MEETING WITH ALAN GRANT OF THE ORLANDO COMMITTEE,THURSDAY, 1 JUNE AT 11:30 A.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003100300016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 7, 1961
• Content Type: MF

F! 0 E ti T; A -1.
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7 June 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Meeting with Alan Grant of the
Orlando Committee, Thursday,
1 June at 11:30 a. m.
1. At Mr. Grant's request I saw him on your behalf
on Thursday, 1 June. He explained that he wanted this
opportunity to tell me what he was doing in order to push
the concept of the Freedom Academy which the Orlando
Committee has been devoting time to for several years. He
said that he hoped that the Agency and yourself would be able
to back this proposal with the Congress.
2. Mr. Grant advised me that he had spent a half
hour with Colonel Walmsley, presently working with General
Maxwell Taylor, about two hours with Admiral Arleigh Burke,
had also talked to Mr. Siegenthaler, in the Attorney General's
office, and Leigh White, in the White House. He said that it
had been his hope that General Taylor would put some recom-
mendation on the Freedom Academy in his report.
3. Mr. Grant is highly exercised over the lack of
research in depth in what he calls "non-military combat".
He orated at some length on this particular subject, although
acknowledging that he had little or no knowledge of what CIA
did in this area. I did not enlighten him.
4. Mr. Grant also talked at some length about an
individual named Bernard Fall, who fought with the Maquis
in France and later with the French in Indo-China. Grant
seemed to feel that Fall has unique qualifications in this area.
5. At the conclusion of our discussion, I thanked
Mr. Grant for his courtesy in calling on us; told him that you
regretted very much being unable to see him; and assured him
of our continued deep interest in his efforts.
*
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through Mvlr. .,alners E. Smit , in Senator Mundt?s ottice
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Suggestion: It seems to me that we could benefit
considerably, public relations-wise, if we indicated deeper
interest in this Freedom Academy and particularly in the so-
called education in. "non-military combat". In this regard,
your VFW speech has attracted wide interest.
I would suggest that we set up a series of
briefings for Congressmen and senior Government officials on
the subject of what is being done in the Government in training
in "non-unitary combat". I also think that we could benefit
by assembling a compendium of all non- governmental education
in this field. Our compendium would be more complete than
anything done by a private organization like the Orlando Committee.
It would be unclassified and we could use it as a public relations
media.
25X1
X~rman B. irkp trick
Inspector General
Attachment (w/orig. only)
cc: DDCI
AD TN" /A F
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SUBJECT: Brief of Proposal on the Freedom Academy by Mr. Alan G. Grant
of the Orlando Committee
1. Mr. Grant, in his proposal for a Freedom Academy, points out that
in the non-military area the Communists are assulting the free world with
an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments. Guerrila warfare, subver-
sion, propaganda, blackmail, culture, aid and diplomacy are all intermixed
in a thousand pronged offensive. It is conceivable, according to Mr. Grant,
that the Communist Bloc can substantially isolate the United States and a
few allies in a hostile world in a few years unless we develop, and quickly,
a far greater capacity in the range of countermeasures potentially available
to us.
2. Mr. Grant recommends first, the public must have greater under-
standing of Communism, especially Communist conflict technique, and the
nature of the global struggle. Second, the private sector must know how
it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic
manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent,
ingenuity and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping
solve our cold war problems. Third, policy makers and cold war agency
personnel at many levels must understand Communism, and again with special
emphasis on Communist conflict technique. Fourth, policy makers and those
who advise them must understand the full range of measures potentially
available to us in the public and private sectors to meet the entire Communist
attack and to work toward our national objectives systematically. Fifth,
at all levels, agency personnel must be trained to understand and implement
this sophisticated strategy.
3. Mr. Grant feels that 80% or more of the research and training
program needed to develop fully the capacity of this country in the non-
military conflict area has not been instituted. He claims that we are on dead
center and that no one below the President and his close advisers has the
responsibility to consider non-military conflict whole. The FSI and War
Colleges can't. do it. They are primarily training institutions. No university
or research institution, including RAND, has the combination of expert know-
ledge and experience to cope with it in the necessary breadth and depth.
Mr. Grant also points out that there is no government operated school or
private institution where personnel are sent which gives coverage in any real
depth to Communism and Communist conflict technique. A partial exception may
be one CIA school about which he has only sketchy information.
4. According to Mr. Grant the Freedom Academy seems the best organizational
setup to give us a badly needed conceptual framework for non-military conflict
within an acceptable period of time.
5. On Page 5 of the attached proposal, Mr. Grant makes mention of your
VFW talk.
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9 June 1961
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BRIEFING PAPER ON FEEEDOM ACADEMY PROPOSAL
Prtpaa.3ed by Al tenana T. -Grant
of the Orlando Committee
In the non-military area, the Communists are assaulting the Free
World with an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments. Following
Lenin's admonitions, they have mastered all methods and means of conflict and
these have been integrated into a many directional strategy. They are using
every promising avenue to approach their objectives and are demonstrating
exceptional organizational capabilities in penetrating and manipulating a wide
range of political parties, institutions and organizations in Latin America,
Africa, the Middle East and Far East.
Even today few of our people appreciate the remarkable research,
development and training program in conflict technique and management which
has been in high gear in the Soviet Union for nearly forty years. This
program has enabled the Communists to develop and integrate the full spectrum
of conflict instruments and to train "conflict managers" capable of orches-
trating all of these instruments in carefully patterned and calibrated
aggression in which the widest possible range of non-military weapons and
weapons systems are used against us in an intelligent, sustained and
systematic manner. Guerrilla warfare, subversion, propoaganda, blackmail,
culture, aid, and diplomacy are all intermixed in a thousand pronged offensive.
It is not only the ability of the Kremlin leaders to orchestrate
the cold war. They have also carefully developed the many organizational
means and especially the trained, motivated cadres which enables them to
implement their strategy in all of its dimensions.
The well developed nature of Soviet conflict technique makes our
problems of defense and offense in the non-military area extremely difficult.
Forty years of intensive preparation are now paying off. The situation is
beginning to develop rapidly. It is conceivable the Communist Bloc can
substantially isolate the United States and a few allies in a hostile world in
a few years -- unless we develop, and quickly, a far greater capacity in the
range of countermeasures potentially available to us. This is the greatest
challenge to the Administration and will determine its place in history.
When we speak of developing a greater capacity to meet the Com-
munists in the area short of hot war, what must be done? What are the
requirements for preparing a pluralistic society to meet the Communist cold
wax attack on a global basis? It is only by keeping these requirements in
mind and the difficulties of meeting them that the present bill can be
understood.
At the risk of dwelling on the obvious, let me list these. In doing
so it is assumed the global struggle is indeterminate -- that is, it may go on
for decades, and that the present capabilities of the Communist Bloc are such
that we cannot rely on half measures but must develop our full capacity to
engage in the new dimensions of conflict.
First, the public must have greater understanding of Communism,
especially Communist conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle.
This is necessary to maintain the will to victory and to overcome apathy in a
long and tedious struggle. It is necessary if the public is to support whole-
heartedly the difficult and often distasteful things we must do in the coming
years. In a free society, policy, to be effective, must have public support.
