CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES MAY 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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LAS.J.LhAJJAX,L L L
SOVIETIZING RELUCTANT RELIGIONS
May 1972
Two recent events, a "Lenten Letter" addressed to the Patriarch
of the Russian Orthodox Church by Nobel Prize-winning author
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and a petition sent to the United Nations
Secretary General by 17,000 Lithuanian Raman Catholics have served
to refocus world attention on the continuing persecution of religious
groups within the USSR and on the dilemma that "religion" poses
for the Soviet regime.
The Lenten Letter
In his open letter to Patriarch Pimen, Solzhenitsyn highlights
both the hypocrisy and the duality of Soviet policies regarding
religion at home and abroad. He accuses Pimen of being a tool of
the atheist Soviet state who passively acquiesces in regime efforts
to stamp out the church within the Soviet Union while serving Soviet
propaganda abroad in its efforts to portray the USSR as a country in
which complete religious freedom exists. Recalling that Pimen's
New Year's message had appealed to the Russian faithful abroad to
raise their children to love the church, Solzhenitsyn notes that
"perhaps for the first time in half a century, you finally spoke
about the religious upbringing of children." He then asks, "But
what is the purpose of all this; why is your earnest appeal directed
only to Russian emigres; why do you call only on those Children to
be brought up in the Christian faith; why do you admonish only the
distant flock to 'discern slander and falsehood' and be strong in
truth and justice; and we---what should we discern; should we or
should we not foster in our own children a love for the church?"
Given Solzhenitsyn's moral authority and the worldwide publicity
his statement has been receiving---with much of this publicity
filtering back into the Soviet Union---this denunciation of Pimen
(and indirectly of state-controlled spiritual heads of other religious
bodies in the USSR) may have widespread repercussions bot only within
the Russian Orthodox Church but throughout the religious communities
in the Soviet Union. The "Lenten Letter" marks the first time since
Stalin's death that a public figure of Solzhenitsyn's stature has
openly demanded greater religious freedom for Soviet citizens and
denounced the compliance of Church leaders with the Kremlin's anti-
religious measures.
Solzhenitsyn portrays the futility of .a religious man under
the yoke of the totalitarian atheist Soviet regime as he dissolves the
veneer of "religious freedom" in the USSR, to indict the Kremlin with
specific charges of officially administered religious persecution.
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He captures the substance as well as the essence of repression,
not only of Orthodox believers, but also of Moslems, Jews, Catholics,
Protestants and others in the USSR in the following excerpts from
his letter:
"The entire administration of the
ment of priests and bishops (including
Churchmen who make it easier to deride
all of this is secretly managed by the
Affairs. A church dictatorially ruled
sight not seen in two thousand years.
Church, the appoint-
even sacrilegious
and destroy the 'church),
Council for Religious
by atheists is a
"Priests are powerless within their own parishes;
only the conduct of church services is still entrusted to
them, and even then, only if they remain within the church
building. But if they wish to visit the bedside of the
sick or a cemetery they must first ask for approval 4 the
city council.
"For every functioning church, there are twenty that
have been razed or irretrievably ruined and another twenty
are in a state of neglect or profanation. How many populated
places are there in this country where the closest church is
one hundred or even two hundred kilometers away? Any attempt
on the part of the church activists, donors or bequestors to
restore even the smallest church is blocked...
ft...after the baptizing of infants, all of the child's
associations with the church usually cease. The doors to a
religious upbringing are tightly shut against them. They are
barred from participating in Church services, taking communion
and, perhaps, even from attending church. The right to
propagate the faith of our fathers has been broken, as well
as the right of parents to bring up their children within
the precepts of their own world outlook. And you, leaders
of the church, have yielded to this and condone it by accepting
as reliable evidence of religious freedom the fact that we
must place our defenseless children not into neutral hands
but into those of the most primitive and unscrupulous kind
of atheistic propagandists.
"We do not even ask about the pealing of church bells.
Why is Russia deprived of her ancient adornment, her most
beautiful voice?
"There are even no gospel books---these are brought to
us from abroad....
"Why was it necessary for me to show my passport when
I came to Church to baptize my son? With what sort of
canonical demands must the Moscow Patriarchate comply in
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registering the souls of those who are being baptized?
One must wonder at the spiritual strength of the paretts and
at the fathomless spiritual resistance inherited through the
ages with which they go through this denunciatory registration
and must later face the persecution at their place of
employment or the public ostracism of ignoramuses."
The Catholics
In February of this year more than 17,000 Lithuanian Roman
Catholics, in the largest known open protest of its kind ever
experienced in the Soviet Union, petitioned the United Nations
because "believers in our republic cannot enjoy the rights set
out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
(The declaration, passed by the UN with the Soviet Union abstaining,
calls for the recognition of religious freedom by all countries.)
Among the specific charges of religious persecution cited by the
Lithuanians were:
"Soviet officials limit the number of new priests
to be trained and control the assignment of priests to
parishes. No more than 10 youths a year can enter the
seminary. There are so few priests in Lithuania that
one must often serve two or three parishes and that even
invalid and aged priests must work.
"Catholics have not been allowed to rebuild churches
destroyed during World War II and have difficulty in
getting permission to hold services in private homes.
"Two parish priests were sent to labor camps for
providing religious instructions to youngsters. Two bishops
were exiled without trial.
"The authorities do not enforce a law which would punish
those who persecute church-goers."
There are an estimated 3.5 million Raman Catholics in the
Soviet Union, most of them ethnic Lithuanians and Poles living in
Lithuania] and in western parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine.
Lithuania, with a current population slightly over 2.5 million,
is the largest single Catholic area with an estimated 500 churches
stillipperating. Prior to its annexation into the USSR in 1940,
well over 80% of the population of Lithuania belonged to the
Roman Catholic Church.
Catholicism has been strong and influential in Lithuania
through several centuries and is deeply engrained in the Lithuanian
national identity. Unlike the Orthodox Church, whose spiritual
head, Pimen, rules from Moscow, the Lithuanian Catholics fall under
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the spiritual domain of the Pope, in Rome. Lithuanian Communist
Party attempts to sever these ties by forming a state-sponsored
National Lithuanian Church in 1952 were abandoned because of
stiff resistance by church leaders. Although the church still
remains within the spiritual realm of the Vatican, part of the
price for its survival is the Lithuanian Catholic leaders' public
support for Soviet foreign policy objectives.
The Moslems
Islam, next to Orthodoxy, has the setond largest following
in the Soviet Union. Official figures published in 1912, gave the
number of Moslems in Imperial Russia as 16,2 million. According
to Radio Moscow, following the 1959 census, there were some
30 million Moslems in the USSR. This figure is obviously based
on nationality rather than on active religious affiliation. The
most recent Soviet census, of 1970, lists the greatest percentage
gains of population since 1959 for those areas inhabited largely
by Moslems, so that today the number of ethnic Moslems in the USSR
may be well in excess of 40 million. There are no reliable figures
on the number actively engaged in Islam worship. In 1912, however,
there were over 26,000 mosques in Imperial Russia, whereas in 1959
the last date for which official figures are available, Tashkent
Radio placed the number of mosques at about 1200.
The position of Islam in the USSR is unique in several respects:
it is the sole religion practiced by over 30 more or less compact
but distinct nationalities, among whom it serves as a cultural bond.
The traditional Islamic way of life, although to some extent affected
by Westernization, especially in the towns, remains as a whole far
more distinct and particularist than that associated with any other
religion or ideology; the Moslem peoples of the USSR have much closer
cultural, social and biological affinities with the non-Soviet Moslem
peoples living adjacent to them than with any of the non-Moslem
Soviet nationalities*.
Today, Moslem leaders give full support to Soviet policies as
the price for the continued existence of their institutions and the
practice of their faith. Like the other main religious bodies of
the Soviet Union, the followers of Islam, too, are controlled by
the Council for Religious Affairs which is centrally directed by
the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Some state repressive
measures peculiar to Islam are:
*Religion and the Soviet State - A Dilemma of Power, Max Hayward
and William C. Pletcher, 1969.
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- The Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca which is the
canonical obligation of every believer once in his life-
time if he has the material means) has long been banned
to the rank and file Soviet Moslem. For external
propaganda purposes, small groups of usually not more
than 20 Moslems, selected primarily for their devotion
to the Soviet regime, are occasionally flown to Mecca
at state expense amidst much publicity directed to areas
of the Middle East by Radio Mbscow.
- Since 1955, Soviet authorities have permitted the
publication of only three small(editions of the Koran.
The latest edition came out in 1969 in 5,000 copies. It
is printed in old Arabic, however, and therefore, cannot
be read by most Central Asians, who do not even know the
script in which their own languages were once written.
The Jews
Unlike the official status accorded to the other main faiths
recognized in the Soviet Union, Judaism has not been allowed to
establish any form of central organization to administer the
Jewish communities scattered throughout the Soviet Union. The
1970 Soviet census lists 2.1 million ethnic Jews in the USSR.
The number of active believers of Judaism is not available
nor are official statistics on the number of practicing synagogues
remaining in the USSR. One source gives the number of recognized
synagogues in 1965 as 62. By contrast, the number of synagogues
in 1941 was 1,011 while in 1926 1,003 registered Hebrew communities
had existed in the Ukraine alone.
Official measures of persecution peculiar to Judaism included:
- The rite of circumcision, allegedly symbolizing
the concept of the "chosen people" has been attacked with
particular vehemance. Information on the medical value
of circumcision reportedly does not even appear in Soviet
medical journals.
- The observance of Passover With its national overtones,
for example, the phrase "next year in Jerusalem" with which
the Seder, the traditional Passover ceremony ends, has also
been strongly discouraged.
- The baking of matzos (unleavened bread eaten by Jews
during the Passover) has been made very difficult and except
for a very limited supply baked in Moscow, it is virtually
unavailable.
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The Protestants
Officially Russian Protestantism was a protest against Tsarist
state intervention in the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church.
It was made up of numerous sects, the two most important being the
Evangelical Christians and the Baptists. In marked contrast to
other religious groups in the USSR, the Evangelical Christians
and Baptists, with a total membership of only about 100,000 in
1914, were treated with an attitude of positive benevolence by
the new Soviet regime in the first few years after the Revolution.
As a consequence, by 1928 there were about 4 million Evangelical
Christians in some 3200 congregations in the USSR. The year 1929
marked the beginning of almost continuous severe repression of the
sects, primarily over their resistance to the collectivization of
agriculture. Many members of the sects were deported to Siberia.
Many died en route to or in labor camps. By 1941 the number of
congregations was reduced to approximately 1,000. In 1945 the
Evangelical Christians and Baptists, together with several other
small denominations, were united in the All-Union Council of
Evangelical Christian-Baptists (the VSEKhB, from the Russian
initials). Since its inception, the VSEKhB, managed and controlled
by the Council on Religious Affairs, has been at pains to preserve
correct relations with the Soviet authorities. In 1962 the VSEKhB
claimed 545,000 full members in its application for membership in
the World Council of Churches. Today, outside sources estimate
the figure as high as 1.5 million full members and a total community
of 3 million.
In 1965, a group of Baptists calling themselves "Initsiativniki"
broke away from the VSEKhB in protest of its leaders' compromises
with the Soviet regime. Demanding complete freedom of religion,
the dissident Baptists have established themselves into well organized
illegal (unregistered with the Council of Religious Affairs)
communities. In disregard for Soviet laws and repressive measures,
they give religious training to their children, print and distribute
their own religious literature, some of which attacks the Soviet
state, and actively seek new members. Over 500 of their members
have been illprisoned in the last ten years.
The Dilemma
Religious protesters play an increasingly important role in the
growing civil rights movement in the USSR, as evidencedlory'thereporting
on instances of religious persecution in the Chronicle of Current Events.
The Chronicle is a clandestinely circulated samizdat publication issued
on a more or less regular schedule of once every-two months Whith,
although not yet known to the Soviet masses, is rapidly growing in
significance and influence among Soviet intellectuals.
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Religion is a alemma for the Soviet regime. The question faced
by Soviet policy makers is not whether religion in general or any
specific religion is compatible with communism. Rather, the question
is how does religion influence the realities of Soviet power
objectives While Soviet foreign policy objectives require an
image of progressive liberalism towards religion (as well as towards
the closely related phenomenon of nationalism), Soviet internal
objectives, stemming from the multinational make-up of the USSR
and involving Kremlin attempts to foster an all-embracing "Soviet
nationalism," demand the suppression of religion and nationaliSmL)
ibecause of theif chauvinitic and irtedentist tendendies.drice,the
complete liquidation of religious groups (if this were possible)
would severely damage Soviet foreign policy objectives, however,
the Kremlin is at pains to maintain a plausible tightly-controlled
facade of constitutionally guaranteed "religious freedom" for all
of its citizens.
The latter is no easy task, however, for it involves the
manipulation of the most subtle human thought processes and emotions
as well as the ethnic, racial and spiritual heritage of many centuries
of human existence. It is furthermore complicated by a modern world
in which racial, ethnic and spiritual identity :AM more universally
sought after than ever before and technology in communications and
transportation increasingly facilitates international human exchange.
There are many indications that Soviet attempts to maintain
their delicately contrived balancing act regarding religious affairs
are experien4ng serious difficulties. Solzhenitsyn's Lenten Letter
and the Lithuanian protest highlight these difficulties. The
samizdat revelations on a continuing and ever-expanding basis, lend
considerable substance to what appears to be an increasing interest
in religion by a wide variety of Soviets but most pointedly on the
part of Soviet intellectuals. The controlled Soviet press, itself,
in admitting the ineffectiveness of its own anti-religious propaganda
and in chastising youth,. intellectuals and even Communist Party
members for their interest in religion provides probably the best
indication that the problems posed by religion for Soviet policy
makers are far from resolved. Furthermore, while this growing
interest in religion will almost inevitably tend to increase
Kremlin measures of repression and persecution, the growing voice
of protest resulting in worldwide publicity of Soviet ambivalence
with a potential for damaging Soviet foreign policy objectives will,
hopefully, act as a restraint on those in the Kremlin who might
otherwise favor a'return to Stalinist terror.
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NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1972
Today is Easter by the calendar of the
Russian Orthodox Church. This is the
full text of the letter sent to Patriarch
Pimen of Moscow snd All the Russias
by Alehsandr L Solzhenitsyn, express-
ing his deep concern over the state of
the church, its subservience to the
Soviet state and its failure to defend
the cause of the faith in Russia.
By ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN
CPYRGHT
A Lenten Letter
lkilostow Patriarchate comply In regis-
tering the souls of those who are being
baptized? One must wonder at the
?spiritual strength of the parents and at
;the fathomless spiritual resistance in-
herited through the ages with which
they go through this denunciatory reg-
istration and must later face the perse-
? cution at their place of employment or
the public ostraciSm of ignoramuses.
At this point persistence runs out
ter the baptizing of infants all of the
c lid's associations with the church,
ually cease. The doors to a religious!
u ibringing are tightly shut against
t em. They are barred from participat- 1
g in church services, taking corn-
union and, perhaps, even from at-
nding church. We are robbing our ,
ildren by depriving them of that un-
peatable, purely angelic perception !
the church service, which in adult
e can never be recaptured nor even
derstood as to what has been lost.
The right to propagate the faith of
r fathers has been broken, as well
s the right of parents to bring up their
ildren within the precepts of their
wn world outlook. And you, leaders ;
f the church, .have yielded to this and
ondone it by accepting as reliable evi-
ence of religious freedom the fact
at we must place our defenseless
hildren not into neutral hands but
to those of the most primitive and
nscrupulous kind of atheistic propa-
Most Holy Master!
That?which presses upon the head
like a gravestone and crushes the
breast of a moribund Russian Orthodox,
'people ? is the subject of this letter.
Everyone knows this, and it has al-
ready been shouted aloud, but every-
one has again reverted to a doomed
silence. And a small stone needed to be
placed on top of the large one to make
it no longer possible to remain silent.
I was weighed down by such a small
stone when I heard your message on
Christmas Eve.
, I felt a pang at that point when, per-
haps for the first time in half a cen-
tury, you finally spoke about childrenb
suggesting the following precept that,
along with infusing their children with
love for their country, parents should
foster in them a love for the church
(and apparently for faith itself?) and
they should strengthen that love by
setting a good personal example. I
beard this ? and saw before me my,
early childhood, spent in attending
many church services, and remembered
that initial impression, exceptionally
fresh and pure, which later could not
be erased by any millstone or mental
theory.
But what is the purpose of all this?
Why is your earnest appeal directed
only to Russian trnigres? Why do you
call only on those children to be
_brought up in the Christian faith, why'
do you admonish only the distant flock
to "discern slander and falsehood" and
eb strong in truth and justice? And we
--what should we discern? Should we
or should we not foster in our own
children a love for the church? Yes,
Christ taught us to search even for the
hundredth sheep that is lost ? when
the remaining ninety-nine are found.
?But when even the ninety-nine are
missing ? should we not concern our-
selves, first of all, in their behalf?
Why was it necessary for me to
show my passport when I came to
church to baptize my son? With what
sort of, :n fli al d ds nu- the
'The right to propagate
the faith of our fathers
has been broken."
andists. You find evidence of religious
freedom in the fact that adolescents
orn away from Christianity (God for-
bid that they should be infected by it)
are left with the ravine between the
agitator's manual and the criminal
code for their moral upbringing.
Half a century of our past history
has been neglected. I do not even
speak of rescuing the present but how
can we save our country's future?the
future which will be constituted by to-
day's children? In the final analysis the
true and profound 'destiny of our coun-
try will depend on whether the idea of
the rightness of power shall be irrev-
ocably implanted in the people's con-
ether that darkening
eclipse shall be cleansed and the power
of righteousness radiate once again.
Will we be able to reinstate within our-,
selves at least some of-the traces of
Christianity or shall we lose them com-
pletely and surrender ourselves to the
, calculations of self-preservation and
profit.?
A study of Russian history in the,
last few centuries will show that it
might have been incomparably more
humane and harmonious if the church
had not surrendered its independence
and .the people had listened to its
voice, as for example, in Poland..
Alas, with us it has been different
for a long time.
We were losing and have lost that
bright, ethical Christian atmosphere
in which our values, way of life, world
outlook, folklore and even the word
"peasant" have been founded for
thousands of years. We are losing the
last traces and signs of a Christian
people?is it possible that this should
not be the main concern of the
Russian Patriarch?
The Russian Church has its indig-
nant opinion on every evil in distant
Asia or Africa, yet on internal ills-
-It ha none ever. Why art the
mes: 7ges which we receive from the
church hierarchy traditionally tranquil?
Why are all church documents so
complacent, as if they were issued
among the most Christian of peoples?
One serene message follows another,
in the course of the same inclement
year. Will not the need for these
messages soon cease altogether? There
will no longer be anyone left to whom
they should be addressed; the flock
will disappear, With the exception of
the Patriarchal Chancellery office.
Almost seven years have passed
since two honest priests, Yakunin and
Eshliman, wrote their famous letter
to your predecessor in which they
demonstrated through personal sacri-
fice that the pure flame of the Chris-
tian faith has not as yet been extin-
guished in our country. They described
in an extensive and convincing fashion
the voluntary internal enslavement of
the Russian Church which has reached
the point of self-annihilation and asked
that anything which was untrue be
pointed out to them. But every word
was true; none of the hierarchs too
CPYRGHT
1,p4Notity4 i0C.itiktp.wemitil 1 uTa9potP1M9t10-n? Preservn-
"Half a century of
CPYRGHT
our past history has
been neglected."
It upon himself to refute them. And
how was their letter answered? In a
most simple and crude manner: for
telling the truth they were forbidden
to conduct services. And up to this
very day you have not corrected this.
The frightening letter of the twelve '
believers from Vyatka has also
remained unanswered; they were only
put under pressure. And the only ,
fearless Archbishop, Yermogen of
Kaluga, is still in monastic seclusion.
It was he who had forbidden the
closing of his churches and the burning
of icons and books, an accomplishment
In which degenerate enraged atheism
achieved great success up to 1964 in
other diocese.
It is almost seven years now that
all of this was, said aloud, but what.
has changed? For every functioning
church there are twenty that have:
been razed or irretrievably ruined and
another twenty are in a state of
neglect or profanation. Is there a sight
more harrowing than these skeletons,
the sole domain of birds and store-
keepers? How many populated places,
are there in this country where the,
closest church is one hundred or even
two hundred kilometers away? And
our north?that age-old repository of
Russian spirit and, perhaps, Russia's
most dependable future?is left entire-
ly without churches. Any attempt on
the part of , church activists, donors
smallest church is blocked by the
one-sided laws of the so-called division
of church and state. We dare not even
ask about the pealing of church bells.
Why is Russia deprived of her ancient
adornment, her most beautiful voice?
But how can we speak of churches?
There are even no gospel books?
these are brought to us from abroad,
in the same way as our own preachers
used to take them to the Indigirka.
This is the seventh year?and has
the church asserted itself on anything?
The entire administration of the
church, the appointment of priests and
bishops (including even sacrilegious
churchmen who make it easier to
deride and destroy the church), all
of this is secretly managed by the
Council for Religious Affairs. A church
dictatorially ruled by atheists is a
sight not seen in two thousand years.
Also under their control is the, church
economy and the use of church
resources, those coins deposited by the
fingers of the devout. Five million
rubles are donated to outside funds
with magnanimous gestures, while
beggars are chased away from the
portico and there is no money to
repair a -leaking roof in a poor parish:
-Priests are powerless within their own
parishes; only the conduct of church
services is still entrusted to them, and
even then, only if they remain within
the church building. But if they wish
to visit the bedside of the sick or
a cemetery they must first ask for
approval of the city council.
What sort of reasoning can be used
to convince oneself that the consistent
destruction of the Spirit and body of
the church by atheists is the hest
an for whom? Certainly not for
arist. Preservation by what meanV
'74lsehood? But after falsehOod?what
;art of hands should perform th
icharist?
Most Holy Master! Do not scar
entirely my unworthy outcry. You will
nrobably not hear one like it ever'
ven years. Do not let us suppose..
not make us think that for the high
71iests of the Russian Church earthly
authority is higher than heavenlr
authority, earthly responsibility mon
r ghtening than responsibility before
Gd.
Let us not deceive the people, and
more importantly, let us not deceive
ourselves while praying, by thinking
that external fetters are stronger than
or r spirit. it was not any easier a .
Il e time of Christianity's birth, bu .
X has survived and flourished and ha :
t own us the way: that of sacrifice
He who is deprived of all materia
power is always victorious througt
acrifice. The same martyrdom worth3
of the first centuries was acceptec
by bur priests and fellow believer:
La our living memory. But at tha
time they were thrown to the lions
today one can only lose well-being.
During these days, when the Cros:
ii brought out to the middle of tin
cl-urch and you kneel before it, asl
tfta Lord: What other purpose coulc
tillare be for your serving a peoph
winch has lost the spirit of Christianita
and the Chrisitian image?
?Great Lent, Sunday of
Veneration of the Cross, 1972. ,
Ti"nslated by Ludmilla Thorne
CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES
23 March 1972
Solzhenitsyn Says
The Russian Church
Neglects Its Flock
Soecial to The New York Tiraes
MOSCOW. March 22?The
author Aleksandr i. oiznerut-
CPYRGHT
"A gravestone presses upon
he head and rends the breast
of a moribund Russian Orthodox
aeople," the letter Ibegins, ac-
:ording to a copy made avail-
able to Western newsmen.
Written in the ecclesiastical
language customary in com-
munications with the church,
syn, in a "Lenten letter" dr.;
culating in Moscow, has accused
the Russian Orthodox Church
lof forsaking its flock and of
;being a tool of the atheist state.
The letter, addressed to Patri-
arch Pimen, leader of Russian
Orthodoxy, also contains an
Union since the middle sixties
Impassioned plea to the church
cn the ground that he has
Ito bring the Christian spirit painted the country's Stalinist
lback to the people. ast in dark colors.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02.
tIC letter lists limitations on
Lie rights of priests, the closing
ri churches and the repression
o( dissident churchmen as ex-
amples of submission to the
authorities.
Mr. Soilzhenitsyn's novels,
best sellers in the, West, have
een banned in the Soviet
2
While continuing to write for
publication abroad, the 52-year-
old novelist and Nobel laureate
has also become increasingly
vocal on issues of civil rights.
His open letter is believed to
be his first protest on church
matters.
He depicted a land in which,
for every functioning church,
"there are 20 that have been
"razed or i etrievably ruined
and another 20 in a state of
neglect or desecration." He was,
presumably referring to a prac-
tice common after the Bol-
shevik Revolution of converting
churches to secular uses.
"How mry populated places
are there in this country with
no church within 100 or even
200 kilometers?" Mr. Solzhen-
itsyn asked,
Charging that restoration of
_even ?the_smallest church was
CIA-RDP79-01194A000
being hampered by what hel
termed the "one-sided laws of
the so-called division of church
and state," he said that he did
not dare ask about the renewed
pealing of church bells, no
longer tolerated in the Soviet
Union.
"And yet," he went on, "why
should Russia be deprived of
her most ancient adornment,
her most beautiful voice?"
The novelist, accusing the
church of taking orders from
the Council for keligious Af-
fairs, wrote:
"The entire administration of
the church, the appointment of
prieSts and bishops, including
even sacrilegious churchmen
who seek to deride and disrupt
the church?all these are se-
cretly managed by the Council
for Church Affairs.
200170001-8
"A churclMini9rUP r PSMARd PigtinaVti,
rected hv atheists IS a sight not
seen in "2,000 years."
Mr. Solzhenitsyn said that
Patriarch Pimen, in his first
year in office, had done noth-
ing to reinstate two dissident
priests, Nikolai I. Eshliman and
Gleb P. Yakunin, who were de-
frocked in 1965 for having ques-
tioned the church's collabora-
tion with Soviet authorities.
IArchbishop Yennogen of Ka-
luga is still being kept in mon.
close churches in his diocese,
the letter said.
/In an allusion to occasional
church statements on world is-
sues, apparently at the Soviet
Government's behest, Mr. Sol-
zhenitsyn said: "The Russian
:church has an impassioned
opinion about the slightest evil
In far-away Asia or Africa, but
never about its own domestic
troubles.? "
Deploring restrictions on the
CI< Li pi yrliegs1 uiptiaydy
nts
nests are powerless within
their own parishes, with only
the conduct of church services
entrusted to them. And if they
should ever wish to visit the
bedside of the sick or a ceme-
tery they must first ask for an
ordinance by the city council."
Referring to a. message by
Patriarch Pimen apparently read
in orthodox churches at Christ-
mas, Mr. Solzhenitsyn berated
him for calling on Russian Or-
trodox abroad, to teach their
CPYRGHT
214jilidlettAjoUllal3the church but
avoiding such a recommenda-
tion to believers in tho Soviet
Union.
Russian history might have
been "incomparably more hu-
mane and harmonious in the la
few centuries," Mr. Solzhenit-
syn said, "if the church ha
not surrendered its indcpend
ence and had continued to
Imake its voice heard among
the people as it does, for ex?'
ample, in Poland."
, .
WASHINGTON POST
27 March 1972
CPYRGHT
MOSCOW, March 27 ?
17,000 Baltic Catholics
Cite Soviet Persecution
Lnm Animus This
CPYRGHT
more tnan 17,11U0 Homan Cath-
olics from Lithuania have sent
petitions to the United
Na-
tions, charging Soviet reli-
gious persecution. It was the
largest open protest of its
kind in the Soviet Union.
An inch-thick stack of peti-
tions, bearing over 17,000 sig-
natures of "believers," was
sent to U.N. Secretary General
Kurt Waldheim last month
after Soviet 'officials in Mos-
cow ignored their earlier pro-
tests, according to dissident
Russian sources who made
'copies of the papers available
to Western newsmen today.
Lithuania, a small republic
on the Baltic Sea that was an-
nexed by the Soviet Union in
1940, is known as an area
where traditional religious be-
liefs persist despite official,
harassment by the Communist
regime.
The petitions suggest con-
tinued strength of the Catho-
lic Church in Lithuania de-
spite steady anti-religious
propaganda. It also seems to
he a part of a growing effort
by religious communities to
induce the government to im-
plement religious freedoms
guaranteed by the Soviet con-
stitution.
Last September, 2,000 per-
sons from the town of Prenai,
which has less than 10,000 pope
ulation, signed an open letter
to the Soviet leadership charg-
ing that freedom of religion
was being curbed by local au-
thorities in Lithuania.
Three other open letters
with a total of 5,000 signatures
were sent last fall to' Party,
leader Leonid tBrezhney but'
police -using threats, arrests
and handcuffs prevented the
mass collection of signatures,Y
the letter to Waldheim said.
"Such action by the authori-
ties prompted the conviction
that the present memoran-
dum, signed by 17,000 believ-
ers, will not attain its aim if it'
is sent by the same means as
?previous collective declare-
ions," the letter said.
The Catholics were taking
their complaints to the United
Nations, the letter went on,
because "believers in our re-
public cannot enjoy the rights
let out in Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of,
human Rights." The declara-
tion, pased by the United Na-
tion with the Soviet Union ab-i
staining, calls for the recogni-
tion of religious freedom by
all countries.
[At the United Nations, a
;pokesman had no comment
in the petitions today.]
In their petition, the Lith-
uanians complained that So-
viet officials limit the number
of new priests to be trained
and control the assignment of
priests to parishes. They said
no more than 10 youths a year
can enter the seminary.
? ,The are so few priests in
Lithuania, the letter charged,
that one must often serve two
or three parishes and that
'"even invalid and aged priests
must work."
' The Lithuanian authorities
do not enforce a law which
would punish those who perse-
cute church-goers, the petition
claimed.
k In addition, Catholics have
, not been allowed to rebuild
[churches destroyed during
:World War II and have diffi-
' cony in getting permission to
hold services in private
homes.
"At the same time, a dance
hall was allowed to be built in
the parish of Andreivas where
the church stood," the petition
said.
It repeated charges made
last November that two parish
priests were sent to labor
camps for providing religious
instructions to youngsters.
Two bishops were also exiled
without trial, it said.
More signatures Would have
been included in the 123 sepa-
rate, identical typed petitions'
If the Soviet police had not red
acted so strongly against the
dissidents, the letter said.
"If in the future, the organs
of the state take the same atti-
tude toward believers' com-
plaints as they have until now,
we will be obliged to address
ourselves to international bod-
les, the Pope, the head of our
church, or the United Nations
as an authoritative institution
defending human rights,"
In addition to repressing re-
ligion, the Catholics said, the
"forcible atheistic upbringing"
of Soviet society has also
caused increases in juvenile
crime, alcoholism, divorces,
abortions and suicides.
The Lithuanians' protest
comes at a time of improving
relations between Moscow and:
.the Vatican. Soviet President'
Nikolai Podgorny and Foreign'
Minister Andrei Gromyko
have called on Pope Paul VI,
and the Most Rev. Agotino
? Casaroli, who is tantamount to
a Vatican foreign minister, vis-
ited Moscow last year.
There arc an estimated 3.5
million Roman Catholics liv-
ing in the Soviet Union, most
of them Lithuanians and'
Poles. Catholics are situated
in Lithuania, and in western
parts of Byelorussia and the
Ukraine.
Lithuania is the largest
sin-
gle Catholic area, with nearly
500 curches still operating
there,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6
3
CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6
LE MONDE, Paris
29 March 1972
CONTRE LA POLITIQUE ANTMELIGIEUSE
Dix-scpt omit= IitIllQS
s'adresscni a M. Droiray
Moscou minimise emig? ration juive
?
Les catholiques iltuaniens, lasses de volt sans reponse diverses
petitions envoyees aux autorites sovietiques, viennent d'adrosser
M. Brelnev un memorandum portant dix-sept millet signatures. La
police a vainement essaye den empecher la collecte. Les sIgnataires
ont adresse copie do cc document a M. Kurt" Waldheim, en prient
le secretaire general de l'ONU de le transmettre lul-mente au chef
du part! sovietique.
