'THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,' BY CARMELO MESA-LAGO. WORLD AFFAIRS, SUMMER OF 1973 ISSUE.

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100850001-2
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• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
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• Publication Date: January 2, 1974
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"THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE," by Carmelo Mesa-Lago. World Affairs, summer of 1973 issue.
This article is a detailed, well-documented review of the way by which the
Soviet Union has achieved control over Cuban internal affairs, and how it has
also brought Castro into line, at least in his public pronouncements, with
Soviet foreign policy.
The writer notes 1968, when Castro came out in support of the Soviet inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, as the beginning of the end of any real independence of
action by Cuba, and then carefully traces how, beginning in 1970, with the
establishment of the Soviet-Cuban Commission of Economic, Scientific and Technical
Collaboration, the Soviets have built their own style economic and administrative
hierarchy to protect their huge investment in Cuba. The writer cites mid-1972
as Cuba's "point of no return" in its dependence on the USSR.
Although numerous statements by Cuban officials are quoted to illustrate
Cuban repudiation of what the writer calls the "Sino-Guevarist" years, i.e.
those during which Cuba was most active in trying to export its revolution, he
also highlights those instances when Castro himself has never answered directly
whether he has come to believe that guerrilla action is subordinate to other
means of attaining power.
The last section of the article outlines conditions under which there could
be a rapprochement between Cuba and the U.S., and analyzes Castro's current
dilemma: when he bitterly criticizes the U.S., it indicates he is concerned
about losing power; on the other hand, when he sets conditions for negotiations,
it is probably the result of Soviet pressure on him, to resist it would erode
his power even more. The announcement from Moscow, 17 December, that Brezhnev
has decided"to postpone his visit to Cuba by at least two weeks indicates that
the Soviets may be having second thoughts about this very issue. By attending
the January first celebrations marking the fifteenth anniversary of Castro's
revolution, as they orginally planned, they could have run the risk of
embarrassment by possible anti-American outbursts by the Cubans.
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Cornelius W Vahle Jr.
Managing Editor
Theodore L. Stoddard
Consulting Editor
Jeannette Patrick
Assistant Editor
Barbara Marney
Circulation Manager
Franklin L. Burdette. Chairman
University of Maryland
Donald Armstrong
Llashington, D.C.
James D. Atkinson
Georgetown University
Harold E. Davis
The American University
Roderic Davison
The George Washington University
Herbert S. Dinerstein
The Johns Hopkins University
Stephen Horn
California State University, Long Beach
Ernest W. Lefever
The Brookings Institution
Genevieve C. Linebargcr
Washington, D.C.
Rayford W. Logan
Howard University
Robert A. Lystad
CPYRGHT
.
WORLD
AFFAIRS
A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
Contents
Articles
The Sovietization of the Cuban Revolution: Its
Consequences for the Western Hemisphere
Carmelo Mesa-Logo
36 The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the
Haystack Diplomacy?
Joseph L. Zentner
48 The Energy Crisis, the Middle East, and American
Foreign Policy
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.
74 Bilateralism in South Asia
Shirin Tabir-Kheli
The Johns Hopkins University 88
John J. Murphy
The Catholic University of Amgriea
William V. O'Brien
Georgetown University
Howard R. Penniman
Georgetown University
Don C. Piper
University of Maryland
Richard M. Scammon
Elections Research Center
Ronald M. Schneider
Queens College, CUNY
Vance L. Shiflett
District of Columbia Teachers College
Josepph F. Thoming
Washington, D.C.
licnry Wells
I vrrsity of Pennsylvania
Paul T. Welty
Northeastern Illinois State College
1. William Zartman
New York University
Book Reviews
Cochran, Bert Harry Truman and the Crisis
Presidency
Franklin L. Burdette
Penniman, Howard R. Elections in South Vietnam
Victoria Schitck
Jowitt, Kenneth Revolutionary Breakthroughs and
National Development: The Case of Romania,
1944-1965
Richard P. Farkas
Number 1 Summer 1973
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CPYRGHT
CONTRIBUTORS
Carmelo Mesa-Lago is Associate Director of the Center for Latin American Studies
and Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh. Ile has pub-
lished three books and numerous articles on Cuba.
Joseph L. Zcntncr is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of
Southwestern Louisiana in Lafayette. lie was previously on the faculty of the Uni-,
versity of I louston.
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge. He is the author of numerous books and articles on
American foreign policy and international relations.
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, currently an Academic Adviser at Temple University, recently
received her Ph.D. from the Universityfof Pennsylvania. This article was written after
a summer of research in Pakistan during the time of the signing of the Simla Accord,
and after attending the Pakistan National Assembly session convened to consider
and ratify the agreement.
World Affairs is published quarterly in summer, fall, winter, and spring by the
American Peace Society, Room 304, 4000 Albemarle Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20016. All correspondence concerning manuscriptsand books for review
should be sent to this address.
The: iters': sf414W ld='lfj:airs welcome the submission of relevant manuscripts. The
views cxpressexi, inthe various articles appearing in World Affairs are those of the
individual authors and are not necessarily those of the publisher.
Manuscripts submitted for publication must be prepared in double-spaced
typescript. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively and should be placed
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World Affairs is indexed by the Public Affairs Information Service, Current Con-
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Institutions: $ 10.00 in the United States and Canada; $11.00 elsewhere.
Single copies, $ 2.00; back issues, if available, $ 2.00.
*T. M. Registered, U. S. Patent Office.
Copyright?1973 American Peace Society. Printed in the United States of America.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.
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Carmelo Mesa-Logo THE SOVIETIZATION
OF THE CUBAN
REVOLUTION:
ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
Since Premier Fidel Castro endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, the USSR has plwed an increasing role in Cuban affairs.'
Such influence was first manifested in the more orthodox and moderate
foreign policy of the island which, for instance, aligned itself with the
Russians in their ideological battle against more radical-leftist positions.
Until recently Castro managed to preserve his relative independence in
internal matters, but the serious dislocation of the Cuban economy,
precipitated by the Premier's futile mobilization for the ten-million-ton
sugar harvest, -put an end to that situation. He dramatically announced
in the summer of 1970 that the Revolution had. entered into a new
stage characterized by less idealism and more realism.
Soviet control over the island s domestic affairs has been achieved in
various ways. Castro has delegated most economic powers to President
Osvaldo Dorticos, a moderate whom the Soviets trust, and Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, chief economist, planner, minister without portfolio,
and old-line pro-Soviet communist. The Prime Minister seems to have
turned his energies outside the country, traveling abroad more than
three months in one single year (from the end of 1971 to the end of
1972). Through an intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission, con-
trolled from the Cuban side by Rodriguez, the USSR has institu-
tionalized her supervison over the use of her economic and military aid
to the island. A new wave of Soviet technicians has flooded into Cuba,
and native personnel in charge of plants built with Soviet aid are being
sent for training to the USSR. The Cuban economy has become even
more integrated into the Soviet bloc through the former's entrance into
Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). Castro's concern
over the United States-USSR detente has been appeased by Soviet
rhetorical statements and his own realization of this new era of
realpolitik. Cuba has dramatically reduced the exportation of the
revolution, accepted. non-guerrilla-warfare roads to socialism, and
assumed an increasingly compromising attitude vis-a-vis some conven-
tional regimes in Latin America. In view of these developments and the
United States rapprochement with China, it is somewhat surprising that
a normalization in United States-Cuban relations has not occurred as
yet. But it may happen in the near future if some conditions discussed
in this article are met.
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The Increasing Soviet Tutelage over Cuba
In December 1970 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez led a Cuban delegation
to Moscow for meetings with a Soviet team of economists headed by
Nikolai Baibakov, director of the Soviet Central Planning Board. As a
result of such conversations, the Soyiet-Cuban Commission of Eco-
nomic, Scientific, and Technical Collaboration was established. In
February 1971 the Soviet-Cuban long-term trade and payments
agreement for 1965-70 was temporarily extended until 1975.2 The
signing of a permanent trade agreement was delayed, until the
Commission had carefully studied the situation. To complete the basic
details for the Commission's organization, Baibakov visited Cuba in
April and May, and Cuban Chancellor Raul Roa went to Moscow in
June 1971.3
The first meeting of the Commission was held in Havana early in
September 1971. The Soviet delegation was led by the Vice President
of the USSR Council of Ministers, Vladimir Novikov, and was
composed of top officials from several ministries as well as the Soviet
ambassador to Havana. The Cuban delegation was led by Rodriguez,
who also presided over the meetings, and was composed of top Cuban
officials and the Cuban ambassador to Moscow. Rodriguez opened the
meetings with an appraisal of the Soviet role in the birth and support of
the Cuban revolution. In the same vein, Novikov reported that
Soviet-Cuban trade in 1970 had increased by 60 percent over 1966,
reaching more than one billion rubles per year (about three million
dollars daily); he also stressed the pivotal importance of Soviet oil,
steel, and machinery for the island's economy and listed the factories
and plants built or repaired with Soviet aid.'