A widening fissure between public knowledge and policy can spell disaster.
For defensive purposes alone this knowledge is essential, if public opinion is
not to be confused and manipulated by the deceptions and blandishment of
skilled propagandists who understand us and our desire to be left alone too
well.
Second, the private sector must know how it can participate in the
global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the
private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity and strength which can be
developed and brought to bear in helping solve our cold war problems. A wide
range of interrelated programs can be implemented, if certain preconditions
are met. Whether these things are done or not done can be the difference be-
tween victory and defeat in a close contest in which the enemy has mobilized
his entire society to win the cold war, as well as to prepare for hot wax.
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Third, policy makers and cold war agency personnel at many levels
must understand Communism, and again with special emphasis on Communist
conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts available for consulta-
tion. This is basic "battle knowledge" which must be widely disseminated in
the agencies, if planning and implementation are to be geared to the conflict
we are in.
Fourth, policy makers and those who advise them must understand the
full range of measures potentially available to us in the public and private
sectors to meet the entire Communist attack and to work toward our national
objectives systematically. This means they will have to master a broad range
of non-military measures which have yet to be thought through and systematized.
They4nust be able to organize and interrelate these measures in an integrated
strategy in which our national objectives are approached from many directions,
using every promising method and means and fully utilizing our national
capacity to compete in the new dimensions of struggle.
Fifth, at all levels, agency personnel must be trained to understand
and implement this sophisticated strategy. Unless there is a substantial
"common fund of knowledge" about the nature of the enemy, the global conflict,
and the'vast array of negative and positive measures available to us, there
cannot be the integrated team play necessary to carry out a complex strategy
with vigor and-elan against a dedicated and skilled enemy.
There are other requirements, but the above are basic. By and large
we have failed to meet these, because we have not understood that the necessary
capacity can only come about through a systematic, large scale research and
training program. This generalization irritates some people in the agencies
and universities who have devoted much of their lives to solving cold war
problems. I do not intend to depreciate work already done, nor to imply that
in all areas it has been inadequate. I do say that our research and training
program in the area of non-military conflict, considered as a whole, is
grossly inadequate and has failed to achieve to a substantial degree any one
of the above five requirements. This should be self-evident, but there is a
built-in ability within the agencies to resist this fact and the conclusions
to be drawn.
Actually an increasing number of people in the agencies are aware
of this. Nevertheless, when a group of outsiders state these things in
generalities, they assume we do not know of much work that is being done,
and suspect we are unsophisticated in the complexities of many problems.
Of course, no small private group, like the Orlando Committee, can
know everything the government is doing, some of which is classified. How-
ever, over the years, we have collected considerable data on what is being
done and not being done, with emphasis on research and training in non-military
conflict. We have been over the curriculum of the War Colleges, the Foreign
Service Institute, the USIA training program and the research and training
programs of leading university centers dealing with international affairs,
and area studies. We have checked our findings with various experts across
the country and within the agencies. We have done heavy reading in the area.
We have reviewed all cold war legislation. And, I expect we may have given as
much thought to what the private sector can contribute as anyone else.
The conclusion is inescapable that the problem of formulating and
implementing an adequate research and training program in non-military conflict
has been approached on a piecemeal basis. Fifteen years ago, when we realized
we were entering a cold war, our policy planners began formulating some rather
minimal ideas and programs for meeting the non-military challenge. As the
crisis deepened and the massive nature of the Soviet assault on our civiliza-
tion became evident, various research projects were instituted at our universi-
ties, RAND and within the agencies; there was a beefing up of language study
at the Foreign Service Institute and greater emphasis was placed on the non-
military area at the War Colleges. However, I can find no evidence that any-
one sat down and thought out the overall research and training program which
would be necessary to fill systematically and adequately the five fundamental
requirements I have listed. Rather, the problem was considered in bits and
pieces, and the programs instituted met bits and pieces of the problem.
Possibly 80% or more of the research and training program needed to develop
fully the capacity of this country in the non-military conflict area has not
been instituted.
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Let me be specific.
Take something as basic and fundamental as Requirement No. 3 -- the
need for wide understanding of Communism and especially Communist conflict
technique in our agencies. There is little evidence of a comprehensive,
organized effort to fill this requirement.
The War Colleges may devote two weeks to a month to coverage of the
Soviet Bloc. Within that period the specific treatment of Communism and
Communist conflict techniques rarely exceeds two or three days. Yet this is
a difficult subject which requires considerable-, systematized study, and it is
absolutely essential to an understanding of the conflict we are in. It is
true, of course, that the rest of the instruction is related to the Communist
threat. But this is an indirect tie which in many cases presupposes a more
complete understanding of Communist operations than the student actually
possesses.
The Foreign Service Institute has a two-week seminar on Communism
and the Soviet Union. This is a broad survey course, which can give only
light treatment to Communism and Communist conflict technique. By trying to
cover everything in ten days of actual training, the course is necessarily
superficial. For example, it provides 1 1/2 hours of lecture-discussions
each on Communism in the Far East, South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia,
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the United States. There
is one lecture-discussion on such involved, encyclopedic subjects as sub-
version and "coordination of forces" to stop the Communist advance.
Considering the very few points even a first class lecturer can get across
in one lecture, the superficiality of the course is self-evident. This is
no criticism of the teachers -- they just don't have enough time.
The Basic Foreign Service Officer's Course (8 weeks) required of
all junior officers on appointment and the Mid-Career Course in Foreign
Affairs (12 weeks), which are the mainstay of FSI training (outside language
training), offer almost nothing. The Basic Course has six hours of lectures
by CIA experts "covering" the Soviet Union, the international Communist
movement, the organization and strategy of Communism, Soviet global propa-
ganda, and how to answer criticisms abroad originating from Communists. (In
Orlando we considered seventeen hours on the same subjects too skimpy for
high school seniors.) The Mid-Career Course includes only a two hour lecture
on Communist doctrine and practice, two hours on the role of behavioral
science in Soviet strategy, and two doors on Soviet political organizations.
(There is time, however, for five hours on "Philosophy of Administration" and
four hours on "Origin and Diffusions of Myths and Rites.")
In 1958 FSI inaugurated the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, a
nine months course, for about twenty senior officers at a time which appears
to be the FSI counterpart to the War Colleges. This devotes five days to
"Communist Strategy," and a good part of this time is spent in discussion
groups or attending optional films. Actually there are just five lectures by
four guest lecturers, who are, however, top men, and several short training
films. Thirty-one books are recommended to the students, together with
certain classified material, but this lengthy list must have been drawn up
with tongue in cheek for a five-day course. Again, much of the remainder of
the course relates to the Communist threat, but as in the case of the War
Colleges, this is an indirect tie which presupposes more knowledge about
Communism than the student usually possesses.
The USIA training program has no course on Communism, but makes
use of the two week FSI Seminar.
people.
The FBI, I am told, has a one week course for its internal security
A limited number of agency personnel are assigned to various
universities taking courses, practically all of which, insofar as they are
connected with Communism, are of the area study type devoted to the Soviet
Union or China rather than study in depth of Communism and Communist conflict
technique.