Le four memo ? le 27 mars ? oCi le texte des catholiqueS Nue-
niens OMR communiqu?ux correspondents, occidentaux a Moscou,
un porte-parole officiol laisait des declarations stir l'emigration ((five.
En minimisant le chiffre des departs, if a voulu apparemment rassurer
les Etats arabes.
De notte correspondant ALAIN JACOB
CPYRGHT
meme 'curs propres frets, les
Moscou. ? Les catnoliques (Wises bridees )), et les fideles
ittuarnens duab le !MAIM, doivent obtenir avec de grandes'
dum est date des mois de &cern- ? eiffictates, des autorites. la per-
bre 1971 et janvior 1972 ? se pia-
cent sur le terra n des droits de
l'homme et const stent que ? pour
les croyants de totre pcuple, la
liberte de conscience est toujours
absente et l'Eglise sujette a per-
secutions ?. Les !Pits qu'ils citent
peuvent se resun er ainsi : -
o Le clerge : c Nos eveques-
Ju. Stepanovitcluis et V. Sled-
kiavitchus ont t?xiles sans
proces tandis qu'en ruivem-
bre 1971 a les pr tres You. Zdep-
skis et P. B ibnis ont etd
condamnes a Lt privation de
liberte parce Wits exptiquaient
les fondements le la foi it des
enfants, sur la cr,mande de leurs
parents ?. Le manque de pretres
s'accentue d'aut .e part du fait
que a les autorite.s ne permettent
qu'a dis etudiat ts par an d'en-
trer au seminair7 ?? (de
et que celui-cl ti'est pas entre
les mains de notre eveque, mats
du pouvoir ?.
? L'educatior religieuse des
enfants est non seulement entra-
vee par des mcsures telles que
les arrestations. mais ? atheisme
est inculque dg force dans les
&ales sovietiquet ?.
? En violation du code crimi-
nel de la Repu )11que sovietique
de Lituanie,croyants sont
victimes d'ostracisme ? us per-
dent notamment leur emploi, ?
en raison de h ur lot : a Les
croyants de l'in elligentsia crai-
gnent de pratiq ler leur religion
tick no represente qU'une petite
ouvertement. ? plus, a les re
minorite en U.R.S. et ne bent-
presentants des autorttes inter
disent aux croyants de restaur
tide pas des tolerances relatives
,
Approved or Release 1999/09/02 ?
r-ussion d'exercer le cute it leur
Comitile ?.
Les signataires concluent en
clarant que des efforts du gou-
-rernement sovietique pour re-
edier a cette situation ? nous
Ideraient, nous, castholiques,
nous considerer comme citoyens
? l'Union sovietique a Part en'
I iere n.
Annexee a l'U.R.S.S. en 1939.
Lituanie comptait encore, 11
r a une dlzaine d'annees, envi-
ron deux millions et demi de
( atholiques, soit pres de 85 % de
Is population. M. Nikita Struve,
(,111 cite ces chiffres dans son ou-
nage les Cltretiens en U.R.S.S.
(le Seull), ajoute cependant que
ks effectifs du clerge ont dim,-
slue de moitie entre In fin de la
tuerre et le milieu des ann6es
it) et ment,ionne plusieurs rres-1
!ations de pretres en 1961 et
( n 1962. D'apres Ilinnualre du Va-
tican, seul l'eveque de Kaunas,
\4gr Matulalkis est actuellement
in fonctions.
Quelques jours peine apres I
lettre de l'ecrivain Soljenitsyne
u patriarche Pimene. chef de
'Yeglise orthodoxe (le Monde du
:4 mars), le memorandum des ca-
t holiques lituaniens contribue A
attirer l'attention sur le probleme
lc rapports de la religion et de
l'Etat en IJ.R.S.S. Le cas des ca-
I holiques soviatiques est plus dif-
ficile encore que ceiui des ortho-
loxes. Le catholicisrne remain, en
nccorcke a l'eglise nations le
russe. Au contraire. 11 prete le
!lane A, des sma !games ? justi-
fies ou non ? avec la survivance
de sentiments nationalistcs et se-
4,riratistes dans des cornmunautes
plus ou moms receminent annexes
h ? dans les Pays bal-
tes, notaminent mats susst
dans les nciens territoires polo-
nais. L'Eglise romaine est d'au-
tant plus K suspecte ? aux yeux
des autorites de Moscou qu'elle
est liee au Vatican. Enfin, le sort
des catholiques petit ici se com-
pares a celui des baptistes l'ac-
Myna' spostolique est beaucoup
plus essentielle pour l'Eglise ea-
tholique que pour l'Eglise ortho-
doxe, cc qui provoque des conflits
plus aigus avec le pouvoir, qui
propage ratheisme.
En &pit dune certalne pru-
dence et d'une grande discretion,
les autorites sovietiques cherchent
eteindre ce que les communau-
tes catholiques ont de plus vivant
ur les marches? du territoire de
l'U.R.S.S. Les uniates de Galleie
en font l'experience au meme titre
que les catholiques lituaniens. Si
it sons dipiornatique du Kremlin
s'est manifesto par les egards avec
lesquels Mgr Casaroll. sous-secre-
hire d'Etat nu Vatican, a ete
ccuellii ?oscou nu mois (lc
fevrier 1971, les nrrestations de
pretres signalees par le memo-
randum des catholiques Btu:miens
datent de novembre de. la meme
armee, comme les petitions de
plusieurs communautes demeurees
sans reponse de scptembre, octo-
bre et decembre.
Un autre document, tout A fait
offlciel ce1u1-14, a ete nubile
lundi. II s'agit d'une interview
de M. Choumiline, vice-ministre
de l'interieur de l'U.R.S.S.,
l'agence de presse Novosti sur
question de l'emigration des julfs
sovietiques h destination d'Israel.
Le porte-parole du minister? se
defend contre les accusations
a prevaricatrices ? scion
lesquelles cette emigration attein-
drait des proportions ? massives
et aurait pour resultat d' ? ac-
croltre k potentiel mititaire israe-
lien D. L'auteur de l'interview
croft mettre les choses au point
en admettant qu'un nombre
timito de julfs sovietiques ont
demande partir pour Israel:
?.Ces personnes, explique-t-i1 avec
un parfait sang-froid, peuvent.
quitter l'U.R.S.S. au meme titre
que les antres citoyens sovie-
tiques,,sans distinction d'appar-
tenernee nationale, ethnique, de
sexe et &doe. Leurs demandes de
depart sont soigneusement etu-
diem' par les organes du ministere
de l'interieur de l'U.R.S.S. selon
La procedure en vigueur et, en
regle generale, satisfaites.-
Le porte-parole sovietique donne
le chiffre de dix mule senst-
blement inferleur aux estimations
reeties (Vinare part ? pour le
nombre tni a I des den.irts en
Israel en 1971. 11 entime apprirem-
ment contrilmer it lute meilletire
appreciation de cc phenomene en
rappelant min a pendant tante la
period(' de rapres-grierre, environ,
vingt et 1111 tnille personnes ont
valid l'U.R.S.S. pour Israel n
? atom que u le nombre total des
immigres venus dans cc pays du-
rantlz meme periode a atteint
deux millions '
Mimes le texte de l'interview,
les limitations nctuellerm.nt
nosees aux demandes de depart
CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6
Approved
CPYRGHT
eleaseai I.
:
Proche-Oricnt s. En conse-
quence. lrs limitations cancer-
neat surtout crux qui possetient
tine instruction ntlittaire ott qui
out ten travail touchant dr prds
les interdis de i'Etat s. e Pen de
&mantles de depart, ajoute le
porte-parole, ant etd ddmsdes par
les habitants tie growls centres
de l'U.R.S.S. tele quo Moscou,
Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, et de
regions idles quo la Republique
socialiste sovietigne tie MoWavle,
etc.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 April 1972
114;WERIttaittAVIZIT
sent essentlellement &stirs:Ts
alimenter une contre-propagande
rassurante pour les pays arabes
en rneme temps qu'h detendre
? avec redress? nue ron volt ?
11J.R.S.S. centre les accusations
dont elle est robjet dans de rmil-
Myles ,paya occidentaux.
ALAIN JACOB.
CPYRGHT
70001-6
CPYRGHT
Nationalism stirs in Baltic States
By Charlotte Salkowskl
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Moscow
Local nationalisms are smoldering in
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and getting
Increased attention from Soviet authorities
these days.
Whetherlethnic sentiments are actually on
the rise in these tiny republics, once inde-
pendent states that were incorporated into
the Soviet Union in 1940, is difficult to know.
It could be they are simply getting to be
more of a problem for the regime because
Soviet society as a whole is harder to control
without Stalinist methods of repression.
In any case, some recent developments
point to continuing nationalist discontent in
the Baltic region: .
* More than 17,000 Lithuanian Roman
Catholics hare signed a memorandum to
party leadei Leonid I. Brezhnev charging
persecution of their Church, according to
unofficial sources this week, The Catholics
call on the Soviet leadership to ensure the
freedom of conscience guaranteed in the
,Constitution, "which until now does not exist
In practice."
Etittanie issue discussed
? In Estonia early in March the party
leadership called a special plenum to dis-
cuss "interethnic indoctrination of the work-
ing people," indicating a concern about rela-
tions between Estonians and the growing
number of Russian migrants;
? An underground letter from 17 Latvian
Communists charging the gradual russifica-
tion of Latvia, was published in the West
In January. The letter has been discussed
(and denoqnced) in the local Latvian press,
and recently Latvian party leader August
Voss called on party propagandists to corn-
Although the Lithuanian petititin concerns
religion, it has strong nationalist overtones.
for Lithuania was predominantly Roman
Catholic before the Soviet annexation. The
Soviet press itself has complained that loy-
alty to Catholicism has fed anti-Russian na-
tionalism in the republic.
The Catholic memorandum, sent to United
Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
for forwarding to the Soviet leadership, cat-
alogs a host of grievances. It says two
priests were imprisoned in 1971 for giving
religious instruction to children and that two
bishops have been exiled for 10 years with-
out trial.
It also charges that atheism is forcibly
Inculcated in Lithuania's Soviet schools, that
Soviet authorities rather than the bishops
,handle seminary affairs, and that Catholics
are not permitted to rebuild burnt-out
churches.
"In the years of Soviet power in Lithu-
ania," an appendix to the memorandum
states, "such vices as juvenile crime, alco-
holism, and suicide have grown tenfold, and
, divorces and abortions have taken on threat-
ening proportions as well. The further we
are removed from the Christian past, the
clearer become the terrible consequences of
forcible atheistic upbringing and the more
widespread becomes an inhuman way of life
deprived of God and religion."
In Latvia and Estonia, for their part, there
has long been resentment about the influx
of Slays, mainly Russians, into the republics.
Some local officials have even resisted the
expansion of industry so there would be less
need to import Russian manpower ? an
bat "manifestations of nationalism local-
, attitude that has been sternly assailed in the
ism, and separateness." ' . official press.
ApprouPri Few PPIPase 1999/09/02 ? SIA-RDP79-0119AA000200170001-6
Approveri-Enr-Release 1999109102 ' CIA-RnP79-011QAA00020n1700n1WYRGHT
The concern of some Estonians and Lot-
vianS is that Russians, who account for 30
percent of the population of Latvia and about
25 percent of that of Estonia, will eventually
tlominate every aspect of indigenous he.
Thus the letter from the 17 Communists
(which was addressed to Communist parties
in the West and smuggled out last summer)
bitterly charged that only Russians or "So-
viet Latvians" hold the top party posts, that
the share of Latvians in the population
dropped from 62 percent hi 1959 to 57 per-
cent in 1970, that most of the radio and tele-
vision programs are in Russian, and that
few all-Latvian kindergartens and schools
remain.
Political bservers cite a number of fac-
tors that could account for what seems to be
a stirring of nationlist activity generally (in
the Ukraine, and other areas as well): The
success Soviet Jews have had in agitating to
emigrate to Israel, the influence of Western
broadcasts and tourism over past years, and
the spread of underground publishing.
Some observers believe that the general
ideological apathy in the country May play
a role. After so many years of Marxist in-
doctrination and a less than stimulating
leadership, it is suggested, people may be
seeking spiritual' nourishment in religion
and in their traditional cultures.
Failure to inspire youth seems to be par-
ticularly troubling to the regime. In recent
months party leaders in the Baltic region
have placed great stress on bolstering ideo-
logical indoctrination in the schools and uni-
versifies,
It is possible, too, that ethnic feelings are
coming to the fore more because the regime -
is reluctant to deal as brutally with the
problem as it would have in Stalinist times.
It continues to crack down on political dis-
sent but seems to apply only enough force
to keep it under control.
In the case of the Lithuanian memoran-
? dum, for instance, Soviet authorities knew it
* was being circulated, and although they re-
portedly interfered with the collection of
signatures, they did not move with full force
to stop it.
CPYRGHT
BALTIMORE SUN
27 November 1971
Lithuanian trial
reportedly bloody CPYRGHT
ny nevi. mum
Moxcow Bureau IV The Sun-
Moscow?Several Lithuanians
were injured early this montl. in
a melee that resulted when ,-)o-
lice broke up a crowd of several
hundred Catholics who raffia to
the support of a priest on tr al,
reliable sources reported yes er-
day.
The incident is described ir an
unofficial account of trials 1,10-1
vember 11 and 12 in which two!
priests were sentenced to me
year in a labor camp for teach-1
ing children the catechism. The
underground document, m ide
available to Westervorrespc-nd-
ents, gives this account of the
trials and the events that ge?
ceded them:
The Rev. Juozas Zdcbekis, the
pastor of a parish in the cit./ of
Prenai, was arrested Angus 26
and placed in a police lock p.
lie was beaten so badly by o-
licemen that his mother "ba ely
recognized him.". Other Lith-
uanians arrested/M*0M ed
hooliganism and placed in thei
next cell heard the priest "beg :
he policemen not to beat himi
about the face." I .
Case moved to Kaunas .
The case was moved from
Prenai, where it would have
been tried normally, to the city
of Kaunas. "Probably," the un-
derground report states, "the
authorities wanted to avoid a
confrontation with those people
whom the priest had served,
whose respect and love he had
N011."
But all the same, many people
learned about the trial. From
arty morning, people hurried to
(
the courthouse. By 10 A.M. near-
y 600 people had gathered.
Although the trial was ostensi-
bly open, the report says, in fact
only court officials, school offi-
cials, and employees of the
_KGB he secret police ,were let
Fir -Release 1999/09/0
Several injured
"Believers filled the corridors,
the staircase, people crowded
into the courtyard and onto the
street. Shortly before the begin-
ning of the trial policemen be-
gan to push people roughly out-
side and chase them away. Dur-
ing the 'clearing' of the stair-
case, several people were in-
jured. One woman lost con-
sciousness from a blow on the
head, another broke a rib.
"On the street, policemen
seized men and women. The
girls with flowers suffered the,
worst?the policemen seized-i
them and shoved them into po-
lice vehicles. Those who resisted
were beaten; thrown to the
ground, dragged by their legs."
'About 20 persons, including I
priests, were arrested. Formal!
cha ges were brought againsti
abo t 10.
Father Zdebekis was charged mold frequently by admoni-
with the "organization and sys- lions from the judge, Father
IPCIAQIROPMCPV4914Adoceti Off TN) Mt-enstitu-
I lessons for minors," The priest
! admitted that he had given reli-
gious instruction to the children
of parents who requested it.
The prosecuter argued that
the priest had violated Soviet
regulations requiring the separa-
Bon of church and state by inter-
fering in the educating of chil-
dren.
Vague answers
About 10 children from Father
Zdebekis's confirmation classes I
were called to testify, but gave
vague answers to the prosecu-
tor's questions. A few refused to
talk at all or simply cried on the
witness stand. One 10-year-old
girl said she and her friend had
attended two lessons, then
stopped because people had pho-
tographed them near the church
and warned them not to return.
In a 10-minute speech inter-
6
CPYRGHT
tional gunrAppreveillof or
religion give him the right to
offer religious instruction.
? Father BubinS sentenced
The ether one-year sentence
was given the following day, No-
vember 12, by a court in Rasei-
'yan tn.the Rev. B. Rubins. par-!
ReAsztaAPAil 1A9 thiPP/Ct2G:r.0 IAeRdaRZEOlcle4ANW 0 047 CIONIA. ing and fright;
.kalnis. Along with other priests drove around to the churches. encd?into the fire station. Lock-
in the area, Father Bubins had On July 25. officials burst into ing them in the fire station, they
:offered to examine children on Father Bubins's church while he gave the children pencils and
;their religious knowledge after was questioning a boy on his,? paper and dictated a written ae.
the bishop in Raseiyan was giv- religious knowledge as 30 other cusation against P'ather Buhiris;,t
en official permission to confirm children waited in line. No details, other than the sett;
.children, The officials, the underground tence, were given of the Bubistis1
On the days children were to report says, "began to seize and trial. ?
T., I
GIRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 April 1972
71.
C/3111 itara
d.espite
ersists ha U.S.S.a.
io71
?
remora 0171ave
By Paul WA!
Written for The Christian Science Monitor
CPYRGHT
Religion is strengthening its hold on the
thinking of many people in the Soviet Union.
"The religious mist not only does not dis-
appear, but on the contrary, begins to en-
compass our youth," the Byelorussian youth
journal Znamya Yunosti recently com-
plained.
In response, one atheist conference fol-
lows another, and antireligious militancy
does not cease. The latest effort to snuff out
religion was a national seminar of college
and high-school teachers of "scientific
atheism." It was convened March 14 by the
Ministry of Higher and Specialized Educa-
tion.
Last June, a similar conference deliber-
ated for four days. Its findings were pub-
lished in the atheist monthly Nauka i Zhizn
(Science and Life). The main reasons for
the tenacious survival of religion were said
,to be the indifference of part of the coun-
try's youth, Western influences, a concilia-
tory attitude within the Komsomol (Com-
munist youth organization), youth's gulli-
bility, family influences, and the spreading
of underground religious literature.
The objection atheist agitators most fre-
quently come across ? even among non-
believers ?' is that "religion helps." This
way of thinking recently came out in a sur-
vey made by the administration of? the
Vinnitsa medical institute.
Survey question
The question asked in the survey wa..
"What is your attitude to religion?" The
results of the survey were discussed on
Feb. 4 by the Vinnitsa radio in Ukrainian.
Out of 350 students questioned, only 163
stated firmly what they knew the adminis-
tration wanted them to say, namely that
they do not believe in God.
More than half of the students, exactly
180, stated that their attitude could be de-
scribed as indifferent. A different 180 said,
they came from families who maintained
religious traditions. And 83 students said .
they had believers, meaning church mem-
bers, in their families.
these 'medical missionaries' is: 'Tile doctors
merely bandages the patient; it is God
who cures him!'
"Medical establishments should pay mora
attention to the atheist education of stu4
-dents," the broadcast warned. This is pre-,
cisely what last month's Moscow seminar;
was supposed to bring about, through atheist
"enlightenment" and militant antireligious
propaganda.
That is the Soviet line toward its own citi-
zens. Its line toward the Arab world .is differ-
ent. In a series of talks entitled "Against
Imperialist Attempts to Exploit Religion for
Reactionary Purposes," Dmitry Ponomarev,
candidate of historical sciences, proclaimed
March 27 that among the Afro-Asian people,
"religion may serve a noble purpose under
certain circumstances.
"Men of religion currently exercise great
influence in mobilizing Egyptians for the
struggle against Israeli aggression. . . .
Many men of religion, Muslims included,
have expressed their sympathy for the
struggle for peace and justice.
"Marxist-Leninist parties call for alliance
with believers in the common struggle for
just objectives."
On the following day Mr. l'onomarea
sought to dispel any qualms Arab Muslims
might have about the Soviet attitude toward
religion in their own country: "The Corn.
munsts show respect for the feelings of be.
lievers," he said, "including Muslims. The
true democracy of Soviet society lies in the
fact that every Soviet person is free to be.
lieve in God or to disbelieve."
In an attempt to explain the continued in-
fluence of religion, the broadcast went on to
describe the "missionary activities" of
"some sects, such as the Adventists and the
Baptists, who try to instill in man's con-
science a social program of their own."
Especially singled out were so-called
"medico-missiortary" activities:
"One frequently encounters in hospitals a
nurse or a sister who secretly whispers to
the patient: 'Pray to God, for only He can
help you.' Although the patient subsequently
recovers thanks to the ingenuity of the doc-
tors, he will nevertheless have in his con-
science traces of the nurse's brainwashing
and will begin to believe that he was saved
by God."
Priorities suggested
"That is why," the broadcast continued, i
"believers give priority to medical establish-
ments when sending their children to insti-
tutes of higher learning. The formula of
7
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NEW YORK TIMES
13 December 1971
Islamic Past of Azerbaijan Republic
Frustrates Moscow's Marxist Plans
BAKU, U.S.S.R.?Half a cen-
tury of Soviet power has done
much to modernize the Azer-
baijan Republic, but the
Azerbaijani style of life, re-
flecting centuries of Moslem
Influence, refuses to conform
to the Communist model.
As an Institution the Islamic
faith Is weak here. The veil
has virtually disappeared. Wo-
men as well as men have been
educated and moved into jobs
in numbers unheard of before
the Bolshevik take-over in this
region of the Caucasus on
April 20, 1920.
The industry of Baku has
been modernized and diversi-
fied and new plants have been
installed , in district towns.
Phalanxes of square - faced
apartment houses surround
Baku and have sprouted in new
Industrial towns like Sumgait.
Some Western economists have
reckoned that, for many, health
care, education and standards
of living are higher in Soviet
Azerbaijan than in neighboring
Iran, where several million
ethnic Azerbaijanis live.
But vestiges of the past re-
main to bedevil and frustrate
determined flarxists.
'For Mercenary Reasons'
No less a figure than GekJar.
A. Aliyev. the Communist party
chief, has been complaining
about nepotism, forced child
marriages, corruption on a
grand scale, the urge for private
ownership and the penchant for
private tradIng?"plundering of
socialist property for mercenary
reasons,, '.,.he called it.--and the
practice of bribing examiners
at universities for entrance or,
graduation.
In to unusually tarti
speeches in March and October,1
Mr. Allyev castigated idea-,
logical backsliders of all kinds..
Ile was upset by commercial-
ism in local theaters, painters
who copy "the worst models of
modern art of the West," the
ii
undue pessimism of some novel-
ists, non-Marxist probing of
local history, worrisome cur -
Apprrtvpri. nr
By HEDRICK SMITH
Rportal In The T:ekr York ?Imre
',say alma religion among tile
young and even financial dona
tions to mosques by leading
intellectuals.
"One reason for bribery is
the striving for private prop
erty, the basis for which is
Individualism and selfishness,
and worrying only about one's
own benefit, and the wish to
get as much as possible for
oneself and less for society,"
the party chief declared. "One
should not undervalue the in-
fluence of bourgeois ideology."
The clannishness of the
'Azerbaijanis, their skill at ar-
The New York Times/Doc 17. 1411
ranging deals under the table
and their generally undisci-
plined ways have long been a
problem for Communist leaders
?apparently at a greater scale
than in many other regions.
Some local Communists blame
centuries of Moslem domination
over this southern territory
during the conquests by Per-
sians, Arabs and Turks.
"Islam is more aggressive
and more reactionary than
other religions," asserted
Gasham Aslanov, editor of the
Communist party youth news-
paper Yunost, which circulates
350,000 copies three times a
week. , "This religion tenches
people to think about them-
selves and their families."
1
The for mer
hairen ana younger looking
than his 37 years cited what lie
said were Moslem proverbs to
demonstrate the selfishness fos-
stered by Islam.
"We have these proverbs,"
he said. "'He who sacrifices
all of his efforts for the bene-
fits of the people suffers more.'
'First It Is necessary to build
up the inside of the mosque
and then the outside.' Each
man tries to gather coal under
his own stove."
"We lived about 1,300 years
by this religion, by this ide-
ology," he explained during a
chat in .a hotel cafe. "We have,
lived under Soviet power only
50 years. During 50 years it is
very difficult to change human
nature."
City With a Hybrid Past
Actually 13aku is an inter-
national city with a hybrid past.
Its Victorian - style balconied
apartments and its tree-lined
promenades facing the Caspian
Sea give it a Mediterranean
flavor.
Russian influence dates from
1806, when the czarist empire
won this region from Persia. At-
tracted by oil. Russians made
up a fourth of Baku's population
Cr percentage today. Azerbal-
,jianis constitute just half of the
city's 1.3 million people.
The language of commerce,
politics and advancement is
Russian, spoken by most people;'
regardless of ethritc origin.
Major public speeches arc de-
livered in Russian. A young
;journalist recalled his older
brother's insistence that he
learn Russian at school not
;only for the sake of his career
but so he could date Russian
girls.
Nonetheless, it is Islamic tra-
dition and the Azerbaijani char-
acter that give the region its
distinctive personality. Beside
the vast homes of one-time
oil magnates, put up on a scale
to rival Fifth Avenue mansions,
are buildings with the graceful
arches of the Islamic world.
And the faces of the Azer-
baijanis, dark, lively, honey-
coloaldat
PrAritaA nut /
8
CPYRGHT
; Formal Islam has withered
under the pressure of militant
atheism. Local specialists slay
:there are only 16 mosques, two,
,in Baku, for Azerbaijan's 5.11
;million people. The Koran, it is?
!reported, was last printed ini
!Russian three years ago and is,
' not available in local book-
shops.
Some Youths Turn to Faith
Generally the mosques at-
tract only the old, though the
leader of the Communist Youth
League complained recently
that young people, including
some of his members, were at-
tending religious rites.
It is less the formal religions
structure that disturbs Com-
munist leaders than it is the
social influence of Islamic cus-
toms?girls dropping out of
school for marriages arranged
by their families, women left
at home by husbands going out
to socialize and not advanced
properly even in the Commu-
nist party, and the undisciplined
economic style.
Privately, some people talk
like unreconstructed capitalists,
eager to display Western
watches or fountain pens,
boastful about their financial
canniness, unashamed that
bribes or contacts are the key
to success.
"You've got to have money
to get what you want," said a
well-tanned director of a state
farm. "It's the same every-
where?in America, in the So-
viet Union, everywhere."
It is that style of life that
Mr. Aliyev, formerly chief of
the republic's secret police, has
pledged to wipe out since being
, put in charge here in 1969.
He has removed up to 50
;senior government and party
officials for abuse of office or
dereliction. A number of offi-
:ials have been put on trial for
iribery, among them a judge
who allegedly took bribes from
three men accused of fraud but
was caught before he could fix
the case. Nonetheless, some
Azerbaijanis remain skeptical.
"Let them bring another and
another and anntherr said a
ascribed how
?.!T Alls7VetfCrl speed surgical
operations. "It will stay the
same."
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SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow
26 January 1972
PAPER CONDEMNS ACTIVITIES OF amsK BAPTISTS
[Article by Ye. GoloshUmov: "The poisoners"]
Omsk?Wow his arrival in the commune of the followers of the so-dalled Csuncil
of Churches of the Evangelical Christian Baptists and the sermons and the meetings of
brother-dissenters and much else seems like a delusion or a bad dream. But all this
took place and lasted for many years. These years he, Gennadiy Skalyga, now regards
as being erased from the 20 years of his life, as spent vainly, to no purpose. Or rather,
there was a purpose and, according to his notions of that time, an extremely significant
purpose--the service of God--but on verification it turned out to be no more than a
mirage. His "spiritual fathers" themselves, however paradoxical it may seem, razed to
be ground his religious world outlook which, in his opinion, was as firm and tenacious
as the smell of incense in the church. But he had only to come into contact with the
secular affairs of his mentors in the commune and nothing remained of this "world out-
look."
...The beautiful and large city of Omsk where he went a few years ago from neighboring
Tyumen Oblast to study at the road transport technical college seemed comfortless and
unwelcoming to him. Who knows, it is possible that everything would have turned out
differently if he had been in a hostel among his contemporaries. But he happened to
settle in a private apartment. The shy, reserved and impressionable Gennadiy felt
equally ill at ease in the noisy corridors and lecture halls of the technical college
and the quiet, soothing apartment of his landlady and relation Ye. KoznaCheyenko: he
was homesick.
-Koznacheyanko meanwhile gradually sized up her tenant. She sized him up not Just for
the sake of curiosity but to carry out the order from the ringleaders of the commune of
followers of the Council of Churches to which she belonged--to swell the ranks of the
dissenters, to agitate and to advance. From a distance, obsequiously and diplomatically,
she talked with Gennadiy about God and about how it was only in Cod that he would find
his solace, how God would calm his soul.
At first Skalyga Listened with surprise and indignation: "Stop putting, all this nonsense
into my head!" Keznacheyenko and her daughter Lyuba, also a commune member, did not take
-offense and were silent, but then they began all over again: subtly, unnoticeably and
meekly. It all ended with Gennadiy going to a prayer meeting one evening.
The commune greeted him guardedly, distrustfully, although in a superficially af,able
manner. From the very start the elder "brothers" started to talk. to Skalyga abwAt the
need for the strict observance of the church secret. What this secret was Gennadiy
understood later, when he was accepted in at a general meeting as a commune member end
had undergone the baptism ceremony and then become the leader of a youth group. But
meanwhile he sawed and chopped wood and gathered potatoes in the dissenters kitchen
gardens and learned religious verses.
At first Gennadiy did not understand why such secrecy, such mystery and reticence was
necessary. Surely the religious feelings of believers in our country are guarded by
law and nobody raises any obstacles before registered religious groups and sects
providing, of course, that they do not violate the law. But then it gradually became
clear that the whole point was in the antisocial provocative trend displayed in the
activity of the ringleaders from the commune of the followers of the notorious council
of churches?activity which they carry out illegally, hiding from people's view.
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Who ArkWiegthOrSFtglear56142929/09/Q2re gA:PiPligag)19444Q924,0P1M01-6
ideologist, who taught humility before God, obedience and readiness to bear one's heavy
cross to the end. Behind his demagogic words he skilfully concealed selfishness and
excessive ambition. "Religion for Kozorezov was a means of having power over people,
of obtaining an advantage for himself and of insuring his own personal well-being,"
Paval Dronyayevn, former commune member and now a soldier in the Soviet Army testifies.
Kozorezov did not consider it shameful to profit by gifts from believers or to make
use of believers to work on his private farm. Hostile to Soviet society, Kozorezov
had created an underground printing office in the apartment of the Gams sisters where
the illegal journals "Chronical of Salvation" [Vestnik Spaseniya] and the "Brotherly
Leaflet" [Bratskiy Listok], and sermons were printed and other hostile ideological
materials were prepared. For this Kozorezov ended up in exile 5 years ago. When he
returned he set abouthis former occupation, and naturally he again got his reward. -
The other "mentors?" N. Savehenko was tried for marauding, A. Popov and P. Pererva were
tried as criminals, and I. Yefimenka served time for betraying his motherland. F. Poyunov
and others were brought before the court not because of their belief in God.
The ringleaders of the sect pay special attention to recruiting young people. At the
prayer meetings the members of the youth group recited reactionary verses and songs
which contained veiled, and indeed open, anti-Soviet appeals.
In addition to the dissemination of foreign radio broadcasts and postcards, literature'
obtained illegally from abroad was studied. The efforts of' the commune ringleaders did
not go unnoticed by foreign "well-wishers." Letters of thanks and parcels began to
arrive from somewhere in the Netherlands addressed to Kozorezov's wife Aleksandra and
Savehenkols wife Lyudmila.
As the leader of the youth group Gennadiy Skalyga frequently had occasion to visit the
communes of other cities, including cities outside Siberia: the sect leaders attach
special significance to contacts with young people. Everywhere he saw one and the same
thing: the hypocrisy and demagogy of the commune leaders and their antisocial activity.
They poison the souls not only of the young people who have fallen into the sectarian
snares but also the souls of the children df believers who are educated "in the fear of
God." Special underground school groups according to age are created for them, where
illegally printed anthologies of religious stories, verses and songs are studied.
"Why should I be in the same company with such obscurantists as A. Kozorezova,
N. Savchenko, Yu. Terekhov and E. Gossenrik? Why should I deprive myself of the
joys of life? Why should I hate my motherland which has nurtured me and given me
an education?" Gennadiy Skalyga asked himself these questions with ever increasing ,
frequency. He left the sect.
