for the present day dissident movement )
1962: Organized illegal art exhibition featuring works of
proscribed artists. When exhibition was drdered
closed, Bukovsky escaped arrest by joining
archaeological expedition to Siberia for six months.
Early 1963: Returned to Moscow and worked as computer programmer.
May 1963: Arrested by KGB and charged with having in his
possession two copies of the book, The New Class,
by Milovan Djilas. He was sent to Serbsky P syc Tat-
ric Institute where he was declared insane.
Dec 1963: Transferred to prison asylum in Leningrad,
Feb 1965: Released and returned to Moscow where he again
became involved in the dissident movement.
Dec 1965: Arrested and sent to Serbsky Institute for organi
ing demonstration demanding an open trial for
writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel.
Aug 1966: Released.
Jan 1967: Arrested for organizing demonstration on behalf, of
Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov. Convicted
and sentenced to three years in the Borr labor camp
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210004 -1
in Voronezhskaya district, 300 miles south of Moscow.
Jan 1970: Released, and in poor health, including heart mur-
mur and rheumatic ailments.
Mar 1971: Arrested and held incommunicado, part of the time
in Serbsky Institute, for sending abroad an open
letter asking that Western psychiatrists investi-
gate Soviets' use of mental hospitals to detain
dissident intellectuals, and for his continued
contacts with foreign journalists.
Jan 1972: At one-day trial, Bukovsky was convicted of "anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda," and given the
maximum twelve-year sentence under Article 70 of
the Russian Criminal Code: two years in prison,
five years in a labor camp and five years in exile
(or enforced residence in a remote area desigrtated
by Soviet authorities).
20 Jan 1972: Andrei Sakharov wrote Communist Party chief Leonid
Brezhnev requesting Bukovsky's release. Pointing
out that the trial had been closed and the defense
prevented from calling witnesses, Sakharov said
that everyone who knew of Bukovsky's activities
"justifiably assumes that the real reason for the
extremely strict sentence was his self-sacrificing
struggle for human rights," and that "healthy
forces in the leadership of the country and among
the people are concerned. . ."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
 CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON POST
6 January 1972
By Robert G. Kaiser
wanhloaton rots Foreign Service
MOSCOW, Jan. 5--A A1os?
cow court tonight sentenced
Ylndlmir Rukovsky, a prom-
inent Soviet dissident, to sev-
en years in a "strict regimen
corrective labor colony" and
five additional years In exile.
It was one of the harshest
I,r.ntcnces ever given to a well-
known member of the tiny and
shrinking dissidents commu-
Inity.
Iukovsky was charged with
".activity aimed at undermin.
ing and weakening Soviet
power" under article 70 of the
Soviet criminal code. A seven.
yenr prison sentence Is the
maximum provided by this
.etatute. The c.mirt ruled to.
right that flukevsky should
sl,enrl two years In Jail, five
in a labor ramp and then five
more in exile., probably In some
place like Siberia.
Rukovsky 28, has. already
spent nearly seven years in
Soviet prisons and mental hos.
pitals for past political trans.
gresstaiis. lie now suffers from
heart trouble. He has always
displayed his opposition to the
Soviet regime openly' some.
times brazenly. Ile also cut.
tivated the friendship of West.!
ern journalists, something So-1
vlet off4Finls constantly dis.
courage.
[its, severe sentence chin-
cities - with nn Increasingly
popular theory In 5loscow's
Russiaii Dissideiit.
Gets Prison, Exile
1t'cstcrn: diplomatic commu-
go 431P !!a@@
the Soviet Union Is beginning
a new crackdown. on domestic
oppositidn as n complement to
Moscow# current diplomatic
offensive abroad. One West-
to the outside world protected
by tightenltag the screws at
home.'"
The theory, assumes that the
Soviets fear the domestic im-
pact of increased contact with
foreigners, even on an official
level. It is easier to postulate
such a theory than to test it.
Outsiders have not been
able to perceive any signifi-
cant degree of opposition to
the regime here. Figures like
Bukovsky seem to be rare
exceptions, not representatives
of any large movement. Bute
outsiders are in no position
to judge the state of Soviets
society.
According to Tast, the gow
ernment news agency, the
prosecutor in the fukovsky
rg8e today accused him of try.
Ing to smuggle a printing press
Into the Soviet Union, of "dis-
seminating slanderous lies
about the ,social and govern-
ment system of the U.S.S.R.,"
and of trying to persuade two
soldiers to disobey orders and
help him. Tass said Bukovsky
"did not deny the facts cori.
cerning the actions for which
he was tried" when he ad-
dressed the court.
According to friends, I3ukov.
ski told the court that he only
little" for freedom In the So-
viet Union while he was Iast++
out of prison-from January,
1970, until last April, when he
was arrested on the charges
which led to today's one-day
trial. Western newsmen were
barred from the trial, which
Tass described as open.
The dissident movement of
which Bukovsky has been a
fixture apparently reached the
apex of its. influence after the
1905 trials of two writers, An-
drel Sinyavsky and Yuli Dan-
set. Their seven- and five-year
prison terms aroused wide-
spread indignation and an un
precedented-thnugh still tiny
-amount of public protest.
But those protests (Bukov-
sky organized one, and- went
to jail for it) were to no avail.
Later criticisms of the invasion
of Czechoslovakia were simi-
larly fruitless.. By their own
admission, the dissidents lost'
much open support, and' in thei
last year or, so they have
openly bemoaned their fate{
and their failures,
More Cautious d
One prominent opponent of
the regime shad not long' ago,
that people who. might stave'
joined: a protest or signedt r
petition Live years ago are
more cautious now.
"They see that petitions
dbn't have much effect," this'
)person said.
One group of disscntcrs re?
tar 't ~t..,? and has hat
cess-the Jews. Perhaps. as
many as 12.000 Jews were al:
lowed' to. leave the Soviet
Union for Israel during 197I.1
more- than in all previous
-usagr
have an adiantage," one dissi-
dent noted. "They have a goal
to work for--i.e. cmigratio`
to Israel. ;,. ,
And. if the dissidents have;.
lost some following and manv
leaders, they have two. promi-
nent and apparently perms
nent allies who, so far at least, I
seem, beyond the reach of thel
police authorities. They are
Andrei Sakharov, a distln-
guished physicist known as
father of the Russian' hydra
gcn bomb, and Alexander Soiz-
henitsyn, the Nobel prize-win
ping novelist.
Sakharov is founder of the
unofficial. committee for hu-
man right, lie regularly
circulates letters of protest
against arbitrary government
actions. lie has several times.
protested on Bukovsky's be.,
half, and he was barred from
the courtroom today.
nlzhnnilsvn takes no known
active rote In dissident affairs,
but he has become a symbol of
the Russian intellectual who
endures his government rather
than supporting it, His every,
public utterance Is now widely
reported. in the West, and then
by short-wave rarii-, back -W1
.the Soviet Union.
BALTIM)RE SUN
6 January 1972
Soviet court decals harshly with dissident
fly DEAN attrt,s
CPYRGHT
MOSCOW-A Soviet court found years' exile in - ria. There were few details avail- Industrial section of southeast
Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a civil The sentence. which followed able yesterday regarding the Moscow, but they were r,fused
rights activist, guilty of "anti-. a speedy, one-day trial, is ex- 12-hour trial, except for short entrance. Among them was An-'
Soviet agitation and propagan-., traordinarily harsh, even for official versions by Tass, the drei Sakharov, the nuclear
da" yesterday and handed him dissident cases. It carried an official news agency. physicist who helped, build the
the maximup~,poss Ig" a cue tgt~y e h ~Q80O2OO2l Ot40* 4 bomb and
-seven ye4 b~w%io hip 0'11 p n yT"'criti `9ukovs 's suppporters gathered a co- Dander of an unofficial
t.ti.- -__ t,ahead 1w fivw rize the svstm-n. otitside the courthouse, in an human rights committee.
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
The only details of Mr. Bu.
kovsky's own statements avail.
able yesterday were his closing
words to the court. In a refer.
ence to his human-rights activi.
ties between the time he was
released from a previous son=
tence in 1970 and his arrest on
the new charges last March, he
reportedly said:
"I regret very much that in
one year, three months, and
three days, I did very little."
Mr. Bukovsky, 29, who has*
been confined several times to:
various Russian mental hospl.
this himself, campaigned par.
icularly fervently ngainst the
practice of incarcerating politi.
cal prisoners In such institu.
tions, lie gave interviews to
Western correspondents and
wrote letters to. Western author.
Ries on the question,
He said during his brief pert.
CEJICAGO TRIBUNE
6 January 1972
One S
2. Two Soviet military offs-i
cers testified that the defendant
had tried to persuade them to
"betray their oath of enlist.
ment." The officers testified,
according to Tass, that he had
asked them to disobey orders
from the command and per.
suade the privates, to do the
same" after meeting them In 11
Afnscow cafe. There was no
explanation of %iiat kind of
or,'^rs r,crn involved.
3. There were, said Tass,
"several foreign citizens with
whom Bukovsky had meetings
with illegal aims in view."
The single concrete charge
.againSt hint, mentioned by Tas4
was' that i he disseminated
"anti-Soviet materials" pub.
lished by the People's Labor
Union, an anti-Soviet Russian
;emigre o-'ganization based in
Western Europe. 4
CPYRGHT
viet Became
40,30 1
eil 2
By Frank Starr
WAMINGTON-They threw the book
at Vladimir Bukovsky oh Wednesday-
,putting him away for 12 years,
If he serves it all, as it seems likely
he will, e longest stretch of freedom
he will have known between the ages
of 20 and 42 will have been 15 months.
His reaction: "I very much regret
that in one year, three months, and
three days, I did very little."
Violated Criminal Code
What this 29-year-old son of the Soviet
intelligentsia had done, according to
official accounts, was to violate a
broadly worded article of the criminal
code prohibiting !'anti-Soviet agitation
and propaganda" by seeking to smug-
gle portable printing equipment into the
oviet Union, persuading acquaintances
o smuggle information abroad, and
ying to enlist two army officers t~
elp him smuggAppt'1~4t19id"dj.te
od of freedom that, whatever
the official charges against app has wread a series and
him, it would be for this that through to leaders here ands
her would in an at-
Soviet authorities would arrest tempt to free the
him son.
His friends said "" u111~IC v1 we nussian
yesterday Federation Criminal Code un-
that excerpts from the filmed der which Mr. Bukovsky was
interview he gave the Columbia tried prohibits "agitation on
Broadcasting System's former propaganda- aimed at subvert.
Moscow correspondent; Bill ing or weakening Soviet power"
Cole, were shown in court. and the preparation, or posses-
The woman prosecuting attor. Sion of literature containing I'll
ney, Aza Bobrushko, also cited . belous fabrications" against th
as evidence against him favora Soviet system.
ble references to Mr. Bukovsky The specific acts with which
In broadcasts by the Voice of he was charged, according to
America and the British Broad- Tass, seemed to be, In Western
;casting Corporation. terms, not W much acts as
Mr. Bukovsky apparently thoughts:
.withstood the trial well, the 1. "Bukovsky was going, to
friends said. But his sister, use the assistance- of one of his
Olga, fainted at one point. His 'foreign acqunintanees (to)'.
mother, Mrs. Nina Bukovsky, smuggle a portable printshop,
was in "very bad condition" Into the country." (Private citi
after the sentence was pro. zens are not allow p# to own any'
wM.Mnna 116-v ...&A 1!_ D..1. ~. 1_1 .
He took seriously the United Nations be where he is now, in a tape-recorded
Declaration of Human Rights -providing interview with me when I had the good
for free flow of information across na- fortune to know him well during his
tional boundaries and the Soviet con- 15 months of freedom. That freedom
stitution's article 125, which reads: ended with his arrest last March.
"In conformity with the interests of "For my generation-10 to 12 years
the working people, and in order to old when Stalin died-he [Stalin] w ;s
strengthen the Socialist system, the the personification of Soviet rule," Bu-
citizens of the U. S. S. R. are guar- kovsky had said. "We were raised in
anteed by law freedom of speech, free- this spirit by the newspapers, our par-
don of the press, freedom of assembly, ents, the schools, and by our total en-
including the holding of mass meetings, vironment.
demonstrations. -"~ Strong Deification Concept
"These civil rights are insured by "Even tho it was never said outright,
placing at the disposal of the working there was a religious feeling toward
people and their organizations printing Stalin, and the concept of his deification
presses, stocks of paper, public build- was strong. We children, for example,
ings, the streets, communications facili- saw a mysterious aspect in the signa-
ties, and other material requisites for tures of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Staligr-an
the exercise of these rights." otherworldly power.
Vladimir Bukovsky made clear the "Try then, to imagine StaIin's sudden
ajj9i3~ 2rgvGf -lb[R79-0dkHt9*-M2i)Q24MQ~4ib1e that
st u on to im, and how he came to
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
CPYRGHT
God is mortal. There was great confu-
sion even among.those people whom we
had grown accustomed to regarding as
strong people-our teachers and parents.
"They were bewildered; they did not
know what to say or how to behave.
Teachers sobbed during lessons and our
parents cried their hearts out at home.
All this was perfectly sincere, not the
'least artificial. The whole country was
united in a desperate feeling of catas-
trophe.
"Just imagine, after this profound
experience of our childhood, the death
of a god. Literally two or three years
later came the unmasking of that god.
And suddenly it was revealed that this
was not god but a . terrible monster; a
Moloch who had devoured millions of
people, and had irretrievably perverted
everything.
"Just as before, when Stalin and
Soviet rule and Communism symbolized
to us everything that is beautiful; to
which everyone owed allegiance, now
by that analogy the image of Stalin and
the understanding of Communism and
Soviet rule in our minds became the
symbols of evil, force, and destruction.
This occurred quite mechanically, as a
matter of course, and it occurred simul-
taneously in millions of minds.
System of Lies
"Naturally, we who were young at that
time, 15 or so, being impulsive and
craving generalizations, came to the
firm conclusion that the whole system
was oppressive and evil, a system of
lies and falsehoods.
"It turned out that all those who
understood this had lied all their lives,
starting with the state and ending with
one's own friends. It turned out that the
whole structure was by no means man-
kind's ccntpries-old dream. It turned
out evcrytng had been fabricated. It
turned out that nature, people, state, and
society had{becn raped. All those who
contradicted` were eliminated. It became
obvious to us that there could not be
any truth or justice in general in such
a system and that it had to be changed
radically. '
"A second fact which I regard as a
turning point was the rebellion in
Hungary in 1956. Corning so quickly
after the unmasking of our god, this
caused a quick and acute. reaction."
By 1957, when he was 15, he was
already in a spontaneous, and therefore
illegal, organization--a loose association
of youngsters who thought alike but
Two years later he saw the Soviet'
the first time. He edited a satirical
magazine in school, unbeknownst to
officials, called Martyr-a play on
words. Uchenik in Russian means stu-
The Communist Party Central Com-
mittee building was near the school, and
news of the magazine reached the com-
mittee quickly. The director of the
school was fired immediately. An effort
to gain a general condemnation of the
magazine from the student body failed,
but Bukovsky was expelled.
He was Interviewed by officials, who
refused even to say he would. So he was
study he would-have to "stew in the
laborers' caldron to understand 'what
writer and confirmed Communist and
whose mother was a journalist for Radio
Moscow but who since has defended her
son, was deeply affected by this experi-
ence. He was already on his way to
becoming a hardened, devoted leader
of what would eventually be the Soviet
again, I shall organize other demonstra-
tions-always, of course, like this one,
in perfect conformity with the law."
Works Hard After Release
' After his release, he did indeed work
hard, seeing as his chief objective in=
forming the world and the Soviet people
in as much detail as possible of the use
of psychiatric institutions against dissi-
dents, of every instance of official legal
abuse. According to the authoritative
but clandestine journal of the derio-
cratic movement, Chronicle of Currxmnt
Events, he succeeded just before his
arrest last March in sending to the West
clinical findings in a series of psychi-
atric cases involving dissidents.
During his 15 months of freedom, I
knew him well. He was a remarkably
optimistic and cheerful young man but
at the same time intensely devoted to
.his own objectives and courageous be-
yond the limit of many of his associates
and beyond the belief of many of his
foreign friends.
Muscular, square-jawed, and tough,
Bukovsky was always polite, sometimes
brusquely businesslike. In the 15 months
I knew him he never once asked for
anything for himself, as many Russians
who saw the opportunity for otherwise
unavailable consumer goods did.
During that 15 months he told 13i11
Cole, an American television correspond-
ent, in a clandestinely filmed interview:
"I, am often asked what hope there
making and distributing copies of the
Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas' book,
again for organizing a demonstration
against the arrest of writers Andrei Sin-
to psychiatric wards again until August,
"He was a remarkably
optimistic and cheerful young
man but at the same time
intensely devoted to his own
objectives."
for organizing another street demonstra- -
tion in defense of those who'd been ar-
rested for compiling an account of the
Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and was sent to
labor camps until January, 1970.
At that trial, Bukovsky made a final
plea that has become a landmark in the
dissident movement. Speaking for two
mendous sense of personal dignity" and
"with legal erudition" his right to the
Bukovsky concluded by saying. "I
.
Approved For ReleasegMd% 00 -01194A000200210001-1
Is for change in. this country and how
many sympathizers we have. That's an
understandable question but a difficult
one to answer. First, one must under-
stand the essence of our struggle, which
in my opinion, is a struggle with fear,
the fear which gripped society in Stalin's
time, which still does not subside, and
thanks to which there still exists a dic-
tatorial system of oppression. It is
against precisely this fear that we con-
centrate our efforts, and in this struggle
the personal example has great sig-
nificance
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000200210001-1
struggle."
That Bukovsky was tried in the course
of one day in a small courtroom on the
outskirts of Moscow from which foreign
correspondents were barred but fed
one-sided accounts thru the official
press agency, that he was given the
maximum sentence Soviet law will al-
"One Must Struggle" '
"I personally did what I believed in,
protested when I wanted to. And I am
alive. Now I am sitting here, not in
prison. I can walk about; I can live.
For me 'and for many people, that is a
very Important fact. That fact shows
that one can struggle, that one must
DAILY TELEGRAPH., London
8 January 1972
SOCIETY SIK
low-seven years Imprisonment followed
by five years of exile-where apparently
be was not accused of passing secrets
but simply "slanderous" informat;or,
that Soviet authorities hive decided to
risk international censure by creating
an intellectual martyr must be a meas-
ure of the fear they have of him.
ITH FEAR,,
SAYS BUKOVSKY.
By 04YID' FLOYD
LADIMIR BUKOVSKY, 29, the Russian
dissident sentenced to seven years' hard
abour on Wednesday for " anti-Soviet
activity," turned his , final speech into. 'a
denunciation of the methods used by the police
and judiciary to silence him.
The full text of his speech was smuggled out of
Civil rights movement
Bukovsky was presumably re-
ferring to the activity on his be-
half by the civil rights movement
in Russia, in which prominent
intellectuals such as Academician
Sakharov play an important part.
They have kept the outside
world aware of the treatment
being meted out to Bukovsky and
court and -passed by other dissidents to foreign corre? other dissidents.
spondents in Moscow. " I will never renounce my convic- Bukovsky said that in Sep-
ternbcr learn-t that the
ions," he said. m
edical lcommission apprAnted
Under the right given me But the Process of the spirit- to examine him intended to pro-
nounce him incapable of stand-
)y Article 125 of the Soviet ual recovery of our society has ing trial.
onstittttion, I shall continue already begun and it cannot be
o communicate them to all stopped. "It was only on Nov. 5, after
ho wish to listen to me. Bukovsky revealed that the pr,?ssure had been exerted by
K G B (secret police) had tried ' the Public, that a new medical
"I shall fight for legality and to have him certifird insane so commission pronounced me fit.
nstice and, my only regret. is that there would have been no "There you have clear proof
hich I was at liberty--one year His opposition to this and called slanderous In this court, access to secret case proce-
'o months and three days--I th It pwchiatric reprisals are dune,"
uccecded in doing too little for public interest in his case made organised against dissenters on "
s cause." the impossible. Bukovsky commented: "One
orders of the KGB." wnmtere what kind of secret
Held in jail
Bukovsky was last arrested
in March. Since when he has
been held mostly in hefortovo
jail, Moscow.
In 1963 ite was confined to, a
mental institution, though later
second time the authorities had being tried for anti-Soviet pro-
tried to have him certified paganda?"
insane. "Ti lany case where and In
" And so." be continued, what Soviet law is this cele-
"on Nov, 5 I was dcc!ared brated ' access' set out? No-
sane, put into prison again where"
and the breaches of legal pro-
cedure continued."
was sentenced to three years no need to prove a crime had Among the beaches of SOY-
in a prison camp. been committed. The man is just let law with which Bukovsky
Whenever he was free he sick, mad , . " charged the anthorities were:
resumed his campaign of There would also have been police persecution,
criticism of the Soviet regime. no sentence as a reprisal against Provocation in prison.
