LIBYAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002100190001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 20, 1975
SUBJECT: Libyan-Soviet Relations
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship that has developed between Libya
and the Soviet Union during the last year adds a new and
potentially dangerous element to the Middle East equation.
Soviet military assistance and diplomatic attention has
enhanced President Qadhafi's ability to promote radical
causes in the Arab world. It may also encourage him to
expand his activities in such diverse places as Ethiopia
and the Philippines. Of immediate concern is the un-
settling effect Libyan-Soviet cooperation is having on
Egypt, and the possibility that this may ultimately hinder
progress in peace negotiations.
Soviet-Libyan relations have broader implications for
the Mediterranean area and for the US. The magnitude of
the most recent arms agreements--although greatly exag-
gerated in most accounts--raises the possibility that Moscow
will gain a new strategic foothold in Libya. Whether
Moscow is able to parlay these initial successes into
greater assets will depend on the Libyans and on Soviet
ability to treat with them. While both sides are still
uneasy with one another, each seems interested--if not
anxious--to maintain the momentum of the recent movement
toward better relations.
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This memorandum assesses the current status of the
Soviet-Libyan relationship, the motives behind it, and
the direction it may take.
II. EVOLVING RELATIONS
The Soviets enthusiastically greeted the 1969 Libyan
coup that brought Qadhafi to power, but they soon dis-
covered that the Libyan leader was bitterly anti-Communist
and suspicious of "superpower" influence in the Middle
East. Soviet overtures for closer ties were rebuffed by
Qadhafi, and the Soviets soon joined those who found him
erratic, unpredictable and irresponsible. Political ties
were openly strained and characterized by frequent ideologi-
cal invective. The Libyans did buy from Moscow prior to
1974 some $125 million in military equipment, mainly armor
and other ground forces equipment. Tripoli also sold Moscow
some oil, but these deals ended when oil prices skyrocketed
in 1974.
During the last year, Libya and Moscow have begun to
move in a new direction. On the Libyan side, the key has
been a desire to coordinate their military inventory with
those of the Arab frontline states. The Soviets have wanted
influence in a new corner of the Middle East and Libyan hard
currency. A commonly held antagonism to Egypt has motivated
both parties to seek better relations with each other. The
Soviets also saw a chance to gain some advantage over the US
in the Arab world, particularly since the US has been un-
willing to meet Libya's minimal arms requests.
A turning point in Soviet-Libyan relations was Prime
Minister Jallud's visit to the USSR in May 1974, which led
to two substantial military sales agreements. Soviet Premier
Kosygin's visit to Libya last month, the first by a top
Soviet leader, was a follow-up to the Jallud visit. Kosygin
sought to expand military and economic dealings, and establish
a closer political relationship.
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Kosygin's visit was only one sign of the change in a
relationship that not long ago was fraught with misunder-
standing and recrimination. Polemics have been muted,
Libya has upgraded its representation in Moscow by re-
placing its charge with an ambassador, and the Soviets
have established one of their many "friendship societies"
to further the idea of better Soviet-Libyan relations.
Kosygin is now letting it be known that he went home with
a changed view of Qadhafi's stability.
Nothing that happened in Tripoli, however, significantly
narrowed the substantive differences between the two countries
regarding the nature of communism, the right of Israel to
exist, or the outlines of a Middle East settlement.
III. THE ARMS ACCORD AND NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
Several days after Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to
Libya in mid-May, President Qadhafi was asked whether he
still regarded Moscow as an imperialist, atheist state.
Qadhafi glibly retorted that "he could deal with Moscow as
an equal." This naive confidence combined with Qadhafi's
deepening frustration over peace negotiations are at the
root of his dramatic--though perhaps somewhat tentative--
turn toward the Soviet Union.
Kosygin's visit to Libya and news of an expansion of
a 1974 military agreement between the two sides have given
rise--especially in Egypt--to exaggerated reports about
massive arms purchases and Soviet base rights in Libya.
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The two sides have also reached a number of agreements
in the economic and scientific fields that will draw them
closer together. The most noteworthy is a preliminary
accord under which the Soviets have agreed to build a nuclear
research center in Libya. This agreement--which will not be
finally concluded until the end of the year--has provisions
for a small 10-megawatt research reactor--similar to those
the Soviets have given Egypt and Iraq--a training program,
and advisory and coordination assistance. Libya has rati-
fied the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--presumably a
condition for receiving the reactor--therefore, it should
come under international safeguards.
If the agreement materializes, it will not significantly
advance Libya's quest for nuclear weapons, but it will enable
Tripoli to take the first halting step toward acquiring the
necessary expertise.