...I met Gennadiy in the hostel of the machine unit plant where he works. It was
a rainy fall evening. Skalyga was hurrying to the road transport institute where he
is studying in the evening department'. Genhadiy is a Komsomol member. In addition.
to the institute he is engaged in the "Metelitsa" ensemble with which he' went on
tour to Mongolia last summer. His life is now interesting and full-blooded. He is
glad that Pavel Dronyayev, Galina Poyunova, Lyudmila Kolohanova and many others.
have left the sectarians.
But the obscurantists continue to poison unsophisticated people. Ivan Vine, Vladimir
Pedorchenko, the sisters Olga and Yelizaveta Kolosova, Lyudmila Stanova and Lyudmila
Oalaktiionova whisper prayers on their knees at secret meetings.
"It is necessary to struggle to help the deceived people rise from their knees',
see the joy of life, and realize the happiness of creation,." Gennadiy says. ."The
poisoners should be deprived of the opportunity of. continuing their black deed."
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SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow
17 October 1971
PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUS SECTARIANISM VIOLATE SOVIET LAW
(Article by S. Ousev, Moscow Oblast prosecutor and state legal adviser 3d class:
"The Strict Letter of the Law")
The. behavior of brothers yoloda and Sasha worried their teachers. At first
the brothers, under a variety of pretexts, refused to accompany the'class on a visit
to the museum. Then they declined a cultural visit to the movies and, finally, when
the time arrived for them tlio join the pioneers, they categorically refused to wear
red ties.
The worried teachers went to se
with your children?
their parents and asked them: "What ia the matter
They are dSfferent from all the Other boys," The parents however, were hot in tt.e
least surprised and were even pleased to hear this.
This was explained by the fact that the parents of Voloda and Sasha were members of a
strict Baptist sect and brought up their children in a specially created religious
circle,
A certain N. Vorenova was the leader of this circle. She got the children of members
Of the sect to go to her house or to someone'S apartment, read religious sermons to
them,, taught Biblical dogma, made them learn religious verses, psalms, and prayers,
and organized special childrens' prayer meetings. This was a flagrant violation of
the legislation on religious cults.
It was instilled into the Children that they must not learn or sing Soviet songs.
listen to the radio, watch television, read the newspapers, go to the movies, theater,
or the circus, or in any way participate in any of the school's mass social functions
whatever, in a word, an attempt was made to turn the children into juvenile recluses
and deprive them of all human pleasures.
Voronova was warned of her responsibilities and required to cease the illegal meetings.
However, the members'of the sect replied that they were answerable only to the laws
Of cod. It got to the stage where, without permission of the authoritative organs,
they:arranged open-air baptisms of adults. Children were brought to these ceremonies,
which were an insult to social conduct, and Voronova took an active part In all this.
The prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings, and a people's court sat in justice on
her and sentenced her to imprisonment. . .
Prosecution organs, local soviets, and social organizations perform a considerable
amount of work in suppressing the illegal activity of members of sects Talks and
lectures are organized on their behalf, and individual work is conducted.
Many members of sects, when they realize their mistakes, refrain from infringing the
legal norms in force. Those who 'shamelessly and maliciously infringe the laws are
brought to justice.
Sect members Semen Tabachkov from Zhukovskiy and Vasiliy Ryzhuk from Krasnogorsk have
beenmenteneed to imprisonment at different times. These people represented themselves
as defenders of the believers and actively worked against the Soviet legislation on
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11'
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maeciously condemned the sinfulness of the world"--something which
they themselves concocted--and tried to completely isolate the believers from society
and instill in them a negative attitude toward our reality. Moreover, they tried to
provoke conflicts and deepen the gulf between the sect and all the rest of our fellow
citizens.
Sectarian' leaders strive to be permitted to propagate religion unrestrictedly and to
stop antireligious instruction in schools. They demand that rank-and-file believers
undertake not to acknowledge the state laws and they frustrate their implementation,
But maybe the sectarian leaders teach their flock to acknowledge no Soviet 'laws--,without
exceptioh? Such is not the case. They by no means refuse to accept wages from the
state, concession trips to rest homes and sanatoria, paid leave, apartments, or pensions.
They acknowledge their right to free medical services and willingly and without relying
on the grace of the almighty enjoy these and other benefits available to all our
Citizens irrespective of sex, age, nationality, or religion.
Our laws pebtedt the rights Of believers and the treeddm of their religion. RoWeveri
these laws ifttpOte On believers an obligati-On, the S'affire as Oh atheiets, to fulfill their
civil duty a:6 defined by the USSR Constitution,
Our state is particularly concerned to protect the interests of children and young
citizens of the country, in whom we see our future. Hence in allowing adults freedom
of religibn, regarding this as a matter of conscience and the periOnal view of each
individual, the state allbws no one to impose his religious views on children,
The RSFSR Council Of Peoples' Commissars decree signed by V.I. Ltnin Oh 0 January 1918
"On the Separation of the Church Prom the State and the School From the Church"
pointed out: "Nobody may refuse to fulfill his civil obligations by reason of his
religious views.,., Freedom from the performance of religious ceremonies is secured
provided that they do not infringe social order and are not accompanied by encroachments
On the rights of citizens Of the Soviet republic. The local authorities are empowered
to take all necessary steps to safeguard' social order and security in Such cases,"
The position of religious organizations was clearly defined by subsequent legislation.
Primarily they Were allowed to engage in their activities only after appropriate
registration in accordance with established procedure and were allowed to function
only for the purposes of jointly satisfying citizens' religious heeds.
Here they were ferbidden to organize prayer meetings and groups and circles for religious
instruction specially for children and young people, arrange excursions and children'
recreational areas, or open libraries or reading rooms. Ministers of religion were
categorically forbidden to conduct propaganda aimed at alienating believers from active
participation in social, cultural, and state activity,
A certain Petr Rumachik, one of the leaders of the strict Baptists, systemdtically
infringed all these legal requirements. For months he did not work anywhere. traveled
around cities and villages, met sectarians, and supplied them with illegally published
literature containing direct appeals not to observe the Sbviet legislation on cults.
In the so-called "Brotherly Advice to Yoeng Christians" young believers were called
on to alienate themselves from Soviet society, renounce the study of modern science
and technology, and observe only the laws of God and not Soviet laws.., naturally the
prosecutor instituted legal proceedings against him,
Methods of persuasion should be more broadly used with regard to the rank-and-file
believers, who frequently do not realize the real aims of their leaders. Local
authoritative organs and party, Komsomol, trade union, and other social organizations
should conduct special meetirgs arrange for the most respected local citizens to
meet believers, and intensify individual explanatory work in homes and in enterpribes
where there are sectarians. In this scheme 0 large role can be played by teachers--
it is mratOOkeroilketdaWei MOVIOnte tA-IttiFentonfigiimolnoti'rOoo1 -6
pepils. 12
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It is up to all of us to realize profoundly that although sectarianism has demonstrated
its utter hopelessness, this must not give us cause for complacency. The struggle
against religious ideology is an integral part of communist education. It was and
still is the party's program requirement. It is an ideological struggle based on
atheistic propaganda and on methods of persuasion. However, those who systematicalli
and Maliciously infringe Soviet laws under cover of the demands of their faith, who
incite other citizens to infringements, organite them into nonregistered communities;
and commit other illegal acts will continue to be held responsible, With the Pill
severity of our laws.
ZARYAVOSTOKA, Russia
31 August 1971
STRICT PARTY CONTROL OF ATHEISTIC PROGRAM DEMANDED
Increasing attention is being given, in the process of building a
communist society in our country, to questions on the further cultivation of
communist morality; further development of the culture of Soviet man--mainly
spiritual culture; overcoming the survivals of the past in the consciousness of the
people--including eradication of religiosity and the formation of a scientific-
materialistic outlook for all members of the socialist society without exception.
Religious prejudices are the most vital survivals of the past, the struggle against
which demands special sensitivity, caution, and perseverance.
Even under socialisM the struggle against religious prejudices does not cease to be
a difficult matter, although with each decade our people are becoming more educated
and enlightened. False and pernicious is the opinion that survivals of the past
will die out when we are able to offer everyone a sUfficient education. Religious
prejudices cannot vanish by themselves. They cannot be repealed. Administrative
measures are important here. They can only lead to intensification of religious
fanaticism. Persuasion is the only correct and the only necessary measure in
atheist propaganda.
It is no secret that a trend to idealize the church way of life and church rituals.
has begun to manifest itself among the youth in recent years. There have been
instances when Komsomol members have participated in the performance of religious
rites.
Just what attracts a person to the church? Curiosity? The quest for "poetry"
or "romance"? How can one explain that long-forgotten ceremonies are being
revived in a number of populated points of Adzhariya and Abkhaziya, and that
the youth is participating actively in this?
Komsomol and trade union organizations are not participating sufficiently actively
' in atheistic propaganda. Many cultural-educational establishments are doing a poor
job in such. participation. This is especially important in Abkhaziya, Adzhariya,
' Rustavi, and several other areas in the Georgian SSR where religious sects exist.
Atheistic education, being a composite part of the work in communist education,
requires constant strict party control. Moreover, certain party organizations
forget that the path to success lies through systematic and consistent work, and
they engage in it incidentally, mainly during religious holidays. Religious views
are incompatible with a materialistic world outlook and with social and scientific-
technological progress. Resolute struggle against them is an important condition
for the formation of the man of the new society.
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WASHINGTON POST
12 March 1972
Co-via .jews:
Different View
By John Dornberg
The writer, Newsweek's correspond-
ent in Munich, was the magazine's
Moscow bureau ehief until his exputsion
in October, 1970. This article is ex-
cerpted from his forthcoming book,
"The New Tsars."
CPYRGHT
rIESPITE THE OUTCRY against
UP their treatment, Jews in the Soviet
Union have actually fared as well or
better than most minority groups
here. Perhaps this is because there
are 10 limes as many as there are, for
nstance. Crimean Tartars. More likely
it is because they have influential
brethren abroad and the force of world
public opinion behind them.
Propaganda in and outside the So-
viet Union has contributed to a dis-
torted picture of the plight of the Jews
in the U.S.S.R. As long as Jewish mili-
tants in the United States and else-
where scream hysterically "Let my
peoOle go," threaten Soviet diplomats,
disrupt performances by Soviet artists
(most of them Jews themselves) and
vandalize Soviet diplomatic, journalis-
tic and commercial offices, as long as
the Soviet authorities trumpet the lie
that there is no anti-Semitism in the
U.S.S.R. and that Jews in the Soviet
Union have never been as well off,
that picture is not going to be in focus.
In one sense the plight of the Jew in
the Soviet Union is that of the Jew
anywhere, except in Israel. If his situa-
tion in Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorus-
sia, Moldavia and Uzbekistan, where
anti-Semitism has a long and violent
tradition, is worse than his position in
France, Britain or the United States, it
is largely because as a Jew he is a
member of a minority in a country in
which all minorities are more or less
oppressed. His nationality is stamped
into his passport. Often his physical
appearance identifies him. He is sub-
jected to a delicate system of quotas
designed to maintain a balance of pro-
. portional representation of nationali-
ties in the economy and in high gov-
ernment and party organs such as the
council of ministers, the politburo and
the central committee. He is scorned
and discriminated against in a society
of more than a hundred nationalities,
nearly all of whom scorn and discrimi.,
nate against each other.
In some ways his situation is worse
than that of the other nationalities:
a consequence of the confusion, first
of all, whethei his is a nationality,
an ethnic group or a religion. Undeni:
ably, it is the only nationality group,
that is also a religion, 'an inherently
difficult situation in a state that pro-
? fesses atheism. Moreover it is a reit.
? gion that has been the traditional ob-
feet of intense discrimination in Rus-
Sia, where chauvinism and orthodoxy
? went hand in hand. Furthermore it is a
religion that tends to be tribal rather
than ecumenical. Jewish culture as a
whole presents difficulties for Soviet
'neology.
Finally, he is the only member of a
Minority group that is genuinely extra-
territorial. Not only do most of his
brethen live outside the Soviet Union,
but 2.5 million of them live in a state
that calls itself his homeland and cove
petes for his loyalitics. Worst of all,
....?.that state is at war with a group of
countries whose principal ally and sup-
porter is the Soviet Union. Because of
the Soviet Union's propaganda against
that state, anti-Semitism has again be-
' come acceptable, if not actually fash-
ionable, in the U.S.S.R.
' The plight of no other Soviet minor-
ity group has received as much Wen-.
tion outside the U.S.S.R. as that of the
Jews. Some of it has been justified.
Some of the attention has been blatant
propaganda and the product of con-
fused emotions growing out of the bel-
ligerent relationship between two sov-
ereign states: Israel and the U.S.S.R.
Overstating the problem has merely ?
worsened the predicament of the Jews
In the U.S.S.R. And to assess their real
situation, fact must be separated from
fiction.
It Is a fact that for many years very
few Jews were able to leave the
U.S.S.R. But some did leave: at an av-
erage rate of 150 monthly, even after
the Six-Day War in 1967. At times the
number rose to 300 a month, at times
it was as low as 80. This figure is the
highest emigration rate of any nation-
ality group of the U.S.S.R. Israel has
been receiving the highest number of
Soviet emigration since 1967. The
United States is a poor second, Canada,
sought out mostly by Ukrainians, is an
even poorer third.
It is also a fact that in early 1971 the
number of Jews permitted to leave in-
creased sharply, as a consequence,
apparently, Of intensified propaganda
abroad and more militant agitation in
the U.S.S.R. itself. Most of the
emigres. however, were those Jews
who had aggressively pressed their de.
;rands. Between January 1 and May 31,
an cAtimated 3,500 hail emigrated. The
Kremlin apparently decided to get rid
of "troublemakers," particularly those
Jewish militants who had formed links
with the dissident movement,
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A Delilskapiteifitfm? se
I) UT 'IT IS A FICTION that Jews
are being discriminated against in
their desire to leave and a deliberate
distortion of the facts to imply that
vast waves of Jews are just waiting for
exit visas:
The Kremlin sees the desire to leave
as an expression of disloyalty and
makes little distinction between Jews
who want to go to? Israel, Ukrainian
who want to emigrate to Canada and
Russians who want to leave for any-
where because they are weary of an
economically deprived life in one of the
world's most regimented dictatorships.
Who wants to leave and why? Israeli
and Zionist sources have spoken of
"tens of thousands." It is an, accurate
fit ure. but cloaked in a semantic play
to the grandstands. Joseph Kazakov.
the 50-year-old Moscow engineer who
organized and led the letter-writing
and petitions-signing campaign of Jew-
ieh dissenters until he was finally per-
mitted to leave for Israel in February,
1971, told me that Jews who want to
leave represent about 5 per cent of So-
viet Jewry. That would mean approxi-
mately 103,000 people based on a 1970
Soviet census figure of 2,151,000 Jews.
"Perhaps," he said, "if all of them
were suddenly allowed to emigrage
without difficulty, others would be en-
couraged to apply for visas and the
number might double. But 10 per cern
Is the maximum."
How many of these 5 or 10 per cent,
I asked him, want to leave because
they are Zionists, religious or consider
themselves, as Jews, victims of special
discrimination? How many simply
want to leave the U.S.S.R. because it is
an unpleasant place to live in, but
have no special affinity fo Israel? "I
don't know," Kazakov said, "Maybe
half and half."
Actually, hundreds of thousands of
Jews would elect to remain in the U.S.S.R.
Assimilated, prosperous and Sovietized.
they consider themselves Soviet citizens
first, Jews second: like most Jews in the
United States, France and Britain. The
Kremlin made this argument effectively
in March, 1970, when it staged a press
conference by a group of prominent
Jews who professed their loyalty for
the U.S.S.R. and their condemnation of
Israeli foreign and military policy.
On the platform in Moscow's House
of Friendship for the 2-hour news con-
ference were 31 Jews from the Soviet
establishment, led by Venyamin Dym-
%hits, one of the U.S.S.R.'s nine deputy
prime ministers and the highest-rank-
ing Jew in the governmental hier-
archy. Beside him were three uni-
Q2d. 1r1s
generals; a koikhoz chairman from the
Ukraine; Alexander Chakovsky, the
conservative editor in chief of Liters-
turnaya Gazeta; Aaron Vergelis, the
editor of Sovietish Geimland; govern-
_ment officials; scientists; popular SO.
,viet comedian Arkady Raikin, who had
just stalked off the stage of a theater
In the Ukraine because someone from
the audience had called him a Yid.
They delivered themselves of anti-Zi-
onist and anti-Israeli diatribes which
were repeated in a long statement,
signed by those on Mage and 22 others.
In the West this curious display of
loyalty by prominent Jews was imme-
diately written off as a "put-on" job by
"tame-house Jews." Indeed, no Ameri-
can Jew would be likely to go before a
press conference to beat his chest and
proclaim his loyalty to the United
States. On the other hand, why
shouldn't these Jews have said what
they did? They are among those who
made it to the top and have a vested
Interest in the Soviet Union.
Many Are Assimilated
ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES (lid
tell a Western journalist that he
had signed the statement under threat
el* being denied a trip abroad. But on
the whole, these 53 Jews represented
hundreds of thousands of 'ess prom-
inent Soviet Jews who did not care
whether or not Jewish culture is sup-
pressed or Yiddish theaters and maga-
rines exist, whether or not there is a
Yeshiva and whether or not prayer
shawls and prayer books are available
for the believers in the synagogues.
They did not care because they are as-
similated in the Soviet culture around
them.
Dissenting Jews complain that
"young Jews cannot read Jewish books
because the Jewish language is not
taught in a single school lathe Soviet
Union." That is ture and that is part of
the discriminatory picture, hut it
means little to the majority of Jews,
who would not read a book in Yiddish
if the Kremlin gave them out free.
When assessing the status of Soviet
Jews, Western observers find it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to make objec-
tive judgments, to separate fact from
emotion.
To draw an accurate picture certain
facts should be borne in mind. The
Jews are virtually the only minority?
the Volga Germans are also an impor-
tant exception?who did not become
Part of the old Russian Empire
through conquest and colonialism.
Anti-Semitism is deeply rooted, and
reached exceptionally violent propor-,
CPYRGHT
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M}lWifdfohjff4"oT'the U.S.S.R.'s na-
tionalities, especially the Russians and
Ukrainians. The present Soviet regime
is not anti-Semitic, but it is anti-Zionist
and through its propagation of anti-
Zionism it ineluctably kindits anti.
Semitism because its propaganda is
crude and the masses at whom it is dill
reeled cannot differentiate between I
the two.
re.fr Aber Nand, profession:OW
Jews are very well off in many fields,/
Including art, music, :Science, litera-
ture, engineering and law. Although
they represent less than 1 per cent of
the total Soviet population, they ac-
count for 14.7 per cent of all physi-
cians, 8.5 per cent of writers and Jour-
nalists, 10.4 per cent of all judges and
lawyers, 7.7 per cent of actors, musi-
cians and artists.
Of some 650,000 scientific workers in
the U.S.S.R., 55,000 are Jews. Fourteen
per cent of the Jewish population has
a higher or specialized secondary edu-
cation, a rate almost triple that of Rus-
sians, In the U.S.S.R. as a whole there
are 10 students per 10,000 population
In institutes of higher education. For
Jews the figure is almost double-315.
Of 844 Lenin Prize holders, 564 ? are
Russian, 184 represent all the other na-
tionalities and 96 are Jews. And where
else but in Israel itself would one find
that many Jewish generals?
Yet Jews seem to be deliberately
barred from the government and Com-
munist Party hierarchy and their role
in both has decreased steadily since
the days when most of the Bolsheviks
were also Jews. In 1939 Jews ac-
counted for more than 10 per cent of
the central committee membership;
today they represent less than 1 per
cent. They are proportionally under-
represented in the Supreme Soviet and
the republican soviets. They have al-
most no role in the foreign service and
in journalism many Jews feel they
must adopt Russian-sounding pseudon-
yms to get ahead.
Most of the nationalities have their
own territories, where the language is
their own and where most officials are
of their nationality. Theoretically the
Jews have Biro-Bidzhan, the Jewish
Autonomous Region on the Chinese
border, established in 1934. It is about
as Jewish as a ham sandwich. Of a
total popuation of 180,000 only 20,000
are Jews and of these only 30 per cent
give Yiddish as their mother tongue.
Until 1970 the first secretaries of the
regional Communist Party committees
have been Russians and Ukrainians.
Now, at last, the party chief is a Jew.
4A000200170001-6
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Agents of Russifiention
CULTURALLY AND POLITICALLY
the dominant role in BiroBidzhan
has been played by Russians. not
Jews. and only in 1970 was an attempt
made to redress the balance. In the li-
braries and bookshops there are few
shelves of Yiddish books. There are no
shops catering to kosher requirements
and there is in the city of Bit.oRidzhan
itself only one synagogue, called "the
prayer house for Judaists," which
serves the whole region. Yiddish is not
taught in any of the schools, no special
courses in the history of the Jewish
people are given, there are hardly
enough settlers left who write Yiddish
well enough to contribute to the re-
gion's small daily newspaper Shtern,'
and of the five deputies which the re-
gion sends to the Soviet of Nationali-
ties, onY two are actually Jewish.
The Jew thus is the eternal stranger.
Since Jews tend to assimilate into the
Russian culture rather than the indi-
genous culture of the non-Russian areas
in which they live, they are further
suspected as agents -of Russification.
Thus, in areas of traditional anti-Semi-
tism such as Moldavia and the
Ukraine, the Jew is doubly damned:
for being ethnically Jewish and cultur-
ally Russian. In Russia, they are sus-
pected of harboring dual political and
psychological loyalties to a homeland
other than the U.S.S.R., a suspicion '
that Israel and Zionist propaganda has
not allayed but merely fostered.
'wva flocked in great ea-ethers to the
revolutionary banner in the early
191)0s. The overthrow of the tsar gave
them a chance to leave the Pale of Set-
tlements and to escape, hopOully for-
ever, from the threat of pogroms. Jove
like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sver-
dlov and Litvinov were indispensable
to Lenin in making the Revolution.
And as long as Lenin lived anti-Semi-
tism was held at bay.
By 1939 anti-Semitism in all its varied
manifestations had receded into the
background. True, Stalin had purged
the party leadership of most of its Jew-
ish members, but the motivations were,
political and his own surge for ultimate \
power.
An ominous reversal followed the.
flitter-Stalin pact. Foreign Jewish Com-
munists who had found refuge in Mos-
cow and survived the purges of the
Comintern membership suddenly
found themselves being shipped to
Germany and Hitler's concentration
camps. Soviet propaganda swung onto
the Nazi line.
After the war, Stalin cracked down
In earnest. His campaign against "root-
less cosmopolitan?' resulted in the
shutting down of virtually all Yiddish
cultural institutions, from theaters to
newspapers. In 1952 approximately 30
leading, Jewish writers and intellec-
tuals were liquidated as Stalin set the
stage for the "anti-Zionist" purges that
gripped his satellites Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany. Finally
the "Doctors' Plot" was in motion. If
Stalin had lived it would surely have
led to pogroms.
Khrushchev once denied publicly
that anti-Semitism exists in the
U.S.S.R. But it was under Khrushchev
that dozens of Jews were shot at eco-
nomic speculators and their Jewish ?
names prominently published in the
press. It was under Krushchev also
that the furor started over Yevtushen- ?
ko's poem "Bahi Yar."
What Stalin started and Khruschev ,
finished, in his own way, was the de-
struction of Jewish cultural life. Under
Brezhnev, as a consequence of the Six- .
Day War and Soviet commitments to
the Arab countries, antiZionism and an.
official anti-Israel policy have been un-
leashed. Until 1967 the dilemma of the ,
' Jews in the Soviet Union had been
that the majority were ceasing to.bo
Jews.
Now, as a consequence. of Moscow's
carnpagin against Israel and Zionism
even some assimilated Jews have been
reimbued with a sense of their own.
Jewishness.
Most significant of all, however, are
the spirit of militancy which has
?gripped the Jewish communities in the
U.S.S.R and the draconian measures
which Soviet authorities have employed
to suppress it. Scores of Jews have
sent and signed petitions to the Krem-
lin demanding exit visas. Dozens hn?e
staged hunger strikes In Riga, Vtnius
and Moscow and dozens more have en-
gaged In sit-in. strikes in both the re- '
ception offices of the Supreme Soviet
and the Central Telegraph building in
Moscow. In August 1971 an estimated
3,000 Lithuanian Jews staged a march
to commemorate the deaths of Soviet
Jews killed in World War IL Dozens
of others all around the U.S.S.R. have
been arrested, questioned. intimidated.
convicted and jailed for demonstrating
or demanding their rights and emigra-
tion visas.
Inadvertently, the Kremlin has fos-
tered Jewish awareness, and thereby
added yet another ingredient to the
simmering melting pot of national and
racial unrest.
1P12 be Jnhn ?timber,.
Prom the forthcominr book "The Neer MITE
MIAMI Under the Heirs st ettlln," lo W Pub-
Unhed by Doubled'.
?
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16
25X1 C1 Ob
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I'MPIPPPMPA4WW1101111111 TI1In May 1972
?SOVIET YOUTH TOREIY,'CYNICAL, RESTLESS
In 1953 the world was much moved by photos of desperate East
German youths battling Soviet tanks with nothing but stones. In
1956 even 12-year old HUngarian youngsters manned barricades in
the hopeless battle against Soviet armed suppression. In 1967
students issued a bold challenge to the Czechoslovak regime,
symbolic of the national sentiment which eventually ushered in
the doomed but courageous 1968 experiment of Communism with a
human face. Not only had Communist institutions patently failed
to mold these youths into the new Communist man, a conforming
servant of the State in which they had virtually no voice, but
their bold protests threatened the stability of other Communist
regimes whose youth might catch the same infection.
In 1968 and 1969 when youthful rebellion and unrest in the
non-Communist world was making headlines, the Soviet reaction was
ambivalent. However much they deplored and distrusted the anti-
authoritarian attitudes, the inexplicably classless nature of
the demonstrations, and the occasional Maoist slogan, they were
also beguiled by their revolutionary potential. At the same time,
the Soviet Union was fearful of the reaction of their own
population, more than half of it under 30. So the Party press
turned reportorial somersaults to explain that western radical
youth was, of course, rebelling solely against capitalism.
To protect their own people against contamination, they
tightened controls on _foreign travel (even to the East European
Communist countries where life styles were a bit more casual and
westernized, as in Poland), forbade reading of foreign periodicals
and limited controversial foreign news coverage. Word of foreign
cultures does reach the Soviet citizen, however, via radio,
foreign tourists, and occasionally by an oversight in the
Communists' own propaganda films and literature.
Official reluctance -- sometimes refusal -- to admit the
existence of anti-social behavior in USSR is typified by Party
Chairman Brezhnev's pep talk to a 1970 Komsomol conference. Soviet
youth, he declared, is "healthy, energetic, ambitious.. .full of
enthusiasm for the cause of the Party and Communism" (see
attached New York Times article, 27 May 1970). Such wishful
thinking is understancrable. For a Party leadership whose average
age is now over 60, the spectacle of ever-greater numbers
(though still a small percentage) of its youth turning away from
political concerns despite all the Party and government pressure,
must be extremely alarming and conjure up fears for the future.
One Politburo member, P.Y. Shelest, was more candid when he called
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on all public organizations to fight the intolerable, shameful
hippy who "scorns work" ("khippi" in Russian transliteration)
under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and morals (see
attached New York Times article, 30 Jude 1971):. All inditations,
including scathing comments in the Party press, are that Shelest
spoke more accurately than Brezhnev.
In 1969 more than 80% of juvenile offenders were drunk when
picked up; hooliganism and vandalism are increasing; western dress
and hair styles, western music are enormously popular and are seen
as inherently evil by the authorities. Most disturbing of all is
the fact that idleness and apathy are more and more a way of life
among the educated youth. Many thousands reportedly go.as
far as the SibetianrPlains to avoid the_sta.ificationLof life
in the Soviet labor force. Agricultural lands, suffering from
the inefficiencies of centralized, bureaucratic management and
emptiness of rural Soviet society, now lose as many as 19 of every
20 youths to the cities where many of them are content to work
only enough to provide a bare subsistence. The age of the
Stahkanovite is over; the age of the parasite may be ascendant.
"Parasitism" is the official term for refusal to do approved work,
a definition which is easily stretched to include all non-conformist
activities. Penalties for parasites include being shipped off to
"special locations" for two to five years.
Soviet youth is manipulated, politicized and bureaucratized,
starting at an early 'age, by four institutions: the schools-,
military services, Pioneers and Komsomols (Communist Youth League)
The last two are especially significant. At age 10 nearly all
Soviet children join the Pioneers. Supervised by Komsomol leaders,
Pioneers are indoctrinated with group discipline and patriotism
along with being taught a wide range of recreational games and
skills. The Komsomol, the junior Communist Party, has traditionally
been a more elitist organization but is now moving toward all-
encompassing membership of youths from 15 to 28. Directly controlled
by the CPSU, the Komsomol provides an interesting window on
authoritarian Communism. Its paid professional officers are directly
responsible to the Central Committee of the CPSU and are not account-
able to the membership. Komsomol structure apes that of the CPSU
and like that body is managed from the top down through "democratic
centralism."
"In pluralistic societies, the term 'youth organ-
ization' brings to mind a voluntary association of
members with conmon interests and shared goals --
a description that should not be applied to Komsomol.
Its existence depends not upon massive popular
support, but upon the power and authority of the
Communist Party. The Komsomol is the antithesis
of a youth movement. It iS an organization sponsored
2
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by the Party preciselyinorder to monopolize the
field and to orestall the emergence of what
are viewed As authentic youth movements in
democratic societies. This characteristic of the
Komsomol is of fundamental importance in evaluating
its role in the Soviet system and in attempting to account
for its successes and failures."* remphasis added].
Like their mentors in the cpsu, Komsomol leaders are aging.
Although regular membership is limited to those under 28, leaders
stay on (at one Komsomol Congress, over 50% were over 28). Two
recent Komsomol chiefs were later rewarded with leadership of the
KGB, the Soviet secret service, on the strength of their work in
the Komsomol!
In addition to the schools, the Pioneers and the Komsomol,
pre-military training is mandatory for all students, beginning at
nine years. Further enhancing the patriotic, dutiful-citizen model
emphasized by other institutions, military training during school
years is so thorough as to permit reducing the term of regular,
mandatory military service for adults.
Despite these years of regimentation, or more probably
because of it, a rising number of Soviet young people are dis-
enchanted with the reality of Soviet life after school, which they
compare unfavorably with the selflessness they have been trained
to cultivate.
While many of the worlds' youth are questioning their parents'
values, their elders, their teachers and leaders are experimenting
with responsive reforms. The Communist reaction to problems with
their young people contrasts vividly with some non-Communist
efforts. Instead of trying to understand youthful attitudes and
problems, they deny their validity; instead of trying to bridge a
generation gap, they deny its existence. Instead of examining
educational institutions for their contribution to humanistic needs
in a technical society, they establish more boarding schools for
closer control over students. Instead of exploring the basis for
apathy and cynicism, they try to repress its manifestations.
Instead of questioning their.own restrictive training methods,
they blame disaffection on western influences. Instead of helping
the individual to achieve the highest possible level of education,
they require students to augment factory labor forces. Instead of
practicing the egalitarianism .;hey ipreach, they'award the best -cljools,
the best jobs to the political activists. Instead of opening the
political process to youthful partitipants, they close it further
*Allen Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, Harvard University Press, 1965.
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by denying secret ballots to regular Komsomol members and excluding
students from decisions about their own lives, just as they exclude
the average Party member from important decisions.
Realistically, little else can be expected. In education and
youth training, as in politics and every phase of Conununist life,
to decentralize command, to permit individual choices or experiment
along untried lines is to invite the loss of Party control over
every field of public activity. There is little likelihood that
the Soviet Union, or any of its East European subordinates feels
strong enough to run that risk.