IIe has played a leading part in him and he could not have made
exposing the Soviet authorities' his final speech to the court. Refusal of defence lawyer.
use of commmeatalns s of mental hos-
pitals ?They would have triad me in "Before my arrest there was
pitals as a m absentia,'had it not been for the constantly a ' tail' on_me. I was.
opponents of the regime. influence of intensive interven- followed, threatened with mur-
"Our society is still sick," he tion by the public." der and one of the people follow-
told the court on Wednesday. ing me lost his self-control suffi-
, to threaten me with his
"It is -sick with a fear which ciently. Stalin era, A
has come. dowp tpoproved "Pe
Release 1999/09/02 : C9*=RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
4
ment of the KGB very much
wanted me to be found not
responsible for my actions,"
Bukovsky told the court, in the
Moscow suburb of Lyublino.
"How convenient that would
have been. Then there would
have been no case against me,
CPYRG
It was after Bukovsky com-
plained about this that the police'
called for an inquiry into his
"psychological conditjon,"
Stool pigeon
Ike said: "The police put a
stool pigeon into the cell with
me-a certain Trofimov-who
admitted to me that he had been
instructed to carry on anti :Soviet
conversations with me with the
idea of provoking me to make
similar remarks;
For this he was promised
early release from prison."
Bukovsky asked to be repre-
sented by Mme. Dina Kamin-
skaya, a Moscow lawyer known
for, her--vigorous defence of
other dissidents.
His application was rejected
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1972
a of Viadhnir .eme brans s Btikovsky,
Soviet Dissident By Anthony Astrachan
THE LAST TIME I saw Vladimir Bukov- Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov, two writers
sky, the Soviet dissident sentenced last who had been arrested after taking up the
Wednesday to seven years in prison and cause of Sinyasky and Daniel. At that trial,
labor camp followed by five years' exile, it Bukovsky read aloud Article 125 of the So-
was in his Moscow apartment. The heart viet Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of
murmur and rheumatic ailments that he had speech, the press, meeting and assembly,
acquired in Soviet psychiatric clinics had re- and marching and demonstrating in the
curred and made him too ill to deseend four streets. Isn't the Constitution the basic law
flights of stairs to greet friends at the street In our country?" he asked.
door. Over Fcups of tea he predicted he The trial proceedings were recorded by
would soon be in jail again. And a few Pavel Litvinov, a grandson of the prewar So-
weeks later, at the end of March, he was. viet foreign minister, and published in the
But neither Illness nor his unending strug- West. Litvinov was exiled to Siberia for live
gle could dim the talents and energy that years in 1968 for protesting the Soviet inva-
had enabled him to learn English in a Soviet sion of Czechoslovakia. In Bukovsky's one-
prison camp. They could not quench his
laughter when two secret police teams, one
following him and one following a corre-
spondent, met on his street and failed to rec-
ognize their common employer. Nothing in-
stilled fear f him or lessened his capacity
to love frieds, family, women. ,
I thought, over the tea, that it was a tragic
waste for Volodya to spend his whole life
fighting a system he could not change signif-
icantly in that lifetime. But Bukovsky him-
self did not regard his life as wasted. Every
battle against public fear was its own vic.
tory, in his view. Every confirmed report of
repression that he helped make public by
passing information to Western newsmen in
Moscow, prevented a Stalin-like terror from
building up on its ow; secrecy.
He seldom agreed with foreigners who
said the dis idepts would never be able to
bring about gnificant change in the Soviet
system. But ;he sometimes agreed with ob-
servers who said the Soviets treated the dis-
1 t s harshly because they kept the pos-
s o
CPYRGHT
after my release, more material for a read'
interview.
Early in 1971, Bukovsky sent abroad ap-,
peals to western psychiatrists, asking them
to put the forcible hospitalization of pollti?
cal dissidents on the agenda of International.
psychiatric congresses. But The World Pay
chiatric Association decided just last month
that it had no procedural basis on which it
could condemn the Soviets.
In September, 1971, the Soviets showed
their real concern over dissident publicity
by having the KGB (secret police) interroa
gate two western correspondents, James R.
Pelpert of the Associated Press and Andrew
Waller of Reuter, as part of the pre-trial in-
vestigation of the Bukovsky case. They were
told it was a prison offense to reveal any.
thing about the interrogation. This changed
the unwritten rules of the journalistic game
in Moscow, where the usual actions against
foreign correspondents had previously been
official warnings, attacks in the official So-
viet press, and expulsion.
er-~
LEAKS TO DISSIDENTS during Bukov
sky's pre-trial Investigation indicated that
his dealings with the foreign press were part
of the Soviet case against him. Vechernaya
Moskva said specifically last Thursday that
Bukovsky's TV interview with CBS corre-
spondent William Cole was part of the pros-
ecution's case. In that interview, he said,
The essence of the struggle Is the struggle
against fear in which personal example
plays a great role."
Many people may feel that Bukovsky's
personal example will be lost, now that he is ,
back in prison. Despite the waste of talent
and spirit that/his prison sentence means, I
am not so sure. I cannot get out of my head
an Image from a short story that Volodya
wrote in his earlier literary days.
The story is about a little boy whose
grandmother repeats an old Russian nursery
rhyme to him:
What proud man can lift Tsar-bell
Or move the huge Tsar-cannon's weight
Or be slow to doff his cap
At the Kremlin's holy gatel
We.
sibility of change alive, and that this alone VLADIMIR B11'KOVSKY
wits more than the authorities could toter day trial this year, the authorities made sure
ate, no friend of his was making a transcript.
ACCORDING TO his own account, Bukov-
sky was one!,of the original literary radicals
whose gathef ings in Moscow's Mayakovsky
Square in 1938 and 1959 were the precursors
of today's dissidence: He was then 16.
Bukovsky was sent to psychiatric hospitals
in 1963 for organizing an Illegal art exhibit
and in 1965 for organizing a demonstration
protesting the arrest of writers' Andrei Siny-
asky and Mull Daniel.
Bukovsky was sentenced to three years In the Moscow prosecutor's office and warned
prison camp in January, 1967, for organizing that he could be put on trial for the inter
la demonstrator on behalf of Alcksandr view. Bukovsky replied, "Is that a threat?
Don't threaten me. I am not afraid. If one
trial is not sufficient, if my last speech was
'not enough, there will.be a second one-and
"I always tried to imagine that proud
man," Bukovsky wrote. "There he was,
standing at the Spassky gate, hands on hips
and looking up, with his head flung so far
back that his cap almost fell off. And he
looked so valiant!"
Bukovsky was seeing himself, -hie friends
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After emerging from prison, Bukovsky got,
to know foreign correspondents in Moscow.`
In May, 1970, he gave an interview to Holger
Jensen of the Associated Press, which was
published in The Washington Post. It was
the just detailed account of the treatment of:
political inmates in Soviet psychiatric hospi-
tals, it also described conditions he had seen
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-tPYRGHT
INFORMACIONES, Madrid
12 January 1972
T, NN estos dias, 14 Prensa interiurcional se estd ocu-
Jui pando del caso, ya tipico, de un escritor sovietico.
Vladimir Bukovski, el escritor en cuestion, es un in-
telectual de modesto relieve, pero con un signo de re.
beldia compartida con otros escritores de su genera.
citin. Dukovski ha silo acusudo coma aculpuble de
actor tendentes a perjwiicar el poder sovietico y a de-
bilitarlon, y, en eonsecuencia, acaba de ser condenado
por tun Tribunal de MMoscic a siete ands de privacion'
de libertad,'de los cuales los dos primeros habra de
pasarlos en una prisidn de reha.bilitacivn, y el resto,
como deportalo.
PI process so ha dcsarro-
nado in la presents de
eorresponsafes de Prensa
extranjcros tit tampoco to
ha sido pcrmitida la asts-
tcncia at mismo at acadd-
mico sovidlico Zakh.arov. {"
iico do prestigio internac o-
val y fundador de un Co
tnitd de Derechos del llont-
brc (no rcconocido Legal-
nrentc), que habia inicrve-
nido pubticamcnte a favor
de Bukovski. Los cargos
qua pesaban sobrc dste. sc-
giin la agencfa Tass, Bran
haber incitado a ios milita-
res a la desobediencfa yy ha-
te' tratado do diIundtr es-
crttoa clandestinos y con.
testatarfos, en contacto con
otgunos extranjeros.
No vamos a ser nosotros,
deade luego, qufenes juz-
oitemos >uevamente el caso
Dukovski, pero ai cabe rc-
sefiar que fate es uno mds
de la ya large iista forrna-
da por Los Sintavski, Da-
"let, Tarsi3, Babftski,
Drodski. Litvinov. Amairik,
Pasternak, Kuznetaov Y
Sulzhenttsyn, entre otros.
Como algunoa de ellos, Bu-
ltovski ha pasado tambidn.
antes de esta condone, por
cAnicas psiquidtricas espe-
ciales, ese tratamiento, tan
especLai tam bit n de la
Union Sovidtica, reservado
Lya familiar Para los inte-
etuales Rdivergentes>s.
Tampoco pretendemos in-
siatir on Ottos casos. bas-
tante aircados aun desor-
titados, sepun las autorida-
dea de Moscu, que no.tar-
dan en hablar de ecampa-
t.as antisovfeticass occiden-
tales. Lo cierto ea, six em-
NEW YORK TIMES
13 January 1972
ma aovitticn, Pero. como ve-
mos, este. Uega a morderse
la cola.
Si el grado de tibertad
creadora - y critfea.- de
loa arttstas e intelectualea
ha stdo stempre un buen
critcrio Para juzgar el indu-
ce de trsaludn interns de
una cociedad, of baremo
tarnbien dehe aplicarse con
todo derecho a la U.R.S.S.
Una U. R. S. S., ademas.
octralmente empciwada en
fa rclajacibn de todas Las
tensione3 con el Oeste eu-
ropeo. Pero esas tensfones
-tampoco hat que, otridar.
Lo- rristcn, estdn ahf, co-
mo Las dispositivos villita-
res, par algo. Las fuerzas
m.ilitnres opuestas entre Los
dos bloques son, sin duda,
la mejor, ea,presidn de as
tenstones, ta.nto como una
ccusa de ellas, aunque no
(a iinica. Genera l m e n t e
con las tropes tar que vie-
nen dotrds de las tensions,/
no a la inversa.
Pues buen, sl la U.R.S,S,
desea con tanto intcrds que
se allanen obstdculos den-
iro de la gran Europa cde
At!dntico a loo Uralesi,, no
parece que baste para ello
una simple retirada de so!.
dados. Para que era Europa
quede en calma es prectso
quo so lumen tambiCn otros
contrastes que estdn en la
base de todas as tenstones.
En otras palabras, antes da
to gran Oita europea a que
invita la U. P. S. S. es ne-
cesarto arreglar Ia casa por
dentro prcviamente. Y la
represidn de la aintelligent.
sias, como de ordinarto
eualquler represidn, dice
poco a favor de coma an
dab Zas cosas de puertax
adetttrtt on is U. B. S..S S.
gt.ieran o no, su actitud,
acaba iem.pre voli?idiidose-
contra el orden vigente en'
su pais.
E1 escritor, conto el tnte-
tectuat en general, es 71m v
aprectado socialrnente en la
Union Soviettca. El pu@blo
rttso, uno 'dg ins que Inds
icon en el mundo, requiere
eseritores en abundancia.
Ese a/an cultural ?ue pro-
movido por el propio siste-
bargo, que esos casos se st-
guen productendo y que fox
mi mos encausadoa son Los
primeros en saber quo a
trcnudo son u1llizaclo3 con-
tra su pais. Pose a todo, at-
pue habfeiido escritorea
amaldit.osn on la U. R. S. S.
V se sfgue luiblando de
ellos, can to que el hecho
ha pasndo a la categoria de
un /enbmeno habitual y it-
to. Debe a r ea p tai tan-
to.
buds importante - no solo
pat atencibn a la proble-
indtfoa interna de la
U. R. S. S.
lQud ocurre con Los ea-
critores, artistes e inietec
tuales de talante rnds o me-
nos aconiestatarion en la
U. R. S. S.? La respuesta
parece di/ieft -no siempre
se puedc reuntr, par ejem-
plo, un buen co,,:;-auto de
datos-, comp tampoco puc-
de hacerse sin mati4a c i o-
nes. Pero, on general, es ya
de suyo significative que
todas estos fntelectuales,
que ordinariamente no re-
rEnfegan do la ideotogta
sociaiista, no d u d e n en
a/rontar las penas y la eoi-
dcnie persecucid> de que
son objeto por carte de Las
autorkiades aopittkas. Lo
`Our Society Is Still Sick'
CPYRGHT
BY VLADIMIR K. BUKOVSKY
MOSCOW-Before my arrest there the number of the official car in which
was constantly a tail on me. I was these people traveled around behind
pursued, threatened with murder, and me and presented other facts which
one of those following me lost his made it possible for them to be sought
self-restraint to such an extent that ouHowever, I never received an, answer
he threatened me with his service
to this request from those depart-
an giving me an answer, sent me
to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic
Psychiatry for medical examination.
The investigation department of the
K.G.B. very much wanted me to be
found irresponsible. How convenient.
Then there would be no case about
weapon.
While under investigation I peti ments to which I sent it. me, no need to construct a charge
tioned for a criminal case to be insti- As far as the detective is concerned, and here there would be no need to
tuted against t se eo le. I v n gave he, instead of examining my complaint prove the fact of commission of a
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.i 0210,Q01,-,1
,
~
? ~ .____?__._., .. ..... __ .. ...: ,.,'R n t. .., t
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
CPYRGHT
crime. The man is just sick, mad.
And only on Nov. 5, after pressure
was exerted by the public, a new
medical commission pronounced me
healthy.
There you have trustworthy proof
of my assertion-which is called slan-
derous here in court-that on the in-
structions of the K.G.B. psychiatric
reprisals are set up against dissenters.
In accordance with my right to de-
fense, I demanded that the lawyer
Dina Isakovna Kaniinskaya be invited
for my defense in court.
No lawyer was given me.
It took my 12-day hunger strike,
a complaint to the prosecutor general,
to the Justice Ministry and the Com-
munist party Central Committee, and
also new, active intervention by mem-
bers of the public before my legal.
right to defense was finally fulfilled
and I was given lawyer Shveisk, who
was invited by my mother.
The trial proceedings today have
also been conducted with numerous
procedural infringements. The indict-
ment, in which the word "slanderous"
is used 33 times and the word "anti-
Soviet" 18 times, contains no con-
crete indications of which facts are
slanderous among those I communi-
cated to Western correspondents and
which materials which I allegedly dis-
tributed are anti-Soviet.
I allegedy handed over these ma-
terials in the presence of Volpin and
Chalidze [Aleksandr . Yesenin - Volpin,
son of poet Sergei Yesenin, and Valera
Chalidze, a physicist and member of
an unofficial Soviet civil rights com-
mittee].
However, my demand that these two
people be called as witnesses was not
met.
Furthermore, not one of the eight
people I called who could confirm the
authenticity of my assertions on the
facts of confinement and conditions
of detention of people in special psy-
chiatric hospitals was summoned to
the court.
What were all these provocations
and crude procedural violations needed
for, this stream of slander and un-
founded accusations? What was this
trial needed for? Only to punish one
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 January 1972
~CPYRGHT
'person?
No, there is a "principle," a kind
of "philosophy" here. Behind the ac-
cusation presented, there stands an
,other, unpresented.
With the reprisal against me they
want to frighten those who try to
tell the whole world about their
crimes.
Our society Is still sick. It is sick'
with the fear which has come down
to us from the Stalin era. But the
process of the public's spiritual en-
lightenment has already begun and
cannot be stopped.
And however long I have to spend
in detention I will never renounce my
convictions and I will express them,,
availing myself of the right given me
by Article 125 of the Soviet Consti-
tution, to all who want to listen to me.
I will fight for legality and justice.,
And I regret only that over the short
period-one year, two months and.
three days-during which I was at
liberty, I managed to do too little for'
this cause.
The irrepressible last word
The Soviet Union cannot escape the torship of the literary magazine Novy by keeping his Nobel Prize from him and
consequences of its attempts to force polit- Mir: "There are many ways of killing a : making him a nonperson, a Tvardovsky
ical "uniformity" upon its writers and. poet -- the method chosen for Tvardovsky for a consistently liberal viewpoint. The
thinkers. was to take away his offspring, his pas- irony of course is that these men, though
This was the import of young Vladimir Sion, his journal.... But you need to be in different ways, were showing that the
3ukovsky's response when sentenced last deaf and blind to the last century of Rus- system - of "hospitals" and "mental In-
week to seven years in prison and labor sia's history to regard this as a victory stitutions" and "prisons" 'plus the courts
amp, and another five years in exile. and not an irreparable blunder! Madmen! and official press - meant to enforce a
"The process of spiritual enlightenment When the voices of the young resound, uniform doctrinal line only demonstrates
of (Soviet) society has already begun, and keen-edged, how you will miss this pa- its Inherent ruthlessness.
it cannot be stopped. Society already tient critic, whose gentle admonitory
understan4s that the criminal is not the voice was heeded by all. Then you will Life can be desperate for men of free
person whp washes dirty linen in public, be set to tear the earth with your hands mind in the Soviet Union. Prison or si-
but the person who dirties it." for the sake of returning Trifonovich." lenee or ill health seems to be forced upon
x them. How remarkable, then, that they
And it was the Import of Alexander Strong words of moral judgment. can see past their own difficulties to the
Solzhenitsyn's prose poem written in It is not surprising then that the Soviet', process of spiritual enlightenment at
memory of his friend Alexander Tvardov- Union would want to silence a pukovsky work. It is the voices of conscience that
ky, who died in December just six by sending him to prison, a Solzhenitsyn get the last word.
months after being forced out of his edt-
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7
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THE ECONOMIST
15 January 1972
Und a rest rn eyes a g n
other communist states, is ruled by a few
ageing men. They can count on the docility of a great
part of a nation long accustomed to despotism, and only
now achieving the transition to a mainly urban society
from a very backward rural one. But they have no
illusions about their popularity. The past few months'
have seen a rising accumulation of evidence of that, up
to the imprisonment last week of Vladimir Bukovsky ;
and the evidence has been made available to people
outside Russia by the regular appearance of the illegal,
but apparently unstoppable, underground publications,
such as " Chronicle of Current Events."
The leaders of the Soviet Union rule with less` of an
iron hand than Stalin did so years ago, but they dare
not face an organised opposition. The average Soviet
citizen lives better (han he did in Stalin's -time ; but
his masters know that appetite grows with eating, and
that when the sheer struggle to survive is no longer all-
absorbing people's surplus energies may overflow into
dangerous channels. So they are still forced to maintain
a huge, costly and cumbrous apparatus of political
policing ip order to curb manifestations of dissent. And
this. apparatus is not working well.
Ritually, at intervals,' the people are marshalled to
go through the motions of elections ' whose results are
fixed., and known, in advance. Ritually, they are like-'
wise required to attend " discussions," in which their
role is in practice equally limited ; all important questions
are decided at the top, irreversibly. A population that
is increasingly literate and sophisticated is ceasing to
regard these rituals as forms of participation in politics
in any real sense. And it is irked by its rulers' neurotic
seeretiven so much so that, on the occasions when
-Pravda tells the truth, many Russians suspend belief
until they can check its version by listening to foreign
broadcasts.
Russia's " silent majority" is silent for a sufficient
reason. ,(,ny exercise of the right of free speech that
is, in theory, guaranteed by the Soviet constitution means
trouble. Speaking one's mind may lead to loss of promo-
tion, of a job, of a chance to get a flat, of social security
benefits, or of the right to further education. Persistence
in speaking out brings harsher punishments : harassment,
smearing accusations, transfer to degrading work in
remote regions, persecution of the offender's - relatives
and friends, and, eventually, imprisonment in conditions
so cruel that many. victims do not survive it. In these
circumstances, what is surprising is that any sounds of
protest are heard 'in Russia at all.
? In tsarist times the. grip of the Russian police state
was weaker than in Stalin's time because the political
police were less efficient, because -a well-born young
dissenter was sometimes protected' by . his influential
relatives or friends, and because ? the regime veered
between bouts of severe:reprtssion and'attempts to relax
A roved For Release 1999/09/02
the pressure in hope of 'letting off some of the steam
harmlessly. Some of these conditions. now seem to be
reappearing. Last week a searing account was published
of the cruelties being inflicted on Andrei Amalrik, who
has been sent to one of the notorious, Kolyma prison
camps in north-eastern Siberia after .writing a book
(banned, of course, in Russia) called "Will the Soviet
Union Survive until 1984 ?" . In some ways the more
relevant approaching date ,for Russia now seems to be
1905. That was the year when the tsarist facade cracked.
The veering tendency is again visible. In 197 r nearly
14,000 Jews were allowed to leave Russia. Never before
have the Soviet rulers pgrmitted any such number of their
subjects to leave the country. Their purpose in doing
so was evidently to reduce the -pressure not only of
the, Jewish Russians' wish to emigrate to Israel but
also of the protest movement as a whole. Throughout
last year the regime also tolerated the, existence of the
human rights committee that had been formed in
November, 1970, by a group of distinguished scientists,
of whom Andrei Sakharov is the best known. Its mem-
bers protested repeatedly-at acts of injustice that flagrantly
violated the Soviet constitution itself. They suffered some
harassment, and of course the Soviet press frionopoly
gave its readers no hint of their existence ; but the
authorities failed to stop them circulating their protests
abroad and, clandestinely, inside Russia too.