IV. SOVIET MILITARY USE OF LIBYA
One major breakthrough for the Soviets is the commit-
ment they appear to have won on naval access to at least some
Libyan ports. Until now, the Libyans have restricted even
routine port calls; no Soviet naval combatant has visited
Libya since 1969. the
admission of the Soviet attache in Egypt indicate is will
change, but the precise nature of the new arrangement is not
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Our estimate is that at this stage the Libyans, in
response to Soviet urgings, have decided to grant Moscow
occasional port calls for bunkering and replenishment and
will initially attempt to keep a tight leash on the Soviet
navy. The Libyans may be dangling the prospect of greater
concessions in return for Soviet help in building Libyan
naval facilities. So far, however, we have detected no
Soviet naval vessels in Libyan waters.
At present, Libya does not have much to offer Moscow
in the way of significant naval facilities--particularly in
comparison to the dockyard Moscow uses in Alexandria. Tripoli
and Benghazi are crowded commercial ports currently under
extensive renovation with limited berthing space and only
minor repair facilities. Tobruk at present has only limited
berthing space and no significant repair facilities. It
does have a large natural harbor and potential for develop-
ment. (Annex I contains a detailed discussion of Libyan and
Egyptian port facilities.)
If Moscow could gain unrestricted use of Libya, currently
available anchorages and bunkering would provide a suitable
alternative for all Egyptian ports other than Alexandria.
Moscow would have to make extensive use of its repair ships
and even these would be no substitute for Alexandria.
Moscow, however, would find it difficult to maintain its
current level of deployments--particularly submarines. If
the exUS air base at Uqba bin Nafi (Wheelus Field) were made
available, it would provide first class facilities for
Soviet naval reconnaissance and attack aircraft--which the
Soviets have not had in this area since 1972.
We have examined the possibility that Moscow may use
its military shipments to Libya to preposition substantial
amounts of military equipment for its own forces to use in
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the event of a new Middle East war. This prospect was
raised after the Kosygin visit but we think
it highly unlikely tor both military and political reasons.
To date, most of the Soviet equipment delivered to
Libya is in the western part of the country near Tripoli.
1w is we Would associate
with Soviet units. Nor have we had any indication of
adequate numbers of Soviet maintenance or other operational
personnel in Libya to prepare equipment for Soviet forces.
We would expect Moscow to seek to keep any prepositioned
equipment at a high state of readiness and this could only
be done by Soviet forces. The Libyans, of course, would
be likely to object to any substantial Soviet combat
presence.
We have seen no evidence
Libya would not be a desirable location for such a
force. Tripoli is almost 1200 difficult road miles from
the Suez Canal; Tobruk is 450 miles from Cairo. If the
Soviets wanted to preposition a force in the Middle East,
it would seem more likely they would try to do so in Syria--
which is now Moscow's closest Middle East ally. (See Annex
II for a detailed discussion of the possibility of preposition-
ing.)
V. SOVIET INTERESTS AND INTENTIONS
In responding to Libyan arms requests, the Soviets
appear to have had one eye on making a fast buck. Soviet
officials have commented on the financial windfall opened
up by Moscow's arms transactions, and certain aspects of the
sales bear the earmarks of the sharp trading.
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Political objectives, however, were almost certainly
controlling. It is hardly coincidence that the Soviets
began to make progress with Tripoli at the same time that
its relations with Egypt were becoming more difficult.
The Soviets want to put Sadat on notice that they have
other options open to them and want to contrast their
military generosity in Tripoli with their stinginess in
Cairo.
While Moscow wants to send Sadat a message, there is
no evidence that the Soviets have directly encouraged
Tripoli's campaign against him and it is doubtful that they
have taken the risky step of directly colluding with Qadhafi
against the Egyptian president. Indeed, the comments of some
Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not want Libyan-
Egyptian friction to become so bitter as to complicate its
ability to maneuver between both.
Soviet efforts in Libya are also part of Moscow's more
general efforts to win a place of influence in the Middle
East and the Soviets would have responded to overtures from
Tripoli even if their relations with Cairo were better.
Closer relations with Libya enable Moscow to keep one
foot in the camp of Arab "rejectionists." This could prove
useful to the USSR if it wants to switch tracks and try to
obstruct a Middle East settlement. In the meantime, this
threat forces the US and Egypt to give Soviet interests in
a settlement serious consideration, particularly when a
new round of step-by-step diplomacy is in prospect.
The Soviets seem to recognize, however, that they
have few ideological allies in the Libyan body politic.