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Thi; was believed the -first!
time that a leading Soviet of-
1k al has used the word '
."11 ppies" in public, In Rus-
.simn and Ukrainian it sounds I
ahoost the same as it does in ,
, Er glish?"khippi."
'Many youths by their un-
worthy behavior have brought ?
sh me on themselves, their
comrarkb' parents and collee-,
hich they work. or',
study," Mr. thelest said, fie.'
carding to the latest issue of
141 Ukranian party paper to
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CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1970 ?
Brezhnev Compares Unrest of Youth in West
With Calm in Soviet
By BERNARD GWERTZMEN
sordid to Tho New York Times
MOSCOW. May 26?Leonid
I. Brezhnev, the head of the
Communist party, said at the
opening session of a congress
of the Young Communist
League today that the "stormy
upsurge" of youth in the West
provided evidence of the "deep-
ening social crisis of cnpitelism. '
The 5,000 delegates?most of
them between 25 and 35 years
of age--cheered as Mr. Brezh-
nev compared this "crisis" with
the situation in the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Brezhnev said that In
the West "youth does not want
to put up with h system of
exploitation and with the
bloody adventures of imperial.'
ism.' Urging more contact with
these "progressive" forces, he
said protests In recent years
"have become a serious factor
In the political fight in the cap-
italist countries."
Mr. Brezhnev said that So-
viet youth, meanwhile, . "is
growing up morally healthy,
energetic and ambitious."
1 ' &Act youth ? is full.
of enc ?gy and enthusiasm ? for
the fig it for the cause of the
party, for the cause of Com-
munism," he said.
Po ideally Most Active
The delegates in the Krem-
lin's P lace of Congresses rep-
resent the country's 27 million,
members of the Young Commu- ,
nist League, kohWK111-fhe Set
yiet Union by the acronym
Komsc mol.
The r election as delegates
Indica .ed that they were ,the
most politically attive of thel
Komsomol members. . They
form the traditional training
grouni for future party lead-
ers. They have a reputation of
being the most ideologically
orthodox, 'certainly more so
than their nonactivist fellow
memt crs.
Thr7 aiaiimAiialeatiy shouted
CPYRGHT NEW Y?R1( TIMES
30 June 1971
in rhythm, "Glory to the party,"
and 'Lenin is with us," waiting
for the meeting to open.
Mr. Brezhnev, in his speech
to the -quadrennial congress,
drew the attention of the dele-
gates ?to .the economic prob-
lems that he has underlined in
many of his speeches this year.
He said the first years of the
Soviet system were like "a pri-
mary school" compared with
the difficulties facing the peo.
'plc today.
The main report was given
by Yevgeny M. Tyazheloikov,
the First ?Secretary of the
Komsomol. He said that al-
though Soviet youth was ba-4
Isically on the right track, "we'
icannot say That the poison or
anti -Communism does ot pose
dangers." He then said that the!
%Komsomol could not tolerate
..rsome appearances of skept1-1
tism, ? apolitical .. behavier, a,
'sconiful attitude, toward work
study, School or :civil ?obliga.
tiori. 1: I f I, .. ...; $4.4 :).68t.V1...14'....'
CPYRGHT
Ukraine Leader Urges Soviet to Get Rid of Whippis!
&Witt to Th1 Nrr Otic Times
MOSCOW, Arne 29?Pyotr,
Y. Shetest, a. bovIrt, roll I
LII 1.?
member, has called for a pub-,
lie campaign to rid the Soviet,
Union of what he regards as
the latest Western scourge?,
, hippies.
At a Central . Committee,
meeting of the Ukrainian '
? party organization last Week,
.Mr. Shelest, the Ukrainian
leader, said every Communist
and every public organization:
must loin in the fight.
reach Moscow.
"Under the influence of
bourgeois propaganda and
morals, part of the youth for
this or that reason has
slipped from under our tnflu-
once," he complained. "Phe-
nomena not unlike the so-
called hippies who scorn
work have developed. This is
harmful to the Socialist
world view."
?He said that "these siinme..
ful phenomena are intoler?
able in our society."
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Russian youths often register apathy
when their elders try to instill Commu-
nist Wet logy in them.. ?
They adopt Western fads such as'
miniskit s and long hair, and display
what o der people generally regard as.
sexual looseness.
These youngsters arc accused of fail-
ing to ippreciate the sacrifices of their
elders in making possible the "good life"
which they appear to take for granted.
Rossi in parents, no less than their
U. S. ci unterparts, seem baffled in deal-
ing wit such attitudes. Their reactions
range f om official crackdowns and stern
admon, inns to attempts at sympathetic
tinders ? .?ling.
Politi ;Iv, Russia's young are i)..iyinv
a maim role in protests dematnin4;
citizens be given, in practice, me righo.
accorded to them in theory by ose So
vict C mstitimon?frecdom of spero..
press a id assembly, and the right to a
fair tri . ?
or e pase WF(0114A0002001 (0001-
.A1PRYAu ists ant n it .5 uthris
not tolerant of any public
show of disorder.
There is also little sign of
any interest in marijuana
, among Soviet youth.
What Mr. Shelest seems
most upset about are the in-
terest in Western fads shown
. by Soviet youth and a cer-
tain skepticism toward offi-
cial ideology exhibited by
some of them. Thus, in fash-
ions, the miniskirt, the midi
? and even some maxis are
seen here, and all sophisticat-
ed young people listen to,
.Western popular music. ?
") Ironically, the interest in
hippies was in a sense los.;
tered by the official props,
ganda.
, Nipples Seen in Films
Soviet television and mo-
Nie theaters have shown
many films about the anti-
war movement in the United
States and almost all the
voune mimic in the films
public opinion must join in
.the fight against them. The
goal-of party organizations is
to raise decisively the re-
sponsibilities of all Commu-
nists for the education of our
youth," he, said.
Mr. Shelest did not say
' how extensive he thought
' the hippy influence was. But
it has been quite clear that in
major Soviet cities, the young
people are gradually moving
toward a hippy look. Part of
the reason for this is the de-
sire of Soviet youth not to
be out of step with young
people in other countries.
Although long - haired
youths are no longer curiosi-
? ties and blue jeans are even
manufactured in the Soviet
Union, there Is nothing like
the hippy cult of the West in
the Soviet Union. Restrictions
on movement and residency
in most cities prevent the
communal arrangements of
have the hippy look. Soviet
efforts to encourage tourism
. have brought some Western
hippies here as well.
In addition, quite a few
Hungarian and Polish hippy
-- types have been here on offi-
cial youth exchanges, much
to the consternation of offi-
cials of the Soviet Young
communist League.
' The proper appearance for
'young Communist men in-
cludes 'short haircuts, dark
, suits, and either white shirt-
isnd tie or a white turtleneck
shirt. Girls are expected to
wear a sober stilt, or blouse k
and skirt, with the hem just
,above the knee.
? There have been some re-
, ports that a number of peo-
ple, not all of them young,
.'have been , migrating to Si- ,
j berla, where there are fewer -f;
restrictions and where they,t,
i can live a sort of hobo exist-
Am. These Russians are
t,ealled "bichi,lk at ,distinct
trom hippies,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT
18 August 1969
CPYRGHT
YOUNG GENERATION: SOVIET WORRY
Now it is Russia where grown-ups are beginning to
look at their brash youngsters with disbelieving eyes.
Widening, there, is the gap between young and old as
Marxism's children learn about protest?and miniskirts.
MOSCOW
The "generation gap" that has brought
anguish to millions of American parents
and educators is also becoming a.,major
problem in Communist Russia.
Here. in a country supposedly ruled
- by, Marxist discipline, fathers and
mothers despair increasingly over their
. children.
Small groups of students have staged
illegal demonstrations over such . issues
as minority rights, and have circulated
petitions denouncing the persecution of
dissident intellectuals.
- The challenge. As in Ameriett, an
"underground press"' flourishes among
, students here?mocking the "establish-
ititent" and its ways.
Little is seen of a drug problem among
Soviet youngsters. But their elders corn-
constantly about drinking and
hooliganism" among the young.
Communist authorities, from the ag-
ing men in the Kremlin on down, are
responding with jail, exile and other' -
repressive Measures.
Occasionally, however, an older per.;
,son's voice rises in defense of the young
and their (lemands. Typical is -a letter
sent by Ivan A. l'akitimovich, chairman
of a Latvian collective farm, to the
prominent theorist and Politburo mem-
ber Mikhail A. Suslov. Commenting on
the trial of four youthful dissidents in
Moscow, the writer said:
"I believe that the persecution of
young dissenters in a country where more
than 50 per cent of the population is
younger than 30 years of age is an ex-
tremely dangerous line: adventurism. It
. not toadies, not a public of 'yes men'
Lord, how they have multiplied),
'mama's boys' who will determine
? future, but rather those very rebels,
the most energetic, brave and high-
principled members of our young genera-
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tion. It is stupid to see in them the ene-
mies of Soviet power, and more than
stupid to let them rot .in prisons and
make mock of them. For the party, such
a -line is. equivalent to self-stra?gulation.
"Too bad for us if we are net caOable of
reaching an understanding with these -
young. peinple.; They will inevitnbly
"serenitt'tn new Palti."
Worry over the future course of BUS.
sia's young was indicated when the Sov-
iet ICadership recently accused the
country's official youth organization, the
23-million-member Young Communist
League, of failure to enlist youthful en-
. thusiasm for Communist ideals and
causes.
Concern over morals. Soviet elders
nlso me paying much attention to sex
among the young.
An "Izvestia" article reported a court
: case of 15-year-old girls who had sexuai.
relations with 40-year-old men. The or-.
tiele brought a flood .? etters' froml
readers, ; ? '
These are some excerptst
"I would ban tho showing of all for.,
,
7 eign films, as Welt as some of our own."
; ... "This idiotic short-skirt fashion must
? be prohibited. A man can't ride in
streetcars any more." . . . "Ise't it time
that the content of books were carefully
checked? I. Nieras's novel. 'What Makes
the World Co Round; glorifies a girl
who gave birth to an, illegitimate child.
It would be better for young people to
send the classics."
One reader wrote:
"There is need for discipline. When
(other used to lay on with the saddle
girth, you didn't easily forget it. And
it's ton had that the custom of smearing
tar ou the doors [of delinquent girls] is
being made fon of.
"If it didn't help one particular girl,
nt lent it scared off other&-
. L. Ocha]korskaya replied with this edi-
torial Opinion: ?
"Nonsense! As though it were possible
to instill morality with a saddle girth.
. . Communist morality can be in-
stilled only by a lofty goal, by serious
work, by nobility on the part of those
who surround yOu."
"All the bare knees." The miniskirt.
especially, stirs indignation among older
ROSSialiS.
In an unsigned letter to the "Literary
Gentle." a reader reeently derenmeed
short skirts as "a great shortcoming and
a harmful thing in nor society." The let-
ter added:
"When I see nil the bare knees every-
where. I sec nothing elegant about it..
I am being pursued by miniskirts. They
are everywhere-in buses, in parks, in
theaters, in streets, in planes, in trains,
on land and on the sea. . . . The emo-
tions of a normal man develop in the
wrong direction."
Replying to this, one A. Raskin urged
the anonymous author to calm down and'
argued that although he, himself, did ,
not care for mieiskirts, women should
be free to choose their own fashions, ?
Le s_s tolerantly, the Soviet daily "Len-
inist. Balmer" recently attacked Soviet ?
youths who imitate 'We.stern dances such
as the "shake." The newspaper said:
"The boys are shaking their bodies as
if their pants are nailed to a fence and,
they are trying to tear them off. . . .
"After such a hot dance, the wornout.
partners return to their places and em-
brace. There is nothing surprising about
this, since the lack of modesty in the
movements of the 'shake' and the 'twist'
are creating relations which can cause
anxiety......
Shakes' and 'twists' are not an in- '
nocent amusement, but a means of build-
ing ideological bridges."
Lush life. Complaints also are being
heard about young people's "spoiled. "
insistence on high living.
A. recent article by T. Kozhevnikova
- in "Pravda" criticized lavishness of grad-
uation parties, citing the case of a girl
. who presented her parents with the fol- ;
lowing ultimatum:
"Either a dress of white guipure'
[heavy lace] or I won't go to the party!"
, Said the writer:
"What is it that creates excessive de-
mends on the part of someone who is
still a minor and who has not earned a
single kopeck? Is it the growing material ,1
well-being of the family, or consideras
tions of prestige, or the implacable laws.
of fashion? Probably all three. Also ap-
,.
parently. there is the absesice of reason-
ably &iced and yet modem merchau.7;
disc, fled also the fact that recurrences
of philiStine conceit, vanity and exhibi-
tionism :.often go unchallenged -by public
opinion nt the school, and by a firm 'No'
at home."
In ?It recent article in "Pravda," E.
i.'
Kostyashkin, nn educator, said: -
"Present-day schoolchildren. especia -
ly in the city, and most students as we1 '
freed from labor obligations, sometime0
take it for granted that their parents
should mquestioningly fulfill their needs
and even their whims. NVe are witness-
ing a kind of inflation of material values
-for adolescents. They make less and Jess
of a connection between the results of
labor and labor *elf. . . . According to
our observation, ;expenses for children
grow more rapidly than income of the
.parents, and abs#0 nn ever-larger part
of the family budget... -
"Children often dress much better
than their parents:- Many have expensive
cameras, -transistors mid Moo recorders-
without "even having learned what it is
to earn .a ruble,"
Cerinsule Kostynslikin found nothing
wrong with this, provided a corrective
was ;introduced in the form of physical
Mhos which should, he thought, accom-
pany n youngster's schooling from child-
hood onward.
A recurring complaint is that unity's
youth in Russia pays no mind to tho
work lied sacrifices of its elders, not
only the "men of the '40s" who defend-
ed the country ? in war and rebuilt it
from ruins, but the "men of the '30s"
who laid the foundations for Russia's
industries. .
Clowns and guitar players. This
point was made strongly by n spokes-
man for the older generation, the well-
known writer Nikolui Cribachev. In a,
Poem, No Boys!" that appeared in
"Pravda," he told Ilussia's young that their
elders did 'not toil and sacrifice "so that
you could become clowns in the market-
place and guitarists for languid girls."
' An American) would immediately grasp
.the thought, if not the imagery, of Com- .
rade Cribacliev's complaint-which re-
veals much about the "generation gap"
rapidly developing within the world's
No. 1 Communist power.
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CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
EVENING STAR
27 July 1969
? By ANTHONY C. COLLINS
' Imoeiste4 Prem. Stall Wr!tot
' ;P. ?
MOSCOW ? Angry student dem-
viistrations In liw West NCUIll like
:'scenes from another world to Rus-
:tria's tightly reined students.
Yet, despite Communist party
control which prevents nny inaseive
;student rebellion, Kremlin rulers
fAee n few signs of youthful restless-
,- sass here ? and they're worried.
A tiny handful of students has
taken part in recent illegal demon-
' strations over minority group
f rights and has signed petitions pro-
;testing the persecution of dissident
intellectuals.
I% A larger number read, and some-
times contribute to, underground
!literary magazines which pre free
Communist censors.
An even larger number of youths
;expresses its restlessness not in in-
tellectual or political dissent but in
;drinking and 'hooliganism."
Soviet rulers have shown their
'contern by arresting the few dem-
.onstrators, trying to suppress the
,underground magazines and seek.
Ing new ways to combat juvenile
'delinquency.
t. One new proposal on combatting
'crime gives a rare inside look at
the frustrations of Soviet youth and
ttlio problems Moscow has in con-
trolling its young citizens.
.'? Two women jurists, N. Bukov-
fskaya and E. Melnikova, proposed
.that the regime's existing controls
on youth be expanded to cover
their after-work or after-school
'.hours.
YOUTH HAS KREMLIN WORRIED
Under existing controls, the par-
ty's 24-million-member Komsomol-
'Communist Youth League, keeps
sharp eye on young people at
iseh.00l, at work and in the army.
!This is not only to combat crime
but also to prevent copying the po- ,
!litical'agitation of Western youth?
seizing school buildings, striking,
disobeying military orders. .
j. No Control Now
But the Komsomol does not now
!control the average Soviet youth on
his neighborhood streets, the two ;
?
?women wrote in Komsomoiskaya
:Pravda, the official .Komsomol
vaner.
"Only on the street does he feel
I 'free,' " they said. ?
This leads to spontaneously
fesaturl groups, and about 80 per-
iscent of ?,ivenile crimes are commit-
;led by them.
;' The s )1ution, the women said, Is
4far Communist youth officials to
i.`work with the manager of each
tapartmuit building ? the .most
(widespread type of housing ? "to
Organize groups . of youths of the
same rice, education and inter-
t.'ests "
i ? ?
Closely' watched groups of 15 to 20
:4
,,youths ach should be encouraged
'to go ice skating together, visit mu-
seums Ind movies, and go with
,i,Komsorned volunteers to work on
c.farm or construction sites, the two
k women n
This ins been tried In Leningrad,
lisecond biggest city after Moscow,
they ad led, and has helped cut
l'teen-nge crime in half.
K. Such i. system of tighter party
control would "cultivate the spir-
itual needs of minors and their
moral i leals," the writers main-
tained.
They e aid their studies at a crime
Institute showed that most juvenile
crime re suited from "spiritual pov-
erty, combined with unorganized
leisure activities."
This f is in with previous corn-
? plaints by the press and youths
themselt es that often there's noth-
." ing inter :sting to do.
Deprived of many Western con-
sumer pods such as cars and good
' clothes, some youths complain that
? cultural mtlets such as records, TV.
shows aid movies are .either in
short supply or weighted down with
? propagat da.
On col ective farms, increasingly
abandon( d by youths for the cities,'
the boredom problem is worse, oth-
er articles have said.
? Although studies of home life are
lacking, Western observers see
some st .ains on youth stemming
from crowded one-room apart-
ments an I working mothers.
This rr akes the lack of adequate
leisure f nzilities more critical.
The di bate in the West over
? youthful marijuana users Is un-
heard at here, and there is no pub.
lie evidence of a drug problem.
'. Added to the lack of leisure nctiv-
' !ties, young people face other limi-
tations more constricting than
those which Western youths rebel
against.
;? Two years of military service are
:mandatory for all 18-year-olds, al-
though those lucky enough to get
Into college can defer active duty.
Travel Curb
' After college, or one of the many
'vocational institutes, students are
expected to "repay their debt to
society" by working at least a year
in some unpopular, labor-short area
?' such as Siberia. Many find ways to
quit before the year is up.
Soviet young 'people travel more
? than in the past, but few aro al;
lowed out to the West or even to
Eastern Europe. A lucky one, Yuri,
saw East Germany and reports:
' "Life is better there." The travel
ourb, like restrictions on studies,
apparently stems from a Kremlin
? fear that contact with forelpn ideas
?might turn young people's thoughts
? ? toward rebellion.
Possibly for a similar reason, So-? ,
viet news media which usually de-,
' light in 'U.S. troubles have largely.
Ignored America's ? student upheav-
al.
? But observers do see some signs I
-of a Soviet-style generation gap...!
One sign is a taboo on even discuss-
ing the problem, called "The fa-
,thers and sons question."
?`; When one writer in Molodoy
! !Kommunist-Young Communist, a
? party youth journal, dared to sug-
. gest a conflict existed, the journal's
next issue attacked him. "No other
? society has ever known such soli-
?clarity between 'fathers and sons,'?
it claimed.
As proof that the new generation'
shares the Communist ideals and
patriotism allegedly held by the;
I previous one, the press cites school'
group trips to World War II come-
(cries.
At the same time, cartoons in the
ressline's Own satire magazine, Kress
kodil, ridicule young people for'
we,iring, long hair o? miniskirts
blnri-ng week, &ming vo(l!ca or.
listeisng to Western pop music. '
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CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIKES
6 July 1969
IOUTH'S PAPIOISIA SCORED I SOVIET
Army Journal Asks 11-latrq
for Nation's Enornios
By It ERNAIID GWFATZMAN
ri*ct'i IoDI tree, York 71mte
MOSCOW, July 5 -- The
Communist party jumoal e
the Soviet armed forces com-
plained this week that some
young people were pacifist and
lacked the "hatred" of older
generations for the Soviet
Union's enemies.
The journal, liCommunist
Vooruzhennikh BII, said lb W113
mandatory for young recruits
to be educated in "hatred for
the enemy" led by the United
Stith& '
I The )ournal, published every
? two weeks, h rend primarily by
military officers and Political
CPYRGHT
commissars of the armed forc-
es. It genersilly refieets an ul-
Unpatriotic conservative lino
reactionary and anti-semitie
groups had developed in Czarist
Russia. .
The May Issue contained un-
nubl ished poems by Miss
Aklunntova and the first publi-
cation in Russian of Albert
Camus's story, "The Fall," with
a postscript that justified the
publication of this ruminative
work as an example of contem-
porary Western thought.
Memoirs Are Begun
Tsetsiliya Kin started her
mrmoirs about her husband
Viktor Kin, n Soviet journalist,
and writer who was executed
In 1937 during the Stalinist
purges. i
The conservntives seek to
discritirnee reviving memoirs of
the Stnlinfst purges in Sovieti
publications. .
Perhaps the most interesting'
article was by one or Nnvy
blir's more controversial critics,
Vladimir Lnkshin who eulo-
gized Mnrk Slicheglov, a close
friend of his.
Although the works of liberal
writers have become known in
the Soviet Union since Mr.
Shcheelov's death In 1955, Mr.
Lnitshin mourned that his
friend and fellow critic had not
lived to write of them and their
work.
Listing many authors who
were either unpublished in
Stalin's time or severly at-
tacked, hut who have gained
acceptance rimong the country's
liberal Intelligentsia since then,
Mr. Lakshin saki of Mr. Shche-
glov:
"About all. this he would
have written. He truly Would
have written, And would have
Written better than we." ,
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6PYRGHT
NUMtRO SPtCIAL
Mars 1972
ISTY
EDITION FRANcAl&E
Bulletin de la resistance socialiste tchecoslovaque
PROCLAMER LA Vain
par VERCORS
La tragedie tchecoslovaque n'a pas ete
seulement celle d'un pays de douze mil-
lions d'habitants. Elle reste celle peut-
etre de tante Tespece humaine. Avant
?intervention, en 1968, un parti commu-
niste avait reussi a secouer, de l'inte-
rieur, la masse enorme d'erreurs, d'in-
justices et de mepris de l'homme qui,
depuis quarante ans, alteraient si gra-
vement le visage du socialisme que
l'opinion publique, a travers /e monde
et dans la grande ma jorite, assimilait le
socialisme aux crimes commis en son
nom. En quelques semaines, au cours
d'un printemps prodigieux, des centai-
nes de millions de gens sur la terre assis-
talent a la demonstration que le soda-
lisme etait tout le contraire de ce mons-
tre froid et, cessant soudaln d'en avoir
peur, s'ouvraient a plus d'espoir meme
qu'en 1917. Apres un demi-si?e pen-
dant lequel, avec Staline puis sans Jul.
le socialisrne s'etait lentement et parfois
cruellement denature, void qu'eclatait
Prague une joie barite nouvelle, a la-
quelle participait toute la population,
tcheque et slovaque, une explosion de
liberte dans les idees, les arts, les let tres,
le theatre; une explosion surtout de la
vent& et pas seulement pour quelques-
mais de la verite pour tous, celle
chantee par Eluard, tandis qu'une renou-?
veau economique, et de nouvelles con-
ditions de gestion auxquelles participaient
les travailleurs, ouvraient les perspec-
tives d'une merveilleuse prosperite. Tou-
te cette allegresse avait, hors des Iron-
tieres, Un tel pouvoir de conviction, un
tel attrait sur les populations d'une so-
ciete capitaliste en vole de decomposi-
tion, que l'Europe en restait tremblante,
non de crainte, mais d'esperance.
Le 21 mit a detruit tout cela, en un
instant.
11 l'a detruit pour le moment. Car il
demeure que cette joie a eu lieu. Qu'elle
a ete possible. Qu'elle a ete produite
par une prise de conscience d'un parti
de son appareil. Ce qui s'est produit une
lois, sous la contrainte des realites, peut
se produire de nouveau, sous la con-
trainte de realites analogues. L'histoire
ne se repete pas, mais la vie no cesse
d'evoluer ; et ce qui a produit le prin.
temps de Prague peut susciter des reac-
tions de meme ordre dans d'autres part is
communistes, dans d'autres appareils al-'
ironies a des impasses equiva/entes. Le
moment venu, un meme besoin de juge-
ment sain, une meme contestation, une
meme aspiration a la franchise, a la ye-,
racite, peuvent balayer semblcrblement
les elements fetus et scleroses, les obli-
ger a licher le pouvoir, a le ceder a des
hommes plus lucides, a des communistes
plus clairvoyants.
Mais cela se prepare. 1968 ne s'est pas
fait tout seul, ni en un jour. 'Ce tut l'effet
d'un long et persistent effort de l'intelli-
gentsia communiste au cours des annees
precedentes ? et le nouveau pouvoir ins-
talle a Prague par les baionnettes russes
le sait si bien que ses coups ont ete et
sont de plus en plus diriges contre ceux-
la, contre ces intellectuels qui leur onf
fait Icicher les leviers de commande, les
ant precipites a bas du pouvoir. Et corn-
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C0 ? ?I
II Par la seule vente. t,n procicr-
mant la verite. Aussi la verite est-elle
pour eux la menace dont us OM le plus
peur, puisqu'ils savent bien qu'elle est
revolutionnaire, et tout ce gulls font de.
puis quatre ans, c'est de Tempecher par
tous les mdyens de sortir de son putts, of
d'y fourrer; dans le pulls, tous ceux qui
pourraient la faire Miler une lois encore.
Alors on empeche les ecrivains d'ecrize,
quand on ne les met pas en prison, on
ne publie pas leurs nouvelles ceuvres
et Ton met les anciennes au pi/on, on les
reduits a la misere et a la mart civile,
a la disparition intellectuelle, on vide les
universites, on fait, selon l'expression
d'Aragon, un Biafra de Tesprit, clat?on
ramener la nation au desert culture], au
dernier rang des connaissances de tons
les pays du monde. Mais un tel crime
ne peut etre commis que par des hom-
mes au cerveau petrifie, a Tesprit cor-
mmpu, crux yeux desquels seul compte
l'exercice du pouvoir, quelles qu'en doi-
vent etre les consequences. A utrement
dit, Sous les vieux crocodiles, les reve-
nants staliniens qui s'accueillent muluel-
lement, comme Novotny, avec cies roses
et ne revent que de retablir les bonnes
vieilles met bodes, les procedes drasti-
ques du bon vieux temps. S'ils se set:-
tent retenus encore de les app/iquer
pleins gaz, s'ils se contentent encore de
recluire leurs victimes a la liquidation so-
dale, faute de pouvoir d?, comme
trefois, recourir a la liquidation physique
ce n'est pas ? us en riraient -- au nom
du respect de la vie, de considerations
humanitaires ; mais seulement pour des
raisons &cliques, provisoires. II ne foul
pas effaroucher trop vile les ames sen.
sables des partis freres, qui croient en-
core, les pauvres. au XX" Congres. Alors
la tactique est simple : bien stir on ne
renonce pas crux arrest ations ni crux pro-
ces, on assure seulement gulls n'ont pas
lieu. On jure gulls n'auront pas lieu dans
Ie moment-meme oti us se font, sans se
soucier d'une contradiction que tout le
monde peut voir en lisant le journal. A
l'envoye du P.C.F. que ces nouvelles
inquietent, on repete n'y aura pas
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de poursuites poiMes faits remontant
a 1968-69, justeme t c-uand l'auteur d'un
article de 68, ap roive par le comite
central, est condo rnne pour cet article,
en meme temps q re vingf et un autres,
dont l'ancien commestateur a la teleyi-
sion, porte-parole du bureau politique.
Salt-on que retie p 'orrteese, ce rnensonge
pris sur le fait, c ue ce propos a ete
tenu par M. Husak mais non pa*
seui a soul, mais er presence de Sot?
ennemi M. Bilak ? Cc r on ne laisse pas
M. Husak parler a ten camarade fran-
ccris sans temoin. M. Husak est surveille.
C'est de nouveau le regne de la me:
fiance generalisee, as chacun surveille
l'autre. C'est l'amlaiance des annees 50;
au pire moment dr lc denonciation mu:
tuelle ? lorsque S'anaky laissait pendre
Clementis et que Got wald laissait pen-
dre Slansky de p?ur d'?e pendu lui-
meme. Car forcemmt tout recommence,
les memes causes produisent les memes
effets. Seulement, c es effets, apres vingt
ans de deviation cl Ins Ia terreur, us ont
fini par causer, a leur tour, la reaction
subite et salutaire du prinfemps de
Prague...
Mais ils ne Tont pas causee sans aide.
II a fallu la femor46 de quelques 6cri-
vains et /a con fiance 7u'un Smrkovsky,
un Dubceir leur on hate. II a &Hu la
proclamation incessonte. quotidienne, de
Ia verite, de Joules Ces verites. Ce fut l?
l'honneur et la gloirc die la presse tcheco-
slovaque. Ce fuf l',ionneur au premier
chef de Literarny Liely ? et qui explique
Tacharnement du noureau pouvoir con-
Ire la redaction de oe journal courcrgeux.
La presse est morte en Tchecoslovaquie,
et avec elle la vc rite. II n'est qu'un
moyen pour faire refaiire icr verite, c'est
de faire renaitre autssi Ia presse. Void
le premier numero dt nouveau Listy
traduit en longue frongaise. C'est le
premier espoir, Ia precnii re pferre de celte
renaissance. Saluons4e:
VERCORS
2
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6
LISTY . Listopad 1971 e. 6
,
Casopes leskogovenske socialistick4 oposke
'Politika cukrovi a biZe
CPYRGHT
?Stettin, politlks le onlehrt?A ? porlobE
kampant a tak jsme pies pribubtlny temet
nepneorovant z kampsue posjesdove v kant-
psnl pferlsolebni, trprostfed mrsdnIn vykel
Xerstkitv klink net kde je Warn!
nebezpeel ? lute hlasnl teIlgtt boje o ',Mond
Ildn, ktcrj obsshosnl nektcr.) enjintavd, pHs-
?Ong. Je to prepearovsny text projesn k
kleologIckim injernnIkUm. gvestka prIsnAsk,
re neberperi "pravIce" deend try& Iseprestola \
poletlekt MI a existovat ?"jejl konceper
majl dowel enstlay vtiv r rinmi MU".
Venni thke, ninori sitstdvoll r onsistd
reshicnct nebo pomyglejl na aktivni Moor
? elat s filch je JJL nyrd progrumove aktivni.
Dot proto ideologIcke tronte ukoly: 1) xtipas
o siskdrd delnicke Indy, sejmina yelkych
Riendib 2) strum verlond mlAdefe. Semites
byl v taroks predern ? al na tackle pro-
prrammllsticke ligfe, kale dAvid do kdnoho
pylle "prissier ? "Icrirrilmtbd s vnbte mot!.
spedeSenske Slyly" -.. sfejnt2hiIIskntetnostl
net Itustik. Tun ? ntkolika poslednich proje-
vech. JOrjrnt predvolelmIch, sehnzoje.
dolcm. jeko by P vyjinikon pAr 'pn1lkh
erldblelonista celc tenk.sslovenslm
rovslo Jelin polltlkn. nedasno Re porlob-
ni vvjoultoval .Novolny I n 11..xikorl a itival
ha ila Rouvislostl tg estlannlinInti centrib
land. schnenn ibirintiskym. llyrokrall
km. Oleo Bourbon' -- nemmilleint
lIngSk v projsva k 211A11,41
StraterIcl) daval es Mahn) 7.Stopthr
Obrnl. Ziejult by titter syrolat
jaked 'zitopkorske Inurti' ? morning sa-
ntolumt. Zeitortk Rim dopisech Widens'
tredi. byl 'vsstasen existent...arm tlaktt,
ornolttilhu glifidni std. J1n1 Usk*
oduldwall. Vtra enslasski odmith remnant.