Last week Mr Sakharov was refused admission to the
cruel farce of a " trial " at which the young writer
Vladimir Bukovsky was given a '12-year sentence for
protesting at the Soviet use of mental. hospitals as places
where political prisoners are confined -and tortured.
Nevertheless, the Sakharov committee's protests about
the rigging of the trial were made widely known irl the
scientific and intellectual circles whose sympathy for the
committee's aims inhibits the ruling group whenever it
is tempted to try to squash these nuisances.
The KGB is more efficient, and less concerned not
to violate the forms of law, than its tsarist predecessor,
the Okhrana, was. But, like the Okhrana, it now finds
it wise to inquire into a suspect's .connections with
influential .people before taking drastic action against
him. And it must be getting worried at the way it is
,now being repeatedly defied, even by people who have
already been scarred by its claws. The more punishment
is meted out to those who circulate forbidden material,
the more such material is circulated. It is all uncom.
fortably ;reminiscent. of the way things were going 70.
years ago. The Russian opponents of despotism may
still appear as weak and dispersed as they did at the
time when Joseph ;Conrad wrote " Under Western Eyes,"
but there is little comfort ir4 that comparison for the KGB
and its masters.
The hammer flinches
As the ,20
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CPYRGHT
proceed, rather hysterical notes are being sounded by the
hacks who serve the political police in the Soviet press.
Literaturnaya Gazeta has solemnly tried to discredit
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Prize-winning author
of " One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," by acsert-
ing that his grandfather owned a large sheep farm.
(George Orwell could tell who owns it now.) The Novosti
agency, whose comment on the Bukovsky trial was
unusually stomach-turning even by its own standards,
is becoming shrill about alleged attempts to subvert army
officers. It seems to be getting harder to find anything.
to say that will not put undesirable ideas into people's
heads. If one contrasts the few small visible signs of
dissent with the colossal apparatus of repression that
overhangs them, it is not easy to understand why the
repressors should show such nervousness. It is as if a
steam hammer .were to .'get the jitters on being con-
fronted ;with, a nut. But perhaps this particular steam
hammer knows something about. the nut that we don't
know...
NEW YORK TIMES
19 January 1972
Tights y riet Internal Security. Is ? Seen
MOSCOW, Jat. 18-Western`
diplomats believe that the So
s,~gipq, laightening inter-
ii}l[yii and seeking to
shore up ideological vigilance
,among Soviot citizens to offset
possible side effects of its pol-
icy of relaxing tensions with
the West.
They cite indications that So.
viet security agencies are en-
gaged in a campaign against,
domestic dissidents, especially
those having contact with for-:
eigners. .
Some diplomats consider this
no more than one of the peri-
odic "vigilance campaigns"
that the Kremlin sanctions
from time to time. Others sus-
pect that th security agencies
may be intiending to deal a
more crippling blow to major
elements of the dissident move.
ment, which has functioned
here for several years.
Conviction, Arrests, Raids
Since a call in December to
Communist party members for
greater vigilance against the
dangers of subversion and hos-
tile propaganda from foreign
travelers, residents and radio
stations, there have been, the
following developments:
Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a 29-
car-old dissident, was con-
.icted Jan. 5 of anti-Soviet
gitation and propagandizing
nd given the maximum sen?
ence, seven years in prison
nd five in exile. His summary
ne-day trial was used by the
ewspaper r Vechernaya Moskva l
to warn of
the
dangers of hay-
ith
tacked
in
196
for
favorable
cents were still verv minor
W
respondents
here-
mmen s on a an the West in a book, "Both Sides of the
compare with the purges of
the purges of the thirties or
Thirteen Ukrainians were ar-
rested. last week in Kiev and
Ocean,
"
his
account
of a
visit
even. later crackdowns, and
Lvov for nationalist activities.
to the United States, Italy, and
France.
Moscow intellectuals insist that
the
general atmosphere is a far
The 13 included Vyacheslav
Ch 1,
ornovi a journalist jailed
In an attack on the activities
cry from the Stalinist period.
in 1967 after having prepared
1
of visiting American Congress-,
'men
the Government news
Nonetheless, the latest as
tions
are widely regarded as
an accounj of pniit*r~i t.11,11
,
-
in the Ukraine, and two liter-
ary critcs, Ivan Svitlychny and
Ivan Dzyuba.
The homes of nine Moscow
dissidents were raided by se-
curity police Jan. 14 as part
of an investigation of suspect-
ed "anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda." More than 3,000
documents, articles, .clippings,
letters, tapes and booklets, in
cluding a copy of Orwell's'
"1984," were reported taken
from the apartment..of Pyotr
Yakir, a historian regarded by
the police as the leader of the
loose group of dissidents who
call themselves the Democratic
Movement.
Further Arrests Feared
Two of the nine, Yuri Shi-
khanovich, a mathematician,
and Kronid Lyubarsky, an as-
tronomer employed at the
Chornogolovka Institute of
Solid State Physics near Mos-
cow, were called in subse-
quentjy for questioning and de-
tained by the K.G.B., or secret
police. Dissidents say that they
fear further arrests:
Agents in Kiev searched the
apartment of Viktor P. Nek-
rasov, a noted Ukrainian au?
thor. He gained fame with a
popular World War U novel,
"In the Trenches of Stalin.
grad," and was sharply at-
tia were V. N. Chalidze, a phys-
icist who is a member of the
small Soviet Committee on
Human Rights, and three Jew-
ish intellectuals who have lost
their jobs since they applied'to
emigrate to Israel, Aleksandr Y.
Lerner, a computer specialist,
and his son, Vladimir, and Vik-
tor G. Poisky, an electronics
specialist who formerly headed
a laboratory.
Diplomatic observers empha-
sized that the steps taken re-
security tightening in at least
'a year and perhaps longer. The
last notable crackdown was they
trial in Leningrad in 1970 of{
Jews and others accused of
having conspired to hijack a
Soviet commercial airliner.
The latest wave of police ac
tion was preceded in November
by a speech by the Ukrainian
party leader, Pyotr Shelest, urg-
ing party workers not to let
the policy of detente weaken
their ideological vigilance.
There was also an article last
month in the Communist party
monthly that urged party faith-
ful not to slacken the ideologi-
cal struggle with the west be-
cause of the policy of peaceful
coexistence. The article said
Western countries sought to
use detente to try to undermine
socialism through political and
economic means and intelli-
gence operations.
Jewish activists, however,
apparently have been exempted
from arrests or raids in keep-
ing with the comparatively
moderate policy of allowing
many Jews to emigrate after
bureaucratic delays provided
that they do not take away
needed skills.
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NEW YORK TIMES
21 January 1972
IBREZHNEV IS URGED' TO FREE DISSIDENT
MOSCOW, -Jan. 20 -- Andrei
D. Sakharov, the Soviet phy-
sicist and civil-rights advocate?
has petitioned the Kremlin for!
the release of a 29-year-oldl
dissident, Vladimir K. Bukov-I
sky, ort hie ground that his
recent trial had not been public
and that the defense had been
given no opportunity to call
its witnesses.
The petition, addressed to
Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Com-
munist party leader, suggested
that there might be ~"healthy
forces" in the Soviet leadership
that were not. in agreemetn
with the current campaign
against political dissent.
There was no indication in
Ithe appeal whether the refer-
SAIGON POST
10 November 1971
fence to "healthy forces" re-
flected special knowledge about
official positions or merely Mr.
Sakharov's wishful thinking. ~
Mr. Bukovsky was sentenced
to seven years' imprisonment,
,to be followed by five years'
enforced residence in a remote
place, after having been found
guilty in a summary one-day
By JOHN SCOTT
There are strong political
,7 Ic reasons why
bdth``1 c' 'French and the
Suvict govornuients should
have wished lrezhnev s visit
to Paris to meet with every
.po,ssible success. The Soviet
press has been publishing
lengthy articles recently on
the increasingly warni rc15
Lions between France and I he
USSR, and this has hcen
reciprocated to a large exicnt
in French newspapers. The
French Ministry of the Inrc.
tier , ordered 5.`t possible
troublemakers to leave Paris
for is duration of the
Soviet Coniutunist Party
leader's visit? Eveii tile
Israeli eoniinkinity in France
was courted by Ambassador
Abr.sintuv, Who invited some
60 of its n)euib,v~ to the
embassy in u,'dcr to expl.iin
-lu I,hcni that Jews in the
US51t shared tutu equality of
?rights and ut,ligat-unbs with
otter Suvict t:utzc.13?
Not everyone; howev#,r,
co.,siders national interests
more vitut than tile %Veitate
t.f 1111:1rown fatuity, as be.
came apparent from the ap?
.peat addie+acd to hiadatne
Putupiduu by ' one Soviet
mother. Her son, Vladimir
:Bukovakp, is st present Ueing
detained in a p~y~lUaG It h ,e?
,pitai, and bite wisued . the.
french President's who to
interveuo on his behalf , wi-h
the Soviet leader. Site ? wrote
that, being certain - of the,
innocence of her sou, she
hoped that Madame 'rPonipi'
don would use every - legal
means possible in his defers.
,CC and especially her perso.
nal eout?cts with the ?Soviet
ruler.
Mothers everywhere, of
Couree, tend to claim that the
whole regiment is out of-
step when their sot% tuarcues
off on that wrong root, slid
ifew are likely to believe that
their own son Is insane.
lluch that B kuvsky said In
an interview last year with
the Auiericaii journ.+Iist, U11-
hoot Cu;e, could be repre.,
seoted'as I,ers*Culion Mania.
,RI in continually btattg fo1-
arrwcd; ,uy t elephone Is aiway
tapped; dnrl I at" conscious,
all the' tituc of being under,
the obscrcation of the aulho-
rirt. s.? B.tl it ce
of Vladia'fr Bukovsky.
Expulsion
Born in 1912, the on or ti
'successful S.-vict journalist,
,and with both parent in the
tCuntatunist Patty, one might
b ve expected Bukuvsky to
have grown up as a contented,
member of privileged class,
of Soviet society. In 1060,:,
however. he was expelled.
from school for publishing
,an unofficial satirical journal,.
and a year later, continual;
his career as a free thinker.,
by be! .g expel from school
for puhiist.ing an . unofficial,
satirical journal. and a year
late continued his - career as
a free t'vinker by being ezpel.
led from Moscow University
as one of the organisers of
or the underground journal
PF.ocu:x, Athough he was
attacker; in Jan.rai y 19(12 for
,his literary activities in the
Soviet press. the particular
article adtuiled, albeit sarca-
stically, that the 19 year-old
Bukov sky stand o+it among
his companions as a trgiatit of
theoretical thoaght.r To
escdpe' arrest rot having
organised an ur.offical exltitii?
Approved or Release
1999/09/0 __ IP79-0119 1.
trial on charges of anti- ov e
activities. The sentence is being
appealed.
He was accused in particular
of having sent detailed docu-
mentation abroad to show that
Soviet mental institutions were
being used for the incarceration
of sane persons with political
views opposed to those of the
Government.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011.94A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT
tion of abstract painting, ho
disappeared for six months
on a geological expedition.
On returning to Moscow he
continued his unorthodox
behaviour. He was arrested
Io May 1003 and was confined
without trial in the Serbsky
Institute of Fcaanzic Pay.
eiiIntry, being later
transrcrrcd to a psychiatric
hospital in Leningrad.
Ile later described this
establishment as being a pi a.
revolutionary prison, full of
muhicrers slid the criminally
insane; there aterc, however,
some either Inniates?political
prisune's, dissidents for
whom no article in the trim.
anal code could bin found.'
Armin(; his companions in the
asylum were the prize-win-
ning Leningrad geophysicist
NIkolal Sansonuv, and a
French Communist or Iiun a.
nian extraction who had
come to the. USSR t:- ice how
Co-ninunisrn wnrkod in prac.
tics. They were kept in locked
cells and had one hour's
excrrisn a day. They were
allowed visitors once a month
one letter a month to rela.
Lives and one parent a month.
The doctors themselves reali.
-zed that It wits more of a
rpreson than a hospital and
sometimes even said so open.
ly. The inmates war punished
for misbchavioitrby doses of
+drngs which either .depres-
sed the nervous system, or
induced a state of feverish
?lestlessness for several days.
Bunkpvsky also claims that
'hey ere tortured by being
wropOed tightly in strips or
wet ciinvas which ahraok as
It drlgd.
When be was relQasod In
February 1965 he immediately
became Involved in passing
to foreign aorrraponderits
rm ton on the. v o a .nn
human rights In the USSR.
Indeed, Vladimir Bukovsky
has shown ?uch a cunsi'lcnt
disregard for his own wellbe
that his more cautious
compatriots could , he for.
t1ven for considering ilia
foolhardiness of his curago
a kind of smadnesdo.
Bukovsky's Involvement in
the defence of the writers`
Daniel and Sinyvaky and can.
aequcntly of Ginzburg and
Galauskov resulld in his being
borought to trial in February
1ti7. Ho was sentor,.^ed to
three years corrective labour
for a-Ilegal dcwonslration.a
His clever citing during the
trial of ilia Soviet Cu.-stitu-
Lion which guarantees a'ho.
right of street proses.,
sions and denionstrationse,
did not endcar him to
the judge lie was freed
In 1970 without having rcno.,
unced his viewscStalinist file..
thods no longer work. The
authorities don't want a big
scandal They have to main-1
lain a scnibiancc of legality-a.
In January of this he wroto
an open letter to tVe.,turn'
p.ychiatrlsts askinng then' to
study -hc diagnosis InndC On
scuts' dissident inieilcctuala
in order to decide if the
ccldonce' Justified iso sting,
them rro'i sdetety in wouttil,
inslitu[loos.
Marco Arrant
Bukovsky knew what to
expect, and was in fact ar.
rested !u Marc sounh, after
his bettor hall been dopivered
to the Faris press. Last month
he - was tran%terred to a
mental institution.
Bukovsky is only one among
hundreds of Soviet Intellec
iuals who are reported to
share his rate or indefinite
Internment in a psyciislric
hospital. Andros Atualrik. tile
yonng Russian historian
who wrote wi,1 tha Soviet
Ui.lon Suroiue until 1984.-,says
that he personally knows
,several normal, sane pcnple
who have been confined In
such institutions. It stems
to me that this is a clear'
example of toe ideological
capitulation of this regime
before its opponents, if the`
only thing it can
find to do with is to
declare them insano s
One of ilia best known is
Goneral Grigorunko, who has
been held to Chornyalchovrk,
mortal hospital au-cc June
1J70.--atf you co.isidor that
ilia only mental Soviet eiti.
is one who sul-mits n-eclcly
to evy letrrspotic aet commit
ted by the bureaucr+.ts, (lien
I atn, of course, abnonual.a
Last year the biologist Jau.
res Ued-cdev was interned In
mental hospital for ? thrco
months for his dissident wri-'
inks, but wasp freed after
strong protests byintellectuals
both in the USSR and the
West. On this occasion the
Nobel-prize winning author'
Alexander Solzhenitsyn wro
to t alt is Iin-c to think
clearly: the incarceration of
frce?iliinking, healthy
people in madhouses
is spiritual . hter-
ders if is a variatinn on the
gas chamber, but it Is even
more cruel - the torture of
the people belof. killed Is
,more n-,rluciuus and more
iprului.bcd.s
At Utc beginning of October
sonic 50 iniellectuais, inctnd.
ing Academician Sakharuv,
the leading Soviet physicist,
signed it petition asking that
Bukovsky be freed. Perhaps
a mare direct, perscinal ap-
proach by Madame Pompiclou
may yet succeed whore t ho,?
bttav failed - FWP
Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
11
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
THE PROGRESSIVE
January 1972
TNT C'EE^J AGE OF SOVIET DISSENT
GEORGIE ANNE GEYER
That night, the rain swept in blinding, towering
sheets across the gray rooftops of Moscow. It hammered
at the windows of the old room where we sat, rattling
a skull that sat grinning incongruously at us from be-
tween long shelves of books.
It was the room of a Soviet scientist, but not any
ordinary Soviet scientist. This was the one-room home
of Valery Chalidze, thirty-two-year-old Soviet physicist
and dissident.
"Why should Russian scientists be interested in hu-
man rights?" I asked this darkly handsome man-half
Russian, half Georgian-who ranks next to the famous
physicist Andrei Sakharov in the scientific dissent com-
munity.
Chalidze ran his long fingers through straight, coal-
black hair nearly shoulder-length and fixed his dark
eyes on some remote spot above my head. "Because
science demands an exact logic," he began. "We feel
that the study of human rights also demands an exact
logic. As scientists have logical minds, they are used
to dealing in absolutes. They bring a special expertise
and a special knowledge to the study."
On November 4, 1970, Chalidze, backed by Andrei
Sakharov (father of the Soviet H-bomb) and several
other leading scientists, began the U.S.S.R.'s first Hu-
man Rights Committee "to consult with government
agencies on human rights and to study how human
rights are guaranteed by Soviet law and practice and
compare them with international laws."
"I and the committee feel that law should be based
on law alone, with nothing ideological to precede the
law," Chalidze said. "And if a person is sent away be-
cause of his political beliefs, it follows that human
rights arc not adequately protected."
To many Westerners, this forming of a "committee"
might seem a normal, innocuous thing. But in the So-
viet Union it is a daring, hitherto unheard-of thing. It
has broken taboos, both by the act of forming the Com-
mittee and by the fact that it has been made a mem-
ber of the International Committee for the Rights of
Man, al consultative body to the United Nations. (So-
viet citizens are not permitted to form voluntary asso-
ciations and then ally them to international groups.)
Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has al-
ready begun studying such forbidden topics as the
Soviet's incarceration of political prisoners in insane
asylums and the place, of the defense attorney in po-
litical and other cases. Also, despite warnings from the
government, dismissals from jobs and sackings of scien-
tists' apartments by the secret police, the KGB, these
Committee A ga9dtfartRLvp6betrl'/AW02
CPYRGHT
sidents in the larger "democratic dissident movement"
that has grown in the last five years to something of
genuine importance. It is even, Sovietologists assert,
approaching the scope of a "movement."
"This conception of a movement is entirely new,"
Edward Keenan, Soviet specialist at Harvard Univer-
sity, told me in an interview. "It is also important that
there is a kind of cooperation among the various na-
tional and religious groups. A national approach in
the past has been unheard of. People now have a sense
of being together with their countrymen."
Who are the dissidents? What do they stand for?
Have they actually had any positive effect on society
-or will they, by arousing the ancient Russian fear of
anarchy, only set back liberalization within the Soviet
Union?
Pyotr Yakir is a dissident. He is a rotund man of
forty-eight with a wild beard and dancing eyes. He is,
at present, the leader of the "democratic" central co-
ordinating group.
"The basic thing is to educate yourself and. your
friends," Yakir said one night, as we walked along the
promenades by the Moscow River. "I am a pathological
optimist. I am sure that in the long run society will
change."
"Why?" I asked him. "Through what techniques?"
"Under Stalin, we called it the 'Iron Curtain,"
Yakir went on, "But now this has changed. Today,
with regard to dissidents, the KGB occupies itself with
one major goal-to sec that information does not go
out to the West. At this time in the country's history,
the government is trying to put on a facade of com-
plete democracy, of freedom of the press. It is try-
ing to take its place among the countries of the world,
and anything that destroys that illusion is dangerous."
To break this facade, Yakir's group gets information
on political trials, religious persecutions, and any
breaches of civil rights to the Western press in Moscow.
The group trusts these correspondents to get this mate-
rial printed in the West and then broadcast back to
Russia through the BBC and the Voice of America.
Group members also picket, sit-in, demonstrate, and
send petitions to Soviet leaders on the occasions of
trials and "special events." In effect, they have tried to
force a psychiatric experience, bringing all the con-
tradictions within Soviet society to the surface, where
they can be dealt with.
"Why do we reach across the border 'in this way?"
Yakir asked, as a warm breeze blew in over the river
orld trri~8 c~y - A1c~. lYie ~~`ot Ameerca1and
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
the BBC are a kind of bullhorn for us. Our job is to
et as much information to them as we can. Then it
rcRibThurc, and people from Siberia to the Urals
know about it. They may not know us by name, but
they are listening to information sent back by us."
Yakir's group, while it is the closest thing to a coor-
dinating group that there is in the country, is only
one of the strange, mystic (and very Russian) brother-
hood of groups that today comprise "dissent." There.
are the scientists; the disaffected nationality groups like
the Jews, the Crimean Tatars, the Armenians, the
Caucasian Turks, and the Ukrainians; the religious dis-
sidents, such as some Baptists, Evangelicals, and Ortho-
dox; the strict legalists, the anti-Stalinists, and the sim-
ple, decent young people who are tired of everything.
While there are, at any one moment, only hundreds
who might picket or write nationalistic poems (which
can be a reason for a three-year sentence to Siberia),
there are certainly, according to the Sovietologists who
have studied the "movement," tens of thousands of So-
viets, particularly young people, who sympathize be-
cause they, too, want to be able to read, to know, and to
speak out.