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The various Russian research centers are not suitable for instruction
but are devoted to research. (This is also true of RAND which in this field
has gone to sleep.) A person attending these institutions does so in order to
write a research paper or a book. Research on specific operational matters is
rarely done by these institutions which are overly academic. This should be
obvious from their literary output.
None of those programs provide an adequate coverage of Communism.
Furthermore, only a small fraction of our agency people have had even this
minimal, formal exposure. Nor is there any systematic follow-up with those
who have graduated. Much of what little is offered is more concerned with
area studies and the history and philosophy of Communism than Communist con-
flict technique, though the latter is the pay-off phase.
Minor exceptions are seminars run by Kissinger at Harvard and
Possony at Georgetown. These are small seminars with a handful of agency
personnel, but I understand they do give a little more coverage to Communism
and non-military conflict problems.
As far as I can determine, there is no government operated school
or private institution where agency personnel are sent which gives coverage
in any real depth to Communism and Communist conflict technique. A partial
exception may be one CIA school about which I have only sketchy information.
When I checked this with Dr. Stefan Possony of Georgetown Univer-
sity, a leading authority on Communism, lecturer at the National War College
and FSI, and adviser on Soviet affairs to the Department of Defense, he
advised, "there is, to the best of my knowledge, no school within the govern-
ment which specializes in Communism, let alone operational Communism."
He further commented, "without detracting in the slightest from
the value of the War Colleges and the agency trade schools, it cannot be
seriously argued that these schools provide an adequate coverage of
Communism. There is indeed a coverage in broad outline, but no intensive
study and there are large gaps in the coverage. This cannot be otherwise
because literature dealing with Communism also shows wide gaps; furthermore,
there are no textbooks which allow a student to tackle the whole problem
matter within two covers. Instead, anyone who wants to be knowledgeable
on Communism is compelled to read a minimum of two or three dozen books,
and such an undertaking simply is not in the cards within a ten-months
course (length of War College courses), most of which deals with other
subjects, let alone courses lasting only a few weeks. The very fact that
there is no textbook on Communism is a good enough illustration for the
necessity of a Freedom Academy."
Please note the above deficiency deals only with instruction about
Communism, not the deficiencies in political warfare, etc.
Consider Requirement No. 1 -- adequate public knowledge about
Communism and the global struggle. Again there is no evidence of an
organized effort which can hope to fill the gap.
it should be emphasized here that even adequate generalized know-
ledge about Communism and Communist conflict technique can only be obtained
through a systematic training program or a heavy amount of organized reading.
It is no answer to say that our news media give excellent coverage of world
events. They present a hodgepodge of uncorrelated facts which leave the un-
trained individual with a blurred image of Communism. Nor is it any answer to
say there are many good books about Communism in our libraries, when no
significant number of people are reading these books, or reading them in
sufficient quantity.
It should be kept in mind there is little in the experience of our
people to prepare them to understand the present struggle. The type of enemy
we face, the dazzling and confusing array of methods and means used against
us, the skillful deception, the ambiguous nature of enemy moves, the mis-
leading vocabulary, the slow and often concealed erosion of our position, the
seemingly disconnected events in all parts of the globe, subversion raised to
the level of a science, are all foreign to our experience.
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Our secondary schools and universities are an obvious place to make
a beginning in organized instruction about Communism and the world conflict.
Yet by and large they offer almost nothing. Allen Dulles, in his speech last
August to the VFW commented:
"In our schools and colleges we can find many courses in
ancient history, in philosophy, courses on the great move-
monts of the past, the conquests of ancient times from
Alexander the Great to Napoleon. Courses on Communist
theory and practices are few and far between.
"By and large, however, in our educational institutions,
except in the graduate field or in specialized schools and
seminars, these subjects are not generally taught.
"There is a real urgency to build up our knowledge on the
entire background of the Communist thrust against our
civilization.
"The people of this country are and will continue to be
basically opposed to Communism in general. This
opposition is based more on instincts than on knowledge.
This is not enough. Our people should be sufficiently
educated in all of the ramifications of communistic in-
trigues and its historical background, its purposes and
programs adequately to contribute toward an effective
answer.
"The initiative for new knowledge comes more often from
those of us who want to learn than from those who teach.
But let us also call on our educators, and on those in
authority who have influence over the development of our
educational system to begin to expand the realistic teach-
ing of the history and policies of Communism."
Mr. Dulles was overly generous in his reference to the graduate
field. Dr. Possony, in a recent letter, advises, "I do not think there are
more than half a dozen courses in the entire country that cover Communism
as such and, if so, discuss operational technique rather than political
philosophy and history. If there are more such courses they would be outside
regular degree curricula." A course covering political philosophy in the 19th
and 20th centuries in which the student reads the Communist Manifesto and
State and Revolution, does practically nothing to prepare him to-understand
the conflict we are in. Nor do a few chapters on Russia since 1917 in a
Modern European History course. Yet this is about all that most colleges offer.
As Dulles emphasized, this instruction should begin in our secondary
schools. Here the gap is almost complete. Actually some public pressure is
developing to institute courses on Communism versus Democracy in our high
schools. However, even if our schools wanted to do this, and some now do,
they are stymied, because. no teachers have been trained to give such courses,
or to include the subject Ti a equate form in social science and history
courses.
Nothing demonstrates our research and training failure better than
this failure to teach the teachers. Again and again civic organizations, the
American Bar Association for example, have urged such instruction. And each
time they run up against the same roadblock. There is little evidence our
teachers' colleges and state universities are doing anything to remedy the
situation or that they have instructors themselves, in many instances, who are
prepared to teach these things. In the coming years, here and there, something
may be done, but there will be no organized effort to fill this appalling gap
without the Freedom Academy, It is unrealistic to expect our busy teachers to
educate themselves in this difficult subject. Under mounting pressure, courses
will begin to appear in our high schools, but there quality, in the absence of
systematically trained teachers, will leave much to be desired.
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There are a few bits and pieces, small scale attempts to overcome
public ignorance. The War Colleges bring in a few private citizens, mostly
reserve officers, for one or two week Strategy Seminars. These range over
such a wide area they can provide only the skimpiest coverage of Communism.
Some private groups have initiated schools on Communism, usually of two or
three day duration. These have been given in only a few cities and there is
no systematic follow-up, so the initial impact is soon dissipated.
It is when we come to Requirement No. 2, however, -- not merely
understanding Communism but knowing how the private sector can contribute to
winning the global struggle that the extent of the research and training gap
really becomes apparent.
Let me emphasize this. The Orlando Committee, after years of
considering the problem, is convinced that many of our most difficult cold
war problems are susceptible of partial solution, at least, through a wide
range of method and means which can be implemented by the private sector --
provided that our private institutions and civic organizations have among
their members some who have received at least a little systematic training
about Communism, the global conflict, and what the private sector can con-
tribute. Without such trained and motivated people, what the private sector
can do is limited. With them, even in comparatively small numbers, the range
of activities is almost unlimited. Yet, as in the case of school teachers,
we have neglected to provide anywhere a training program which would enable any
significant number of private citizens to learn about these things.
