CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES APRIL 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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April 1972
POLITICAL PERSECUTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
"In the fall of 1971 and at the beginning of this
year, workers of the Interior Ministry arrested certain
disseminators and producers of anti-state leaflets and
other materials of the same nature .... The seized documents
indicate that these Czechoslovak citizens strove in the
period of 1970 and 1971 to create illegal anti-state
groups .... They organized these activities in combination
with emigres and foreign enemy centers.... Subjects of
foreign states also participated in this criminal
activity........."
Prague Television, 11 January 1972
Although rumors of detentions and police interrogations of
certain individuals in Czechoslovakia filtered to the West during
the last months of 1971, this was the first official admission by
the Prague regime that a new wave of arrests was under way.
The harsh facts of these arrests, which took place in late
1971 and in January 1972, are well known by now and are receiving
considerable publicity in Western Europe. About 200 individuals,
most of whom held positions of some influence during the liberal-
ization process of 1968, are involved. The highest ranking of
these are Milan Huebl, former Rector of the Higher Party College
and co-author of Alexander Dubcek's Action Program of April 1968,
and Jaroslav Sabata, former Secretary of the Party organization in
Brno. Both were elected members of the Central Committee at the
"clandestine" Party Congress convoked 48 hours after the Soviet
invasion. According to press reports, Huebl is accused of involve-
ment in the distribution of samizdat materials in Prague and
Czech Lands, while Sabata is said to have mobilized his entire
family (two sons, a daughter and other 'relatives) to conduct a
wide-spread campaign throughout the province of Moravia against
the national elections of last November.
International flavor was added to the affair through regime
charges of foreign involvement, and the arrest on 5 January of
one Italian newsman, Valerio Ochetto, and the summary expulsion
of two others. This resulted in a surprisingly strong and indignant
protest action in Italy, which included critical editorials in
the principal organs of the Italian Communist Party. Possibly
under the influence of this pressure, the Czechoslovak Press
Agency officially announced on 17 February that Ochetto had been
expelled from Czechoslovakia. The decision to resolve the
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irksome Ochetto case through mere expulsion suggests that the
Husak regime is still sensitive -- at least to some degree --
to criticism from abroad, especially when levied by a "fraternal"
party.
It remains to be seen how the regime will. react to the growing
storm of protest its actions have evoked elsewhere in Europe,
notably among the French left, particularly on the part of
prominent, former French Communists. Some of the public statements
made by the French left on the political arrests are contained in
the attachments. Most prominent is the half-page protest printed
in Le Monde of 5-6 March, signed by 144 leftist intellectuals,
mostly French, including socialists and dissident and orthodox
Communists. Among the more prominent signatories are philosopher
and writer Jean Paul Sartre, former Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign
Minister and author of the book The Confession Arthur London, former
French Communist Party (PCF) Politburo member and theoretician
Roger Garaudy, author Simone de Beauvoir, and the Greek composer
Mikis Theodorakis. Additional signatures are coming in despite
the PCF's demand that its members disavow their signatures.
Roger Garaudy,* writing in the large circulation, independent
daily France Soir, exposes the absurdity of the Czech regime's
claim that there are no political trials going on in Czechoslovakia.
Another PCF expellee, Paul Noirot, expressed his views in his
own Communist dissident weekly, Politique Hebdo. At the same time,
he published excerpts from a letter written by -the above-
mentioned Milan Huebl to his former comrade-in-arms, Gustav Husak,
warning about the incalculable consequences of starting political
trials. Huebl wrote the letter last October and sent a copy abroad
to be published in the event of his arrest. (Attached is a trans-
lation of the whole letter, which was published in the Italian
newspaper L'Espresso.)
On the French left only the PCF sees nothing wrong in Czecho-
slovakia. The French Socialist Party has urged the PCF to join it
in a common protest against the political repressions but with no
success. In fact, a delegation sent to Czechoslovakia by the PCF
to seek assurances from Husak that political trials would not be
held, returned to Paris with the expected whitewash and denials of
political repression, but the exchange between socialists and
Communists is continuing.
The question arises as to why the Prague regime, having
repeatedly proclaimed the completion of consolidation and defeat
of the right wing, embarked at this particular point in time on
*Garaudy was expelled from the Party in 1970 for his persistent
criticism of the Soviet system of Socialism.
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large-scale arrests and trials of known and generally respected
supporters of Dubcek.
Soviet and Czechoslovak paranoid concern with criticism at
home and abroad is well known and amply documented. The year
1968 taught Prague and the Kremlin a lesson they are unlikely to
treat lightly again. Husak knows and has admitted publicly that
"despite the election results, it must not be assumed that 99%
of the people are with us." Probably-more than some of his
colleagues, Husak is aware of public sentiment and of the fact
that he is presiding over a brooding and even hostile nation.
Being unwilling or unable to initiate meaningful steps toward
national reconciliation, Husak can only silence potential
opposition leaders and thus intimidate and neutralize large
numbers of less determined individuals who might be willing to
follow someone else's lead but are not themselves strong enough
to take the initiative. Given this national impasse, the price
of adverse publicity abroad and more intense hostility at home
must be paid as the lesser of two evils. Husak has no other
alternatives given the inexorable reality within most ruling
Communist Parties that those who have been publicly accused of
serious transgressions against existing Party statutes must be
punished, lest Party discipline among the rank-and-file suffer.
Since ridiculing the opposition one day and charging it with
heinous plotting the next is obviously not impressing the
skeptical and politically mature Czech and Slovak man in the
street, the regime must _ as in the past- manufacture intricate
and ominous ties between the domestic opposition and "powerful
international enemy centers abroad." Consequently, visits to
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and since then by Western journalists,
academic personalties, etc,, have been and continue to be
presented as "espionage trips" and subversion. The press, radio
and television tediously repeat fantastic tales of "an invasion
by the Green Berets," the presence in 1968 of "American tanks"
(which incidentally were rented in Austria for a film dealing
with WW 1I), attack purely scholarly meetings in the West, such
as the Reading Seminar in England, and put the imperialist brand
on even such apolitical organizations as the PEN Club and Amnesty
International by calling them tools of Western espionage, Need-
less to say, activities of Czechoslovak emigres -- old and new --
are magnified out of all proportion and every activist among
them is accused of working for at least one Western intelligence
service.
As ludicrous as this may seem to the average Westerner, to
Prague -- as apparently to Moscow -- it is a deadly serious matter,
and Prague's exaggerated concern throws some light on that govern-
ment's defensive and nervous posture Apart from the above, the
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decision to crack down on Czechoslovak dissidents may well be a
logical consequence of the recent Soviet wave of arrests of
dissidents in Moscow and the Ukraine. Given Czechoslovakia's
semi-colonial status since 1968, it is unlikely that Husak would
take any major step without full coordination with Moscow.
Finally, this may all be part of an overall Soviet Bloc tightening
of security at home which, as many analysts have predicted, would
accompany the Soviet detente campaign vis-a-vis the West.
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 CPYRGHT
LE MiJ DE, Paris Approved For Release 199(R93)41:e2IA-RDP79-01194A000200190001; 4
..
5-6 March 1972 LES SIGNATAIRES DE L'APPEL ONT SOUSCRIT E N S E M B L E LE PRIX ' CET
ANNONCE Q J LE 410,4NDE A BIEN VOULU i EUR ACCO RDER AU TARIF PU LICITAIRE
g r , 711
omme au temps de a l'Aveu? - reputees criminelles de Prague a Bratislava ?
Si vous nous y aidez, nou!
Pour soustraire leur honneur et leur vie aux persecutions qui les mena-
Des hommes et des femmes sont suspectes, surveilles, poursuivis, empri- cent et les trappent, nous retusons de les laisser prendre au piege du silence,
onnes, fetes au secret des prisons d'Itat parce qu'ils symbolisent 1'espoir d'un de notre silence.
F
d
'
li
audrait-il - sous pretexte
e n
a
menter aucune campagne - accep-
euple qui, malgre les rigueurs de l'occupation et de la police, ne consent pas
ter de se taire? Certains le penseront sans doute. tilais beaucoup d'autres
t
--
Quelques-uns parmi nous ont rencontre certains de ces hommes et de ces "` - "`"e I? "- ""' ""` "`
notre solidarite ouvertement expritnee.
emmes, et les connaissent bien. Nous ui par millers signons et signerons cet Appel et contribuerons
Nous les admirons d'avoir decide, it y a trois ans, de continuer au coude a interdire le silence sur le sort des victimes de la repression, notamment par
coude avec leur peuple le combat pour le socialisme et prefere cc risque auX la voie de tels communiques, les placerons sous 1a seule sauvegarde qui leur
olitudes de 1'exil. reste : la notre.
LES PREMIERS SIGNATAIRES
Maurice AGULHON Rene DAZY
Dr Lean HEPNER Pier
re NAVILLE
Helene SAMAN-MARKOVITCH
Pierre ALEKAN Marcel DEGLIAME-FOUCHE
Joris IVENS Fern
and NICOLON
Dr Michel SAPIR
Francois ALQUIER Charlotte DELBO
Raymond JEAN Hen
ri NOGUERES
Jean-Paul SARTRE
Daniel ANSELME Dr Pout OENAIS
Serge JONAS Paul
NOIROT
Pierre SCHAEFFER
Claude AVELINE Serge DEPAQUIT
Ernest KAHANE The
odoros PANGALOS
Laurent SCHWARTZ
Yves BAREL Genevieve DEROIN
Maurice KRIEGEL-VALRIMONT Jacq
ues PANIGEL
Gerard de SEDE
Simone de BEAUVOIR Maurice DODE
Julia KRISTEVA Rog
er PANN"UIN
Jorge SEMPRUN
Loleh BELON Jean-Marie DOMENACH
Guy LECLERC Hele
ne PARMELIN
Robert SIMON
Jean BENARD Maurice DOMMANGET
Victor LEDUC Ann
e PHILIPE
Philippe SOLLERS
Dr Norbert BEN SAID Jacques DUPIN
Henri LEFEBVRE Jean
PICART LE DOUX
Albert SOBOUL
Gilbert BERGER Colette DURAND
Germaine LE GUILLANT Edou
ard PIGNON
Gilbert SOUCHAL
Jean BERNARD Marguerite DURAS
Michel LEIRIS Gail
lard POL
Pierre TERUEL-MANIA
Ginette BERNARD-POMPIGNAT Dominique ELUARD
Daniel LELONG Jean
PRONTEAU
Mikis rHEODORAKIS
Janine BOUISSOUNOUSE Claude FAUX
Albert-Paul LENTIN Mad
eleine REBERIOUX
Laurence THIBAUT
Alphonse BOULOUX Victor FAY
Artur LONDON 'Paul
REBEYROLLES
Rene THUILLIER
Claude BOURDET M' Jean-Jacques de FELICE
Francoise LONDON-DAIX And
re REGNIER
Janine TILLARD
Dr Andre BOURGUIGNON Marc FERRO
Serge MALLET Hen
ri-Francois REY
Charles TILLON
Roger BOUSSINOT Vera FEYDER
Robert MADROU Mic
hele REY
Raymonde TILLON
Jean BOUVIER Michel FOUCAULT
Jacqueline MARCHAND Loui
s RIGAUDIAS
Jacqueline VERNES
Robert BRECY Roger GARAUDY
Gilles MARTINET Hen
ri ROBERT
Aline VELLAY
Jeanne BRUNSCHWIG Pierre GEORGES
Jean MASSIN Suza
nne ROBERT
Dr Pierre VELLAY
Dr Jacques CARON M' Christiane GILLMANN
M' Leo MATARASSO Phili
ppe ROBRIEUX
Monique VIAL
Jean CASSOU Roger GODEMAN
Henriette MATHIEU Max
ime RODINSON
Paul VIEILLE
Jean CHAINTRON Andre GORZ
MATTA Dr R
odolphe ROLLENS
Louis de VILLEFOSSE
Nicole CHATEL Andre GRANOU
Daniel MAYER
Jean-Marie VINCENT
Maurice CLAVEL Daniel GUERIN
Michele MOGUY Jean
ROSTAND
Olga WORMSER-MIGOT
Michel COQUERY Jean-Claude GUERIN
Claude MORGAN Clau
de ROY
Boris YANKEL
Jacques COURTOIS M' Gisele HALIMI
Edgar MORIN Mad
eleine SAINT-SAENS
Vladimir YANKELEVITCH
Anne CREMIEUX Jean-Pierre HAMMER
Pierre-Vidal NAQUET Mar
c SAINT-SAENS
Alain ZARUDIANSKY
Celles et ceux qui veulent se solirlariser moralement et materielle-
ment avec cette initiative doivent ecrire a :
Apptoved F__F Imaw$?, I~. ,u et7o -4 ~1429URDIR p1-4
 CPYRGHT
LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 March 1972
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(Advertisement)
CPYRGHT
The signers of this appeal have together paid for this announce-
ment, for which Le Monde granted them the'conmercial rate.
Will revolutionary fidelity and national pride be
gain -- as in the days of 'The Confession" -- reputed
being criminal in Prague and Bratislava?
Men and women are being suspected, kept under
urveillance, prosecuted, jailed, thrown into the
epths of state prisons, because they symbolize the
lope of a people which, despite the rigors of
ccupation and police, does not consent to disavow them.
Some of us have met these men and these women
d know them well.
We admire them for having decided, three years
go, to continue, shoulder-to-shoulder with their
eople, the struggle for socialism, and to prefer
his risk to the solitudes of exile.
For the Victims of Repression in Czechoslovak a
If you help us, we shall not let them be either
sullied or broken.
We refuse to let them be trapped into silence, our
silence, to save their honour and their life from the
persecutions that are threatening them and are striking
them.
Is it necessary to accept silence -- under the pretext
of not contributing to some campaign? Some, no doubt,
think so. But many others will say with us that their
own freedom and, for many among them, their ideals, depend
on our solidarity openly expressed.
We, who by the thousands sign and will sign this
appeal and contribute to banning silence about the fate of
the victims of repression, place them under the only safe-
guard that still remains to them: ours.
The First Signatures
[Signatures]
Those who wish to express their moral and material
solidarity with this initiative should write to:
Mme Genevieve DEROIN, 7, rue Victor-Hugo (92) Colombes
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PARIS-MATCH, Paris
26 February 1972
CQ i M1 ISTS AGAIN TORN BY EVENTS IN PRAGUE
Since the start of the year, a new wave of
arrests has been building up in Czechoslova-
kia, despite solemn commitments made by its
rulers to brother communist parties. Raymond
Tournoux tells us about the hidden crisis
precipitated by these arrests within the
French CP and throughout the political left.
The communist party brandishes the tax returns of its
elected office-holders. Through Mr Jacques Duclos, it is calling
for publication of "cabinet members' fortunes." The offensive
falls well within the boundaries of the stardard rules of poli-
tical warfare. And yet, even while this is going on, the CP is
covering up the inner tragedy, the secret tragedy that deeply
troubles many of its members and a number of its leaders. Toward
the outside world, its law of silence is still ironclad. In all
the shouting of the headlines, the tragedy has got lost. Let us
have a look at some of its important acts.
At the beginning of this month of February, a new wave of
arrests swept over Czechoslovakia. It came in the wake of pres-
sure applied to intellectuals who,,in the view of the present
authorities, were a bit too much in evidence during the "Prague
Springtime." Among the people recently jailed were a philosopher,
.a historian, a scientist, and a journalist. A month earlier the
police had picked up, among others, Mr Milan Huebl, former rector
of the Czech CP's Ecole Superieure, Mr Ludeck Pachman, former
chess champion, Karel Kyncl, journalist, Jan Sling, son of Otto
Sling, a party dignitary who was executed in 1952 at the same time
as Rudolf Slansky, the secretary-general, and ten other leading
party lights. What is it they are supposed to have done? What
are the trumped-up charges against them? They allegedly formed
small groups working "against the state" with the help of emigre
associations and "hostile foreign organizations." Some of these
men, but only a few, have apparently been freed since their arrest.
Events follow one another relentlessly. On 2 February,
Mr Jiri Lederer, who had been arrested in the pre-dawn hours of 31
January, without his family's being able to find out the reason
for his arrest, was sentenced to 2 years in prison. Why? Because
in May 1968, he had written an article for Literarn Listy -- then
the organ of the Czech Writers' Union -- critical of Mr GZTmulka.
The court called it "defamation of an allied state."
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Suddenly -- quite by chance, his friends said at first --
Mr Roland Leroy, member of the Chamber of Deputies, secretary of
the Central Committee of the French CP, set off for Prague. With
him went Mr Paul Courtieu, a member of the CC. In 1968 an emis-
sary from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had come to Paris
to pledge his party's solemn word that no prosecutions would be
opened against those who had taken part in the "Prague Springtime."
What has become of those promises, once so freely and prodigally
given?
On the left, Mr Francois Mitterand takes pen in hand in
the first issue of L'Unite, the infant socialist party weekly.
He writes about the repression that scourges those Czechoslovak
communists "guilty of thinking differently from Mr Gustav Husak,
secretary general of the CP." He writes:
"Here we are back in Prague again, and in its springtime
that knew no summer. What to do? Each of us has the inner for-
titude to bear another's sufferings. Are we to leave them utterly
defenseless, these muzzled men guilty of having dreamed of a
socialism out of joint with the times in their own country?"
The fact is that another very grave matter, born of events
in Czechoslovakia, is smouldering inside the French CP. On 12
February, the communist party felt called upon to restate its po-
sition in an absolutely extraordinary statement which appeared
on page 3 of Humanite. It does its best to start its own diver-
sionary maneuver:
"Trying to cope with the grave difficulties which the crisis
in French society has created for it, a crisis for which it must
bear the whole responsibility, the big bourgeoisie now seeks to
launch a new anti-communist campaign..."
The CP makes two points:
1. It states that it stands by its 19th Congress position,
namely "its disagreement with the military intervention in Czecho-
slovakia [which occurred on] 21 August 196$."
2. It expresses satisfaction "with the statements of the
secretary general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the
effect that there will be no prefabricated political trials."
Yet at the very same time, Rinascita, the official weekly
of the Italian Communist Party, deplores such subterfuge. It
goes a great deal further under the headline "Grave news from
Prague." It cites the several phases of a kind of liquidation
still going on, the elimination of leaders, purges in the party,
in the labor unions, in the professional organizations, at the
university, among intellectuals, and in the press. And it wonders
aloud whether the arrests made over these past few weeks are not
actually tantamount to abandonment of a solemn commitment not to
engage in repression and not to mount [show] trials.
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Touching Italian Appeal
It concludes in moving terms:
"The news reaching us from Prague is grave. We cry out to
the Czechoslovak communists, to the international worker movement,
to all who aspire to the free, just world of socialism. We speak
as communists, as internationalists, as revolutionaries, as those
who are most deeply wounded by what is happening in.Prague."
Several Italian newsmen have been arrested and expelled
from Czechoslovakia, among them Ferdinando Zidar of Unita, Italy's
equivalent of Humanite.
On 18 February another communique from the French CP's
'political bureau: 1. It admits that Roland Leroy went on a mis-
sion to Prague; 2. It officially notes the assurances from Ian
Husak that there would be "no prosecutions, no arrests for poli-
tical acts dating back to 1968."
So? Still according to the political bureau, Husak said:
" A preliminary investigation was recently begun into the
constitution of an illegal conspiracy network.... Most of the
persons arrested for questioning have been released." In other
words, they are arresting people in Prague.
And so in Paris the CP suars through its hidden tragedy,
whose origins date back to 26 August 1968. That was the day
Waldeck Rochet took to radio and TV to make his historic statement
to Robert Boulay:
"We were painfully surprised to learn, on the night of 21
August, of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. I shall
not hide the fact that there is some bitterness and even anguish
in our realization that there is grave disagreement between us
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the matter of
this military intervention in Czechoslovakia...."
Waldeck-Rochet was just back from a flying trip to Russia.
He had failed in his efforts at the Kremlin to prevent the order
to move against Czechoslovakia from being given to the Russian
troops. His pleading as a child of the people, like his ideolo-
gical arguments, were swept away before the icy determination of
the general staff and by the steel-clad arguments of strategy.
Today, somewhere in a villa outside Paris, Waldeck Rochet,
;secretary general of the communist party, comrade of Maurice
Thorez, scales the tragic hill of an endless Calvary. He has
become invisible in an inaccessible hideaway. For 3 years this
deeply sincere party man has failed to recover, intellectually
or physically, from the blow of Prague. He is still too deep in
soul-shock, this man who had tried to lead the CP out of the
ghetto and into what he hoped would be the irreversible way of
leftist unity, this man whc3 had committed his word and his honor
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 in the debate over the eac 1 p sq~ o res ect
forAW9yRAF8C ~1-4He
wanders in a world of ghosts and nightmares. He is lost in a
Kafka universe. His soul runs in search of a lost dream, still
seeking a Church that is gone forever.
PARIS-MATCH., Paris
26 February 1972
CPYRGHT,
i)cpuis IC dCI)Ut (IC I'anncc, UI1C nouvelle Vatiuc (I'arrestations sCVit en `'chccoslovaquie,
au nlcprls (ICs engagements pris par ICS rrouvcrnants a I'ct and des P.C. frcres.
Raymond Totiri1OLIX 11OUs racontc la crisc cachcc provo Ll6c par CCS arrestations
au SCltl (Ill P.C. fral14a15 Ct (I(' 1-0 11tt, In S).'
Le parti communiste agite
les feuilles d'impot de ses
elus. Par la bouche de
M. Jacques Duclos, it re'-
clame la publication de
- la fortune des minis-
tres r. L'offensive entre
dans les regies classi-
ques de la guerre politi-
que... Pourtant, dans le
meme temps, le P.c. dis-
simule le drame intime, le
drame secret qui an-
goisse beaucoup de ses
militants et nombre de
ses dirigeants. A regard
de I'exterieur, sa loi du
silence reste implacable.
Dans le feu de l'actualite, le
drame est passe inapergu. 11
convient d'en reconstituer les
actes principaux.
Au debut de ce mois de fevrier,
uhe nouvelle vague d'arresta-
tions est operee en Tchecoslo-
vaquie. Elie survient apres la
mise sous les verroux d'intel-
lectuels qui, au gre des auto-
rites en place, s'etaient trop
manifestos lors du - prin-
temps de Prague ?. Parmi les
personnes recemment incarce-
philosophe, un historien, un
scientifique, un journaliste. Un
mois auparavant, avaient deja
ete arretes, entre autres, MM.
Milan Huebl, ancien recteur de
I'Ecole superieure du P.c.
tcheque, Ludek ?Pachman, an-
cien champion d'echecs, Karel
Kyncl, journaliste, Jan Sling,
fils d'Otto Sling,. dignitaire du
parti qui, en 1952, fut execute
en meme temps que Rudolf
Slansky, secretaire general, et
dix autres .personnalites. Quels
reproches ou quelles char-
ges falla.cieuses les accablent
donc ? Avoir voulu constituer
de petits groupes agissant
- contre I'Etat - avec ('aide
d'associations d'emigres et
. d'organisations etrangeres
hostiles ?. Quelques-uns de
ces hommes - mais quelques-
uns seulement - paraissent
avoir ete remis en liberte.
Les faits se succedent, impi-
toyables. Le 2 fevrier, M. Jiri
Lederer, arrete I'avant-veille
au petit matin sans que sa fa-
Mille ait pu apprendre les mo-
tifs de l'interpellation, s'entend
condamner a deux ans de pri-
son. Pourquoi ? Parce que, en
mai 1968, dans Literarni Listy
- alors organe de ('Union des
sanctionne : ? Diffamation d'un
Etat allie. ?
LES HOMMES
BAILLONNES
Soudain - un hasard, affir-
ment tout d'abord ses amis' --
M. Roland Leroy, depute, se-
cretaire du comite central du
parti communiste frangais, part
pour Prague, accompagne de
M. Paul Courtieu, membre du
comite central. En 1968, un
emissaire du parts communiste
de Tchecoslovaquie etait venu,
a Paris, donner ('assurance so-
lennelle qu'aucun proces ne
serait ouvert contre les partici-
pants au - printemps de Pra-
gue -. Qu'en est-il done des
promesses prodiguees nagua-
re ?
A gauche, M. Francois Mitter-
rand prend Ia plume clans le
premier numero de - ('Unite ?,
hebdomadaire du parti socia-
liste. II evoque la repression
qui s'abat sur les communistes
tchecoslovaques, - coupables
de Denser autrement que
M. Gustav Husak, secretaire'
general du P.c. ?. II ocrit :
- Nous voilfi ramenes a Pre-
roes. figurent notamment un a rivains -, ii avast critique que, et a son printemps sans
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tous assez de force pour sup-
porter les maux d'autrui. Lais-
r~c Hans defense ces
rnrii mss`' baillonnes, , coupables
d'avoir reve a un socialisme
inactuel par les temps qui cou-
rent dans ce pays qui est le
leur 7
En realite, une nouvelle et se-
rieuse affaire, nee des evene-
ments de Tchecoslovaquie,
couve a I'interieur du P.c. Le
12 fevrier, le parti communiste
estime necessaire de rappeler,
sa position -par une declaration
tout a fait inhabituelle, que
I'on trouve en troisi6me -page
de - I'Humanite w. II s'efforce,
P son tour, de provoquer une
manoeuvre de diversion :
Aux prises avec les graves
tiifficultes que lui cree la crise
de la societe francaise, crise
dont elle porte 1'entiere res-
ponsabilite, la grande bour-
geoisie cherche a relancer la
campagne anticommuniste...
Le P.c. precise deux points
1" II affirme s'en tenir a sa po-
sition du XIX^ Congres, a sa-
voir - son desaccord avec ('in-
tervention militaire du 21 aout
1968 en Tchecoslovaquie ..