Furthermore, they do not overrate Libya's political significance
and certainly do not see it as an influence in the Arab world
comparable to Egypt--or even Syria or Iraq.
Libya's strategic location on the southern rim of the
Mediterranean could be of considerable advantage to the Soviet
fleet if it is shut out of Egypt. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
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that the Soviets have any expectation of making significant
use of Libya any time soon. The fact that the Libyans in-
serted their usual rhetoric opposing foreign bases in the
Mediterranean into the communique ending Kosygin's visit
will help keep Soviet hopes in perspective.
If the Soviets have gotten Libya to drop its opposition
to Soviet naval visits, however, they will be encouraged to
press for more. They will certainly seek to put their
access to Libyan ports on a regular basis, similar to what
they now have in Syria.
The substantial inflow of Soviet arms into Tripoli
is not without problems for Moscow. For one thing, apprehen-
sion in Tunis has already caused Moscow to seek to allay
Tunisian concerns. It also opens Moscow to potential Western
accusations that Soviet actions destabilize the Middle Eastern
situation and violate the spirit of detente. We do not think,
however, that these considerations have given Moscow much
pause.
Nor has concern over the use Qadhafi might make of
Soviet weapons such as bombers and submarines, inhibited
Moscow from promising them. The Soviets probably are un-
certain about Qadhafi's intentions. Grechko once described
him as a "madman on top of a pile of gold" and Moscow was
irritated when Tripoli gave the SA-7 to fedayeen. But Moscow
is certain that Libya cannot master all of its weapons with-
out Soviet assistance. In any event, the Soviets do not hold
themselves responsible for the use to which their weapons are
put.
The Soviets probably recognize that the Libyans will seek
to use their arms stockpiles to influence Arab politics. It
may be that Moscow thinks the impact of arms deals on the Arabs
will be positive from their point of view--once again under-
scoring that only Moscow can provide the wherewithal to
challenge Israel.
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The Soviets do not appear concerned over the possi-
bility that Libya will transfer arms to other countries.
Although the Soviets will retain a handle through control
of spare parts, ammunition and training, the Soviet equip-
ment already in Libya gives Tripoli an impressive inventory.
In the event war breaks out, the Libyans would have to depend
on Soviet or other Arab air and sea transport to move rapidly
substantial amounts of equipment--particularly SAMs and
armor--to the Arab belligerents. Furthermore, Moscow has
probably incorporated in its agreements standard clauses
prohibiting arms transfers without Soviet consent. Moscow
may think this will give it some influence over Libyan
attempts to send arms to other Arabs.
VI. QADHAFI'S MOTIVES
President Qadhafi, who once offered Egypt generous
inducements to expel the Soviets, is now expanding his own
ties with Moscow for political purposes that apparently
transcend his anti-communist convictions. We do not believe
Qadhafi has softened his ideological opposition or lost his
basic distrust of the Soviets; on the contrary, his contempt
for them may ultimately disrupt the liaison. His motives
are more opportunistic, stemming mainly from his desire to
challenge Israel, its supporters, and those Arab leaders
willing to accept a negotiated settlement.
Qadhafi believes negotiating with Israel is dangerous
and doomed to eventual failure. He, therefore, wants a
well-equipped arsenal, which must be Soviet-made to augment
those of Arab nations that will fight a war he believes is
inevitable. In the meantime, he plans to use his newly-acquired
weapons to unnerve Israel and to try to block peace negotiations.
In this campaign, President Sadat and Egyptian policy are his
primary targets.
Qadhafi hopes that a large flow of Soviet weapons into
Libya will create unrest in the Egyptian military--based on
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envy and fear--and thus put pressure on Sadat to alter
his negotiating stance. The Libyans are aware that some
of Sadat's advisers are worried about deficiencies in
Egypt's military inventory and troubled by Sadat's turn
away from the Soviets. Qadhafi intends to play on these
fears and appeal to the young, pro-Nasir audience in Egypt
that he has usually been able to influence. The change in
emphasis of the Egyptian media over the last week from
personalized attacks on Qadhafi to serious consideration
of his actions and their implications suggests anxiety that
his strategy will succeed.
Qadhafi also yearns to recapture the influence he had
during the years when Libya was setting the pace of Arab oil
policy and planning a union with Egypt, the most powerful
country in the Arab world. In the two years since then,
Qadhafi has come to realize that his prospects are now
almost exclusively dependent on his ability to re-establish
an alliance with Cairo. He may, in fact, be hoping eventually
to use Soviet arms to buy his way into another unity project
with Egypt. Qadhafi's fixation on unity with Egypt often
matches his desire to defeat Israel, and in his mind, the
former may be a necessary first step in achieving the latter.