Today the private sector wants to participate. From personal
experience, and this has been confirmed by others I have talked with, I can
testify a marked change has occurred recently in the public's attitude toward
the cold war. Responsible citizens who showed little concern even a year or
two ago, are now crowding forward to ask "what can we do?" They are worried.
They sense that the business as usual civic projects now engaging their time,
are a little silly in terms of the present world situation. Many display
eagerness to involve themselves and their organizations in worthwhile projects
that have some real bearing on winning the cold war. These are responsible
civic leaders, who understand the battle must be won in Latin America and
Africa as well as Hoboken, and by a combination of positive as well as nega-
tive programs.
By and large, however, this increasing desire to participate has
been frustrated by lack of trained leadership at the community, state and
national levels and advanced knowledge on what the private sector can do.
This is disturbing, because every day opportunities are slipping by,
some never to reappear, where the private sector could make an important
contribution. But our civic leaders lack the training to enable them to
visualize these opportunities, or the methods and means their organizations
would employ to take advantage of them.
The little training that is available, like the Strategy Seminars and
the short schools on Communism, have one common failing. They get the student
all stirred up and then suggest little or nothing he can do.
There is a good reason why. The things the private sector can do
are not as obvious as some imagine. Knowing something about the enemy is not
sufficient preparation for making an effective contribution.
This is a tough and complex struggle. It will require a concentrated,
systematic research program involving a broad cross-section of experts with a
maximum cross fertilization of ideas and experience to think through the many
methods and means the private sector can employ -- if the private sector is to
participate on a sustained and systematic basis.
A number of private organizations are making some contribution here
and overseas. Certain foundations are spending substantial sums over-seas on
a range of projects that have at least an indirect bearing. The AFL-CIO has
done considerable work in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia attempting
to build up free labor against the Communist onslaught. Several universities
offer short courses to businessmen going overseas. If you go through the
whole list of private participation, at first glance it appears impressive.
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In fact it is not. Only a tiny fraction of the ingenuity, talent
and strength that could be brought to bear here and overseas is being utilized.
The great majority of our civic organizations are uninvolved. Much of what is
being done is mediocre in terms of what it could be, if we had trained,
motivated people to carry out these programs.
To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive, organized effort going
on anywhere to research and think through the full range of methods and means
the private sector can properly employ. Nor does any existing center have
the staff, funds or directive to undertake this enormous and challenging job.
Yet, until the problem is considered whole, until a wide range of expert know-
ledge is focussed on the problem, we can never know what the true capacity of
the private sector is.
In planning our strategy in the non-military area, we tend to down-
grade the role of the private sector and this is realistic, considering its
present limited capacity.
The point is that we can very likely develop a tremendous capacity
to participate with the right research and training program. Instead of
bemoaning the lethargy, indifference and seeming incapacity of the private
sector, we should recognize these are the natural and expected results of our
neglect to institute an adequate research and training program.
Today no one (not even the Orlando Committee, we must confess)
really knows what that capacity can be. No one can know until the type of
research and training program envisioned for the Freedom Academy is undertaken.
Requirements 4 and 5 are again especially illustrative of the in-
adequacy of our research and training program in non-military conflict.
In approaching our rational objectives, we are employing only a
fraction of the methods and means potentially available. Again and again an
objective is approached along a few well worn avenues, when a whole complex
of access roads lead directly or indirectly to the same goal. Ours has been
a limited approach to strategy, while the Communists have mastered and employ
all methods and means.
Possibly our greatest weakness is that we continue to plan too much
in terms of present capacity rather than in terms of systematically developing
capacity in the new dimensions of global conflict. This means developing the
full range of operational knowledge and then training people to use it.
At the higher levels we need conflict managers on our side who have
assimilated a wide range of background knowledge and operational knowledge and
can visualize, organize and manage the whole range of interrelated measures
and countermeasures by which the global conflict will be determined. The field
is so vast, the interrelationship between programs so sophisticated, that it
cannot'be mastered except through systematic and intensive study. Yet today
there is no training program or combination of training programs which can
produce rounded cold war strategists. Of course there cannot be, in the full
sense, until a much wider range of operational knowledge has been researched
and systematized.
Lacking an adequate training program, our cold war strategists have
had to learn on the job, with tragic consequences. Furthermore, in coming up
the ladder, the conceptual thinking and experience of careerists is often
limited to one agency. While they may serve on various inter-agency boards
and even attend one of the other agency schools, they are short on operator
knowledge outside their agency. There are exceptions -- non-careerists like
Robert Lovett and Gordon Gray come to mind, who have moved around quite a bit.
This stands in marked contrast to the preparation of Soviet conflict
managers who have been schooled in political warfare throughout their careers
and have been known, particularly in recent years, to serve successively in
the KGB, the Army, the AGITPROP, and the foreign service.
Henry Kissinger, in his remarkable study, Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy, commented on this (page 434):
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"Whatever the qualities of Soviet leadership, its training
is eminently political and conceptual. Reading Lenin or
Mao or Stalin, one is struck by the emphasis on the relation-
ship between political, military, psychological and economic
factors, the insistence on finding a conceptual basis for
political action and on the need for dominating a situation by
flexible tactice and inflexible purpose. And the internal
struggles in the Kremlin ensure that only the most iron-
nerved reach the top. Against the Politburo, trained to
think in general terms and freed of problems of day-to-day
administration, we have pitted leaders overwhelmed with
departmental duties and trained to think that the cardinal sin
is to transgress on another's field of specialization. To our
leaders, policy is as a series of discrete problems; to the
Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political pro-
cess. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet
system has had many of the attributes of any contest between
a professional and an amateur. Even a mediocre professional
will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the
amateur does not know what to do, but because he cannot
react with sufficient speed and consistency. Our leaders
have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while
doing, and this has imposed too great a handicap."
The nearest thing we have to a multi-dimensional training program
is at the War Colleges. Originally designed to emphasize military subjects,
the Colleges have reoriented their courses to give to national and inter-
national affairs something approaching a co-equal role. Their primary purpose
is to give the officer, often insulated from non-military matters prior to
World War II, a grasp of the broader aspects of national strategy. Tiny
quotas are also assigned from State, USIA, CIA, ICA, Treasury and Commerce,
Many factors which go into formulating national policy are con-
sidered. In terms of providing a broad survey of our cold and hot war
machinery, an understanding of the interplay between existing programs, and
a survey of current political, economic, military matters around the world,
the War Colleges do a reasonably good job-and they enjoy considerable prestige.
However, the War Colleges, despite their excellence, fall far, far
short of training rounded conflict managers. Their purpose is more modest.
Such central subjects as Communist conflict doctrine are, as noted, given
only the lightest coverage. The all important subject of psycho-political
warfare is mentioned, but not really studied, and so forth. The same is true
of the Senior Officer's Seminar at FSI. They hardly begin to open the students'
eyes to the whole new range of operational methods and organizational forms
which we must develop and master, if we are to successfully resist Communist
protracted conflict from the student organizations of Latin America to the
jungle villages of Viet Nam.