The agenda for the meeting included the establishment of a more
efficient system of training the Cuban personnel in charge of the
Soviet-made plants; Cuban reports on the measures adopted to make up
for delays caused by the 1970 sugar-harvest mobilization in the
Soviet-aid construction of one electrical plant and two fertilizer plants;
and the possibility of future Soviet cooperation in mechanizing the'
sugar harvest, expanding electrical capacity, and establishing a pharma-
ceutical industry in Cuba. Premier Castro attended the signing of the
agreements but, unaccustomedly, did not say a word; in the official
picture he was standing behind Rodriguez, who was signing the
document. The latter thanked the Soviet delegates "for their efforts in
organizing and making more effective use of the aid provided by the
USSR." In the protocol, the Cubans agreed to speed the operation of
loading and unloading Soviet vessels in Cuban ports, to accelerate the
work at plants being built with Soviet aid, and to send to the USSR the
technicians who would direct such plants. The USSR promised to send
Cuba a new sugar-cane harvester designed jointly by engineers from
both countries and to provide technical aid for Cuba's attempt to
produce its own harvesters locally on a large scale, with tests, supervised
by Soviet experts, to be conducted on both machines during the 1972
harvest. Nothing concrete was agreed to on new electrical and
pharmaceutical plants.' Upon his return to Moscow, Novikov an-
nounced t at the a 1 i
Appro
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neements in -
At the end of October 1971 Premier Kosygin visited Cuba. He had
reviously been in Havana in June 1967 on his return to Moscow from
is Glassboro meeting with President Johnson. This was at a time when
oviet-Cuban relations were deteriorating; the important dignitary
eceived a cool official reception and little attention from the Cuban
ress. In contrast, his second visit was heralded with great fanfare and
I elations were very cordial. In a meeting with Castro the Soviet Premier
aid: "We have lost no time in getting together with comrade
idel .... It isn't only on this meeting but also in other matters we
ame to a quick understanding with him." Castro replied: "One way to
xpress our gratitude to the USSR for their great aid is to extract the
maximum out of the Soviet equipment, to use it efficiently, and to
-eep it in running condition."' There was a communique signed by
both Premiers, in which Castro fully endorsed Soviet foreign policy
while Kosygin condemned the United States' "illegal holding" of the
Guantanamo base and invited his colleague to visit the USSR.8
While visiting Chile in December 1971 Castro was publicly asked
whether there were any "contradictions" in the relations between Cuba
and :':the -socialist countries. He acknowledged that there had been
contradictions "at times" and, recanting past statements, said that they
had been partly due to Cuban idealism.' Almost at the same time, in a
meeting held in Moscow between President Dorticos and Secretary
Brezhnev, the former stated that Cuba was "creating the foundations of
socialism" while the latter reported on the "progress made in the
construction of communism in the USSR." Thus Cuba acknowledged
being at the bottom of the Soviet-invented four-step ladder to full
communism, two steps below her protectors. This was a repudiation of
Cuba's heretical proclamations during the Sino-Guevarist years ~of
1966-70 that she was building communism and was ahead of the USSR
in the development of consciousness, communist ownership, an
egalitarian distribution.10 Dorticos also expressed his gratitude "for the
public recognition by the Soviet Union of the significance of the Cuba
Revolution with respect to the liberation movements in Lati
America." This subservient attitude would have been inconceivabl
during the 1960s when the Cubans attempted to lead the Third-Wort
revolutionary movement, thus challenging the Soviets. Once th
"conflicts" between the two countries had been overcome, Kesygin wa
willing to announce that conversations had begun on the signing of
trade agreement for 1972-75 that would replace the old 1965-7
agreement provisionally extended (see below).' i In the meantime, th
extended old agreement was hurting Cuba economically: in 1972 th
international price of sugar was above the 6.11 cents per pound paid t
Cuba by the USSR. In December 1971 the latter paid 7.14 cents p (r
pound for 270,000 tons of sugar bought from Brazil, the archenemy f
Cuba.'2
The extent to which Cuba has departed from Sino-Guevarism a
moved toward Soviet orthodoxy is evident in the treatment given
the Cuban press to Nixon's visit to China vis-a-vis his visits to Mosco
and Warsaw in 1972. Reports of Nixon's visit to China were clever y
manipulated by the Cuban press to criticize the Chinese. In one issue f
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newspaper Granma, the front page was divided into two CPYRGHT
halves: the top half contained news and photos of the United States
bombing of Vietnam while the bottom half had photos of Nixon
shaking hands with Mao and Chou En-lai. The newspaper also
reproduced excerpts of the friendly toasts exchanged between Nixon
and Chou, and its last page was full of photos with ironic comments. 13
In contrast, Nixon's visits to Moscow and Warsaw were reported
factually (taken from TASS), although very briefly and not in
prominent places, but without any type of evaluation or comment.14
The second meeting of the Soviet-Cuban Commission was held in
Moscow in April 1972, with Rodriguez as head of the Cuban delegation
and Novikov as president of the meeting. At that meeting the results of
the tests made during the 1972 sugar crop of the various types of cane
harvesters were probably evaluated. (Significantly, in June the USSR
announced that a factory to build the model sponsored by the Soviets
would be sent to Cuba.) The Commission agreed to supply Cuba with
an electronic computer to help in economic planning, thus strengthen-
ing Rodriguez' position in favor of a more technical and powerful
central planning apparatus. Other topics discussed were the mechaniza-
tion and modernization of ports (the inefficiency of loading and
unloading Soviet ships had been on the agenda of the first meeting),
civil aviation, irrigation, hydroelectric energy, a pharmaceutical in-
dustry, education, and communications. Rodriguez decorated Novikov
with the medal of the Cuban Academy of Science and met with
Kosygin:_1 s
,Although the subject of military aid was not included in either of the
two agreements of the Commission, events in 1972 showed that this
was on the agenda. Early in January the Cuban Navy received several
Soviet missile-carrying launches that doubled its missile and antiaircraft
equipment.16 In April the Air Force, in turn, received a flotilla of
MIG-23's, the most technologically advanced Soviet aircraft, which
modernized the Cuban stock of MIG's 15, 17, 19, and 21. For several
months a team of hundreds of Soviet military experts led by Lt.
General Dimitri Krutskikn had been training Cuban personnel in the use
of this equipment. 17
On May 2, 1972, Castro began a trip to Africa and Eastern Europe
which lasted 63 days, longer than all of his previous trips abroad put
together. Before taking off, the Premier said. "Only a few years ago
none of us would even dream of being outside of our country for too
long, considering the way the imperialists were acting, with all their
threats. Fortunately things are different now."1" Castro was no longer
afraid of the possibility of a United States direct or sponsored invasion,
but he was concerned about the Soviet commitment to a rapproche-
ment with the United States, which was manifested by the fact that
Nixon's decision to blockade North Vietnamese ports and escalate the
bombing of the North did not impede his visit to Moscow. In Castro's
mind Cuba and Vietnam are in a similar position; thus, he devoted a
large portion of his speeches in Eastern Europe to attacking the United
States and pledging solidarity with the Vietnamese. In his speech on
arriving in Poland-Nixon had just left-Castro pointed out that his
pN~country was not part
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Brezhnev rhetorically respoTfded to Castro's pressure by condemning
the United States blockade and bombing of North Vietnam as well as
the United States occupation of the Guantanamo base in Cuba and by
assuring the Cuban Premier that the policy of peaceful coexistence
would not weaken the ideological struggle, that the confrontation
between capitalism and communism would become more acute, and
that small socialist nations would be defended and treated equally by
the Soviet superpower. Apparently satisfied, Castro said that for twelve
years the United States had exerted pressure on Cuba to break her ties
with the USSR but that, instead, the relations and confidence between
the two countries had consolidated, reaching a level never attained
before. Then he pledged that Cuba would never accept "opportunism,
neutralism, revisionism, liberalism, or capitalist ideological penetra-
tion." One wonders whether this statement was a betrayal of his
subconscious hope that the USSR would abstain from such vicious
practices.
Castro's trip also made evident his new, more compromising attitude
toward other countries. Four or five years earlier Castro had strongly
criticized llouari Boumedienne for overthrowing Ben Bella. Now Castro
began his trip with a stay in Algeria of nine days, equal to the time he
later spent in the USSR. (Algeria was followed by six days in
revolutionary Guinea and one day in traditional Sierra Leone.) Castro
had also earlier sorted friend from foe by the country's prevailing
antagonism toward the USSR; hence, Rumania had been very high in
his esteem. Now the length of his stay in each of the Eastern European
countries was positively correlated to their orthodoxy and good
standing with Moscow: nine days in the USSR, eight in East Germany
and Bulgaria, seven in Poland and Hungary, five in Czechoslovakia, and
only four in Rumania.
Rodriguez joined Castro for the Eastern European stage of his trip,
replacing Major Juan Almeida, a black, who was an asset in the African
stage of the trip. (Some members of the Cuban delegation who were
unacceptable to the USSR also returned to Havana.) Both the Cuban
and the Eastern European news media ranked Rodriguez second in the
Cuban delegation; he was decorated in several countries; and in the
Moscow meetings he, Castro, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny met
alone. Rodriguez was shown in photos at important meetings; he
apparently was taking 6 are of the serious business. During the trip
Castro did all that he could to build up his image. He submitted to
unaccustomed formalities, such as wearing a necktie to receive the
Dimitrov Order in Bulgaria and the Lenin Order in Moscow, and a cap
and gown in his investment as Doctor honoris causa at Charles
University in Prague. He visited dozens of factories and farms even in
remote areas, played football with Bulgarians and basketball with Poles,
and often mixed with the population. Castro's visit to the USSR was
originally scheduled for three weeks but lasted only nine days. When
leaving the country, the Prime Minister said that he would return in
1973 or 1974 "for a more extended unofficial visit." Rodriguez stayed
in Moscow for a few days after Castro left, preparing a significant
announcement.
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officially requested Cuba's entrance into the organization, and its eight
members unanimously accepted.29 Rodriguez promised to eliminate
"once and for all" the instability of the Cuban supply of sugar to the
socialist camp and requested entry into the Intergovernmental
Commission of Socialist Countries for the Development of Electronic
Computation. In turn, Kosygin stated that the needs of the Cuban
economy should be coordinated with the 1976-80 plans of Comecon
members.20
In the West there was the impression before Castro's trip that neither
he nor the Soviet leaders were eager for Cuba's entrance into
Comecon.21 After the step was taken, it was speculated that Cuba's
admission could be a Soviet concession to give guarantees to Castro that
Moscow's improved ties with Washington would not be to the
detriment of the Caribbean island.22 But if this were the case and
Castro had a vested interest in getting such a "concession," why did he
not stay in Moscow five more days to make the request himself?