7.1'opkuto "dnemittl" r Rodent orlon. CH.
klatInf je portoj kokYch gptgovateld; ptemens
rtipegruello trjb.ru r nosy Seas spisovattli
se tnnsela jit po ntkollkAte odlotit. Ethan
? pfedlotenem fekl. Frv
IsSm alkoho nerni. Kempf tohn Is ? adsrha
nejson sninut poem,. je 1 prAntitny re&
ochotnYch kanditliad semen Grl let.
Melaka) polittka se tak panel sflosno
keno a pedbizenlm. Silo.. se ml hrgt s ten%
kteti treed' na svem. Tint ss mail strnAlt
I ?slain' n Me, postragenl map ease dostat
nabilika Irskaveho zachdeeni ? p(,jdon-11'
k volbtlm. dostst softie zejmina
\ Tribute, k undies Vysledck voleb se 111 gamine
unmet jen rteutast se ttrko rust IA. Pled.
tolebrd spoleine essedSulOV PCSC ? NT,
tato polltikn huslkovskeho cukrovl ? blie
elme pletlextlit pokud moino ?
lAkavent Laical. Nebot jak syldtd6 Inds&
sulskternIkiim ? volbj ,budon pleblReitem.
,Sk11(211 o volbu.,nebucle meg) Itym
vont. Ve4en1 nem.) Huse gni o hodnott Masi)
pro. Cher polose vedet, bylo mato itch.
Ma se enlvASIII postarlt aktIvnt moll, at
ut Skrtem nebo pfetlertim ne.iirdt1 n4 vnlbt-h.
Nik.ln It nits mho& Moths( trelm setierd
starobnkli 11Stelus1k byt je. troeint tralme.
Se k ntmn docidiel r potlobt volebn Ito
allfhte. i'llilmejme slut steehno,
mint v pholvolefnifelt mbetfurkli nal. el.
Chodnir tin ptertvolelnil issithre apormlut ne
?
skim titbit jet. re Weed. nti
stn h.
kotintmllniclo, vittrAnlelb el okremsleh. Al ti.
vitn rollers, on nit dimly NnImil se isk m Se
ih'er
emenit 2 2221121P2111 opagandy ? nook
lobo, eo filady sleds. . Vedeni potty-bole
mlnitrigni Oast ns dvotebnIch sehArch
a maximilni na rot Sch. s echo/ swims&
pooh's,.
UI ted se dtji tajinnart ski. X 21. Irmo
byly pflorsT4 alery birdlike Intents.
cktailn1 pont drodalky. /Dahmer/ No
tenni "Nepredilr . V mbilech me moonshots
pottidkoo sa pflpestrovaty sugary II ssokiiiikogi
CPYRGHT
? LISTY ? en francals
CPYRGHT
4( LISTY ? es
le journal de l'opposi-
En accord avec nos amis .tcheco.
lion sociaiiste tchecosiovaque.
siavaques,
nous reproduisons icl quel.
II parait bus
es deux mots, dans dif-
ques
articles, informations ou echos
ferents pays et
rangers et en Tcheco-
p3rus
dans ? LISTY ? en 1971. II esl
slovaquie ineme.
Par lui clrculent les
b
en comprehensible que les redac.
Informations sur
la situation dans le
te
urs vivant en Tchecoslovaquie occu.
pays, la repression,
les luttes de la
pe
n'ont Pu signer certains articles
resistance.
de
leurs noms reels.
? Soutenu auss
bien par les hommes
Jiri Mikan, editeur de X LISTY ?, di-
? du X Printemps
de Prague ? qui furent
recteur
de la Television de Prague en
contraints h l'exil
que par ceux qui 1968,
elu membre du Comite Central
continuent la kite
dans le pays, malgre au
XIV' Congres du Part! Communiste
la repression du
pouvoir ? normalise ?,
tc
hecoslovaque, le 22 ao0t 1968, a re.
le retentissement
1checoslovaque
de ce petit journal
est considerable.
d
go specialement un editorial.
A l'exterieur,
II est la manifestation
Le grand ecrivain Vercors, dont is
de la continuit4
du courant en faveur
notoriete
en Tchecosiovaquie est con.
d'un socialism
a Visage humain ; a
siderable,
a blen voulu &tire la pr?
? l'interieur, dan3
ioccupee, H es
la Tchecosiovaquie
le symbole stimulant
fe
ce de ce numero special.
de la resistanc
a soclaliste, le porteur
En le remerciant, nous exprimons
des espoirs.
n3tre
q
reconnaissance a celles et a ceux
A, repondant a notre appel, nous onl
Le COMITE
)U 5 JANV1ER, consti-
p
prmis de reunir la somme necessaire
Rue au debut
de 1970, en cherchant
a
la publication de ? LISTY ? en fran.
de nouvelles fc
rmes d'activite suscep-
c3is.
Nous avons tenu a donner a ce
Itibles de renforcer,
en France, le cou-
n
mem le meme aspect, format el
rant ^croissant
de solldarite avec le
yr
Ise en page, qu'au ? Usty ? tcheco.
peuple Ichecos
?vague, a pense gull
s
ovaque auquel 11 rend hommage, en
serail bon qu'une
edition en langue
womettant
au peuple de Tchecosiova.
francalse de a
LISTY * fosse mieux
cpie
et a sa resistance socialiste d'am.
connaltre cells
publication.
Oilier
'noire campagne de solidarite.
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3
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6
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tine repression qui est
CPYRGHT
l? ? 6
ding e contre vous
par Ad PELIKAN
editeur de ? USW n
Pour cc ountero exception net de List!! ),
nous nurions voulu presenter au public
&melds one selection representative d'ar-
(Holes annlysnnt de c Printemps de Pra-
gue i, des essais brillants ct um programme
pour ravenir.
Mais in sortie de te !turner? cointide
avec tine ,nottvelle ? et malheureissement
pas in derniere ? vague de repression
en Tchecoslovaquie.
C'est Masi que nornbre d'organisations
plus de documents et d'articles stir In
lutte de notre people que sur sa culture.
111 le comprendra sans doute, aneme s'il
nous est desagreable de nous represent&
comme ceux qui, en exposant Jour cas
viennent troubler la conscience des mitres.
Nous savons bien que de l'Histoire, les
gens aiment it oublier les &Tenements der
plaisants, surtout lorsqu'ils risquent de
!cur donner un sentiment de culpabilite.
I:occupation de la Toliecoslovaquie, d'un
pays sane an &ear de l'Europe et cela
en plein (lege international, appartient
sans doute it cette cntegorie d'evenements
dont le rappel m'est pas lagreable...
C'est stir eels que cornptent les occu-
pants de notre pays et le-s gotiverneurs
(fulls ant places it an direction. C'est..pour-
quoi its ont considere que le moment etait
opporttm ? it l'abri de nouveaux espoirs
de detente ? pour regler leurs comptes
avec ceux qoi Tonkin:yid, en 1968, tin
socialisane it visage human et qui
,ntont pas abandonne deur lune au lieu
d'aocepter la crealite,.
iMais nous serions injustes si nous no
voyions pas que beaucoup de femmes et
d'hommes, dans le monde, se revoltent
.contre cette ,creglei de l'Histoire et que
lettr solidarite avec le people tchecoslo-
vague est toujouns vivante. La partition
de cette edition ,francaise de Linty) en
est un des nombreux exemples.
C'est ainsi que de nombre d'organisations
et d'amis out (Metre leurs voix, ces der-
mieres semaines, contre da nouvelle vague
? de repression en Tchecoslovaquie. Nous
Ileur en sornmes profondernent reconnais-
sants. C'est un encouragement moral dont
valeur ne pout pas se mesurer.
Un excel;?
Mais le problem est beattcoup plus pro-
fond. Quand on deponce In repression it
Prague, on a souvent tendance it in pre-
senter comtrne onal exces 3. des groupes ou
des personnes extremikles ? tels les
ultras Blink et lndra, on la police secrete
? qui iraient it rencontre de In volonte de
lltisnk et surtout en opposition avec de ligne
(le In direction sovietique actuelle.
comme (lit tin proverhe tcheque, 4 de desir.
ilevient fie Ore de In pensee
En effet, la repression policiere aujour-
d'hni, en Tchecoslovaquie, est, seulernent
ttne consequence inevitable de l'occ?upa-
lion sovietique du pays, le nesultat de In
politique de granite puissance.
Un regime d'occupation, impose de cello
maniere ine pout pas ? independamment
(les .personnes et de deur volonte ? regner
autrement que par In peur et roppression.
Tonics les comparaisons avec In Pollogne
el la Hongrie sont fausses parce que ? en
ilehors de 'traditions differentes ? l'Anntee
sovietique knit install& dans ces pays
avant son intervention, alors que, dans le
ens de la Tchecoslovaquie, II s'egissait
(rune invasion pure et simple, avec ton-
les les consequences psychologiques que
cola suppose pour la population.
Contains observateurs etrangers conti-
nuent it repeter que Husak ne vent pas In
repression, lambs que Bilak, Indra et d'au-
tres la venlent. Vest one vision superfi-
cielle, inome si on admet l'existence de
contradictions an sein du groupe dirigearst
de Prague.
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CPYRGHT
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Chaque regime prefere que tons les ci-
toyens l'acceptent et le soutiennent volon-
tairement. C'est dans ce sens que Husak
voulait, ,comme ?les autres, qtte les s hom-
ilies du ,printemps de Prague ) fassent leur
autocritique et se salissent eux-minres, lents
camarades et deurs idees defentlues en 1968.
A ceux qui anraient accepte tette humilia-
tion pultlique, on promettait tine bienveil-
lance ,magnanime. Mais ii ceux qui refuse-
rent et persisterent it conserver leurs opi-
nions, on a declare la guerre sans mettle
Guerre politique, tout d'abord : des ac-
cusations publiques de etrahlson), sans
in moindre ,possibilite de defense. Puis
materielle : expulsion du travail, 4ransfert
trtin poste a Pautre, discrimination envers
Icon enfants chassis des Universitee on de
Fern plol. Atteinte physique dans beaueotip
de cas : interrogatoires, perquisitions, ar-
restations, condemnations, brutalites tlani
les prisons.
11 ne s'agil. pas d'une errcur, person-
nelle tie Husak, d'un exces tie Blink ou
trim groupe incontritle r, rnais des con-
sequences logiques de l'occupation sovie-
lique. La settle difference entre Cr. Husak
d'une part, et Indra-Ililak de l'autre, c'est
que lc premier ipensait pourrnit !wiser
In resistance du pettple sans tecourir it la
repression, tenths que les seconds sont
con vaincus depuis le debut qu'on ,ne pourra
y aboutir, ni obtenir des autocritiques
sans da ,peur resultant de in repression. Alais
le but est le Mine : etouffer la voix an-
thentique ties peuples tcheque et slovaque
et burs aspirations it l'independance, au
socialisme demooratique.
On salt que Cr. Husak a donne Passurence
n'y a pas, qu'll ,n'y aurait pas de
proces e prefabriques ) et des attestations
en raison des opinions manifestees en 1968-
1909, mak iftivait-il pas assure aussi qua
cpersonne ,n'avait invite Perm& sovieti-
que on hien resterait on tomberait
tivec le cainarade Dulteek ), pour affirmer
tout le contra-ire un an apres?
414 Les assurances >0 de G. Husak
La valtur de telles c assurances, a dep
,ete demontree par de nomItreux exemples
connus ? de In comlainnation du general
Prchlik en 1971 it ceHe du joutnaliste
Lederer en fevrier 1972 ? sans patter des
centilitres de can inconnus. Le ministere
de la Justice tchilque a avoue, thins sea
: GIA-Klat rascgtileq1WPWIRMAPAntibi-
tie de l'annee 1970, 11 y (wait en 506 per-
sonnes condamees pour c nctivites contre
In Republique ). On snit que, .mniheuretise-
un ouvrier on un etudiant n mins
tie chance de beneficier it l'etranger de la
publicite qui peut entattrer ?Ia condamna-
tion d'un journailiste cm d'un intellectuel
tonal's hors du pays.
Si mime tine telle repression retroactive
n'existait pas, devrions-nous etre reconnais-
sants parce qu'un regime qui se reclatne du
e socialism ne punit pas des dirigcants
,politiques on des citoyens pour les opinions
politiques gels ont exprimees 3 ou 4 an-
flees auparavank ? Ces hommes politiques
tictivent-ils acceptor volontairetnent la fin
tie lent vie politique et professionnelle
alors gulls ne sont pas revoques par ceux
qui des ont emus .apres tine lutte politique
interne, mais tenverses par tine invasion
armee etrangere ? Est-il 'normal .de les con-
traindre it acceptor en silence les accusa-
tions les plus monstrueuses diffusecs pu-
bliquement centre eux et contre Jo peuple
qui les await spontaniment sontenus ? Nest-
ii pas de leur droit et mettle de deur devoir
de militants et de patriotes de se defen-
tire par tons des moyens, de denoncer les
crimes contre lent pays, contre tout le
mouvement socialiste et dome de parler
it haute rvoix.
Et si cc lour est refuse par le
(regime, us n'ont d'autre recours que de
s'exprimer dans tine presse clandestine ?
cc qu'ont fait tons les fondateurs do socia-
lism ? et aussi dans In presse interna-
Umiak. ,Devrait-on accepter des e lois* inn-
poiikes par In force (Pune occupation et
considerer toute ,activite contraire it cette
occupation corn-me etant c hors la loi)
C'est la force morale de Dubcek, de
Smrkovsky, de Kriegel et des autres din-
pants ou militants du e Printemps de
Prague qui refusent l'autocritique ) et
demeurent ainsi des symboles de la resis-
tance, une alternative possible pour l'arve-
nir. ',Information est parvenue jusqu'a la
presse occidentale que Dubcek, Smrkovsky,
Kriegel et des imilliers d'autres ant refuse
de participer it la farce electorate de no-
vembre 1971; an geste qui a sans doute
aggrave leur situation, mais augmentA leur
prestige dans In population.
Une opposition socialist?
C'est odors an settle v&ntte dans lee ? assu-
rances} de Ilusnk n'y aura pas de
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-6
proce prefabriqt parce y a
it y aura des proces politiques contre une
opposition politique reelle. Une opposition
organisee ou spontanee qui ? pour an pre-
miere fois dans un pays de tl'Est n'est
pas une opposition anticommuniste, mais
one opposition socialiste.
11 ,ne serait done pas juste de parlor de
la repetition mecanique des procedes des
annees 50. Car Slansky et les 'autres diri-
geants executes alors n'etaient pas en oppo-
sition consciente it la ligne du Patti et
c'est pourquoi on devait fabriquer s cette
opposition et tleurs aveux s. Cette fois, on
arrete et on persecute des communistes, des
socialistes, des patriotes qui sont eonseiem-
meet dans l',opposition et qui se battent
pour un socialisme different de celui qui
existe en U.B.S.S.
f;'est aussi In raison pour laquelle it n'est
pas possible aujourti'lliti de faire des grands
(show tprocess, ear In plupart des accu-
ses s'y defendraient ouverternent ? d part
one ,minorite qui sc laisserait baser. ?Et le
public refuserait de oroire aux accusations,
mais s'ielentifierait plutest aux accuses qui
exprimeraient ses sentiments. Devons-nous,
pour autant, etre satisfaits de ce progres
Le schema des process
Certains faits, comme l'arrestation
journatiste italien Valerio Ochetto, la cam-
pagne developpee Indoor .de cc (casts par
in .presse officielle itchecoslovaque ? et
aussi sovietique laissent prevoir In cons-
truction artificiellle de [ohms proces poli-
tiques, qui se preparent a Prague, it Brno,
it Bratislava. Le regime, intpose de l'exte-
rieur, no petit pas accepter que les hom-
mes de l'opposition agissent par leur pro-
pre conviction et s'appuient sur le peuple :
il sent In .necessite de les presenter corn-
inc des e agents corrompus s diriges 4 de
1.'istranger s. De la resulte le schema
? d'un cote, l'opposition interieure qui
Prepare i un coop d'Etat s ;
-- de l'autre cede, les .?gr?lebeco-
slovaques qul envoient des s instructions s
Popposition intenieure et qui, nature/le-
nient, travaillent i pour les services de ren-
seignetnerds hoperialistes s ;
- onfin, les journalistes et touristes
et/lingers qui, emote courriers s, font In
liaison entre les deux groupes.
Sur cette base, les opI"I.
vent etre artificiellement condamnes non
pour leurs opinions politique.s s, mnis
pour !curs c activites criminelles a. Et
I. llusak pent dire qu'll a respecte les
assurances) gull avtait donnees...
On peut se demander pourquoi cette
peur de l'oppoSition et des hommes pro-
dames plusieurs .fois c hallos et ouhlies s
et attssi Si cette repression n'est pas en
contradiction avec les efforts sovietiques
pour la Conference Europeonne de seen-
rite. 11 n'y a pas de contradiction, mais
plutot tine logique de fer : l'ouverture vers
l'Occident suppose la liquidation de l'oppo-
&Rion et de toutes les ttlissidentes s it
l'interieur du bloc, et le renforcement de
l'higemonie absOlue de Moscou. Doe oppo-
sition, meme minoritaire on epotentielle s,
exprimant les sentiments de la population,
pent se transferor subiternent it roccasion
/Pune ?rise interieure on internationale
qui transformerait l'etincelle en grand
incemlie s. CA' tla .est particulierement vral
en TIM de tension on de confrontation avec
un autre pays, ermine In Chine Populnire
par exemple.
Telle est In VTIVIC raison de l?epression
actuelle contra tout cc qui ressernble it
tine opposition politique dans les pays de
l'Est, et particttlierement en Tchecoslova-
quie, qui est ,nujourd'hui le maillon le plus
foible du bloc et on l'opposition est enra-
cinee 4e phis profondement dans le people.
Brejnev, ilusak et les autres dirigeants
tin newstalinisme savent bion gulls pen-
vent settlement offaiblir, mats non detruire
cette opposition par In reprission. Its oat
(lone besoin de In complicite de l'opinion
publique occident/de pour etotiffer In 'yds
de l'opposition.
Les vraies questions
.Cette situation pose un dilemme difficile
.certains, parfois mettle tragique et ton-
jours inconfortable. Comment exiger, ii
juste titre, In liberation d'Angela Davis el
des ontifascistes espagnols on grecs, en se
taisant MIT la repression qui frappe des
communistes et des pittriotes tchecoslo-
vaques ? Pent-on ? it juste titre ? demon.
der le retrait de l'anmee americaine er
Indochine et ignorer ,l'occupation de h
Tohecoslovaquie par l'armee sovietique
Ext-Il possible de se taire par orainte d'art
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CPYRGHT
taxe it' 4 antisovietistne), talons que ces cri-
Ines discreditent Oe socialisme dans le
monde entier ?
tics Tcheques et les Slovaques ? et pas ,
Popinion publique occidentale ces ques-
settlement eux attendent la reponse del
tions. Avec espoir mais non inquietude ni
angoisse. En attendant, us continuent leur
Outte avec obstination, car elle a ses racines ,
dans ?leur Histoire.
Faut-ill rappeler qu'en 1938 un hom.me
IrEtat trancais, avec on homologue hri-
tannique, ont snorifie la Tchecoslovaquie
l'abandonnant a Hiller pour 4 saii-
.ver h Nix pour sine generation ? Cette
illusion ? si ce ne tut que cella ne
shwa pas 'plus d'une .annee. ? La. repetera-
tt-on ?
Combien de temps Iamb-a-WI, cette fois,
pour comprendre qu'on ne peut pas servir
la detente Internationale en elouffant In
..,voix (Pun people et de la Illyerte,? et .que
la repression en Tchecoslovacpsie est
? gee ani contre tons ceux qui, dans 4e
monde, Itutttnt pour le progres
GAZETIE DE LAUSANNE
10 Felbruary 1972
CPYRGHT
Chasse aux rOfractaircs en Tchecoslovaquie. ? III
Obstade- C!,--.cdterite et-irnexsinue.
O Durcissetnent ideologique .en
(JRSS, arrestations et 'repression
en Tchecoslovaquie, l'hiver en Eu-
rope de l'Est est decidement tres
rigoureux. (t Gazette de Lausan-.
ne du 9 fevrier). M. Husak, qui
semble Vostlok en fink avec les
oppositionnels irreductibles, laisse
la bride sur h, cou a la police
d'Etat. L'arbitraire du . regime
reepargne personne COMIC k re-
late notre correspondant.
(D'un corrcspondant pour
les affaires de l'Est)
Le'cas de Jan Bzoch,.ancicn
redacteur de la revue hebdorna-
claire Kulturny Zivot ?, mon-
tre bicn quelle est la perfidie
des accusations. Jan llzoch a
t?reete sur lie simple fait qu'il
portait dans sa serviette k nu-
mero de la revue communiste
italicnne c Vie Nuove-Gior-
ni contenant la famcitse in-
terview de Joseph Stnrkovsky.
Fait alarmant, des hornmes
comme Vladimir Skutina, d'au-
tre part, gravement maladc, et
Vaclav Prchlik, directeur.
repoque de Ditbcck de la Sec-
tion des forces ?armees du Co-
'mite central, qui vient d'etre
? condamne a 3 sins de prison,
sont soumis ?outes sortes de
mauvais traitements
? Les derniers evenements de-
vraient scrvir Wavertissement
au monde libre. Le jour meme
ou l'agence de presse CTK pu-
bliait un premier communique
sur les arrcstations elk COM-
mcntait egalement la reunion a
Bruxelles de la conference con-
sultative des represent:10s de
!'opinion publique ettropeenne,
conference an curs de lamiclle
le chef de In delegation sovi&
tique Alexei Sitikov, appuye
bicn sinr par la delegation tchtS-
coslovaque, demandait que
ropinion publique europeenne
soutienne activement le projet
de mise en place d'une commis-
sion internationale chargee de
convoquer tine conference sur
In cooperation et la securite
europeenne.
II existe unc contradiction
manifeste entre la volont6 for-
cenee des pays du Pacte de
Varsovie de 'convoquer une
conference europeenne de secu-
rite et la chassc aux sorcieres I
laquellc ces Etats se livrent
,chez cox. Un rapprochement
tine detente authentique ne
sont guere conccvables s'il n'y
a pas possibilite de garantir un
libre &flange d'in formations
honnetcs. Le renforeement du
black-out sur its informations
dans les Etats de l'Est et les
persecutions auxqueltes sont
soumis ccux qui devient, ne
serait-cc que d'un ponce, dc la
doctrine officielle font que l'on
petit se demander si les Etats
du Pack de Varsovie s'interes- ?
sent reellement a la securite eu-.
ropeenne ou s'ils n'ont en tate
qu'une nouvelle ruse tactique;
- FIN
LONDON OBSERVER
12 March 1972
,
Ir77,f7J4r4
41!:04'
? AH'61;:r
ihmuf
771 a
C
A. Czech dissident re-
port.on a new- Prague
drive tecrushlthe under
ground..
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7
CPYRGHT
THE CieellosiotkiK itaciembjge
is seeking to con*HEITAMenr
Communist' Party with, the':
.underground opposition, in'
Ciechoslovakia,
According to information
from Prague, not only political.
detainees but even members of
the Central Conimittee of the
Party have been. questioned'
about their personal and' ?Moira!
!contacts with the Italian CoM-.
munists, who continue strongly;
to condemn the 1968 Soviet-led'
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
This attempt to collect damaging.
evidence against the 'Italians may,be
a search for grounds eventually to
,demand the excommunication' of:
'the Italian Communists from; the?
:world Communist movement. The.
'search could not be conducted'
without- the implicit approval' of
Moscow or at least a,group in the'
Kremlin.
For a Party leader.who has con
-
sternly promised `no political!
arrests,' Dr Gustav Basel-, the First'
Secretery, has achieved the remark-
able score of more than 200
arrests since last November's
elections. In most cases, no charges
have been laid. The group arrested
in Brno. for instance, has been
held. for over three months
although a new law allows &tens
ii0r1 without charges for only 90
days.
The pattent of the arrests' is
,startling. It is not the non-Corn-
?munists of 1968 who are' beings
Ort d hut net 10
erre
lease
oreanieations labelled as counter-
revolidionary after the invasion?
' KAN e' the 23!, Club, the?
Social-Democratic?Partye?has bee'n
held. ?
Some of those arrested are ex-
Communists, like . Mehl and
Sabala, both former Central Com-
mittee members; the journalists
Karel Kynel and fin Hochman.
the hiOoriane Bartosek and. Kap-- .
Ian. the lawyers Sarrialik and'
Soe.hor. the sociologists Siklova; ?
and Klofec, and the ? erninent
ideoloeist Karel Kosile The others
,are former students' union officials,
known. for New Left 'views:
Mravec (e.tready sentenced), Jane-
slay Jira and the well-known Jiri
Mueller.. who headed' the Student
Committee for Co-operation with,
Workers, created' after the invasion.
The attests ere a hid- to crush
the underground, Whose very exist-
ence proves that the official policy i
of 'consolidation.' is a dead duct
But to Party, astonishment, the
undergeound.continues to circulate
leaflets and even Teenier bulletins
in Bohemia.' and Moravia., The
' levet of their deformation indle.
caws that Party members' and'even
secret sympathisers in.: the Central
Committee' are-. in touch with the
opposition:. ?
The secret police are trying psi-
meetly to. utemaek. these sources of
informations House searches are
increasing, typewriters and! mail
are examined and loaded' questions
dosing interrogations prove that
letters from abroad--even letters
rorii.ogetibr so
meo
police (STP) is trying hard, so far
fecoless.ly, teefind out how financial'
aaostance? to the families of politi-
cal prisoners is being organised.
Even spme members of the
' Central! Committee, and close
friends and. relatives- of President
Svoboda, were not informed about
the latest arrests': This-suggests that
a situation reminiscent of the 1950s.
is arising in which a small,, anony-
mous and uncontrollable group-
within, the ruline, clique usurping
power. This group may be directed.
from the' Ministry of the Interior
and by Soviet advisers.
The dissidents will probably be
tried by small groups, in trials given.
little publicity. Official statements
? will go on insisting that they arc
being tried' for offences committed
after 1968, hoping. to placate
criticism from Western Communist
Parties.
TheT
authority of Dr Husak has
waned,. but not vanished. The
February Meeting of the Central
Committee was a minor victory for
him: iediscussed the' economy in-
stead of the report on ' political'
given a forum for his hard-line.
consolidation' which would. have
opponents like Bilak and Kapek.
But littsak's harping on economic
shortcomings?excessive increase in
production costs, non-fulfilment of
sense areas of the plan, chronic
emphasis on quantity at the expense
of quality?was a partial admission
of defeat.
Worried economists demand the
Installation of highly qualified
managers and the profit criterion in
2004 95000+-6rnarkd improve-
ment in the neet two years. They
hint that the consolidation, policy ,
should not be allowed to impede
this. progress.' It seems that features
of Professor Sik's old economic ,
reforms arc to he surreptitiously
introduced again.
In the leadership there is Fdalc-
mate, and apparently the waning
factions have declared a truce, for
several months. For the preseqt,
no major personnel changes aro to
be made.
Moscow is still willing to support
Husek as long as he can. put the
economy on its feet and keep the
lid on the political crisis in the
country. . If the crisis boiled oyer,
he would become dispensable.
It is sometimes argued that
underground opposition is counter-
productive because it undermines
fiusak and opens the way Cor the
hard-liners. Such pragmatism may
interest historians and Weetertt
'experts on Communist effeirs,'
hut the opposition feels it cannot
afford to compromise on principles.
The dissidents clo not wish to
degenerate?as Kesik put it?into
a. mere 'Czech- and Slovak-speak-
ing population producing steel and!
grain,' devoid of political identity.
Those who protest publicly lay
themselves open to arrest for sub-
version. Members of the opposi-
tion' in Czechoelovakia want, it to
be known that 'it is protest by
Western Communists and promi-
nent /eft-wingers, above all, which;
might reduee the severity of the
sentences on those now in prison?,
?
LONDON TIMES
22 February 1972
771CY 9S
CITIVA
? t
Vaclav Pravda is the pseudonym
of a Czechoslovak journalist
who was an orthodox communist
propagandist until I963.
. when he came out strongly in
, favour of Mr Dubcek's
i reform .movement. In this
remarkable letter to a
friend in the West he explains
? ' bow he came to change,
. why he will not change again,
and what it feels like to live
in Czechoslovakia today. The
text has been edited and
shortened, mainly to avoid
easy identification. ?
Approved For Ftele
Prague..lemiery 16. 1972
CPYRGHT
a:Eery'
:411i4A.
c:Irt? to poorfr senieneed not for what!
Dear X.
At last I have managed to sit down at this
borrowed typewriter. Even to own a type-
writer is a luxury tor criminals like myself
because the police will always prove very
costly that this or that illegal pamphlet has
been written on a particular machine.
But somehow I feel I do not care any
snore. There seems no point in being a
" good boy The machinery of revenge .
for 1968 is working in th6 traditional
manner. First they invent the guilt. then
they stage the crime and order evidence
and testimony. The judge and the prose-
cutors arc instructed by the Party, and the
Party secretariat fixes the length or the
sentence and chooses the defendants who.
anyway. were placed on prepared lists
long ago.
It is true that in Moscow. and where
necessary in Prague too, they promised the
Italian and the French communists that
t here_ seivieljeceng lisalierikejegfrime
ase woubuilahi
8
they did in 1968 but for later activities ".
You must understand that I have no idea
what my fate svill be. 11 I am still sitting in
my house a month front now I shall not -
know why they let time it here. They have,
already spent so much money on mc that .
I feel they must somehow bring the whole
matter to an end and get something in
return for all that expense.
They check on any car which stops in
front of my house. and every person who
walks here is immortalized on film. The
moment 1 drive away the boys step on their -
pedals and a convoy is formed, I have an
escort to the food shop. the shoe shop. the
butcher, the supermarket. the barber, the
cinema
By now I know all their faces. and
recently I criticized them for ell wearing
the same type of sweater. Three times f
was obliged to get lost. and 1 have an ad-
vantage here because of my exec/lent
imigktolkilei striisiwee have snow
ehere
Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A00020017WOYaGHT
is no roily Hi ihe IMIC I !ling. It must cost
a hell of .1 lot of money. Surely they do
not think I am such an idiot as to -organize
the Min-throw of the Government whcn .1
have the police on my heck. Clearly 1 will
do this when I ;iin left alone.
In December and this month they struck
at mallY or to).' closest friends. All of 'theni
had- ;Also been closely watched in recent
rhonths.: Fluter some pretext even thc
driving ficea..cs of some of them w'ere invali-
dated. One of them had a recurrence of
ulcer troubles and was twice in hospital
in January because his blood count is lousy
and his liver does not function properly.
Our great police force also follows my wife
svherever she goes. Poor girl. on one occa?
. sion she not?iced someone eyeing her and
thought: he was making passes at her. but
- not so:, it Vvas comrade ! ?
. Now I have a special system for quickly
destroying what is necessary when thc police
:come. I kr ow dready what they are aftcr
and what they like to take. For instance.
? they take Solzhenits?yn from the .libraries. so
:I have already sent these hooks to safe
places. I have also removed?as all other
-candidates for the gallows all docu-
ments from the past era. all my corre-
sponderice.:and naturally all newspapers and
magazines of 1968-69. because that is what
they always steal. All incoming mail I burn.
There .are. of course. some things I want to
keep at .home- until the last moment, like
drafts of letters and unfinished manuscripts.
and my address book, which I have tran-
scribed on to one little sheet of paper. All
these things I keep in one place and they
will be thrown into thc flames the minute
thc first agent of thc Holy Congregation
shows up. We have begun to lock aricl
secure our front door, which was not done
herc in the past. That gives me at least
30 seconds. I am only sorry I can never kccp
a whole manuscript here. for that means
that working is no fun.