Dr. Possony in a recent letter summarizing some of the gaps that
exist in present government cold war training programs, says:
"If we look at specific gaps, we find that there is nowhere
any instruction on political warfare. Sometimes the word
is used but the speaker usually has no solid background of
information nor is documentation handy. Nowhere, to my
knowledge, is the subject treated comprehensively, and
even if one agency does devote some attention to this, I
doubt that there is enough competence throughout the govern-
ment. Hence not only our own operators, but also those
large segments of the U. S, Government who are the very
target of political warfare, are left in ignorance about the
matter.
"Similarly, there is no place where ideology is being
studied. Ideologies are studied in universities, of course,
but only in terms of Hegel, Marx, etc. In a deeper opera-
tional sense, notably in view of offensive or defensive
manipulation, ideology is not on the instructional map. I
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would go so far as to say that there is no instruction through-
out the government designed to protect us against hostile
propaganda. It is naively taken for granted that our people
understand propaganda techniques and have no trouble dis-
tinguishing propaganda from genuine communications.
"Going beyond propaganda, I an unaware of any government
effort dealing with psychological warfare including such
important features as motivation, will, perseverance, con-
version, anxiety neuroses, and other factors from the area
of psychology and personality.
"There is unquestionably some pragmatic experience in
economic warfare, but there is no agency where this problem
is studied comprehensively.
"With respect to technological warfare, the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces has been making some progress, but,
essentially, this school continues to deal with economics
in the traditional sense.
"The inter-relationships between psychological and tech-
nolpgical warfare such as they manifest themselves in the
test-ban agitation are studied nowhere. The many scientists
who are called upon to advise the U. S. Government on
technological matters are kept in blissful ignorance about
the most essential points on which their advice has a bearing.
"Academic instruction is one thing and operational training
another. The operational training the U. S. Government
has been providing, even in its trade schools,, is quite
inadequate, partly because operational records are kept
highly classified and are withheld from instruction. Once
a particular operation is terminated, the data and the lessons
learned could be incorporated into the instructional materials,
but this is not done, possibly with the occasional exception
of one trade school.
"There are several efforts to acquaint reserve officers
and civilian leadership groups with communism and other
strategic problems (Strategy Seminars), But these programs
are intermittent, improvised, and have too broad or narrow
an audience base. No effort is really made to give the
facts to such key segments of the American people as the com-
munications industry. Nor is a real effort made to acquaint
public opinion with the facts of life. Add to this the unfulfilled
or largely unfulfilled need to increase the knowledge on com-
munism in allied countries, and to give a proper instruction
to exchange people and foreign students, and you have a good
list of the many things we are not doing."
These gaps in political, economic, psychological, technological
warfare and propaganda, as well as operational Communism, could hardly
be more critical, for they are in the very subjects which are essential to
an understanding of the conflict we are in.
Without intensive, systematic study of these subjects, how can a
cold war strategist possibly hope to develop strategy attuned to the world
conflict? To say that specialists are available to advise him on these
matters is like saying experts on strategy and tactics are available to a field
commander who has never gotten around to studying these things himself.
Washington advised Braddock about those unconventional Indians and well
before the ambush. Unless the policy maker has himself mastered these
central subjects and can think conceptually about the conflict we are actually
in, the availability of specialists will not make a strategist out of him.
When these grave deficiencies are pointed out, the stock answer is,
we know government training programs are inadequate, but this is supple-
mented by sending regular quotas to the better schools of international studies
at our universities. As one State Department official put it to me, "we like
our people to get the Harvard viewpoint, the John Hopkins viewpoint, the MIT
viewpoint, rather than just the viewpoint of a Freedom Academy." (No one
has suggested the Freedom Academy would replace these centers.)
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The point is that our universities are concentrating on language and
area studies and not on developing or teaching non-military conflict. Whoever
heard of a course in political warfare? Yet it is total political war in which
we are engaged. Their programs are weak in essentially the same areas as
government training programs. Possony's comments apply equally to our
universities,
I do not argue against the desirability of exposing agency personnel
to many viewpoints. I do say that when these training programs, in sum, skim
over or bypass the subjects most essential to an understanding of the war we
are in, they are in no sense a substitute for the Freedom Academy. Language
studies and area studies are important. But until the strategist has also
studied in depth Communist conflict doctrine and political, ideological, psy-
chologicU, organizational, economic, para-military conflict from our view-
point, as well as the Soviets, he cannot relate the other knowledge to the
conflict we are in.
The urgent need is for rounded cold war strategists. Our universi-
ties are attuned to developing scholars and specialists. The urgent need is
for operational-organizational know-how in the new dimensions of struggle.
Our universities are attuned to language and area studies, or to inter-
national law and diplomacy in a more conventional context.
There is another most important reason why our universities fall
short. This has to do with motivation and the will to victory. Motivation
is the most essential element we must instill in our people at all levels.
We are constantly told that the Communists work harder with more dedication
than their opponents. This is true because the Communist training program,
the whole process by which they mold their cadre, concentrates on achieving
a complete personal commitment, We naively assume motivation. Our armed
forces understand its importance. Paratroop, Marine Corps, and Ranger
cadres have it, and it has been carefully cultivated in training, because
their tough combat missions require it. Yet non-military conflict tests the
human will in more subtle and deadly ways than military combat, and the will
to win is crucial. The university atmosphere is simply not conducive to
developing a complete personal commitment. Sometimes it will, but this is
by accident rather than by design.
Many of the programs which are potentially available to us are
conditioned on highly motivated as well as trained personnel to implement
them. Men and women ready to accept any financial sacrifice or physical
rigor if it contributes to victory; who will not permit themselves to be
affected by the apathy of their associates, or the psychological pressures
of the enemy.
Our training program is, of course, severely handicapped by the
grossly inadequate research and development program in non-military conflict.
This has kept us from understanding our true capacity and instituting a train-
ing program oriented to this capacity.
Much work has been done at our universities on area research,
especially on the Soviet Union, The Russian Research Center at Harvard has
produced a number of books going into many facets of the Soviet state. There
is an increasing awareness of the need for African, Latin American and
Eastern studies, and many area studies are underway at our universities.
Language training is being stepped up. Hundreds of books have been published
in recent years on the Soviet Union and Communism.
Yet we must keep constantly before us the distinction between
studying Communism and the languages, institutions, economies and histories
of foreign countries on the one hand and researching and developing the
operational-organizational know-how and the conceptual framework for non-
military conflict which makes it possible to understand the conflict we are in
in all its dimensions and to apply the full range of methods and means
potentially available in an integrated, sustained and consistent fashion.
It is this operational-organizational knowledge and a realistic
conceptual framework for a global struggle between Freedom and Communism
which is neglected at our universities.
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The Soviets also engage in extensive area and language studies,
and in African studies they are probably ahead of us. But it is not this
which gives them their great advantage. Rather, it is the systematic way in
which they have thought out and mastered all the organizational forms and
operational techniques which are possible in a total power struggle and the
way in which they apply these flexibly yet systematically and consistently
with clearly understood purpose within an all encompassing conceptual frame-
work.
I do not mean to imply that nothing is being done about these
things in our universities. Here and there an individual professor, or a
small group is doing some work.