Probably what he wanted was Cuba's admittance into the Warsaw Pact,
but this was too much to ask of the Soviets because it might have
jeopardized their delicate new detente with the United States. It is
doubtful that Cuba's entrance into Comecon will bring any significant
advantage to the island; and, conversely, it may result in less flexibility
in Cuban economic plans, now to be coordinated with those of the
seven Eastern European nations (and Mongolia!). Personally, this step
will reduce Castro's power in economics even more and strengthen that
of Rodriguez. The USSR seems 'to be the main winner with its
increased control over the island's economy and, probably, a
distribution of the Cuban economic burden among Comecon mem-
bers.
Cuban dependence on the USSR seemed to have reached a point of
no return in 1972. Some 60 percent of Cuban trade was with the
Soviets, approximately the same proportion it used to be with the
United States in the 19505.23 Cuba had also systematically failed to
meet her sugar export commitments with the Soviets, thereby building
in 1965-72 a cumulative deficit of about 20 million tons of sugar, the
equivalent of three good sugar crops.24 According to Soviet sources, the
island's cumulative trade deficit with the USSR for 1960-70 amounted
to 1.5 billion dollars; but Cuban statistics indicate that the figure was
above two billion dollars.25 Due to Cuba's bad sugar and tobacco crops
of 1971-72, such trade deficit may have increased to three billion
dollars by 1972.26 The total debt of Cuba to the USSR in that year was
probably close to the four billion dollar mark if the annual repayment
of loans. plus interest, shipping costs, and the cost of maintaining Soviet
technical and military advisors are added. It has been reported that the
National Bank of Cuba estimates that half of such debt could have been
saved if Cuba had traded with market economies.2' Cuba's merchant
marine, despite its remarkable growth in the last decade, carried only
seven to eight percent of the island trade, most of which was handled
by Soviet vessels.28 The USSR gave Cuba $1.5 billion in military aid
until 1971; and although, apparently, she did not charge for it, she has
gained substantial control in the supervision of such equipment. In the
summer-of 1371 there warx sQ =3-O0Q,SQvi
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 Ai
praGVof I~~s~ ~1~9'~1-fJF~l~i- F~'1~'i`'1 d~8500
key positions have been and are being trained in the USSR.
In the 1960s conflicts between the USSR and Cuba were generated,
by several causes. Cuba often felt treated in a neo-colonial manner by a
big power. The first serious confrontation occurred in 1962 when the
USSR agreed with the United States, without consulting Cuba, to
withdraw the missiles that created the October crisis. Six years later
Castro accused the "developed socialist countries" of using commercial
practices similar to those employed by the capitalist countries and
specifically denounced the USSR for restricting its oil supplies to Cuba,
thus obstructing the lftter's development. Other points of friction
resulted from divergent' doctrinal stands; thus, in 1966-68 (when
Sino-Guevarism was in , vogue) Castro imputed the Soviets with
neglecting ideological consciousness and political awareness for the
development of the material base and with introducing economic
reforms that pushed them back to capitalism.3o
in his speech of July 26, 1972, the Cuban Prime Minister showed
how his dependence on the Soviets had forced him to retreat from his
previous positions. He said that Cuban-Soviet relations were "based on
principles and doctrine." Castro also reported that since his 1964 visit
an impressive Soviet progress had occurred in technology, economics,
and science, and in the cities, and stated that this development of the
material base had been paralleled by the achievement of a "tremendous
political awareness": "It is an unquestionable fact that imperialist
ideology, propaganda, and corruption have not succeeded in gaining a
toehold anywhere in the Soviet Union .... Marxism-Leninism lives on
there, [it] is the daily bread of the Soviet people." Finally he stated
that the Soviet leadership had "deep feelings of solidarity, affection,
and respect" for the Cuban people and that they, in turn, were "proud
to have the priceless, disinterested, and revolutionary" friendship of the
USSR: "The economic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union
have been the most generous and the most revolutionary
possible .... Relations of this kind used to be unknown in the history
of relations among nations ....Though the world of tomorrow will
change, our friendship with the Soviet people will remain a constant
and our gratitude will be eternal.""
In November 1972 there was an important reorganization of the top
Cuban government apparatus: an Executive Committee with power
above the Council of Ministries (JUCEPLAN-Junta Central de
Planificacion) was established, composed of ten Deputy Prime Ministers
with direct control over sectors of the economy, each one grouping
several central ministries and agencies. Castro became the President of
the New Executive Committee and retained the Premiership of the
Council of Ministries and control over several ministries and agencies,
principally the armed forces and internal security. But, obviously, there
was some delegation of his previously omnipotent power. Rodriguez
was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Policy with control over the
Soviet-Cuban Commission and all foreign relations. President Dorticos
was given control over JUCEPLAN (junta Central de Planificacion),
the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Labor, the National Bank and other
minor agencies.32 Nevertheless, Rodriguez's control over the foreign
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tt r gives' 13 in enormouspower -iii foreign' trade (m addition, this
ministry is headed by Marcelo Fernandez, a follower of Rodriguez's
economic thought) and expertise in planning a de facto control over
JUCEPLAN.
The Soviet-Cuban Commission, Cuba's entrance into Comecon, the
strengthening of the former's planning apparatus, and the increasing
influence of Rodriguez and other technocrats trusted by the USSR
assured the latter that the island would use Soviet aid more efficiently,
follow a more orthodox and rational economic policy, and do her best
to honor her export commitments in the future. And yet Cuba's
accumulated debt was of such a colossal magnitude that it put in
jeopardy the new economic strategy. Important concessions were
necessary to allow such strategy to consolidate, bear fruit, and eradicate
the negative image of Cuba's poor economic performance which had
been so embarrassing for the Soviets all over the world and,
particularly, in Latin America.
In December 1972 Castro and Rodriguez returned to Moscow,
having been invited to participate in the festivities of the 50th
anniversary of the founding of the USSR. At the plenary meeting of the
anniversary, in a final political concession, Castro cited the Soviet
"single multinational state" as a model for a "Latin American socialist
community."33 The next day he and Brezhnev signed five economic
agreements through which the USSR made the following important
commitments: (1) stipulation for 1973-1975 of higher prices for Cuba's
two main export items-sugar (an increase from 6.11 to 11 cents per
pound) and nickel; (2) technical aid in 1973-1975 (at a value of 300
million rubles) to mechanize the sugar harvest; to repair, modernize
and/or expand nickel, electricity, oil-refining, textile, and metallurgic
installations; and to help in planning and electronic computation (this
credit will be paid in 1976-2000); (3) deferment for 13 years of the
payment of the Cuban debt to the USSR (both principal and interest)
accrued in 1960-1972 (payments will be made in 1986-2011); (4)
granting of the necessary credit to compensate for the expected Cuban
deficit in the balance of payments in 1973-1975 with the Soviets
(probably about one billion rubles) under the same payment conditions
as in number 3; and (5) a,three-year (1973-1975) trade agreement
(details were not given . 34
The third meeting of the;,Soviet-Cuban Commission was held in
Havana in February-March 1973 to implement the new economic
agreements signed in Moscow: Rodriguez, the head of the meeting,
opened it with praise to the USSR for the concessions made. No further
information was made public.35 The numerous concessions made by
Cuba since 1970 had finally paid economically but the island
dependency upon the USSR was greater than ever before.
Cuba's Realpolitik with Latin America
The Organization of American States (OAS) agreed in January 1962
to expel Cuba from the interamerican system, alleging that it was
incompatible with Cuba's self-proclaimed socialism and Marxism-
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OAS, responding to evidence presented by Venezuela of a Cuban-armed
expedition, agreed to cut diplomatic, economic, and transportation
links with Cuba. At the time only Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay opposed
the sanctions, but eventually the last two countries accepted the OAS
decision. Cuba resorted to increased aid to support revolution in Latin
America as the only way to break her isolation in the hemisphere. In
addition, in 1966-67, Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Castro pro-
claimed the dogma that the rural guerrilla loco a la Cuba was the only
road for revolution in Latin America.
In the late 1960s three events induced Cuba to stop sending armed
expeditions abroad and to reduce dramatically her aid to Latin
American guerrillas and revolutionary movements: the death of Che
Guevara and the concomitant failure of his guerrillas in Bolivia (as well
as previous failures in Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela); the
deterioration of the Cuban economy which forced an inward concentra-
tion of all the nation's resources and efforts; and the rapprochement
with the USSR, which allowed the latter to exert pressure on Cuba to.
normalize her relations with Latin America."' Early in 1970 the
Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo accused Castro of abandon-
ing continental revolution for consolidating socialism in his own
country, as Stalin had done in the USSR in the 1930s. The Premier
answered, defending his nation's "right and duty" to improve her
economy, and warned that, in the future, guerrilla fighters would have
to meet Cuban criteria to receive aid.37 Since 1970 very little or
nothing has been heard from the Latin American Solidarity Organization
(OLAS), founded in Ilavana in 1.967 to promote continental revolution.
There are occasional reassurances in Castro's speeches that Cuba is still
supporting the revolution in Latin America, but these seem rhetorical
statements except perhaps for the training in Cuba of a selective group
of Latin American revolutionaries.
In trying to break her hemispheric isolation and under pressure from
the USSR, Cuba has become increasingly compromising with the
socio-economic-political systems of other Latin American countries,
first accepting the "progressive military," then "democratic socialism,"
and finally conventional military and representative democracies. In
mid-1969 Castro had set three preconditions in order for Latin
American countries to restore relations with Cuba: (a) rejection of the
OAS sanctions; (b) condemnation of the "crimes" committed against
Cuba by "Yankee imperialism."; and (c) revolution. He then said that
Cuba would never return to the OAS and would wait as long as
necessary (ten, twenty, thirty years) until all Latin American countries
would revolt and establish the Organization of Revolutionary States of
Latin America. 3a Less than one year later Castro replaced all these
preconditions with a new one: that the country behave independently
from the United States.39
Peru was the first country that offered Cuba an opportunity to
practice the new realpolitik when, in 1968, General Juan Velasco
Alvarado overthrew the democratic, but weak and inefficient, govern-
ment of Belaunde Terry, proclaimed a revolution, and nationalized the
United States oil business. Since then Cuban-Peruvian relations have
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phenomenon," that of "a group of progressive military playing a
revolutionary role"; in 1970 generous Cuban aid was given to help the
victims of the devastating Peruvian earthquake; in the fall of 1971
Valasco invited a Cuban delegation to attend a meeting of the
UNCTAD's Group of 77 held in Lima; in late 1971 Castro made a
stopover at the Lima airport (on his way back to Cuba from Chile) and
met Valasco; and early in 1972 Peru presented a motion at the OAS
requesting that its members be left free individually to reestablish
relations with Cuba if they wanted. The motion was defeated but, in
July, Peru reestablished relations with Cuba.