2" 11 se felicite - des declara-
eons du secretaire general du
parti communiste de Tcheco-
Plovaquie, selon lesquelles it
n'y aurait pas de proces ~poli-
tiques prefabriques
Mans le meme moment cepen-
dant, - Rinascita -, I'hebdoma-
daire official du parti commu-
niste Italien, regrette les faux-
fuyants. 11 va beaucoup plus-
loin, sous le titre : - De graves
nouvelles de Prague -. II men-
tionne, pour sa part, les diffe-
rentes phases d'une sorte de
liquidation en cours, ('elimina-
tion des responsables, les
purges dans le parti, les
syndicats, les organisations
professionnelles, l'Universite,
les intellectuels, la presse. Et
it se demande sans ambages si
les arrestations effectuees du-
rant ces dernieres semaines ne
sont pas, en effet, ('abandon
d'un engagement : celui de ne
pas se livrer a la repression et
de no pas ouvrir des proci's.
v ie..
APPEL PATHETIQUE aldeck Rochet revenait d'un
II conclut en termes patheti-
ques : - Les nouvelles qui
nous parviennent de Prague
sont graves. Nous nous adres-
sons aux communistes tcheco-
slovaques, au mouvement ou-
vrier international, a tous ceux
qui aspirent au monde libre et
juste du socialisme. Nous par-
Ions en communistes, en inter-
nationalistes, en revolutionnai-
res, les premiers qui sont
blesses par ce qui see passe a
Prague. r
Des journalistes italiens son'
arretes ou expulses, dont 'Fer-
dinando Zidar, de - l'Unita
('equivalent de - I'Humanite
Le 18 fevrier, nouveau commu-
nique du bureau politique du
parti communiste frangais : 1)
i' reconna:t que Roland Leroy
s'est rendu en mission a Pra-
gue ; .2) it prend acte des as-
surances donnees par Jan
Husak : ? aucun proces, au-
cune arrestation pour des faits
politiques remontant a 1968 ^.
Alors ? Toujours selon le bu-
reau politique, Husak a decla-
re une instruction a ete
recemment ouverte sur la cons-
titution d'un reseau illegal de
conspiration... le plus grand
nombre des personnes inter-
pellees et interrogees ont ete
relachees Autrement dit, on
arrete a Prague.
'Ainsi a Paris, le P.c. vit son
drame cache dont l'origine re-
monte au 26 aoGt 1968. Ce jcur-
la, devant le micro de R.t.l.,
Waldeck Rochet faisait a Ro-
bert Boulay une declaration
historique :
? Nous avons ete douloureu
sement surpris en apprenant
dans la nuit du 21 au 22 aoiit
('intervention militaire en Tche
coslovaquie. Je ne cacherai pa
que ce n'est pas sans amer
tume et un certain dechire
ment que nous constaton
notre grave desaccord avec I
parti corrrmuniste de I'Unio
sovietique au sujet de I'inte
vention militaire en Tchecosl
oyage-eclair a Moscou. II
vait echoue dans sa tentative
n vue d'empecher, au Krem-
n, que solt donne l'ordre d
arche des forces russes. Se
djurations de fits du peuple
es arguments ideologique
vaient ete balayes par la froi
ajors, par les argument
ans appel de la strategie.
ujourd'hui, quelque part dan
ne villa de la region parisien
e. Waldeck Rochet, secretair
eneral du parti communiste
ompagnon de Maurice Thorez
ravit les tragiques etape
Fun calvaire jamais terming. I
st devenu invisible dans un
etralte inaccessible. Depul
rois ans, ce militant sincere n
i physiquement, du coup d
Prague. 11 demeure trop anti
ement choque, lui qui avai
voulu sortir le P.c. du ghett
pour I'entrainer dans la voi
esperee irreversible, de ('unit
de la gauche ; lui qui avait en
gage sa parole et son honneu
dans le debat sur Ies voles p
cifiques du socialisme, sur I
respect de la souverainete
de I'independance national
par les partis freres. II err
dans un monde de fantbmes
de cauchemars. 11 evolue dan
un univers kafkaien. Son esprit
court en quete d'un reve perd
a la recherche d'une Eglise di
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7 I
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FRANCE-SOIR, Paris
25 February 1972
Roger Garaudy
FROM BURGQS TO PRAGUE, THERE ARE NO POLITICAL TRIALS
CPYRGHT
In late January the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union published two resolutions on the "ideological struggle."
This is the usual means of indicating that the policy of the leaders is
encountering difficulties and of announcing new measures of repression--
.the only method known to these leaders for overcoming difficulties.
And here are the chain reactions:
First, in the Soviet Union where men who advance the slightest criticism
are sent either to insane asylums or prison: Bukovskiy after Grigorenko
and hundreds of others.
Then, in the Czechoslovak protectorate, where Husak is again repeating
that there are no "political trials" when, among hundres of other arrests,
Bzoch has been imprisoned in Brno for carrying in his briefcase the Smrkovsky
interview published by an Italian communist newspaper. He was also proclaiming
that there were no "political trials" when the first wave of repression swept
General Prchlik into prison for having carried out the orders of the Dubcek
government in 1968. There are no "political trials" because the slightest
divergence is qualified as a "violation of the law." According to this
terminology, there were never any "political trials" under Stalin. The
unfortunate thing is precisely that political opposition under such a regime
is a violation of the law.
The political opposition is by definition an "enemy of the people" as
in all police states, from the Spain of Franco to the Greece of the colonels.
Thus from Burgos to Prague, there are never "political trials."
An Italian journalist is gathering information on the opposition; he is
arrested for conspiracy. There are no "political trials," at least not for
all those who accept, in France or elsewhere, the normalization and its
vocabulary.
Bilak, the man who was preparing himself as early as 20 August 1968
for a position as jack-of-all-trades for the occupiers of Prague, is charged
with seeing that the orders of his masters are obeyed by those who do not
accept the normalization and its vocabulary.
fie condemns the Romanian desire for independence. The Romanian Bilak,
General Ion Serb, was removed from office and arrested (if not executed)
as a Soviet agent.
He castigates Yugoslavia, which he says is abandoning "the principles
of Marxism-Leninism" in its attempts to allow the workers self-management
of their factories and the possibility of criticizing the policy of their
government.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
C PYRG I accuses Hungary of following the path of Czechoslovakia when
trying 'to regain its independence.
Ile reproaches Gierek for having restored the workers' councils in
Poland at the very moment that Mravec and Lederer are being arrested in
Czechoslovakia for having criticized Gomulka.
There is a link among all these facts: the will of the Soviet leaders
to impose their law in all socialist countries. In so doing they are the
means they propaganda--periodically t eirthey
best suppliers t of
are
intervene anti-counist
are prepared
"fraternal" countries and parties.
But where is the socialism in all that?
Who strikes? And who is struck?
Those who strike are those who continue the political and ideological
illusionism of Stalin. At-the 18th Party Congress in 1937, Stalin presented
the new Soviet constitution as a "consistent and fully developed democracy."
Ile was completely right. One has only to read the text to recognize that
it was the most democratic of constitutions up to that time. It was, none-
theless, in the name of this constitution, and without the slightest
violation of it, that one of the bloodiest dictatorships the world has
ever known was established.
The key to the enigma is found in the postulates of identification and
substitution. If we translate each reference in the text to the worker
class or the citizens as the party that represents them and is identified
with them, and if we recognize that the leadership represents the party
and is identified with it, everything becomes clear. This sort of democracy
led 200 million Soviets, acting in good faith, to "participate" in the
crime against Czechoslovakia in August 1968 because they had no reason to
doubt the official lies: "We have been called by the Czechoslovak people,
and our troops are welcomed with enthusiasm."
Who is struck? Those who combat the postulates of substitution and
identification and who tried, in Yugoslovia in 1948 in the first resistance
against Stalinism and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, to construct socialism
by the people--giving the workers themselves the control and self-management
of their enterprises.
This is why the Soviet problem and the Czechoslovak problem are French
problems. At stake in these instances of intervention and repression is
the future of socialism in our country. As long as the Soviet model with
its substitutions and identifications that are a hideous caricature of
socialism is not repudiated, as long as these interventions are not
denounced, as long as the lie that "there are no political trials" (because
the political opposition is an "enemy of the people") is accepted--and by
this acceptance, one becomes an accomplice--socialism is dishonored and
French prospects are blocked.
The struggle for socialism will never be credible until it is clearly
11
9
 GPY(RGHT
Approved For Release 199
FRANCE-SOIR, Paris
25 February 1972
Fri to Comjtti C ntraleduuPartj
Communist, do I'Unton
Sovl6tiquo publie deux risolu-
fians stir In - lifts 1ti6ologique ..
C'cst In formulo hahituello pour
dire quo in politique ties dirt.
goants co heurto A des dlfficult6a
et pour annoncer Jos r6pres-
Slon, seulo method, que cc gen.
re do dirigmnts connaisso pour
leg surmonter.
Et voicl lee rdactione en chat-
Be.
i)'nbord on Union Sov16tiquo,
oil Ins hommos qui avancont la
moindro critique sont vntilCs
entro lax itr)pitaux psychlatri-
gung at leg prisons , Bnukowskl
npr6s Grigorenko of dos rental.
nes d'autres.
Puis Bans to protectoral tchd-
cnlovaquo Of, ttusak r6peto uno
foi,s do plus quit nest pas cities-
lion do ? procbs politiques .
insguo, pnrmi des centnInes
d'nutres arrrstnttons, tlzoch net
nmprl.vonn6 A Brno pour avoir
dons sit serviette ]'Interview tlo
Sntrkowaky publi6e par un )our-
n;tl contmttnisto italien. iI pro-
clumnit'rnletnrnt , II n'y it pas
,in ? proces politiques ? lorsquo
la prentlbro vague tie repression
cunduiatt on prison to general
PrrhIlk pour avoir execute, en
1960, ton orclre.s du gouvernement
Duhrrk. If n'y a pas do ? procbs
politiqune - pufsqun In moindro
diverg;enco oat quallfi6e do
? vi
l
o
ation d I lt S
ono .olon co
vocabulniro it n'y a lamats ou
do ? proces politiques . sous Sta-
line. Ln ntalbeur c'est prec)s6-
mrnt qua I'opposltion politique
Inns un tot r,,rItoo soft line vie.
Minn Itin in lot,
L'npposant politique nst, par
ctrfinltion, tin ? ennrml Fit, peu-
pin ?, comme dans tmis leg r6f~i-
mns policlers, do I'i spalrna tie
France A In Greco tics colonels.
Afnsl, do Burt;oc A Prague. 11
n'y a jamats do ? procbs politi.
grits ..
Un lournalisto 11a1ten s'infor-
me sir l'oppnsitinn , Il est ar-
rPt6 pour complot. II n'y a pas
tin . proces polttlqurs . du moms
pant toffs cnux qui aCCeptent,
on France oft ntileurs. In norma.
Ilsat(ort et son vocabulaire.
**
I~'OUR crux qui no I'accnptent
pan. Minh. celul qui s'on.
prCtait. des le 20 notlt 1960,
o
rme ce s n
Approved For Releasei I 49 'Ib~lb11~`'ti ?-RD Pf?'C 1'94-A000000190001-4
1.occupant A Prague , Oct charge
do r6percuter lee consignee do
see maitres.
tif blAmo J. vo1ont6 d'lhd6pon-
Banco do Ja Roumanie, oil Is Bi-
talc roumain, to general lord
Serb, a ate destitue et arrbte (ni-
non execute) comme agent go-
vi6tique.
11 somonce la Yougoslavle qui,
en s'efforcant do donner aux
travailleurs I'autogestion do
lours usines et Ia possibilit6 do
critiquer In politique do -tour
gouvernement, abandonne, Solon
lul, ? ton principes du marxisme
leninismo ..
II accuse la Hongrfo de pren-
dre le chemin do In Tch6coslova-
quio au temps oil oil() tontait do
rocouvrer son ind6pendance.
11 roprocho A Gierok d'avolr
rostaurd an Pologne leg conseils
ouvriers, aft moment mime oil
on Tch6coslovaquie Mravoc of
Lederer sort arrbtCs pour avoir
critique Gomul)ca.
11 y a un lien entre tous co
fait , s
]it volont6 des dirigoants
sovibtiques d'imposor lour lot
dans tout pays socialist,, C'es't
par lit qu'ils soot 10.5 ntoillours
ournisseurs do la propaganda
anticommunist, . en faisant p6-
rlodiquemnt In preuvo qu lie
sont prbts A intervenir par toue
los moyens darts Its pays of lee
penis qu'lIs appellant des pays
et des partis freroe.
M A)S ou oat in eociatisme on
tout cola ?
frappe Qui frappe 7 Et qui est
Coux qui frappent Co sont log
continuatours do I'lllusionnisme
politiquo of id6ologlquo do Stall-
no. Au XVIii' Congres do son
Partt, on 1937, Stalin, pr6sentalt
In nouvelle Constitution sovibti-
quo comme ? one d6mocrntJe
cons6quente et developpCe jus-
gtt'nu bout. ? iI avnit parfaite.
ment raison , II suffit Wen lire
In toxic pour reconnaltre qu'elle
est In plus d6mocratiquo des
constitutions avant existd Jus-
gur-IA. C'es't pourtant au nom do
cello Constitution, t sane )a
vfnler le mains du monde, qu'a
Tin s'instituer l'uno des plus san-
glantes dictatures quo l'histoiro
aft connues.
de substitution , si chaquo foie
qu'il s'agit, daps le toxto, do In
classo ouvriere ou des citoyens,
noun traduisons par , to Perth
qui les represents et s'identiflo
A aux, et si nous admotions quo
la direction represents co paril
of s'identifie A lul, tout deviont
clair. Uno dcniocratio do co gen-
re a fait ? participer - do bonne
tot deux cents millions do Sovi6-
tiquos, on aout 19x,8, nu crime
contre is Tchecosiovaquie parco
qu'ils n'avaient aucun moynn do
mettro on douto los mensongos
officiels , ? Nous sontntes apno-
l6s par be pouplo tchOcoslovequo
et nos troupes sont accuelilies
avec enthousinsme. .
a
cmbattent lesPostulate do sub-
stitution et d'identification of
qui ont tenth, en Yougoslavje on
1918. Flans is premiere resistance
au stalinlsme, comme en Tch6co-
slovaquio en 1968, do construiro
to socialisme par le peuple. en
donnnnt Flu. travai)leurs oux-
memes In parole et I'autogestion
do Ieurs entreprises.
C'ost' pourquot to proltlbme
soviCtique et to problbmo tch6-
coslovaque sont den problbmes
francais. L'enjeu do cos Inter-
ventions et do cog repressions,
r'es't I'avenir du socinlisme Clans
notro pays. Tant quo ]'on no rb-
puclicra pas le model, sovl6ti-
quo avec son substitutions et see
Identifications qui sont uno ca-
ricataro hideuso du socialismo,
tant quo I'on no denoncora pas
COS Interventions, tant quo I on
accepters, on 8'(,n fatsant ninsi
compllco. Ie nlensongo Arlon lo-
'U ele;1 n 'y a pas do proces po-
qU ? parrs qu'on a baptise
i'opposant politique - ennoml du
Poupin ?, on laisso d6shonorer to
socialisme et )'on bouche, to
perspective francalse.
La lutte pour le socialisme no
sera credible quo lorsqu'on dire
clalrement , le socialisme, ce
n'es't pas vela I
Prochain , FACE
A, L'OPiNlON
JMIN
(dipole UDR, president do t
La cle de retie 6nl
10
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POLITIQUE IIEBDO, Paris
10 February 1972
TIE HOUR OF THE TRIALS
CPYRGHT
Mow Far i e o.
From his free tribune, Le Monde, Vercors cries, "Now it is starting all
over again," in reference to the wave of arrests that is now sweeping so many
comrades into Iiusak's prisons. The author of "Silence de la Mer" refers with
moving sadness to the responsibility of the French Communist Party.
It must, in fact, be denounced, again and always. For, objectively
speaking, it has aided the normalization -- by its lies, its half-lies, its
silence. Objectively speaking, it bears and will bear the cross of the coming
trials in Prague -- the beginning of which is marked by the sentencing of Jiri
Lederer, for having uttered criticism of Gomulka in 1968 a thousand times milder
than what Gierek is saying about him now.
"We support Husak completely when he says that there will be no trials.
We are absolutely opposed to political trials," Georges Marchais affirmed to
television and to Europe I in July 1970 (L'Humanite, 22 July 1970). Husak
lied; he could do nothing but lie. Today is the proof.
Georges Marchais is silent; L'Humanite is silent. Roland Leroy, secretary
of the French Communist Party and the party "liberal," reiterates to all who
will listen his dismay at the return of Stalinism; Roland Leroy is in Prague,
while they are arresting my comrades, who were also his comrades.
Powerless. Doubtless so. But an accomplice like so many others because
he is silent.
It is beginning all over again. How far will you go this time?
The witch hunt has begun in Czechoslovakia. Heavier and heavier repression
strikes the friends of Dubcek and those behind the "Springtime of Prague" who
remained in their country, occupied by the Red Army, to wage a combat becoming
more and more difficult with resources becoming more and more limited.
After those of December and January (1), the third wave of arrests in
early February claimed figures who, by virtue of their reputations, had hereto-
fore been spared. Thus, the historian Karel Bartosek and Karel Kaplan, the
former secretary of the Prague Committee of the Communist Party, Jiri Litera,
well known in scientific circles, Jiri Hochman, former editor-in-chief of the
Reporter, (the organ of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, prohibited in
1969 by order of the Soviet authorities) and another journalist, Vladimir
Nepras were arrested.
The police arrested, then released, but kept under surveillance the
philosphers Karel Kosik and Sochor, the jurist Frantisek Chamalik, and Richard
Slansky. Slansky is the son of the former secretary general of the Communist
Party who was arrested in 1952 with 10 other leaders of the Communist Party,
sentenced, and executed after a rigged trial, replete with confessions, the
sinister machinery of which Ar-,:hur London unveils in his resounding book.
11
 CPYRGHT
ARprfllveegroSfR&lpaea9p-r/,OaZsO2 aga~instRR~ie o pos94 o00b0eg00n19 g0011f over
again? Already the journalist Jiri Lederer has been sentenced to two years in
prison by a Prague court for having "defamed the representatives of an allied
country." In truth, Lederer, in April and May 1968 made the same criticism of
Gomulka in several articles in the newspaper of the Union of Writers, Literarni
Listy, that are made officially today in Warsaw.
It is possible that the intellectuals and militants arrested recently
or in early January -- like the former rector of the Advanced Political School
of the Communist Party, Martin Huebl -- will be brought to trial on charges of
,having printed and disseminated not only "subversive tracts," but also a
clandestine opposition newspaper circulating secretly in Czechoslovakia.
Jiri Hochman
Hoch an, 44 years old, a former deportee, was., in the early years after
the liberation in 1945, a carpenter. After obtaining his baccalaureate at the
School of Economics, he began working as a journalist for Obrana Lidu, the
organ of the army, as director of the foreign politics section. In the late
fifties, he began work for Rude Pravo, the central organ of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party as foreign politics editor. In 1967 he took a job with the
weekly of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, Reorter. It was there, as
editor-in-chief, that he waged the fiercest battle or the "Springtime of
Prague." Expelled from the party in 1969, he was, although gravely ill with
tuberculosis, forced to find employment as an ironworker in a small town.
His wife, a teacher, became an agricultural worker,. Jiri Hochman is the
author of a satirical novel, Jeleni Brod, which has just been published in
Czechoslovakia by Index Publishers of WeNest Germany.
Milan Iluebl
1luebi ,, 45, is a specialist in contemporary history -- particularly that
of the socialist states. In this scientific work, he devoted several studies
to the problem of the DAV, agroup of Slovak progressive intellectuals. In
the late fifties and early sixties, he brought attention to himself by demanding
the release of the leaders of the Slovak Communist Party who had been arrested
and sentenced in 1952 for "bourgeois nationalism" -- among them was Gustav Husak.
A professor at the Advanced School of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, he
became its rector in 1967. He was one of Alexander Dubcek's closest associates.
Karel Bartosek
Bartose , 41, is a historian. He is the son of a working-class family of
Skutec (Moravia), a working-class city near Gottwaldow.
In 1948, the son of a militant (his mother was a member of the Communist
Party as early as before the war), he entered the university. He then went on
to the Institute of Contemporary History, where he specialized in the study
of the Second World War. He published his first book in 1959, The Slovak
Insurrection.
In the sixties, he worked with Karel Kaplan, director of the Institute, on
an analysis of the crimes of the Stalinist period.
Ile wrote for Literarni Listy and participated from its beginnings in 1963
in the movement of ni ellectuals against the obscurantism of Novotny. In 1968
he was one of the active members of "Springtime" and wrote for the Reporter.
At the time of the invasion, he and others were maintaining the free Czechoslovak
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
CPYRGHT
radio -- thus contributing to resistance agar
resigned from the Czech Communist Party in 1969, he has been without work since
June 1970: the Institute of Contemporary History was purely and simply closed.
A Fifty-Year Old Student
At the last meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Union
of Students, held in Warsaw from 26 to 29 January, the representative of the
Czech students was --- 50 years old. This old official of the Stalinist machine
was one of the principal figures behind a coup that permitted the Soviet dele-
gation and other delegations closest to the Russians to exclude two students of
the National Union of French Students (UNEF) from the IUS congress and to expel
them from Poland. These two students, Pierre Nesterenko and Jean-Claude
Boksembaum, had recalled the position that their organization took "against
intervention by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia" and against
governmental repression by Itusak for the Brezhnev government.
The Socialism that Itusak Condemns
"We are going to begin a new struggle. And your task, my comrades-in France
and in Europe, is to understand . . . It marks the beginning of a new period of
our political history: the struggle of all those exploited by 'socialism' against
their exploiters. . .
"Against the bureaucrats who have taken over the national state and its
possessions. On the threshold of this new class struggle, we must choose our
position carefully.
"We are those who tomorrow will struggle for the power of the workers in the
factories, in the cities, and in the country, at all levels of social activity,
and thereby for the destruction of the state of the privileged persons who speak
of socialism.
"For the moment, we are weak. The best among us are falling without glory
today. But there will be revenge!"
K.B. Self-criticism in the blood of
a few comrades. 25 August 1969
"We must unite so that the fifties will not be repeated. The abuse of
power and the contempt for the law knows no limits -- reaching the highest
officials as well as ordinary citizens, those who are politically committed as
well as those who are not.
"We must then build a bulwark against the illegality that has resulted in
the political trials."
Karel Kaplan "Machinery for a Trial"
translated in "Politique Aujourd' hui"
September 10 and 12 1970.
"It is very important to begin a new and exhaustive investigation, and in
particular, a review of the fundamental conditions for socialism. It seems
to me, in fact, that the notorious consequences such as disrespect for the
individual, destruction of libert',-, consumption of the individual by the masses,
the concentration camps, etc., ar:~ only just that -- consequences. We will all
remain prisoners of the secondary and the superficial as long as we do not
pd~ 1AM00b'crat is
 i
CPYRGHT
soc K9veA fto[Rgl9 sSe 11909/09/ e2TeCIA-RDP79-of h94 0000200190001-4
concepts ry, of man, of
truth. We can summarize all that in these terms: the Czechoslovak experience
brings socialism before critical thought and before philosophical reflection
on the primordial and the essential."
Karel Kosik
Conversation with Antonin Liehm in
'"Three Generations"
"The revolutionary political union of workers and intellectuals must take
as its point of departure the fact that this union is based on mutual and
bilateral action, on dialogue. The natural attribute of one and the other,
as modern social classes, is the capability for an overall view that goes
beyond the partial or the biased. It is, furthermore, a critical spirit that
spares nothing, not even itself. One must consider as symptomatic of abnormal
circumstances that the intelligensia is forced to convince others of its own
importance -- being unable, furthermore, to exercise its normal critical role
with society and with itself. The revolutionary ties of workers and intellect-
uals arise from the fact that the two classes have both brain and hands; that
they both work and think: the meaning of their union is to bring innovations
to the political level. This undefined political innovation is effected pre-
cisely in this association and results from the dialogue, the contact, and the
reciprocal influence. The union does not mean then that one class falls in
line with another, or that one takes everything from the other. In that case,
there would be no union, simply destruction."
Karel Kosik (Ibid.)
The Union of Writers Protests and Calls for Protests
Czechoslovakia has lived or tree years under a regime of military
occupation.
We all have reason to fear that its leaders, after having so long affirmed
their hostility to political trials, are now engaged in a process of repression
as brutal as it is cunning, aimed at depriving all intellectuals of their
means of subsistence, when it does not deprive them of their liberty.
That is why the Union of Writers, meeting in general assembly, appeals
to all democrats to protest vigorously these methods, which are incompatible
with true socialism.
7 February 1972
Address signatures to the headquarters of the Union of Writers, 23,
rue Gazan, Paris, 14.
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POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
10 February 1972
TC
ECO
SLOQUIE.
"I'hQUrQ
des procQs
Approved
< Voici que ca recommence >>, crie Vercors
Bans sa Tribune fibre du ? Monde >>, devant
la vague d' arrestations qui emporte en ce
moment Bans les prisons de Husak tant de
carnarades. Et l'auteur du < Silence de la
Mer >> evoque avec. tine emouvante tristesse
la responsabilite du P.C.F.
On la doit denoncer, en effet, encore et tou-
jours. Car, objectivement, it a aide a la nor-
malisation, par ses mensonges, ses demi-
mensonges, ses silences. Objectivement ii
porte et portera la croix des proces qui s'an-
noncent a Prague et dont la condamnation de
Jiri Lederer pour avoir, en '1968, dit de
Gomulka mille fois moins que ce qu'en a dit
,au jourd'hui Gierek, sonne l'ouverture.