By and large, however, we have hardly more than begun to think
through the full range of methods and means we can employ in the government
and private sectors. We are far from achieving the capability of applying
all of these methods, when and if they are developed, flexibly yet con-
sistently. We simply do not know what our capacity for non-military conflict
is.
Take a specific case.
One of our major problems is the deep Communist penetration of
Latin American universities and student organizations. Keeping in mind our
policy of non-intervention, what operational methods, organizational forms
and programs are possible in the public and private sectors which can help
solve this serious problem? The conventional methods of cultural programs,
student exchange, USIA libraries immediately come to mind, but these are
entirely inadequate.
From how many directions can this problem be attacked? What can
the private sector contribute now -- what could it contribute if the Freedom
Academy had been in operation the last few years and many of our civic
organizations and universities had Academy graduates? What direct or
indirect methods are possible in the government sector other than those
employed now?
I suggest that if three intermediate level graduates of the Freedom
Academy, with experience in Latin affairs, were locked up with this problem
over a weekend, they would find 'there is an almost limitless range of inter-
related programs in the public and private sectors which could be brought to
bear -- and with minimum risk of successful accusations of Yankee Imperialism
and with no violence to our democratic; ethics -- provided again that the
activating organizations possessed a few Freedom Academy graduates.
Today there is almost no chance these things will be done. There
is little awareness of the infinite variety of operational-organizational
possibilities inherent in a total political-ideological struggle, and we do
not have the trained, motivated people deployed where they could plan and
implement these things, especially in the private sector.
The President's recent speech indicates the Administration has
turned a corner in its comprehension of the inadequacy of our strategy and
the means of implementation in non-military conflict. I was particularly
struck by these sentences:
"We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new
and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new
concepts , the new tools, the new sense of urgency we
will need to combat it, whether in Cuba or South Viet Nam.
And we dare not fail to realize it is this struggle which is
taking place every day without arms or fanfare, in thousands
of villages and markets and classrooms all over the globe
No greater task faces this nation or this Administration
. Too long have we fixed our eyes on the tradtional
military needs. . . . We intend to profit from this lesson.
We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds,
our tactics and our institutior..s herein this community. We
intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways
more difficult than war."
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If I understand the President right, he is saying what I have been
saying -- we must fully develop the capacity of this country in non-military
conflict and we must do this rapidly with a sense of urgency. Previous
administrations never turned this corner.
So the question now is how.
Does the Administration yet understand this capacity can only be
achieved in time through an intensive, systematic, large-scale research and
training program?
Capacity in non-military conflict does not come easily or quickly.
If the enemy is given enough lead time, as in missiles, we may never stop
him. Further, we can pass the point of no return, without this country being
aware of it. We can leave the enemy uncontested in the villages, the class-
rooms, the markets, just so long, when he has the capacity the Communists
have demonstrated, then the trend may become irreversible short of a nuclear
spoiling attack.
Already the OAS has been partially neutralized by Communist
penetration of student organizations, intellectual groups, labor and the
peasantry. Africa, considered safe a few years ago, is now in doubt with
a strong tide running against us in Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Ghana, Somalia
and within the FLN. There is deep though hidden penetration of the Nationalist
parties in most of the new African nations. The guerrilla-political attack
now inundating Laos and Viet Nam seems destined to spread across the remainder
of Southeast Asia. A serious guerrilla-political potential is building in the
backlands of Columbia and in the northeast provinces of Brazil. The Japanese
Teachers' Union remains captive and the government seems helpless to prevent
the systematic subverting of large numbers of school children. With every
day's news the net is pulled more tightly around us.
The most alarming aspect of this snowballing situation is not Com-
munist gains to date, but their capacity for non-military conflict vis-a-vis
the West. The question must now be asked in all seriousness whether Com-
munists capabilities are such that they can complete the isolation of the West
before we can develop sufficient countercapabilities. The Communist re-
seaxch, development and training program, beginning with Lenin's three little
schools of revolution in Italy and France prior to 1917, and expanding during
the twenties into the most massive research and training program in all
history has given them truly frightening capabilities.
We cannot hesitate or fall back on half measures. Only a crash
program backed by the full weight and prestige of this government will be
realistic in terms of the challenge we face.
I have noted the President's interest in guerrilla warfare. This
is significant and encouraging. Guerrilla warfare is a substrategy of
political warfare, as are ideological, psychological and economic warfare.
These substrategies cannot be developed in isolation. Rather they
are so closely intermeshed that our concept of political warfaxe, or non-
military conflict, must be developed as a whole. Otherwise, we cannot grasp
the interplay, the nuances, the range of possibilities.
The Freedom Academy is attuned organizationally to the development
of our overall capacity in the new dimensions of struggle. For the first
time we will be able to bring under one roof the necessary range of knowledge
and experience to. consider non-military conflict whole. Only when considered
whole can we take the measure of the challenge and generate an adequate
response. Only in this way can we see clearly the extent of our research
and training failure and define the many gaps to be filled.
The organizational structure of the Freedom Academy encourages
maximum cross fertilization of ideas between the vaxious substrategies and
disciplines and with the least time lag, since our people will be under one
roof. It maximizes the opportunities for synthesis.
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The range of expert knowledge will enable us to consider all
avenues leading toward our national objectives with relevant procedures from
each substrategy and discipline brought to bear systematically. Strategic
objectives now approached along a few routes will be seen to be approachable
along a network of crisscrossing roads leading into the objective from every
point of the compass.
Further, strategy will not be considered in a vacuum. There will
be a concentrated effort to devise the organizational forms and the operational
techniques which will make possible complete implementation of a multi-
dimensional, multi-directional strategy.
The Freedom Academy seems the best organizational setup to give
us a badly needed conceptual framework for non-military conflict within an
acceptable period of time.
The development of a conceptual framework and thinking through the
many interrelated methods and means available in non-military conflict may
avail us little, unless this knowledge is rapidly incorporated into a training
program designed to meet the requirements I have listed. Too much of the little
we have researched and developed in non-military conflict has not been
assimilated by our operators.
Let me reemphasize a few points.
At advanced levels the Freedom Academy would seek to train a rounded
cold war strategist in non-military conflict. This, unfortunately, is going
to take time, and the curriculum will be inadequate until we begin to get
some results from the research side. The students will be mature individuals,,
many of whom already have substantial operator experience in some phase of
the cold war. Two years is probably a minimum estimate of training time,
with three years preferable for at least some advanced students. This may
be cut down later, when the basic material is more widely taught in our
universities and other government training programs.
This should be a prestige course. At this level the Freedom
Academy will be operating as a National War College for Non-military Conflict.
The graduate in the breadth of knowledge attuned to non-military conflict
should be well ahead of almost anyone we now have. He should have deep
knowledge of Communist conflict doctrine, a thorough understanding of
political, ideological, psychological, sociological, economic, para-
military conflict in all its dimensions, a knowledge of the wide range of
tools in the public and private sectors which can be developed and utilized,
a conceptual framework for non-military conflict so that these many tools
can be employed flexibly yet systematically with clearly understood purpose,
a grasp of the infinite variety of organizational forms and operational tech-
niques inherent in a global struggle between Freedom and Communism, a grasp
of the systemic revolution sweeping the world and an understanding of the
range of positive and negative programs, many still to be researched and
developed, which can assist the new nations toward freedom and an open
society. No existing training programs, or combination of training programs,
can even approximate these objectives.