For a brief period, under the rule of leftist General Torres in
1970-71, there was a chance that Bolivia would repeat the Peruvian
example; but the military Coup of conservative General Banzer in late
1971 closed that possibility.
Since 1971 Cuba has been courting Panama's military regime led by
General Omar Torrijos. Although he has not introduced any revolution-
ary or significant reformist changes in his country, Torrijos, has
challenged the United States over the Panama Canal. At the end of
1971 two vessels under Panamanian flag were captured by the Cuban
navy, which alleged that Panama had launched incursions against Cuba
before and that the captain of one of the vessels (a Cuban by birth and
a United States citizen) was a CIA agent. The U.S. government offered
its aid to Panama and requested from Cuba the return of the vessels and
the captain. Castro immediately denounced this as a United States plot
to divert Panamanian attention from the Canal and damage relations
with Cuba. He invited Torrijos to send a plane to Havana to pick up all
the crewmen who had not participated in acts of aggression. A
Panamanian delegation soon arrived, heard the confession of those
crewmen accused by Cuba, accepted the conditions, and hailed Castro
for respecting Panama's sovereignty.40 In 1972 Panama supported the
Peruvian motion at the OAS and Panamanian air force planes made
regular trips to Cuba carrying politicians and university professors and
students. Later in the year Torrijos followed the Cuban precedent at
Guantanamo Base by refusing to collect the United States' annual rent
for the Canal Zone. The conflict over the Canal was brought by Panama
in 1973 to the UN Security Council with strong support from Cuba,
Peru, the USSR, and China, and against United States objections.
During the Council meetings held in March in Panama City, General
Torrijos condemned the embargo of Cuba, and Foreign Minister Juan
Antonio Tack announced that Panama would recognize Cuba soon.41
In 1969 the Chilean Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei
initiated trade exchanges with Cuba and, in June 1970, signed a
two-year trade agreement for $11 million. Later in the year the Marxist
candidate of the Popular 'Front (Unidad Popular, composed of
Socialists, Communists, Radicals, and a leftist split of the Christian
Democrats-MAPU), Castro's friend Salvador Allende was elected
President. Ten days after taking office Allende reestablished diplomatic
relations with Cuba; and earl)t, in 1971 a new trade agreement
(increasing the trade volume by only six million dollars) was signed by
both countries.42 Allende and ,,Castro exchanged visits to their
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respective countries; the Cuban Premier's trip took place at the end of
1971 and lasted almost one month, while the Chilean President's trip
took place at the end of 1972 and lasted less than one week.
In 1971 Castro supported Uruguay's Popular Front (Frente Arnplio)
in that nation's elections. This Front, more a mixed coalition than that
of Chile, was composed of splits from the two traditional parties
("Blanco" and "Colorado"), plus Communists, Socialists, and Christian
Democrats, and was led by retired General Liber Seregni. The urban
guerrillas, "Tupamaros," an illegal movement, could not participate in
the:: elections and, although manifesting doubts that they could solve
the problem, did not oppose the Frente. Castro was greatly dis-
appointed when the Front lost the election to the conservative
candidate of the incumbent party. Nevertheless, the entering of military
men into the cabinet in 1973 opened the door for potential changes
which are carefully watched by the Cubans.
A surprising rapprochement took place in 1971-72 between Cuba
and the conventional government of Ecuador, led by the 78-year-old
politician and quasi dictator Velasco Ibarra. lie had not introduced a
single revolutionary measure in his term (nor in his previous two brief
periods as President) but seized some 50 United States fishing ships that
had entered the unilaterally established 200-mile territorial waters of
Ecuador. (The country is strategically important to Cuba because it is
expected to become the second largest Latin American oil exporter by
1974.) In the Soviet-Cuban communique released on the occasion of
Premier Kosygin's visit to Havana, both parties hailed Ecuador's
"independent posture" (as well as that of Panama). On his way back
from Chile, Castro made a stop at Quito's airport and met Vclasco
Ibarra and part of his cabinet. The warming relationship was inter-
rupted in early 1972 by a military coup that overthrew Velasco Ibarra
(for the third time in his career!). The new military regime has been
cautious in its statements; and, although siding in 1972 with the
Peruvians at the OAS meeting, did not follow them in reestablishing
relations immediately with Cuba. In March 1973, during the ECLA
meetings held in Quito, the chief of the Cuban delegation, Rodriguez,
met with Ecuadorian President General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara
and the Legislative Commission. When asked by journalists if the
reestablishment of relations-between the two countries was imminent,
Rodriguez diplomatically said "we are not in a hurry."43
Mexico never accepted the, OAS decision to isolate Cuba. Diplomatic
relations and small trade continued uninterrupted although several
conflicts created tension and coolness between the two countries. Early
in 1972 the situation apparently changed when, for the first time since
Cuba's revolutionary takeover, an exchange of foreign-trade missions
took place. Cuba is interested in buying Mexican lubricants, manufac-
tured products, and medicines' (the latter suggests that the expected
Soviet aid to develop a pharmaceutical industry in Cuba has not
materialized) and in receiving technical experience in the industrializa-
tion of minerals and petroleum derivatives in exchange for tobacco,
rum, and minerals. Mexico's Foreign Trade Bank offered to finance the
operation and an agreement was signed in March 1973.44
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Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago entered the OAS in the late 1960s.
instead of alleging that they were not bound by the 1964 OAS
decision, the two countries abstained from establishing diplomatic and
trade relations with Cuba. The two nations have rather conventional
regimes, democratically elected; and at one point Trinidad and Tobago
accused Cuba of training some of its citizens in revolutionary warfare.
The situation changed in 1971-72, however. An exchange of trade
missions took place between Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago in late
1971, and a more liberal party gained power in Jamaica early in 1972.
Both countries voted in favor of the Peruvian motion in the OAS in the
spring of 1972, and Castro hailed them for doing so. in a conference of
Commonwealth Caribbean leaders held in Port of Spain in October,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (as well as Bardados and Guyana
which entered the OAS in the early 1970s) decided to establish,
diplomatic relations with Cuba and the decision was implemented in
December 1972.4s
The unexpected occurred in Argentina when President-General
Alejandro Lanusse quickly convoked presidential elections; these were
freely held in March 1973 and won by the Peronist candidate Dr.
Hector Campora who was inaugurated as President on May 25. Cuban
President Dorticos was invited to the inauguration and three days later
Argentina and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations.46
In Central America surprising changes began to take place. At the
end of 1972 Cuba sent two "medical brigades" to help the victims of
the earthquake that dcstroyed Managua (interestingly the same gesture
that opened the door to the Peruvians) and they were received by the
Minister of Public Health.4? Cuba stated that this was an act of .
solidarity to the suffering people of Nicaragua and did not necessarily
mean support to Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, Jr., but even
this gesture would have been difficult to conceive three years before.
On the other hand, Costa Rican President Jose l~igueres (another
former archenemy of Castro) addressed in 1973 a meeting of Cuban
exiles in Puerto Rico, advising them to be realistic (in view of the United
States rapprochement with China) and to open themselves to the
possibility of a rapprochement between Cuba and. the United States.48
Finally relations with Venezuela, the nation that in 1963 requested
of the OAS the imposition of sanctions against Cuba, have improved
considerably since 1969 as a result of a change in attitude by the
Christian Democrat government. The first step was taken by President
Rafael Caldera's "pacification program" which included legalization of
the Venezuelan communist party, amnesty to revolutionary activists
who agreed to respect the democratic process, and relaxation of
tensions with Cuba. In 1972 top Venezuelan officials from the
Ministries of Education and Agriculture visited Cuba; there were
professional, scholarship, and sport exchanges; the Cuban press agency
I'rensa Latina was allowed to establish a branch in Caracas; and one of
the two Cuban guerrillas arrested in the 1963 landing was freed. Early
in 1973 Caldera stated that the guerrillas in Venezuela had disappeared,
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considerably reduced, that the normalization process between
Venezuela and Cuba was evolving positively, that his government was
endorsing Cuba's entrance into international agencies (e.g., the Group
of 77), and that, although Venezuela would not formally present the
Cuban case in the next OAS General Assembly, the theme would be
discussed informally. The Assembly held in April was headed by
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Aristides Calvani who played a crucial role
in getting approval for the new doctrine of "ideological pluralism" to
accept, within the OAS, nations with divergent socio-politico-economic
systems, including Marxist ones.'" At the same time that the OAS
assembly was taking place the Christian Democrat presidential candi-
date Lorenzo Fernandez (elections will be held in December 1973) was
discussing in Moscow with the Soviet leaders the possibility of shipping
oil from Venezuela to Cuba.50 In his May Day 1973 speech, Castro for
the first time openly courted Venezuela by welcoming its recent step to
annul the commercial treaty with the United States and by.announcing
that Cuba would support the Venezuelan government "regardless of its
economic system" in case of a serious conflict with international oil
corporations. 51
The previous pages show that Cuba has assumed an increasingly
compromising attitude vis-a-vis Latin American countries with divergent
revolutionary stands:52 the Chilean Marxist government; a group of
nations that have proclaimed themselves revolutionaries but are mostly
reformist (e.g., Peru and Mexico, and probably Argentina in the future)
or have not changed the status quo at all (as in Panama and Ecuador);
and a group of conventional regimes that do not pretend to be
revolutionary (e.g., Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Venezuela). A Hungarian journalist posed the problem to Castro
while he was in Chile, asking him: "You have said a number of times in
your speeches that there are many ways to achieve socialism; could you
give us a general picture of the Latin American scene in this respect?"