< Nous appuyons tout a fait Husak quand
it dit qu'il n'y aura pas de proces. Nous sommes
resolurnent opposes aux proces politiques >,
affirmait Georges Marchais a la television et
a Europe I en juillet 1970 (1'H:Humaiiite 22-7-1970).
Husak mentait, it ne pouvait que mentir. La
preuve en est aujourd'hui apportee.
Georges Marchais se tait, l'-1 rumanite fait
silence. Roland Leroy, secretaire du P.C.F., le
du Parti, celui' qui repete a tous
ceux qui veulent IV entendre sa souffrance
devant le retour au stalinisme, Roland Leroy
est a Prague, Landis qu'on arrete mes cama-
rade*s qui furent les siens.
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190001-4
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Impuissant ? Sans doute. Mais complice,
comme tant d'autres parce que muet.
ra recommence : jusqu'ou irez--vous cette
fois ? P. N.
a chasse aux sorcldres
est ouverte on Tcheco-
slovaqufe. Une repres-
sion de plus on plus lourde
s'abat sur les amis de Dubcck
et sur !es artisans ?du ? prin-
temps de Prague - qui etaient
demeures dans leur pays occu-
p6 par I'Arrnee rouge pour y
wiener, avec des moyens do plus
en plus faibles, un combat de
plus en plus difficile.
Apres celles de decembre et
celle de janvier (1), la troisie-
me vague d'arrestations, celle
du debut Wrier, touche des
personnalites qui, du falt de
leur renom, avaient etc jusqu'ici
epargnees. C'est ainsi qu'ont
etc apprehendes les historiens
Karel Bartosek et Karel Kaplan,
!'ancien secretaire du Comite du
partl communiste de Prague, Jlrl
Littera, blen connu dans les mf-
lleux scientifiques, Jirl Hoch-
man, ancien redacteur en chef
de - Reporter - (/'organe de
P. Union des journalistes tche-
coslovaques interdit en 1969
sur ordre des autorites sovietl-
ques) et un autre journaliste,
Wladiniir Nepzas.
La police a arrete, puts rela-
che, mais maintenu sous surveil-
lance, les philosophes Karel Ko-
sik et Sochar, le Juriste Frantl-
sek Chamallk et Richard Slans-
ky. Celui-cl est le fits de I'an-
clen secretaire general du P.C.
qui fut arrete en 1952 avec dix
autres leaders du P.C., condam-
ne a retort et execute apres un
prochs entierement truque mar-
que par des - aveux , dont Ar-
thur London a, dans un livre re-
tcntissant, dernonte le sinistre
mecanisme.
L'cre des - grands proces
contre 7es opposants va-t-elle
s'ouvrir a nouveau? Deja le
journaliste Jir! Lederer a etc
condamne par un tribunal de
Prague a deux ans de prison
pour avoir - diffame, les repre-
sentants d'un pays atlle en
fait, pour avoir porte contre Go-
mulka, en avril et mal 1966,
dans plusieurs articles du jour-
nal de !'Union des Ecrivains,
- Literarni Listy ?, des critiques
qui sont celles que I'on pout en-
tendre aujourd'hui officiellement
a Varsovie.
II n'est pas exclu que les in-
tellectuels et les militants arre--
tes recemment ou au debut jan-
vier, comme 1'ancien recteur de
la Haute Ecole Politique du P.C.,
Martin Huebl, comparaissent en
justice sous !'accusation d'avoir
redige et diffuse, non seulement
des - tracts subversifs ., mais
un journal clandestin d'opposl-
tion circulant sous le manteau
en Tchecoslovaquie.
Jiri Hochman
44 ans, ancien deporte, fut
d'abord menuisier, apres la libe-
ration en 1945. Ayant termine
l'ecole economique (niveau
bac), it entra comme journaliste
a - Obrana Lidu organe de
I'arrnee, dont it dirigea to servi-
ce de politique etrangere. A la
fin des annees 50, it passe au
- Rude Pravo organe central
du parti communiste tchecoslo-
vaque, a la redaction de politi-
que etrangere, puis en 1967 a
I'hebdomadaire de l'Union des
Journalistes tchecoslovaques Re-
porter. C'est la que, comme re-
dacteur en chef, it menera le
plus rigoureux des combats pour
le Printemps de Prague. Exclu
du Part! en 1969, it est, bien que
gravement tuberculeux, oblige
de travailler comme serrurier
dans une petite vflle. Sa femme,
universitaire, gagne sa vie com-
me ouvriere agricole. Jiri Hoch-
man est 1'auteur d'un roman sa-
tirique, - Jeleni Brod -, qui vient
de sortir en tcheque aux edi-
tions index en Allemagne fede-
rate.
etudes au probleme du groupe
des intellectuels progressistes
slovaques DAV et, a la fin des
annees 50, au debut des annees
60, 11 se fit remarquer en recla-
mant la liberation des dirigeants
du parti communiste slovaque
accuses et condamnes en 1952
pour - nationalisme bourgeois -
(dont, notamment, Gustav Hu-
sak).
Professeur a 1'ecole superieu-
re du parti communiste tcheco-
slovaque, if en devient recteur
en 1967. 11 fut I'un des tres pro-
ches collaborateurs d'Alexandre
Dubcek.
Karel Bartosek
41 ans. Historien. Fits d'une
famille ouvriere de Skuteo (Mo-
ravie), cite ouvriere proche de
Gottwaldow.
En 1948, comme fits de mili-
tant (sa mere etalt membre du
P.C. des avant la guerre), it en-
tre a I'Universite ; puts, a I'lns-
titut d'Histoire contemporalne. 11
se specialise dans !'etude de la
seconde guerre mondiale. A cc
titre it public en 1959 un pre-
mier livre sur - !'insurrection
slovaque -.
Dans, les annees 1960, II par-
ticipe avec Karel Kaplan, direc-
teur de cot institut, a I'analyse
des crimes de la periode stall-
nienne.
CPYRGHT
ii collabore a - Literarni Lls-
ty - et participe, des ses debuts,
en 1963, au mouvement des in-
tellectuels contre I'obscurantis-
me de Novotny. En 1968, 11 est
un des membres actifs du - Prin-
temps - et collabore notamment
au - Reporter Au moment de
!'invasion, if assure, avec d'au-
tres, la survie de la radio I1-
bre tchecoslovaque, contribuant
ainsf a la resistance aux occu-
pants. Demissionnaire du P.G.T..
des 1969, it est sans travail de-
puls juin 1970: !'instltut d'His-
toire contemporaine a etc pure-
ment et simplement ferme.
Milan Huebi
45 ans, historien, specialiste
de I'Histoire contemporaine, no-
tamment de celle des Etats so-
cialistes. Dans cc travail scien-
tifique, if consacra plusleurs
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 CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Un etudiant de 50 ans...
Lorsde la dernlere reunion du
Comite Executif de /'Union Inter-
nationale des Etudiants, qui
est tenue a Varsovie du 26 au
9 janvier, le representant des
"tudiants tchecoslovaques etait
-ge... de cinquante ans. Ce vteux
onctionnaire de I'appareil stali-
fen a ate I'un des principaux
rtisans du coup d'Etat qul a
ermis a la delegation sovieti-
exclure, d'abord du Congres
de l'U.I.E., puts de faire expul-
Nesterenko et J.-C. Boksembaum
qui avalent rappels la prise de
mees du parti de Varsovie en
Tchecoslovaqufe - et contre Is
repression gouvernementale or-
ganisee par Husak pour Is comp.
le socialisme que husak condamne
Nous allons donc com,nencer une nouvelle lutte. Et
votre t6che, mes camarades de France et d'Europe, est de to
comprondre (...). Elie marque le debut d'une nouvelle periode
do notre hlstoire politique : to lutte do tous les exploites
du ? socialisme ? contre leurs explolteurs (..).
Contra les bureaucrates qui se sont approprles 1'Etat
national et ses proprietes. Au seull do ce nouv,~; combat
de classe, if taut savoir cholsir oil nous situer.
Nous serons ceux qui, domain, lutteront pour le pouvoir
des travalfleurs darts les usines, dens /as villas at les
campagnes, A tous les nlveaux de I'actfvite Societe at, du
memo coup, pour In destruction do I'Etat des nantis qui parlent
du socialisme.
Pour le moment, nous sommes foibles, les mellleurs d'entre
nous tombent sans gloire aujourd'hul. Mats gare A to
revanche I -
K.B. Autocritique dons la sang de quelques camarades.
(25-8-1969.)
- Nous devons nous unir pour que _ le;; ennees 50 no so
repetent pas. L'abus de pouvoir at to mepris des lots no
connaissent pas de limites, atteignent les plus hauls fonctlon-
nalres comme les simples citoyens, les personnel engagees
polltiquement comme cellos qui no Is sont pas.
11 Taut donc edifier un rampart contre 1'idegelite dont sont
issus les proces politiques. -
Karel Kaplan.
Mdcanismes pour un proces -
Tradult dons ? Politique Aujourd'hul ?, 9/10-1970 at 12-1970.
? /1 imports d'entreprendre une nouvelle at exhaustive Inves-
tigation, at, en particulier, If taut repenser /as conditions
londamentales du socialisme. It me semble an effet que des
consequences de notoriete enerele tapes %r',rirrespect
v
CPYRGHT
l'homme par la masse, les camps de concentration, etc., no
sont, precisement, que des consequences, et que nous demeu-
rerons tous prisonniers du subsidiaire at du superficlel aussi,
fongtemps qua nous ne nous rendrons pas compte que le
socialisme humaniste jail/it d'eutres racines qua le socialisme
bureaucratique, quo I'un at rautre procedent de conceptions
_differentes de I'histoire, de I'homme, de Is verite. Nous pour-
rions aussi resumer cela an ces termes : rexperience tcheco-
slovaque convle le sociallsme a une pensee critique, a une
meditation ph'losophique Sur le primordial at I'essentlel.
Karel Koslk
Entretien avec Antonin Liehm, dons ? Trols generations -,
? L'union politique revolutionnaire des ouvriers at des
intellectuals devrait partir du fait qu'etle s'appule sur une
action mutuelle at b/laterale, rur un dialogue. L'attribut natural
des uns et des autres, comme couches socieles modernes,
c'est I'aptitude 6 une vue d'ensemble qui depesse les aspects
partiels ou partiaux, c'est, an outre, un esprit critique gut
n'6pargne rien of sot-memo. Aussi dolt-on tenir pour sympto-
matique de circonstances anormales que /'intelligentsia soft
dens /'obligation de convaincre eutruf de so propre impor-
tance, no pouvant, de surcroit, exercer son rdle critique normal
envers to societe comme envers ells-m6me. Le lien revolu-
tionnaire des ouvriers at des instellectuels nalt de cette
donnse que les deux couches ont 6 la foss cerveau at mains,
que toutes deux travaillent at pensent; le sens de leur union,
c'est d'innover sur le terrain politique ; cette nouveeutd
politique indefinie se realise precisement dens cette asso-
ciation et resulte du dialogue, du contact at de rlnfluence
reciproques L'unlon no signiffe done pas qu'une couche
s'aligne sur i'autre, qua l'une emprunte tout d rautre ; sfnon,
iI n'y aurait pas d'union, mais simple dcrasement. -
Karel oslk (Ibldem)
L'Union des Ecrivains
proteste et appelle a protester
... Le Tchecoslovaqufe vit,
depuis trois ens, sous le
regime do roccupation or-
m6e.
Nous avons toutes raisons
de craindre quo ses dirl-
geants apres avoir long-
temps affirms leur hostilite
aux proces politiques, no
soient maintenant engages
dans is voie dune repres-
sion aussi br 'tale qua sour-
noise, quf tercf 6 privet tous
(as intellects,'Is de leurs
moyens dex :tence, quand
else no /as prive pas de
feur liberte.
Ceest pourquof !'Union
des Ecrivains, reunie an
assembfee generate, appelle
tous les dsmocrates a pro-
tester avec eclat contre des
procedes incompatibles avec
un veritable socialisme.
Le 7 Wrier 1972.
Adresser les s gnatures
au siege do ? L'U lion des
Ecrivains -, 23, rt a Gazan,
Paris-14'. ^
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POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
17 February 1972
CPYRGHT
First in a few lines, then in a long, gray anonymous communique, I had
the answer to the question which in this same column last week I directed to
he leaders of the PCF [French Communist Party] in general and to Roland Leroy
n particular.
In a few lines, first of all, as filler in L'Humanite of Friday,
1 February, just below the news of the arrival of Queen Elizabeth of England
in Thailand: "During a brief trip that he made to Czechoslovakia, Comrade Leroy
iad talks with Comrades Gustav Husak, Secretary-General of the CCP [Czechoslovak
ommunist Party] and Vasil Bilak, member of the Presidium and Secretary of the
entral Committee of the CCP. Comrade Paul Courtieu, member of the Central
mmittec of the PCF, participated in this fraternal discussion."
How far will they go? I asked. The answer came quickly. While they
ere throwing into prison my comrades who were his comrades, Roland Leroy
as fraternally clinking glasses with their jailers.
The long anonymous communique, for its part, came out on page three of
the Paris edition of the L'Humanite of Saturday the 12th, and was rerun that
Monday the 14th in the same paper. It explained that the PCF still "disagrees"
with (it is now longer a question of censuring) "the military intervention
of 21 August 1968 in Czechoslovakia," that it was quite right to congratulate
itself over the declarations of G. Husak, according to which there would be
no "prefabricated political trials" in Czechoslovakia, and that it plans
"to develop and strengthen its close cooperation with the CPSU and with
all the other Communist Parties," thus with the CCP. And this is why, the
communique goes on to specify, Comrade Leroy was clinking glasses with the
jailers of my comrades who used to be his comrades. That's how it is.
But then, how is it that, very fraternally, Vasil Bilak himself
explained in camera to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party on the 21st of last October that "at present there are only a few
parties which have reservations concerning the current line of our party:
above all the Communist parties of Australia, Great Britain, Spain and re
certain problems, also the Italian Communist party?" Then, the PCF no
longer has any reservations? Who's lying? V. Bilak or the Secretary of
the PCF who doesn't even dare sign his communique?
Or, in reading the two texts more closely, should one conclude that
it is only the interpretation of the past that still causes differences
(friendly) and that the trials which are being prepared against the authors
of the Prague Spring will not be considered by the PCF as "prefabricated,"
but will-fall in the category of acts justified in advance in this ambiguous
phrase of the anonymous communique: (the Party) "has always considered
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it the duty of the socialist authorities to protect the new regime against
every attempt to cast doubt on it by illegal means, as well as against
all external interferences?"
Upon reflection, that's surely it: Husak, in toasting with Roland Leroy
the condemnation of my imprisoned comrades who were his comrades, must have
explained to him about the interference of our Italian comrade Ochetto and
the subversive activities of the old Communist militants Hubl, Hochman,
Kaplan, Bartosek, etc. Roland Leroy was convinced. On his return he
convinced George Marchais.
We eagerly await the next step; the communique justifying the non-
prefabricated trials. Like those of the 1950's. To be added as an annex
to the little orange book, a chapter on freedom in the "advanced democracies."
Paul Noirot
POLITIQUE HEBDO, Paris
17 February 1972
'al eu, d'abord en quel-
ques lignes, puis en un
long et gris communi-
que anonyme, la reponse a la
question que je posais ici me-
me la semaine derniere aux dl-
rigeants du PCF en general, et
a Roland Leroy en particulier.
En quelques lignes d'abord,
dans les ? puces ? de i'Huma-
nlte du vendredi 11 Wrier, jus-
te en dessous de I'annonce de
I'arrivee de la refine Elizabeth
d'Angleterre en Tha'ilande :
? Au cours d'un bref sejour
qu'il a fait on Tchecoslovaquie,
to ca-grade Leroy a eu un en-
tretien avec les camarades Gus-
tav Husak, secretaire general
du PCT, et Vasil Bilak, membre
du Presidium et secretaire du
Comite central du PCT. Le ca-
marade Paul Courtieu, membre
du Comlte central du PCF, a
partlcipe a cot entretien frater-
nel. .
Jusqu'ou front-Ils ? interro-
geal-je. La reponse est venue
vite. Tandis qu'on jetalt en pri-
son mes camarades qul furent
les slens, Roland Leroy trinqualt
fraternellement avec leurs geo-
Iiers.
Le long communique anonyme
est sorts, lul, en page 3 de I'edi-
tlon pprlslenne de l'Humanlte du
samedl 12, et II a ete reprodult
a nouveau ce lundi 14 dans le
memo journal. 11 explique clue
tion militaire du 21 aout 1968
en Tchecoslovaquie ., qu'ii a eu
bien raison de se feliciter des
declarations de G. Husak selon
lesquelles iI n'y auralt pas de
proces politiques prefabri-
ques . en Tchecoslovaquie, et
qu'll entend, dans ce cadre,
a developper et renforcer sa
cooperation etroite avec le PC
US, avec tous les autres par-
tis communistes ?, done avec
le PCT. Et c'est pourquol, preci-
se encore le communique, Ro-
land Leroy a ete trinquer avec
les geoliers de mes camarades
qui furent ses camarades. Dent
acte.
Mass alors, comment se fait-
ii que, tree fraternellement, Va-
sil Bilak lui-mame expliqualt le
21 octobre dernier devant le Co-
mite central du parts communis-
to tchecosiovaque reuni a huts
clos qu' ? 11 no reste a present
clue quelques partis qui font des
reserves a I'egard de la ligne ac-
tuelle le notre Parts : II s'agit
avant `out des PC d'Austraiie,
de Gr ,nde-Bretagne, d'Espagne,
et, sur un certain nombre de
proble mes, egalement du PC ita-
lien ? ? Le PCF ne fait done plus
de reserves ? Oui ment ?
V. Bi ik ou le secretariat du
PCF, ; ui nose meme pas si-
gner ,, m communique ?
Ou Mors, en Ilsant de plus
pres le! deux textea_ faint-ii
au
o
r
le rL I- est tou ours ? on desac- conciure que s I r a
c*OPPOW ForgRsilease 1 M/09/Q2s:e6 $ 1 194A000200190001-4
reprobation) avoc ? I'interven- diverger.:e (amicale), 1ue les
CPYRGHT
proces qul se preparent contre
les Inspirateurs du Printemps de
Prague no seront pas juges par
le PCF comme ? prefabrlques .,
mals rentreront dans la catego-
rie de ces actes justifies par
avance dans cette phrase ambi-
giie du communique anonyme :
(le Parts) ? a toujours conslde-
rd que le pouvolr soclaliste a
pour devolr de proteger avec rl-
gueur le nouveau regime contre
toute tentative do le remettre
en cause par des moyens file-
gaux, de memo que contre toute
Ingerence exterleure ? ?
A is reflexion. c'est surement
cola : Husak, en trinquant avec
Roland Leroy a la condamnatlon
de mes camarades emprisonnes
qui furent les slens, a dO lui
expliquer les ingerences de no-
tre camarade itallen Ochetto et
les activates subversives des
vleux militants communistes
Hubl, Hochman, Kaplan, Barto-
sek, etc. Roland Leroy a ete
convaincu. En rentrant it a con-
vaincu Georges Marchals.
Attendons avec curlosite la
suite, le communique Justifiant
les proces non prefabrlques.
Comme clans les annees 1950.
A jolndre, en annexe, au petit II-
vre orange, chapitre sur les II-
bertes dans Ia societe de ? de-
mocratle avencee ?.
P
l AN
r
ot
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L'ESPRESSO, Rome
20 February 1972
I IUEBL' S LETTER TO HUSAK
Prague
Dear Comrade First Secretary, us a .
CPYRGHT
I address myself to you once more in writing, despite the fact
That my previous letter of 18 February of this year,
has remained unanswered. I consider it indispensable to communicate
new information to you, so that you cannot say later that you were'
not told about it.
Sine 1 July 1970, that is,.from the time when my employment
as Rector or the Party Political College came to an end, I have
been out of a job. Since then I have received no salary; I cannot
receive unemployment benefi-G, nor have I been allowed the grant from
the journalists' fund for which I had asked and to which I was in-
deed entitled, having been a journalist for many years; in short, I
am, totally deprived of the means of livelihood.
Moreover, the ten months which I have spent searching for a
job have brought no result whatever. Not only have I not been able
to find work corresponding to my qualifications as a historian of
the modern period, but I 1?ave not been able to find a job of any
kind, either in Prague or in Bratislava. This was not because people
did not want to take me on but because I am on the "black list," and
directors of every. type of office and factory ire afraid --
if they take me on - of getting involved. They know, in fact, the
relevant precedents: they know that the director of an institute who
had had hired the former secretary of the, Prague Party organization
and this with the. explicit agreement of the Secretariat of the
Central Committee of the CPCS -- was later dismissed; and the city
committee of the party justified his.dismissal by the very fact
that he had taken on Bohumil Simon.
I worked in the aoparat of the party from 1947, except for
period 1964-68. If a private employer behaved in this way toward
um;m cone who worked for him for twenty years, he would be justly
condemned as asocial. If a French Communist could not find employ-
ment in his homeland, the French Communist Party would certainly
protest against this method of discriminating against citizens on
the basis of their political convictions. And when this kind of
think occurs within a party in power, in a.country which in its very
name defines itself as socialist, are we to consider-it normal,
just, natural, and even downright normalized?
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20
 CPYRGHT
AnnrnviPrl Fnr RPIPact 1 999/n9/n9 - C1A_RfP79_n119dAnnn9nnl gnnnl _d
Of course, you can-cite various declarations by yourself
and other representatives of the leadership in which it is affirmed
that those who have been expelled from the party also have the
right to work corresponding to their qualifications. I personally
know hundreds of persons expelled from the party, but there is not
even one of them who has been able to find work corresponding to
his qualifications -- unless you consider that a job measuring water-
levels is appropriate to the qualifications of a /former/ pro-
fessor of cybernetics. You are deceiving either yourselves or pub-.
lie opinion, domestic and foreign,"about the reality of the present
situation.
On 1 October last my wife, Eliska Skrenkova, special assistant
in the Faculty of Russian Studies at the University of 17 November,
was also dismissed. The management of the school had invited her to
rethign voluntarily, telling her that otherwise she would be dis-
mi`rDsed on the ground that she was "unworthy of trust." She replied
that, because her salary had been the only means of support for.the
family since 1 July, she could not agree to resign; and the Rector,
Otaker Taufer, then dismissed her without further ado on the ground
of being "unworthy of trust." Dismissal for being "unworthy of
trust," reserved for those who try to subvert'the socialist order
(evidently in the case of my wife it is possible to subvbrt the
socialist order by simply teaching Russian) makes it practically
impossible to-find other work of any kind.
oo, at a time when my own prospects of finding employment in e'situation marked by lay-offs, checks on non-party people, etc. -??
are minimal, we find ourselves facing the dismal prospect of being,
left at the end of the year without the indispensable means for main-
taining even minimal living standards. And 'on top of that we have
two sons whom we must not only .-Feed but also educate.
Thus, there has been created an atmosphere in which there is
no way out, an atmosphere which has brought more than one to madness.
In such a situation it is possible to understand the protest of the
poet, Stanislav Neuman, who lost all wish to live when the party
trampled underfoot the ideals for which he.entered the political
struggle; and so he committed suicide.-.
The men marked down are being destroyed materially and crushed
morally. You are tolerating a situation in which -- in violation of the
the Constitution -- a section of the public has been arbitrarily
deprived of all rights, including that of existence and that of de-
fending one's honor. We are outcasts in this society, and with
regard to us everything is permitted. I am not exaggerating: it
is literally true.
- Recently there was published the Slovak translation of the
book, Beware of Zionism!, written by Ivanov, to which Yevgeny
Yevseyev Mass adder a note on Czechoslovakia.- It came out in an
extremely large edition,-and-is being used as a basis for the prepara-
tion of party reports and to 'illustrate the zionist background of
the'events of 1968. The work has been produced by the party publish-
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 CPYRGHT
Approved For, Release 19g 2 I R
ing- house in Bratilava, and9 ~~ eye As~,CQ i'iQ~~1~90~@?~9?~@1~4
carried by the party journal Vvchodoslovenske N?lovinv (Eastern S1ovaKian,
Journal). In this wor~c`i am accusea or awing been one of
the leaders of zionist subversion in Czechoslovakia. Last spring I
had already been accused by Ta ncianskke Novi. (Trencin'Journal)
having been nothing less than one or the heads of the international
zionist plot," apparently because I had gone to Trencin to give
lectures and not to Tel-Aviv as the-guest of Ben Gurion (I may say
in passing that 'these were lectures on the need for a new constitu-
tional set-up in Czechoslovakia and for the return of Husak and others
to political life); at the time I let it go, considering it as a:
clumsy joke that didn't come-off.
But since similar absurdities are now being repeated with in-
creasing frequency in ever more important and influential organs, it
seems to me that there is no longer anything, much to laugh at.
This country experienced its first "Dreyfus affair" with the case
of Hilsner (he too, like Dreyfus, a Jew, and he too falsely. accused).
A second "Dreyfus affair" -- but a much more absurd and bloody one
was imposed on the country with the trials of Slansky and others.
Dn . you want it to-happen a third time, with all the concomitant
phenomena of poli`cal agony?
The above-mentioned Yevseyev talks about espionage and con-
spiracy, in a style worthy of a pupil of Beria. He includes me among
the members of a zionist club which was allegedly directed by a
foreign diplomat named Zucker. It is of course useless to try to'
defend oneself by objecting that it is hard to believe that an
Israeli diplomat could carry on such activity -- and still less
direct a club -- in a country which had broken off diplomatic
relations with Israel. It would be equally useless to make the
objection that in my whole life I have never known anyone called
Zucker. Perhaps I shall then have to confute the charge of
zionism by demonstrating my -- forgive me "pure aryan origin"?