It may also be desirable for a rounded strategist to have a variety
of operator knowledge and study should be given to rotating promising per-
sonnel through several agencies, but this is outside the scope of the bill.
At the intermediate level, courses will probably run from six
months to a year, and from a few weeks to several months at the basic level.
Much thought should be given to developing these courses and to selecting
students so as to meet Requirements 1, 2, 3 and 5.
Training of government personnel at the intermediate and basic levels
is to create capabilities for implementing an advanced, integrated strategy
in the non-military area with vigor and elan. A rounded expert, at the level
to which we are trying to advance the art, can hardly be trained in six months
or a year, although he may already have considerable operator experience. But
he can acquire a working knowledge of operational Communism, a conceptual
framework for a multi-dimensional, multi-directional strategy in non-military
conflict, an eye-opening exposure to awide range of positive and negative
measures available to us, and practical, operator usable knowledge in a wide
range of conflict situations with some detailed case studies.
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The intermediate level training will provide major benefits up and
down the line. First, an increasing number of agency people will acquire a
broad "common fund of knowledge" in the central subjects of non-military
conflict leading to a more general comprehension of our problems and commonly
accepted premises enabling the various parts of our government to move in
unison in planning and implementing a far wider range of programs. Second,
the man in the field or behind the desk will be aware of a whole new range of
tools available for problem solving and he will be far better equipped to
diagnose and anticipate enemy activity. His reports and recommendations
should be more imaginative and better attuned to the protracted conflict.
Third, the graduate will be strongly motivated to think in terms of counter-
measures and to seek out solutions. I have never known a man who has looked
deeply into Communism whose life and attitudes have not been profoundly
changed. The added stimulus of knowing there are answers to conflict
problems which seemed insoluble before can do much to induce the complete
personal commitment, the driving desire to seek out solutions and carry the
fight to the Communists so essential to victory. Finally, a whole range of
new operational-organizational methods and means will become capable of
implementation and not as individual programs, but as part and parcel of an
integrated strategy, as the agencies acquire an increasing number of
graduates who understand these things.
Even the limited training in non-military conflict provided at the
War Colleges is beginning to have a beneficial effect as the graduates of
recent years rise in the hierarchy. This should be some indication of the
benefits to be derived from the Freedom Academy.
The basic and intermediate courses for private citizens are to
increase understanding of Communism, the nature of the protracted conflict
between Freedom and Communism and how the private sector can contribute.
Courses going no further than describing Communism and our cold war problems
can accomplish more than is often recogn.zed, particularly in maintaining
the will to victory, understanding enemy moves, and supporting policies that
call for real sacrifice. To stop here, after the student has been motivated
to participate, would be to forego the biggest dividends. As the research
side of the Academy gets into full swing, we will begin to understand the
true capabilities of the private sector and I am sure a vast range of inter-
related programs will open up which can play an important role in Latin
America, Africa and the East, as well as the U. S. For the first time we
will be in a position to develop the full capabilities of the private sector
in an organized fashion. We can determine the type of institutions and
civic organizations which can beat implement specific programs; the avail-
ability of their members for training, the number of trained people they
will need; the follow-up material to be provided by the information center;
the type of training which can provide maximum capacity in minimum time,
and so forth.
The Senate Committee and Senator Dodd have indicated some of the
training programs and the areas from which we would expect to train private
citizens. There is no point in repeating this.
So little thought has been given to what the private sector can con-
tribute outside of the obvious that I believe the government is in for a
pleasant surprise, provided the Freedom Academy is adequately staffed and
funded. The Orlando Committee is prepared to make a separate presentation on
this-
Let me try to answer some of the objections or counterproposals
which are being made.
I have not seen the agency evaluations of the bill, but from my
talks with their representatives, I believe much of the debate centers around
the question of whether the existing schools and research centers could do
the job better with less confusion and overlapping.
From what I have already said, I hope it is clear the debate should
be whether they could do the job better, and not whether they are doing the job.
I am fearful the Administration may be persuaded that some re-
orientation or beefing up of the existing programs will do the job. This
would be an easy way out. I submit it would also lead, inevitably, to a
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continuation of our piecemeal approach to non-military conflict, both as to
training and research with little hope of meeting the basic requirements
enumerated.
An additional seminar at PSI, or a few more lectures in the Basic
or Mid-Career Courses, or another month at the War Colleges on non-military
conflict is no answer.
For too long non-military conflict has been a stepchild in in-
stitutions which take note of its existence, but do not study it in depth.
May I repeat -- this is a vast and complex subject. What we need is a
research and training institution designed from the ground floor up to
concentrate on this.
This does not mean the existing programs -- training or research --
will be preempted by the Academy. The Academy would not take over language
or area studies which are collateral to non-military conflict, and most
certainly we would not want the Academy to be burdened with the special
training functions of the agency trade schools.
On the research side the Academy would pull together in one place
our existing knowledge in non-military conflict so we can see where we are,
define the gaps which must be filled to meet the requirements I enumerated,
make an organized effort to fill these gaps, interrelate, systematize,
snythesize this knowledge to produce new ideas, new programs, new operational-
organizational approaches, a new conceptual framework for non-military
conflict.
Under present circumstances such an effort is practically im-
possible. Each agency has its assigned area of responsibility, and all are
concerned with non-military conflict to some degree. As various problems
materialize, these may be farmed out to this or that university or research
group. But non-military conflict is never considered whole, and no existing
research center is staffed or funded to consider it whole. Further, each
problem can only be attacked within a limited conceptual framework because
the supplementary and complementary material, the related sub-strategies and
organizational-operational methods and means, have not been developed and
brought forward together, and the new insights, the new approaches they
would offer are not considered. The result is an ad hoc approach to re-
search and development in which only pieces of the conflict spectrum are
studied, and then within comparatively narrow limits.
At the Academy the development of the substrategies can be brought
forward together with maximum cross fertilization and synthesis and within
an ever expanding conceptual framework. There is no need to duplicate good
work where it has been done, nor would it prevent the Academy from utilizing
existing research facilities at our universities. Rather, by considering
non-military conflict whole, we would be in a position to know and evaluate
what has been done, to make maximum use of this in developing new knowledge,
to know what still needs to be done and to go about the further development
of this art or science in a comprehensive, organized fashion. Where adequate
research is going on on parts of the problem, let it continue. Encourage
more research rather than less at our universities. But let all of this
knowledge be assembled at the Academy.
We are on dead center. No one below the President and his close
advisers has the responsibility to consider non-military conflict whole.
Obviously they can't do it. Who can? Where is the impetus to come from?
Where is the organization which is staffed and funded and has the directive
to organize and coordinate this tremendous research and development job?
The FSI and War Colleges can't do it. They are primarily training
institutions. No university or research institution, including RAND, has the
combination of expert knowledge and experience to cope with it in the necessary
breadth and depth.