Another unity bid is not necessarily inconsistent with
Qadhafi's current campaign against Sadat. Although the
Libyan leader would prefer another partner and is working
toward that end, he has tried privately to reach a recon-
ciliation with Sadat, believing that the Egyptian president
eventually will see the error of his ways.
While waiting for the right opportunity, Qadhafi might
try to use his arms to bargain for Egyptian concessions on
lesser issues--a meeting with Sadat, for example, or a firm
declaration of Egyptian support for the Palestinians.
While we doubt that Cairo and Tripoli have a secret
agreement providing for the supply to Egypt of Soviet
equipment being delivered to Libya,
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we do not rule out the possibility that the two sides have
discussed this question during past lulls in their feud, or
that they might in the future agree on terms for such an
arrangement. We assume, moreover, that whatever the state
of his relations with Sadat, Qadhafi would feel duty-bound
to support the Egyptian military fully in the event of
renewed hostilities with Israel. He had no trouble doing so
during the 1973 war, despite his fury over Sada's rjection a
month earlier of union plans, and he is likely to give
generously again.
Like most ideologues, Qadhafi can rationalize the
bending of one principle, for example, non-alignment,
to serve a higher purpose--in his case, the restoration
of Arab Palestine and greater Arab unity. His swing toward
Moscow is made easier by what he sees as Washington's
unresponsiveness to Tripoli's recent diplomatic overtures,
its footdragging on the release of US-manufactured and
licensed arms, and its threatening posture toward Arab
oilfields.
Whether Qadhafi fully appreciates the risks in
becoming closely involved with Moscow is problematical.
he has warned the Soviets that he will not be used "like
other Arab leaders." His behavior during the Kosygin visit
suggests that he intends to remain aloof, leaving the task
of dealing with the Soviets primarily to Jallud, who is
more sympathetic to them. Qadhafi wants to hold the line
on the number of Soviet advisers and technicians in Libya
and is willing to sacrifice efficiency and perhaps a great
deal of equipment to do so. With the deep-seated xenophobia
of the Libyan people working for him, he has and will continue
to isolate Soviet personnel wherever possible.
Despite this caution, the parallel between Qadhafi and
his mentor, Nasir, is striking as well as paradoxical given
Qadhafi's outspoken opposition to Nasir's relationship with
Moscow. Over the years, Qadhafi has fervently adhered to
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Nasir's teachings, mimicked his tactics and style, and--
perhaps finally--lost sight of his mistakes. Unlike
Nasir, Qadhafi does not need Soviet arms for Libya's
defense; moreover, he has a bargainer's financial
independence. Nevertheless, the Libyan leader's brash
confidence, impatience, and near blindness to some
political realities may leave him vulnerable both to his own
actions and to his new patron.
Elements in the Libyan military--the major prop of the
regime--are reportedly concerned about the new Soviet
connection. The issue apparently has also divided the ruling
military council. Qadhafi will probably ignore these danger
signals as he has so often ignored others in the past. If
he listens to anyone, it will probably be Prime Minister
Jallud, who seems to be eagerly identifying himself with
Tripoli's new policy toward Moscow.
We see few effective constraints--other than Qadhafi's
own disdain for Moscow and tenacious sense of independence--
on his policy toward the Soviet Union.
VII. EGYPTIAN ANXIETY
Egypt fears the Libyan-Soviet liaison. Sadat already
believes that Libya has attempted subversion in Egypt, and
that it was directed specifically against him. He also
knows that the Soviets would like nothing better than
to be rid of him, and he therefore fears that the coalition
on his western border increases the danger to his position.
Sadat's anxiety also extends, more significantly, to
the implications of Libyan-Soviet cooperation in the broader
context of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
This cooperation threatens to negate Sadat's efforts to limit
Soviet influence throughout the Middle East. Sadat seems
convinced that Qadhafi is clinically insane or at best
dangerously erratic. In Sadat's view, Qadhafi's fervent
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nationalism and anti-communism are not enough to ensure
against the establishment in Libya of the kind of Soviet
tutelage that formerly existed in Egypt. Sadat knows
from bitter personal experience the ease with which Soviet
political influence followed Soviet arms during Nasir's
rule.
We doubt that there
exists, a secret Egyptian-
Libyan agreement providing tor the continuing transfer to
Egypt of virtually all of the Soviet arms to be delivered
to Libya. But we do not doubt that the Egyptians asked for
immediate or eventual access to Soviet arms delivered to
Libya last year. From the Egyptian standpoint, such a
transfer would benefit Egypt and in the long run hurt both
Libya and the Soviets--itself a benefit for Egypt. The
Egyptians would not feel politically indebted or even any
friendlier toward Libya; they would delight in being able
to undercut the Soviet effort to keep Egypt on a short
leash as far as arms deliveries are concerned.