Yakir says, probably correctly, that the movement is
"like an iceberg." You see only the few at the top, but
there is a huge mass underneath that to some degree is
sympathetic. These supporting elements are not only
occasionally and curiously intertwined organizational-
ly, they are also spasmodically intertwined ideologically.
Their 1 iotives ranee from anti-Stalinism to fighting
ideological interference in science to demanding rights
for nationalities to anti-Russianism and to desires for
strict legalism.
Many of the dissidents are wholly new types of hu-
man beings for the Soviet Union. They go off to serve
sentences in Siberia, then they come back to join the
movement again. ("I absolutely do not repent having
organized this demonstration," Vladimir Bukovsky, one
of the most defiant dissidents, said in his court case.
"When I am free again, I shall again organize dem-
onstratiqns.") There is none of the willingness of the
1930s to express self-condemnation or to confess to
crimes never committed. Instead, the dissidents stand
up against the state, telling it that it is wrong. There is
a sacrificial joyousness about many of them-they seem
strangely free of the fear that has in the past paralyzed
Russians. "Sacrificial populism, mingled with Jacobin-
ism," the American Sovietologist Sidney Monas has
written, "is part of the tragedy of Russian history."
With all their diverse complaints, what, basically, do
the dissidents want? "They want a humanizing of soci-
ety," one Sovictologist told me. "They want a return to
the moral and ethical bases of society. Somehow values
have to be found for the masses."
Lewis Feuer, the perceptive professor of sociology at
the University of Toronto who has studied Russian
student militants throughout history, finds a "philos-
ophy of cternalism" among today's dissidents-a philos-
ophy that has somehow s1 phoned through the cracks
in thaA{J Nr
truths are relative. It is a belief that there are ethical
truths which are eternally valid for all men.
Considering the enormously restrictive society, both
politically and psychically, that all Soviets are raised in,
it is astonishing that any Soviets should have the inner
and outer courage to speak out and resist. But a look
at the personal experiences of some of these men and
women and a look at the times at least partially explain
why.
"I was fourteen when they arrested me in 1937,"
Yakir explained that night, as we walked along the
river. That was also the year his illustrious father,
Major General Iona E. Yakir, was executed in Stalin's
purges of two-thirds of the top officers of the Red Army
-purges which left Russia supine in the early stages
of the Nazi invasion. "I sat fora long time in the con-
centration camps," Yakir went on. "Sixteen years. I saw
many horrible things with my own eyes. I saw many
good, honest people die in the camps. Those people
died not because of anything they did wrong, but be-
cause of an arbitrary government."
Once the Khrushchev "thaw" came in 1956, Yakir,
like tens of thousands of other innocent survivors, was
"rehabilitated." tic was even chosen to travel around
the country speaking about the Stalin years. He gave'
some 300 speeches before Khrushchev was demoted
and the "thaw" turned to another freeze. Men like him,
anti-Stalinists who had seen too much, had little to lose
-they formed the core of the dissidents.
But the real beginning of organized dissent was the
1966 trial of Daniel Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, the
two writers convicted of publishing "anti-Soviet" writ-
ings abroad. Khrushchev was out, and the trial was to
be a warning to the young that the lid was going
back on. But it was too late-there had been ten
years of relative freedom, and there was no going
back. Instead, the trial generated anger and defiance.
For the first time, all the dissatisfied individuals and
groups began to seek one another out, to know and to
support one another.
Trial followed political trial, and the picketing dis.
senters drew closer together. They sent petitions to their
leaders asking for redress and for the basic freedoms
guaranteed by Soviet law and the Soviet constitution.
"White boe ks" were published underground, giving
exact proceedings of the trials, and then were pub-
lished abroad. Different dissenters, in turn, were ar-
rested, and new ones came to take their place.
But by far the most amazing document is the under-
ground journal Cronika or Chronicle of Current
Events, a typewritten, terse, objective compilation of
C IA-tea $4469 Q?&2O IQi@) igits, biograph-
This "philosophy of eternalism," of course, is in total
opposition to Marx's dialectical viewpoint that ethical
teal sketches of dissenters, dissident literature, and
13 news ' of deportations. It has come out-in carbon
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copies-for forty months and, amazingly, it gets around-
that vast country rapidly. It is passed from hand to
hand on the street and on trains and planes.
pygl@HTs another such publication, Political Diary,
which is less well known but equally important; it cir-
culates among the higher echelon in the government
and the intelligentsia and focuses more on forbidden
political, social, and economic ideas that could not be
published elsewhere.
Western students of dissent in the Soviet have come
to the conclusion that these publications must be put
out by people deep "in" and "up in" the society, simply
because no one else could know as much as the
people who put out these journals obviously know.
There is ,always the suspicion that the KGB might be
putting them out itself-in order to watch who is
drawn to them-but in the last analysis that makes no
sense because the publications cause the government
and the KGB so much trouble and embarrassment.
Rather, Sovietologists believe that Cronika, in partic.
ular, is put out by people in the scientific community-
because they are the only ones who could have access
to so much information. All of this indicates, of course,
that there is some high-level collusion or at least sym-
pathy with the dissidents, particularly the scientists.
Unquestionably, the scientists are the most interest-
ing and important group.of dissidents. Of a Soviet sci-
entific community estimated at 400,000, some objective
analysts estimate that perhaps as many as sixty per
cent syn1pathize with or are dissidents. Moreover, the
scientists -are respected and needed. It is impossible to
call them "hooligans" when they have so well served
their country. The Soviet state hesitates before sending
a Soviet scientist to Siberia. Men like Chalidze have
lost their jobs, but they have not been arrested as yet
because they have been meticulous about staying within
the law. No one knows exactly why Yakir is still at
large, bit it is generally believed that it is because of
posthumous respect for his famous father.
But have the dissenters really accomplished any-
thing? Will they ever really change anything? Dissi-
dents still go to Siberia and to insane asylums, where
they are incarcerated because the Soviet officials want
to tell them (and apparently genuinely believe) that
anyone who dissents is mentally ill. Masses of "respect-
able" Soviet citizens still consider them "traitors." The
state is as powerful as ever. Isn't it even possible that
the dissenters, by challenging injustices too soon, might
set back `,the glacially slow but steady liberalization of
the Soviet Union?
There `-is more evidence to the contrary, reason to
believe that the dissidents have had a surprising effect.
Writers such as Bulat Okhudzhava, Alexander Galich,
and the famous Alexander Solzhenitsyn now publish
abroad without being tried at home. Chalidze's Human
Rights 11 Committee continues its investigations, even
though members are harassed. This summer a friend
of Solzhenitsyn was beaten up at the writer's summer
home; the KGB formally apologized to Solzhenitsyn for,
the "error" (there were no apologies in Stalin's time).
Soviet bureaus to secure permits lasted two or three days).
"Even in the last five years I have noticed a change,"
Yakir said. "Before, they would arrest you for standing
outside a courtroom during a trial. Now even Tass
(the Soviet News Agency) is forced to provide infor-
mation on some of the trials. A lot of foreigners,
raised in different traditions, can't realize the signif-
icance of five people demonstrating in Red Square. But
to us, it's extraordinary."
"Yakir's right," Peter Reddaway, the Soviet specialist
at the London School of Economics, told me in a re-
cent interview. "Many taboos have come down, and
they won't come again. The authorities won't go back
to the old terror. They can't do it again."
There are, as the Soviets would say, "objective fac-
tors" at play. Slowly bui gradually, the Soviet govern-
ment is beginning to respond to its people; public
opinion is becoming an operative force. As the govern-
ment becomes increasingly sensitive to foreign criticism,
it is faced with a vexing dilemma-as it becomes, more
and more, a "respectable" world power, it must more
and more act respectably at home; it can no longer
indulge in the boorish behavior it has historically lav-
ished upon its own citizens without some loss of respect
as a world power.
It must be remembered, too, that the dissidents are
not opting for another system or advocating the over-
throw of the government. The vast majority are liberal
Marxists who want political democracy within Marx-
ism. They are challenging their country to be what it
says it is. And-perhaps most important, they have
broken, by their sheer numbers and determination, the
government's assurance that anyone who disagrees with
the official catechism is a "traitor" in the pay of a for-
eign government. It must deeply disturb the Soviet of-
linked with a foreign anti-Soviet emigre organization
As to the future, Soviet specialist Reddaway believes
-and I concur-that the movement "will go on as
before" but that "the field will become more differenti-
ated. At the ends, groups will form that are quite
mcnt will remain the mainstream, with fragmentation
around the edges. There is bound to be an increase in
the underground groups," Reddaway went on, "and
some arc bound to be violent because the government
cannot possibly keep up with everything the young Rus-
sians want and because every society has certain violent
proclivities which are not easily bought off by material-
change."
Perhaps, in the end, the dissidents' greatest value is
the degree to which they have broken the chain of
"eternal" fear and hatred of the outside world, a fear
that seems to come in the blood. For centuries attacked,
invaded, and massacred by marauders from all sides,
the Russians turned in upon themselves. They clung
to each other with a communal, collective passion that
long preceded Marxism. To them, outsiders were dan-
Tcn thou&addr% Ve 9b 4902 ; G~F~`-` 9~ 1 A t~`2 0 '~"-~'r. It
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CPYRGHT
is only today-with this generation, the first to have
a genuine inner and outer security and relative afflu-
ence-that this is changing. Today's young Russians
are trying to talk rationality and not blood fears, law
instead of terror, and objectivity instead of xenopho-
bia. And it is not easy.
Yakir tells a story about the Chechens, a tribe that
lives in the northern Caucasus and has always hated
GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
15 January 1972
Russians. "There was a Russian boy raised in a
Chechen village," he said. "He was very close friends,
with a Chechen boy-they were like brothers. One day
they were walking single-file down the pathway to a
wedding when suddenly the Chechen, who was walk-
ing behind, said, 'Oh Vanya, you'd better walk behind.
It's in my blood to kill you.'
"Well, that's the way it is between the dissidents and
the KCB," Yakir said. "It is in their blood to hate us."
CPYRGHWhere dissent t8
Moscow .courts are tough. A 29-"
year-old Russian, Vladimir Bukovsky;
accused of "having committed acts'
Intended to weaken Soviet authority,"
was given last week the maximum,
sentence, for those who oppose thei
regime - seven years' detention, two
of them' in prison, the balance In a,
corrective labour camp. He will then
be under house arrest, outside
Moscow, for a further period of five'
years. The accused man, according
to TASS, admitted all the charges
made against him.
In truth, Bukovsky never made s'
secret of what he was doing. He had
already served thee years in a labour
camp for agitation In favour of the'
writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yull'
Daniel. The experience did not bring
him to mend his ways. As soon as he.
was freed he resumed the struggle
for the defence of persecuted intellec-
tuals and distributed a document on
the Soviet practice of Interning dis
sidents In psychiatric institutions. It
was presumably to this aspect of
Bukovsky's work that the Public-
Prosecutor referred when he charged
him with "having distributed untrue'
information which was used by anti-"
Soviet organisations abroad." Vladi-
reason;
mir Bukovsky had assumed the task'
of keeping the West posted on the,
protest movements in his country.,
As in previous trials, no foreign
journalists were permitted to be
present. It was clear, right from the tl
start, that the court was determined",
to give a sentence severe enough;'.
to serve as a warning to all those
who pass on information illegally,
though not surreptitiously. The Soviet
police often turn a blind eye to suchi1
activities, and they had known for''
a long time what Bukovsky wash
doing. From time to time, however,
they pounce on 'someone engaged in,'
such activities in the hope of per-,
suading the other "offenders" toy"
aecept the Soviet facts of life. This
as been the method adopted since,,
Leonid. 'Brezhnev came to power.:ti
Moscow can count on the world-
losing interest as the . trials are*'
repeated. The arrest of Daniel and ~l
Sinyavsky,: for example, caused a,?
worldwide reaction, but public opinion
finally got used. to these tactics c1
which, In any event, are far less cruel ; ,
than those practised In Stalin's time.10.
In any ? case, the S7ovlet authorities d
have so,far refrained from prosecut-.u
, ing internationally known ' figures, t/
like the Soviet academician Andrei
Sakharov, who.can thus continue his
courageous fight for the rights of man.'
Others who are less well known
abroad and don't : carry the same
weight in Soviet society take part in
these struggles In, the knowledge
that they. will in all probability pay
a heavy price. .
The dissenters are clearly- only a'
tiny handful and quite apart from a
society which hardly seems to share
their longing for freedom. Yet their
obstinacy irks, possibly even worries,
a regime unaccustomed to being
questioned. At these trials, the
"rebels" usually admit the charges
brought against them; but refuse to
plead guilty, on the grounds that
the Soviet Constitution guarantees
freedom of speech and action.
As far as immediate results go, the
activities of the dissenters seem
hopeless, for they' run the risk of
being crushed by a'regime which has
a powerful secular arm at Its disposal.
Many of them have already done
time In prison camps or psychiatric
wards, but they persist In their
struggle. They are alone; sustained
only by the astonishing strength of
men who have overcome their fear.
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ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN
In early January it was announced in Stockholm that Alexander
Solzhenitsyn would receive his Nobel Prize gold medal at a private
ceremony in Moscow this spring, Along with the attached Back-
grounder are included. reprints of various media commentary on the
Solzhenitsyn affair describing among other things his travails
under constant and mounting KGB harassment. Together they include
sufficient material to exploit the situation whether Solzhenitsyn
does or does not get his Nobel medal.
For those able to use additional background we particularly
recommend "Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record," edited by Leopold
Labedz (Harper $ Row, 1971, $7.95). Labedz' skillful assembly of
virtually all the known documents in the Solzhenitsyn "case" covers
the author's rise to fame with the publication of "One Day in the
Life of Ivan Denisovich" and what Labedz calls Solzhenitsyn's
"road to Calvary" --- from official criticism and theft of his
manuscripts by the KGB, prohibition from publishing his works or
even mentioning his name, to the tawdry, official condemnation
of the Nobel Prize. Attachments include a review of the Labedz
book and a reprint of its table of contents. See, also, page 4
of the Backgrounder.
Even though not himself an activist in the Soviet Human
Rights or dissident movements, for many in the Soviet Union ---
too many as far as the Politburo is concerned. --- Solzhenitsyn
has become the symbol of those movements. For that reason the
KGB seeks in all possible ways to besmirch his character, his
talents as an author, and his credentials as a loyal Russian.
In this connection, see the excellent article, "Solzhenitsyn:
The Obsession of Morality," by Abraham Rothberg, reprinted from
Interplay, final attachment.
In commentary on the award or non-award of the Nobel medal.,
it would not be amiss to take a few swipes at the Swedish Govern-
ment's timorousness in not allowing Solzhenitsyn to accept his
well-deserved award in a small ceremony on the grounds of the
Swedish Embassy in Moscow in the first place!
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972
ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER'SOLZHENITSYN
The Swedish Academy has announced that it will present to
Alexander Solzhenitsyn the Nobel Prize for literature, for which
he was selected in October 1970, at a private ceremony in the USSR
in spring of 1972, more than a year after the official ceremonies
took place in Stockholm without him, The year between began with
Solzhenitsyn's declining to go to Stockholm for his prize. The
Soviet government, which sentenced him to ten years of penal
servitude and exile for privately criticising Stalin, which
refused to publish most. of his work and which sent a former Nobel
Prize winner* to Stockholm to work against his selection for the
1970 award, was quite capable of preventing Solzhenitsyn's return
home if he should leave. Ekaterina Furtseva, Soviet Minister of
Culture, confirmed at a press conference while visiting the U.S.
in January 1972, that the Soviet government would indeed have done
just that.
The Swedish government then refused to allow its Moscoir Embassy
to be used for the presentation for,fear of offending the Soviet
Union! And so the Soviet Union which had bitterly denounced the
award as politically motivated, seemed to carry the day. Sol.zhenitsyn's
subsequent correspondence with the Stockholm committee reflects his
ironic view of himself as the victim in this bureaucratic tangle,
rather than the honoree. The impasse was resolved only after Prime
Minister Olaf Palme's defense of the Swedish position had publicly
embarrassed his government.
Most of the world saw the Nobel award as proper recognition of
a major talent, albeit with some political overtones because
Solzhenitsyn's works were proscribed in his own country. The
Italian newspaper Corriere Della Serra conducted a poll among
literary critics oT-qT countries on continents before the Nobel
award was announced. Only the Argentinian Jorge Luis Borges topped
'Solzhenitsyn -- and by only two votes.
Much of the independent Communist press agreed. Vittorio Strada,
Italian Communist writer said in his party's'Rinascita, 16 October 1970,
"there is no doubt that it is not consistent to we come the prize
* Mikhail Sholokhov, establishment author and winner of the 1965
Nobel Prize for Literature.
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when it is conferred on a Soviet writer who is officially favored
and to become indignant when the same prize is given to no less
significant a Soviet writer who is not." Moscow correspondent
for the Italian Communist Party's L'Uriita called Solzhenitsyn one
of "the most notable writers of our tire'' Kommunist, the Yugoslav
Party weekly of 22 October 1970, supported t e o e award and
declared, "It is not Solzhenitsyn who is to be blamed that the
truth he describes has been so dark. The facts are dark and
indeed, he has not invented them." At the same t mi the~French
Communist L'Humanit6, 10 October 1970, called Solzhenitsyn "one
of the most remarkable novelists of our time." The French Communist
weekly, Les Lettres Franaises of 14 October, declared that "the
choice o exaner o z enitsyn is one of those which justify
the existence of the Nobel Prize for Literature."
Strada also spoke in Rinascita of the "great prestige which, in
spite of everything, he enjoys In is own country." "One Day in
the Life of Ivan Denisovich," published during the brief de-Stalinization
period under Khrushchev, gave most Soviet readers their first look at
the infamour labor camps and at the way political prisoners were degraded
in their peoples' democracy. It is the only one of Solzhenitsyn's
novels published in the Soviet Union* The others are reportedly
circulating in samizdat --- painstakingly typed and illegally distributed.
Thus the censors ip-ri den Soviet people keep informed -- at great
personal risk -- about what is actually happening in their own country
and are able to read literature which is officially disapproved.
Banning these books has boomeranged against the Soviet Union and
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: the stories are now widely
read in samizdat; they are promoted abroad on the basis of their
forbidden-7-Fa-racier; world opinion has again been shocked by Communist
treatment of its intellectuals (not only the author but other brave
and principled men who have protested their government's repression
of thought). In effect the political content of his books has become
as important as their literary value solely because of the CPSU's
fear of free expression of opinion.
In addition to "One Day," the foreign press has snapped up all
of Solzhenitsyn's available writings to publish editions in English,
French, German, Italian, and Spanish. The main works published
abroad include:
"August 1914," in Russian only, 1971, YMCA Press:
the first of a trilogy concerning Russia's role in World
War I. See comments below.
"Stories and Prose Poems," 1971, Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux: See comments below.
"For The Good of The Cause," 1970, Praeger: a novella
of callous bureaucracy,
And it is now banned in the USSR
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"First Circle," 1968, Harper and Row: a novel about
the exploitation of political prisoners with technical
skills, based on the author's own experience.
"Cancer Ward," 1968, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux:
a novel of the life and attitudes of doctors and patients
facing death in a Soviet hospital as was Solzhenitsyn.
August 1914
Solzhenitsyn's newest novel, the first in a projected trilogy,
was published in June 1971 by the YMCA press, a Russian-language
p';ublishing house in Paris. It deals with the heroic efforts and
agonies of the Russian people as individuals and as a nation during
the first ten days of World War I. Acclaimed by its early readers
for its epic sweep, "August 1914" was described in a review written
from London by Anatole Shub as a "work that may well herald the
most important Russian literary masterpiece of the 20th Century."
Shub describes Solzhenitsyn's epic as the author's "attempt
to fix, shape, and color for the consciousness of future generations,
the primal upheaval of recent Russian history with the same finality
that Tolstoy depicted the Napoleonic wars ... and, like Tolstoy,
Solzhenitsyn brings the social fabric and cultural atmosphere of
civilian Russia to the battlefield through a rich variety of characters
both historic and completely ficticious." Paris Le Monde, 12 June,
reported that "August 1914" had been circulating inoviet Union
as samizdat for some three months before it appeared in the West.
Kon tantin Simonov, author and one-time editor of No Mir, was
among those who believed that "August 1914" should e published
at home since there was nothing in the book that could rem y
be considered as an attack on the Soviet Union.
It was just a week after the Swedish Academy had announced
that Solzhenitsyn would be awarded his Nobel gold medal and diploma
at a private ceremony in Moscow, that the city's officialdom took
:note of "August 1914" with a highly critical article in the
12 January 1972 issue of the Soviet Writers Union journal, Literary
:Gazette. That journal described "August `1914" as having "turned
out to be very helpful for anti-Soviet elements of every description."
This has aroused suspicion that some official action against the
Nobel Prize winner might be contemplated.
Stories and Prose Poems
Also published for the first time in translation in 1971, this
work contains twenty-two novellas, short stories and prose poems of
widely varied style and color. When two of the stories, "Matryona's
House" and "An Incident at Krechetovka Station" were first published
in the USSR in 1963, the reviewer for the Soviet Writers Union wrote
in Literary Gazette: "His talent is so individual and so striking
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that from now on nothing that comes from his pen can fail to excite
the liveliest interest..." How ironic.