For experts of the caliber of Yevseyev,.a diaeresis (Umlaut)
on the "u", the "a" or the "o" of the name, and even more the
fact that one condemns the anti-Semitic character of the trials
in the 'fifties, constitutes sufficient proof to establish the
Jewish origin of the accused. He evidently goes by the principle
established by the old anti-semite Lueger: "I decide who,is Jewish."
What a humiliation for a movement that has'had among its ranks.Marx,
Liebknecht, Luxemburg and Lenin!
At this point I must ask a question: are we to take as still
valid the resolution of the 1963 resolution of the Central Committee
of the CPCS, in which it wat declared that the trials of the
'fifties were falsely rigged-and that all the accused were free of:
guilt? This is certainly not a rhetorical question, now that the
Czechoslovak Government weekly Narodni Vvborv (National Committees)
has published in seven installments a rev it of this Soviet
work on zionism. This pamphlet has been published by Narodni
Vyborv in seven installments, numbers 34:to O. And you are poring
on tranquilly on while the party press and the government weekly are
preparing an atmosphere suited to a new series of political trials!
22
 CPYRGHT
Do you not at least realize that the trial of alleged
zionists in the 'fifties was directly linked with the trial of so-
called Slovak nationalists? Anyone who knows the way such
trials are managed can easily imagine how in an early phase Huebl
would be. questioned about his relations with Zucker in Kriegel's
club. As far as such an interrogation is concerned, the fact that
this club did not exist and that I did not know Zucker at all is-
of no importance. At a later stage, Huebl could be brought to
confess having acted as a link with the Slovak conspirators -- for
example, Husak's club. In a country which is like one great
Dionysian ear competent agents will certainly have documented
how often I went to Bratislava,.and how I regularly stopped in -
Ot rancov mieru-Street and then in 4a Ostravska-Street. In addition,'
they-will be able to cite our appearances together on television,
our frequent meetings and our common activity in the federative
commission.
I am not joking: I just want to impress on you with the
greatest seriousness that if you permit this campaign to keep on
developing, it will end by forming a tidal wave that will sweep
over your heads as well. It is not an accident that the ideologist
of the new trials, Lang, is already rebuking you,
saf =?; that "with your silence of complicity, holding yourselves
neutral between the two sides of the barricade, you seek to hide
the more or less important part which you played in the recent
events" (Narodni Vybory, No. 39,.p. 11). These circles take
the criticisms which you have expressed in Rude Pravo about
as seriously as the USA takes the 457th serious warning from
China! Through your preceding praise for the activity of the
Cechie circle, the ultra-Stalinist club founded after the
invasion, you have given your blessing to all this.
If you think I are exaggerating, consider the year that
has just passed and draw up a balance-sheet.
When twelve professors were dismissed from the Party
Political College in 1964, you described it as an arbitrary act
Ily Novotny, of the most serious kind; but 75 have been dismissed
in 19701
What has happened to your comrades who were imprisoned
with you in the 'fifties? All of them who had been rehabili-
tated again under Novotny are being once more expelled from
the Party, with the usual accusations being made against them.
Even their children are being expelled from the party.
Where are the members of the commissions who sought to
achieve their rehabilitation and yours? Almost.without excep-
tion, they have all been expelled from the Party and have lost'
their jobs.
Where are those political figures who worked for your
return to political life? Tray have been excommunicated and
deprived of any possibility of political action. Perhaps this
h sp `6~ipec 08r 'eI easer1 559 2t: %AFA 6`~T91d 19 Xb8O $OI 96sOH-4
 CPYRGHT
ve
M77 L '" rince: ne who elps:others to gain power is digging
a grave To- r himself." But Lenin insisted that party leaders
should behave loyally toward their comrades.
Where have these men-ended up? Who can say?
There is the other side: where are those who falsely accused
you, interrogated you, condemned you, imprisoned you, and finally
did all they could to prevent your rehabilitation? You know
better than anyone what positions they hold today, to what high
posts you are often obliged to appoint them..
You are caught in the fatal clasp of your former jailers.
Nevertheless, I would like to remind. you once more of how --
and it's not so long ago -- you and I found ourselves in agree-
ment with Marx's saying: "A revolution which, like Saturn',
devours its.own offspring, has taken the wrong road."
LE MONDE, Paris
20-21 February 1972
Approi
CPYRGHT
MR. MARCHAIS Q-IARGES MR. MITTERRAND WVITII BECOMING IDENTIFIED
IV 'H AN ANTI - CCU
have an impact on the French left as witness
the response, full of bitterness, that the
French Communist Party's politburo has sent
Francois Mitterrand, first secretary of the
French Socialist Party, on this subject. The
executive office of this party had issued on
9 February 1972 an appeal condemning the polit-
ical repression in Czechoslovakia and requesting
the authorities of that country to review "their
present positions." The national secretariat
had then transmitted this appeal to all the or-
ganizations of the left so that the latter might
become identified with it or might participate
in the formulation, in the same spirit, of an-
other protest.
It is in reply to this initiative -- whose
authors assert that it was in no way provoc-
ative -- that Georges Marchais, deputy secre-
tary general of the PCF (Parts Communiste
Francais; French Communist Party), wrote a
long letter to Francois Mitterrand in the
name of the French CP's politburo, a letter
made public on 18 February 1972. Mr Marchais
recalls the assurances given by Gustav Husak,
secretary general of the Czechoslovak CP, to
the delegates of the French CP as regards the
absence of political repression in his country
ed(1;00 FA 9410 bf ltWRDFI? 11a9J400020019000
1-4
 Approve Y G Lase 199910910-2 .
onsider a that the initi...ti1ro of the Social-
st Party is "111-found ee and untirmely."
;tor cnumeratinr- a bill of p :a ticulars
ainst tho Socialists re gating to facts
hat have nothing, io do u th prescnt events
n Czechoslovakia, Georges Marchais charges
rancois initter acid and his friends with
ivirg their support to an anti-communist
ampaigri.
ho tone of this letter is -fairly surprising
nd it astonished the Socialist leaders who
Lad just read with intoreat the statement of
he French CP's politburo. As.Claude Estier,
member of the Soc .aliat Party's national
ecretariat, noted on Europe 1 television net-
ork on Friday, the Socialists had seen in
he letter the confirmation of 'the fact that
the French coxzunist loaders were themselves
reoccupied by the situation in Czechoslovakia."
eorges Marchais' communication indicates at
,ly rate that they are extremely sensitized to
his problem and to its consequences in French
omestic policy.
CPYRGHT
After rejecting the Socialist protests, Georges Marchais
wrote the following in his letter to Francois Mitterrand:
"'you claim to be 'desirous of upholding in all places
and in all circumstances the right of individuals to criticize
and. to the free e ,session of their opinions even though these
be contrary to the established order.'
We note your claim with interest but are obliged to
find that your expressed concern has not always been corroborated
by facts.
"Accordingly, to restrict ourselves to a timely example,
you have not raised a protest against the scandalous decision,
taken recently by the Senate of Hamburg, to prohibit members of
the German Communist Party from being hired in the civil service,
that party still being banned in the German Federal Republic of
Willy Brandt.*
"The workers and democrats cannot fail to draw an analogy
between the lack of initiative that you often display ii the
defense of liberties 'in all places and in all circumstances'
and the haste that you have evidenced, thanks to our free press,
as soon as a socialist country is concerned.
*The .D_7: i7ri;117L1.iti:icho Par tai Deutschlands; Communist
Party of Germany), which ir. 1951 won only 2.2 percent of the
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25
 CPYRGHT
P?vreminrd youajgso
democrats have had to wage on numerous occasions an uphill
struggle against the repression of 'individuals' rights to
criticize and to the free expression of their opinions even though
these be contrary to the established order,' a repression that
was--also the result of governments in which men presiding over
the destinies of the French Socialist Party today used to partic-
ipate. This is incidentally why, beyond all polemics, if we
ourselves give democratic guaranties in our practice and our
proposals for the future, it behooves us to request same from
the Socialist Party."
Georges Marchais went on to recall the principles which
he holds, specifically the acceptance of criticism and challenge
expressed in legal forms. He added:
One cannot help wondering about the significance
of an initiative like yours. The latter, by reinforcing a
campaign with very evidently anti-communist overtones, cannot
but tend to raise new obstacles in the path of unity, to seek
new pretexts to delay once again the time for a political agree-
ment taking the form of a joint government 'program."
allots and thereby lost all its parliamentary representation,
was outlawed by the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe on 17
August 1956. This proscription was never lifted. However, a
new legal communist party, which inverted the letters in the
old set of initials and is known as the DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische
Partei; German Communist Party], was established in Frankfurt
on 26 September 1968 under the presidency of Mr Kurt Bachmann.
The DKP, forming a single front with various organizations of
the German extreme left, obtained at the general elections of
1969, under the banner of the ADF [Action for Progress and
Democracy], no more than 0.6 percent of the ballots cast. Its
offers of collaboration with the German Social Democratic Party
never met with any notable response.
LE MONDE, Paris
20-21 February 1972
CPYRGHT
L . ~ G -0c he AA9 kv4A .4 P%
Qt .OUTG d
s'cssocier a une cam agne anti-commuuist~e
,r sort (it, a c eeos m'agute na pas lint
de prser sur relui de in gartclie Irancaisr,
cotttmc en tdmoigne In reporse, lactic err
aigrenr. que Ir liurearr politique du parti
cornrnuniste viral d'adressrr h cc suict. a
M. Francois Alit trrrarid, premier sccrtllaire
du parts sociali.clc. Le bureau csdcutif de
ccl(c drrnidre formation anait tamed Ir
.u /errricr fin altne1 condamrtant in rdpresslon
poliliqur (,it Tehecoslovaquic at demandant
aux auto ties do cc pays de reviser (lours
po:;ftlons actuellea a ; le srcrdtariat national
await ensuile Iransrnis crt appcl a toutes Ies
srs a It t c it r s assurent qu'rlle n'avait rirn
dune provocation - qua M. Georges Mar-
ehais. secrdtaire general adjoint du P.C.V.
a. au noun du bureau potitique, ecrit une
longue I c t t r e a M. Francois Mitterrand,
lcltre qui a did rendue publique le 18 fdvrier.
M. Marchals rapprlle les assurances qui oat
dt(l dotndcs per M. Gustav Husak, secrd-
laire gdndral du P.C. tchdcosiovaque, aux
ddldguds du P.C.F. en cc qui concerne Cab-
sence de repression politiquc darts son pays
(la Monde date 19 /dvrier), et consid?re que
I'initlative du parts socialiste est a mat
slovaquie, M. Marcltais rcproche d M. Mit-
terrand ct a ses amts rt'apporter Ieur ran/ort
it une campagne anticommuniste.
Le ion de cetic lettre est asses surprenant,
at if a elonnd (as dlrigeants socialistes, qui
venaient de lire aver interdt la drlclaretion
die bureau potitique du P.C.F.: its y avaient
vu, comma M. Claude Esilar, membre du
secretariat national, 1'a notd vendredi a
Europe 1, la confirmation du fait qua a lea
dlrlgeants communistes trangals @tafent eux-
mames preoccupas par la situation an TchCco-
slovaquic n. La Icitre de M. Marchals montre
an tout cas qu'ils sont extrdmement aensi-
associrnt art qu'a hpq s st
VXA
ion. daps to mdinetc fiT ii TitT'atttl'e~td lea quI fl
L
A
.1eilconsdquen ces
yra gaise. - A. L.
 C~IY , d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00200190001-4
Aprrs avoir oppose une fin de
non-rccevoir h la proposition so-
cialiste, M. Marchais ecrit : a Volts
rows deciarcz a soucieux de main-
t> tenir an tolls lieux at an toutes
? circonstances le droit des intli-
? vidus it la critique at it la Libre
? expression de leers opinions,
? /assent-clles contraires it l'or-
a dre etabli ?,
? Nous an prenons note area
interdt, mats force est de cons-
tatcr que cc souci nest pas tou-
jours corrobore par Les baits.
? C'est ainst que, pour nous
limiter it un exempla actuel, vows
nc vous etas pas clever contra la
decision scandaleuse, prise reccm-
. ment par he S6nat de Hambourg,
de refuser l'acces de la fonction
pitbliquc aux tnembres du parti
contmuniste allcntand, lui-mama
toujours sous le coup dune inter-
diction dans la Republique fe-
derale allemande de Willy
Brandt (1).
? Us trarailleurs at Les demo-
crates ne pcuvent manquer de
mettre en par a i 10, 1 a l'ahsence
d'initiative dont vous faites sou-
tent prcurc s'agissant de la dC-
/ense des libcrtcs a en toes licux
BASLER NAQIRIQITEN, Basel
18 January 1972
n at en toutes circonstances n et
l'empresscment que vous mani-
festez, ,sue la loi d.'informations
incontrdldcs, des lors qu'il s'agit
d'un pays socialists.
? Notts vows rappelons Cgale-
ment que les communistes /ran-
cais at d'autres ddmocrates ont
ell it soutettir it maintes reprises
tine dure mite contra la repres-
sion du cc droll des indivld'us 4
la critique at d la fibre expres-
sion de (curs opinions, Jussent-
elles contraires d l'ordre etabli ?,
(1) Le part( communlste allemnnd
(K.P.D.) qui. en 1951, n'avalt obtenu
quo 2,2 r, des suffrages et perdu do
cc fait tottte representatlon pnrle-
mentnlre, a 6t6 Interdit par la Cour
constitutlonncllc do Karlsruhe, to
17 aoi,t 1956. Ccttc mosure n'a Jamnls
'6t6 levee, mats un nouveau parti
communiste Itgal Intervertissant lee
lcares du slgle, to D.K.F. it 6.0. fond(,
It Francfort to 26 septembro 1968
sous Is rp6sldcnce do M. Kurt Bach-
mann. to D.K.P. formant un front
commun aver dlverses organisatlonsi
(('extreme gauche n'n obtehu aUx
elections gen6rales de 1969, sous In
banniere de I'A.D.F. (action pour to
progres et 1% democrat(s) quo 0,6%
des sutfrnegs exprim6s. Sea offres do
collaboration avcc to parts soclal-
democrnto Wont Jamals trouT6 d'eoho
notable.
CPYRGHT
At official gatherings in Prague the consolidation process in
Czechoslovakia is described as "already completed." This seems to
be as much a part of the communist propaganda's world of lies as is
Husak's assertion that there have been no political trials in his
country since 1968. Last weekend the Czechoslovak regime found
itself obliged to admit officially that some 150 people had been impri-
soned in a wave of arrests during the last few days. Among those ar-
rested were Huebel, former director of the party academy, Pachman,
former world chess champion, and Kynzl, the well-known journalist.
They were all accused of having engaged in anti-government activity.
At the same time Czechoslovak Prime Minister Korcak in a speech to
factory workers in Prague issued a warning to all those seeking to
disturb relations with socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.
Thus, after three and a half years of Soviet occupation, the si-
tuation in Czechoslovakia can not yet be regarded as consolidated,
since the government is still forced to maintain peace and order by
intimidating the people with periodic mass arrests. Several actions
of this kind were carried out in the second half of last year alone, and
arrests have for years been part of the daily fare in this country under
the yoke of the Soviet Union. Thus last May about 2000 people were
arrested in Moravia. At that time Nova Svoboda, organ of the North
Moravian communist party praised the "good cooperation" between
people and police in this action carried out against "parasites."
repression qui Jut aussi le fall de
gouvernements auxquels partici-
paicnt des hommes qui president
aujourd'hui aux destincIcs du
parti socialiste. C'est d'ailleurs
pourquoi, au-dais de touts pold-
mtquc, st holes donnons nous-
mCmes des garanties desmocrati-
ques dans notre peatiquc et nos
propositions pour l'avenir, n ou s
sommcs /ondds it en rdclamer du
parts socialiste, ?
M Marchais rappelle les prin-
cipes auxquels it est attache,
notsmment l'ncceptation de la
critique at de In contestation s'ex-
primant dans les formes legales,
? et ajoute
a... On no pent que s'interroger
sur la signi/ication dune initia-
tive comma la vOire. Celle-ci. an
apportant ran/ort it une cam-
pagne aux motivations tres dvi-
demmcnt anticommunisles, no
pent que tcndre & dresser de
nouveaux obstacles sur le chemin
de l'unitd, it rechercher de nou-
veaux prdtextes pour retarder une
Jois de plus l'heure d'un accord
potitique prenant la forme d'un
programme commun de pouver-
nement. n
Approved Ew Releaasen'L9908 O2ilC .J D 7i9O14 4A O049@001-4
trials in which --hiefly intellectuals received draconian sentences.
 CPYRGHT
I Ap-gwedAort W-r?A ' MO/t4rZr (; RPg7q ,1,9s4hggQ204lg9qqII4
July for example, Professor Jaroslav Sedivy, Alois Polednak, Vaclav
Cerensky and his wife Dr Edita Cerenska, Dr Hubert Stein and Mrs
Milada Kubjasova, all recognized scientists and journalists, were put
on trial and accused of "subversive activity." The notorious trial ended
with their being sentenced to long prison terms of between two and 12
years. Even Pavel Licko, the prominent Slovak writer, was sentenced
at a secret trial by a Prague court at the end of August. Other long-
term prison sentences were also meted out to well-known writers and
journalists like Vladimir Skutina, Vladimir Vavra, Arnost Vrajik-
Prazak, and Vladimir Burda.
On 8 October 1971 the regime had the federal parliament pass a
new law on safeguarding state secrets and security. This was done
to assure it legally a free hand in carrying out terror tactics and to
have a two-fold deterrent effect by intensifying police methods. The
terror trials carried out on the basis of the new law are intended to
demonstrate not only the regime's power to arrest anyone and send him
to jail, but are also supposed to intimidate those who still dare to main-
tain contacts with foreigners or even make the slightest criticism of
the system.
It is certainly conceivable that the present wave of arrests is
related to the summit conference of Warsaw Pact states to take place
at the end of the month in Prague, and that the arrests are supposed
to prevent possible anti-Soviet demonstrations. Often before, Husak
has tried to muzzle his potential opponents by terroristic means prior
to important events. His purpose was to let the opposition elements
understand that those who do not submit to the goals of the Soviet rulers
will sooner or later have to reckon with political. removal and punish-
ment.
BASLLR NACHRICQiTBN, Basel
18 January 1972
Neue Verhaf fungs)velle in cler CSSR
r Regime m .terdri ckt jecle Opposition
Von unscrem Osteuropa-Korrespondenten
tml. Der het offis.icllen AnIissen in Prat stets nls
tthe rests obi rschinssen? hezcichnete Konsolidie-
rungsprnzess In der Tschechoslotvnkel scheltit
ehwtsn in die Liigemvelt der konununistischen Pro-
pni;anda zu gehhren vie die Ilehanptung llusaks,
das5 os in seinent Land sell, 19G8 keine politisehen
I'rozesse gegelmn Mille. Ant verzani;enen 'Vochen-
ende snh rieh they tvchccltuvlntvaleiecitc Rei;inte fie.
zwtntl;en, nun a.uch offizicll einzuGeK.tehen, doss fin
Laure oiner Verhafiungstvefle in den letzten Tagen
CPYRGHT
wieder 180 Personen, daruntor der frtihere Leiter
der I'artei-Akademie, Ilfibel, der ehemalide Sclinch-
weltnieister Pitchman and der heknnnte Journalist
Kynzi festgenommen wurden. Sic vile tvurden oppo-
sitioneller Tlitigkelt bese.huidlgt. Glcichzeitig
warnto der tschechoslowaklsche AIlnIsterpri sident`
Korcak in elner Redo vor Fabrikarbeltern in Prag
nlle jone Personen, die die Dezichungen in sozialintl-
schen Llindern, insbesondero in der Sowjetunion?
stdren wollen.
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 CPX ved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
Von diner Konsolidierunz drr Tae in der Tsche-
ehnclowalcri lcann a]sn Hach dreieinhalh Jai,..-en so.
wjetischer Pesctzung nosh immer nicht die Rode scin,
da die Regierung nach wit-, vor gez wangen 1st, die
I3evhlkerung llurch periodische Massenverhaftungen
cinzuschuchtern, um Rube and Ordnung aufrechtzu-
erhalten. Allein in der zweiten Htilfte de.o, vergange-
nen Jahres wurden mchrerc derartige Aktionen
durchgefhhrt, and Verhaftungen stehen scit Jahren
auf der Tagesordnung in diesern von der Sowjet-
union unt:erjocliten Land. So wurden zum 13eispiel im
Jolt let.zten Jahres in Mahren rund 2000 Personen
verhaftet. Das Organ der nordml:hrischen KP -Nova
Svoboda~ lobte damals die ^?gute Zusanvnenarbeit:>
zwischen der Bcvhlkerung and der Polizei bei diesen
gegen -Schmarotzer., durchgefuhrten Aktionen.
Im August folgte eine weitere Verhaftungsvmlle,
bei der laut offiziellen tschcchoslowakischen Mel-
dungen in insgesamt 4000 Fiillen IIausdurchsuchun-
gen durchgcf0hrt and 178 Personen festgenommen
Warden. Im November, kurz vor den sogenannten
^Wahlon?, versuchte das Regime, die Opposition
lurch lihnliche Aktionen einzuscht ehtern, denen un-
ter anderem der international anerkannte Histori-
ker Jan Tesar, der angesehene Philosoph Ladislav
Iiedjanok and der Historiker fatek zum Opfer fie-
len, die herelts 1969 mehrore Monate im Gefangnis
verhringen mussten,
Zur gleichen Zeit filhrte das Regime auch mchrere
Terrorprozesse durch, in denen vor allem Intellek-
tuelle drakonlsche Strafen erhielten. Es handelte
sich dabei jewellen urn geheime odor halbgeheime
Verfahren. So wurden zurn Beispiel im Jull Professor
Jaroslav Sedivy, Alois Polednak, Vaclav Cerensky
and seine Frau Dr. Edita Cerenska, Dr. Hubert Stein
and Frau Milady Kubjasova -- alles anerkannte
Wissenschaftler and Journallsten - vor Gericht
gestellt and der Sabana, and der Studentenfiihrcr Jrri
Muller, der sclion 1966 wegcn Kritik an Novotny,
aus der Partei ausgcschlossen worden war. Den
moisten Vcrhaftetcn wurde Vcrbreitung von
Fhrgbliittern vorgeworfcn. Die danialige Aktion
der Sichcnccitsorganc 1st zu Beginn dieses Jahres
offiziell bcstiitigt worden.
Angst vor Izutigranten
Eine ztreile Verhaftungsivellc folgte urn die
Jahrestvende. Wicder wurde dcn Bctroffenen die
I-ferstellung and Vcrbreitung fcindlicher Flug-
blatter vorgeworfen, aber auch andere castaats-
feindliche Aktionen> , wic die Bildung regime-
;egnerischcr Gruppen and die Absicht, den
KonsolidicrungsprozcS im Landc zu sti ren. fill
Zusammenhang, mit den damaligen Verhaftungen
sieht man auch the Fcs(nahmc des it alicnischen
Fcrnschjournalistcn Valerio Ochc'tto anfangs
Januar. Ochetto ist immcr noch in haft. ES wird
ihm (lie illegalc Ein- timid Ausfuhr gewisser
Schriftcn vorgeworfen and angedeutet, data cr als
Verbindungsmann zwisc}tcn den Reformanhiin-
gern in Prag and den exiliertcn Krcisen in Rom
um Jiri Pclikan, den friihcrcn Chef des Prager
Fcrnsehcns, gcdicnt hahe. Zu den ungcfiihr glcich-
zeitig vcrhafteten tschechoslowakischcn Pcrson-
lichkeiten, denen staatsfcindliche Tiitigkcit and
Vcrbindun"ert zu emigricrtcn Kreiscn wic auch
feindlichen aushinuischen Organisationen vorge-
worfen wurdc, gchoren A Mall Iliiehl, chenutliger
Reklor der Parteihochschufe, der bcrcits friiher
verschie(lentlich verhaftete Schachmeister Ludwik
Pachinarut, der chentalige Radiojournalist Karel
Kvncl and Jan Sling, Sohn des Hach deco
Slansky-ProzeS gchiinetcn Ota Sling.
In (fen leizlen Wochett and Tagen Sind wcilere
Pcrsonlichkciten festgenontmen worden, darunter
der friihcre Prager Parteisekrctiir Jiri Litrera, der
Historiker Karel Kaplan, der . Philosoph Karel
Kosik, der Malcr Hegr, die Journalistcn Vladi-
nrirNepras and Jiri Lederer sowic Rudolf Slansky,
der Sohn des friihcrcn Partcisekrctiirs Slansky.
Einzelne dicser Pcrsonlichkciten wic Kosik,
Slansky and Flcgr sind inzwischen, nach Mcldun-
gen der franziisischen Nachrichtcnagentur, wieder
freigelassen worden.
Bedcutend mehr Eindruck hat aber (lie Vcr
urteilung Jiri Ledcrers vor ciner Wochc hinter-
lassen, wail ihnt die zweijiihrige Gcfangnisstrafe
wegen kritischcr Aeul3erungen iihcr die Politik
Govnulkas aufcrlcgt wurdc - Acufierungen, die
er vor vier Jahrcn getan hat and die inzwischen
Approved For Release 1999/09/024 CIA-RDP79-01 194A000200190001-4
 uPr r~9ATFor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
von Merck selber offizicll wiedcrholt worden
rind. Daly cr nach so linger L.cit dcnnech wegen
sl3eleidigung einer belreundeten Nation> verur-
teilt wird, 1 diffamiert hiittcn.