- In the rt two rears I have also learnt
- to distinguish sounds. At night, for in-
stancF. I can distinguish the sound of a
car which is going to stop from that of
(me that is merely slowing down. I can
recognize whether a car stops at the front
or the back door. It reminds me of thc
?war, wilco I was a teenager and my lather
was arrested by the Gestapo. My mother
:cursed the Czech policeman .who accom-
"panicd the Germans. He looked exactly
:like the present ones. .I am glad that I
inherited much of my mother's courage
and Ntrong will and that I managed to
overcome the ? kindheartedness from my
fathers side.
We all 4.7ree that Ihe- comrades from
thc keret police arc worse than those
immortalized by liaSek in The Good
Soldier Sehweik. We try. to convince our-
selves that we should not . underestimate
then. but it is hard not to. Certainly they
will be able to organize perfect trials. like
Bukovsky's. but: if there were really an
organized opposition. or even resistance.
they would just pack up. But this is
probably true of, any political police
wherever and Whenever there exists that
instittitional absurdity a political party with
absolute power- which pros between itself
and the population not arguments hut
policemen.
This .brings me to some debates of thc
past. What was wrong with mc was that
I was biased in favour of thc RusSians.
Yoti. knoW that I was very critical of thc
rigidity -of their foreign policy. and I found
their priinness. prudery and exaggerated
pathos ridiculous. bin I always found
excuses for all this sinsply because I wanted
to. Perhaps it was because thc s practically
saved my life and my father's in May.
1945. Also. was Om in a working class
family. My recollections of life in the
pre-war republic are negative, and it has
taken mc a long time to learn to.. under-
stand it objectively. My father. by thc
way., Wa an old-time communist And
always had a sober altitude. but I Kasai)
to understand things only much later.
To be quite frank. I never felt that
the posl-revolution dictatorship Nhilti.id be
a permanent arrangement. I could, never
convince myself that all that nonsct)se was
necessary. but I had only a very saigtic
notion about thc scope and thc melliods of
the dictatorship and its impact 7on the
opposition. I was locked in my sindy and
was interested only in thc big %void issues.
never really grasped what was :ping on
in my country. Having had an, injustice
to a friend of mine put right 'I thought
that justice could always he achie?ed if
one tried. I ardently believed that
socialism was good. that the dictatorship
WM only temporary. that the horrible and
limitedapparatt-hicks smith' be ,:ent lo hell,
and that people would again speak With*
human OICCS.
I reinsert to believe that this was the way
thc Russians wantcd it. On the contrary
I judged them by the few 1 met?the
Khrushchcv people-t.and I thought that
-they detested thc spittle-licking Czecho...
slovak Comnumist Party.
. Years ago 1 came to the conclusion that
?a democratically elected team %vorild
replace the idiotic dictatorship run by lin
established. incompetent clique. and that:a
political opening svould have to be start0
in a situation when there was no longrer
an eyriloiting class. It took mc t long time
lo understand 111;it Kbrushchev's f. Inuaimt
a turn towards conservatism. hceause I was
disgusted by his excursions into the 01-
tura' field and 1 was only sorry that with
him thc last human facesdisappeared from
Russian politics.
F read Marchcnko only last year. The
First Crrele and Cancer Ward only in 1%9.
But I had to be conditiooed to understand
aIl this. and only after the,Russian invasion
was I able to undcrstand,'or perhaps a few
weeks before. when I began: to grasp the
scope of Russian pressure. Another
influence was the Kidder Repirt and the
Piller Report on the Prague trials (of thc
I950) which I read in hill only in 1969.
People who were gaoled in the 1950s spoke
frankly with me only in June. 19(ift. That
was a real shock ror mc. I rcalifcd th?t
our type i'V.socialism bore the same relation
to my ideals as the inquisition did to
Christianity. I remembered what inv father
said in February.?
'? .Now nc rc?
going to have socialism according to Stalin,
and that will bc no fun.- At that tinn: I
thonaht this was heresy.
Now I am sitting here staring out of the
window, and I realize that 30 years of my
life have been wasted, I have used up my
energy and my health in the, cause of a
great fraud. I never for one moment.
cherished the idea of emigrating. I feel I
don't have the right to do that. I know
.1 will have to go through it here until the
hitter end, but nothing will rid me of my
feeling of complicity. Mind you. I never:
had any position of power in the regime.
but I peddled all that nonsense about a
harpy future at a lime when millions were
suffering, eating my daily ration of half a
pound of salami. which ;Ira,. ay was get-
_
ling more expensive every vear.
When people ask me now if I am still for
socialism I usually answer indirectly : let
the Czechs choose what they consider basic-
--that the right of choice must be guaran-
teed for ever. If f am ever allowed to write
again this is what I Will idi.rocate :thrive all.
Democracy k basic. Th. 'Social Democra'ts
knew this 50 years ag,i- but wc did not
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CPYRGHT
iiiiiterst;ind it (AprioyeidifteirRqlem
SM1 red %0 I chi/ 11 the Hen to sneak ou
.on other thin s, and only if others art
'allowed to speak equally freely and frankly.
If they are not allowed to do that I will
shut lop too, I hove written gibberish tong
enough. Personally. I still advocate public
ownership of the means of production as
the foundation of social justice. in that
-respect I shall never. change. I reject etas-
'sical capitalism even if under it democracy
is corrupted negligibly compared with
under our bureaucratic dictatorship.
The whole nation is silent. It is a silence
of a kind I have never experienced before.
People are totally dieemeted but at the
same time there is surprising optimism.
Most people pin their hopes on 'he Euro-
pean Security Conference. expecting that
the Russians will be forced to leave and
?that once the regime has to face the people
alone it will have to climb down a lot. The
Mobile Guard is. it is truc, being feverishly
built up. but everyone knows what an
reliable Clement it is in our country.
According to the experts the economy i4
going to the dogs. Sometimes I meet
people who compare our situation with aril
of the 19.50s. when .Stalin was still alive.
I do not think this is correct. For instance.
look at my situation compared ? with the
situation of communists ostracized in the
fifties. They were completely isolated.
The anti-communist majority had no
reason to syropithite with them because
it had no reason to believe in their guilt
(how could we haVe believed in it ?). and
the communists and their fellow travellers'
'were absolutely hostile to them.
Now the situation is different. During
that. one Year. IV68. the whole nation
s,as Mat' 4 (OW` -1-1111;t1 ; 011,9,4Qi I
the occupation and the dictatorship.
Ninety-live per cent supported that. After
the." restoration " only a small part of the
majority was bought, 1 he great mass of
?people cannot he bribed. They are the
nation and if they accepted the new state
of affairs it would he an act of suicide.
This is why the leaders remain isolated.
When I enter a shop or go somewhere
I have never been before. when I pick up
a hitch-hiker, or when I hitch-hike mysetf.
whenever I get among people I do not
know. I have the great and rewarding
feeling that people think exactly the same
as I do. And once you get a little closer
to the people you ?ind they speak the same
language. I have the great advantage that
' my views are publicly known. sO that
people who know my name immediately
? start speaking with me quite openly and
? frankly. This was a new discovery three
years ago. I realized that for 20 years
people had not talked to me honestly. 1
, was flabbergatitld how many people had
rejected this regime from the very
beginning. Now I know.
? . If there are any anti-communist senti-
ments in this country they emanate in the
, first place from what official propaganda
calls the working class. There arc among
the workers, it is true, a few who for a
few thousand crowns are willing 10 per-
form heroic laboiirs. but the general
, situation is quite clear, If the Politburo
kncsv the rcal thoughts of the class
.....whose name it pretends to govern it would .
jump into the lake. Or, more likely, it does
know hut we shall have to throw it in the
? lake.
CPYRGHT
tilM1 gcr 171 dell tsfhtir;;',
'except in t c sense that the bureaucrats
arc always he last to sneak not and the
? first to sh 4 tip. Illit these people ,also
know the rids from their figur6 and
papers. anr they see the economic:roeSe.
hut of coit se it is better to spend the
winter neir Iv. stove 111111 to be sent, with
a shovel in is the fresh air.
The te,.! nological intelligentsia h
always oornsed the regime. The intql
?
gentsia of he liberal arts is a rig
newcomer it opposition: So all the re lent
? has got is the police. the officer corns.
the manapers and their deputies. the
proper seri nts of the dictatorsliiii. They
have to piy people even for joining
. parades an I waviac flare. Otherwise the
chief meths. d is fear. Here methods are
being improved. People arc shown hew
. large is the scale of things they should be
afraid of. Nervous tension must be kept
up. People ; re-led to feel there is nothing
they can be sure of. It starts with
children....
I listen ao the foreign broadcasts in
? Czech and I often feel that they do not
have any .:al idea what things are like
there. The) do not seem to realize the
enormous c imensions of this farce and
.how pearl: arc playing at Schweik. But
probably lb s has to be so. once you have
no direct contact.
I spent _three evenings writing this
?letter. I hopi it will arrive. ,
Vaclav Pravda
a Times Newspopen Lid 1972
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Nhy
IMMIIMIWWINNWOMPICOMP
PEKING'S STAKE IN EUROPE
Last October a Radio Prague commentary, denounced the visit
to France of Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Pai Hsiang-kuo as an
example of China's efforts to obstruct a pan-European detente.
According to Prague, the purpose of this visit (the first of
ministerial level to a West European country) was to foment
tensions in Europe which would "preoccupy the Soviet Union
politically and limit the influence of the peace policy of the
socialist countries." The broadcast also criticized China's
silence on the Berlin agreement (September 1971) and the Soviet
proposal for an all-European security conference. That this
commentary should have originated in Prague (rather than Moscow
which inspired it) was particularly appropriate, since the arrival
in Europe of a high level Chinese delegation was directly related
to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia three years before.
Until the end of the nineteen sixties, Peking's foreigninitiatives were concentrated on the under-developed countries of
Asia and Africa. Europe was not a priority area, although the
Chinese made some attempts to cultivate potential East European
dissidents following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1956.
By the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China had
close ties in East Europe only with Albania, while in West Europe
it had diplomatic relations with France, the U.K., the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries. It was also in the
process of developing commercial relations with West Germany.
The Cultural Revolution disrupted these initiatives. Peking's
excesses of this period strained relations with both East and
West Europe. (For example, the British Chancery in Peking was
sacked and burned 1111967.) China's stridently anti-Soviet
policies made it difficult for any of the Soviet bloc countries to
maintain close relations with Peking. And Tito was alienated by
Chinese diatribes against Yugoslav "revisionism." All China's
ambassadors in Europe were recalled at the time of the Cultural
Revolution.
Alarmed by Moscow's aggression (1968) against its fellow
"socialists" in Prague, as well as by the ideological formula
which Brezhnev developed to justify this action, China began to
adopt more realistic and flexible tactics in its foreign relations.
The objective was to counter any Soviet initiatives in Asia; however,
Peking was also concerned that the U.S. and the USSR would reach
an agreement regarding Europe. Therefore, the Chinese moved
quickly to improve their relations in Europe, giving particular
priority to those states which they thought were trying to resist
Soviet and U.S. hegemony.
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At the time of the Sino-Soviet border. talksand the renewal
of the Sino-U.S. meetings in Warsaw (1969), China's approach to
Europe became more active. The French were singled out for special
attention. Great Britain, for its part, was no longer portrayed
by Chinese media as a supine tool of Washington but, increasingly,
as an independent European state seeking to resist U.S. domination.
Peking lauded British efforts to join the Gammon Market and switched
its line on the European 'community to one of approval. (In early
1971 China inquired about establishing fOrmal relations with the
Common Market in Brussels.) It also became more circumspect in
its support to European Maoist groups.
Although West Germany is China's most important trading partner
on the continent, heither-has-Yet-agreed to estabiish-dipliailatic
relations'.'Nforeover, Peking has-continued to oppose --
the Soviet concept of a detente between the two Uermanys, as well
as Moscow's demands for a pan-European security conference (which
the Chinese interpret as an effort to break up West European unity
and expand Soviet influence). Peking is also appealing to East
Europe's anti-Soviet sentiments and its traditional fears of a
united German state.
In East Europe there were also indicative changes in China's
approach. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
when Moscow was threatening wayward Rumania with consequences
similar to those suffered by the comrades in Prague, China publicly
assured Rumania of its support and -- to make its point clear --
dispatched a high ranking Chinese official to Bucharest. Later,
in 1970, Peking signed an aid agreement with Rumania, its first
formal assistance to a Warsaw Pact country since 1957. During
this period, China also put an end to its attacks on Tito, signed
a ten-year trade agreement with Yugoslavia, and in 1970 cemented
the new relationship between the two countries by receiving a
high level Yugoslav delegation. (China has not agreed, however,
to restore party -- as opposed to state relations with Tito.) In
Albania, the Chinese continued their large scale military and
economic assistance program. Chinese efforts vis-a-vis the
Soviet bloc countries of East Europe (as opposed to Albania and the
independent-minded governments of Yugoslavia and Rumania), have
encountered strong Soviet opposition.
What are the basic reasons behind Peking's renewed efforts
vis-a-vis the advanced states of East and West Europe? Obviously,
the men who run China are not motivated by any altruistic concern
for the well-being of countries they regard as unsavory capitalist
or "revisionist" relics. First of all, there are sound economic
reasons: China has adMitted it needs access: to the advanced
industrial products and techniques of the West. Also, renewed
diplomatic and commercial contacts with Europe are helpful in all,
Peking
China's image as a responsible world power. Above all,
Peking would like to make sure that the USSR is confronted by a
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strong and indepenaent power on its western flank, since the more
Moscow is challenged from this quarter, the fewer resources it will
have to devote to the critical eastern frontier with China. Similarly,
if the United States has to shore up its position in Europe, it may
be obliged to curtail some of its Far Eastern activities which
China considers a threat. For these reasons, then, China is
encouraging both Europes to develop independently of the United
States and the USSR, and is discreetly taking advantage of a changing
situation to bring to bear its limited but growing influence.
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001?11001.011111?1111.011.4m May 1972
CUBA-USSR: REVOLUTION AT THE SUMMIT
Next month Fidel Castro goes to Moscow. It will not be an
easy trip for the no longer youthful dictator. Nineteen years of
"revolutionary" leadership have taken their toll. When Castro
and Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev sit down to review just
where Latin America stands today and what changes they have been
able to bring about in this portion of the globe, it would be
understandable if Castro felt a little discouraged. Great Changes
are shaking the area from Mexico to Tierra del Fuego. But where
can Castro point and say, "I caused this change?" Even more
discouraging must be the realization, if he can bring himself
to admit it, that Cuba's potential as a revolutionary catalyst
is diminishing with each passing year.
In a lesser man the impact of this realization might bring
with it a retrenchment, a lowering of sights. But Castro, as the
Soviets have long realized, is unique -- egotistical in the extreme.
His life style, as he showed in every phrase and gesture during
his three-week barnstorming tour of Chile late last year, is active
and aggressive, with wild swings in moods from depression to
ebullience. At the start of his visit to Chile Castro tried to
stay away from his usual revolutionary rhetoric and to give at
least indirect endorsement to the Soviet doctrine that a peace-
ful path to socialism can be found in some countries. Few believed
him. More typical were his reactions to the defeat of the leftist
front in Uruguay or the overthrow of the leftist regime of
Gen? Juan Torres in Bolivia: "Bourgeois institutions can never
reform themselves and the idea of a peaceful road to revolution
is a farce." Most recently Castro has been telling visitors to
Havana that he believes the days of his friend in Chile, President
Salvador Allende, are numbered since Allende has vacillated about
smashing his Christian Democratic opposition and their middle class
supporters.
Meanwhile, guerrilla movements that Castro has backed over
the years in :Bolivia,: Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and
Brazil have either been wiped out or reduced to mere nuisances by
the governments in power. And yet he :cannot face fact.7 It,
Venezuela, for instance, after four guerrillas were caught by
government forces in February of this year, their interrogation
revealed that they were part of a group of Venezuelans who had
been in Cuba since 1967 being trained in rural and urban guerrilla
warfare. They had recently been dispatched from Cuba with specific
instructions to form a nucleus around which other guerrilla groups
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could unite in Order to wage terrorism in the urban areas of Venezuela
in the period leading up to the 1973 elections.
For the Soviets Castro's guerrilla adventures are a nuisance
but not a serious threat to their strategic plans for Latin America.
They have succeeded in taming him to the point where he will
begrudgingly give vocal support to popular front tactics in some
areas. A second factor is that, for all the dimming of Castro's
luster, Brezhnev knows that he is still an_iMportant-inspiration
for Latin American revolutionary movements. In some instances
the Soviets probably see positive benefits to be gained by letting
Fidel play guerrilla. First, it. gives Moscow a counter to the
new threat they see from the Communist Chinese in Latin America.
Peking already has (or will soon have) representation in Chile,
Peru, Argentina, Guyana and Mexico. While the Chinese have
demonstrated: only the most correct behavior so far, the Soviets
must be anticipating that their strongest competitor for leadership
elsewhere in the Communist world might soon become involved in
subversive activity in Latin America. If, however, Cuba remains
the main source of training, arms, money and inspiration to the
guerrilla and urban terrorist movements of Latin America, the
Chinese will be to some extent pre-empted. Even though the Soviets
have expressed doubts about the wisdom of some of Castro's involve-
ments, they must be saying, "Better Fidel than Mao."
The essential difference between Castro and the Soviets when it
comes to guerrilla warfare seems to be mostly a question of timing.
The Soviets see the revolutionary process in a longer time frame.
They believe that precipitous violence, such as Che Guevara's fatal
escapade in Bolivia in 1967, can result in a strengthening of the
forces of "repression" and severe setbacks for the left.
Bolivia today is still a point of contention between Castro and
the Soviets. Their differences about it may figure in the upcoming
Mbscow talks, particularly in view of the Bolivian government's
ouster of a large number of Soviets during April. Those who know
Castro say he is absolutely determined to see a leftist regime take
power there through armed revolution, regardless of the cost in
time, money and manpower. They attribute his compulsion to see a
guerrilla movement succeed in Bolivia to his inability to admit
that he and Che Guevara were wrong when they chose that country
as the point from which to launch a continent-wide revolution.
The overthrow of the leftist regime of General Jose Torres in 1971
only enraged Castro further.
Bolivian exiles in Chile are now being marshaled by Castro
forces to try again for the goal that Guevara failed to reach --
to communize Bolivia. Five months ago they set up an "Armed
Revolutionary Front" (FRA) dedicated to the development of an
insurgent movement in Bolivia and the overthrow of the government
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of Col. Hugo Banzer Suarez in La Pat'. FRA is made up of a
conglomerate of radical groups including the Soviet-oriented
Communist Party of Bolivia, pro-Chinese Communists, Trotskyites,
and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The ELN is an organization
of Bolivian and other Latin American exiles directed, trained
and financed by Cuba -- and, if Bolivian suspicions are justified,
indirectly by the Soviet Union.
Cuban intermediaries between the Bolivian exiles and the
Chilean government work for the "Liberation Directorate" of the
Cuban Ministry of Interior. This is a new organization which
was broken out of the regular Cuban intelligence organization
about two years ago to work exclusively on exporting the Cuban
revolution. The head of this special group of Cuban Embassy
officials in Chile is Luis Fernandez Ona, husband of Allende's
favorite daughter, Beatrice. While personal relations between
Allende and Castro are very close, Allende has tried to maintain
a tight lid of security over both Cuba's involvement in Chilean
internal security and the efforts of Castro to use Chile as a
safe haven for guerrilla operations against neighboring countries.
Allende does, however, understand the strategic value of using
Chile as a base of operations against contiguous areas such as
Bolivia. The Chilean President was told by General Giap of Hanoi,
wham he met when visiting North Vietnam in 1969, that the reason
for Guevara's failure two years earlier was that he did not have
support bases in the countries around Bolivia to which to retreat
if hard pressed.
While Castro and Brezhnev may find that they do not agree on
supporting armed insurgency at the moment in Bolivia, they will have
less trouble when they discuss Guatemala and Colombia. The tactics
of the Soviets and Cubans towards these two countries run closely
parallel. Both countries are run by conservative governments, both
have had a history of violence over the years, and both now confront
guerrilla terroristmovements. The pro-Moscow Communist Parties
in Guatemala and Colombia are supporting guerrilla groups in the
countryside and terrorist units in the cities with money that is
received from Moscow as part of the regular stipend that each party
gets. The Soviets probably figure that, given the spe4a1 history
of violence in these countries, if they do not permit the local
Communist Parties to sponsor armed insurgents, they will lose most
of their appeal to the young and disaffected.
Cuba has long maintained its own guerrilla groups in these
countries -- the Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia and the Rebel
Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala. Most recently, the Cubans have
sent their own paramilitary personnel to work directly with the
Guatemalan FAR to resucitate from the blows being received from
the Arana government.
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Recent information gathered by the Guatemalan and Colombian
governments shows that the pro-Cuban and the pro-Moscow guerrillas
are meeting and planning strategy and tactics together, a little
suspicious of each other to be sure, but nonetheless overcoming
old hesitancies. These two countries, where violence is already
a way of life, may well be the best example of the concerted
Sovet-Cuban "liberation" warfare to which other Latin American
countries will be subjected in due course when "the masses have
matured politically,"
One sector in Latin America presents both opportunity and
possibly problems to Castro -- and to the Soviets behind him.
This is the social-minded, "progressive" military DOW in power,
as exemplified in Peru and Panama, and perhaps (if is early yet)
in Ecuador. The military junta in Peru and the hyper-nationalist
general Torrijos in Panama both are determined on reform and have
grudges against the United States -- to the point of strained
relations with that country. The nationalization of U.S. companies
in Peru's case and the colonial status of the Canal Zone in
Paftama's both have afforded Castro diplomatic openings to exploit-
CaStro has maintained quasi-diplomatic personnel in Peru as
"earthquake relief advisors" ever since the quake in 1971. He has
hopes that Ecuador's new military regime -- itself wrangling with
the U.S. over fishing rights -- will follow suit once Peru breaks
the logjam. Castro is maintaining close relations with Torrijos
in Panama and is advising him on the canal treaty negotiations
with the United States, These ties are prized in Panama as a
counter to U.S. weight. At the same time, none of the three
regions is pro-Soviet or pro-Castro in ideological or strategic
terms, To a degree they are partners of convenience because their
disputes with the United States offer common ground. Castro's
(and Brezhnev's) problem is how to play these issues to "lock in"
these regimes to their long-range purposes,
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BOHEMIA, Caracas
28 February 1972
CASTRO TAMED
By Fred Stokes
The constantly rising numbers of Russians in Cuba, occupying more
and more important positions, and always carrying their cameras and large
briefcases, is the most typical feature of Cuba's existence. They dine in
special places; they make purchases in special shops; they travel in spe-
cial vehicles; and they hold special positions. According to the most con-
servative estimates, there are some 5,000 Russians there; perhaps as many
as 12,000, if one counts the military personnel.
This penetration, though nothing new, has become especially inten-
sive during the past 6 months, coinciding with the presence, in Cuba, of
a group of special envoys and delegations assigned to discuss with Castro
the specific terms for the continuation of the trade pact with the U.S.S.R.
Forced by the failure of Castro's attempts to industrialize the coun-
try to depend exclusively on the sugar industry, Cuba is now completely
under the control of the U.S.S.R. Two years ago, the Soviet diplomat, Ru-
dolf Shiliapnikov, who now resides in Caracas, was assigned to threaten
Castro with the total stoppage of petroleum supplies from Baku, Which would
have paralyzed Cuba's sugar industry if Castro had not agreed to a certain
amount of Soviet control over the country's administration. See, for exam-
ple, page 1475 of Hugh Thomas' book entitled, Cuba, the Pursuit of Freedom.
Since that time, the Russians have been exerting increasing amounts of pres-
sure, with the support of Kosygin who, for several years, has been known
in Cuba as "the man who insists upon collecting," a phrase that Castro him-
self let slip out in the presence of foreign journalists.
In everyday life, the increasing pressure to control Castro is felt
in the harsh antipathy that now prevails in Cuban-Soviet relations which,
up until a few years ago, were cordial. At first, when there were only a
few volunteer Soviet advisers, a wave of sympathy arose; but now that they
are being sent to control and direct, the Soviets have become increasingly
bureaucratic. They are almost not on speaking terms with the Cubans, who
react with sullen disdain. Even the military advisers live totally apart
from Cuban officialdom.
Elimination of Castroites
Soviet pressure on domestic political affairs has taken the form of
constant elimination of Castro's cronies, who are gradually occupying posi-
tions of lesser practical importance. Men such as Armando Hart and Faustino
Perez Almeida have been removed from positions that bore some direct rela-
tionship to production and administration, and have been assigned as figure-
heads on the Central Committee. The Soviets' confidence has turned exclusive-
ly in the direction of the technocrats trained in the U.S.S.R., who are spe-
cialists of humble origins who returned from their study grants with the
habit of obeying the Russians. Their confidence has also been directed to-
ward Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul Castro or Sergio del Valle, who enjoy a
certain amount of trust on the part of Moscow, in high-ranking positions.
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damaged Moscow's good relations with Dorticos. The latter, who at one time
was the favorite of the Soviets, chose to remain loyal to Castro at the
time of the friction between the two governments. The consequences are that
he has lost the complete confidence of the new owner of Cuba's sugar indus-
try, Kosygin.
The presence of the Soviets in the economy and in intermediate posi-
tions is even more evident. Since Kosygin's second visit and the ratifica-
tion of the trade agreement between Cuba and the U.S.S.R., all the nation's
administrative posts now have their built-in "Russian." All the sugar re-
fineries have a Soviet administrative expert controlling their expenditures.
Daring January 1972 alone, four key Soviet missions, headed by General Ni-
kolay Shchelokov, the U.S.S.R.'s Minister of Internal Affairs, and, an-
other, by Andrey Kirilenko, from the Central Committee's Political Bureau,
toured Cuba to ascertain the efficacy of these controls. The other two
delegations were headed by the Central Committee's Deputy Chief of Propa-
ganda, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, and Lieutenant General Leonid Batrushevich,
from the political directorate of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.
Following these visits, which checked the efficiency of Soviet pen-
etration into all areas (the economy, education and the Army), a veritable
wave of high-ranking experts practically took over the Cuban Central Plan-
ning Junta, the National Bank and the Ministry of the Sugar Industry. And,
simultaneously, a series of agreements on technical cooperation which had
been suspended for several months, were signed, with additional changes, and
went into effect.
It is difficult to determine to what extent the Soviet pressure will
succeed in subduing Castro, in whose view the Russians hold only a secondary
figurehead status, without any real authority, but who has kept the support
of his own internationally advertised image that is practically impossible
to tarnish without a collapse of the regime.
Rise of the Pro-Soviets
However, the Russians are even taking an active part in the affairs
of internal repression, protecting their own, and eliminating those who are
opposed to Soviet influence. For example, there are specific reports that,
during Castrola visit to Chile, over 50 individuals who had been arrested
in connection with the case of the pro-Soviet "micro-faction," headed by
Anibal Escalante, were released as a result of pressure from the Russians
and orders from Raul Castro himself. These men, the "Anibalistas" of the
so-called micro-faction, had been given long sentences of forced labor; and
the principal charge was that they were "pro-Russian." All, or nearly all
of them were old Communist militants who, faced with the choice of obeying
Castro or the Russians, had decided in favor of the latter. Two years ago,
Castro could have repressed and imprisoned them. Their release and return
to industries and positions is like the amen of an about-face that Castro
cannot prevent.
Those fond of impressive talk see in all this an act of submission
by Castro to Moscow; but, in fact, all that is involved is acceptance of
the fact of the failure of Cuba's economy. Che Guevara, opposing Castro,
maintained that Cuba must be industrialized, at any cost. However, the
inefficiency of the regime, Castro's madness and the paltriness of Soviet
aid brought the industrialization effort to disaster. It has, by now, been
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Appritated offdRild044f0 9-g9h49A2t:oCI&WF.12411,1 90(E, Viandlst ry .
At the start of the revolution, Camila Cienblegos? who foresaw the problems
involved in drastic change, tn;ed to defend the theory of a democratic re-
volution that would not break off relations with the rest of. the continent;
but Camilo died under mysterious circumstances.
The result is that, 13 years after his rise to power, Castro is de-
upon sugar, just as 411 Cuban rulers in, the past had to depend on
it to support the country. Hence, the fruit of these 13 years has been
just a change in masters. Many Cubans are of the opinion that the only
thing which makes the new master different is that, not only is he poorer,
but more gloomy and aloof.
Thirteen years of hard work, a million exiles, the loss of tobacco
markets, the disappearance of tourism and the increased political repres-
sion seem toohigh a price to pay for such an insignificant and disadvanta-
geous change. But no amount of pondering can now prevent more and more
Russians from arriving in Cuba each day, aimed at preventing further waste
and at controlling the economy, education and the Army on what Castro, but
a short time ago, loudly proclaimed "free territory of America."
Meanwhile, the Russians have assigned Castro the role of sales agent
in Latin America. A completely tamed Castro, who continues to play the
guerrilla fighter inside Cuba, but who works in Latin America as Moscow's
errand-boy, with the sole purpose of expanding the U.S.S.R.'s trade rela-
tions, and of destroying the Communist groups that are pro-Chinese, inde-
pendent, or suspected of hostility toward the U.S.S. R.
BOHEMIA, Caracas
28 February 1972
C PYRG HT
Mosce ha sometido el "co-
munismo nacional", regi-
menta cada paso de la po-
litica y la economia cuba-
nas y ha reducido a Castrt
at papel de jefe de yentas
en America Latina.
Por Fred Stokes
1 ti constante aumento de rusos
dentro de Cuba quk ocuurvet
y ms cargos impf3/4P0154
siempre con sus cameras
CPYRGHT
totograficas y sus grandes
portafolios, es el signo mas
caracteristico de la vide cubana.
Comen en lugares especiales,
compran en tiendas especiales,
vlajan en vehlculos especiales?
y ocupan cargos especiales. Hay
en el orden de cinco mil rusos
segOn los calculos m?
prudentes. Tal vez doce mll,
si se incluye a los mIlltares.
netraci6n, aunque no es
atinn Mr 2
Esa
reciNts.
F fikEntffi
semesti
e, y ha coincldido con la
presencia en Cuba de una serie
de envlados y delegaciones
especiales, cuya mision ha sido
discutir con Castro las
condiciones especificas para la
continuaciOn del tratado
comercial con la URSS.
Condenada por el fracaso de
los Intentos castristas de
administraclan del pals. Ver, por
industriallzar el pals, a depender
excluslvamente del azikar, Cuba .ejemplo, p. 1475 on el libro de
este ahora totalm Hugh Thomas, "Cuba, The
m '. Desde
: % 6J749P cYsaovie4tico???"/414664114?
s, 1 plomati presionando mas y m? apoyadOs
a han Ido
Rudolf ShIllapnlkov. ahnra nor Kneigyr Gite-n doode ka...e
3 .
1 residente en Caracas, tue el
encargado de amenazar a Castro
con el cierre total de los
suministros de petroleo de Baku,
wet hubiera paralizado la
Industrie azucarera cubana, si
Castro no aceptaba un cierto
control sovIetico de la
?
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varios anos, es conocido en
Cuba como "el hombre que
insiste en cobrar", segOn f rase
lue.una vez deje escaper el
)ropio Castro ante
)eriodistas extranjeros.
En la vide corriente, se siente
presiOn creciente por conholar,
4 Castro n troves de la ruda
Antipatia que rige ahora as _
relaciones entre cubanos y
sovitticos, clue hace unos ems
eran cordiales. Al principle,
cuando los asesoret sovieticos
eran pocos y voluntaries, surgio
Jna corriente de simpatia. Perci
ahora, enviados para control&
y dirlgir, los sovietices se han
vuelto m?y mas burocraticos. ?
Cast no hablan con los cubanos
y estos les pagan con un hosco
desprecio. Inclusive los asesores
militares viven totalmente
aparticlos de la ?
oficialidad cubana.