Solzhenitsyn's "Stories and Prose Poems" give the foreign
reader a vivid view of subsistence living in a poor village; of
hooligans drawn to a religious ceremony by curiosity and contempt;
of the inefficient inhumanity of minor bureaucrats The 16 prose
poems are brief lyrical passages; a chained puppy as the symbol
of the Russian people; a tribute to a poet who created beauty
from a peasant's hut; the decay and desecration of old churches.
Most are autobiographical, at least in part, All prove the
author's knowing eye and compassionate heart. All are part of
his continuing dissection of Soviet society fifty years after the
revolution which was to free the worker and peasant from the
tyrant. Here, only the tyrant has changed.
The translation, done by Michael Glenny, unfortunately abounds
in British colloquialisms. The works have also been published in
German as Im Interesse der Sache, 1970, by Hermann Luchterhand
Verlag, West er 1nc.
Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record
Also in 1971, Harper & Row published "Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary
Record," edited by Leopold Labedz, It is . brilliantly conceived
selection of Solzhenitsyn documents which, in essence, chronicle
the Soviet Union's public and private response to the appearance
in the USSR of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." (See attach-
ments). Included are state documents and letters to and from
Solzhenitsyn and about him. They begin with his 1956 release from
exile following the terrible prison camp described in "One Day."
They include discussions leading to his expulsion from the Soviet
Writers Union and end with the address given in his absence at the
Nobel Festival in December 1970, Throughout is the absurd spectacle
of official attacks on the fourth Russian* to win the Nobel Prize
for Literature only to be denounced by his own government! Courageous
letters of defense and praise from his colleagues are included as
are moving comments from former prison camp inmates. A Writers Union
discussion on the publishing of "Cancer Ward" reveals the conflict
of all writers under Communism between their literary judgement and
their state-imposed political responsibilities. The latter inevitably
wins.
As a member of the Union of Soviet Writers declares,
"...the works of Solzhenitsyn are more dangerous to
us than those of Pasternak: Pasternak was a man divorced
from life, while Solzhenitsyn with his animated, militant,
ideological temperament, is a man of principle."
* Mikhail Sholokhov, 1965; Boris Pasternak, 1958; and Ivan Bunin, 1933.
4
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
16 October 1971
L/ rare So1zhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record .
Edited by Leopold Labedz
CPYRGHT
Since 1962, when Alexander Solzhen-
itsyn broke the stupefying silence
about Stalin's ' iconcentration camps,
I'a f faire ;Solzhenitsyn has generated
controversy. Masses of documents have
accreted to his short novel, One Day
in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.. Most
of These documents are extraliterary:.
manifestoes and counter-manifestoes,
protests and rebuttals, eulogies and de-
nunciations.
Premier Khrushchev was guided by
political motives when he ordered the
publication of the novel in 1962. Then
under fire in the Kremlin for his de-
Stalinization policies, he hoped to strike
a blow at his competitors. Liberals in
Russia misread his action as a signal
that the crimes of the Stalin era would
at* last be fully and publicly exposed,
together with some of their most wicked
executioners. But Khrushchev, and his
successors, gradually began to per-
ceive that such disclosures inexorably
pointed to their own complicity. One
Day, Solzhenitsyn's only major work.
to be published in Russia, was removed
from libraries and reading rooms, and
its topic officially declared a "danger-
ous th#me."
LeopQd Labedz' brilliantly conceived
selection, of Solzhenitsyn documents is,
in esse -ce, a chronicle of Russia's pub-
lic anct private response to One Day,
and to the coruscating issue of Stalin-
Ism. i n one level, the Soviet press
registered the reflex of instant and ex-
travagant; compliance to the order of
the day that is automatic among bu-.
reaucrats, journalists and critics who ac-
quired their professions under Stalin.
Since the appearance of One Day
seemed to promise punishment for
those immediately responsible for the
imprisonment of writers like Solzhen-
itsyn, Isaac Babel, Osip Mendelstam,.
Boris Pilnyak and thousands of others,
these persons were the first to speak up.
The archetypal response came from the
critic Vladimir Ermilov, the most notori-
ous of Stalin's "literary" denunciators.
Ermilov declared in Pravda: "in our
literature there has come a writer gifted
with a rare talent, and as befits a real
artist, he has told us a truth that can-
not be forgotten, that must not be for-,
gotten, a truth that is staring us. in the
face."
Khrushchev's recognition of his folly
in having published One Day, and
Brezhnev's subsequent ban on all
Solzhenitsyn's work, have resulted
in an increasing flow of polluted ver-
biage that threatens, like the efrlier
praise, to engulf the genuine writer con-
cerned. Even Americans, benumbed by
the invective and obscenity in our own
literature, must be impressed by the
singular squalor of this journey
through modern Soviet letters. But
apart from the official cant and the
vituperation, there exists a deep under-
lay of genuine feeling, both for and
against Solzhenitsyn in the private
.sphere. Testifying to this is a remark-'
able document, edited by Solzhenitsyn,
that circulates. from hand to hand in
Russia. It is a selection from some of
the personal letters the author-received
in response to ? One Day. Half the. cor-
-respondents are former or present-day
prisoners in Soviet ~ camps. The others.
are former ? or present-day camp guards
and other Soviet security police per-
sonnel. These letters constitute a sotto
voce; dialogue between victims and
executioners that is likely to be carried
on in Russia for some time. It is ac-
companied by Solzhenitsyn's own
brief and often sardonic commentary.
In writing to Solzhenitsyn, many ex-
prisoners literally identify themselves
with the characters in the novel: "ivan
Denisovich. That's me, SZ-208. /bpd
I can give all the characters real names."
Others offer thanks: "It has so much
life, so much pain, that one's heart.
might stop beating. People who have
not been there exclaim in horror. Now,
just a little sympathy for those who
perished is beginning to penetrate such
people." On "I am astonished that they
have not yet put you and Tvardovsky
away." (Alexander Tvardovsky, the
editor'of Novy Mir, was the first to
publish One Day. He was dismissed
from his post in 1970.) Solzhenit-
,syn's . comment: "We are surprised
too."
The prisoners writing from today's
camps are generally angry. One writes:
"You at least were allowed to receive
parcels and earn extra bread. Why does
no one deign to come to a camp and
see who is inside? Once you have
decided to reveal the truth, you should
take it through to the end."
There follow the letters from "prac-
tical workers." Who? Solzhenitsyn ex=
plains: "It turns out that this is how
camp guards style themselves. The des-
cription is, priceless." Hete there is no
.trace of the artificially generated inclig-
nation that prevails in the Soviet press
only pure, spontaneous hatred: "He
deliberately incites the people against
the organs of the Security Police Min-
istry. It's a disgracet"
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 y A
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3
 A mago lease 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT
18 August 1971
! Solzhenitsyn'$- Challenge to the Police
Following it the text of the letter
Nobel' Prize winner Alexander Solzhe-
nitsyn sent Aug. 13 to Yuri V. Andropot',
head of the Soviet police:
To the minister of government security of
the U.S.S.R. Andropov
For many years I have borne In silence
the lawlessness of your employees: the
Inspection of all my correspondence, the
confiscation of half of it, the search of my
correspondents' homes and their official and
administrative persecution, the spying
,around my house,-the shadowing of visitors,
the tapping of telephone conversations, the
drilling holes in ceilings, the placing of re-
cording apparatus in my city apartment and
warden plot, and a persistent slander cam-
paign against me from speakers' platforms
when they are offered to employees of your
.inistry.
But after the raid yesterday I will no
longer be silent. My country house village of
'Rozhdestvo, Naro-Fominsky Rayon was
empty, and the eavesdroppers counted on
,my absence. Having returned to Moscow.be-
cause I was taken suddenly ill, 1 ,had asked
my friend Alexander Gorlov to go out to the
country house for an automobile part. But it
t'arned out there was no lock on the house
rnd voices could be heard from Inside. Gor?
lov stepped Inside and demanded the rob.
,bars' documents. In the small structure,
where three or four can barely turn around,
-there were about ten of them, In plain
clothes.
On the command of the senior officer "To.
the woods with him and silence him"-they
bound Gorlov, knocked him down, and
-dragged him face down into the woods and
'beat him cruelly. Simultaneously, others
were running by a circuitous route through
,tae bushes, carrying to their car packages,
!papers, objects perhaps also a part from the
apparatus they had brought themselves.
However, Gorlov fought back vigorously and
ie1~ed, summoning witnesses, neighbors
from other garden plots came running in re-
.sponse to his shouts and barred the robbers'
,way to the highway and demanded their dos
uments. Then one of the robbers
them pass. They led Gorloy ?bie face mutt.
dated and his suit torn to rib~onL..to the ear.
"Fine methods you have," be said to those&
"We are on an operation, and on an opera-,
tion we can do anything."
Captain-according to the documents he
presented to the neighbors-Ivanov, accord.
Ing to his personal statement first took Gor6t
by to the Naro-Fominsky milita, where the
local officers greeted "Ivanov" with defer-,'
trice. There, "Ivanov" demanded from Gor-.
by written explanation of what had hap-
pened. Although he had been fiercely)
beaten, Gorlov put In writing the purpose of
his trip and all the circumstances. After that
the senior robber demanded that Gorlov,
sign an oath of secrecy, Gorlov flatly re-
fused.
Then they set off for Moscow and on the
read the senior robber bombarded Gorlov,
with literally the following phrases: "If Sol.
zhenitsyn finds out what took place at' the'
Dacha, It's all over with you. Your officiat
career [Gorlov is a candidate of technical
sciences and has presented his doctoral dis-
sertation for defense, works In the Institutes
Giprotis of Gosstroya of the U.S.SS.R.] will go:
no farther, you will not be able to defend
did not give in to them, refused to sign the
pledge, and now he is threatened with re
prisal.
..I demand from you, citizen minister, the,
public naming of all the robbers, their pun-
ishment as criminals and an explanation of
this incident. Otherwise I can only beltev
that you sent them.
13 August 1971.
To the Chairman of the Council of Minis
ters U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin. .
I am forwarding you a copy of my letter(
to the Minister Of State Security. For all of,
the. enumerated lawless actions I consider
him personally responsible. If the govern-,
went of the U.S.S.R, does 'not, share in these
actions of Minister Andropov, I will expect[
-- - -- ' A. SOLZHENITSYN. 1
. e% 1_ ,; ' . 1g August 1i~1,
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NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1971
Swedish Rebuff to So1zheniLsyn w cored
Special to The New York Times
STOCKHOLM, Sept. 12-The
Swedish Government has been
sharply criticized for its re-
fusal to ;x11ow the 1970 Nobel
Prize fog Literature to be
handed over to Aleksandr Sol-
handed over to.. Aleksandr: I.
Solzhenitsyn in its Moscow Em-
The attack was made in a
book, "Middle Man in Mos-
cow," published here last week
by Per Egil - Legge, a Norwegian
journalist and a former corre-
spondent in the Soviet capital.
According to Mr. Hegge, who
was expelled from the Soviet
Union in February, he had
been in touch with several of
Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends in
the summer of 1970. He was
the first journalist to interview
the Soviet writer after the
Nobel Prize announcement was
made early. in October. .
On Oct. 28, Mr. I-Iegge was
approached by one of Mr.
Solzhenitsyn's friends. Mr.
Hegge refers to him by a cover
name of Ivanov. Ivanov said
that the prize-winner wanted
to come to the Swedish embassy
to discuss with the Ambassador,
Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, whether
he would be able to go to Stock-
holm for the Nobel Prize cere-
mony. Dr. Jarring had at that
time temporarily left his mis-
sion as United Nations mediator
in the Middle East and was Mr. Solzehnitsyn would. not
back on his regular post as receive an invitation to the
Swedish Ambassador in MOs- embassy but that the Ambas- rir. Hegge and Mr, Solz-
COW. sador would see shim if he came henitsyn walked toward the
Sought Moscow Ceremony there without invitation. "A" ,Swedish embassy. Mr. Hegge
Ivanov also said that Mr.' also said that a Nobel Prize said that the author was not
Soizhenitsyn wanted to know ceremony at the embassy was bitter nor even surprised at the
whether the embassy could ar- impossible. Swedish decision. Mr. Sol-
range a Nobel Prize ceremony This decision had been made; zhenitsyn said that since he
in Moscow for him if he was, 'on a high Government level in would receive no invitation and
unable to gQ to Sweden. ' stockholm. "A" said that he since the embassy did not ilT-
A few days later Mr. Hegge) understood that this "did not tend to give him the prize be
look very heroic," but that the
;took a walk in Moscow with a first duty of the embassy was saw no reason for any further
Swedish diplomat, whom he talks with the Swedish diplo-
calls "A." "A" said he had to) !still to keep up good relations mats. He was said to be dis-
forward these inquiries to the) with the Soviet Union. appointed however, that he
Swedish Foreign Ministry in the Mr. dip lomat Hegge tha said he Nobel Prizes reminded would not be able to see the Stockholm. He added that he had been presented to Soviet "famous Gunner Jarring."
.
personally thought that it would winners previously by Swedish Later Mr. Solzhhnitsyn was
be difficult to arrange a Nobel Ambassadors. He mentioned said to have asked the embassy
Prize ceremony in the Swedish ,the literature winner, Mr. Mi- via Mr. Hegge whether the
embassy. Ithail A. Sholokhov in 1965 embassy could possibly foie
"Remember we are here to and Lev D. Landau, the winner ward a letter from hiln to the
maintain good relations with (in physics in 1962. Secretary of the Swedish . The
Soviet authorities and a cere-I I erny, Karl Ragnar Gie Gierow The
mony for the sharply criticized Mr. Hegge said that It the embassy reportedly first said
)author Solzhenitsyn might be Swedish decision became) no but then reluctantly gave in
it known outside the Soviet] -on the condition that the letter
embarrassing," he is reported Union the behavior of the that the cm-
to have said. be unsealed so
Swedish embassy would be bass could check its contents.
.Mr. Hegge said he could y
widely regarded as diplomatic The letter eventually reached
)understand, that but since the.
prize was normally given to-
winners by King Gustaf VI
Adolf in Stockholm, the Am-
bassador, who was the king's
personal representative.- might
also be able to do it.
In November, Mr. Hegge and
"A" met again. "A" said 4hat
NEW YORK TIMES
24 September 1971
CPYRGHT
servility. Mr. Gierow.
On Nov. 20 Mr. Hegge final Commenting on Mr. Hegge's
ly met Mr. Soizhenitsyn in book, Premier Olof Palma said
person. The meeting was ar- that Mc. Solzhonitsyn could
ranged in cloak-and-dagger certainly have received his
fashion. Ivanov came first to prize at the embassy if he had
the meeting place, and after !consented to do it without a
making sure that no suspicious ceremony,
'` The Rebuff of Soizilenit,ylt
To the Editor:
1 Premier Olof Pahno of Swcddn is'
wrong in maintaining In his Sept. 17
letter that "a represcntative of Sol-
zhenltsyn's publishers" proposed a'
:cereniolty in the Swedish 'Embassy in
Moscow..As my hook "Go-Between ins
Moscow" makes clear, and is the
Swedish Embassy in Moscow notes, It:
was tho Nobel laureate himself who,'
through me, at an early stago Inquired
t, whether presentation of the award at
the embassy was possible. The answer
to this was no.
At the salvo time' the embassy ro-
fused to give him an Invitation card to'
1` tho embnssy for a conversation, stat-
ing as the reason that the embassy,
cannot invite private Soviet citizens.
to my. view, Mr. Palma should
answer the following question: How
does he envisage the presentation of
the Nobel Prize In an embassy that
;:flatly refuses to Invite the laureate?
PER EGIL HEGGE'
s' ' l + ? Oslo, Norway, Sept. 17,1971.
CPYRGHT
persons, were aroun r. O-
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
20 October 1971
Solzhenitsyn Rejects Secret 'Prize-giving'
rtLEXAN1)JSR Solzhcnit-
syn, winner of last
Spear's Nobel Prixe for liter-
ature, has insisted that :?e
should receive his diploma
and gold medal at a public
ceremony in Moscow. .
A requset by the Soviet writer
to receive the. awards at a sere.
ninny in the. Swedish Embassy in
Moscow and drliverr his Nobel
lecture has already been turned
down by Dr Gunnar Jarring,
Ambassador to llussia.
present the award privately-
ON' rlY so as not to offend the
Soviet authorities.
Snlzhrnitsyn, 52, has written
NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 1971
I to Per t:gil Ileggr, a Norwegian
journalist expelled from ilussia
earlier this year, saying that to
agree in such a proposal " would
mean degrading the. prize, rc-
f tircling it ss something shame.
ul which must be hiden."
"Stolen goods?`1
The writer also expressed sure
rise at \1r Olof Palme, the
Swedish Prime Minister, who
wrote to the New York Tinrrs
to .iuslify his Government's
decisinn?
"Is the Nobel prize really
stolen I;nads that mist be pre.
settled behind closed doors and
without witnesses?" hr asked. ' `
?' And why was he (Mr Palmr)
Sn sure in advance Ihat my
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
'ext of Solzheinitsyn Letter to, the Swedish Academy,,
r..nw4 to The tt>.
.. CPYRGHT
(state, its acting president,
Syed Nazrul Islam, said In
Dacca that he would welcome
relations with the United
States if President Nixon
changed his policies.
Meanwhile, Dr. A. M. Malik;.
the former Pakistani civilian
governor In East Pakistan,
made his first public appear-
ance to deny reports that he
had been turned over to Bang-
ladesh authorities for trial as,
a war criminal.
In an Interview with UPI,.
Malik confirmed that he and
other West Pakistani officials
were being held in an Indian
military garrison on the west-
ern outskirts of Dacca to pro.
tect them from r e p ri s a l s
from Bengalis. He said he was
being well treated by the In.
dians.
Subcontinent.
Bhutto is scheduled to stay
in Ankara for a day before`
s
said to plan to visit Morocco,
Liberia, Tunisia, Libya and
Egypt.
olitical life of the country." Independence. for talks with Turkish govern- Britain and Iran, with the.
In a report from Dacca, ( ment leaders on bilateral reTa- United States as an associate
ravda noted th Singh also assailed China A0PP ~d For Release 1999/09/'2 . . 4 9LVg" AA00 ?F0001-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
WASHINGTON STAR
22 December 1971
CPYRGHT
DAVID LAWRENCE
People on Other Side !deed Facts
The Soviet Union doesn't
make public its annual budget.,
but there is every Indication
that the situation in Asia Is
going to ost the Kremlin
more moncyc -especially by an
..increase in the amount of mill-
tary assistance to he distribut-
As a result of the India-
:Pakistan conflict, the Soviets
feet that they now should ex-
tend their military strength In
various parts of Asia. The alli-
ance with India is just, the be-
glnning of a movement to
break down the prestige of
Red China and build up naval
bases for Russian ships along
the southern coast of the conti-
nent.
The real expense for the So-
,Viet Union in such a policy of
expanding its Influence in the
world is that of furnishing
arms, military equipment and
supplies for the land, sea and
air forces of certain nations.
Among these are the Arab
states-notably A 1 g e r I a,
`Egypt, Syria and Iraq-Cuba,
Eastern Europe, North Korea
.and, of course, North Vietnam.
'These countries and others
which the Kremlin seeks to
bring under its wing are look-
ing to Moscow for economic
'nsAlstanco of the typo called
"defense support"-roads, rail
facilities, ;port equipment,
merchant shipping and the
like.
Russia's latest venture in
Asia made It possible for India
to invade and dominate East
Pakistan. This could not have
been done without Soviet back-
ing.
Although the new Bengal
'istato Is theoretically being
granted Independence, East
Pakistan is an abysmally poor
area and will need all kinds of
help. Since India cannot afford
to provide it-the Indians say
they, fought the war to get the
Bengal refugees back into
East - Pakistan from India-
this, too, will be up to Moscow.
There Is a feeling now that,
while Russia may allow the
Vietnam war to come to what
Americans will call a "con-
clusion," North Vietnam will
in due time be given enough
military support to take over
Indochina. The assumption is
that the United States is not
going to be involved again in
wars in Asia. The Soviets, on
the other hand, are inclined
toward more military en-
croachment on that continent.
There is talk of reducing the
number of American troops in
the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, and the Russians
are pushing hard for this step.
They are willing to promise to
withdraw some of their forces
from the satellite countries.
But the truth is they want the
United States to take its troops
back across the Atlantic so
that the Kremlin will have vir-
tually a free hand In the fu-
ture.
With a cloud overhanging
Asia, there are also beginning
to be worries as to what will
occur when the strength of
NATO has been weakened. Its
army at present is very small
compared to the large units
which can be mobilized cur-
rently by the Soviets.
The key to the whole prob-
lem of war and peace in Rus-
sia rests with the people. Mil-
lions of Individuals are in mili-
tary service, and the standard
of living generally has not im-
proved materially to anything
like Western norms. Many
persons are unhappy and some
day will express. their discon-
tent In an outbreak against to-
talitarianism.