Drci der Strafen wurdcn nach Angaben des Organs
der KP Nord nrilire ns, Tos~ow and
as the war may perhaps be won there Peking, the Vietnam war has lost some
 CPYRGHT
f its glamour tor the communist world
fter all these years. Soviet aid to North
Vietnam during [ 97 [ has been esti-
mated at about ?2I01n ; China's
ontribution was approximately half
that fgure. Much of the aid is required
imply to feed North Vietnam and keep
its economy afloat. But a large pro-
portion is directly earmarked for the
war effort, which would collapse with-
out it. If, as is widely believed, the
oviet 'Union intends to ask President
ixon for technological help during his
oscow`. visit in Mav, he might suggest
that the' Russians should stop sending
o many , resources to Vietnam.
The group in Hanoi which advocates
ANEW YORK TIMES
17 February 1972
a quick crack at victory is thought to
be led by Truong Chinh, the party's
chief theoretician. The defence minister,
General Vo Nguyen Giap, has also
been associated with talk about main-
force warfare and decisive leaps for-
ward-a contingency for which the
North Vietnamese army has recently
shown signs of preparation along the
borders of South. Vietnam.
The opposing school, which favours
a long-drawn-out preparation for
victory while rebuilding the north,
seems to be led by the party secretary,
Le Duan. It may well be that this uiew
currently prevails. It is interesting that
the North Vietnamese did not in the
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
end launch the offensive they were
expected to make in February, even
though they completed the necessary
preparations. The obvious explanation'
at the time was that the leaders in
Hanoi realised that the attack would
probably fail. But it is equally plausible
that in a see-saw debate within the
politburo the advocates of the long
haul had it called off because it would
have been too expensive. In South
Vietnam this week President Thieu
ordered his troops to put more stress
on smaller-unit guerrilla warfare. He
believes the communist command has
decided to revert to guerrilla tactics.
P"i IT 7r
1 '.. L,a C',-&
By FOX Inu-V 1TI'. LI)
$; I to T. :e_:'. .,?k T,n`.?,
iG-\Vhen Pt. Bud Van Aub'ft
his native village near Ifanoi
last fall tai begin the long march
to South Vietnam, he ra~?s, his
parents and re1 ttives cried for,
a long t.im. For no soldier;
from their village had ever re-t
turned after infiltrating; into the
South.
Private Au's jr,`rrncy ended
three days ago ',.hen his cf>m-
pany of RO nlrn will
by an Anlrriran of ?^r . tioni
plane In the Central 11:~11il::ndra
near Hontum. Air atrikra
called In, killing alnsn.t all of~
his contfades, and Private Au
was captured by an American!
helicopter pilot who swooped
down on the survivors.
Priv,1te All, who says his Tills-I
lion was to bolster North Viet-'
namcsa strength in the Higit-!
lands in preparation for a raa-!
jor offcnsivc, dis,c,issecl his ex-I
periences on the Ho Chi ?.1inh
Trail in, an unusual Interview
today. Ip the past, the South
ictnamese Army has selrlom1
allowed interviews with enemy)
prisoners.
Although the Central Hi^11-
iands has remained quiet this,
week, American and South
ictnamcse.officials in Pleiku,,
he hcadquarter3 of 'Military
eglon IT, which Includes the
entral iri;:'rla !' lit ^.
,r ~. rt. - i J ?,.. -:1 A rt J' j J"ry ?` ! y ~\ ' S j-: ,
r7 t~ A ...'... 4. +. 'til ~-t r.
licvc that t1. C: , eii c i will
ilaunr} :+ ;,r ',"A by.
D1vi ;ton InMlratcd
Till c:pt, c cf Private Au,i
and the di~covcry that his unit,
the 30113 Div;: on, had just in-
filt.ratrd Into hontum Province
the expectation that Hanoi)
would launch its predicted Teti
offensive in the highlands. I{
"Actually, the Tot oflenshe
has already h-gun" said John
Paul Vann, iii" chief Americlal
official in Military 12r,1ion 11.1
"It he;gin last neck with a
series of s;nall-:scale zit: cks in
13inhdinh Province on the coast
and
an attempt to cut the
highway up to the Highlands."
Mr. Vann, a short, intense
man, believes that some of the'
isolated South Vietnamese
Ranger camps along the. Cam-
:hodinn and Laotian homers,
such as Lcnhct, may be tem-
porarily overt un.
But, he argued, the disparity
Is great between what the Com-
munists have told their men
they will do and what they
are now capable of achieving.
The Communists have contc-
where bete.-con 35,000 and 60,-
000 inen, most of them regular
North Vietnamese soldiers, in
the mountainous, - iungle-cov-
crrcC':nt:il lti"iil,lnds.
But Pit! South _ Vietnanlesel
sou tl` can 'veil prepart:dfor
d"y ive, 1%11- , ;trill as-
serts. "Actually, I welcome a
Communist offensive," he said.
"For after the enemy expends
himself and loses many of his.
men, be has to stay quiet un-
til next year and rives us n
n ro .
Sinc a prolonged North
Vietnamese siege of Fire Bases
5 and 6 In Kontum province
last' spring, enemy activity in
the Central highlands has been
at it.; lowest level since the
build tip of the war In IDG5,
Mr, Vann added.
Private Au, who was inter.
vie ed with another member of
his unit, Private Ngtrvnc van
Minh. in South Vietnamese
headquatersin Pleiku,appeared
tired and nervous, but in good
health. He spoke through a
South Vietnamese Army
inter-preter.
A slight, boyish-looking 20-
'ycar-old with close-cropped hair
and iii easy smile, Private Au
said that 1115 officers had told
him very little about conclitions~
in South Vietnam, except that
his trait Was to help liberate
the South Vietnamese from the
Americans.
"At hone In my village, the'
people didn't pay much atten-i
tion to the war,".hc. "id. "The
war has been going on so long,
who kno','s when It will end.
Be idr's, thcv are more in-
terested In ntantin-, their rinnnt'
Private Au, who was drafted
lost May. explained that he had
not been happy nhout Joining
the army. "None of the soldiers
from my tillage who have gone
off to the South have ever re-
ts cd and
only one time when anyone in
the village got a letter from a
relative who had been sent
south." Private Minh 'told a
;similar story.
Other North Vietnamese prin.
oners have previously reported,
that until the last year or two
the Ito Ciii Minh Trail network
has been largely it. one-way
(street, with few soldiers ever
going hack to the North.
Private Au's unit marched
during the day, but it was hard
going, with steep mountains
and mud up to the men's knees.
,At first they got food, at sta-
tions along the way, but as
they moved farther south they
were given only rice and salt
and were often hungry.
"We could hear air strikes
In the distance," Private Mink
reported, "hut we never expe-
rienced any ourselves until
three days ago. The worst
problem was the fear-we
didn't know what to expect-.
and all the marching. We got so
tired.
2'
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002001906g1 Y4GHT
U IE ECONaII ST
19 February 1972
They had a holiday while
they waited
A volley of fireworks lit up the Saigon
sky on Monday night, but it was not
the much-rumoured Tet offensive.
People were just trying to frighten
away evil spirits at the start of the
Year of the Rat. With both sides
having declared a ceasefire for the
lunar new year-the communists for
four days, and the South Vietnamese
and the Americans for 24 hours-the
fighting had stopped.
Well, not quite. A few minor
guerrilla attacks were reported in
various parts of South Vietnam, and
the Americans' B-52 bombers were
diverted to Laos for an intensified
bombardment of the I-To Chi Minh
trails. But despite all the recent
speculation about a major communist
offensive, officials in Saigon were not
expecting trouble before the end of
the week. The phrase " Tet offensive "
has stuck in people's minds ever since
the bloody events of 1968, but the
hopeful guess is that the communists
have little to gain from an onslaught
during Vietnam's main family reunion
of the year except the element of
urprise. And this year, unlike 1968,
South Vietnam's army was on full
alert all week.
At the beginning of the week
mcrican and South Vietnamese
dicers were picking Sunday, February
TT IL ECONOI`IIST
19 February 1972
The electronic war
the gEdge s
loth, as the likelier date for an attack
that is the day before President
Nixon's arrival in Peking. North
Vietnam has not concealed its anxiety
about the shift of Chinese policy
towards the United States last year,
and the uneasiness persists in Hanoi
despite assurances of undiminished
support from Peking. It is now becom-
ing quite clear that China considers
Russia, not the United States, as the
greatest threat to its security. And
Russia is the chief arms supplier to
North Vietnam, and currently the
most active supporter of its persistent
search for total military victory.
The fear in Hanoi is that Chinese
suspicions of Soviet intentions in Indo-
china could provide the ground for
a narrowing of the gap between
Chinese and American ideas about.
how to end the war. 'So it is highly
desirable for North Vietnam to provide
an unfavourable backdrop for Mr
Nixon's talks in Peking : an offensive
that calls into question the -success of
Vietnamisation, sets off a new wave
of breast-beating and defeatism
in America, and 'te11s Chou En-lai that
'Vic'tory lis close and therefore not to
be compromised.
An offensive which coincides with
the Nixon visit might achieve these
aims, and also spoil some of Mr
Nixon's favourable publicity at home.
But if it started too early the Saigon
government nm'i;g+ht have time to got
on top of it while MT Nixon is stdi91
in Peking, thus proving his conten-
tion that vietnan- isation is working.
At any rate, that is the reasoning used
in Saigon to explain the fact that
things were still so quiet on Thurs-
day morning.
North Vietnam's other main target,
of course, is vietnamisation itself. The
communists' concern over this
programme is revealed in their policy
statements, including their refusal to
negotiate a political settlement unless
Vietnamisation is stopped. A really
successful attack now could have a
decisive demoralising effect on
Saigon's forces before what is expected
to be a final all-out communist cam-
paign a year from now.
As the Tet holiday drew towards
its close this week, the men in the
military planning offices conceded that
the North Vietnamese might be strong
enough to launch spectacular assaults
in three regions : just south of the
demilitarised zone, in the central high-
lands around Pleiku and Kontum, and
in the provinces around Saigon. But
they were still waiting, with fingers
crossed, to see when it would start,
how rough it would be--and even
whether the big thing might be put
off until the autumn.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
ovea,
the American command now has more
sophisticated methods of assessing
enemy activities than relying on
hunches and anniversaries. The elec-
converted General Westmoreland to the
idea of their wider use.
The most common form of sensor is
shaped like a torpedo, with antennae
made of green plastic which hh?nc1 in
trails is in full swing. the Laotian jungle. When dropped
:vcr since the 1968 Tet offensive the g. from tl- the ,
mcricans have got anxious at about juice lqt)b the Americans have laid sensor is buried and records the
his time of year. But this year their a $3,000111 electronic network along movement of men or vehicles passing
rrecautions have gone to unusual the communists' supply route from by. There are also acoustic sensors,
engths. They have brought another. North Vietnam. The development of which pick up noises above ground,
tircraft-carrier to the Vietnam coast ; electronic warfare for Vietnam began and a host of other devices implanted
wore I3-52s have been put into Guam earlier, under Mr McNamara. But it on the trail : metal del ctors to dis-
nd the born
iyy~~~~.,, ~tt }~, }~v 1; QX1 ns, magnetic
o be Jul rpiK* ofbr~fhe prTegaS~c~i4dt?rYgO et ct-eneOm~yltiro~ u9 194 ,~O QDe1N9~,~ea truck is
licted communist offensive has been the siege of Khe Sanh in 1868 that coming or
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
up trucks' ignition, and the notorious
" people-sniffers." These eerie devices
are said to detect the ammonia in
human urine.
The sensors and their like are laid
in patterns parallel with the , Ho Chi
Minh trails. Their signals are relayed
back to computers in Thailand which
can then calculate the number of men
or vehicles, their speed, distance apart
and direction. The patterns of signals
built up by the computers can reveal
other subtleties. For instance, a convoy
which -takes an unexpectedly long time
to pass a set of sensors may reveal
that there is a truck park in the area ;
a southbound convoy which stops and
then heads back towards the north may
indicate a dump ; and silence from
the sensors may- mean that the North
Vietnamese have constructed another
bypass.
Once the targets are identified, it is
up to the bombers from the four
American bases in Thailand and the
jets flying off the Seventh Fleet's
aircraft-carriers to attack them. The
most common bomb is the 750 lb
blockbuster. But there are other bombs,
as ingenious as the sensors : bombs
with radar, TV, and laser guidance.
built in. There is also the particularly .
destructive "mother" bomb which
rains smaller bombs over a wide area.
One form of bombing is ",geological
bombing." Geological faults are sur-
veyed and then bombed in the hope
of causing landslides across- part of the
trails.
Airborne gunships have been fitted
up with computers which relate
automatic-sighting devices, such as
infra-red radar for night work, to the
actual firing. In all, it makes up a,
much more precise system of bombing
than anything the Americans had four
years ago. As General Westmoreland
once mused, " I see combat areas under
24--hour surveillance where we can
destroy anything we locate through
instant communications and almost
instantaneous application of firepower."
That, at least, is the theory. Whether
it works in practice is another matter.
The United States Air Force claims
that it destroys almost 85 per cent of
all war material coming down from.
North Vietnam. Even more impartial
observers estimate that the ow a ong
the Ho Chi Minh trails is 40 per cent
less than in previous years. But there
is a cost.
Probably the number of non-
combatants killed and wounded is
small ; there have never been many
people living in the tangled hills
through which the trails run, and most
of them fled from the fighting some
time ago. But the damage to the
countryside is great. Large parts of
eastern Laos, north-eastern Cambodia
and the north-west of South Vietnam
are now virtually free-fire zones. The
days when targets in Laos and Cam-
bodia had to be carefully checked out
with the authorities in Phnom Penh
and Vientiane have pretty well gone.
Now the computers in Thailand do it
all.
Yet it seems likely that the new
capital-intensive war will go on for
some time. The Americans' casualties
in this aerial war are tiny. And is any
politician going to campaign on a
bring back the sensors " platform in
" bring United States ?
The following are excerpts from news dispatches of January, February and Mardi 1972.
CPYRGHT
DAILY TELEGRAPII, London
8 February 1972
By IAN WARD in Saigon
Waves of Coll CCtlil'C vicinity of Knntnm city, and with
According to the South Viet- them upwards of 50 tanks. Nearby,
amese high command, Hanoi's in lli,ih Dinh, loner a Viet Con;
military re -deployment over the stronghold and South Vietnam's
past two months has resulted in least pacified province. Communist
at least five and probably seven agents are busy organising " up-
infantry divisions inside South rising committees" whose activ--
Vietnani or in adjacent border tics they clearly intend to ce-
areas. A further breakdown reveals ordinate with the coming offensive.
the Fifth, Seventh and Nin'1i Finally, further north, the 3001 i
Divisions - originally Viet Con;; Division has returned to the de-
units but now comprising 80 per militarised zone after assisting in
cent. North Vietnamese regulars- flood relief throughout the Red
stationed in Fastern Cambodia rlivrr delta of Norih Vicbiarin..
within walking distance of some of This time 1vas1unhtnn9ehas rbd -
Smith Vietnam's most important cided to encourage
population centres. from Saigon's bevy of instant
Hanoi's 320th Division, usually experts-television reporters and
based in the Toll epona area of the newspaper journalists. The reason-
Laos panhandle, has heen sig'c'rd ins is simple. In an election year
in the Communists' base area f1O11 it is far better to prepare the
near the tri-bor(Ier. T'he Second American public for torrid battles
T)ivision, code-named NT2, than have these erupt un-
formerly operational on the cen- announced as in 1968.
tral coastal plains, is in the same At least the psychological impact
reion, of heavy South Vietnamese
some r(Qivod,,F,ortRejeas&4i999i0$ 2 sRO 9-01
are known to he in the general, what-even though
shown that the first sign of trouble
will automatically be interpreted
by the Western Press as yet
another Government debacle.
Currently on offer is a complex
battle strategy-a drive at the
central highlands to suck in
Saigon's strategic reserve, a feint
at the capital city itself and a push
to the coast along Route Nine,
slicing off a chunk of Quang Tri
province-a sort of thinking man's
guide to Communist intentions.
That three predicted commence-
ment dates for the offensive have
come and gone without incident
in no way diminishes the waves
of conjecture.
Optimists within the Government,
and particularly in the Saigon high
command, insist that the South
Vietnamese military will not only
prove the validity of Vietnamisa-
tion and pacification in the coming
weeks, but will go on to demon-
strate that 1972 is, for all intents
1'~~b"b~1tri4ber e o
 CPYWKoved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
pointers to success.
High on the list are the remark-
able strides made 1 v the '['hieu
administration in terms of 'eneral
political control. Saigon would not
) e nnrm;al withmit a Iiberal
sprinIs]ing of anti-Government
fervour, yet the fact remains that
flirro is no viable alternative to
Ihiru. Anil this has never been
leper appreciated by the
pposition groupings than at this
nomen t.
Viel:namisation and pacification
are also considered plusses for the
mnvernment despite the outpour-
'111E WASHINGTON POST
9 February 1972
j! "s from sceptics who insist that
bn h activities merely maintain
facades of success.
Prorran;,iies of this nature,
which must retain standards while
continuing their expansion, are,
by definition, delicately balanced.
Setbacks in one field or another
tend to i7roduce a string of alarm-
in * statistics, readily available and
open to limitless speculation.
That the war, for the past 1.8
months, has been fought essentially
outside South Vietnam's borders-
on the battlefields of Cambodia
and Laos-is a testament in itself.
Viet Pr
vin'c e
1 e
JP
a~
By Peter Osnos
Washlnctan Post Foreien Service
QUIN]ION, Feb. 8-The
order has gone out to all gov-
ernment forces In Binhdinh
province that any soldier
seen carrying a weapon but
not wearing a helmet can be
shot on the spot.
The reasoning behind this
drastic regulation . is that
enemy troops In the past
have managed to infiltrate
close to villages and milt-
tary outposts by donning gov-
ernment uniforms easily
purchased in marketplaces.
"You , see, now, we will
break the Vietcong plan,"
Col. Nguyen Van Chuc, Binh-
dinh's province chief said
with a grin the other day.
"They cannot find helmets
(or boots for that matter) so
they cannot fight."
For weeks now, Binh-
dinh, a populous coastal
province about 200 miles
north of Saigon and one of
South Vietnam's least se-
cure areas, has been braced
for a surge of enemy activ-
ity.
Indeed, many here In
Auinhon, the provincial capi-
tal, are predicting a full.
scale offensive. One cap-
tured document said the
date would Le Jan. 27. Now
senior Americans fix tlae
date as Feb. 10. Others make
it even later.
Reinforcement
Among the signs of trou-
A-k
ble in Binhdinh are Intelli-
gence reports that a North
Vietnamese regiment re-
cently crossed into the prov-
ince from neighboring
Quangnnai to join the two
regiments alrcad} there.
A 13-?vear?old North Viet-
namese soldier, who de-
fected to the government be-
cause he was weak from ma
laria and discouraged about
ever getting home again, de-
scribed in detail ]low his
unit spent six months train-
ing in the Binhdinh jungles
for an assault they were told
would come.on Feb. 16, the
second day of the Tet new
year holiday.
"Cadres said this would
be the big year," the soldier
said In an interview at the
Having said this much. eve.,, the
optimists concede the. ce tit ai
nature of world public opinion as
fashioned by Press reports emanat.
ing from Saigon. No one appre-
ciates better than they horv Tot
19F8, the Cambodian invasion and
last year's Laos fighting became of
incalculable propaganda value, to
the Communists.
Their confidence over the put.
come of the Government's bathe.
field strategy does not extend to
the war for international public
opinion.
CPYRGHT
government center for
defectors. "We would have
to go Ill' out this year or the
war would drag on for an.
other five."
Moreover, the South Viet-
namese secret police epn-
firmed in December that
Vietcong political cadre
were busily engaged in or-
ganizing "general uprising
committees" and Instructing
people to make preparations
for a big attack,
If what the Communists
really do have in mind is an-
other T&-style military of.
fensive, with the kind of
popular uprising that failed
to happen in 1968, then Binh-
dinh, is certainly one of
the best places In Sokith
Vietnam to go all out.
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THE ECONOMIST, London
13 January 1972
Confidence in Saigon
r
expectation that the communists will make some sort of attack during the next few
weeks. At the moment, the fighting is largely confined to the far north and extreme south.
The general picture is one of increasing prosperity. Transportation and commerce
are flowing throughout the country, with the outgoing American troops being rapidly
replaced by incoming `carpet-baggers', sniffing possible big profits in the near future.
Both politically and economically, Saigon now sees itself in a position of strength.
The controversial election of last October is now fading; in the public's memory; the
new austerity measures are being pushed and accepted; the countryside is almost at
peace; foreign money is coming in; oil drilling is about to start; and adequate continued
support from the United States, both military and economic, is reasonably assured -
thanks in no small measure to astute tactics by Pham. Kim Ngoc, the economics
minister, whose new schedule of `tiered' exchange rates neatly hung the Vietnam
albatross around Washington's neck.
If anything, there is perhaps an excess of ebullience. The new draft investment law
is couched in terms which suggest that its authors imagine that foreign capital is fighting
to get in; the terms for repatriation of profits are not sufficiently attractive to lure
investors, who have many other options. Second thoughts are now surfacing.
As President Thieu and his advisers see it, a democratic structure will be main-
tained but the future of the country will be in the hands of the army; there will be no
more well-meaning but starry-eyed meddling by Washington to change this basic
reality. There will be no, demobilisation, and hence no significant unemployment.
The surplus manpower of the armed forces will be used increasingly on development
projects, but the armed forces will remain around their present strength for a long time
to come. Thicu's scenario is that, if there should be a `Peace of Amiens' for a few years,
South Vietnam should be ready, to take the communists on, if and when they reopen the
war in the late 1970s or 1980s. His more hawkish supporters. talk seriously about a
South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam -'next time'.
All this may look like rhetoric to western observers - but it is a far ?cry from the
mood of January, 1968. At the moment Thieu has probably firmer control than ever
before. South Vietnam is gearing itself for a possible communist attack - but also for
foreign business.
BALTIMORE SUN
12 March 1972
Pentagon cliuigs to the view
t .:gat a Hanoi offensive is likely
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Forecasts of attacks General Westmoreland said He noted that the military before the presidential election
during a Vietnam visit January forces had to develop their herein
Forecasts of possible attacks 31 that there was "every indi- plans on the basis of the capa- The officials proved to be
in February-in part designed bilities being ? shown by the fur. wrong in the timin
to insulate the public against cation" the enemy was prepar- y g predicting ~
Pased on Mr. Laird. too, spike at the for the first attacks but not,
I ing for an
offensive.
Shock effects-had came from
"
end of January of
several (en- authorities say, in their esti-
intelligence,
estimates, this
114elvin R
Laird
he Secretar
.
, t
y could come in February. "indi- emy) spectacylars THIS YEAR, mate of the enemy build-up,
of Defense, Gen. William C. { cations" were that it would probably some time in Febru- which is still going on.
W It l d l A h' f'
l
t
es
ore an ,
ie tiny c ~e come, in the highlands and ary, and undoubtedly against There is thus no chortling In
of staff, and U.S. Officials in rt rn bond r this summer and so - as there has
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been in some areas, over the,
failure of an offensive to mater-
ialize as yet..
"All the evidence shows the
enemy is building the capability'
for an offensive," a well-placed
Defense Department source
said. "There are even larger
forces in place than there were
a few weeks ago. Units long in
South Vietnam are being beefed
up. We don't have the enemy's
plans, but we'll believe the cap-
ability fpr attack has subsided
when we see those divisions
move away."
The ep emy divisions (usually
numbering 8,000 to 10,000 men)
believed preparing for attacks,
six in all, are strategically lo-
cated along the Ho Chi Minh
trail opposite the northern part
of South Vietnam, with some
elements inside the country,
and opposite Military Region 3.
Opposite Khe Sanh
The 304th Division is reported
opposite Khe Sanh in the far
northwest, the 324th near the A
Shau Valley, and the 320th part-
ly in the Central Highlands, and
partly in the enemy's so-called
B-3 front in the tri-border area
where Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam meet. A fourth divi-
sion, the 305th, has moved
down from Vinh and is avail-
able across the buffer zone.
These farces are in addition
to smaller units normally based
in the 13-3 front.
The other three divisions, the
5th, 7th and 9th in eastern
Cambodia, have moved closer
to the border of the 3d Military
Region.
Officials can only offer their
best judgment as to why an
enemy in an attack posture has
not actually attacked. They are
heavily persuaded, however,
that serious disruption of the
foe's schedule was caused by
the aerial counteraction.
Systematic strikes
This began with systematic
B-52 strikes in mid-January and
was bolstered in mid-February
by Air Force and Navy fighter-
bomber attakcs.
There was also the increased
readiness of the South Vietnam-
ese ground forces, making it
additionally difficult for the foe
to achieve the sort of surprise
that it managed in Tet, 1968.
And there remains the simple
explanation that this may not
.have been the time chosen by
Hanoi for attacking.
An authoritative analysis
holds, however, that it is hardly
possible the Allied forces were
victims of a hoax, given the
knowledge at hand of battle,
orders and extensive battlefield
preparations.
Rise in enemy rak
There was no visible oi posi-
tion to hold off because ,cif k res-
ident Nixon's visit t) China,
according to this reasoning, and
in fact there was a rise in
enemy rinds in andaround pop-
ulation centers after Tat. In
mid-February. These raids
proved to be unimpressive,
however, and analysts conclude
the enemy tried to mount some
attacks but that the plans
flopped.
The effort to build up
strength near population cen-
ters continues, hand-in-hand
with the bolstering of division
forces near the borders, it is
said.
All authorities continue to ex
press confidence in the South
Vietnamese ability to cope with
the attacks when and if they
cone, assuming the continuing
availability of American air
support.
NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1972 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
AnyEnem, Offensive Expected to Be Long
By WILLIAM IBI'.ECHER
Fprcikr to rht Ntw York Tinua
Troop Shifts Described
they expect the offensive to bel
focused close to sources of sup-
ply. Operations in the southern]
as hinted in recent rrcsrnentlai
speeches, has not been decided,
the officials said.