ELIMINACION DE CASTR1STAS
En la Vida politica interna, la
presiOn sovietica ha tornado la
forma de una constante
eliminaclifin de los amigos de
confianza de Castro, que cada
da ocupan puestos de menor
importancla practice. Hombres
como Armando Hart, Faustino
Perez, Almeida, han sido
separados de los cargos que
tenian alguna relacien directa
con la eroducciOn o la
administracien, y asignados a
puestos figurativos en el Comite
Central. La confianza de los
sovieticos se ha oriented?
exclusivamente hacla los
tecnOcratas formados en la
URSS, especialistas de origen
humilde que volvieron de sus
becas con el habit? de obedecef
a los rusos. Y tambien hacia
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul '
Castro o Sergio del Valle, que
en los altos niveles gozan de
clerta confianza por
parte de Moscii.
La preferencia de la URSS por
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez ha .
golpeado tamblen a la buena
relaclon de Mont) con Dorticos.
Este, que en un tiempo era el
favorite de los sovieticos,
prefiriO mantenerse f lel a Castro
durante Is fricciones entre
ambos gobiernos. El resultado
es 'que ha perdido toda la con?
fianza del nueVo propietario
del azOcar cubano, Kosigyn.
En la economfa y los puestos
intermedlos, la presencia
sovletica es todavia m?nofable.
A partir de la segunda visite
de Kosigyn y de la ratificacien
del acuerdo comercial entre
Cuba y la URSS, todos los
puestos administrativos del pais
tienen ahora su "ruso'
incrusted?. Todos los centrales
azucareros tienen su experto
sovietico en administracien
Ilevando el control de los gastos.
Selo en enero cje 1972. cuatro
miaiones sovieticas de
lmportancia, encabezadas por el:
General Nikolai Shchelokov,
Ministro de Asuntos 1nteriores
de la URSS y otra por Andrei
Kirilenko, del Bur6 Politico del
CC, recorrleron Cuba pare
comprobar la el icacia de esos
controles. Las otras dos
delegaciones fueron encabezadas
por el Diputado Jefe de
Propaganda del CC, Yurl
Aleksandrovitch, y por el
Teniente General Leonid'
Batrushevitch, del directorio
politico de las Fuerzas
Armadas de la URSS.
Posteriormente a esas visitaa,
que controlaron la eficiencia
de la penetracien sovietica en
?todos los reng ones ?la
economia, la educaci6n
y el ejercito? una
verdadera oleada de tecnicos
de alto nivel ocupO practicamente
la Junta Central de PlanificaciOn
de Cuba, el Banco Nactonal y,
et Ministerio de la Industrie
Azucarera. Y simultaneamente,
una serie de acuerdos de
cooperaciOn tecnica que Ilevaban
varios meses suspendidos,
fueron firmados con nuevas
modifIcaciopes y
I comenzaron a funcionar.
Es dificil determiner hasta que
Punto la presion sovietica poara
doblegar a Castro, pare qulen ?
los rusos sOlo reservan un papel
secundario de figuritin sin
autoridad real, pero que
conserve el respaldo de su
propia imagen internacionalmente
divulgada y practicamente
imposible de clesvIrtuar sin que
el regimen sufra un colapso.
AUGE DE LOS PRO SOVIETICOS
Pero inclusive en los asuntos
de la represion Interior, los
rusos estan participando
activamente, protegiendo a los
suyos y elimlnando a los qua
se resisten a la influencia
sovietica. Por ejemplo, hay
noticias concretes de que,
durante la visite de Castro a.
Chile, m?de cincuenta
detenidos por el caso de la
"micro faccion" pro-sovietica,
que encabezaba Anibal Escalante
fueron liberados por presIones
rusas y Ordenes del propio Ratil
Castro. Estos hombres, los
"anibalistas" de la Ilamada
micro-facciOn, habian sido
condenados a largas penas con
trabajo forzadocy la acusaciOn
principal era la de "pro-rusos'.
Todos, o casi todos, eran viejos
militantes comunistas que ante
la alternative de obedecer a
Castro o a los rusos, se habian
decidido por lo segundo. Hace
dos arms, Castro pude
dominarlos y encarcelarlos. Su
liberacion y retorno a as
industries y cargos, es como el
signo de un viraje que Castro
no puede impedir.
Los partidatios de as grandes
palabras senoras, ven en todo
esto un acto de sumisiOn de
Castro a MoscO, pero en la
practice, se trate sOlo de la
aceptacien del hecho del fracas?
de la economia cubana. Frente
a Castro, el Che Guevara, sostuvo
la necesidad de industrializar
a Cuba contra toda dificultad,
pero la ineficiencla del regimen,
las locuras de Castro y la
mezquindad de la ayuda
sovietIca, condujeron al esfuerzo
industrializador al desastre. Hoy
est a ya abandonado y Cuba ha
vuelto a la dependencia del
azticar. Al principio de la
revolucion, Camilo Cienfuegos /
que preveia las dificultades de
un viraje excesivo, intente
defender la tesis de una
revolucien democratica, que no
rompiera con el resto del
Continente, pero Camilo murio
en circunstancias misteriosas.
El resultado es que, a los trece
ems de su Ilegada al poder,
Castro depende del azOcar,
igual como en el pasado todos
los gobernantes cubanos
dependieron pare mantener el
pais. El fruto de esos trece
arms ha sido, pues, sara un
cambio de duerio. Muchos
cubanos piensan. que lo Unica
que distingue al nuevo amo es
que no sOlo es m?pobre,
sino que es tambien
mucho m?hosco y lejano.
Trece afios de duro trabajo,
un miller] de exilados, la perdida
de los mercados pare el tabaco,
la desaparicion del turismo, la
creciente represiOn politica,
parecen un precio demasiado
&to para un cambio tan
Insignificante y desventajoso.
Pero ya ninguna reflexiOn puede
impedir que, dia a die, m?
y mas ruses Ileguen a Cuba
destinados a impedir nuevos
derroches y a controlar la
economfa, la educacien y of
ejercito de lo que hasta hace
poco, ruidosamente, Castro.
Ilamaba "territorio ?
fibre de America".
Mientras tanto, los rusos
destinan a Castro el papel de
agente vendedor en Latino-
america. Todo un Castro
domesticado, que dentro de
Cuba sigue presumiendo de
guerrillero, pero en
latinoarnerica trabaja como
mensajero de Moscti en el
proposito exclusivo de expandlr
las relaciones comerciales de
la URSS y destruIr a los grupos
comunIstas pro-chinos,
independientes o sospechosos
de antipatia frente a la URSS.
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CPYRGHI?PProved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6
NEW YORK TINES CPYRGHT
28 January 1972
Cuba's Treasury Remains in Moscow
By GEORGE VOLSKY
MIAMI?"It is more di 'ft-
cult to govern man to WI ge
guerrilla warfare," Prem.er
Fidel Castro of Cuba
marked
-
marked last month.
The remark pointed up the
extent to which the former
guerrilla leader is bedeviled
by the task of govern!' g,
which in Communist Cusa
Means directing the countr7's
economy.
The 1971 performance of
the sugar-dominated economy
of the island must have been
disappointing to Mr. Castro,
who recently suggested that
prospects for an economic
improvement this year we .e
not very bright.
As a result, Cuba's depen f-
ence on Soviet aid?estimated
at $750-million a year, et
more than $2-million a day?
became greater than ever.
"Without [Soviet] fuel, raw
Materials, equipment, mach's-
ery and factories Cuba cou4
not fimction," the Economics
muusuer, t-anos iterate }wart-
guez, said last April.
Thus the size of Soviet aid,
negc tinted annually in trade
talks in Moscow, has become
as important to Havana as the
volume of the country's
prodiction
Last year, Cuba registered
sorra gains in the industrial
sect( r add in fishing, and
continued to invest heavily
in expanding output.
But agricultural production
declined. Intensive efforts to
revitalize the sagging produc-
tion of rice, coffee, tobacco,
cattle and fruit proved unre-
ward ng. Strict rationing of
food and consumer goods
conti wed, and on a few items
it had to be tightened.
More important, the 1971
sugar output of 5.9 million
tons was a million tons be-
low tie target, and Mr. Castto
predit ted that 1972- produc-
tion would be even lower.
We stern experts believe
that Cuba will produce 5 mil-
lion bin of sugar this year.
A rent Soviet purchase of
')Cs2 Qt 0 tens of Brazill
sugar was regarded as an in-
dication of Moscow's concern
that Havana might find it
difficult to fulfill its sugar
export commitments.
Sugar is, and according to
Mr. Castro for many years
will be, the basis of the Cu-
ban economy. It represents
about 85 per cent of the
country's exports, with nickel
accounting for 10 per cent
and tobacco 3 per cent.
Because of declining ex-
ports and growing domestic
needs, Cuba's annual trade
deficits have been steadily
rising, especially her imbal-
ance with the Soviet Union,
which provides 60 per cent
of the island's imports.
United States economists
estimate that Cuban exports
in 1971 totaled $1,4-billion,
of which $840-million came
from the Soviet Union, $200-
million from other Communist
countries and $360-millions,
from non-Communist nations.
According to. these esti-,
AL vI ts
tyn to Sor- tne e."7
million in economic aid, the
Soviet Union last year sup-
plied Cuba with $240-million
in military and other assist-
ance. In all, Cuba is believed
to owe the Soviet Union $4-
billion, a debt that Moscow
cannot realistically hope to
collect.
While a shortage of trained ?
personnel along with govern-
mental inefficiency has ad- ?
versely affected production,
the main economic problem
seems to be the apparent
apathy of Cuban workers and
peasants, who do not respond
with the required enthusiasm
to constant governmental ex-
hortations for harder work,
Last year, which Mr. Castro
called "the year of produc-
tivity," a campaign was
ordered against what he de-
scribed as "laziness, loafing,
disloyalty, parasitism, selfish-
nes, and bourgeois mental-
ity."
At the year's end, a Cuban
radio commentator reported
that despite the shortage of
manpower "loafers are on
.CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
19 February 1972
Biossat
Cuba in the red ink -
CPYRGHT
Firm reports from the island say malinger-
ing and job absenteeism are worse than in any
Iron Curtain country. Castro is searching rath-
er desperately for non-material incentives to
spur more and better work.
There is no sign these are broadly effective,
and Cuba now applies a two-year jail term to
hose convicted of "vagrancy," which includes
hat the regime deems to be avoidable unern-
loyment.
The government's control over the Cuban
ork force is both rigid and sweeping. Identifi-
ation cards are required of workers. Chronic
lackers may find themselves in Castro's "cor-
ective rehabilitation" camps.
CUBA'S Fidel Castro may
log some priceless tube time
when he plays basketball in
Chile, but it doesn't do all that
much to refurbish his tar-
nished image. His ?big nega-
tive in most Latin lands is
Cuba's terrible economic flop.
His country's total indebted-
ness to the Soviet Union is in
the range of $3 billion, with
upward of $300 million owed
to other communist nations. Th q red ink grows
every year.
0
OfHING so pointedly revealed Cuba's eco-
omic shortcomings as Fidel'S all-out 1970 ef-
Ort to reach the long-promised goal of 10 mil-
ion tons of sugar cane output per year.
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His hard lunge for the goal came after years
of failure. In the attempt, he pulled thousands
of Cubans away from other jobs into the cane
fields, thereby seriously disrupting the entire
economy. And even then he didn't make it.
Production in 1970 was just 8.5 million tons.
Thereafter, output slid back toward 5 million
tons and the newest harvest may well fall be-
low that.
To get just that much, Castro has to rely on
manpower from the strong Cuban armed
forces for 15 per cent of the year's harvest. ?
His moves to industrialize quickly have
drawn people from the cane fields. Still, they.
lack the training and skills for the new work?
not to mention incentives. He is also short of '
management talent, not least because of the
exodus of 250,000 Cubans from the island to the
United States in recent years.
? ? ?
WHAT all this adds up to is an economy-
essentially stagnant since Castro took power in
1959. Cuba's annual population growth has
been averaging around 2 per cent, despite the
outflow. Economic development has not offset
,this growth, Measured in real terms (correct-
ed for inflation), the country's gross national
produce ? on a per capita basis ? declined 9
per cent from 1958 thru 1970.
For contrast, a study of 18 major Latin
American lands shows that their real per capi-
ta GNP shot up by 24 per cent from 1900 to
1970.
Maybe all this will change one day. Cuba
has poured large sums into capital investment.
Roads, electric power facilities, and other "in-
fra-structure" elements of the economy have'
been markedly improved.
But, again, American specialists looking at
this effort do not find it being translated into
significantly higher output. There are count-
less Soviet advisers and technicians on the is-
land, but they do not appear to compensate for
the out-migration of qualified Cubans.
Even Castro sees no real upturn until 1975.
Against this gray backdrop, he's no hero in
most Latin lands. Says the same official in
summary: "The Latins are not impressed.
And Cuba is certainly no model in their eyes."
,
CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON POST
13 February 1972
CPYRGHT
Cuban Housing Cheap, Scarce
No Buying
Is Allowed,
Only Trading
By Marlise Simons
thsecial to The Washineton Post
HAVANA ? "Under the
trees-. on me rase? aei
Prado is the casual address
of a vital Havana institu-
tion: the open-air housing
exchange. Every morning
scores of men and women
mill around in the shade by
the warty treetrunks along
the avenue, some pinning up
notices, others reading them
eagerly.
Officially, the Havana
Housing Exchange is behind
Impersonal office walls
nearby, but since Cuban
newSpaners carry no adver-
tising, "under the trees" has
become a classified ads sec-
tion.
"We have only two chil-
dren," one neatly typewrit-
ten message reports. "Will
exchange house with patio
for apartment In the center.
Must have bath." Another
Approved F
hand-scrawled note in red
ink says: "Urgent. Offer
apartment with view of the
bay for house in West Ha-
vana. You can only see me
on Sunnays."
When parties come to an
agreement, the exchange of-
fice must come into the pic-
ture to formalize the deal,
which it does free of charge.
In feet, an exchange of
this sort is all that house
owners or tenants can do in
Cuba, since the buying or' s
selling of real estate ended
with the Urban Reform
No one, according to
th s law, may own more
than one residence, and no
ore need pay more than 10
per cent of his salary in
re It. After 10 years of pay.
1n, rent, a tenant becomes"
th_s owner of the property,
which, of course, he can
oily exchange, a local offi-
cii 1 explained.
Desmie the post-revolu-
ti confiscations and the
di ;tribul ion of the I hott-
saiads el homes vacated by
the masqive exodus of refit-
Havana, the beautiful cap-
ital which Premier Fidel
Castro has often called too
large and too costly for
Cuba, bears the brunt of the
shortage. Most of the spa-
eious emigrant homes have
been turned into schools,i
kindergartens and boarding
houses for high school and
university students,
The high-rise apartments,
.,built shortly after the Cas-
tro takeover, went to the
homeless and the squatters
who traditionally ring Latin
cities, Since then, building
has been reserved or the
countryside.
But even in the country as
a whole, the housing proj-
ects of the revolution have
been few, compared to the
population increase of 1.5
million. Yet in the last few
months since Castro an-
nounced the formation of
"microbrigades" and the
new national target of
"building 100,000 homes per
year," there are signs of a
drastic change.
Some weeks ago,
"Granma." the official daily
of the Communist Party,
counted 274 apartment
buildings going up at the
hands of mierobrigacies in ?
Havana province alone.
These brigades are construe- .
tion teams made up of fac-
tory workers who take time
off from their ordinary jobs.
A factory receives suitable
land and building materials,
Its brigades go off and build ?
the homes needed by its em-
ployees.
The advantage of such teams,
according to Castro, is that
construction workers need not
be taken away from such In-
dispensable projects as dams,
roads, hospitals and agricul-
tural warchoescs. The plan is
workahte, Castro told a meet-
ing of union leaders, since a
government study has shown
thati toe majority of Cuba's
factories are overstaffed. .
Foreign observers have dis-
missed the ambitious honsing
goes, Cuba's housing shor- 'program as another Castro im-
tage Is suu very serious. e
?
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nnot be ef-,
CPYRGHT
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fieiently carrier out _because
of its size and the use of un-,
trained personnel. Yet, at the
moment, apartment building
is moving ahead full steam,
In Alamar, a construction
? site some 15 miles outside Ha-
vana, the. improvised micro
? brigades seemed no different
, from professional hard hats.
Huge Russian trucks loaded
with sand wet e eriven about
with great dexterity. and roof-
top workers Joolsed steady de-
spite the breeze coming off
the Caribbean only a few
hundred yards away.
Now 66 Days
The 18 apartment blocks,
four floors each, were in dif-
ferent stages of completion
.and the roads were finished.
"Luckily, these brigades
learned very' quickly," said
Emigclio Diaz, the 30-year old
building coordinator. "The
first blocks took more than 80
days, Mit now we ere reaching
the fourth fIcY.r 'in 66 days,"
The 000 i-nen- and- wome-n
at work in Ammar are divided
into brigades of 30, supervised -
by trained builders and archi-
tects. "We have all kinds of1
people here, except for astro-
nauts," said an official as he
led the way into a workshop
were men were soldering
pipes.
Andres Regera, in blue over-
all and cover^d with soot, said
he ordinarily worked as an ad-
ministrator in r Havana fac-
tory. He gets the same salary
here as he d'd behind his
desk, and his job is kept for
him until he Jets back. In the
meantime his office colleages
have to do his share of the
work.
Regera does not know
whe(lwr he or other members
of his brigade will be living in
Alamar. "When the apart-
ments are finished they be;
come property of the facto-i
ries," he explained, "and the,
workets' asse-uhly will decide
who gets them, depending on
individual neer s and men sQ20.
The first farwlies are sup-
posed to start moving in this
month. Monthly rent, irrespec-
tive of the size of the apart-
ment, will be ti pet cent of the
tenant's salary. An additional
4 per cent of his salary will
pay of the fin niture, which
comes with the apartment, in-
cluding refrigetator and tele-
vision set. Eventually he will
own the furniture, most of
which ts built in the Alamar
carpentry shoo.
Neighbor Upkeep
When all of the 336 apart-
ments have been handed over,
neighborhood committees will
be responsible for their up-
keep. 'With workers having
made such a great effort them-,
selves, we expect- that the
neighborhood will be well
looked after," said supervisor
Diaz.
"We do not want a repetition
of what happened in East Ha-
vana, the new suburb built
after the revolution. There the
0170001-6
people were given their homes
for free, without any effort on
their 'tart. so they let .t.he
place crumble,"
But for t he timete*Inv. ,
Diaz's problems are to get sup.
plies hi finkti the building,
Most n Ater ;all arrive without
trouble though there are ex-
ceptions "like steel parts ?
tubes and sockets --that fiavc
to come all the way from I9ast _
ern Europe."
Food supplies for the work
emace also ent by the gov :
ernment in tfavana. However.
Diaz explaineo. Alamar it
finding its own solutions. "Wc
have made a deal with the
fisherman of Cojimar. We con-
struct them a voiding, an
they supply us with fish."
"But I'm no,. so sure now
who *ins the better deal,'
laughed Diaz 'There has beer :
quite a bit of northern winc
lately and wren the nortt
blows you can btiild, but yot
can't ge fishing,"
CPYRGHT WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
25 January 1972
CUBA DIARY:
CPYRGHT
Havana stores are nearly empt)
- Mr. Bo-how is the second accredited
American journalist ? and the first
news service representative--to report
from Cuba in nearly two years.
By IRA BERKOW
(Copyright gi 1972 by Newspaper Enterprise Am)
HAVANA ? In a large department store Ir
downtown Havana, a "saleslady" leans va.
cantly on a glass case that is empty except fat
one .pair of perfoiated black men's shoes. Or
the second shelf there is one box wrapped It
colorful paper and a blue ribbon. There ar(
rows and rows of such stark glass cases. ThE
shelves are also almost empty. Few custom.
ers. You can hear their footsteps.
"We have money now in Cuba," she says
"But we have very little goods to buy."
With a few exceptions, only necessities art
sold. Almost everything in Cuba, from cigar:
to shoe laces, is rationed. A copybook It
needed for every purchase. I tried to buy t
pair of socks and found that a foreign visitoi
can buy limited goods only at one of two
stores (in hotels) in Havana. The buying popu
lation of Havana Is split into groups, with one
group able to make purchases on given clays
SOME APPLIANCES
There are appliances In a corner of the
store. East German-made radios, Soviet refrig-
erators and television sets. One television set
sells for 750 pesos ($750 ? the U.S. exchange
is "par").
Yet only_a privileged few can buy these rare
Items: They are the people who have worked
7well and herd and long, have done much vol-
unteer work in the sugar cane fields, for ex-
ample, aric . in a meeting of their fellow work-
ers and eft zens, are chosen as worthy enough
to buy the luxury items.
For othe .s there is a stiff black market. "To
buy a 1949 Westinghouse freezer," says a
woman who had lived in New York for two
years in tie early 1950s, "it will cost about
13,000 peso t. A 1958 Ford, 35,000 pesos."
On the rarrow street there are a goodly
number of cars, tho there are no traffic jams.
Autos are neither made nor sold in Cuba. Offi-
cials usual y get ears from Russia, tho Castro
himself, has a chauffeur-driven 1970 Alfa-Ro-
meo, Mos cars In Cuba are Detroit-made
from the 950s. Chevys, Fords, Oldsmobiles,
even an Edsel, are common; often the chrome
Is off1 the paint jobs are ancient.
HEIRLOOM AUTOS
"But they run," says one owner of a 19!
faded-blue Plymouth. "I got mine from tr
father. I take care of it very, very carefully.
is like the baby in our family."
It is lunchtime, I stop In a store that wit
once a Woolworth's. The sign above the fro,
door is 'still up, but looks shabby without ti
embossed lettering. It is called "El Ten Cent
The line is long. I wait 30 minutes before heir
seated. No menu. Everyone eats the san
thing. Today: A simple roll, a soapy crew
soup, a slab of a white fish topped with heav
cream, a hard red piece of chicken, rice pu
ding, a small cup of dark sweet coffee.
"No other choices?" I ask a workingmt
seated on the stool beside me.
"No," he says. I ask him if that doesr
bother him.
"No, no," he says, surprised at my questio
Then proudly: "El Ten Cent has the best foc
around here."
NOT LIKE SEARS
The man once lived in Miami, he says. I a!
him how he has adjusted to the scarcity
goods and choices in Cuba.
"It was hard at first," he replies. "1 mea
a dcpartenint ..tehe Kr,. Is not like Stara ax
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fPYRGHT
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Roebuck In the States. But you get used to it
And you are suffering now for your, country.
We know that.
"We do not have the consumer mentality
here like you do in North America. We know
that we cannot have the luxuries we like today
because we must export clothes and food to
import industrial and farm equipment. We
look to tomorrow. Tomorrow will be better.
We are in a revolution. A revolution takes
time. Some of us have less luxuries than be-
fore the revolution, but at least now we know
that there are no more starving children with
big bellies filled with parasites, that there are
no beggars in the streets, that everyone in the
country is guaranteed work."
SOME THINGS FREE
He tells me that schools are free, phone
calls are free, medicine Is free, that buses
cost only five cents.
It has been 12 years since Castro took over..
How long will people endure the lack of goods?
. "As long as it takes," he says. "You first
stop being, before you stop being a revolution-
ary."
Two blocks away, there Is a neon sign above
tall building facing a broad, tree-lined street.
The sign reads, "You first stop being, before
you stop being a revolutionary." (Fidel says it
often, I learn.)
I walk thru the neighborhood streets In the
Veda-do section. On every block there is a
shingle in front of one house. It reads: "Com-
Mittee Mr the Defense of the Revolution." The
"committee" is a kind of vigilante group com-
posed of block neighbors. Blocks are part of
zones. The committees, organized by the Com-
munist Party, perform such tasks as providing
two neighbors each einghi_m.,, 0.14..womee.
? to patrol the streets, watching out for van-
dalism or fires or thieves.
CLEAN HOUSES
"Cubans are becoming some of the best
says one man.
" n it
comes my turn to patrol, I sit around ith
another guy and shoot the baloney. It' like
the volunteer workers in the sugar cane fds.
People from the city are asked to fro retaYbe
once a month to the country to help. May b) all
day one person cuts eight sugar canes and
eats six."
I notice the houses. At first glance, they are
shabby and peeling. But they are also neat
And clean and orderly. Carelessness is costly,
a luxury.
. "We must be demanding," Castro has told
crowds. "It is neither right nor correct to al-
low a pig to be raised in a bathtub in the City
of Havana."
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Excerpts from article by Tran Quoc Hoan, North Vietnamese minister
of public security, reviewing the carrying out of the party line against
I'counterrevolution" in North Vietnam:
HOC TAP No. 3
March'1972
During the past 40 years...our people have struggled and achieved great
successes in the great Vietnamese revolutionary struggle, opening the finest
era for our nation.
...During the period when the party struggled for power, the French and
Japanese imperialists resorted to many wicked, cunning and ruthless tricks
to destroy our party and quell the revolutionary movement. To protect the
party and revolutionary bases, the party led the masses in struggling
against secret agents, informers and other reactionary lackeys, incessantly
checked and eliminated from the party ranks the "AB" elements (Footnote:
"AB" is short for anti-Bolsheviks who disguised themselves as communists and
were organized by the French imperialists as fifth columnists to undermine
our party) and continually educated cadres, party members and revolutionary
bases fo firmly maintain revolutionary pride and preserve revolutionary
secrets. As a result, the party and revolutionary movement were increasingly
consolidated and developed and won one victory after another.
In the August 1945 general uprising, faced with the enormous offensive
strength of the revolution, the reactionary forces were caught off guard.
Driven into a:passive position they declined quickly. Under party leader-
ship the revolutionary masses ruthlessly repressed stubborn reactionaries
and elements owing blood debts to the people, but were lenient toward those
who went astray and sincerely repented...
After power was won our people were faced with the danger of having an
enemy within and without, with the responsibility of coping with many enemies
at the same time and with the extremely difficult situation of a newly
established administration. But...our people's struggle against counter-
revolution completely frustrated all of the enemy's sinister and wicked
schemes and overcame a number of great obstacles as the people entered
the protracted resistance struggle against the aggressive French colonialists.
In nearly 9 years of resistance against the aggressive French colonialists
our people's struggle against counterrevolutionary elements occurred in all
domains--military, political and economic--in all strategic urban, rural and
mountain areas. Illuminated by the correct party line, the struggle against
counterrevolution recorded great successes in protecting the party, the
revolutionary administration, the people's armed forces, the resistance forces
and the revolutionary struggle of the masses in the free areas as well as in the
guerrilla base areas, thereby greatly contributing to the great victories
of the resistance against the French colonialists.
After our people won in the resistance against the French.. .the struggle
against counterrevolution became a broad, widespread mass movement, especially
the campaign to motivate the masses to implement agrarian and socialist reform.
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This struggle foiled all enemy schemes and sabotage...
The 'Northern people have unceasingly struggled against spies and other,
counterrevolutionary elements. They firmly maintained order and security
throughout the time the U.S. imperialists expanded the war of destruction
throughout the northern part of our country...
The line of struggle against counterrevolution is an important part
of the political program of our party...
The imperialists have made use of reactionary members of our more
elite nationalities to organize and instigate the underdeveloped masses
in such a way that they, formerly giving no support to the revolution,
turned against the revolutionary administration after the successful
August revolution. The imperialists introduced many religions into our
country to use this situation to saw disunity among our people and use
the reactionary followers of these religions. They criticize communism,
prevent compatriots of various religions from participating in the
revolution and help the imperialists sabotage the revolution. The task
of struggling against the reactionary clique which is using Christianity
and against the reactionary clique of the more elite nationalities must
be imbued with the party's policy toward religions and minorities and
must be closely related tb:the satisfactory fulfilling of all tasks set
by the party and state in these areas...
With regard to counterrevolutionary forces, especially foreign spies,
we must use the absolute superiority of the revolutionary forces to
resolutely attack them and promptly suppress all their dark schemes and
sabotage. The absolute superiority of the revolutionary forces must be
used to resolutely suppress all hostile sabotage of socialist construction....
The imperialists headed by U.S. imperialists have constantly sought
and capitalized on all vulnerable points of the socialist camp and of the
world revolutionary movement to launch counterattacks.
They have carried out combined measures and tricks?such as armed aggression,
engineering of internal subversive riots and coups, economic blockade, psychologica]
warfare, promotion of peaceful evolution...with the ultimate aim of eliminating
the Marxist-Leninist parties, revolutionary power and the socialist system...
The imperialists' plots and activities are aimed at destroying our
revolution through all acts and maneuvers, including armed aggression.
To implement the imperialists' plots the counterrevolutionary clique
in our country has carried out investigations and intelligence collection
in the military, political and economic fields in order to study and
evaluate our strength. It has carried out material and spiritual
destruction with a view to causing difficulties and obstacles to the
revolution, and has established secret bases in order to carry out
destructive schemes, psywar, riots and murders of our cadres and to
prepare its strength to overthrow the revolutionary administration
and annihilate the socialist regime through violence or "peaceful evolution."
The counterrevolutionary clique is camouflaging itself and infiltrating
deep into our ranks in order to persuade, buy and corrupt our cadres
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and to build secret bases. Its most common activities are psywar and
counterpropaganda with a view to distorting all party and state policies
and slandering our regime in order to reduce our party's prestige, to
sow disunity and to kindle chaos among our people. It has actively
carried out its activities in the military, political, economic, cultural
and ideological fields anywhere and any time, especially when the
revolution faced temporary difficulties.
Therefore the struggle against counterrevolution must be a struggle,-
of the entire people led by the party and must be an overall struggle aimed
at frustrating all the enemy's destructive schemes and plans in all fields.
This is a continuous political struggle that accepts no "afrmistice" and
no clear battleground...
In the period from its founding to the success of the August revolution
our party led our people in struggling against the secret agents, informers
and reactionary organizations--lackeys of the imperialists and the dominating
colonialists--in order to protect our party, our revolutionary organizations
and our revolutionary movement.
In the resistance against the French colonialist aggressors the tasks
related to the struggle against counterrevolution consisted of effectively
protecting the leading organs of the resistance, protecting the revolutionary
armed forces, firmly maintaining public order and security in our free areas,
contributing toward strengthening and developing the resistance forces and
the revolutionary movement in the areas under temporary enemy occupation,
creating conditions for liberating the temporarily occupied areas and
firmly, maintaining public order and security in the newly liberated areas
in order to contribute toward victoriously carrying out the resistance.
At that time, the targets of our attacks in the liberated areas were all
sorts of French aggressive imperialist lackeys such as enemy spies, informants,
secret agents, bandits, commando spies, the reactionary clique that was
making use of religion especially Christianity, the reactionary upper class
in the highlands and reactionary parties and factions. In the areas
temporarily controlled by the enemy, these were the Vietnamese traitors
and reactionaries who collaborated with the French imperialist aggressors
in destoying the revolution as well as the secret agents and informants who
chased our cadres and destroyed our resistance bases.
During the days of mobilizing the masses to reduce land rent and
carry out land reforms, the objective of the struggle against counter-
revolution was to serve the peasants' struggle. The peasant struggle's
targets--in areas where the movement to cut land rents and carry out land
reforms was being conducted--were the cruel and stubborn landlords and
despots as well as those who sabotaged and opposed this movement...
From Lenin's viepoint, the suppression of counterrevolution...is a basic
task to which great attention must be given. Lenin considered the organization
and building tasks to be more important but he absolutely never considered
the suppression of counterrevolution to be a secondary task...
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Experience in building socialism in the Soviet Union, China and
other brother socialist countries has completely testified to the great
Lenin's teaching. The counterrevolutionary riots in Hungary late in
1956 and the "peaceful evolution" plot in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were
also profound lessons...
There is an...inseparable relationship between suppressing the
counterrevolutionary elements and the organization and building tasks.
We do not consider violence to be an objective and an essential or sole
method but when the use of violence is deemed necessary, it must be used.
resolutely and appropriately. Actually, in our dealings with counter-
revolutionary elements in the recent past we have still entertained
rightist thoughts and have not properly used violence. A great number
of cadres and party members have been inclined to emphasize the organizational
and building aspects of the proletarian dictatorship while neglecting the
aspect of suppressive violence, believing it is no longer necessary...