Castro answered employing "Cantinflas style" (the deliberately confus-
ing and contradictory way that the famous Mexican comedian Mario
Moreno uses to get away from difficult situations):
I don't think I ever said that there were many ways, I might have said that there
was more than one way, which remains to be proven and, to a certain extent, is
being proved. Also, that ne'.?: variants might conic up .... Here's a new way: the
Chilean process. A variant which may very well set the beginning of a process whose
future we cannot predict, as in the case of Peru.
A Chilean journalist tried to get a more concrete definition from the
Cuban Premier by asking: "In view of the experience of the last ten
years of revolutionary struggle in Latin America do you think that the
theory of the revolutionary nucleus [the guerrilla foco] is now
subordinate to other forms of struggle or is that theoretical stand still
valid?" Castro diplomatically chose to remain silent.53
Cuba's compromising attitude vis-a-vis Latin American countries that
"behave independently from the U.S.A." has been paralleled with
consistent verbal attacks againsrother military regimes (Argentina until
May 1973, Bolivia after Sept-mber 1971, Brazil, and Paraguay),
representative democracies (Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and
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 Ap
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). These are indiscriminantly
despised as "imperialist puppets" or "Yankee lackeys." Training of
selective revolutionaries from some of these countries apparently
continues; and Cuba, at least rhetorically, also claims active support to
revolutionary forces within them. These countries (together with the
.United States) have strongly opposed a revision of the 1962-1964 OAS
agreements. In general, the less legitimate these countries' bases and the
more they are maintained by repression, the stronger their opposition
to Cuba. (Many of these countries, in fact, have exaggerated the
Castroite threat to get more economic and military aid from the. United
States.) The most democratic regimes have been. more flexible in this
matter in spite of real physical attacks originated in Cuba.
Fora decade Castro systematically rejected the possibility of Cuba's
returning to the OAS, abhorring it as a "putrid, revolting den of
corruption," a "disgusting, discredit cesspool" and a "ministry of
colonies of the United States." At one point Castro said that Cuba
would, return to the OAS only if the "imperialists and their puppets
were kicked out first"; more recently he spoke of the substitution of
the OAS first by the "Organization of. Revolutionary States of Latin
America" and later : by the "Union of Peoples of Latin America."
(Notice that the second title, suggested in 1971, conveniently excluded
the word "Revolutionary.")`
The position of OAS officials in the matter has been an embarrassing
one: violently rejected by Castro, strongly criticized by a minority of
Latin American countries, and having strong opposition to change from
the most. authoritarian-conservative countries in the area in an awkward
marriage with the powerful United States. In November 1971, trying to
avoid a repetition of the Chilean example (that individually reestab-
lished relations with Cuba), the Secretary General of the OAS, Galo
Plaza, began consultations in Mexico on the "normalization" of
relations with Cuba. Besides the support of the openly favorable
countries, he apparently received an endorsement from both Bolivia
(then under leftist Torres) and the four open-minded democratic
countries. But the strong-. opposition of conservative military regimes
and that of the United States put an end to the move.55
In the spring of 1971 Nixon's overtures to China raised the
possibility that Cuba would be next. The majority of OAS members
became fearful of losing their scapegoat and bail. for juicy United States
aid, as Taiwan had done. The open-minded minority showed concern
over an embarrassing Cuban-United States agreement on their backs.
Galo Plaza hurried to ask the White House and the State Department to
keep him, and the OAS members, informed of any changes in policy
toward .Cuba and resumed his efforts to find a satisfactory compromise
within the OAS framework. The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations
quickly rejected any move to restore Cuba to OAS membership but
welcomed the restoration of relations with Latin American countries on
an individual basis. Toward the end of the year Peru presented a motion
at the OAS, freeing its members to make individual decisions on the
matter, but withdrew the motion later. (Castro rejected the rumor that
the ship incident which occurred at the. time-a possible cause for the
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sa otage t e motion.) In ay 9 eru reintroduced- the motion
which was defended at an extraordinary meeting of the OAS by
.Chancellor General Mercado Jorrin.5i5 The final vote (thirteen against,
seven in favor, and three abstentions) showed some surprises: Colombia
and Costa Rica (reportedly favorable) voted no, and Argentina and
Venezuela (the first reportedly against, the second in favor) ab-
stained. 57 Castro's strong statement from Sofia, at the same time that
the meeting was taking place, rejecting any "neutralization" of Cuba
and endorsing the Latin American revolution (see below), could have
affected the voting adversely.
The changes that occurred in Latin America in the second half of
1972 and the first half of 1973 significantly altered the OAS voting
pattern in the Cuban case. In April 1973 the majority of the OAS
members accepted the new doctrine of "ideological pluralism" and
Galo Plaza stated that possibly the next General Assembly would lift
the sanctions placed in 1964 against Cuba.58 At the time, there were in
the OAS eleven countries solidly in favor of lifting the sanctions, six
strongly against, and seven dubious. This was a remarkable shift in one
year, but only eight votes (one-third of the membership) are needed to
maintain the sanctions. Therefore, if the United States opposition
continues and there are no significant changes in Latin America, Galo
Plaza's prediction may not come true.' On May Day 1973 Castro said
that the new doctrine of "ideological pluralism" made the 1962 OAS
resolution (declaring the Cuban Marxist system incompatible with.the
"interamerican system") null and void. And yet he did not help to
break the deadlock by stating that it was the OAS that was
incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and by rejecting a return to the
OAS unless the United States is excluded from the organization (he also
added a new condition: that the OAS headquarters be moved to a Latin
American country).59 'Thus in mid-1973 the battle was still between
Ilavana and Washington. Is a rapprochement possible?
The Conditions for a United States-Cuban Rapprochement
In the late 1960s a United States-Cuban rapprochement was mainly
the subject of intellectual discussion with a few practical overtures that
did not produce the expected fruit.6a1 In the 1970s, however, an era of
realpolitik has begun, which has created better opportunities for
negotiation: on the United States side, the understanding with China,
agreements with the USSR, and the settlement of peace in Vietnam; on
the Cuban side, the decline in the exportation of the revolution to
Latin America and a more compromising attitude toward divergent
systems in the area. Until now, however, there have been only minor
changes in the positions of the chief leaders of the two countries, and
the conditions for negotiation established by both seem irreconcilable."'
In October 1969-with an eye on the increasing number of military
and authoritarian regimes in Latin America-President Nixon pragmati-
cally stated that, in the future, the United States would deal with these
countries realistically as they are. This has justified the United States'
close economic and military cooperation with Brazil and its cautious
policy vis-a-vis Peru and. Chile. United States officials have not
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FBI agents' bullets.) Discussions began immediately through the Swis
Embassy in Havana and the agreement was simultaneously signed in tha
plane into the Oak Ridge Atomic Center and the landing in Havan
presented serious problems because the airplane had been damaged b
both the United States and Cuba. (The hijackers threatened to crash th
y hr Fgq1pqgp i '
nteramerican system as a deterrent for normalizing relations between
he two countries. (The "interamerican system" was never clearly
efined but loosely meant representative democracy plus market
conomy, a formula which is rtow absent in most of Latin America and
as been substituted within; the OAS by the , new doctrine of
`ideological pluralism.") The United States government, however, has
not modified its stand vis-a-vis the other two preconditions. established
for the restoration of relations with Cuba:. (1) cutting her military ties
with the USSR, and (2) stopping her subversion in Latin America.
Throughout 1970-73 the President of the United States, the Secretary
of State, and the Assistant Secretaries for Intcramerican Affairs have
reiterated (in reports to the, United States Congress, the OAS, the Latin
American countries, and the news media) that Cuba has not changed its
position on these two points.62 In 1971 the State Department
acknowledged that "Cuba's active assistance to subversive elements was
apparently at reduced levels" but pointed to her .intransigent rejection.
of a. return to the OAS as proof that the situation was not ripe for a
revision.
This deadlock has been slightly altered by occasional events, most of
which have aggravated. the existing tension: the frequent hijacking of
United. States planes to Cuba; the. capture in early 1970 of a. Cuban
fishing boat and its crew by a.group of Cuban exiles (there were attacks
on Cuban fishing boats in the. fall of .1972 and in early 1973 also); the
establishment late in 1970 of a Soviet servicing facility for submarines
in the Cuban port of Cienfuegos; the detention and expulsion from the
United States in 1971 of a Cuban delegation that attempted. to
participate in an international sugar conference held in New Orleans;.
and at the end of that year the seizure by the Cuban Navy of two
vessels under the.Panamanian flag. The latter probably was the gravest
incident of all: the. State Department qualified it.as "an intolerable
threat" to free trade and navigation in the Caribbean; Pentagon sources
indicated that air and naval units-were being placed on. alert and that
they would go in aid of any attacked ship under a foreign registry if the
corresponding government. requested it; and the Navy reported that
warships stationed in Guantanamo (that is, in Cuban. territory) would
be sent to the Caribbean to engage in a potential confrontation with
Cuban war vessels.63
Only in a few cases have there been positive exchanges between the
two nations: in 1971, the entrance of a United States volleyball tea
into Cuba and of a Cuban baseball team into Puerto Rico; in 1972, the
attendance of an official United States scientific delegation (from the
Commerce Department) at an international oceanographic conferene
held in Havana;64 and in 1973, the hijacking agreement. The latter ha
been considered on several occasions and ' was precipitated when i
November 1972 the hijacking of an airplane almost caused disaster i
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grants to each nation the right to deport the hijacker of an aircraft or CPYRGHT
vessel or to try him in its own territory and according to its own laws.