."A?t if Tl..rth V'nrnam mm.nc
North Vietnam could well
view t at as en anc
hhin
the
The intelligence data on .a; "' " """"' "` ,
which the. Pentagon officials 'Probably Into May' ranrag r 5 , 1 1 u , prospects o to emiden t
base their projections of North expect a decision to bomb sup- candidates for the Presidency,
Vietnamese intentions over the The continued movement porting supply targets as far most of whom, according to the
into the northern end of the up the peninsula of North Viet Pentagon theory, might be ex-
next few months report the re- i eline, the analysts add, leads nam as is necessary to stop the'
cent movement of three divi- p p petted it pledge a quick and
le . t 3'lOll. the 424 B btoons the will not conclusion end that after that a opera- week we'flow.d, That, at recommend to least, theis'Presiwhat; forces. Alternatively, of American
stuns`tr
. Alternatively, if Presi-
and the 304th-into positions
along the Laotian-South Viet- or two of heavy fighting. We dent. dent Nixon considered his re-
along for repeated assaults
namese border: a fourth, the The Political Advantages election endangered, rlie a might
, is reported poised just throughout the dry season, decide to shirt hift his strategy tt-
309th, the northwestern end of probably into May,' a general The analysts say that, from take the issue away from his;
said. Hanoi's perspective, an cffet Democratic rival.
.
bput 50,000 replacement the intelligence reports said Live campaign this spring and The prospect of :r series of
that the. flow Of trucks along summer might offer a real pros-, enemy attacks this spring, pare
troops are said to be strung out the Ito cm Minh Trail in 1.8ns pert of eliminating the last 'ticnlarly in the. Central High-j
aloe the infiltration "pipeline" is at record lev"ls. with each vestiges of American force and
from North Vietnam through lanes and the northern prow
Laos. Since the trip normally truck Carr}in> ^hout four tons making moot the question of laces o of South Virtni m, has
takes about three months, the of supnties. In two nights last the United States presence as
1)(-n r:n ,rested in recent weekSi
replncentents should enter week, it was said, American a negotiating issue.
gunships damaged about ^00 The officials believe the North by the President, the Sense-
South Vietnam in February, ` Vietnamese have concluded that varies of State and Defense,
March and April, the intel- trucks a night. the political advantages of such Mr. Kissinger and various gen-
ligence reports say. "This won't stop the flow." a result would outweigh what- erals and civilian advisers.
The level of infiltration, up an analyst said. "They merely ever military risks might be en- More recently some local of-
more than 10 per cent over last feed more trucks into the sys- tailed. They analyze North Vi- ficers in the field, Vietnamese
year, appears channeled toward tem. But it reduces and slows etnamese thinking in this way: and American, have said they
units in the northern half of the delivery effort, without Besides embarrassing Presi- believed the speculation had
South Vietnam rather than doubt." dent Nixon during his visit to been overstated.
those in Cambodia and the The American planners be- Peking starting Feb. 21, bloody Brig. Gen. Pham Van Phu,
southern Half, as were most lieve that United States and; combat after a hiatus of nearly' commander of South Vietnam's
replacements last year, intel- South Vietnamese fighter-bomb- four years should rekindle the First Division, at Hue, voiced
ligence analysts gay. They dig- erg could play a decisive role in Vietnam issue during the Presi- doubt that the North Vietnam-
cern plans for major combat ini efforts to meet the expected dential campaign. Widely pub- ese in his sector would be
the t' Ao northern n;1.t,toryassaults }fir out y~ a
gionsAp uirQll/tw ref ease,., W6/41 Rr4~c~ic e?e ,t suppLacd to begin
Because they believe tile. Lion heavy strikes against sup- mi ht convince the American n a o o Pensive for at least
nearby hind
enemy's supplies are deficient, ply depots in North Vietnam, 7 public that Mr. Nixon's Policy i a mander couple of f the months.
The Third
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Division, Brig. Gen. Vu Van
Giai, voired similar doubts.
Officials in Washington say
that even though enemy forces
do. not have what a cautious
planner would regard as req-
uisite supplies for a major
assault, they may still be or-
dered to proceed, depending
more than usual on infiltration
for enough ammunition and re-
placements to continue tha
attack.
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April 1972
RUSSIFYING RELUCTANT SOVIET NATIONS
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which exploits to the
fullest propaganda possibilities of all anniversaries, has issued
a decree for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of
the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922. Like the year-long tedium
of the Lenin Centenary in 1970, this "celebration" will also
serve an ulterior purposes Just as the Lenin anniversary attempted
to revive the moribund religion of Leninism and use it to reunify
all Communist parties under direction of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, this year's special effort is to insure continued
Russian domination of the non-Russian minority nationalities of the
Soviet Union.
With cavalier but typical disregard for the facts, the decree
states (according to TASS international, 21 February, attached),
"The Soviet Union is an embodiment of relations of unity and friend-
ship of free peoples, that history has never seen before," and "all
the peoples of the country have come to see by their own long
experience how rich are the fruits of unity," and "the Marxist-
Leninist teaching on the nationalities question has stood the test
of practice and the Leninist nationalities policy has won a com-
plete victory." Those familiar with Communist style will recognize
that such exaggerations are the most necessary when they are the
least accurate. Certainly Communist parties around the world, to
whom Soviet Russia presents itself as the only model, recognize
the falsity of such words. So do the nationalities coerced and
dragooned into the Soviet Union; they are the most affected and
least deceived.
The 50-year effort to dominate and Russify these subject
peoples is one of the cruelest sagas of modern imperialism and
one of the least known Within seven years of establishing the
new Soviet Union, many old non-Russian Bolsheviks had been purged--
The constitution had affirmed the republics' right to secede but
Moscow had made it clear that each republic was considered an
inseparable part of the USSR. In the 1940's Stalin moved whole
populations* (including Communist Party and Komsomol members) out
of the Caucasus and Crimea to Soviet Asia, ostensibly for collab-
orating with invading Germans. The death toll of these long
The most prominent nationalities were Balkars, Chechens, Ingushi,
Kalmyks, Karachai, Meshketians, and Crimean Tatars.
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marches went well over 40%! One scholar, Robert Conquest,** esti-
mates conservatively that 1,650,000 people were deported from their
ancestral homelands in addition to 200,000 Germans who had moved
into the Volga farmlands after World War I, Incredible as it seems,
neither the mass deportations nor even the existence of these
nationalities were mentioned in the Soviet press from the migration
period until 1956, the year Khrushchev exposed many of Stalin's
crimes. They and their homelands simply ceased to exist. Russians
and Ukrainians were quickly moved in to fill the vacuum and place
names were changed, The Russian minority now dominates these areas,
even where some deported peoples have been allowed to return.
Russian language takes precedence, intermarriage is officially
encouraged, provincial arts and languages are discouraged. Russifi-
cation extended to the Baltic countries as well. By the 1959
census, Russians constituted 26% of the population of Latvia (67%
in the capital, Riga) and 20% of Estonia. In the south the Kazakhs
were a mere 25% of the Kazakhstan population,
The Crimean Tatars have suffered most of all the "un-nations."
These Turkic:-speaking Muslims lived under a Crimean Tatar Autonomous
Republic until 1928 when their leaders were executed or thrown
into concentration camps. As a consequence, a few thousand Tatars
joined the Germans to fight the Russian despot during World War II.
For the traitorous actions of this small minority of Tatars, Stalin
deported all Crimean Tatars -- some 200,000, According to Andrei
Sakharov, tiie prominent Soviet nuclear physicist and human rights
champion, 46% of them -. mostly children and old people -- died en
route to Siberia: The Tatar Republic was abolished, Tatar build-
ings were destroyed, their books burned and even cemeteries were
ripped up, The region is now part of the Ukraine.
fn 1956 Khru.shchev rehabilitated many of the nationalities
when he denounced both Stalin and the mass repression against
"whole nations,," But it was not until 1964 that the Crimean Tatars
regained some civil rights and limited cultural freedom. But even
now, unlike some groups, the Tatars have not been permitted to
return to their homelands,. Virtually the entire population has
demonstrated and petitioned for redress of their grievances. In
reply, hundreds were arrested and imprisoned for "bourgeois
nationalism" (which is the charge leveled against more than half
of all the camp and prison inmates throughout the USSR),
the Meanwhile,
Soviet
they are, press announces that the Crimean Tatars are happy where
,
The most populous of the minority nations: the Ukraine, and
the most prosperous: the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and
**The Nation Killers: Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, Robert
Conquest, MacMillan,
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Estonia are the centers of resistance to Russification. Both
regions exhibit a fine contempt and hatred for their Russian
masters. The effect of repression on other peoples, too, has been
to increase their resistance to official assimilation efforts.
The minority groups who escaped persecution, as in the Volga region,
have already been partly assimilated, Why, then, has Moscow
decided to push this seemingly unproductive minorities campaign
now? The reason may lie in several current developments which
feed Soviet paranoia over what it calls a lack of unity but which
is actually a matter of rising discontent over 50 years of Russian-
imposed political and cultural domination:
-- Nearly 250,000 Jews, 8% of the Soviet Jewish
population, have applied to emigrate. Under pressure of
world opinion, nearly 15,000 were permitted to leave in
1971. Those remaining have been severely harassed in
the regime's effort to suppress further agitation, but
the success of the few has surely emboldened other
minority peoples,
Courageous dissenters among Russian intellectuals.
might take up the nationalists' cause. Both Andrei
Amalrik, author of "Will Russia Survive Until 1984?" and
Sakharov have expressed sympathy with the struggle.
Dissident General. Petr Grigorenko, still imprisoned in a
mental asylum, has actively supported the Crimean Tatars'
pleas. The possibility of the nationalists and inter-
nationally known intellectuals speaking with one voice
raises before the Soviet leaders the fearsome specter of
another international scandal. of the magnitude created by
their misuse of psychiatric. hospitals to suppress dissent.
Rising nationalism among Eastern European Communist
countries could infest Soviet nationalities and vice versa.
While Tito fears that separatist demands of the Croat
republic of Yugoslavia and the federation crisis they
precipitated could bring Soviet troops in for a Czech-like
crackdown, Moscow undoubtedly sees Croat chauvinism as a
dangerous precedent for its own republics,. In varying
degrees, the Czech experiment of 1968 and the Polish food
riots of'1970 were also protests against centralized
Moscow authoritarian command oveb all Communized peoples.
This centralized Moscow control is, of course, the real
meaning of the "spirit of so:ialist internationalism"
of which Brezhnev spoke to the 24th Party Congress in 1971
while he railed against "nationalist chauvinism."
The stagnating economy and agricultural failures
throughout. the Soviet Union require continued exploitation
of the resources of non-Russian republics. Any loosening
of the tight economic reigns over the richer republics
could spell enormous diffibulties.
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With all these pressures simmering below the surface, the
CPSU can be expected to flood the country from now until the
December anniversary with exhortations to unity, decrying the
evils of nationalism. Harsher repressive measures can also be
expected. In January alone, twelve nationalist dissidents were
arrested in the Ukraine and 100 in Lithuania for anti-state
activity. Many protests and many trials have been kept quiet.
A Latvian group of Communists has protested attempts to Russify
their country (see attached),
The effect of this nationalities problem on the Soviet Union
is twofold. First, since to the regime unity means stability,
the regime's failure to "unify" all peoples reinforces their fear
of relaxing controls and thus results in even stronger conservatism.
But this extreme conservatism in turn serves to sharpen nationalist
discontents,
Secondly, the obvious hypocrisy of the regime on the national-
ities question adds to the alienation of the intellectuals and
humanists, who are the very people most secessionist-minded. An
example of this hypocrisy is the CPSU accusation that the southern
republics are blind to the distinction between the "progressive
historic meaning of the union for the Caucasus with Russia and
the colonialistic actions of the Czars in the Caucasus," While the
Soviet leaders continue to call for liberation of peoples in non-
Communist countries around the world, righteously declaring all
peoples' right to self-determination, they condemn every breath
of nationalistic feeling among their own (non-Russian) peoples.
Finally, the CPSU continuously cites Lenin to bolster the
centralized control concept but ignores his pre-revolutionary
statements (as Lenin did after he took power) on the right of
the republics to disagree, even to secede. The ultimate and most
visible symbol of the fraud inherent in Soviet nationalities
policy is the fact that two Soviet nations, the Ukraine and
Byelorussia, which patently have no independence of any kind --
thus even less than the minimum granted to the Soviet Union's
East European satellites -- hold seats in the United Nations!
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CPYRGHT
i.".SS, MCSCDi
22 February 1972
CPSU DECISION ON 50TH ANNIVERSARY
The Central Committee of the CPSU has adopted a
decision on preparations for the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to be marked on December 30. "For its political
significance. and socioeconomic consequences the formation of the USSR occupies an
outstanding place in the history of the Soviet state," says the decision published
here.
This action made it possible to ensure favourable conditions for reshaping society
,In socialist principles, raising the economy and culture of all the Soviet republics,
strengthening the defence might and the international positions of this multi-national
state. "The Soviet Union is an embodiment of relations of unity and friendship of
free peoples, that history has never been before."
Great merit in creating the multi-national socialist state, the decision notes, goes
to Lenin.
On 30 December, 1922, the first all-union Congress of Soviets unanimously adopted a
declaration on the formation of the USSR.
The treaty on the formation of the union was first concluded by the Russian
Federation, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and the Transcaucasian Federative Soviet
republics. In 1924 the Turkmen and U*bek Soviet republics, and in 1929 the Tadzhik
Soviet Republic were formed. In 1936 the Kazakh and Kirghiz autonomous republics
were made into union republics. In the same year the Azerbadzhan, Armenian and
Georgian republics, earlier comprised in the Transcaucasian Federation, became
constituent members of the USSR.
The reunification of the Ukrainian people in 1936-1945 and of the Belorussian people
in 1939 were stupendous events. In 1940 the working people of Latvia, Lithuanian and
Estonia restored Soviet statehood and the republics joined the USSR. As a result
of the reunification of the Moldavian people the Moldavian Autonomous Republic was
made into a union republic.
"The practice of forming a multinational state of a new type, shows that only a
socialist revolution ensures the close unification of all the popular forces led
by the working class, aimed at eliminating the system of capitalist exploitation
and the system of national oppression at the same time".
"Only tho communist party, which expresses the vital interests of the working class,
of all working people, which pursues a Leninist nationalities policy, could rally
together all the nations and nationalities into a single internationalist brotherhood
and direct their efforts towards the building of a new society", the decision says.
The path towards the unification of equal peoples into a socialist family was neither
easy nor simple.
"Formidable difficulties connected with economic and cultural backwardness, had to
be overcome, the attempts by counter-revolution to utilize in its aims the legacy of
former national strife, bourgeois nationalism and great-power chauvinism, the
resistanco of the national-deviationists within the party--had to be fought".
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 CPYRGHt
TI?m~m9t99 lqf~te1C5~~/n0oe02tha1~4eR,pP79 A-1 USSR by the objective course many-sided experience of the Soviet peoples, a reflection
of their aspirations. The question of the unification of the Soviet republics was
broadly discussed: The working people of all the nationalities expressed their
unbending will and determination to unite their forces and resources for achieving
the common goal--the building of socialism and communism.
The decision states that the Soviet Union is approaching the red-letter date "with
great achievements in all spheres of life".
The concentration of material assets and efforts, the selfless mutual aid of the
Soviet people made it possible to create a highly-developed industry and large-scale
mechanised agriculture in all the republics. Instead of the feudal and semifeudal
borderlands of Tsarist Russia, there have grown up industrial and cultural centres,
well-appointed towns and villages. Exploitation and the exploiter classes, unemploy-
ment, illiteracy, have been eliminated, the workers and peasants alliance has
strengthened. Socialist nations have formed, the social and ideological-political
unity of the Soviet people has firmly taken root. More than forty peoples who in the
past had no script are now the possessors of developed literary languages. The
culture of the peoples, socialist in content, national in form, is flourishing.
"All the peoples of the country, notes the decision, have come to see by their own
long experience how rich are the fruits of unity".
"A new historical community of people ha- emerged during the years of socialist
and communist construction in the USSR--the Soviet nation", states the decision.
It has formed on the basis of social ownership of the means of production, unity of
the economic, socio-political and cultural'life, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the
unity of the interests and communist ideals of the working class. All the material
and spiritual conditions necessary for the further growth of every Soviet person,
for the all-round development of the personality, have been created in the USSR.
"The Marxist-Leninist teaching on the nationalities question has stood the test of
practice and the Leninist nationalities policy has won a complete victory", the
decision points out.
"The formation and successful development of the USSR of its tremendous international
significance, an important milestone in mankind's social progress", the decision
stresses. The Soviet experience of creating a multi-national socialist state has won
world recognition and is of invaluable aid to all fighters for social and national
liberation. The system of capitalism is now opposed by the world socialist system.
Relations between socialist countries "are increasingly characterized by constant:.
growing political, economic and cultural ties, by a development of economic
integration, by'an active exchange of experience and knowledge and close
cooperation in the field of foreign policy".
"The USSR comes out on the world scene as a force firmly and consistently pursuing
a policy of peace and friendship, upholding the Leninist principles of equality of
nations, resolutely opposing colonialism, nee-colonialism, racism, and all forms
of national oppression. This policy was and is a most important factor resisting
the aggressive strategy of imperialism and reaction, an instrument of active
struggle against wars of conquest, for the security and freedom of the peoples, for
social progress", the decision says.
With the young national states the USSR has established relations based on equality,
mutual respect, non-interference into internal affairs and on all-round cooperation in
the common anti-imperialist struggle. "The Soviet Union consistently supports the
revolutionary movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for economic
liberation from imperialism, for social progress. The USSR conducts a policy of
international solidarity with the patriots who are fighting arms in hand against
the still existing colonial and racist re im it
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The Soviet Union consistently upholds the principle of the peaceful coexistence of
states with different social systems.
The decision notes that the constructive and realistic programme of struggle for
peace and international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of the peoples,
set forth by the 24th CPSU Congress, is of tremendous importance for the implementation
of the USSR's Leninist foreign policy course.
It is a mighty, monolithically united Soviet people, confidently and purposefully
advancing under the leadership of the communist party along the road mapped out by
the party's programme, by the 24th CPSU Congress which is approaching the USSR's
50th anniversary, the decision says.
NLW YORK TIMES
23 February 1972
Soviet Organizing Fete
For Its 50th Anniversary
By THEODORE SIIARAD
pcclel to The Kew York Times
CPYRGHT
MOSCOW, Feb. 22-As plans
for the bicentennial of the
American Revolution appear to
be floundering on, the Soviet
Communist party, which runsi
a tight ship, laid down the law
today for an anniversary of its
own, and there were no ifs or
buts.
A party decree filling all of
the front page and half of the
second pago of all major news.
papers this morning mobilized
the nation's resources for the
celebration of the 50th anniver-
sary of the Soviet Union next
Dec. 30.
The Soviet Union was estab-,
,lisped in 1922, five years after
the Communists seized power
in the Bolshevik Revolution of
1917.
1 In the first five years after
that revolt, a chaotic political
situation and Civil War led ul-
~timatcly to the formation of
;nominally independent Soviet
!republics, which then banded
Vion, ether o become the Soviet
or, as its full title runs,
,Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
In the United States, plans
for the country's 200th birthday
have been bedeviled by the fail-
urc of Philadelphia, the pro-
posed center of the 1976 cele-
brations, to come up thus far
with an acceptable plan.
Today's Communist party
decree, setting the keynote for,
,the Soviet celebrations, con-,
tamed such sweeping instruc-
tions mobilizing people in all
!walks of life as to raise some
!doubt whether the preparations
would leave time for anything
else this year. The nation al-
ready faces the problem of
meeting the ambitious produc-
tion goals set by the current
five-year plan.
The decree called on the
;editors of the major news-
papers, all of which are offi-
cially controlled, to pubicize
preparations for the 50th anni-
versary and to vaunt the
party's policy toward this
country's national minorities,
which is being presented as a
model of interethnic relations.
The Soviet Union's political
structure of republics and other,
minority areas is nominally
based on the various ethnic
communities that have been
settled within Its boundaries.
Judging from the party de-
cree, the anniversary celebra-
tions are to be used mainly to
portray the Soviet Union as a
country in which ethnic ani-
mosities have been eliminated,
bias and prejudice rooted out,
and the various communities
live in peace with one another.
However, the decree also
launched a campaign of indoc-
trinating citizens in ethnic re-
Ilations, suggesting that at least
some vestiges of ethnic preju-
dice, nationalism and chauvi-
nism still survive.
All industrial plants, farms,
offices, schools and construc-
tion projects, as well as mili-
tary units, were instructed to
hold meetings commemorating
the anniversary.
Communist youth organiza.
tions received orders to indoc-
trinate young people particu-
larly in what the Communists
view as their approach to eth-
nic problems.
Political commissars in the
armed forces are to focus their,
talks "on further strengthening
of friendship and fraternity
among servicemen from differ-
ent ethnic groups."
Writers and artists were
called upon to work on ethnic
themes, and the 50th anniver-
sary is to be comemorated wlthl
conferences, exhibitions, festt-
-vals and sports events-
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 CPYRGHT
NEAPffrgor Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
27 February 1972CPYRGHT
LATVIAN PROTEST
HELD AUTHENTIC
Letter Circulated in Europe
Charges 'Russification'
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
OP MC!
WASHINGTON, Reb. 26-A
letter attributed to 17 Latvian
Communists, complaining about
what they say are efforts by
Moscow to "Russify" their Bal-
tic republic, has been sent to
several foreign Communist par-
ties.
A copy or the letter, which
has been published in Western
Europe, was made available re-
cently to The New York Times
by Latvian t migres here. United
States Government analysts who
have studied it say they believe
it is authentic and consistent
with what was already known
of the nationalistic tendencies
still prevalent in Latvia, which
was forcibly annexed to the So
viet Union in 1940.
The Voice of America has al-
ready broadcast the full text to
the Soviet Union.
Tho letter is not signed, but
In the body of the document the
17 say: "We are Communists
and most of us have been such:
for 25-35 years and more. We
wish only well to socialism,
Marxism - Leninism and man-
kind."
They declare, "We cannot
sign this letter," but do not say
why.
Russian Chauvinism Charged
The chief complaint in the
5,000-word document is that the
Soviet leaders are practicing
-111 cat JAUSSIR11
are seeking to force the smaller
Soviet ethnic groups, such as
the Latvians, to assimilate with)
he Russians.
Although an effort was made,
to redress ethnic problems af-
ter ter Stalin's death, the letter
says, current policy is to trans-
fer as many Russians, Byelorus-
sians and Ukrainians -- all
Slavs-to Latvia and the other
Baltic republics of Estonia and
Lithuania.
The letter criticizes the cre
ation of new industrial sites in
Latvia and the influx. of non-
Latvian workers. It points out
that the republic now has "a
number of large enterprises
where there are almost no Lat-
vians among the workers, en-I
gineering - technical personnel
and directors."
"There are also those where
most of the workers are Lat-
vians but none of the execu-
tives understands Latvian," It
asserts. "There are entire insti-
tutions where there are very
few Latvians. The apparatus of
the Ministry of Interior in Riga,
for example, has 1,500 em-
ploycs, but only 300 of them
are Latvians."
The Interior Ministry super-
vises the police force.
The letter says that about 65
per cent of the doctors do not
speak Latvian "and because of
this often make crude mistakes
in diagnosing illnesses and pre-
scribing treatment."
'Just Indignation' Cited
"All this calls forth just in-
tion," it declares.
The letter maintains that pri-
ority is given to "the progres-
sive Ru i i " of all 1ifP in
Latvia, and the assimilation of
the Latvians."
There are now about 2.4 mil-
lion people in Latvia, of whom
only about 57 per cent are
ethnically Latvian, a drop of 5
per cent in the last decade.
Russians make up 30 per cent
of the population, a 3 per cent
increase. Poles, Lithuanians,
Byelorussians, Jews and Ukrain-
ians make up the remaining 13
per cent.
The decrease in the percen-
tage of Latvians living in Lat-
via.
via has been due not only to
the influx of non-Latvians, but
also to the exceptionally low
birth rate in the republic, com-
bined with an aging Latvian
population.
For instance, in 1969, Latvia
recorded a birth rate of only
14 per thousand, which is the
smallest of any republic in the
Soviet Union. Its death rate was
11.1 per thousand, the second
highest after Estonia. This
means that its natural increase
(birth rate minus death rate)
was only 2.9 per thousand, also
the smallest in the Soviet Un
ion. The natural increase for
the Soviet Union as a whole in
1969 was 8.9 per thousand.
Russian Broadcasts Noted
The letter states that although
Latvians still are in the major
U. two-thirds
television broadcasts are in Rus
sian. Latvian writers have more
difficulty getting their works
published than Russians, it says,
district organizations, in most
local organizations and in all
enterprises, business is con-
ducted in Russian."
If there is a single Russian
In an organization, he will de-
mand that the meeting be con-
ducted in Russian, and his de-
mand will be satisfied," the
letter goes on. "If this is not
done, then the collective is ac-
cused of nationalism." ,
The letter specifically decries
the "loud preaching" of mixed
marriages in the republic and'
says that Latvian language
theater groups must produce
Russian plays but that Russian;
language groups rarely have
Latvian ones.
The letter was received by the
Communist parties of Rumania.
Yugoslvaia, France, Austria and
Spain among others. It calls on
them to use their influence
with Soviet leaders to improve
the state of the Latvian and
other ethnic groups,
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200190001-4
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
13 March 1972
AB Al AM BRUMBERG reports on a new trend in Soviet protest
Ukraine's law-abiding
dissidents
In the aic-t drive a:;am,,t
So\ let di~sidcots more arrc~is
have talkcn place in the Ukraino
than anywhere ?eIsc in the
USSR. i Three names have
already lbeen mentioned in the
official Soviet press : Ivan
Svitlycluty, a literary critic and
translator Vyacllcslav
'Chornovil, a journalist and
critic; and Ycvgcn Svcrstyuk,
a literary critic and
educationist.