The big task, now Is not
merely to stress in the United
Nations the Importance of
maintaining. world peace, but'
to convey te facts to the peo-
ples behind the Iron Curtain.
In this era of new ways of
scientific communication, o-
ples everywhere can findpoub
what is blocking the road to
peace.
SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
October 1971
India and the New Tsarism
Ernst Ku x
The rea question s: When
are the people In the satellite
countries and in the Soviet Un-
ion going to learn that major
wars are keeping them from
getting the income they de-
serve? When will they unite to.
stop Intrusion in the lives of,
peoples on other continents?
The United States alone can-
not offset what the Soviets are
planning to do with funds ob-
viously intended for military
purposes. The Red Chinese are
not likely to become entangled
in a war with Russia because
they are at a military disad-
vantage-they do not have the
nuclear strength to combat the
enemy.
So the Soviets are enabled
through the India-Pakistan
quarrel to get a stronger hold
on Asia. They soon will in-
crease their military threats
to some of the other countries
and obtain privileges for their
navy and military units which
certainly will be used to tight-
en the Soviet grip on the weak-,
er nations in Asia.
All this is an expensive mat-'
ter for the Russians. But un-
less it is thoroughly exposed
and the Soviet people learn the'
facts by radio, the dropping of
leaflets and other methods,
there Is no way to generate the.
natural influences.that lead to
liberation movements.
CPYRGHT
With the Indian alliance, cemented by the pact of campaigns in Persia in 1717 to open the road for a
friendship signed on August 9, Moscow is continuing Russian march on l idia, was part of a Russian dream
a policy initiated by the Tsars. Brczhncv's expansion of world supremacy. With astonishing clear-sighted-
towards the Middle East and the Indian Ocean seems ness, Marx associated Russian operations in Af-
oddly familiar to those who have studied Karl ghanistan and Persia and her rivalry with England
Marx's analysis of the Tsars' policy of imperialism. ovcr India with Gorchakov's plans in the Baltic and
In M4#*p r dn$Rraf tleaSeorta9ig/QWD& : ClAmR 9s?OfLA 94 280 490i@ilugncc in
Central Asia, which began with Peter the Great's Europe-an association which it would be well not
 P9-01194A0.00200210001-1
to overlcicppr9XX?egF.oreReleaseth199A9/09/02 : %c PRI
eoe s cmocracy. As in o per span countries
back as 1858 Eng:ls was forecasting that "within
10 or 15 years we ,.hall hear the Muscovites beating
at the gates of India."
As Engels wrote proleptically at the time, fore-
seeing the interdependence of Russia's policy towards
India and China, "It is a fact that Russia will soon
be the leading power in Asia and will rapidly put
England in the shade in that Continent. The conquest
of Central Asia and the annexation of Manchuria ex-
pand her territories by an area as big as the whole
of Iruropc if the Russian Empire is excluded, thus
converting the frozen wastes of Siberia to a temperate
jonc. in a short time, the valleys of the Central
4sian rivers and of ..he Amur will have been popu-
I.sted by Russian colonists. The strategic positions
li'nis gained arc as important to Asia as are those in
Poland to Europe. The possession of the Turan is a
threat to India and that of Manchuria is a threat to
china. Yet China and India, with their 450 million
inhabitants, arc at present the most important coun-
tries in Asia."
Lenin regarded India and China less as objectives
of Russian conquest than as centres of world revolu-
tion which, he claimed, would march from Peking on
Paris via Delhi. The "final decision in the world
struggle" between the "counter-revolutionary impe-
rialist West and the .-evolutionary and nationalistic
East" depended in the !ast analysis, prophesied Lenin
in his last pamphlet "L ss but Better" in March 1923,
on the fact that Russia, India and China represented
the overwhelming majority of the world's population.
In reality, the Bolsheviks were more interested in the
reconquest of the furthest-flung colonies of the
Tsarist Empire in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the
Far East than in actively supporting colonial revolu-
tion by the workers of th,- East. The first Soviet
Foreign Minister, Chicherin, referred in an article
dated August 12 1919 expressly to Gorchakov's as-
sessment that Russia's future lay in Asia. It was no
coincidence, thcr:fore, that the newly-fledged Soviet
Republic entered into its first diplomatic relations
with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey, following this
up in early 1921 with treaties of friendship and al-
liance.
After the failure of his China policy, Stalin con-
centrated on Europe and even declined to take up
Hitler's offer, 'made to Molotov in November 1940,
by which the Soviet Union would have joined the
Three Power Pact and concentrated its expansion
towards the south, seeking its outlets in the area of
the Persian Gulf instead of the Mediterranean. It is
not known how Stalin reacted to Roosevelt's sugges-
tion at Teheran in 1943 that the Indian question
should be solved "by reforms roughly on the Soviet
plan." After the British withdrawal and India's ac-
quisition of independence, Stalin, through the Comin-
form, called upon Communists there to seize power
by, force an5kMj1" RyrWW69ssn19QW0?fn2 :
that had achieved independence, communist riots
controlled from Moscow took place in India during
the summer of 1948, but they were suppressed by
Nehru. Stalin had never fully understood the trans-
formations effected by decolonialization or the desire
of the new states for neutrality, and for him Nehru
remained "a marionette of imperialistic colonialism."
When diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union
and India were taken up in April 1947, they re-
mained cool and of little importance. India's protests
against the Chinese occupation of Thihet in 1950
were ignored by Moscow. In view of these historical
facts it sounds suspect, to say the least, whcd
Gromyko speaks in Delhi to Indians of the un-
changing and consistently friendly peaceful policy
of the Soviet Union and implores them to revive
the spirit of Nehru.
The spectacular tour of India, Burma and Afghan-
istan undertaken by Khrushchcv and Bulganin in
November 1955 demonstrated Moscow's growing
interest in southern Asia. In the new policy of
"peaceful coexistence" towards the non-aligned states
of the Third World, India was selected as exhibition
piece. Khrushchev went back there in February 1960,
flattered Nehru and strove by means of development
aid, including a complete steelworks, to win over the
Indians to the Soviet model. Khrushchcv's moves
towards India were not only part of the rivalry with
the West; they were also a reaction to China's grow-
ing activity in Asia and Africa initiated by Chou En
Lai and Nehru with their declaration of coexistence
and their joint participation in the Bandocng Confer-
ence of April 1955. There are grounds for believing
that Khrushchev had agreed to a delimitation of
spheres of influence with Mao and that India had
been allocated to the Soviet sphere.
The shooting on the China-Tndia border in Sep-
tember 1959 and the breakdown of Khrushchev's
American policy were a sign of conflict between
Moscow and Peking and the start of their rivalry in
India and the Third World generally. India's Com-
munist Party was one, of the first to split into a pro-
Soviet and a pro-Chinese wing. During the Himalaya
skirmishes with China in October 1962, for the. out-
break of which India was not entirely blameless,
Moscow, pre-occupied with the Cuba crisis at the
time, maintained a "neutral" attitude and thus disap-
pointed both Peking and Delhi. India, her position
shaken by defeat in this border war, received support
and help from both the Soviet Union and the United
States and the beginnings of Soviet-American co-
operation in containing China began to emerge. To
combat th-s "holy alliance of imperialists, revisionists
and reactionaries", Peking put out feelers to Pakistan,
herself disconcerted by the friendly ~ attitude of her
mc1 j g ~'t gl~n't"t 'toy ter
PYRGHT
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT
into the most tenuous relations with one of the Com-
munist superpowers automatically results in involve-
ment in the conflict between Moscow and Peking.
With the fall of Khrushchev and the death of
Nehru in 1964, the personalized propaganda
phase of Soviet-Indian coexistence ended. Khrush-
chev's successors, who began by seeking a reconcilia-
tion with Peking, aimed at a neutral position on the
Indian sub-continent.,Kosygin, by his arbitration in
tlte Indo-Pakistan border war over the Rann of Cooch
at the Tashkent meeting between Shastri and Ayub
Khan iji January 1966, was able to secure the posi-
tion of'irefcrce and strove to develop this by subse-
qucnt visits to Karachi and Delhi. Moscow's woohig
of Ayub; Khan and the Soviet economic and military
id to Pakistan led to violent anti-Soviet reactions in
India and to a temporary cooling-off of relations.
lYhcn Indira Gandhi succeeded Shastri at the head
the Indian Government, she began by continuing
tie policy of non-alignment alongside Nasser and
Vito, but steadily built up closer links with Moscow.
Vo foreign head of government has visited the Soviet
Union as often as Mrs. Gandhi in the last six years,
while Kosygin has repeatedly been to India, the heads
of state have exchanged visits, and delegations are
constantly travelling to and fro. In important ques-
tions of foreign policy such as the Middle East
conflict,and the Indo-China war, Delhi has taken up
position's identical to those of Moscow. Since 1965
Soviet
collaboration has been evolved further. The
ion has built a second steelworks, provided
ion roubles in credit for the 4th Indian
economic plan and last December signed a commer-
cial treaty with India covering 1971-75 and synchro-
nized with the 5-year. plans of the Soviet 'economy
and C nccon.
At t c same time, military collaboration has been
intensified. In March 1967, General Staff Chief
Zakharov visited India; in September 1967 and
Octobci 1968 the then Indian Defence Minister
Swaran Singh (now Foreign Minister and cosigna-
tory with Gromyko of the recent pact) went to
Moscow for negotiations; in March 1969 Marshal
Grechkc was a guest in Delhi and a delegation under
Grand admiral Gorshkov inspected Indian harbours,
The So'ict Union has supplied armaments, aircraft,.
warship4 and submarines to India and according to
Chinese' reports is to set up naval bases at Visakha-
patnam, Bombay, Cochin, Mosmugao and Port Blair.,
With the British withdrawal from East of Suez, the
run-down of the American engagement in Asia and
the weakening of China through the Cultural Revo-
lution, Moscow saw its chance to press forwards into
the Indian? Ocean and exploited it by dispatching Chineessej border conflict. The most critical point of
diploma PE n s~iIRT [l 91PER?fn 19 t~. ' 2 : CIAi ~tct it, ~C1bSe'tbt' fs" v '1f"t h~ exPamirs,
treme
""he Indo-Soviet friendship pact, though long in
ti preparation, is mainly intended as a counter-
move to American and Chinese "ping-pong" diplo-
macy. By its means Moscow is showing its determina-
tiori, to prevent a displacement of the world power
situation to its disadvantage through sectional colla-
boration between Peking and Washington, such as
might be represented by support for Pakistan. But
instead the result might well be that the American-
Chinese rapprochement, in. which developments in
East Pakistan are probably playing an accelerating
role, could now proceed more quickly and go further.
There arc even indications, such as the unexplained
absence of foreign policy expert Suslov at the
hurriedly-arranged ratification of the treaty, that this
step has not met with approval everywhere in the
Soviet union. At first sight it is of course a success
and the fulfilment of ancient Russian dreams when
Brczhnev and his emissary Gromyko bind India more
closely to them and reap the reward of long years
of not entirely smooth and effective work by Soviet
diplomats, economic experts, soldiers and propagan-
dists. By embracing India in the Soviet treaty system,
which already- covers Eastern Europe with bilateral
agreements and extends to Cuba and Egypt, Moscow
has obtained political and logistic foundations for its
move forward into the Indian Ocean. But against
this Moscow has ? lost the position as arbitrator
between India and Pakistan it won at Tashkent and
has been forced more or less to write off its past
work to win over Pakistan. It is doubtful whether
the pact with India will make Brezhnev's plan for
collective security in Asia or Soviet proposals for
regional economic cooperation any more attractive to
other Asian states. Although the Russians acknowl-
edge India's policy of non-alignment, this pact none-
theless represents a limitation of India's sovereignty
in the form of an obligation to consult on all interna-
tional questions, to refrain from any other military
alliances, to dissociate herself from the West in the
"struggle against colonialism and racialism"; and it
is thus in fact the end of Nehru's non-alignment.
Furthermore, this alliance, like the similarly-worded
treaty with Egypt, makes it clear that Moscow in the
era of the Brezhnev Doctrine is no longer interested
in tolerating non-alignment and neutralism in the
Third World, as Khrushchev pretended to be. The
non-aligned countries are coming more and more into
the slipstream of the global triangle of forces. With
the Moscow alliance, India has practically abandoned
her neutrality in the Soviet-Chinese conflict. Delhi
might find itself invited by Moscow at some stage,
under reference to Article 9 of the treaty, to take
"effective steps" in the case of some new Soviet-
11 case may never arise, Moscow is hardly likely to
 CPYRGHApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
neglect the opportunity of exploiting the alliance
with India to encircle China from the south. For
some time now, Moscow has been playing, up the
Thibet question, and this region has taken on addi-
tional strategic importance from the posting there of
Chinese nuclear and rocket installations previously in
Sinkiang.
R ussia's pressure towards India is no longer
aimed against the British Empire, as Marx
foretold, but against Communist China. A calcula-
tion which may seem attractive to the Soviet leaders
is that the Soviet Union with its 250 million inhabit-
ants now joins with 550 million Indians to form a
'counterbalance to 800 million Chinese. But account
must also be taken of the fact that volatile under-
developed, loosely-cohering India represents an ad-
ditional millstone round the Soviet neck, already
encumbered with Eastern Europe, Cuba and the
Middle east. The cost of the alliance with India in
political, economic and military currency may quickly
prove to be higher than expected and higher than the
Soviet infrastructure is capable of bearing. Over-
extension increases the dangers and uncertainties for
Moscow's power, however demonstratively it may be
displayed. Even Russia's communications with India
cannot be regarded as sure, for to avoid trackless
Central Asia and the Himalayas they must pass either
through the Suez Canal or along China through
Siberia and the Yellow Sea. In spite of his apparent
success, Brezhnev may one day find himself to have
been duped. Stalin extended Russian sway to the
Elbe and achieved an alliance with Mao's China.
Khrushchev derived not inconsiderable advantages
from his rapprochement with America, even though
he had to pay for it with upheavals in Eastern Europe
and the break with Peking. But Brezhnev, in the
global triangle of power, has neither China nor
America on his side, and Cuba, Egypt and India can
never compensate for that.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/0 P79-01194AftO'2i01-1
A MESSAGE FOR REVOLUTIONARIES
The message comes from Pierre Vallieres, ideologue of the
Canadian revolutionary Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ): he
has publicly stated that terrorism has no place in the struggle
for an independent Quebec. Vallieres' words should have particular
iheaning for such organizations as Guatemala's F . A. R. , the Eritrean
Liberation Front in Africa, or other guerrilla activists anywhere
who advocate kidnappings, and other terrorist tactics to reach
their goals. Vallieres' message may also be of interest to the
urban-university variety of revolutionary everywhere, whose
enthusiasm may cause them to confuse what should be with what is.
Attached to the backgrounder is an article by Vallieres
which appeared in the 13 December issue of the Montreal newspaper,
Le Devoir. In a detailed Marxist-revolutionary analysis of the
situation in Quebec, Vallieres concludes that, given the "objective
conditions" which prevail, the FLQ is counter-productive and no
longer has any raison d'etre.
Approved For Release 1999I09/02rZ #.1A-FPP79-01194A000200210001-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972
Pierre Vallieres, ideologue and inspiration of the Canadian
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) which for a decade has been
responsible for political kidnappings and other acts of terror in
the Montreal area, has publicly stated that terrorist tactics .are
outmoded, that the legal aspects of the struggle must be paramount,
and the FLQ no longer has any raison d'etre.
In a 27-page essay which was published in the 13 and 14
December issues of the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir, Vallieres
reaches some of the following conclusions regarding the role of
the Quebec terrorist organization:
a) "No one can arrogate to himself, in the name of a
theoretical principle, the right to engage an entire people
in a confrontation which stands an excellent chance of
resulting in greater repression for the masses.."
b) "The political error of the FLQ is to consider
itself a sort of revolutionary foyer which will liberate the
people by the contagion of its ideas and acts, by the
spontaneous propaganda of its tactics, and by the microbic
radiation of its "cells" on the social tissues of the
population."
c) "The mass struggle in Quebec utilizes the electoral
process and will continue to utilize it as long as that
process appears to be the right method for attaining
political power and for realizing its priority objectives:
national independence and economic, social and cultural
transformation."
d) "The FLQ is outmoded because the situation has
changed and because armed agitation is not suitable to the
present situation. Because this struggle must lead an
entire people to victory and not defeat, the duty of FLQ
members today is to put an end to FLQ activity in all its
form ..and to continue the struggle according to the best
interests of the Quebec people."
Vallieres called upon his FLQ comrades to support the Parti
Quebecois (a party represented in the Quebec provincial legislature
which is also dedicated to gaining independence for French Canada
through strictly legal processes). Valli6res points out that FLQ
activities have become counter-productive since they furnish the
authorities with a pretext to intervene in Quebec affairs and
would lead to the suppression not only of the FLQ itself but of
all other "progressive elements" such as the trade unions, citizens
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committees and above all the Parti Quebecois to which the people
look for leadership in their struggle for a separate state.
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LE DEVOIR, Montreal
13 December 1971
WHY THE FLQ TODAY NO LONGER HAS ANY RAISON D' ETRE
by Pierre Valli ores
CPYRGHT
In a letter to the publisher of Le Devoir, M. Pierre
Vallieres announces that he will soon publish an essay
entitled 1 'Ur erice de'Choisir, comprising four chapters..
In the second chapter entitled "The FLQ and the
Important Lessons of October 1970," the text of which
is attached to this letter, Vallieres explains why he
is breaking definitively with the Quebec Liberation
Front and urging its members to return to democratic
practices. Here is the complete text of this chapter.
An analysis of the evolution, over the last ten years, of the struggle
methods, the organizational machinery and the increasingly precise definition
of political, economic, social and cultural objectives, as well as of the
basic premises of this evolution have led us to the following principal
conclusions:
1) under present circumstances, and taking account of
objective conditions, the main strategic, political force in
the liberation struggle is and can only be the Parti Qudbecois;
2) the creation of a second mass party (worker or Marxist)
would only be a source of diversion and division for the Quebec
masses, and at the same time would retard the development of the
struggle in which the Quebec people are engaged in a total, that
is inseparable, manner on what is called the "national" as well
as on what is known as the "social" plane.
3) the "contents" of independence are shaped at the base
(trade unions, citizens committees, local chapters of the Parti
Qu6becois, the liberation front of Quebec women, etc.) and must
integrate with the political initiatives of the Parti Qu6becois
(party of the masses), the makeup of which, in reality, overlaps
.with the "joint front" of labor unions, citizens' committees and
progressive intellectuals.
Oft the political level, the division between a party which claims
to be leading this so-called social "front" and the Parti Qudbecois
(which one is too inclined to reduce to a purely "national" or nationalist
"front"), would constitute an internal division within the same mass
struggle, would compromise the chances for success of this struggle
and, in short, would strengthen the incumbentregime. In such a division,
the people of Quebec would stand to lose enormously from every point
of view.
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In the light of these conclusions, is an FLQ necessary? The problem
is not to determine whether or not the FLQ possesses at present the
technical means for carrying out actions similar to those of October 1970,
but to decide whether, politically, these actions are necessary for the
Quebec liberation struggle and whether they will be necessary in the
foreseeable future.
To answer this question, it is useful first of all to ask whether
the current situation is revolutionary and, consequently, whether armed
struggle is justified. For a situation to be revolutionary and for
armed struggle to constitute a politically valid means of struggle
for the masses, the following objective conditions must exist:
1) total inability of the regime in power to satisfy
popular aspirations and demands ;
2) the suppression of democratic and civil liberties;
3) a permanent state of repression and of political,
economic and social crisis;
4) Antagonisms embittered to the point that they can be
resolved only by armed confrontation;
5) the objective impossibility of a mass struggle
developing in the election process; i.e., that a mass party
could attain'political power through elections;
6) the objective need for the people to have recourse
to armed struggle (or guerrilla warfare) in order to realize
their political, economic and social objectives.
Is it possible to conceive of an intermediate situation in which
armed struggle would be just another formula and in which the electoral
struggle would remain predominant? Certain Quebec revolutionaries
imagine such a situation. They believe that the FLQ and the Parti
Quebecois should complement each other. They know very well that the
present situation is not yet revolutionary and that therefore the
struggle of the masses must assume an electoral form. Moreover they
note that the incumbent regime, threatened with disintegration, daily
t i ides increasingly toward fascism. They foresee that in the face of
e threat posed by the Parti Quebecois, the unions and the citizens
tomnittees, the authorities will obstruct the electoral process and
will install in Quebec a dictatorship of the Greek or Uruguayan variety.
They describe the present situation as pre-revolutionary.
And, in reality, the political implications of the people's
dissatisfaction today include an enormous potential for explosion.
However, this is not enough to touch off a revolution. Rather, it
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leads to con ron a ions in , MkU
use of stronger and stronger repressive measures. If the Parti Qu6becois
did not exist and if it were not making an effort to channel this
growing dissatisfaction toward a specific objective (independence and
the basic transformation of the economic and social structure) capable
of mobilizing the great majority of the Quebec people, the counter-
offensive would already have had tragic and baneful consequences for
the development of the liberation struggle (which is a revolutionary
struggle) and for the workers of Quebec. The risks of widespread
demobilization and a retreat into darkness would, in such circumstances,
be great. It would constitute a decisive victory for Canadian colonialsim
and American imperialism.