In the socialist revolution in the north, our party held that
"generally speaking, any person or organization that hates the revolution,
sabotages socialist reform and socialist construction...or opposes the
struggle for peace and national unification must be considered counter-
revolutionary." In the process of socialist reform and socialist
construction, a number of people, because they were deeply dissatisfied
with their personal material situation, have performed counterrevolutionary
acts against the revolutionary administration. The imperialist clique's
spies are always the most dangerous for opposing the socialist revolution
in the north. In the anti-French resistance we had to cope with French
colonialist spies. Since 1954 we have had to cope with the spies of the
Americans and their henchmen who are very perfidious and possess many
modern means and techniques. However, to carry out sabotage against
Vietnam, the enemy has to use his henchmen among Vietnamese reactionaries.
The most notable of these are reactionaries who take advantage of Catholicism,
who belong to the ethnic minority upper classes, who were members of the
exploiting class in the old society or who are former local administrative
personnel and spies. Because of the political and social conditions in
our country, this reactionary force is not an independent political force.
In various revolutionary phases they all have served the imperialists under
one form or another. To have a force to carry out sabotage against the
north, spies stationed outside the north must seek ways to collude with
the counterrevolutionary clique remaining in the north in order to organize
and have it sabotage the revolutionary administration. In the same way,
to have a force to oppose the revolutionary administration, the counter-
revolutionary clique inside the country must contact and receive aid from
the imperialists' spies outside of the north.
This is a natural relationship between the imperialists' spies and
the counterrevolutionary clique inside the country.
Therefore, in this struggle it is necessary to actively prevent and
break all relations tetween the domestic counterrevolutionaries and foreign
spies and deprive the foreign spies of their prop by eliminating all the
domestic reactionaries and gradually abolishing the social organizations
of which the reactionaries make use.
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To what extent the enemy can carry out his scheme depends less on
him than on us. If our people constantly heighten revolutionary vigilance
and actively struggle against counterrevolutionaries they will be detected
and properly punished and their schemes, no matter how poisonous and
deceitful they may be, will be traumatically defeated.
WASHINGTON POST
14 April 1972
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
'Doves' 'roublina anoi
CPYRGHT
AN ASTONISHINGLY
tough warning by North
Vietnam's internal security
boss against a "counterre-
volutionary" wave that may
even now be affecting parts
of North Vietnam has raised
the specter of internal crisis
resulting from Hanoi's mas-
sive offensive against the
South.
Just how much the tough
call for "repression" of all
antiwar forces in North
Vietnam is based en events
'actually occurring, and how
much Is designed to put
, party cadres on notice to be-
ware, is admittedly some-
what speculative.
But the long and ex-
tremely specific lecture by
Tran Qum Hoan, North
Vietnam's minister of public
security and an alternate
member of the controlling,
politburo, published in the
March issue of Hoe Tap, the
party's theoretical journal,
hints strongly at the eXist-
ence of grave home-front
problems.
Consider, for example,
these words:
"The counterrevolutionary
clique in our country has
, carried out investigations
and intelligneee-collection
. in the military, political and
economic fields in order to
study and evaluate our
strength. It has carried out
material and spiritual de-
struction with a view to
causing difficulties and ob-
stacles to the revolution and
has established secret bases
in order to carry out de-
structive schemes, psywar
' (psychological war f ar e),
riots and murders of our
cadres (trained party work-
ers) to . . . annihiliate the
Socialist regime through
violence or `peaceful evcilu-
tion'."
In the past, the Commu-
nist government of North
Vietnam has periodically
been forced into draconian
measures to put down re-
volt, particularly among the
700,000 Catholics, the mon-
tagnards (mountain tribes)
and former small landown-
ers .dispossessed by the revo-
hition.
Two such occasions came
in the' convulsive aftermath
of de-Stalinization in the So-
viet Union and the Hungar-
ian revolution of 1956, and
following the Soviet hive-,
sion of Czechoslovakia in
1968. Both are referred to in
the Hoc Tap article.
BUT TODAY, the sweep-
ing directives to party
cadres in Tran Quoc Hoan's
draconian call to arms seem
surely the result of war wea-
riness coupled. with fears
that the 'main-force invasion
of South Vietnam would
trigger the strongest wave
of antiwar fever yet experi-
enced.
Thus, the interior minis-
ter's definition of "counter-'
revolutIonary"?the first
time such a definition has
ever been published by Ha-
noi?includes "any person
or orginization . . . who op-
poses the struggle for peace
and national unification" (as
Well as anyone against "So-
cialist construction" or the
building of a Communist
State).
What the publication of
that flefinition of "counter-
revolutionary" hints is that
Hanoi is deeply concerned
by the growth of North Viet-
namese "doves." The mes-
sage to party cadres: iden-
tify and punish anyone
heard criticizing the war, be-
cause pursuit of the war for
"national unification" of
North and South Vietnam
has equal urgency with
'minding communism at '
home.
Moreover, the interior
minister implicitly and
sharply rebukes party
cadres for being too lenient,
with home-front dissenters; .
"A great number of
cadres and party ? members',
have been inclined to em-
phasize the organizational
and building aspect of the
proletarian dictatorship"'
(obviously by indoctrination.
and education) "while neg.
lecting the aspect of ? sup.' ,
pressive violence, believing
It is no longer necessary." in
short, violent measures are '
needed.
Continuing, Tran Quoc '
Hoan writes that the object
"In this struggle" is to sever
all connections between
"the domestic counterrevo-
lutionairies and foreign
spies, and deprive the for-
eign spies of their prop by
eliminating all the domestic
reactionaries and gradually
abolishing the social organi-
zations of which the reae-
tionaries make use."
The clear ? implication:
Hanoi is worried not only
about counterrevolutionary
agitation among individuals
but among "organizations"
?almost certainly including
the Catholic church.
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May 1972
May 9
DATES WORTH NOTING
Geneva 25th Assembly of the World Health Organization.
May 15 Japan Okinawa k reverts from the United States to
Japan, reestablishing Japanese sovereignty
rights over islands captured during World
War II. The Okinawa reversion points up
the Soviet Union's refusal to return to
Japan the Northern Territories it seized
after declaring war on Japan in the last
week of World War II when Japan was on the
verge of surrender.
May 19 USSR 50th anniversary of the founding of the Young
Pioneers (See article in this issue).
May 20 -
June 1
U.S./USSR
President Nixon is to visit the USSR May 22-30,
stopping first at Salzburg, Austria on May 20.
He is to visit Iran on May 30-31, and Poland
on May 31-June 1.
May 29- Geneva International Labor Organization, 57th
June 7 Conference and meeting of the ILO Governing
Body.
June 5 Europe 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan.
Chancellor Willy Branatof West Germany is
to speak at Harvard University ceremonies
commemorating Secretary of State Marshall's
announcement there in 1947 of the U.S. offer
of financial aid to European countries
devastated by World War II. The aid totalled
$12 billion over the next three and one half
years. Moscow forbade East European countries
from accepting the aid and instead imposed
upon them trade agreements with the USSR that
cut them off from world markets, reoriented
their trade towards the USSR, and limited
them largely to a barter farm of trade with
members of the Soviet Bloc. As a result the
East European countries were held bad( from
participating in the rapid technological
achievements realized in Western Europe in
the 1960's. Now the Soviet Bloc finds itself
economdcally and technologically far behind
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June 5-8 Munich
June 5-16 Stockholm
June 6 Bulgaria
June 11-12 USSR
June 12-15 Prague
June 12 Rabat
the (West) European Camon Market and is
trying to demand the dissolution of EEC
through front activities such as the
Soviet-sponsored Peoples Assembly for
European Security that is to meet June 2-5
in Brussels.
21st General Assembly of the International
Press Institute.
UN World Conference on the Environment.
25th anniversary of the arrest in the
National Assembly of the Bulgarian agrarian
opposition leader, Nicola Petkov, in the
Communists' drive for total power. Petkov
was hanged a few months later, on 23 September 1947.
35th anniversary of the arrest, secret trial
and execution of Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky
and seven other top Red Army generals in 1937.
In the ensuing Stalinist purge of the army,
about half of the officers, including all
eleven army and navy vice-commissars dis-
appeared -- an important factor in the Soviet
Union's subsequent losses when Germany attacked
in 1941.
Congress of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary
Trade Union Movement (national trade union
organization).
Summit meeting of the Organization for
African Unity.
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simmiummoRmaimmomimmNimon May 1972
SHORT SUBJECTS
SOME ARE MORE EQUALTHAN'OTHERS-:
"A:WDOSLAV ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY
The Yugoslays have come up with an interesting and useful
analysis of Brezhnev's 20 March speech to the Soviet trade union
congress, pointing out the significance of Soviet acceptance,
faUte-de mieux, of what Brezhnev describes as a Chinese offer to
conduct relations between the two countries on the basis of
"peaceful coexistence" rather than "proletarian internationalism."
In addition to providing a succinct and accurate definition of the
Soviet use of these terms, the Yugoslav commentary indicts Moscow
for using the principle of proletarian internationalism to extend
its hegemony over East Europe and, ironically, wonders why, since
the USSR has recognized the independence and sovereignty of one
socialist state, this should not open the door to other socialist
states to build their relations on a similar basis. The Yugoslav
analysis concludes that "simultaneously with the granting of
coexistence status to China, the pressure for socialist integration..
will increase in the socialist camp."
1972:
Janez Stanic's col aentary in the Ljubljana Delo, 25 March
"At the Soviet trade union congress which
opened at the beginning of this week, Leonid Ilith
Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, unexpectedly made a major foreign
policy speech. Following a whole series of important
international events, including' above all the visit
of President Nixon to China, this speech represented
the first Soviet reaction at the highest level.
Although Brezhnev discussed all major problems in
his speech, he actually introduced essentially new
views on only two topics! West European integration,
and relations between China and the USSR.
"The proposals which the chief of the Soviet
party addressed to Peking throw a completely new
light on those basic principles which Soviet policy
has tried to follow in its relations with China.
What is essentially involved here is this: Brezhnev
is offering the Chinese relations based on the
principles of peaceful coexistence, and not on the
principles of proletarian internationalism. He
said that the initiatives for building the
relations between the USSR and China on the principles
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of peaceful coexistence had come from official
sources in Peking, and that the Soviet Union was
ready to accept this if the Chinese leadership
believed that it was impossible to build relations
between two socialist states on the basis of
higher principles, that is, on the basis of
proletarian internationalism.
"To grasp the novelty and significance of this
statement by Brezhnev, it is necessary to recall
what peaceful coexistence and proletarian inter-
nationalism mean to the Soviet Union.
"According to the Soviet concept, peaceful
coexistence is a model for relations between states
with different social systems. According to these
principles, the Soviet Union recognizes the independ-
ence and sovereignty of states with capitalist social
systems, renounces all interference in their internal
affairs and all attempts to influence their social
systems, and develops trade, economic, and other
cooperation with them exclusively in accordance with
the principles of mutual benefit and interest. It
is only in the sphere of ideology, that the USSR
retains its right to a sharp and constant ideological
confrontation and struggle.
"Proletarian internationalism on the other hand
represents a model for relations between socialist
states. It is based on the following viewpoint: the
world is divided into two opposing camps, socialism
and capitalism. Peaceful coexistence between these
two camps is necessary because both are so powerful
militarily that a battle between them would be
catastrophic for both. However, this does not
mean that an ideological and social rapprochement
between them is possible because the capitalist
camp is doomed to collapse. Of course, ih its own
struggle for existence, capitalism would like to
destroy socialism, but is unable to do this because
the Soviet Union is sufficiently strong militarily
and economically to be able to defend the entire -
socialist world. Among other things, this also
represents its first internationalist duty, whereas
it is the duty of the smaller and weaker socialist
states to support the Soviet Union, the sole bulwark
of their defense against capitalist aggression.
Since the Soviet Union bears the responsibility for the
existence of socialism, it demands that other socialist
states subordinate their own national interests to the
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general interests of socialism, which essentially
means the interests of the Soviet Union.
"Thus, the difference between the two models
is that the Soviet Union recognized the complete
independence and sovereignty of any state with
whicla it develops its relations on the basis
of peaceful coexistence, whereas it demands
subordination to the common interests -- which
are primarily the interests of the biggest and the
strongest, that is, the Soviet Union -- from any
state with which it builds its relations on the
principles of proletarian internationalism.
"Therefore, the offer to China to build its
relations with the Soviet Union on the principles
of peaceful coexistence rather than on principles of
proletatian internationalism is equivalent to an
official statement that in relations to China, the
Soviet Union renounces its leading role and hegemonist
policy. At the same time, this is also an admission
that China represents too great and too powerful a
reality to force it to adapt to Soviet wishes and
needs as was done with Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus,
Brezhnev has offered the same relations to the Chinese
that Nixon offered them recently, that is relations
between two equal great powers unencumbered by any
ideological ballast.
"This step is quite logical and had to be made
sooner or later because all the ideology in the world
is of little use if an opponent refuses to accept it
voluntarily. It is *possible to force it upon him.
Nevertheless, by its political consequences, this step
is at least as far-reaching as Nixon's visit to China.
Things have now been made clear within the great
triangle: there are three superpowers which mutually
recognize and respect one another and among which none
is able to claim a leading role in relation to either
of the other two.
"If we were naive, we could visualize more far-
reaching conclusions; for instance, we could say that by
recognizing the independence and sovereignty of one
of the socialist states, the USSR has also opened
the door to other socialist states to build their
relations with the USSR on the principles of peaceful
coexistence. Of course, this kind of judgment is
completely groundless. China has not won its status
as a "coexisting" state as a result of any Soviet good
will, but rather because it is so great and powerful
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that no other solution was possible for Moscow. We
can call this realism. There was a great deal of realism
in Brezhnev's speech, but nevertheless, considered from
the Soviet viewpoint, this realism provides no grounds
for any similar concessions where such concessions are
not necessary. It is precisely for this reason that
we can safely predict that simultaneously with the
granting of a "coexisting" status to China, the
pressure toward socialist integration and for relations
on the principles of socialist internationalism
will increase in the areas where this is possible to
implement, that is, in the socialist camp."
FRENCH COMMUNIST DAILY ANALYZES WORK CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.
L'Humanite, daily organ of the French Communist Party,
published between 18 and 28 January a series of seven articles on
the American worker (available on request). The series was written
by Jacques Arnault, a Humardte reporter who spent two and a half
months in the United States interviewing laborers and union leaders.
Monsieur Arnault was reported to have been surprised and pleased
by his reception and by the frankness of his interlocutors. He
has responded by presenting his communist readers with an unexpectedly
balanced account of working conditions in the U.S. Although the
author does not ignore the problems of contemporary American
industrial life, he also finds many positive aspects, such as the
high levels of personal consumption, the physical and social
mobility, and the dynamism of the American economy. In applying
a Marxist analysis to the American scene, the author notes that
certain "contradictions" in.American life have caused serious
problems for the Commnist Party of the U.S.A. Among these
contradicions he includes the fact that most American workers
accept the system and that genuine grievances tend to be taken
up by the major political parties and incorporated in their programs.
Reader response to the series has been overwhelmingly favorable,
praising the objective reporting which has helped 'correct an
erroneous image of life in the United States. In particular,
French communist readers expressed surprise that there are white
workers (and not just black) doing assembly line work, and noted
with satisfaction that U.S. workers, although higher paid, still
have the same problems and worries as their French equivalents.
Readers also showed a greater appreciation of the complexity of
the race problem and the absurdity of anticipating a Marxist
revolution in the United States.
4
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SOVIET-IRAQI-TREATY
The persistent Soviet effort at spreading its influence in the
Middle East took a dubious step inithe-sipinF-of a treaty: with
Iraq, announced on 9 April during Kbsygin s visit to Iraq. It
is similar to the Soviet with Egypt without being so clear in
its military clauses concerning military assistance or mutual aid
in the event of hostilities, though in some respects it places the
Soviets in a stronger position vis-a-vis its new treaty partner.
For the Soviets, it is the payoff for considerable financial
aid to Iraq's oil industry, primarily for developing the North
Rumaila oil field. Additionally the Soviets apparently intend
to capitalize on this agreement to gain naval access to the Persian
Gulf via the Iraqi port of Um Qasr.
The treaty is one more case of the Soviets'fishing in the
troubled waters of the Middle East for their own ends, which,
needless to say, are motivated not at all or, at best, incidentally
by regard for the interests of the countries with which it deals.
In the current case, for example, some observers see the treaty as
a Soviet move to gain a second foothold in the area as insurance
should its relations with Egypt deteriorate even faster, and also
as a.kind of pre-emption of Egypt's ambitions to be the prime mover
in Arab affairs. The indications are that the USSR will seek some
similar arrangement with Syria, again as a counter to Egyptian
claims to exclusive relations with the Soviets and to hegemony in
the Arab Middle East. The Soviets feel the need for a freer
hand in dealing with Egypt.
It will be interesting to see to what lengths Soviet diplomacy
will go in forthcoming months in its pursuit of improved relations
with Iran, a non-Arab country which views neighbor Iraq's advances
in the Persian Gulf with considerable suspicion.
(Evaluation and analysis of this new Soviet initiative are
contained in the attached news articles and commentary on the treaty.)
5
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NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1972
SOVIET AND IRAQ 1g 15-YEAR PACT
BEtRUT,, Lebanon, April 9?
More Military Assistance
? Expected Under Treaty
Signed by Kosygin
CoormIliqo on Del
CPYRGHT
OVernmenL
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THE ECONOMIST
15 April 1972
Iraq and Russia
The tip of the boat
CPYRGHT
Mr Kosygin cut the ribbon and the
oil flowed. A little oil, anyway. On
April 7th production started at North
Rumailah, one of the oilfields expro-
priated from the Iraq Petroleum Com-
pany and developed with Russian
financial and technical assistance.
According to Baghdad, the first ship
load is already in a Soviet tanker on its
way to destinations in Russia or
elitern Europe. On April 9th Mr
!n:nnygin and President Bakr signed a
y?-?ir friendship treaty, similar to
lie Russian-Egyptian treaty signed
nearly a year ago. On April xrth a
Scviet naval squadron began a five-day
goodwHI visit to the Iraqi port of Umm
Q,cr. Frieodship is, indeed, a lovely
ahing.
The initial yield from North
Rumailah will be ,about 5m tons a
year. This is only peantrts compared
with the oil that the IPC, despite the
bitterness of the open-ended quarrel
over expropriation, continues 'to export
from Iraq. It is, all the same, a turning
point--though the direction of the turn
depends, partly, on the measures that
the IPC's shareholders, an international
group of major oil companies, may
take in retaliation. Mr Saddam Hus-
sein, Itareil Ilanith party boss, claimed
that with Russian help Iraq had at
last managed to break the oil com-
panies' monopoly of production and
marketing. In response, Mr Kosygin
rejoiced over the forced retreat of
colonialists, capitalists and all such bad
men. What it adds up to is that Russia
!has made a start in establishing a
Middle East oil source. This, if it leads
to larger operations, could be useful in
helping Russia to keep up with eastern
Europe's growing demands and thus
releasing its own supplies for other
markets ; a project for transporting
Siberian oil to Japan is, for instance, in
the air.
But this is only one aspect of Russian-
Iraqi friendliness. Iraq's great value
from Russia's point of view is its
superb geographical position : it leads
Pit4itiunkliteitlagbcfMtN9/02
of rich, western-oriented states and
kingdoms ; it also outflanks the Nato
and Cento positions in Turkey and
Ira,n. True, Iraq is no alternative to
Egypt ; despite its repeated efforts to
join some Arab club or other, it is too
battled up by its own power groups to
have much influence on the Arab world
to its west, let alone on the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The importance of the
Iraqi alliance is , that it provides a
foothold in preoisely the position where
it is useful, strategically and economic-
ally, for Russia to balance the tip of its
boot.
Iraq's neighbours are playing the new
development coolly, though the
Kuwaitis have privately allowed their
nerves to show. The Shah of Iran, who
might have been the first toover-reaot,
has been markedly restrained. Before
Mr Kosygin descended on Iraq, the
Iranians made discreet inquiries from
the Russians, which produced an
informal assurance that nothing was
intended that might damage Russian-
Iranian 'relations. The Shah, one
presumes, is less than assured. But he
may, uncharacteristically, be taking the
advice of those advisers who believe
that his recent boast that Iran would
be the strongest military power in the
Middle East within five years, and
his preparations to this effect, are partly
responsible for Iraq's turn to the Soviet
Union.
The western powers have banked
their money, and their arms, on Iran ;
Russia may now be deciding to put
? considerably more effort than before
into building up Iraq. While the Iraqi
regiine is treated dismissively by many
other Arab governments, it could well
have a better chance of survival than
most. The regimes now in danger of
losing out are the ones that could be
caught between a western-directed
push from Iran and .an eastern-
directed push from Iraq. At the least,
a new factor has been added to the
edginess of politio in the Gulf?and
beyond.
: CIA-R0P79-01194A000200170001
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CPYRGHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 April 1972
Oil?literal and figurative
Kosygin visit linked
to cloudy Iraqi scene
oviet premier Alexei N. Kosygin's visit
to Iraq comes at a time of growing friction
between the Soviet Union and Egypt, its
major Arab-world ally.
? The Moscow-Cairo clash over the quality
and quantity of Soviet arms deliveries and
over Moscow unwillingness to back any
Egyptian military campaign against Israel
has led Moscow to improve relations with
other Arab states.
Premier Kosygin's visit demonstrates
Moscow's growing interest also in Mideast
oil supplies and in access to the Persian
Gulf, observers here believe.
Mr. Kosygin and an entourage of high-
ranking Soviet technocrats, including the
Soviet petroleum minister, were met at
Baghdad airport April 6 by Saddam Hus-
sein, vice-chairman of Iraq's ruling Revo-
lutionary Command Council Baghdad Radio
said.
The Soviet visit, apparently arranged on
short notice, topped ceremonies in Baghdad
marking the 25th anniversary of Iraq's rul-
ing &lath Party.
Events coincide
It also coincides with the ceremonial start
of production at southern Iraq's giant North
Rome'la oil fields, which the Soviets are
helping to develop.
Further, the Koskgin visit returns one
made to Moscow by Saddam Hussein. Iraq's
most powerful politician in February. It
Might Jr-ad to signing an Iraqi-Soviet coop-
eration and friendship treaty similar to that
signed by the Soviets and Egypt last May,
reports from Baghdad said.
After Saddam Hussein had visited Mos-
cow? a Soviet-Iraqi communiqu?redicted
the nations would "embody in treaties"
their interstate ties and "raise them to a
new and higher level," the same phrase
used by the Soviet Communist Party news-
roller Pravda after signing the Soviet-Egyp-
tian pact.
The Kosygin visit closely follows a new
port call by Soviet naval units at Iraqi
Persian Gulf ports. The gulf area's con-
servative rulers are increasingly worried
about Soviet moves in the gulf and Indian
Ocean zones.
A stride forward
The Baghdad government sees the April 7
North Rumeila oil field inauguration as a
major stride forward for Iraq National Oil
Company (INOC), the Iraqi-owned rival of
the Western-owned Iraqi Petroleum Com-
pany (IPC). ?
INOC took control of North Rumeila
away from IPC following passage of a law
in 1961. 1PC's British, U.S., French, and
Dutch shareholders have continued to con-
test the move and demand compensation
from Baghdad.
Moscow granted to INOC loans totaling
$72 million to develop North Rumeila. Its oil
production is expected to increase from an
Initial annual level of 5 million tons to 18
million tons.
Hungarian technicians are drilling wells.
Czechoslovakia is building a new refinery
In the Persion Gulf port of Basra, while
Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany pro-
vide technical aid and 'equipment. Romania
has loaned INOC $35 million, for industrial
, development, to be repaid by crude oil de-
livered over seven years.
Tankers chartered
INOC is chartering Soviet tankers until
Spain delivers the remaining five of six
35,000-ton tankers it is building for INOC.
On the Persian Gulf, the Soviets are
working in a joint venture to develop the
Iraqi fishing industry in Basra. They have
completed a drydock there and now are
building a shipyard.
East Germany has promised to build a
merchant-marine school in Basra and is
constructing four large cranes to improve
the port of Umm Qasr, used by Iraqi and
Soviet naval units.
In Al FFIW the other Iraqi Gulf port, the
Soviets are building new oil installations as
part of a pipeline system to export the
North Rumeila oil.
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CPYRGHT
JAPAN TIMES
12 April 1972
LONDON (UPI) ?Russia is
"diversifying" ner alignmenta
in the Middle East to safeguard
her foothold in the area against
any weakening of Egypfian de-
pendability.
Iraq seems the latest alterna-
tive, amid signs that Moscow is
aiming at a "friendship treaty"
With that country's Baathist re-
gime. Until recently Egypt was
the sole Arab nation singled out
for such close alignment.
(This article was written before
' Iraq signed a friendship treaty
with the Soviet Union Sunday.?
Editor)
T h e Kremlin leadership,
steadily pushing its influence in
the Middle East, in the past re-
lied heavily on the late UAR
President Abdel Carnal Nasser
in whom they placed virtually
unlimited trust. ,
Egypt then seethed the only
? worthwhile partner is the So-
viet search for a permanent
.foothold in the area. The grow-
ing dependence of Egypt on So-
viet military aid seemed to as-
sure Moscow's objective: Soviet
penetration of the Mediterrane-
an and the eventual passage to
the Indian Ocean.
The Soviet investment in
tgypt is estimated at 0,000 to
Russia Seeks
New Friends -
In Mideast
By K. C. THALER
$6,000 million over the past de-
cade.
If the Arab-Israeli war con-
stituted a heavy blow to Soviet
prestige and undermined Egyp-
tian trust in Russian depend-
ability, the death of Nasser
shook the foundations of the
friendship between the Commu-
nist superpower and the de-
feated Arab nation.
Moscow accepted his sikces-
sor Anwar Sadat, largely be-
cause it had no alternative. But
Moscow's uneasiness has since
grown into an apparent growing
distrust of the Cairo !ender. Sa-
dat in his ,turn has shown little
confidence in Russian credi-
bility as a genuine, dis-
interested friend and partner,
anxious to rally to the Arab
cause.
Cracks in the Moscow-Cairo
axis have widened lately, with
Russia leaving Sadat in no
doubt she has no intention to be
dragged into a confrontation
with the United States over the
lingering Middle East crisis.
Moscow has shown signs of
growing disappointment with
Egypt's military prowess, des-
pite the heavy RusSiari in.
vestment, and Cairo has
clis-
played discontent with the Rus-
sians' coolness and criticism.
More recently the Soviets
have been looking around for
CPYRGHT
other partners in the area, as a
sort of reinsurance against any
change in Egypt's posture to-
ward the USSR.
There have been comings and
goings between Moscow, Bagh-
dad and Damascus, and latest
reports suggest that Moscow has
clinched a deal with Iraq which
might become a major clew foot-
hold, if it came to a major crisis
In Russo-Egyption relations.
This is obviously planning
ahead on the part of the So-
viets, who are known not to
take risks lightly and to reach
for political safeguards wher-
ever they see a 'chance.
This chance has now come to
all intents and purposes in Iraq.
A Soviet flotilla is on the way
to Iraq's Persian Gulf ports,
long a glittering strategic tar-
get and more recently made
more important for Moscow in
the light of its successful push
to the Indian Ocean.
Important contacts are also
in progress between Moscow
and Syria whose strategic im-
portance is considerable in the
wider framework of Mideastern
security planning.
Some diplomatic experts con-
sider these latest moves a sig-
nificant pointer to a major shift
in Moscow's dealings with the
Arab world.
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GUARDIAN/LE ICNDE WEEKLY
15 April 1972
Moscow: still busy
making friends
Atexei Kosygin's visit to Bagdad last
week ? the first ever by a Soviet Premier
to Iraq ? marks an astonishing improve-
ment in relations between the two coun-
tries after a long period in the shadows.
The greater degree of cooperation be-
ween the two nations initiated during the
February visit to Moscow of Iraqi "strong-
men" and deputy chairman of the Council
,of the Revolution Saddam Hussein, was
,consolidated last Sunday with the
signing of a treaty of friendship and co-
operation. There can be no doubt that
this pact represents another success for
:the Soviet Union in its bid to strengthen
? its influence in the Mediterranean and the
Persian Gulf.
2 The treaty is also an indication that the
Kremlin, set on its guard by anti-Corn-
munist repression in Khartum and
Cairo's momentary flirtation with Wash-
' i ?
ington, wants to increase and diversify its
...alliances in the Arab World.
, The text of the Bagdad agreement is
virtually identical to that signed between
I the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971,
?except that this earlier pact spelled out
greater involvement by the two signa-
tories in the Middle East conflict, in the
military sphere, and in constructing and
defending Egyptian Socialism.
But if the Egyptian Soviet pact falls
squarely into the framework of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the agreement with Iraq
testifies to Moscow's concern with assur-
ing its presence in the Persian Gulf, which
harbours the world's largest oil reserves.
In a transparent 'attempt to upstage
China in this region and rival the United
States, which Is well established In Turkey
end Saudi Arabia, the USSR already main-
tains diplomatic relations with the United
Arab Emirates.
It was unable to do as much with Qatar
and Bahrein, but it does have a port of
call in Men for its warships from the
Indian Ocean, while its fishing vessels sail
at will through the Gulf, thanks to agree-
ments with Iraq and the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of South Yemen. Some of
these vessels on "special missions" have
been sighted regularly at the entry to the
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.
As part of its design to secure its
position in the region, the USSR, while
maintaining good relations with Tehran,
seeks at state level to exercise a tri-
partite mediation mission ? along with
Damascus and Bagdad, whose own rela-
tions have improved ? between Kurds and
Arabs to maintain peace in Kurdistan.
And finally to eliminate differences be-
tween the Baath and Communist parties
so as to pave the way to a "national front"
in Iraq.
Success Of such a policy would be cer-
tain to strengthen the hand of the "pro-
, gressive" Arab oil producers in their
dealings with Western petroleum inter-
ests ? particularly the Americans. The
treaty just signed in Bagdad also repre-
sents an important. card in the Soviet
hand only weeks .before the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Paradoxi-
cally, even though Saddam Hussein Is
soon to visit Paris, Europe, which is the
rnain user of Iraqi crude oil as well as the .
petroleum products of the Persian Gulf,
remains a virtual spectator in e part of the
world that Is vital to Rs interests,
CPYRGHT
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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
12 April 1972
CPYRGHT
RUSSIA'S NEW ARAB OPTION
IRAQ HAS now signed what has become the standaro
form of defence treaty with Russia, which Egypt signed
last June and India shortly before the start of the war
with Pakistan. Russia is now strategically firmly base.cl
on the P.ersian Gulf, having lost no time in moving into
the vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal. Last year the
extremist and unstable Iraqi Left-wing Government, after
pushing its traditional pretensions in the Gulf too far,
was faced down by Persia, which is rightly taking no
chances in the new situation. Iraq now has a Super-Power.
backer, and will seek to exploit this.
Mr Kosvoint, in addition to signing the treaty, also
celebrated Russia's entry into the Middle East oil business.
He inaugurated the first shipments from the new North,
Rumaila field which Iraq expropriated from Western oil
companies in 1960 and which Russia. has since developed
at a cost of ?110 million. Thus Russia's long-standing
campaign to get into a position to deny Middle East oil
to the West now brnadens out into getting hold of
increasing amounts of it for herself and her satellites.
A confrontation with the Western companies will now
follow if she tries .to market it outside the Iron Curtain.
There may be some flies on this double layer of
gingerbread. Egypt will be peeved that its upstart rival
Iraq is accorded an equal place in Moscow's comradeship.
Syria will also be jealous, and even more suspicious of
Iraq than at present, King Ilussr.iN, after Egypt's rupture
of relations with him because of his Palestinian initiative,
will feel that the ring of brotherly Arab malevolence
around him. -is more dangerous. The result i8 to make a
Jordan-Israeli settlement even more obviously .a mutual
matter of self-preservation and of political and economic
advantage titan is already the case. In fat the two .keep
in touch to explore the possibilities, which were made to
look unduly bleak' a month ago by -Israel's calculatedly
over-adverse public reaction to King Hussrites Palestine
plan. The prospects should now be better.'
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