Dissident sources in the
Ukraine have now disclosed the
-names of 13 more prisoners c
Irene Stasir, a p o c t e s s;
Stephanie Shabatura. an
artist specialising in carpet
designs Vasyl Stus, a poet
and l i t e r a r y critic ;
Alexander Scrgiyenko, a
teacher ; Leonid 7,cleznenko
and '/,inoviv Antonyuk, about
whom there is no
biographical information.
Nicholas. Shuniuk, who had
already spent 27 years in
labour camps in prewar
Poland and then under Soviet
rule. Stephanie I[ulyk, a
student Michael Osadchy, a
poet and philosopher: Ivan
Het, a worker and student of.
history ; the Rev. Vasyt
Romanyuk, a Roman Catholic
priest ; Gregory Chubay, a
poet ; and Hryhoriy Kochur,
a translator.
Why has the KGB singled out
the Ukraine as a special
target'. Since the charge
against the defendants will no
doubt he "nationalism" as well
as having engaged in " anti-
dS.oviet activities." it is
important to realise that
national sentiments have been
rising throughout the Soviet
Union.
The Chruniele of Current
Events - that remarkable
-clandestine periodical - has
.within the past year reported
the arrests and trials of
"nationalists" in such widely
scattered areas as Armenia,
Tadzikistan, Lithuania. Mold-
avia. on the movement of Jews
to Israel. and on the campaign
waszed by tthe Crimean Tartars
and the, Mfr~kheti;+ns for their
rr;:ht to return to their original
hnntehnnls. front 1thlch they
were expelled at the end of the
tirrnnd World War for having
cullahurated with the Nazi
in%aders.
Nowhere, however. have
national feelings been more
stronly held than among
the 40 million Ukrainians-the
second-largest' group in the
Soviet Union, and the second-
largest nationality next to the
Russians.
. Indeed, the entire history of
Soviet Ukraine is one of con-
tinuous turmoil, of efforts, on
Moscow's part. either to come
to terms with the powerful
currents of nationatism in the
Ukraine. or to suppress them by
methods ranging from outright
terror to the banning of the
Ukrainian language from
institutions of higher learning
and the assignment of Russians
to leadership posts in tradition-
ally Ukrainian areas.
Moscow's difficulties were
increased during the immedi-
ate postwar period with the
absorption of millions of Wes-
tern Ukrainians who lived in
areas formerly belonging to
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Rumania.
Separatist sentiments were
much stronger among the
Western Ukrainians than those
who had already lived for
nearly three decades under
Soviet rule. and so were Right-
wing ideolosical predilections.
which led many Ukrainians to
wage hitter t;u"rrilla strugslec
against the Red Army in some
ar"ac well into the late 1940s.
With his customary dis-
regard for distinctions. Stalin
labelled all manifestations of
Ukrainian nationalism as
" bourgeois " and "anti-Soviet."
In the 1930s, the cream
of the Ukrainian intedi.
gentsia - many of whom were
unflinchingly- loyal to the Soviet
rt' inic - was decimated on
charges of " bourgeois national-
isin." During and after the
Second World War, whole
village populations would often
be accused of collaborating
with the anti-Soviet --merrillas.
and either massacrrc] or
deported to Central Asia and
the Far Eastern parts of the
country.
Thesc strong.arm methods
were superseded by cultural
and administrative Russifica-
tion - policies which con-
tinued until well after Stalin's
death, and which have been
only partially- ameliorated under
Khrushchev and his successors.
Yet the very relaxation of
Soviet policies in the Ukraine
- above all the elimination of
wholesale terror - has created
a situation which the regime
may well consider potentially
more dangerous than sporadic
miltary forays by starving and
poorly armed guerrillas.
. In the mid-1960s, a new breed
of Ukrainian nationalists came
to the fore. Known as the
s)testidesiatniki (men of the
sixties), these have been mainly
young intellectuals, mans of
whom had been dedicated mem-
bers of the Komsomol (the
Communist youth organisa-
tion) and of the Communist
Party.
"Card-carrying" members or
not, almost all consider them-
selves -Marxists or democratic
Socialists, as well as inheritors
of the humanistic traditions of
nineteenth-century Ukrainian
literature. Their protest against
specific policies of the regime
has not been voiced in anti-
Soviet terms but rather in legal
terms.
Much as their counterparts in
Moscow and Leningrad, they
have not criticised Soviet laws
and institutions as such, but
rather those who have con-
sistently violated them - the
police, the courts, the censors.
To the extent that they have
opposed forced Russification
and have urged a greater
degree of cultural autonomy for
their country, they have done
so on strictly constitutional
grounds - in other words, as
freedoms granted both to
individuals and to national
groups by the Soviet Constitu-
tion (freedom of speech,
assembly. and conscience -
articles 124 and 125), and as
legitimate expressions of
Lenin's views on the rights of
ethnic minorities in a Socialist
society.
True, some of them have also
either alluded to, or openly
conic out in favour of, separate
Ukrainian statchond - h u t
again, basing themselves on the
Soviet Constitution. article 17
of which guarantees the right
of secession to all republics of
the USSR.
In 1965-66, the secret police
descended on these young intel-
lectuals, detaining about 100 of
them, and finally sentencing
CPYRGHT
about 20 to terms of hard
labour ranging from six months
to six years. The blatant viola-
tions of judicial norms per-
petrated by the KGB and the
courts (most of the trials, for
instance. were held in secret)
were highlighted in -two
remarkable documents com-
piled by Vyacheslav Chornovil.
Chornovil himself was arrested
in 1967 on charges of po*=essine
"anti-Sovict documents." and
sentenced to three years hard
labour (the term was later
reduced to 19 months).
In one of his letters from the
labour camp. Chornovil - who
is again under arrest - sum-
marised what may he termed
not only his personal. but the
collective credo of the, " men
of the sixties " :
" 1 Categorically state. con-
trary to all illogical asser-
tions ... that I have always
firmly adhered to the
principles of socialism and
continue to do so. But not of
that socialism which tries to
regiment not merely the
actions but also the thoughts
of individuals. I cannnt
imagine Prue socialism with-
out guaranteed democratic
freedoms, without the widest
political and economic self-
government of all the cells of
the state organism down to
and including the smallest.
without a real guarantee -
and not merely a paper one
- of the rights of all nations
within a multinational state."
It is these men and woritcn,
who again find themselves the
objects of the secret police's
wrath. Yet much has changed
since 1965.6. For one thing,
much as the authorities may try,
to smear the Ukrainian dissi?
dent with the brush of " hour-
geui., nationalism " and attempt
to link them with th!, activities
of l:i;itt-Wine Ukrainian group.
abroad. they will find it impos-
sible to lend any credence to
such charges. -
The L"krainian dissidents may
be described - for want of
better terms - as national
Communists or national
democrats." Their ranks have
swollen over the past five years
or so, and their activities have
grown correspondingly.
Perhaps their most notable
achievement is the .snnrisrlnt
journal, the Ukrainian Herald.
five issues of which have
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 ,t?ar.. towever. I h e (,111.() 1-1
e?
pect.y similar to the Chro o(-1' evenj
of Current F~O~r~a/OrrrFl@4$gn~tv~t9t~/~id?
has also. p shed many symp:,tii;: for. t1 ' a t)iratuen, of
literary works by Ukrainian the Ukrainian dissidents. There
writers and poets. hare even been reports of
its principal' aint, however, actual collaboration between
has beert to document all viola. t;roitps in Moscow and L.'nin?
tions of "Socialist legality" in grad on the one hind and those
the Ukraine. all expressions of in Kiev or Lvov on the other.
protest and dissent - by There can be little doubt that
Ukrainians as well as other this growin ideological and
ethnic groins - and all mani. practical collaboration causes
festation, of Russification and
"Great Power chauvinism" by considerable discomfiture in
the Russian authorities. Moscow. For it is only by
Even more important - and espousing popular gries ance
most likely the key to the curr- that the civil rights movement
ent crackdown in the Ukraine in the Soviet Union can hope to
- is tie steady but unmistak- break out of it, isolation. and
able cenversencc between the begin to assume the character
aims a td tactics of the Ukrain- of a genuine mass movement.
sans an(I? the other dissidents in While national aspirations
the USSR. have so far been voiced mainly
Five, years ago, the eloquent by intellectuais (as they have
pleas (}f the Ukrainian Intellec- been in every country over the
tuaks for national and basic past century), there is mount-
human freedoms found little jog evidence that they have
echo among the intellectual, in stud: a responsive chord among
Russia. Within the p?i:t two many ordinary men ;'nd women.
who bitterly resent the rn) Les divergences qui se mani-
festant tie sont pas une particu-
larit(' des r at p p o r t s roumano-
tchecoslovaqucs. Dans le pass(',
Woos a.vions des bonnes relations
do camaraderie et des opinions
concordantes sur torts les pro-
blemes essentiels de politique
Internationale. Cc West pas do
noire fnuto ,i depuis longteiups
dcjlt, et on dcptt de grnnds cf-
forts et dune grande patience,
nous no tr>uvons pas de langage
cotnuiun.,. .
, La raison essenticlic de ces
divergences entrc des partis coin-
munlstcs et ouvriers, dont le
noire, ct la direction du P.C. rou-
nialn c'est la tendaiice qua cclle-
ci >l opposer lcs intent des avantages de
la. coopera.t.ton cntre pays socia-
hstcs ct qu'en meme temps elle
no se sente pas lime pair Ics cnga-
gements collectifs decoulant do
1'appnrtenamcc de la Wpublique
socdnllste rounialne au pacts do
Varsovie.
)> Face nux revendications con-
eernnnt If, renforecinent de 1'ttnltie
M. Biiak est un pro-sovietique notoire. En
janvier 1968, it remplava M. Dubcck, -
nomme premier secretaire du P.C. tcheco-
s?lovaque. - a la tote du parti slovaque.
Aprcls l'invasion, - accuse de ? collabora-
tion n, - it dut ceder sa place a M. Husaic,
mail aprcis la chute de M. Dubcck it Jut
a rehabilite ?. ti redevint un des principaux
de classe : ells parlo de la limi-
tation indisl>en;,lible do l'inihuence
du pacte de Varsovie sur les pays
soclaliste s. etc. Elle no veut ab.;o-
luinent pas parlor de lutt~ contre
Ies d e v i a t ions opportunistes,
contre le revisionnisnie et le na-
tionalisme dans le niouvenient
communists international. Elle
proclame meme que la delegation
du P.C. rotunain a.voit signs, on
faisant des reserves, les docu-
ments de ]a conference de Mos-
cou de 1116) et que setts confe-
rence n'aurait _ pas contribuc a.
1'unite du mouvement conmiuniste
mpndial.
>) Dnns Ic travail iWologique du
parti, tout cc qui est nation-al
est jugs do mnniere peu criti-
que et fait ('objet de louanges
qu'il s'agisae de 1'histoire de la
Roumanie, de la creation litte-
raire et des arts ell general -, on
parle merne des qualites extraor-
dinaires du peuple roumain.
Wine si faisant preuve de la plus
grande comprehension, nous vou-
lons tolcrer certaines specificitcis
-- alors queues noun sent incom-
prehensibles, - noun no pouvons
quand me'mc pas former les,yeux
sur le fait que la direction du
P.C. rounia.in adopts, en politique
etrangere, une attitude dirigt e
contre les int6r;ts de la conimu-
nuutc? socialists ct, on fin de
corpte, au,si Contre Ies interets
propres du peuple roumain,
u Bien que scion la, pratique
usuelle, lee pays socialistcs s'in-
forment mutuelletnent des mcsu-
res importanles en maticre de po-
litique cxtcrieure, la Republique
soclaliste roumaine, non Mile-
men[; n'en fnit Tien, mais de plus,
lie s'cit tient niC;uie p:us tt line ac-
tion commune dans des questions
concernanL Iv,,; inti:rcls de tour les
membrec; du paste de Varsovie,
La position de la direction ion-
'des paiys sociallstes et 1'approfon- malne sur Ies uvcnemcnts tcheco-
disscumnt co 1'inte;;ratlon soda- siovaques. prenant fail. et cause
li:;te, lit direction roumaine met pour Ies forces de drolte.rst sur-
1';icrrnt tour It's prin,?ipc, de non- fi.eatnnunt c Were : cc?Itt (H-cc-
1 ti It c'- r e ri c r rt de : ottverainctt' Lion per,) Cette attitude des dirigeants
roumains, non fondce sur un es-
prit de classes, est attestee aussl
par le fait qu'ils s'idcntifient A la
these sur l'indispensable unifica-
tion des Etats, petits et moycns,
dans la lutte contre les preten-
clues superpuissances, cc qui dans
le vocabulaire chinois sous-entend
avant tout 1'Union sovietique.
C'est un paradoxe penible ? on
se donne pour objectif d'unir dans
la lutte contre le principal appui
du socialisme - ('Union sovie-
tique - memo des pays tels que
le Portugal, 1'Espagne fasciste
de Franco ou ]'Arable saoudite,
oit exists encore un regime semi-
feodai et semi-esclavagiSte,
)) 11 n'y a 6videmnicnt dans le
communique sino-roumain aucune
mention de 1'indispensable unifi-
cation du systcme socialists mon-
dial. La direction chinolse it pro-
fits de Ia visite de In delegation
roumaine pour atteindre ses pro-
pres objectifs nationalistes et
anti-sovietiques. Ncanmoins, Ic
rapprochement roumano-chinois a
un caractere conjoncturel et peu
stable, parse quo 1es pretentions
A. l'hegcmonie des dirigeants chi-
nois et les objectifs nationaux It-
mites du P.C. roumain sont logi-,
quement on contradiction : sans
parlor des besoins objjectifs de la
Roumanie, qui, sans une coopera-
tion avec les pays du Comecon,
se trouverait 6viden-iment clans
une situation sans issue.
n La presidence ciu counts cen-
tral du parts communiste tcheco-
slovaque estime do ,,on devoir
d'informer le comite central de ces
graves probletncs. Mass it est inad-
missible que Yon pane publique-
ment de ces questions clans les or-
ganisations du parti ou qu'une po-
lemique a lour propos se deroule
clans la presse, ]a radio ou la tele-
vision. C'est pourquoi lc presidium
du comite central du P.C.T. a re-
proche au pcriodique do la Jeu-
nesse slovaque Smcna d'avoir pu-
blie deux articles critiques sur la
politique; etrang(re rournalne ?,
a dit encore M. Biiak. En. concitt-
sion, it a affirms qu'il n'y avail
aucune campagne contre la
Roumanie)) en Tchetcoslovaquie et
que celte-ci ferait taus ses efforts
pour cc influencer positivement le
parts et la Republique de Rou-
manic ,.
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 CPYRGHT
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e.rpose, M. r;zta1c s'est Iclicue, tie
I'ametioration des relations de
pays socialiste s aver la Yougo-
slavie et a exprime 1'espoir quit
en irait ainsi a 1'avenir,
a Mais, a-I-il ajoutd, nous de-
vons tenir compte do la realltc : it
existe clans cc pays des forces qui
ne sont pas interessecs par les
per:;pcctives socialistes do ]a You-
goslavie . ni par une amelioration
de ses relations aver les pays for-
mant 1e; poyau cssentiel du socia-
llsme mondial.
? L'intlucncc de la classe ou-
vriere sui` la formation de la poll-
tique ycitiKoslave est faible, et
nombre ilc tentative,, pour chan-
ger cet etat de choses n'ont pas,
jusqu'a present, etc couronnees de
succes. it y it de graves problemes,
m@me en cc qui concerne 1'unite
dc la Ligue des communistes de
Yottgoslavic et de son role dlrJ-
toujours a a position de pretendu
non-engagement, rneme si cette
politique ]'clot,,ne de la Commu-
naute socialiste et du mouvement
communJste international.
? Nous ne voulons pas nous in-
gerer daps les affaires yougo-
slaves, trials nous sommes IntUres-
ses a cc quo clans cc pays les prin-
cipes socialistes soient renforces
et que sa direction se manifesto
scion les principes du marxisme-
leninisme. Sur la base de noire
experience, nous disons franche-
ment, aux representants yougo-
slaves que, clans une clure lutte de
c]asseg, les miles en garde et les
priere adressees aux adversaires
du socialisme ne sont pas effi-
caces, que les inconsequences et
1'abandon des positions du
marxisme-leninisme se patent
toujours cher. ?
geant clans la :',ociete. La direction M. Bilak a aussi constate que ((la
de la Ligue des communistes de majorite absolue des partis freres
appuient
Yougoslavie n'a pas en main la du P.C. politique aautant
climetion do ]a presse ecrite et tchecoslovaque? d'autant
parlee. que ca notre experience de la lutte
Darts ses relations internatio- contre 1'opporLunisme les aide
efflcacernent dins la lutte contre
I'opportunisme dans leurs rings ?.
? Dans certains partis freres
s'est manifests e I'opinicn qu'ils
no peuvent reviser Icurs prises de
position incorrcctes sur Ies ev~-
nements tchecoslovaques en 1968
sans porter cttteinte a lour Unite
et affaiblir leur autorite stir la
population. La vie denaontre tou-
tefois que c'cst exactement le
contraire qui se product. Los par-
tis freres qul, des le debut, ont
pris une position nettement inter-
nationaliste ou qui ont revise
leur opinion unilaterale originelle
sur les evenements tcltecoslo-
vaques ont renforce leurs propres
rangs et ]eurs liens avec Ia classe
ouvriere et les travailleurs de tour
pays. It ne reste a present que
quelques partis qui font des
reserves a 1'egard de la ligne
actuelle de notre part]. 11 s'agit
avant tout des P.C. d'Australie,
de Grande-Bretagne, d'Espagne
et, sur un certain nombre de pro-
bletnes, egalement du P.C. italien.
? Bien quo nous ayons constate
depuis assez longtemps d&Ji1 cer-
taines tenclances centrifuges clans
la politique du P.C. italien, nous
Les errellirs des eoI11111111lls[es sollt1allais
Face a 1'dinotion soulcr tie en
Tch,;eoslovaqulc par le.s c.rcru-
tions do conem.unistes au Soudan,
M. Bilak a jugd stile de prdciser
que ecs a nobles reactions ? te-
moignaient (rune mdcounaissance
de la situation.
e 11 n'aurait pas etc sage
d'abandonner volontairement des
positions difficilement acquises
au Soudan ou ,tilleurs. Nous au-
rions seulement fait le jeu de
l'imperialismc (Jul ::erait henreux
de nous voir pcrdre la po:;siuilite
d'Jnfluencer les evenements nltc-
riours en rompant nn; contacts
avec les forces pro~reai;,.c aic-
cidees 'a ntener cur ,ju5ie 1:1.e.
De surcroit, it y avait clops tes
evcucment:; sondanais, do; i c-
tcurs dont it e,t imi,ussibl', dc
parlor publiquCinent ?, rt. (lit
Al'. Bilak.
Ces ? facteurs ? cc sont dvl-
demment les a erreurs ? commises
par la direction du parti souda-
nais. Lea groupe autour do Mah-
goub, evoluant aussi vers des po-
sitions sectaires ?, a eu le tort de
CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan
14 February 1972
critiquer le regime dentocralique
rez:olutionnaire des a officers
progressistes de Ninlciry ?, qui
avaicnt renver.sd un gouvernemeut
representant a les feodaux et ]a
grancle bourgeoisie ?. Une autre
parlie de la direction, favorable a
uric cooperation totale avec Ni-
mciry, repoussa Ics m.ethodes du
secretaire general et provoqua
une scission aft sein du parti.
Mahgotlb, apres s'etre en./ii de
prison, a commenr;a a preparer
un coup d'Etat militairc, dont ni
nous, ni Ics autres partis freres
CPYRGHT
OFFFNSf W'A-, D;_1 ccF:^ ~ z"ii)) N LL PAT TO DI VA SAVif-
Per Vasil Ci1al tre soli partiti com~nisti possona dirsi Vuramerte ?ortoslossi}>: quello S014
otico,
q!lello rl~cn clo a t!!?I(o ceccslovacco - a!,re criticlte a Unghcria, Mania e Germania oriental
DAL NOSTRO CORRISPONDi:STE
Vienna, 13 c traio.
N,e1 movimento mondiale
ccnninista ~:arebbero sollanto
tie i partiti veratnente or.
todosst .. decni di antniini?
strare I'eredita idcolo zwa e
politica di Marx c di Lenin:
it ,ovietico, it ntongolo c it
cecos]ovacco. In questi ter.
tnini Si cra espresso Vasil
Tsilak. inembro del prams.
diunt del partito comllnista
cvcoslovacco. I.e?endo a Pra-
ga, it 21 ottobrc scorso it
rapporto SCgreto davanti at
plenum del Coinitato Cen-
irate. Le parti essenziali di
quel doctunento erano state
pubblicate icri clal quotidiano
parigiuo Le Monde: Bilak
aveva pore detto di pill ed
avcva. tracciato tin duadro
nettanicnte pessintistico delta
situazione nella quale sJ tro-
cialista europeo. Da nuove it
forina?r,Joni ricevute ogei
Vienna, risulta the Vasil B
lak aveva formulato un wit
dizio neaativo anche viers
I' J i heria, la Polonia c 1
Germania orientate. dove
partiti comunisti sarebbcr
piu o meno knitani dal pit
cipi fortdamentali del ma
xi:fmo leninisme.
ttOi'~ ?":ata:rs efforces de tie pas
conirligt:cr no, re1ations tuu-
tuellcs. C'est pourquoi nous avotls
sugg0ri: plus d'unc fois a to direc-
tion de ce parti do se concentrer
particulierement sur les questions
qui nous unissent, c'est-a-dire
sur ]a lutte contre 1'ennemi de
classe commun. Notre complai-
sance n'a toutefols pas trouv+#
d'echo. Au contraire, la presse dU
parti italien a pubiie 1es points
de vue d'eminents fonctionnafes
du P.C. italien qui prenaient par-
fois failure d'attaques violentes
contre notre parts et dune Ingd-
rence ouverte clans nos affalres
Jnterieures,
? Le fait quo quelques P.C. tie
comprennent pas encore dq quol i
it s'etait agi Bans notre parts et
clans notre pays a aussf des rai-
sons plus profondes, dues a des
opinions differentes stir nombre
de questions concernant le pt'o-
gramme, la strategle et 1;1 tae-
tique du mouvement communtste
international. C'est pourquoi ndus
devons Ore patients affil que In
vie et le temps confirment que
]a verite est de notre cote. ? .
ne savions rtes ?, precise M. Bi-
lak. It rslime que It' putsch c?tait
'
mul prepare, tt
avait Ili l'appui de
I'arnue iii celui des nnasscs, fie
p7u.s 1'0ttitudc negative du secr+s-
trrize ~r'zrrral dre I.G'. soudanais a
I t tutrd du projet dc ledc.'t?atia)ti
des I>republiques arabes liti a vale
i'lnimitid de t'Egllpte et de la
Libile et a fait le jcu des pro-
antCricains. Maintcnant, selon
M. iilak, it s'agit d'aidcP ics ca-
marades sortdanais tt reconnaft `
lour? errcurs et a agir autrement,
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y I t Uiv bens. sccon o 1i.a ?.
si farebbero ora :gii sh:. i er-
rort che avevafl' co:n1inrr;r)
ncl 1966 c net 1057 i diri.
r rtlti cecvs!vvaccili: is rifot-
Illy econoilliCa ll nt!L'rl'C:i!` S: a-
rcbhe avendo Ic rs,>e ccn-
seguenze politiche defe ,Pic-
Cole rifDrtlle , che ('satin bta-
tc attuate dui'ntc 1?ultimo
periodo delta dittatura di
Novotny a Praza: il mrcca?
nismo economico starebbc
sful*gendo al controilo del
partito mettendo in movi?
Mento fol'ze cell tri fugtlr che,
col tempt,. potrcbbero Iaette-
re In chiiicolta Is stcssa m-
rezione del partito, La ca-
duta di Novotny c l'elezionc
dl Duck sarebbero state
provocatc, Fccondo Bilak. da
unit serie di errors analonili
a quclli che ora starebbero
complendo Kadar c I suoi
cullai;w'atori- 13 , avcva
detto al P11r1U7ll Cilr i a fra-
teili un llrresi erano stab
informati di qursto panto di
vista cecosiovacco.
Y V Bilak si era poi drtto scet-
tiro anche surli sforzi del
capo polacco Ciierek diretti a
nligliorare 0 tenor, di vita
del paese. A kiudizio del di-
rigente cecoslovacco. it I TO-
me polacco uscrehbc troppa
arrendevolezza verso 1a Chic-
sa e cib sarelibe un sintonlo
di s debolezza #. Bi1ak aveva
pot manifcstato ^ ^ravi riser-
ve A sulla, rivalutazione del
comitati operai di fabbrica.
operata di Gierek dopo i
suoi incont ri toll le nlac-
stranze dei cantieri navali
del Baltico. La relativa au-
tonomia ricono,ciuta a que-
st) comitati potrcbbe sfocia-
re tin ui:a situazione di
anarco-sindacali.mo , obictti-
vamente in contrasto con is,
gestione che Gierek tents di
realizzare. Potrebbero di con-
seglleiiza sorl;'re Ililovi Coll-
flitti e iI rc?xhnr si indebo-
lirebbe ulteriormente.
La requiSitoria di Bilak si
era rivolta inline verso Is
Germania erientaie: occorre-
rai no vent'anni, secondo Bi-
lak. uer risollevare 1'apparato
politico e 1'econonlia Bella
Repubblica Dcmocratica Tc-
desca dalle consc_uenze delta
gestione sclerotizzata , di
Walter Ulbricht. Sin qu; le
informazioni sal n rapporto >
ricevttte nclla capitale au-
striaca. Aggiunte a qurtle for-
nite ieri da Le Monde, esse
consentono di avere un qua-
dro critico dei rapporti tra i
pacsi membri del Patto di
Varsavia. Va notato che it
rapporto era stato presentato
al Plenum quasi quattro me-
si or sono: non senibra Pero
clle le cos, siano mi!-liorate.
