TWA HIJACKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500090012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 16, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Approved For' Lease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79M0046 QiQ02500090012-
16 September 1976 J
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Douglas Heck
Director, Office to Combat Terrorism
FROM
SUBJECT TWA Hijacking
25X1A
1. As a participant in the management of the
recent TWA hijacking, I would like to communicate to
you a few of my thoughts regarding the handling of 25X1A
the incident. I first want to express my appreciation
for the opportunity to work with you, and I congratulate
you on your performance in a most difficult role.
I believe the outcome of this incident should be
considered successful in that a minimum number of
casualties were sustained and the perpetrators were
apprehended for prosecution.
2. Organizational problems became apparent very
early. I do not believe that the command and control
aspects were understood in the same way by all the
parties concerned. FBI and FAA apparently have a
reasonably well worked out jurisdictional agreement
for domestic skyjacking; when this event became
international, and the Department of State "took control,"
the apparent change in leadership was probably resented
and compounded an already difficult leadership problem.
Indeed, the two organizations that, had the most control
over the incident (TWA and host goernment) were the
least subject to influence by State decisions. In
developing a better organizational response to this
type of incident it must be made very clear where the
final authority lies, and a system to involve better
liaison with the., private sector should. be considered.
However, although jurisdictional problems can probably
be solved by drawing up appropriate agreements among
Agencies, operational success cannot be assured until
there is mutual trust among the actors involved. This
can only be achieved on the personal level. Stated
simply, it means knowing whom to call for whatever
information or action is desired. This ability seemed
to be sadly lacking during this incident.
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3. The logistical and communication problems
at the State operation center were solved to a great
degree by moving to the FAA. The implications for
developing a better physical plant are clear.
4. The frustrations that always occur in an
incident of this nature generate a good deal of anger.
In this incident several scapegoats developed, among
which were the CIA, FBI, New York Police Department,
Government of France, etc. This is not necessarily
a bad thing, for discharge of anger in one direction
can be important to prevent its being discharged in
a potentially more dangerous direction. However, it
can also be counterproductive in preventing the free
flow of ideas and information. Again the issue of
trust is important.
5. What I consider to be a potentially very
dangerous example of the development of frustration
occurred toward the end of this incident. This was
at the time when we were receiving information that
the skyjackers on the aircraft were resistant-to the
suggestions of their comrade in the tower to give up.
I noted at that time a surge of impatience on the part
of many of the people in the command center. Of course,
this is quite understandable. The skyjackers had been
teasing us, and each time we anticipated their surrender
they disappointed us. At this point there was talk
in the room of the French storming the aircraft.
What happened is that the phenomenon that we often.
attribute to police forces began to occur in the
presumably detached and objective observers and
decision makers. An intolerable feeling of impotence
and passivity was dealt with by a wish for action,
and the concept of delay was all but forgotten
(momentarily).
6. The problem of the interpretation and
implementation of U.S. Government policy raised its
ugly head throughout the incident. We have all
talked about this at great length, and I know that
you are aware of the importance of its resolution.
One important aspect of it appeared to go unnoticed.
It has to do with the responsibility of the host
government. When the terrorists requested to speak
to one of several U.S. Government officials, and we
responded affirmatively, I am not aware that there
was any consultation with the Government of France
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about our decision. If there was none, it appears
to me that this would amount to usurping some. of
the responsibility for which we hold them accountable.
I wonder if this may explain in part some of what
appeared to us to be French intransigence, especially
with respect to facilitating our communications.
7. I have spoken to you (both before and during
the current incident) of some of the problems that
.arise in a crisis of this nature. The above points
are not all inclusive, and I hope we have an opportunity
to discuss them in greater detail.
25X1A
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~M$ NO. 237 Use previous editions
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25X1A
Itt: DDA 76-4748 Memo to Ambassador Douglas. Heck,: Director, Office of
fr OMS, Subj : TWA Hijacking
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Combat Terrorism
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