In the latter case hijacking for "strict political reasons" may . be
considered as a mitigating or extenuating circumstance providing that
the hijacker (a) was in "real and imminent danger of death"; (b) did not
have "a viable alternative for leaving the country"; (c) did not use
financial extortion (any funds obtained through this means are to be
returned without delay); and (d) did not cause physical injury to the
members of the crew, passengers, and other persons. These conditions,
at least in theory, considerably reduce the probability of political
hijacking. Another important clause in the agreement stipulates
penalties for those who conspire, prepare, or take part in an expedition
to carry out acts of violence against the territory, aircraft, or vessels of
the other party.65 This was obviously intended to protect Cuba against
attacks from exiles and may explain why the agreement has received no
publicity in the United States.
In the few cases in which the United States and Cuba have had
positive exchanges (including the hijacking agreement) top officials
from one or the other country rapidly dismissed any hope that such
exchange could imply a modification of their respective basic policies.
The United States expects Cuba to break the ice, as President Nixon
indicated in his speech of April 1971, on the United Stags-China
understanding: "If the Cuban policy toward us should change, then we
would consider changing ours. That is, we would take a step
forward .... Havana hasn't taken any steps, so relations with Cuba
remain frozen." Premier Castro answered, saying that there would not
be an overture from Cuba and that his country would neither be
neutralized nor stop its support of all revolutionary movements in Latin
America.66
In 1971-1972 Castro spoke several times on his own preconditions
for a rapprochement with the United States. When visiting Chile, he
remarked that to reach an understanding it would not be necessary for
a revolutionary or socialist government to be in office in the United
States but just a realistic government ("a President of wide vision and
broad understanding") aware of the United States, Latin American, and
world situations and aspirations, and, hence, assuming a policy of peace.
According to Castro, Nixon, although a realistic man, does not
represent those trends and has been aggressive and reactionary in the
past: "Nixon will' never visit Havana!" Cuba will wait until the proper
man is installed in the White House. Two conditions would also have to
be met by the ideal government for a normalization of relations with
Cuba: (1) an end to the war in Vietnam, and (2) an end to the United
States role of gendarme in Latin America, that is, her abstaining from
any intervention as in the past.67
In a press conference in 'Sofia, Bulgaria, held in May 1972, Castro
dismissed as false a Mexican newspaper report saying that he was
planning to meet Nixon in Warsaw: "We arc not at all interested in such
a meeting [and] would refuse [it]." He then stated that Cuba would
never yield to the two United States conditions: "Wc will not give in
one iota in this respect." Since Cuba had been able to overcome the
most difficult tests posed by the United States, Castro ar red that "it
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would be absolutely senseless for us to make any concessions to the.. CPYRGHT
SA [now]." Then he assumed the same attitude that the American
resident had' taken a year before: "Nixon, is the one who's got to do
g." He would have to meet, "with no strings attached," the
omethin
o o conditions set by Castro in Chile: (1) an end to the Vietnam war,I
nd (2) an end to United States intervention inLatin America; plus two, dditional ones: (3) lifting the economic embargo of Cuba, and (4)
etting the naval base out of Guantanamo. Castro said that Cuba would
ait two, four, ten years until such conditions were met and further
tated that "Kissinger and all those advisers and `big brains' will never
ome to Havana or hold any kind-of meeting with us." ss
In his speech of July 26, 1972, Castro reiterated that Cuba's doors
ould.be closed to "Nixon's cheap politicking and dirty deals." At the
same time, he expressed satisfaction at seeing "the advances and, new
formulations in the policies of the United. States" made at the
Democratic Convention and, that "one of the presidential, candidates
[McGovern] was in favor of lifting the blockade against Cuba."
However, he attacked violently another point of the Democratic
platform which stated that 'Cuba could not become aSoviet military
base. "In ou territory we do as we damn please! And no [United
States] party platform has any right to establish prerequisites of any
kind with regard to Cuba." Finally he reiterated the four conditions,
enumerated in Bulgaria, necessary to 'begin negotiating the restoration
of relations with the United States. 69
What arc the actual possibilities' of the United States meeting the
Cuban conditions or vice versa? it is clear that the socialist system o
Cuba is no longer at issue and that the United States has concentrate
all its emphasis on external matters. As this article proves, Cuba'
military and economic links with the USSR have increased in the las
decade, especially in the 1970s ..hence, the United States demand tha
Cuba close the door to her Soviet friends has induced the opposit
result. Without having some guarantees from the_ United States first
Cuba could not cut her links with the USSR because it would have lef
her vulnerable to the former. The Soviet-Cuban military relationshi
presented a serious threat to the internal security of the United State
in October 1962, but during the Missile Crisis the leaders of the tw
superpowers reached an agreement; this apparently. has been honore
by the USSR, which gave explanations to the United States at the tim
of the installation of its submarine base in Cienfuegos. The secon
United States condition was directed mainly at protecting the securi
of the American allies in Latin America. In many cases, however,.thos
allies exaggerated the real threat in order to increase United States ai ;
in others, they managed (with or without United States aid) to capture
the, expeditions or defeat the guerrillas coming from Cuba. Since 196
the island has turned inward, dramatically reducing her efforts t
export the revolution.' With its increasingly compromising attitud
toward divergent systems in Latin America-shown in this article-Cub
has proven that she can be a peaceful neighbor. (The Soviet interest i
normalizing the Cuban situation in the Western Hemisphere has been a
important factor in thischange; thus, the Sovietization of
a el n thhe a to meet one f
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- eit _1 _71-
gap in the other.) And yet; the Cuban leaders could not afford to
acknowledge publicly that they were another paper tiger and thus have
continued their mostly rhetorical support of the revolutionary move-
ments in the area. If the United States would drop its two conditions
(this action should preferably take place within the OAS, perhaps with
the United States supporting a motion similar to that presented by Peru
in 1972) and if a rapprochement were eventually to take place, the two
United States security objectives would probably be achieved anyway:
peaceful relations with the United States and Latin America could
result in the increased independence of Cuba vis-a-vis the USSR and in an
even more conventional foreign policy of the island vis-a-vis her neighbors.
The first condition set by the Cubans has been met already with the
end of the war in Vietnam. (In his speeches of December 1972 and May
1973 Castro dropped this condition.) Concerning the second condition,
the last United States intervention in Latin America occurred more
than eight years ago in the Dominican Republic; in view of the United
States experience there and in Vietnam, it is doubtful that such an
action would be repeated. Certainly the United States could put the
Cubans against the wall, promising to abstain from intervention
provided that the Cubans do the same, and agreeing to keep the
agreement secret. The third condition set by the Cubans (raised to first
condition on May 1st by Castro who added that it should precede any
discussion and be unconditional) could be accepted without any
significant disadvantages for the United States and probably with some
gain. The economic emb'.rgo caused serious problems to Cuba at the
time of its inception, but most of them have been overcome by now.
Still some difficulties remain: the increased cost of freight (Cuba's main
markets moved from 90 to 6,000 miles away); the higher costs paid on
United States spare parts bought by Cuba through intermediaries
(according to the Cubans the overprice ranges from 20 to 30 percent);
the difficulties with shipping. (Cuba's merchant marine carries only 7-8
percent of the island's trade); the relatively poor assortment and low
quality of goods in Eastern Europe (as compared with the United
States); and the higher price that the Cubans pay for their imports from
the Soviet bloc. 70 But Cuba is capable of selling all that she produces
(actually the problem is that she does not produce enough) and of
buying practically everything that she needs either from socialist or
market-economy countries. The embargo, instead, has served the
Cubans as an excuse for their poor economic performance and as a
propaganda tool for despising the United States as a superpower
strangling a small nation. Dropping an economically inoperable
embargo would probably result in an improved political image of the
United States abroad. The fourth condition is for the United States to
get out of Guantanamo. This naval base, according to the opinion of
military experts, does not have strategic significance today and is not
really necessary to the United States. Its doubtful psychological value
("in spite of Castro we are still there") is offset by the risks of a grave
incident that it constantly poses. (Castro seems to have placed low
priority on this condition; he rested importance on it in December
1972 and, although he reconfirmed it as one of his conditions on May
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, e put a low priority on it. Hence this condition may be a
subject of negotiation.)
An American yielding 'on most of the Cuban conditions could be
interpreted as a calamitous defeat. Conversely, the United States
position could be presented as that of a great nation which has taken
the initiative in removing a point of friction in the world, thus
enhancing its own image and eliminating that of an encircled but
challenging neighbor. The example of China proves that taking a noble
initiative pays well in terms of both domestic and world opinion. There
would also be more tangible benefits for the United States as a result of
this normalization, such as the elimination of incidents between the
two countries that could precipitate a grave confrontation.
At this point Castro and Nixon are each waiting for the other to
make an overture; the question is who can afford to wait longer. Both
men are. realistic and opportunistic statesmen who have accepted many
compromises in the past to obtain and keep themselves in power. Dr.
Kissinger is reported to have said, prior to the United States presidential
elections in 1972, that. if Nixon were reelected, the normalization of
relations with Cuba would then be "on the agenda."" On the other
side, although Castro has stated several times that neither Nixon nor
Kissinger will visit Havana, he has left the door open to negotiation by
establishing his conditions and repeating them on various occasions. Let
us now review the internal-and external forces that the two men face
and that could influence their decisions.