Al Colltrario, it rapporto Bi-
lak dimostra 1'esistenza. al-
l'interno del a Campo socia-
lista di unit forte corrente
dei re falchi che Si e Pro'
posts di instaurarC. con nlano
ferrea. nn sistema Politico
ncostal inista, capace di esclu-
dere qualsiasi tentativo di ri?
forme o gt:aai,i,i 1, :ae::za
a plant dt E'
diflicile Poter tile
le tesi di Bilak ri::,nano
quelle di Breznev E' nnta
comunque 1'amieir.a di Bi-
lak con Scheiest. ii cape del
partito ConluniSta ucraino.
esponente dei fa!chi nto?
scoriti. che ha ':a cr:ricato
Is politics brezilr% jilt-,, di
apertura o verso 1.Occi-
dente.
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CUBA: THE ECONCMIC RECORD
Thirteen years into the Casto regime and Cuba is beset by its
gravest economic crisis in history:
Overall outlook
Through 1971, Cuba registered some gains in the industrial sector
and in fishing, and continued to invest heavily in expanding output.
Agricultural production continued to decline. Efforts to revitalize
sagging production of rice, coffee, tobacco, cattle, and fruit were
unsuccessful. Strict rationing of food and consumer goods continued and
on a few items,had to be tightened.
Trade deficits and foreign debts
Sugar represents about 85 percent of Cuban exports, nickle about
ten percent, and tobacco, three percent. Because of declining exports and
growing domestic needs, Cuba's trade deficit has been on a steady rise,
especially her imbalance with the USSR which represents about 60 percent
of Cuban imports, During 1971, the Soviet Union sent Cuba some $510-million
in economic aid plus $240-million in military and other assistance. In
all, Cuba is believed to owe the USSR $4-billion --- a debt Moscow cannot
realistically hope to collect. This year, because of the low sugar harvest
anticipated for 1972, Cuba faces an estimated trade deficite with the USSR
of up to $600-million.
Sugar industry
The 1972 sugar harvest, mainstay of the fragile economy, is not likely
to reach 4.5 million tons. Possibly the lowest yet on record. Two years
of drought and unseasonably heavy rains will not help either. In 1970,
Castro pledged the honor of the revolution to an unprecedented goal of
a 10-million-dollar harvest. The whole island mobilized for the harvest
as Christmas 1969 and New Year's Day 1970 were
Y postponed until it was
finished. When he failed by 1.5 million tons of the announced goal, Castro
fired his sugar industry minister but admitted his own inefficiency as a
leader and indicated Cubans were worse off than at any time since he took
over. The 1971 crop was at a low 5.9 million tons.
Commodity rations
Castro's "sugar obsession" has caused severe cutbacks on other agricultural
production. So, in a country famed for its tobacco production, -Castro has
warned that smoking is unhealthy and rations Cubans to two packs of cigarettes
and two cigars every week. The 1970 sugar harvest reportedly contributed
to a 25% drop in milk production. Now, milk is available to children under
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two years and is rationed at two cans of condensed milk per month. Rice,
the staple food in Cuba is rationed on a per capita basis of 34 pounds
yearly (compared to 134.22 pounds pre-1962); meat is rationed at a per-
capita low of eight ounces weekly (compared to about 73 pounds pre-1962);
coffee is rationed at 1 1/2 ounces weekly; split peas, kidney beans and
soya beans, at six ounces weekly; and butter or margarine, at four ounces
every four months. In February 1972 the government cut individual sugar
rations by two pounds per month. Gasoline and fuel oil have been rationed
since 1968 and Cuban cities become increasingly dark as the government
shuts off electric power to preserve the little there is.
Public health
The Cuban government has not published health statistics since 1966,
but data released by the Ministry of Public Health before that date
revealed: deaths from gastroenteritis had risen from 14 in 1958 to
1,662 in 1966; death by hepatitis for the same period jumped from 26 to
8,977; and incidence of syphilis, rose from 26 cases in 1958 to 1,863
in 1966.
Rationing and shortages of goods have cut per capita consumption of
goods and services in Cuba by a minimum 25 percent. The average worker
now can buy everything that rationing allows for a month with the equivalent
of three weeks' work. This lack of incentive to work fosters the absenteeism
that Castro frequently deplores in his public speeches. Further, deliberate
production slowdown by disgruntled workers is reportedly widespread. In
1971 the government decreed an "anti-vagrancy law" providing for penalties,
including prison terms, for troublesome workers. By the end of the year,
a Cuban radio commentator noted that despite the shortage of manpower
"loafers are on the rise."
CHILE: THE ECONOMIC RECORD
Seventeen months into the Allende regime and the economic outlook
for Chile is indeed bleak:
Overall outlook
When he took office, President Allende -- walking in the economic
footsteps of Fidel Castro in 1959 --- froze prices, ordered production
quotas doubled, and began granting wage increases of from 30 to 50
percent. There was instant, but shortlived euphoria. Now, with inflation
and deficit spending going up, productivity going down, and rationing
threatened, Chile looks to be in for a tedious winter.
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Industrial production
Since the Allende government has been in power, it has nationalized
102 industries --- copper mines, cement plants, breweries, textile mills
land other enterprises all of which have shown large increases in costs,
declines in productivity and either reduced profits or outright losses.
Losses suffered by the state managed industrial enterprises have been
covered by Central Bank currency issuances. This practice, together with
the drying up of sources of new capital investment, could mean an even
more rapid decline in production during the remainder of 1972 with alarming
.inflationary effects. Many skilled technicians and managers have been
replaced by politicans and those technicians still in the newly nationalized
copper mines predict absolute chaos by late 1972 or early 1973 in Chile's
vital copper industry.
Investments and foreign reserves
State capital under the Allende government has been used, not for new
investment, but to buy up existing companies and to finance dramatic, but
delusionary, rises in salaries and social benefits. Following its decision
to seize foreign properties without paying the foreign owners, Chile has
become an unacceptable credit risk for potential new investors. Foreign
currency reserves which stood at approximately $550 million when Allende
was inaugurated in November 1970, are now down to less than $50 million.
Allende's claim of an expected $300 million in aid from socialist countries
during 1972, as well as another $100 million from international organizations
during this year, will hardly close the gap.
Foreign indebtedness
Large-scale foreign aid and credits during the past decade sharply
increased Chile's external debt (to approximately $2.3 billion), with the
heaviest repayments scheduled during the next few years (an average
$330 million annually during 1971-1973). Chile could have covered debt
service obligations if copper production had increased by some 40 percent
as had been anticipated under the previous management's expansion programs.
Allende tried to use Chile's foreign indebtedness at the time of his
assuming office as justification for his policy of nationalizing foreign
businesses without compensation. Now that he finds his economic policies
leading Chile to the brink of economic disaster, Allende has initiated
efforts to refinance the foreign debt.
Chilean currency
Every foreign visitor is required to buy at least $10 worth of Chilean
escudos for every day he is in the country, at the official unrealistic rate
6
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of 28 escudos for one dollar. The black market rate, available on any
downtown corner in Santiago, is roughly 80 escudos per dollar. In the
past 17 months, Chile has printed more paper money than in the previous
20 years combined. Like the Cuban peso, the escudo has value only at
home.
Agricultural production
As a result of the "agrarian reform program" (early revealed to be a
plan to organize all agricultural production into a system of state
`.farms), agricultural production has dropped and cattle stocks have fallen.
'Production failures stem primarily from the rural Chilean's rejection of
the state system. Workers on the state-run farms complain of low wages
which result mainly from the incompetence and indifference of their
politician/managers. To make up these failures, Chile must now spend
about $30 million a month to import food from abroad. Compounding the
problem is the fact that payments must be made in hard currency from the
vanishing foreign reserves because the sellers will not take Chilean
escudos and will give only the most limited form of crbdit.
Cost of living
Food prices are higher than ever and the real rise in prices last
year may have reached 35 percent. For the first two months of this year
prices have already jumped up 10 percent with indications that the rate
of increase is still going up. Most food items are in short supply.
No beef is allowed to be sold in retail stores during the first ten days
of every month. Allende increasingly talks of the possibility that foods
ay have to be rationed. Last year's women's march of "pots and pans"
in Santiago vividly expressed a rising discontent with the direction of
Chile's consumer affairs.
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THE ECONOMIST, London
1.1 March 1972
-CPYRGHT
7 7
'~ :, .. ~. , ,~ , -., ~: ~.. .. is ~ -,~
13ii-.1L11 of a civil war
(Excerpts)
BY OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
n the Chilean surnn>cr, it is hard to
marine .civil war. The yachts bob out
n the Pacific at Algarrobo, beautiful
*irls sip pisco sours in the Grand Hotel
t 7.apallar, and apart from a few
onscicntious " summer widowers "
antiago is strangely empty over
ebruary as the population streams
vest to Viva del Mar and the other
esorts. " Silo," the name of an obscure
\rgentine apostle of hippiedom
crawled on the pavements, seems more
elevant than all those political slogans
hat have eaten up the whitewash
ince President Salvador Allende took
(lice in November, 1970. But summer
nearly over, and behind the holiday
miles most people are conscious of the
ng rough winter ahead.
Over the past year, there has been a
omplete transformation in Chilean
olitics. Last suuiner Dr Allende was
>crfornririg a skilful balancing act ;
he opposition was fatalistic and
iviciecl ; and although the economy
as running down it was still possible
believe that the Popular Unity
fanners would abandon their ideolo,i i-
al ohsr?s.sion with state control in order
> persuade people to invest. "Today,
Dr Allende is very touch on the, defer-
ve. The defeat that his coalition suf-
'red in the by-elections in O'Higgins,
,olchagua and Linares in January
towed not only how strongly the tide
c f public opinion is running against
1 in, but also that the opposition
hristian Democrat and National
I trties have managed to submerge
t leir personal differences and cement
firm alliance.
Last month, the Popular Unity
I aders got together in a house at El
rrayart just north of Santiago to mull
ver tiled- defeat. An extraordinary
i eternal communist party document
1 aked to the -conservative newspaper
I I Mercurio while the meeting was
taking place provided evidence of the
squabbles within the government
coalition as well as the bruising effects
of the by-election. The communists
blamed the " ultra-leftists " within the
alliance for their defeat : " The enemy
has tried to identify the idiocies of the
ultra-left with the actions of the govern-
ment.... The ultra-left tries to make
out that there is a contradiction be-
tween -trying to win over the middle
class and trying to win over the pro-
letariat. This idea has been expressed
by Comrade Carlos Altamirano " (the
secretary-general of the Socialist party).
The communist tactic, in contrast, is to
aim for the support of the middle class
and of moderate opinion, to " neutralise
and then win over the social base of the
Christian 'Democrats " in order to
isolate the most conservative elements.
The bid to win the centre is the key
to Dr Allende's current political
manoeuvres. He is trying to get the
eight political groups that form his
coalition to agree on a single list of
candidates for the next election. He is
also trying to build up the rump of
the Radical party headed by Sr Carlos
Morales and the Leftist Radical party
(PIR) (more conservative despite its
name) into a third force within the
Popular Unity alliance. Sr Morales
told this correspondent that he
believed that Dr Allende was personally
committed to the " decentralisataion of
power " within the coalition.
But the Radical party has lost much
of its grassroots support, and many of
its leaders are suspected of shady deal-
ings. The PIR, on the other hand, is
firmly opposed to marxist ideology, and
has been one of the stumbling blocks
for Dr Allendc's attempts to move to-
wards a single government party. Any-
way, the support of the middle class
does not depend upon which jobs a
clutch of Radical or PIR leaders are
given within the cabinet, but on the
state of the economy and the constant
expansion of state control.
Economics is
power
In the space of 16 months, Dr
Allende's government has created enor-
mous, possibly insoluble, economic
problems. The men who run the
economy-and above all Sr Pedro Vus-
kovic, the minister of economy who is
closely aligned with the Communist
party-are narrowly obsessed with
widening what they like to call the
"social area," a euphemism for state
control. Since they have been in office,
they have failed to create a single new
industry of national importance, to
import new technology, or even to
rationalise or reorganise the private
industries they have been swallowing
up. On the contrary, skilled technicians
and managers have been replaced by
politicians and standards of service and
production have dropped alarmingly.
Driving up to Santiago from Ran-
cagua, this correspondent passed a
crowded passenger train travelling at
night with only five or six light-bulbs
burning in the carriages. Most people
were sitting in darkness. The decline
of the state railways under the manage-
nment of Sr Nahum Castro, a Socialist
party iniii.ant, is an extreme example of
the effects of Popular Unity super-
vision. According to somc sources, ,.joo
trained enginccrs hive been replaced
by political cicmcnts, including nicni-
hers of the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (Mir) who advocate armed
struggle in Chile. Despite a 72 per cent
increase in the govcrnmcnt subsidy last
year, the work of construction and re-
pair has slowed to a standstill because
of shortages of materials and imported
equipment. Some 40 per cent of the
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CPYRGHT
rolling stock is rumoured to be out of
service awaiting -repair.
But it is the impact of state manage-
ment of the copper mines that has the
most serious implications for the
economy as a whole. Although total
copper production in Chile rose last
year, this was due to "the opening up of
the Exotica and Andina mines. Produc-
tion in the three big mines taken over
from American companies---Chuquica-
mata, Salvador and El Teniente
-dropped by more than 8 per cent
between ~ January and September. The
decline in production and The persis-
tent lahpur troubles in the biggest cop-
per mines cannot be shrugged off (as
Mr Graham Greene and other observers
have tried to shrug them off) as the
result of the whims of a " labour aris-
tocracy." Sr Carlos Correa Iglesias, a
former supervisor at the Chuquicamata
mine, has provided an insider's view
of the copper crisis in a series of articles
publishizd in El Mercurio around
Christmas. He showed that, under the
direction of two communists, Sr Julio
Zambrano (appointed president of the
administrative commission with sweep-
ing powers) and Sr Antonio Berthelon,
the sub-director of industrial relations,
the Chuquicamata mine has been
turned into a happy hunting-ground
for the. extreme left.
Systematically, government agents
have worked to expel managers and
technicians regarded as politically "un-
reliable." The result has been the loss
of scores of trained men with many
years' experience. The shortage of
skilled manpower became so acute that
t:ocirlco, tile. state copper corporation,
prrp:urd a Contract for cnnploying
Jugoslav copper technicians at inflated
salaries to be paid in dollars. At the
same time, under state supervision
company resources have been abused
for political ends. It has been charged,
for example, that the number of com-
pany guest houses at the Chuquica-
mata chine has been raised from three
to eight in order to accommodate the
cait)n unist Ramona Parra and
socialist Elmo Catalan paramilitary
origades, which make use of company
cars and store arms on the premises.
Mismanagement of the mines has
added to the problem of low world
prices. While the world market price
of copper dropped from 8o cents at the
end of 1969 to 47 cents at the end of
1971, production costs climbed to 32
cents-a very slim margin for a
country dependent on copper as the
prime earner of foreign exchange.
But the copper crisis is only part of
the reason for Chile's economic malaise,
The government has been working with
formulae borrowed from the Russia of
the 1920S and from Cuba. Sr Vus-
kovic's economic strategy is in a sense
entirely political. It is concerned with
power, with destroying the economic
base of the middle-class opposition.
That is why inoreasingly many Chileans
are asking themselves whether political
liberty is conceivable without economic
liberty. On the one hand, the opposi-
tion can score heavily against Popular
Unity in a by-election and has a good
chance of winning a two-thirds
majority in congress in the legislative
election that is coming up next year.
On the other hand, despite the constant
opposition of a hostile congress that is
now trying (through the Hamilton bill)
to limit the power of the state to buy
up private companies, the government
has steadily -tightened its grip over the
economy by executive action and the
purchase of shares.
The list of 91 companies scheduled
for expropriation that was issued last
month is a death-warrant for private
enterprise. It remains to be seen
whether the government has the power
or the cash to execute it, since the take-
over of the 91 depends mainly on the
sale of private shareholdings, ? and
many of the companies seem deter-
mined to resist.
Anyone who talks with the opposi-
tion and with individual businessmen
in Santiago today will be immediately
impressed by the new spirit of resis-
tance. The case of the Papelera (Com-
pania de Manufactura de Papeles y
Cartones) late last year-when private
shareholders held out against an attrac-
tive state offer to buy them out-set an
important precedent.
But the overall outlook for the
economy is bleak. Industrial investment
is down to nothing, and not many
,people are convinced when Sr Vus-
kovic ascribes this to "monopolistic
conspiracies." It is not just that private
investors have stopped spending.
The vast increase in state spending over
the past year was used, not for new
capital investment, but to buy up
existing companies and to finance
dramatic 'rises in salaries and social
benefits. This creates a huge problem
for the future. Industrial production
rose by something like io per cent last
year because managers were able to
meet increased ronsuiner demand by
running down stocks and drawing on
unused productive capacity. The dry-
ing up of new investment could mean
static or declining production this year
-with alarming inflationary effects.
Up to the end of 1971, the. govern-
ment played out the parable of the
emperor's clothes : because Sr Vuskovic
could not detect any sign of inflation,
it could not exist. In fact, when you
raise wages by 50 per cent and increase
the monetary supply by 118 per cent
in the course of a year, something is
bound to happen to prices even if you
apply a control svstrrti of s1e0-11kc
VI i,urs produced by the
C;IInsIiait 1)riuocttt, snf;grst that the
real rise. III prices last year ntay have
reached :;,i percent.
At any rate, a sericS of dramatic
Brice hikes early this year sngi;rststhat
inflation has finally caught ttp with
Popular Unity-the average price of
r.ars, for example, is up by 56 per cent,
petrol is up by 33 per cent, and on top
of the price rises there is a new hill call-
ing for a wage bonus of 120 escudos a
111011th to enable workers to stay ahead
of the cost. of living*. When you add to
the prospect of this sort of inflation the
shortac of foodstuffs (especially meal)
and of imported goods, the burden of
the farcign debt that Dr Allende's
envoys are having trouble in renegotia-
ting in Paris despite his softer line on
copper compensation, and the huge
budgetary deficit, it is easy to under-
stand why the government is not look-
ing forward to the next election. J
9
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WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
9 March 1972
-1}y S. 1. HAYAKA\VA
0 -1d.M . t,... e....-.~i.~,, a~.~. r..u.,..
1.JNTIL RECENTLY most South Vietnamese .
peasants were tenant farmers. Their resent-
ment of avaricious landlords was a continuing
source of discontent-a discontent that was
skillfully exploited by the' Viet Cong to turn f
village people against the government.
Today much of this has changed. In March
1970 President Nguyen Van Thieu signed the
"Land-to-the-Tiller" law passed by the Nation-
al Assembly. This legislation transfers owner-
ship of more than two and a quarter million.
acres of rice land to tenant farmers.
thru. Even before this legislation was' enacted;
cult decision to raise the official price of rice
in the cities; thereby giving the pea-
sant incentive to progress from subsistence
farming to.production for the market.
With increased security, better distribution
of fertilizer and pesticides, the introduction of
"miracle" high-yield rice, and crop diversifi-
cation already under way, the Land-to-the-Till-.
er program apparently came at just the right,
stake in his newly-acquired land.
All the foregoing is what I have been told
Landowners, who traditionally received one- and what 1 have read. How is the program
third to one-half of the crop as rent, are being like Mme, pwho doesn t know hbeans aboutnfarm?
compensated: 20 per cent in cash and the rest; in g, be, able, to tell? All I can do is tell the
in bonds payable with 10 per cent interest in ? reader what. I saw.
cqual installments over an 8-year period. The
I was taken b to the Mekong Delta
new owners may not transfer or encumber by car .
their land for 15 years. It must remain in the around My The by Mr. C. F. Huang. of the
possession of those who till it. Chinese (Taiwan) Agricultural Technical Mis-
Thru November 1971 over 350,000 farm fami- sion.
lies have been issued titles to over one million ^[ v`r
acres of land. It is expected that by spring W ]~ SAW endless fields of rice at all stages
1973. 800,000 former tenant farmers will have of development, young green plants as well as
become owners. Furthermore, the government- ,field:, ready for harvesting or already harvest-
has begun a program to provide titles to the ed. There were fruit orchards and vegetables
Montagnards for lands traditionally claimed in every available -space-even between the
by them. This program will ultimately involve rice paddies. Ducks and chickens and fish
1,400 Montagnard villages and 500,000 acres of were being cultivated for the market.
land. .._ --- ----I-'- ,-_... /-l =-- - - _ _ _
LAND REFORM has been an issue in Viet-
nam for a long time. Previous efforts in this
direction had foundered thru mismanagement
and the lack of will to see it thru. The present
program, however. shows considerably more
promise for two reasons. First, it appears to.
he exceptionally well designed and well re-
ceived. For this, part of the credit can be
given to two Americans, Dr. Roy Prosterman
of the University of Washington Law School
and Robert L. Coate, San Francisco business-
man and former California Democratic chair-
man. Dr. Prosterman helped to shape the final
form of the legislation. Mr. Coate did much of
the lobbying that got it thru the assembly.
Dr. Clark Kerr, former president of the Uni-
versity of California and chairman of the Na-
tional Committee for a Political Settlement in
Vietnam, describes the program as "revolu-
tionary" in that it gives "the bulk of South
Vietnam's farm land immediately to the sever-?
al million Vietnamese now farming the land.
It is, he believes. "probably the most impor-
tant thing that's happened yet in Vietnam."
The second reason the program is promising
is that President Thieu, himself more at home
in the country than in Saigon, has given it the
highest priority and is determined to carry it
was being used to help the Vietnamese-in-
struction in live stock culture, crop rotation,
irrigation, cooperative marketing. The Land-
to-the-Tiller program, he said, was not enough
in itself. The tiller must prosper, or his owner-
ship of the land is meaningless. In the area I
saw that day, farmers certainly seemed to be
prospering.
The prosperity manifests itself not In sophis-
ticated farm-machinery, American-style, but
in little power units like the outboard motor,
used not only to navigate the canals and riv-
ers, but also dismounted and used as irrigation
pumps, in place of the slow, old-fashioned,
treadle-operated water-wheel.
The road we drove was lined with newly
harvested sacks of rice. In the fields whole
families were at work, threshing the rice by
hand, winnowing it and piling it onto huge
mats.
The group I stopped to visit consisted of a
pretty young girl and her father and brothers.
?I took snaps of the group at work, but when I
tried to get a close-up of the girl, she was
overcome with embarrassed giggles.
But her father. stepped forward, and smiling.
ly lifted tip her straw sunhat so the light would
fall on her face.,So I .snapped the picture.
CPYRGHT
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DATES WORTH NOTING
April 10 U.S./CPR 1st anniversary of "ping-pong diplomacy,"
the first phase of the opening up of
contacts between the United States and
the Chinese Peoples Republic. On this
date in 1971 the U.S. table tennis team
arrived in China, and on the same date
this year the Chinese table tennis team
arrives in the U.S. for a return match.
April 13- Santiago UNCTAD III meets. (See articles in this
May 17 and last month's issues.)
Apr 13-15 Singapore The ASEAN foreign ministers are to meet;
they are expected to discuss the future
alignment of Southeast Asian nations in
world affairs.
April 15 North Korea Kim I1 Sung's 60th birthday.
April 17 USSR Anniversary of the dissolution of the
Cominform (Communist Information Bureau)
in 1956. The Cominform, like its pre-
decessor the Comintern (Third Inter-
national), was tasked by Moscow with
asserting Soviet control over Communist
Parties throughout the world. On March 8
this year the German newspaper Frankfurter
Rundschau reported the Soviet neon is
planning to set up a successor to the
Cominform for its Warsaw Pact allies
following the improvement of Chinese-
U.S. relations.
April 27 Chile Plebiscite at the University of Chile to
determine the university's administration.
This will be a test of popular support
between Allende and the opposition.
April 28 USSR 52nd anniversary of the Soviet Army's
invasion of Azerbay_dzhan, a Mos4lem land
bordering Iran and Turkey, in the Russian
Communists' drive to reestablish Moscow's
control over the Tsar's lands which had
been freed by the Russian Revolution.
On December 30, 1922 Azerbaydzhan, along
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with Georgia (see May 7 below), Armenia,
the Ukraine and Byelorussia, were joined
to Russia to form the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. (This year is the
50th anniversary of the formation of the
USSR. See article in this issue, 'Russifying
Reluctant Soviet Nations.")
April 28 Japan 20th anniversary of the restoration of
Japanese sovereignty following World War II.
In the peace treaty, which was signed by
49 nations, the United States provided for
return of Japanese islands it had captured
during World War II: in. 1968 the U.S.
returned the Bonin Islands, the Volcano
Islands, and Marcus Island; and on May 15
this year the U.S. is returning Okinawa to
Japan. By contrast, the Soviet Union has
not signed a peace treaty with Japan and
still holds the Northern Territories --
Japanese islands that it seized after declaring
war on Japan in the last week of World War II.
May 7 Italy Parliamentary elections.
May 7 USSR 52nd anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship signed by Russia and Georgia and
broken less than a year later when the Soviet
Army invaded Georgia February 11, 1921.
Georgia, formerly part of the Tsarist Empire,
had gained its independence and been declared
a republic on May 26, 191.8. (See article in
this issue "Russifying Reluctant Soviet Nations.")
May 15 Japan Okinawa reverts from the United States to Japan,
reestablishing Japanese sovereignty rights over
islands captured during World War II,
May 22 U.S./USSR President Nixon is to visit the Soviet Union.
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 25X1C10b
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