This is why the authorities, more and more openly, are seeking a
confrontation which they hope will provide an opportunity to forcibly
crush the Quebec people by destroying the organizations which the
people created in order to free themselves: the Parti Quebecois, the
unions, the citizens' committees, etc. The October 1970 crisis provided
the authorities with the occasion for a "dress rehearsal" of this classic
scenario at a time when the organization which by its actions had provoked
the crisis did not have the resources for an extended offensive against
the authorities nor to offer the Quebec people the strategy and weapons
which would have enabled them to resist repression, still less the
techniques of revolutionary action which would have enabled it to
achieve its ends: winning political power and constructing a new society.
Had it not been for the combined action of the Parti Qu6becois, the
workers' groups and all of Quebec's progressive forces, the "ever-present
danger of reaction and retreat which always hangs over a transitional
society" would have occurred and the FLQ would have had to take the
odious responsibility before history of having given the exploiters
of the Quebec people the opportunity of striking them a possibly fatal blow.
Fortunately, the irreparable did not occur because the authorities, taken
,by surprise, reacted too slowly and were not really able to resolve the
"contradictions which existed between the various decision-making levels
and within each of these levels. But the crisis would have provided the
authorities with the opportunity not only to scare people but also and
especially to resolve some of its own contradictions by uniting around
the central government the exploiters of the Quebec people.
If ever the FLQ were to offer the authorities a new opportunity to
invoke the War Measures Law against Quebec, this time all levels of the
state would be prepared, whereas the PLQ again would have no control
over the process it had set in motion. As in October 1970, it would be
obliged to leave to the Parti Qu6becois and to the unions the task of
resisting the repression which would be carried out against everyone.
In short, it would condemn the people to the defensive, to retreat and
to fear. In fact, it would have to swallow what it claimed to combat:
3
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repression. Worse, it would condemn the entire population to a loss
of initiative, to passive acceptance of the state's counter-attack
and to dependence on the mercies of the authorities.
One cannot challenge, in the name of the people, the army of a
regime when one does not oneself possess an army in which the people
can find itself, become part of consciously and through a collective
fight, take the road to political power and the realization of their
social objectives. And in order for such a people's army to organize,
develop and triumph, it is necessary first of all that the people
have no choice but to take up aims, that they know this and that in
their midst there have developed a leadership capable of assuming the
historic responsibility of guiding an entire people toward certain
victory.
No one can assume -- like a self-awarded diploma -- the task
of being the avant-garde of a people on the way to liberation. Above
all, no one can arrogate to himself, in the name of a theoretical
principle, the right to engage an entire people in a confrontation
which stands an excellent chance of resulting in greater repression
for the masses and, for the revolutionary and progressive forces,
attrition if not total annihilation.
Actions such as those of October 1970 reduce the revolutionary
struggle to a series of isolated tactics, of flashy initiatives which
depend on special circumstances and are without any strategic significance.
At the level on which they occur, such actions, even if they arouse the
people from their lethargy, compromise in the long run the security and
militancy of the most politically aware elements of the population, and
thus the nation as a whole.
The fact that an important part of the population up to now has
sympathized with FLQ' initiatives, supported its October Manifesto,
admire its acquisition of political prisoners etc. does not mean that
the FLQ automatically represents for the masses an alternative for
attaining political power. If the masses confuse so easily "felquistes"
(FLN members) and "pequistes" (Parti Qu6becois adherents), it is because
or them the FLQ represents the "radical element" of a liberation movement
hose prime mover remains the Parti Qu6becois.
In the eyes of the Quebec masses and also in the eyes of the
uthorities, it is the Parti Qu6becois which constitutes the real
ternative to power. It is neither the trade unions, nor the citizens
ommittees nor the FLQ. The FLQ is regarded by the people as shock troops
n the struggle for independence and socialism. This subjective view of
the FLQ is closer to the truth than that, also subjective, which the FLQ
embers have of themselves when they characterize themselves as a
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guerrilla army around which the other political, trade union and
social forces in the Quebec liberation struggle will allegedly
radicalize. This subjective and erronious view of themselves is
not shared by all FLQ members. The October 1970 Manifesto, for
example, gives a definition of the FLQ which corresponds approximately
to the way the masses see it. In any case, it should be very difficult
for the FLQ -- at best -- to be more than a tactical support-for_a .
broad, mass movement whose main strategic strength is supplied by the
Parti Qu6becois.
The political and subjective error of the FLQ, maintained and
fed by the authorities and the information media, is to consider
itself a sort of revolutionary foyer which will liberate the people
by the contagion of its ideas and acts, by the spontaneous propaganda
of its tactics and by the microbic radiation of its "cells" on the
social tissues of the population -- all this simply by the political-
magical effect of its violence, its courage, its generosity and its
good intentions. This biological interpretation of urban guerrilla
activity confuses one center among others of social agitation with an
authentic guerrilla activity, which in a given situation acts as the
motivating force in a people's war because there exists no other popular
struggle strategy which can lead the masses to the realization of their
objectives.
In Quebec there is no doubt that armed agitation has nothing to do
with the armed struggle, which is a mass struggle. The FLQ has engaged
in armed agitation; it has never engaged in an armed struggle because
in Quebec the mass struggle can utilize the normal electoral process
and does use it. The electoral process and armed struggle cannot be
used at the same time, since the mass struggle cannot have two heads
and two strategies without repudiating itself. In reality, armed mass
struggle and electoral mass struggle cannot coexist. The masses cannot
at one time become part of two different strategies, as if they were
living at the same time in two different situations. The masses can
and should change political strategy once the situation itself has
changed and requires a different struggle method than that which
corresponded to the conditions of the previous situation.
A strategy never develops by itself and each people has to
forge one of its own by its efforts, its sacrifices, its errors, its
defeats, its battles won or lost,which the people must experience in
order to discover it [the strategy], master it and apply it. In this
domain; even failures, by the experience and knowledge they generate,
are often more tempering than successes too easily won.
The mass struggle in Quebec -- whether or not this pleases those
who only concede revolutionary value to armed political action --
makes use of the electoral process and will continue to make use of it
as long as that process appears to be the right method and formula for
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attaining political power and realizing its priority objectives:
national independence and the economic, social and cultural changes that
are the concomitants of independence.
The mass struggle will commit itself to another approach only if the
situation is radically changed by -- let us say -- the outlawing of the
Parti Qu6becois, censorship, permanent military occupation, the suppression
of the present election process or by a marked limitation of its "normal"
operation.
In his book Guerrilla Warfare, One Method (1961), Che Guevara
emphasizes that one must never exclude a priori that revolutionary
change in a given society can begin through the election process. So
much the better, one must add, if this change can take place completely
through this process. Armed struggle, as revolutionary strategy and
method for mass political action, cannot be undertaken nor develop if
the masses think they can realize their goals through the electoral
process. A revolutionary is one who finds the strategy and tactics
appropriate to the objective situation which exists and who is capable
of forseeing those conditions which will obtain whenever this or that
modification in the objective situation drastically changes the balance
between the forces involved and concomitantly demands that the masses
develop new methods of action, either for seizing political power or
for defending what they have already won.
In the present situation, it would be an unforgiveable error for
the advocates of a real social revolution in Quebec to underestimate or worse deny -- that the Quebec people can profit by the strategy of
the Parti Qudbecois. For it is this strategy which, for the first time
in Quebec, has permitted large segments of the population to participate
directly in a process aimed at attaining political power and, through
a collective effort, to understand its mechanisms, implications,
limitations, dangers and possibilities; in a word, to become aware of
the strengths and weaknesses of their resources, of the importance of
their unity and solidarity in the face of those who threaten them
indiscriminately and seek to divide them in order to better dominate
and exploit them.
Who can deny the sound basis of Rene L6vesque's statement that in-
Quebec "the struggle for national emancipation must develop in the
classic confusion of a social revolution" and that consequently we
must find a way of carrying out simultaneously the struggle for national
liberation and the struggle for social liberation "remembering that
without national freedom we will have neither the maturity nor the
means'to accomplish a social, economic and cultural rennaissance which
is not incomplete or illusory." Le'Devoir,-29 November 1971).
If it is not in the interest of the majority of the Quebec people
at present for the trade unions to set up a second party of the masses
(which would differ from the Parti Qu6becois only by its phraseology
and which, moreover, by its rivalry with the Parti Qu6becois, would
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retard the political and social emancipation of Quebec and,tfie historic
process which is taking place), is it in the interest of the-Quebec people
that the FLQ continue its action begun in 1963 and which in October 1970
provoked the crisis that everyone is familiar with?
Is it in the interest of the Canadian people that FLQ armed agitation,
such as it has carried out in Quebec for the last eight years, continue
to present itself, mythically, as armed struggle, when in reality it
possesses none of the basic characteristics of a true armed struggle and
when objective conditions at present neither permit nor require the
development of such a struggle?
One must reply categorically no.
Even if the political, economic and social objectives of the FLQ
are based on the real aspirations of the Quebec people, its actions have
always been more or less spontaneous, irregular and dependent on circumstances.
Except for its violence, nothing distinguishes it politically from the
agitation of other angry exploited and colonized groups:` Mouvement de
Libdration Populaire, Front de Libdration Populaire, Mouvement de Lib6ration
du Taxi, Ligue pour 1'Integration Scholaire, Rassemblement pour l'Independance
National (in its early years).
This agitation has been useful. It has made aware and given a
political viewpoint to an ever increasing number of Quebec citizens.
Above all it has been responsible for the emergence of an organized
mass movement, the Parti Qu6becois, and has contributed to the radicalization
of the trade unions.
Only one form of coherent political activity, one real alternative
road to power for the "white niggers" of Quebec has come from the social
struggle and political efforts of the last few years: the Parti Qu6becois.
That this party is not perfect, none will deny. But if it were to
disappear without having accomplished its task and without having taken
advantage of all the possibilities which unquestionably the democracy
in power (no matter how sick) still offers, it is certain that, in
uch a case, so much effort over the past ten years in so many different
Melds of activity, would be lost for a long while in defeatism, fatigue
and discouragement, especially if such a premature and catastrophic
disappearance were to be caused (consciously or not) by ideological
;quarrels based more on theories from books (devoting little attention
.to th& study of history) than on a concrete, constantly re-examined
understanding of a specific ever-evolving situation. The consequences
!would be ever more severe if the Parti Qu6becois were crushed or
paralyzed by a savage' campaign. of repression occasioned by, or for
which the pretext was provided, by some flashy act of the FLQ.
The advocates of armed action and of "autumn offensives" should
learn the.main lesson of October 1970 and draw fran it practical,
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politically justified conclusions, in the interest of the people of
Quebec and of their liberation struggle and not thinking -- egoistically,
aristocratically and isolatedly with no regard for the most elementary
sense of responsibility -- of preserving their "principles" and their
nucleus of an organization for armed agitation under the pretext that
sane day, inevitable, a peoples war situation will exist in Quebec, or
that the program of the Parti Quebecois is not revolutionary enough.
The principal lesson of October 1970 is the following: the
authorities consider that they are threatened first and foremost, not by
the FLQ whose real importance they understand, but by the joint political
activity of the Parti Qu6becois, the labor unions and the citizens'
9~mittees, political activity which is basically radical because it
41ims objectively -- and with increasing awareness -- at the rupture
Of the colonial and imperialist relations from which the Anglo-Canadian
bourgeoisie, its American masters and the "ddbris of elites" who make up
the rickety French-speaking "business" bourgeoisie all profit to the
detriment of the development of the Quebec people, its economy, its
own institutions, its culture, its creativity, its freedom and its
dignity.
Now the regime in power portrays itself as a liberal democracy and
t,aa s surrounded itself with political and legal institutions which conform
the liberal ideology that the Anglo-Sazons value so highly (for them-
Ives, first of all). Therefore, it is with the greatest anxiety that
the regime observes the use which the Quebec separatists make of the
political instruments that the regime itself has forged....
How to oppose the "historic process" which, under the present
political system, the Parti Qu6becois and the forces which support
it have the legal right to accomplish by electoral means? Even though
4.n a democracy, the expression of separatist "ideas" is tolerated, can a
federal state, no matter how liberal, allow one of the members of the
federation to undertake separatist actions? Even if such a political
pocess were allegedly carried out by legal, democratic means? How to
avoid the dilemma already presented by the prospect of the accession to
power in Quebec of the separatist Parti Quebecois and, moreover, driven
to the wall by popular pressure (particularly that of the unions and the
itizens' cornittees) to undertake economic and social changes, as the
truggle for independence develops, in the words of Rend Lesveque, "in
he classic disorder of a social revolution?" [sic]
If the separatists, on the one side, hope to win political power
in Quebec, the Canadians, on their side, cannot resign themselves to
seeing Quebec free itself politically (and even less economically) from
their domination and proclaiming itself a sovereign people. Already,
even the possibility that the Parti Quebecois might soon succeed in
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this operation has .provoked a large-scale crisis throughout Canada.
Often in history, such basic antagonisms could be resolved only by
armed confrontation.
However, the reputation of being an "advanced democracy" which
Canada enjoys at home and abroad obliges its good federalist "democrats"
to use a bit more political finesse- than one would expect from a -
dictatorship of gorillas.
The federal government -- beyond any doubt -- seriously plans armed
intervention. However, what it needs in the present situation -- and
taking into account Anglo-Canadian views regarding civil liberties --
are pretexts, opportunities to intervene militarily in Quebec using
the expedient of an-all-out war against "terrorism."
The possibility of Canadian military intervention against a Quebec
which is attaining.its independence by the electoral process must be
clearly faced, without, however, forgetting the fact that for English
Canada such intervention would be extremely costly from the political
viewpoint. English Canada's objectives would be much better served
if an opportunity were provided (by an illegal group) to crush the
Parti Quebecois and the forces capable of reestablishing or replacing
it BEFORE this mass party had won the elections and achieved legitimacy
within the country, as well as abroad -- and has attained the authority
which would make it both.
1) The authentic and unchallengable spokesman of the people
of Quebec, with which the central authorities would have to negotiate
the forms of independence (negotiations which it would be in
Ottawa's interest to prolong, if its objective were, by paralyzing
such negotiations, to stimulate in Quebec a political and. social
climate which, in the eyes of English Canada would-justify the
"discovery" of an insurrection and the invoking of the famous
Law re emergency war measures); and
2) "the new social nerve structure," to use the expression of
Jean-Claude Leclere, of a proletarian nation which expects from
independence something more than a change of "cliques," - expects
nothing less than a basic transformation of the economic and social
structures and the development of new social relations.
Thus, for English Canada, for the central authorities, the objective
is to create a pretext for intervening against the separatist and
progressive forces in Quebec before the Parti Qu6becois has acquired
legitimacy through democratic elections and, if possible, before it
has acquired even that popular legitimacy which historically often
precedes the election, the ballot and the accession to power.
But will the central authorities bring about this confrontation which
will permit it to take the offensive?...
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There is no doubt that the authorities are making every possible
use of the "FLQ menace" to put its police and military shock troops on
a permanent war footing in order to restrict civil liberties and
increase the number of repressive laws. Since October 1970, the "FLQ
menace" has been the handiest political justification for bludgeonings
searches, spying, proclamations, anti-demonstration regulations,
emergency laws, large-scale army maneuvers across Quebec territory,
plot rumors, conspiracies, imaginary plans for selective assassinations,
fake political trials etc...
If, for one year, the "FLQ menace" has constituted the leitmotiv for
the public pronouncements of the "authorities," it is because the October
crisis showed them how much they had to gain from the brilliant feats of the
FLQ which were without strategic revolutionary significance, but which
ould be credibly represented as being part of a long-range offensive in
I genuine revolutionary armed struggle campaign, when in reality these
initiatives were nothing of the sort.
In these circumstances, every FLQ act, no matter how small or limited,
every communication bearing the FLQ seal, no matter how hair-brained,
every FLQ "message;" sham or real, acquires a political importance which
only helps those who use the permanent "FLQ menace" as additional pretexts
to bludgeon the liberation movement of the Quebec masses, while waiting
for one "major" opportunity which would furnish the pretest for marshalling
411 its resources in order to definitely break the back of the liberation
movement...
If, up to October 1970, FLQ armed agitation was the radical expression
of the spontaneous and anarchic character which every national liberation
movement experiences in the beginning, today it has become in fact, the
unconscious but objective ally of the repressive strategy of the regime,
and thus, far from constituting a tactical support for the struggle of
the Quebec people, stands to contribute to the crushing of that struggle
d to the liquidation of its momentum.
The intellectual conviction that armed confrontation is inevitable
,(even if founded on a serious analysis of the world situation) can IN NO WISE
'justify the recourse to armed agitation in the present situation as
modified by the October crisis. If ever in the past, it was warrented
as a means of calling attention to condtions of,domination and stimulating
a firm resolve to escape it, today armed agitation (as well as the non-
armed,agitation of those who confuse breaking a glass window with a
conscious, positive and mobilizing political act) is counter-revolutionary...
For these reasons, which are based neither on opportunism, sentimentality
nor even less on fear of action, but solely on an objective analysis of a
specific situation, one must not hesitate to state clearly and vigorously
that the FLQ ("symbol" of liberation more than the organization of
liberation, and guerrilla "myth" more than popular resistence), today no
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longer has any raison d'etre. And, for my part, having reached such
a conclusion, to be satisfied to break definitively with the FLQ and
withdraw from it every kind of support (including facile sympathy)
without publicly stating the well-founded reasons for my decision,
would be inexcusable.
The FLQ is outmoded because the situation has changed and because
armed agitation is not suitable to present conditions. However, the
struggle itself continues. Because this struggle must lead an entire
people to victory and not defeat, the responsibility and political
duty of FLQ members today is to put an end to FLQ activity in all its
forms, including verbal FLQ-ism and to continue the struggle in the
best interests of the Quebec people...
All that has gone into making popular heroes and myths of FLQ
members does not exempt them from self-criticism or from the responsibilities
inherent in all revolutionary activity. On the contrary, it demand it
of them to an even greater extent since the need is greater. They cannot
escape this high and urgent obligation except by renouncing their convictions
and ideals, and replacing them with. the illusion that they, are the sole
possessors of revolutionary truth.
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 LE
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ber 1971
"L'urgence de choisir"
~(GU[r~QO~OG~'L`L
,8s1
on
ruis dix ans, des formes de Iut
e, des instruments oreanisa
I pius en plus precise des object
(us politiques, economiques
,
sociaux et culturels, ainsi que
des bases de depart de cette
evolution, nous a conduits (...)
aux principales conclusions sus-
vantes:
I-i que dins la conjoncture
actuelle, compte tenu des condi-
tions objectives, la principale
force politique stratcgiquc de
la tulle de liberation est et ne
peut titre que le Parti quebe-
cots;
2'- que la creation d'un
dcuxicme parti de masse (ou-
vrier ou bien marxiste) he Tell-
version elre qu'un facteur de di-
version et de division au sein
des masses qucbccoises, et
du meme coup constituerait
in frein au developpement de
Ia title que les Quebecois li-
vrent de manicre inseparable,
done clobale, au plan dit "na-
tional' comme a celui dit "so-
cial" ;
3't que le "contenu" de I'in-
dependance se definit a la ba-
se (syndicats, comitfs de ei-
toens. qr anisations locales
du' P.Q., Jront de liberation
des femmes quebecoises, etc.)
et dolt s'mtegrer a I'action
polilique du Patti quebecois
(parti de masse) dont la com-
position est, en realitC la
meme que recouvre le "front
commun" des centrales syn-
dicates, dew comitfs;decitoyens
et des intellectuels progressis-,
tes.
Une division au plan politi-
sue. entre in parti prC:tendant
coiffer" cc front" dit so-
cial el le Parti qucb&ois
qu'on a trop tendance a redui-
re a un "front" purement "na-
tional" ou natinnaliste, consti-
iucrail on realite uric division
a l'intmricur dune meme tulle
U1
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
If I a,pfas,do
urdipffi, -
Vallieres annonce qu'd publiera bientot un essai, "L'ur-
gcnce de choisir", compose de quatre chapitres. Cest
Bans le 2e cbapitre, inhtul0 "Le F.L.Q. et Ics grandes
lerions d'octobre 1970', texte annexe a sa lettre, que
Vallic'res explique pourquoi Il rompt dt;finitivement avec
le Front de liberation du Quebec it lui retire tout appui,
exhortant les membres actoels do mouvement a revcnir
I faction dCmocratique. Void It texte Integral de cc
cbapitre.