By the end of the fall of 1972 Nixon seemed assured of another four
years in the White House - and his power was strengthened by his
electoral victory. United States congressmen, such as Senators
Fuibright, Hughes, and Kennedy, had unsuccessfully urged a revision of
the United States policy toward Cuba. In April 1972 a "Congressional
Conference on United States-Cuban Relations" took place in the
Senate, sponsored by .30 senators (all Democrats except three), with a
team of 15 specialists debating the main issues. The Conference was
intended for information rather than action; thus, it did not make any
specific recommendations although it was positive toward a normaliza-
tion of relations with Cuba (measures suggested were: ending the
embargo and travel restrictions; reestablishing commercial flights; and
promoting the exchange of publications, scholars, newsmen, athletes,
and artists). 72 After the hijacking agreement was signed, a group of
Republican congressmen called for a dialogue with Cuba that could lead
to an eventual normalization of relations between the two nations "in
the interest of the United States." 73 Until the Watergate scandal
seriously weakened Nixon's power, the United States Congress was
incapable of influencing him in favor of a rapprochement with Cuba
(this was obviously proved by the inability of the Congress to impose
upon the President a compromise on the more vital problem of
Vietnam). In mid-1973, with the outcome of the Watergate affair still
uncertain, any further discussion on this matter appears as sheer
speculation; nevertheless one thing is certain: even if Nixon is cleared of
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more compromising role with the Congress than before. Externally,
Nixon's position has been strengthened on the one hand but weakened
on the other. In the last decade the increasing Sovietization of Cuba has
not recreated any internal security problems for the United States and
conversely has helped in moderating the island's foreign policy. Sad as
it is, the United States is better off dealing with a Soviet-controlled
Castro than with him loose, creating all sorts of trouble. It would not
be surprising if Nixon took advantage of his trip to Moscow to reach
some understanding with the Soviet leaders on the future of Cuba as he
probably did on Vietnam. Finally., the hijacking agreement has helped
in dramatically reducing two fre~uent sources of tensions: diversion of
United States aircraft to Cuba and attacks of exiles against the Cuban
territory and vessels. On the other hand, while Castro has become more
peaceful and dependent on the USSR, his Latin American brothers have
behaved in a more independent manner vis-a-vis the United States and
have presented a challenge to the latter on numerous fronts. In
mid-1972 only two Latin American countries had relations with Cuba,
but one year later the number had risen to nine and two other countries
were expected to follow the same path soon. Still, at least one-third of
the OAS members were in favor of the status quo. Thus, by mid-1973
the likelihood was that Nixon would not have to face an immediate
challenge on Cuba at the OAS similar to that of China at the UN but, at
the speed that the situation was changing, it was difficult to conceive
that the problem could be postponed until 1976. The pressures from
the majority of the Latin American countries which arc in favor of a rap-
prochement, the crisis in the OAS, the weakened presidential power,
and a desire to emulate in his second term the foreign policy achieve-
ments of the first may move Nixon into taking the initiative soon.
Castro appears also to be in a weak internal position in view of the
erosion of his charisma and the challenge to his power by internal
forces led by Rodriguez and supported by the USSR. These forces give
priority to the island's domestic problems and are in favor of the
institutionalization of the Revolution and the normalization of its
status in the Western Hemisphere. Economically, Cuba is doing poorly
but has been able to survive the embargo, and the new economic
agreements with the USSR will help. The reestablishment of trade with
the United States would help to ease the burdens of the country but
would not be enough stimulus to induce Castro to an agreement.
Normalization of relations with the United States would be a way to
achieve more independence for Cuba but perhaps at a high cost for the
Premier's power. Both for the United States and the USSR, Rodriguez
would be a more reasonable, predictable, and responsible statesman to
deal with than Castro, and.he knows this well. It is doubtful that the res-
toration of United States-Cuban relations would result in enlarged power
for Castro if the United States and the USSR have already reached an
understanding. There is another way to look at the problem; and this is
that, in the past, Castro has exploited the real or imagined encirclement
by the United States to his' own advantage: as a scapegoat for the
frequent mistakes of his administration and as a phantom to keep his
forces united and to impose his personalistic-autocratic will. Castro's
d Fr`r t eieds 9 l~e~e er' krcaDP79-O1194A000100850001-
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roy ~rcn n e S
for his own sake. His bitter criticism of Nixon and his provocative
statements are indications of, his concern about losing power, while his
setting of conditions for negotiation is probably a result of Soviet
pressure on him. Thusit is safe to predict that he will take the initiative
in the negotiations only if he perceives that resisting Soviet pressure for
normalization would erode his power even more. In view of the current
state of Soviet-Cuban and United States-Soviet relations it is unrealistic
for the United States to ask Castro (even if full guarantees are given to
him to preserve his power and the socialist system on the island):to cut
his ties with the Soviets and become totally independent. Between the
two extremes (full Sovietization and total independence) lies a broad
field for negotiation and the United -States initiative could be critical in
the outcome.
The United States policy of isolation of Cuba and "wait-and-see,"
practiced in the last decade, has allowed an increasing Sovietization and
totalitarianism of the Cuban Revolution with the consequent curtail-
ment of political and individual freedoms and vanishing of the
autochthonous characteristics of the Cuban process. The initial
American manifested concern over the negative domestic features of
the Cuban regime (be it rhetorical or real) has been totally displaced by
the United States' own interests in external affairs. The normalization
of American-Cuban relations could help to gain some independence for
the island and more freedom and less economic hardships for its people.
These results are by no means assured beforehand but would depend
largely on the attitude and concerns of the United States. If it decides
to take the initiative and does not neglect the interests of the Cuban
people at the bargaining table, it may induce the slow transformation of
the current autocratic and Soviet-dependent Cuban regime into a more
democratic, humane, and independent socialist system. In an era of
realpolitik, this may be considered a rather naive and romantic
suggestion with which to close this article, but norfor those who dream
of a better world for tomorrow. .-
1. See K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution (New York:
11i11 & Wang, 1970); Edward Gonzalez, "Relationship with the Soviet Union, in Carmelo
Mesa-Lago, ed., Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press,
1971), pp. 81-104; Charles Bettciheim, "La revolution cubaine sur ]a voic'sovictique," Le
,Horde, May 12, 1971; and Leon Goure and Julian Weinkle, "Cuba's New Dependency,"
Problems of Communism, 21 (March-April 1972), pp. 68-79.
2. Radio Moscow, transmissions of December 9, 1970, and February 22, 1971. The
extension of the trade agreement was not reported by the Cuban press.
3. Granma Weekly Review, May 2 and 16, 1971, p. 12, and June 20 and 27, p. 1.
4. "Cuban-Soviet Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Collaboration Holds
First Session," Gran ,na Weekly Review, September 12, 1971, p. 7.
5. "Novikov and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Sign Protocol of Collaboration between Cuba
and the USSR" (and in smaller print: "Prime Minister Castro Attends Signing"), Granma
Weekly Review, September 19, 1971, p. 3.
6. Radio Moscow, transmission of September 25, 1971.
7. "Palabras en el Reparto Alamar," instituto,Cubano de Radiodifusi6n, transmission of
October 27, 1971. See also the daily edition of Grammna, October 25-30. 1971.
8. "Joint Soviet-Cuban Communique," Graunra Weekly Review, November 7, 1971, p. 1.
9. Press Interview, Grannia Weekly Review, December 19, 1971, pp. 12-13.
10. At the eonclu.dittg session of the Soviet-Cuban Commission's first meeting, Rodriguez
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anma eeAly Review, January 14, 1973, pp. 2.3.
35. "3rd Session of the Cuban-Soviet Intergovernmental Commission for Economic,
Scientific and Technical Collaboration Opened," Granma Weekly Review, March 4, 1973, p. 3.
36. Sec Ernrcrn F
tic pT
ov as'o f hosygm ;t,
y~da anlt C>,baP9~strte@19801+0A860 01PYRGHT
socialism." The importance of the Dortic6s-Brezhnev statements is that they were made at
Moscow, using the correct Russian terminology and, then, were reproduced in the Cuban press.
Sec Granma Weekly Review, January 2, 1972, p. 12.
11. Granma Weekly Review, January 9, 1972, p. 10.
12. See Marcel Niedergang, "La recent voyage de M. Fidel Castro a confirme son
aliignement sur Moscou," Le Monde Diploniatique, August 1972; "Brazil, Sugar Challenge to
Cuba," Latin America, 2 (January 1972), pp. 9-10; and "lnestabilidad del mercado azucarero,"
Progreso, August 1972, pp. 35-76.
13. "Cordial Nixon-Mao Interview; Chou-Nixon Friendly Meeting; Paper Tiger Gives
Syrupy Speech in Peking," Granma Weekly Review, February 27, 1972, pp. 1, 7, 12. See also
ibid., March 5, 1972, pp. 1, 12.
14. "Sale Nixon ... en viaj a la URSS," Granma, May 17, 1972, p. 5; "Lleg6 Nixon a
Moscu," ibid., May 23, p. 6; "Actividades do Nixon en Moscu," ibid., May 24, p. 5; "Llegb
Nixon a Varsovia," ibid., June 1, p. 6; "Termin6 Nixon su visita a Polonia," ibid., June 2, p. 7.
The weekly editions of Granma did not publish news on the visit.
15. "Firman Cuba y la URSS protocolo do la segunda scsi6n de la Comisi6n intcrgubcr-
namental de Colaboracibn Econ6mica y Cientf Pico-Tccnica," Graumia, April 17, 1972, p. 6. See
also A. Voronov, "Soviet-Cuban Cooperation Enters New Stage," liuernational Ajfairti
(Moscow), September 1972, p. 81.
16. Raul Castro, "Speech at the Naval Parade on Revolutionary Navy Day," Granma
Weekly Review, August 13, 1972, p. 5.
17. Radio Rcbcldc, transmission of April 18, 1972. See also Granma Weekly Review, April
23, 1972, p. 2.
18. F. Castro, "Speech at the May Day Parade and Workers' Rally," Granma Weekly
Review, May 7, 1972, p. 5. Information gn the trip comes from ibid., May-July editions and the
Cuban radio. Sec also "Fidel por 10 paiscs,". Cuba lnterttacional, 4 (September 1972), pp. 4-71.
19. Until Cuba's entrance Comecon was composed of the seven Eastern European countries
visited by Castro, plus Mongolia. Observers were Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and
Yugoslavia. In 1962, Albania was excluded. China neither entered Comecon nor sent observers.
20. C. R. Rodriguez, "Speech at the' 26th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance," Granma Weekly Review. July 23, 1972, p. 10.
21. See for instance Goure and Weinklc's opinion, op. cit., p. 77, published three months
before Cuba entered Comecon.
22. Theodore Shabad, "Cuba Becomes Full Member of Soviet Economic Bloc," New York
Times, July 12, 1972, p. 2.