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VIII. SOVIET PROSPECTS
The course of Soviet relations with Egypt will have
significant influence on Soviet policy in Libya. The
Soviets recognize that Egypt is still the country of para-
mount interest and influence in the Middle East. Even if
Moscow were confident it could establish a firm footing
in Libya, which it is not, Moscow would think it a poor
second to a similar relationship with Egypt. Despite their
deep problems with Sadat, the Soviets have not wanted to
force an open break and foreclose the possiblity of a
restoration of their position in Egypt. The Soviets will
be given pause by Sadat's restrictions on Soviet naval
access to Egyptian ports in response to Kosygin's visit
to Libya. While it seems unlikely that they will knuckle
under to this pressure, they may want to avoid a further
intensification of friction with Sadat. This suggests
that they will go slow in developing their Libyan ties,
unless relations with Sadat go further downhill.
The recently concluded arms deal already gives Moscow
more influence than it has ever had in Libya. If Qadhafi
is to make effective use of Soviet supplied equipment, he
will need more Soviet support,
Furthermore, control of re-
supply, spare parts and training will give Moscow important
leverage.
But Moscow also faces powerful obstacles in Libya.
Suspicion of the Soviets is strong and Qadhafi remains
xenophobic, nationalistic and anti-Communist. The heavy
handed Soviets have not been able to establish a good working
relationship with more moderate Arabs--much less any with
Qadhafi's volatile characteristics. The relationship is
based on opportunism rather than shared interests and friction
over their conflicting approaches to a Middle East settlement
can erupt at any time. Moscow must remember that if the
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Libyans become dissatisfied with the Soviet performance,
they have the financial resources to send the Soviets
packing and to seek alternate sources for their essential
military needs.
IX. LIBYAN TROUBLE-MAKING
Soviet cooperation with Libya may also encourage
Tripoli's adventurism elsewhere in the Middle East and in
the Muslim world. The fedayeen--already benefactors of
Libyan financial and military aid--are regarded by Qadhafi
as an important anti-Israeli instrument. Some of the Soviet
arms going into Libya are, therefore, likely to end up in
terrorist hands. A less immediate but more ominous
possibility is that Qadhafi will revive a now moribund
program for recruiting and training an Arab "liberation"
army with terrorist components. At its peak in mid-1972,
this program involved several thousand trainees from all
parts of the Arab world.
Libya has already complicated Lebanon's current
government crisis by encouraging with money and weapons
Lebanese leftists and radical Palestinians in their feud
with conservative Phalangists. In addition, Qadhafi has
tried to, promote concerted Arab pressure on Beirut to
accept military assistance in order to protect itself
from Israeli incursions. Fortified with more equipment
than he can possibly use at home, Qadhafi may now try to
channel more arms into Lebanon.
The Scw t-Libyan liaison may bear less directly on
Qadhafi's interests beyond the derailment of Middle East
peace negotiations. Libya's advocacy of a specifically
Islamic Arab revolution has involved political meddling,
financial aid, and in some cases low-level military support--
all of which Qadhafi is fully capable of undertaking on his
own. Soviet aid may, however, encourage Qadhafi to greater
activism and enhance the allure of his ability to provide
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benefits to his clients. For example, Prime Minister
Jallud's threat last week of military intervention in
support of Omani rebels suggests that Tripoli was, indeed,
emboldened by Moscow's endorsement a few weeks earlier.
We do not take these threats seriously at this stage. But,
we do expect a step up in Libyan aid to the Dhofar rebels
and their supporters in South Yemen and an intensification
of Tripoli's propaganda campaign against Iran's military
presence in the area.
Tripoli has provided assistance to assorted other
clients who may now seek renewed or increased support.
-- Libya has in the past supported Moroccan dissidents
and is now probably giving aid to one or more liberation
groupsin the Spanish Sahara.
-- Muslim dissidents in Ethiopian Eritrea have received
Libyan support, which apparently has been increased
since the outbreak of serious fighting in January.
-- Libya has aided southern African liberation groups
through regional organizations, such as the Organization
of African Unity.
--Tripoli has boasted about support to the Irish
Republican Army, although we have been able to confirm
only one instance of Libya's indirect involvement in an
arms shipment to the outlawed group.
-- Muslim insurgents in the Philippines have received
some money and small arms from the Libyans,
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