Compte tenu de ces conclu- 6) la neccssite objective pour
lions. tin F.L.Q. csf-ii n&N- le ?a.,uc? La gdcstion nest pas la lutte larmce (ou guerre de
de savoir si le F.L.Q. possede guerilla) pour realiser ses? ob-
ou non, presentement, les lectifs politiques, economigties
moyens techniques de reali- et sociaux.
ser des actions comme celles Peut?on imaginer une silUa-
d'octobre 1970, mail de decider Lion intermediaire dans laquelle
at politiquement ces actions la lutte armee serait une for-
sont neccssaires aujourd'hul mule parmi d'autres et of la
au developpement de la lutte lutte electorate demeurerait
de liberation des Quebecois et prcdominante, en attendant
si tides seront necessaires yu a son tour la lutte armee
dans un avenir revisible. devienne he mode d'action po-
Pour repond're a cette ques- Iitique predominant? Certams
Lion, it convient d'abord de se revolutionnaires quebecois
demander si la situation actuel- imaginent ainsi la situation.
he est revolutionnaire et, par Its croient que le P.Q. et le F.-
consequent, si la lutte armed L.Q. doivent We complemen-
est justifies. Pour qu'une situa- sire I'un de 1'antre. 1P, save,it
tion soit revolutionnaire et pour bien que la situation save 1 t
que la lutte arml constitue nest revolutlonnal-
le mode de de lutte poli tiqucment ent pas encore
juste pour les masses it Taut re et que la lutte des masses
qu'existent les conditions ob- emprunte done le mode electo-
jectives suivantes: ral. D'autre part, ils constatent
t) I'incapacite absolue du que, menace de desingregra-
C ouvoir en place de satisfaire tton, le regime en place glisse
s aspirations et les reven- chaque jour davantage vers lei
dications populaires; . fascisme. II prevoient que, tot
2) la suppression des liber- ou tard, face a la menace que
ids civiles et democratiqques; representent ensemble he P.Q.
3) un Ctat rmanent de rd- les centrales syndicates et tes
pression et deecrise politique, comites de citoyens, les tenants
economique et sociale; actuels du pouvoir vont bloquer
4) ]'exacerbation d'antagonis- le processus electoral et ins-
mes ne pouvant se resoudre taurer au Quebec mine dictature
que dans et par un affronte- de tyyppee grec oil uruguayen..ils
ment arms; yyualifient to situation presente
5) l'impossibilite objective de re?revolutionnaire.
qu'une lutte de masse puisse Et, en effet, ('implication po-
s organiser et se developper' Iitique de I'agitation populaire
chances de succes de cette lutte dans le processus electoral et, comporte au~ourd'hui un enor-
et renforcerait, en definitive, par consequent, qu'un parti de me potential de rupture. Cela
frontements auxquels le pou-
voir, a tons ses paliers, oppo-
sera une repression de plus-en
9u e.
cois n'existait pas et s it ne
faisait.ptis l'effort de canaliser
vers un objectif precis (indN
pendance et transformation
en profondeur des structures.
economiques et sociales) capa-
ble de mobiliser I'inimense
majorite des Quebecois, la
contre-offensive aurait deja'
des consequences tragiques et
nefastes pour he dcveloppement
de la lutte de liberation (qul
est une lutte revolutionnaire) et
done pour 1'enscmble des tra-
vailleurs quebecois. Les ris-
ques de demobilisation genera-
le et d'un retour a la grande
noirceur seraient alors consi-
derables. Ce pourralt We une
vic!oire decisive pour he cola
nlsalisme canadlen et I'impe-
rialisme americain.
Cest pourquoi, de plus en
plus ouvertement, he pouvoir
recherche on affrontement
ui, espere-t-il, Iii fournira
1j occasion d'ccraser par la
force le peuple quebe cois en de-
truisant les organisations qu'il
s'est donnees pour s'affran-
chir: le P.Q., les centrales
syndicates; les comity de ci-
topens, etc. La crise d'octobre
1970 a fourni au pouvoir hoc-
casion dune "repetition gene.
rale" de ce scenario class: ue,
a in moment ou l'organisai on
qqui avait, par son action, di`
denche la crise ne j>ossedait
aucun moyen do soutenir une
offensive de longue duree con-
tre he pouvoir ni d'offrir au
peu le quebecois la strategic
et les acmes qui lui auraient
permis de resister a la repres-
sion et encore moins la me-
thode d'action revolutionnaire
qui lui aurait permis d'arri-
ver a ses fins: la conqucte du
pouvotr et la construction d'une
nouvelle sociCte.
N'cOt etel'action conjointe du
quebecois y per rail enormd. v i 1~'t - j - `" ~t or es progres-
menta t,nts Ics p~caafed Ft oWKWI@ e~'r9f9/ 5102 : CM IF s Q6ftt%M002 7bE Inges permanent
 - CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1
de reaction et de recul qu i Pot-
to toujours sur une socicc cn
transition" (Rene Levesque,
Le Devoir, 29 nov. 1971) se
serait concretise et le F.L.Q.
aurait eu a assumer devant
I'histoire I'odieuse responsabi-
lite d'avoir offert aux expplol-
tours du peuple queb6cois i'oe-
casion reuse de lui porter un
coup peut-titre fatal.
? L irreparable heurcusement
ne s'est pas produit, parce
quo lc pouvoir a etc pris par
surgrS?e, a roes trop & temps
a rea3Ir et n a vratment reus-
si a resoudre les contradictions
qui existent entre ses difterents
palters de decision et a I'inte-
rieur de chacun de ces paliers.
Mais la crise lui aura quand
meme fourni l'occaslon non scu-
lement de "faire peur an mon-
de" macs egalemcnt et surtout
de rcx.oudre cert.aines de ses
F ropres contradictions en rca-
sant, autour de I'Etat central,
l'union sacrec des exploitcurs
contre Ii population qucbccoise.
Si jamais to 17.1,.Q. dcvait
offrir an pouvoir une nouvelle
occasion de romulguer contre to Quebec lra Loi des mesn-
' res de guerres, loos Ics pa-
tios du pouvoir scraicnt, cette
lois hien prepares, alors que
to I' .L.Q., de son cote, ne
pourrait one tots de plus avoir
aucun controls sur is proses-
sus qu'il aurait dcclenche. 11
devratt, comme on octobre 1970,
s en remettre au P.Q. et aux
centrales syndicates du coin
de resister a la repression
ui s'excrccrait contre tous.
En somme, it condamnerait le
people a la defensive,'au repli
et a la pour. II avaliserait en
fait ce qu'il pre'tendrait com-
battre: la repression. Pire,
it condamnerait la population
cntiere a perdre touts forme
d'initiative, a subir passive-
ment la contre-attaque du
pouvoir et a dependre du bon,
vouloir des nutgritcs.
On no provoque pas an
nom du peuple I'armee du pou-
voir on place quand on ne pos-
sCde pas soi-meme une arniee
dans laquelle un peuple pout
se reconnaltre, s'rntegrer cons
ciemment et. par un combat
collectif, s'acheminer vers
la conquete du uvoir politi-
quc et la realisaipn de scs ob-
eclifs sociaux. Et pour qu'une
tells armce du peuple puisse
s'organiser, se developper
et vaincre, it taut d'abord que
to people ne puisse objective-
ment avoir d'autre choix que
de prendre ics armcs, qu'il
en At conscience, qu'il ait de-
vcleppe en son spin tine direc-
tion politique et militaire plei-
nement capable d'assumer la
lourde responsabilde histori-
Petsonne ne ppoeut solliciter
corrme un diplome qu'il se
donne a lui-memo la charge
d'etre 1'avant-garde d'un peuple
en voie de liberation. Person-
no surtout ne pout s'arrogcr to
droit, au nom de principes
theeoriqucs, d'engager tout un
peuple daps un affrontement
qui a toutes les chances de se
solder) pour les masses, par
une repression accrue, et pour
les forces revolutionnaires et
progressistes, par I'usure, si-
non I'Ecrascment total. Des ac-
tion3 comme celles d'octobre
1970 reduisent la lutte revolu-
tionnaire a one succession de
tactiques isolees, de coups d'e'-
clat 'circonstanciels", pries
de toute portee strategique. Sur
le plan oil elles se situent, ces
actions, meme si titles tirent
la population de sa torpeur,
compromettent a long terme
la sccurite ct la combativite
des secteurs les plus politises
de I i population et, par le fait
mi roe. de la nation tout entiere.
Cc n'cst pas parse qu'une
partie importante do la popula-
tion, jusqu'a maintenant, a sym-
rthise aver des actions du
L.Q., qu'cllc a a~puyc le
coolenu de son Manifeste d'oc-
tohre, qu'elle admire les pri-
sonnicrs politiqyues, etc., que
to F'.L.Q. constitue automati
qucment une alternative de
pouvoir pour les masses. Si Ics
masses confondent si facile-
ment les felquistes avec les
pcq~ istes, c'cst que pour elles
lell,
F'.L.Q. regroupe one "sec-
tion mdirsala d'im mm+v4mnpt
de liberation dont le principal
moteur derneure, pour elies, le
(, est to P.Q. qui, aux yeux
des masses quebecoises et aux
ycux aussi du present regime,
constitue ('alternative recite de
pouvoir. Cc ne sont ni les syn-
dicats, ni lei comites de ci-
toyms, ni to F.L.Q. Le F.L.Q.
est percu par le peuple comme
on groupe do shoe de la
luttt pour i'indcpendance et 1
socirlisme. Cette perception
subjctive du F.L.Q. est plus
prorhe de la vcrite que celle,
subective ells aussi, qu'ont
d'c x-memos ics feiquistes qui
so klinissent comme une ar-
mce de guerilla autour do la-
quelle se radicaliscraient les
autms forces ppoolitiques, syn- peuple s'en forge une a meme ble pour les partisans dune
dicalcs et sociales dans la tulle es efforts, les sacrifices, les veritable revolution sociale au
de liberation des Quebecois. erreurs, ley defaites, les ba- Quebec de sous-estimer ou,
Cette perception subjective et. tailles gagne~es ou perdues aux- pire, denier ce que to peuple
erronce de soi nest toutefois quels ii a du consentir pour Ia quebecois peut gagner ~rar la
pas commune a loos Ics fel decouvrir, la maitriser et l'ap- strategic definie par he I Q. et
quistes. Le Manifeste d'octo- pliquer jusqu'au bout. Et dans qui a permis, pour la
premie-re 1970, par exemple, donne ce domaine, Ics echecs eux- re fois au Quebec, a de tres
du F.L.Q. une definition qui cor? eridme s constit'ient des trem- larges secteurs de la popula-
respond a peu pre a la re- plms: souvent plus ennem'- tion de participer directement
presentation que les masses sants dexperience et de savoir a un processus visant a la
s'en font. De touter facons, it que certain succes trop tact- conquete du pouvoir et, par
diffi
t be
il
F
LQ
f
ti
ll
ti
1~'
en
e an
.
.
c
ve, i
que co
ec
en
lutte de masse all qui cette pra
ender a victor a a,- se
ne APO I ec~ F`on RelpYkAMp IA-I> R7~As0e1a11~49QE@( 100 'I'E'ldpF- mecantsmes,
tactigne a in vaste inouvement
de masse dont la force strate-
gique principale eat constituee
par le P.Q.
L'erreur subjective et politi-
que du F.L.Q., entretenue et
oultivee d'ailleurs par le pou-
voir et les medias d'rnlorma-
tion, eat de se croire one es-
pece de "foyer" revolution-
naire qui liberera le peuple
par la contagion de ses idees
et de ses actions, par la pro-
pagande spontanee de ses tacti-
ques, par l 'irradiation micro-
bienne de ses "cellules" sur
les tissus sociaux de la popu-
lation, tout cela par le simple
effet politico-magique de sa
violence, de son courage, de
sa generosite et de ses bonnes
intentions. Celle interpretation
biologique do Ii guerilla ur-
bainc confond no foymer panne
d'autres d' a itation sociale aver
one authentique guerilla qui,
dans une situation dctermmee,
est appelec a devenir he moteur
d'une guerre du peuple parce
.Witn y existe aucune autre
strategie de lutte ppoopulaire qui
puisse conduire les masses a
la realisation de leurs objectifs.
Au Quebec, it no fait aucun
doute que ('agitation armee
n'a rien a voir aver la lutte
armee qui est une lutte de mas-
se. Le F.L.Q. a fait de I'agi-
tation armee, it ne s'est Ja-
mais engage dans une lutte
armee parce qu'au Quebec la
lutte de masse pout emprunter
he processus electoral normal
et i'emprunte eflectivement.
Elie no pout emprunter a la fois
to rocessus electoral et celui
de Ia lutte armee, car la lutte
de masse ne saurait We bice-
phale et bistrategique sans se
nier elle-meme. Darts les
faits, lutte armce des masses
et lutte electorate des masses
ne peuvent done coexister. Les
masses ne peuvent s'integrer
en meme temps a dcux strate-
gies diflerentes comme A elles
vivaient simultanement deux
situations globales differentes.
Elles peuvent et meme doivent
changer de strategic politique
lors que la situation elle-me-
me a change et impose on
autre mode de lutte que celul
correspondant aux conditions
specifiques do Ial situation an-
(encure.
Unc strategic n'est jamais
donnce naturellement et chaquc
a ceux qui n'actordent de va-
Ieur revolutionnaire qu'a 1'ac-
tion politique armee -, em-
pruntc fe processus clrrfofAl
et continuera do I'empr ter
Cant et aussi longtemps que ce
processus lui apparaitra la
methods a suivrc ? la formule
a utiliser pour la prise du
pouvoir et la realisation de son
objectif prioritaire: I'inrlepen-
dance nationals et to; change-
ments economiques, sociaux et
culturels qu'elle attend do cette
indcpendance.
La lutte de masse nc s'enga-
gera dins on autre processus
quo si la situation est radica-
lement modifies par, disons,
la mise hors-la-loi du Parti
quebccois, l'etablissemcnt de
la censure. t'occu ation mili-
taire permanente. la repression
sans pitie des sync t---1 cats et
.de toules les forces d'opposi-
tion; bref, par la suppression
du processus a ectoral actuel
ou encore par une limitation
considerable de son lonction-
nemcnt"normal"'
Dans La guerre de guerilla:
une methode (1961) Che Gue-
vara soul' a qu'il tie faut
jamais exe ore a priori qu'un
cnangement rcvolutionnaire
dans une societc donna puisse
,commencer par on processus
electoral. Tint mieux, taut-il
ajouter, si ce changement pout
se realiser totalement par ce
processus. La lutte armce, on
tant que strategic revolution-
naire et mode d'action politi-
que de masse, no pout titre
amorcce ni so developper si
les masses croient pouvoir
realiser lours aspirations par
un processus electoral donne.
Le revolutionnaire est celui
qui pout trouver la stratcgie
et les tactiques adequates pour
la situation objective existante
et qui est capable do prevoir
cellos qui to scront lorsque
tel ou tel changement de la si-
tuation objective modificra.
radicalement to rapport des
forces on presence ct, du
meme coup, imposera aux mas-
ses de nouveaux modes d'ac-
tion, soil pour s'emparer du
pouvoir politique, soit pour d~
fendre cc qu'elles auraient de-
la conquis.,
Darts la situation actuclle, ce
serait one errcur impardonna-
Is-
 CPYRGHT
A pproved Forr. R~lease 199%jg9t02 : C'A Rp~P.79-01t194A0091~002t1(~001a-'~
t pa no e d to utili-
Ies implication 'Tes hmites, liberation ropulaire, u re (p rases ogiqucmen par-
en un mot, do prendre cons-
en
cience do la force et de la fai-
blessq do Icurs moyens d'ac-
?tion, le ('importance do lour
unite et do lour solidarite face
a cc qui les menace indistine-
tement et cherche a Ies divi-
ser,pour micux les dominer et
les 'exploiter.
Qt i nicra is bicn-fonde de
Leves-
('affir'mation de Rene Leves-
que suivant laqucile au Quebec
que lutte pour l'emancipation
nationale dolt se pours uivre
dans )e, desordre classique
dune revolution sociale" et
qu'en donsequcnce nous devons
trouvcr le moyen de mener de
front Ii lutte de liberation na-
?tionale let la lutte de libera-
tion soc .e "en n'oubliant pas
que sans la iiberte nationale
nous n'aprons m la maturite
ni les instruments qu'il taut
pour mener a bien aucune re-
novation sociale, economiqque
ou culturelle qui ne soit illu-
soire ou tronquee"? (Lc De-
voir, 9 nov. 1971)
Sit nest pas dans l'intcrd
do la majonte des Quebecois
que less centrals syndicalcs
mettent sur pied prsentcment
un dcuxibme party de masse
qui se distinguerait du P.Q.
par sa scale phraseologie et
qui, do plus, par son opposi-
tion au P.Q., constitucrait on
frcin a ('emancipation politi-
quo et sociale de la collectivite
quebecoise et au precessus
historique on cours, est-il
dans l'intcrct du people qucbe-
coi$ quo to F.LQ. poursuive
('action entreprise depuis 1963
et qui a servi do detonateur,
en octobre 1970, a la crise que
l'on sail?
Est-il dans i'interet du peu-
pie qucbecois quo ('agitation
armce du F.L.Q., telle qu'elle
a etc pratiquee au Quebec de-
puis huit ansi continue do s'af-
finner mythiquement comme
Wile armcc, alors qu'en rea-
lite dlc no possbde aucunc des
caraet:eristiques fondanienta-
les d't ne veritable lutte armec
ct q0 les conditions objecti-
ves nC permetlint pas et n'cxi-
gent 'pas le dCveloppement
dune idle lutte dans la con-
Joncture actuellc?
II faut reporldre par un non
catcgorique.
Meme si Ies ohjectifs poll-
tiqucs, Ceonomiques cl sociaux
poursuivis par to F.L.Q. s'ap-
puient stir les aspirations rccl-
Ies des Quebecois, son action
fat toujours plus ou moins
spontance, pcriodi ue, cir-
conslancielle. A part son ca
-tr,re violent, pen no la
uisungue poliliquement do l'a-
'
autres
gitation provoquce par d
grouper d exploits et de colo-
nises en colbre: Mouvement de
ment de liberation du taxi, Li- land.
We pour )'integration scolaire, La grande lecon d'octobre
assemblement ur I'inde- 1970 est la suivante: le
you
pendance nationale (dans ses voir so sent ct se salt d'abord
annees d'apprentissage)? et principalement menace,
Cette agitation a eu son uti- non par to F.L.Q. dont it con-
10. Elle a permis de sensi- nait 1'importance reclle, mais
biliser et de politiser on nom- par la pratiquc politique con-
bre sans cesse croissant de vergente du Parts quebecols,
Quebecois. Elie a surtout per- des centrals-, syndicates et
mis ('emergence d'un mouve- des corttites de citoyens, pra-
ment de masses structure, le tique politique au depart ra-
Parti quebecois. tout en favo- dicale puisqu'elle vise objec-
risant Ia radicalisation des tivement - et de plus en pplus
syndicats. En fait, de la con- consciemment - I'eclate-
frontation permanente de lut- ment des rapports coloniaux
tes sociales et de crises poli- et imperialistes dont profitent
tiques au Quebec, depuis use la bourgeoisie anglocanadien-
dizaine d'anne'es, n a surgi ne, ses maitres americans et
qu'une forme d'action polio- Is "debris d'elites" qui com-
que coherente, qu'une alterna- posent la rachitique bourgeoi-
live redle do pouvoir pour les sie "d'affaires" francophone,
"negres blancs" guebecors: au detriment du developpe-
et c'est le Parti quebecois. ment de la societe quebecoise,
Que cc parti soit imparfait, de son economic, de ses insti-
personne no le niera. Mats que tutions proppres, de sa culture
cc parti vienne a disparaltre de sa creativite-, de sa liberty
avant d'avoir etc au bout de et de sa dignite.
son action et d'avoir epuise le mouvement independan-
toutcs Is possibililes que lui ,tiste, qui est on memo temps
off re inrnntestahlement enco=
re la democratic en place (si mouvement de liberation so-
malade soil-clle), et 11 est ciale, releve clairement d'une
certain qu'alors taut d'efforts volonle collective de struc-
deploycs depuis dix ans, dans turation d'un Etat quebecois
les milictix?les plus (livers, se fibre politiquement et d'une
perdraicnt pour bn temps economic quebecoise radica-
dans to dcfaitisme, la iassitu- lement transformee. Expres-
do et to decouragement, stir- sion consciente de I'ensem-
tout si eette disparition pre- ble complexe des' antagonjs-
maturec et catastrophique de- mss on endre's par la situa-
vait We provoquee (cons- lion glnhale do domination de
ciemment ou non, peu impor- la nation quebecoise par 1'im-
te) par des qucrelles ideologi perialisme, le colonialisme et
cues s'appuyant davantage sur to capitalisme, cc mouvement
des theories issues dune eru- do liberation nationale menace
dition livresquc (faisant pea directement les assises poli-
do place a ('etude do l'histoi- Glues et economiqacs de nos'
concrete, toujduneours remise "debris d'elites" et surtout
ise a
jour, dune situation concrete Is intercts economiques et
en pcrpctucrlc evolution. Les politiques de (eux qu'ils (prin-
conscouences en seraient en- eipal(ment les Liberaux) re-
core plus dramatiques si le presentent aux divers palters
P.Q. devait etre ecrase ou de gouvernement. L'affirma-
seulement paralyse par une Lion la plus coherente, la plus
repression sauvage dont I'oc- strurt'Ir'? pnlitiqucmcnt, de
casion nu'ie pretexte serail un Viii roi,cctivc de Ii-
coup d'ictat du F.L.Q. beration :t