23. Rodrfgucz has argued that statistical similarity could not hold in economic and political
terms. See "Dialogo con Carlos Rafael Rodrfgucz," Cuba Internacional, 3 (November-December
1971), pp. 86.91..
24. See my chapter, "Economic Policies and Growth," in Mcsa-l.ago, op. cit., pp. 301 ff.
25. Soviet sources arc: h'neshniaia lorLovlia SSSR: statisticl.'e.ckii sboroik 1918-1966 and
Vncsiiniaia torgovlia S.SSR za 1968 god (Moscow: Mczhdunarodnic Otnosheniia, 1967 and
1909), pp. 69 and 15; Foreign Trade (Moscow, No. 6, 1970, p. 55; and No. 5, 1971, p. 48.
Cuban sources are Junta Central de Planificacion, BE Boletin Estadistico 1970 (La Habana:
JUCEPLAN, 1971), pp. 188-191. Sec also Eric N. Baklanoff, "International Economic
Relations," in Mesa-Lago, op. cit., pp. 258-276.
26. In 1971 the value of Soviet imports increased by 17 percent to a record 800 million
pesos, while Cuban exports to the USSR probably declined by 40 percent to 280 million pesos
due to a decline in sugar production from 8.5 million tons in 1970 to 5.9 million tons in 1971.
Probably the level of Soviet imports in 1972 remained equal while that of Cuban exports to the
USSR declined clue to an even worse sugar crop. The 1971-72 combined deficit was probably
above one billion pesos.
27. By Gourc and Wcinklc, op. cit., p. 75, without giving a clear source.
28. F. Castro, "Speech at the Main Event in Commemoration of the Victory of Playa
(:ir,n," Granola Weekly Review, May 2, 1971, p. 6.
29 Martin Schram, "Cuba Today: The Party Seeks Economic Revival," Newsday,
c i 'cr 13. 1971; and Goure-Wcinkle, op. cit., p. 78.
1~r 4cc Gonralez, op. cit pp. 82-86.
a= I ('a,tr,' "Speech on the 19th Anniversary of the Attack on the Moncada Garrison,"
? ;1 ti. sir v R,-to -v , August 6, 1972, pp. 3-6.
I ,,ui~?:c Committee of Council of Ministries Established," Granma Weekly Review,
?. IV 7 2. p. 2.
t "Speech at the Solemn Scion in Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the
r,',,u r. Ilrrkly Review, December 31, 1972, p. 9. Castro also said (p. 16) that lie felt
til^`?,.u and that a man could have two homelands.
34. F. Castro, "Report to the People on the Economic Agreements Signed with the Soviet
Union " C
L
01-2
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Granma Weekly Review, December 24, 1972, p. 13.
46. Gramm Weekly Review, May 20 and June 3, 1973, p.. 1.
47. Granma Weekly Review, January 7, 1973, p. 8.
bl
k
e
a
48. Cuban exiles reacted negatively to Figueres' suggestion with a few remar
exceptions, e.g., Castro's former Minister of Finance Rufo Lopez Fresquct.
l 22
,
49. Marvine Howe, "Venezuela Opens Cuban Contacts," The New York. Times, Apri
FFCiltb,e~ % UR910XU e.QA DP7 ia=4-4Q4At?@(L1?08
V.I. Lenin," Granma Weekly.Review, May 3, 1970, pp. 2-5.
38. F. Castro, "Speech at the Close of the Main Rally Marking the Beginning of the
Ten-million-ton Sugar Harvest," Granma Weekly Review, July 20, 1969, p. 5.
39. F. Castro, "Discurso en conmcmoracion del Centenario del Natalicio de Lenin,"
Granma, April 23, 1970, pp. 2-4.
40. Granma Weekly Review, December 26, 1971, and January 2, 1972. In March 1973
Cuba freed one of the two'temaining Cuban-born prisoners as a friendly gesture toward
Panama.
41. Granma Weekly Review, March 25, 1973, pp. 8-11.
42. CORFO, Chile EconomAc News, February 27, 1971, p. 3.
43. Graunia Weekly Review,,April 1, 1973, p. 8.
44. Comercio Exterior (Mexico), March 1972; and Latin America, March 16, 1973, p. 83.
45. "Caribbean: Cuba Back in the Fold?" Latin America, October 20, 1972, p. 229; and
1973, p. 17.
50. Time, April 16, 1973, p. 38.
51. F. Castro, "Speech at the International Workers' Day Parade," Granma Weekly Review,
May 13, 1973, p. 3.
52. Cuban relations have not only improved with Latin America but with other nonsocialist
countries as well. Trade with Japan, France, Italy, Canada, Great. Britain, Spain, and Sweden
increased notably in 1970-73, reaching the half-billion mark. Cuba imported equipment (for
transportation, agriculture, industry, and construction), received technical assistance and credits
from these countries in exchange for sugar, nickel, tobacco, and rum. See Svea Ornstedt SIDA
(Stockholm), July 15. 1971; "Cuba," Barclays Economic Intelligence. Department (London),
December 17, 1971; "Cuba: From Dogma to Pragmatism." BOLSA Review (London), April
1972; and "Cuba's Links with Nonsocialist World Expanding," Business Latinatnerica, April 20,
1972. At the end of 1971 Castro stated that Cuba was in the process of overcoming the
economic embargo and that the island had a growing foreign market and could sell all that she.
was capable of producing. Granma Weekly Review, November 21, 1971, p. 8, and November
28, 1971, p. 4.
53. "Press Conference with Newsmen from Different Countries," Granma Weekly Review,
December 19, 1971, pp. 8-9. For a detailed account of Castro's 1971 trip. to Chile and stops in
Lima and Quito, see George W. Grayson, "The Significance of Castro's Trip to South America,"
World Affairs, Vol. 135 (Winter 1972), pp. 220-239.
54. F. Castro, "Speech at the Close of the Main Rally," op. cit., p. 5; "Discurso en con-
memoraci6n del Centenario," pp. 2-4; and "Speech at the Main Event," op. cit., p. 6
55. Benjamin Welles, "More Latin Lands Seem Willing to End Ban on Cuba." New York
Times, August 14, 1971, p. 3.
56. Ibid.; and "Peru: End of Story," Latin America, June 2, 1972, pp. 169-170.
57. "Cuba: From Dognis to Pragmatism," p. 201; and "Cuba and the Recent Vote in the
OAS," Granma Weekly Review, June 18, 1972, p. 12.
58. Galo Plaza's statement was made on April 26, 1973, at the Conference, "The OAS
Today and Tomorrow," University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
59. F. Castro, "Speech at the International Workers' Day Parade," op. cit., pp. 2-3.
60. For example, the 1968 conversations between Antonio Niincz Jimenez, president of the
Cuban Academy of Sciences, and American intellectuals who tried to facilitate the intcrch.:ugc
of scholars and publications; the 1968-69 agreements of the Hispanic Foundation, Library of
Congress, and of the Latin American Studies Association in order to promote intellectual
interchange; the seminars held in 1968-69 by the Center for Inter-American Relations (CZAR)
of New York with the purpose of recommending to the United States government a new policy
with respect to Cuba; and the 1969 Ford Foundation grants made available for field research in
Cuba. Sec also the articles by John N. Plank, "We Should Start Talking with Castro," New York
'1'ion's ilagaZiue, March 30, 1969, pp. 29 ff.; Irving Louis Morowitz, "United States-Cuba
Relations: Beyond the Quarantine,%' Trans-action, April 1969, pp. 43-47; Richard Fagen,
"United States-Cuban Relations," ''tale 11. Ferguson, ed., Contemporary Inter-American
Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues (New York: Prentice Hall, 1972), pp. 192-203 (this is
Fagen's report to the CIAR meetings f 1968-69); and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Taming the Cuban
Shrew," Foreign Policy, no. 10 (Spring 1973), pp. 94-116.
61. For background on United States-Cuban relations sec Cole Blasier, "The Elimination of
US Influence," in Mesa-Lago, op. cit., pp. 43-80; and Edward Gonzalez, "The United States and
Castro: Breaking the Deadlock," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50 (July 1972), pp. 722-737.
62. For instance, Robert A. liurtwitch in February 1970 in the TV program "The
Advocates," in July 1970 before the house Foreign Affairs Committee, in September 1971
before the Senate Foreign Rotations Committee, and in February 1973 before the Congress; a
State Department report to the OAS in March 1970; Secretary Rogers to the Congress in March
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1971; Charles Appleton Meyer to the press in July 1971; and President Nixon to the press in
April 1971 and January 1972.
63. Graun a Weekly Review, December 26, 1971, and January 2, 1972.
64. Tad Szulc, "U.S. Government Scientists Attended Parley in Cuba, New York Times,
July 11, 1972.
65. Grans na Weekly Review, February 25, 1973, p. 3.
66. Castro, "Speech in the Main Event," op. cit., p. 6.
67. Grrnnna Weekly Review, December 19, 1971, pp. 10-13; and George Natanson, "Nixon
Doesn't Represent World Rcalities-Castro." The Times of the Americas, May 13, 1972, p. 2.
68, Grauuia Weekly Review, June 4, 1972, p. 6. Two weeks later the Cuban press
mcnuioncd conditions 3 and 4 ignoring the first two. In October Castro mentioned conditions 1
and 2 ignoring the last two. In December he ignored condition 1 (the end of the war in Vietnam
was in sight) and seemed willing to yield on condition 4. In May 1973 he definitely dropped
condition 1, reiterated 2 and 3 (although changing their order, therefore giving priority to a
domestic matter over an intcramcrican issue), and said that condition 4 was still on but had a
lower priority.
69. F. Castro, "Speech on the 19th Anniversary," op cit., p. 6.
70. Some of these problems were explained briefly by Castro, "Speech at the Main Event,"
op. cit., p. 6.
71. "Cuba: Lure of the Market," Latin America, October 20, 1972, p. 229.
72. -Congressional Conference on United States-Cuban Relations," Washington, D.C., New
Senate Office Building, April 19-20, 1972.
73. Latin! America, February 23, 1973, p. 64.
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