As things now stand the comparatively few who are qualified by
expert knowledge and demonstrated motivation are widely scattered where, to
the extent they are being utilized, they are working on bits and pieces of the
problem. They simply are not in a position to make an organized assault on
the total problem. Further, our agencies are fully engaged with immediate,
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pressing day-to-day problems. They do not have the time or extra manpower
to organize or coordinate such an effort.
There is another limiting factor often overlooked. Development
should be practical. There is no point in evolving operational methods or
programs which our people are not trained or organized to implement.
Consequently, present development work in non-military conflict tends
toward conventional solutions that can be implemented by available personnel
within existing organizational patterns.
This brings out a key point in favor of the Academy. There train-
ing will keep pace with research. In determining, for example, what the
private sector can contribute, practical considerations will not limit the
inquiry to projects falling; within the present narrow capacity of the private
sector. Rather, the researcher knows the training program will create
additional capacity attuned to new programs. This will unshackle research.
Admittedly, capacity to implement will always lag behind research, but there
will be the knowledge that capacity is being systematically built up on the
training side.
In evaluating this bill, you must keep in mind there is a research
gap and a training gap. If we establish just a training school, the training,
with some exceptions, will be limited to existing knowledge. If we establish
just a research center, then the production, again with many exceptions, to
the extent it makes a breakthrough, will be in danger of being entombed in
the stacks. It is of utmost importance that our research program and our
training program move forward together.
Non-military conflict is so new to Americans that we lack a con-
sensus on how to go about it or even what the term covers. Certain editorial
writers and agency officials have jumped to conclusions, some completely un-
warranted, as to what the bill proposes.
These might be summarized under three headings. Overt versus
covert operations. Negative versus positive programs. Dogmatic, doctrinaire
approaches versus a multiplicity of viewpoints reflecting a pluralistic
society. Let me take these in order.
There is a tendency in some quarters to see political warfare
exclusively in terms of covert operations in which we try to fight fire with
fire. The nature of the struggle compels us to use covert operations in
certain situations and we must guard against becoming inhibited about this
when the nation's very existence is at stake. However, I believe that most
of the methods and means a free, open society can employ most effectively
are in the overt area and it is here that the Academy will concentrate.
Yet, even when this is understood, some still seem to feel the
Academy proposes to wage the global struggle with "sterile," anti-Communist
measures which may repel the leaders and people we are trying to impress,
rather than positive approaches such as programmed long-term aid which will
show up Communism and convince the uncommitted their best interests lie with
freedom and the West.
Let me say that anti-Communism has never struck me as sterile. In
the struggle for the minds of men we could make no greater mistake than to
soft-pedal the crimes of Communism or to fail to point out at every opportunity
what agricultural reform means behind the Iron Curtain. Let us not be
manipulated into the inhibited, defensive attitude that these things merely
exacerbate the cold war. And just because our inadequate programs of the past
have permitted an atmosphere to develop which makes it difficult for the truth
to be believed, is no excuse to throw in the oars and drift with the tide.
Further, in preparing our people for the struggle ahead we must never forget
that being against an evil has been as great a motivating force in history as
being for something -- and we can be both. In the operational area recapturing
a student organization or a labor union strikes me as a positive accomplishment,
and developing the operational-organizational know-how to do this should be
essential training at the Freedom Academy.
However, let me doubly emphasize that the authors of the Freedom
Academy bill recognize the prime importance of affirmative, positive programs
to win the global struggle ranging from the development of alternatives to
Communism for the uncommitted nations and the ability to articulate these
clearly to the use of technical assistance and aid programs.
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The point is that we are still far from thinking through the range
of positive and negative measures which can be implemented by the government
and private sectors. Equally crucial we lack an advanced conceptual frame-
work to permit us to employ these methods and means purposefully in the
environment of the total political war being waged against us.
The philosophy of the Freedom Academy bill is that we must mFake an
organized crash effort to research and develop these means, both positive
and negative, and to think through organizational forms and operational
techniques to implement them.
Yet we cannot do this effectively or realistically until we under-
stand the new dimensions of warfare in which we are engaged. And the war
we are in cannot be understood by area studies, International relations, and
military studies with a smathering of operational Communism, and political,
ideological, psychological, economic, pare-military warfare thrown in.
When the latter subjects have been mastered, then, and then alone,
will our strategists be able to interrelate the spectrum of positive and
negative programs in a patterned strategy employing our resources to the
best advantage. Then, and then alone, can they comprehend the range of
means available to us.
Last February the New Republic, in a remarkable example of
editorial shooting from the hip, declared the purpose of the Academy is to
"propound dogma."
The operative language of the bill, Section 6, reads:
"The principal functions of the Commission and Academy
shall be-
"(1) to carry on a research program designed to develop
an integrated, operational science that benefits and bespeaks
the methods and values of freemen and through which the
free world will be able to meet and defeat the carefully
patterned total aggression (political, ideological, psycho-
logical, economic, paramilitary, and organizational) of the
Communist bloc, and through which we, as a nation, may
work in a systematic manner for the preservation and
extension of freedom, national independence, and self-
government. To achieve this purpose the full range of
methods and means is to be thoroughly explored and studied
including the methods and means that may best be employed
by private citizens and nongovernmental organizations and
the methods and means available to the Government other
than the methods and means already being used, This re-
search program shall include the study of our national
objectives and the development of proposals for intermesh-
ing and integrating the full spectrum of methods and means
into a coordinated, short and long-range strategy for victory,
seeking the utilization of our full potential in the public and
private sectors; and
"(2) to educate and train Government personnel, private
citizens, and foreign students concerning all aspects of the
international Communist conspiracy, the nature and dimensions
of the global struggle between freedom and communism and
the full-range of methods and means that freemen should employ
to meet and defeat the entire Communist attack in the non-
military areas and to work systematically for the preservation
and extension of freedom, national independence, and self-
government."
Having participated in the drafting of this section, I can say
categorically such was not the intent. It never occurred to the drafters
that any reasonable person could arrive at such a tortured construction.
I have seen dozens of other editorials in liberal, moderate and
conservative papers in support of the bill, and I am sure most of these
would have been hostile, if they thought the intent was to propound and
teach dogma.
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The New Republic did not stop there, but stated the concept
contained in the bill had originated ten years ago among exiles from Com-
munist tyranny impatient with Americans' undogmatic approach to political
matters and hopeful of creating opportunities for themselves in the policy
apparatus! The idea, of course, originated ten years ago in Orlando,
Florida, and all members of the parent Orlando Committee are native born
and most, if they were so inclined, could qualify for the Sons of the American
Revolution. (See my testimony beginning page 9 of the hearings for a history
of the Freedom Academy idea.)
Ours is a pluralistic society. An attempt to arrive at a detailed
consensus of our philosophy of government is probably impossible. Two high
level government efforts have failed, as might be expected. Yet this does
not mean we must continue to mumble when it comes to articulating the alter-
natives to Communism in Asia, Africa or Latin America, or in explaining our
national purpose. These things should be studied and freely discussed at
the Freedom Academy. The War Colleges have studied our national purpose for
many years. I participated in one of these discussions at the Naval War
College and it was a stimulating affair which I believe did much to crystallize
the students' thinking. There was no attempt to impose a solution from above.
The Senior Officers Seminar at PSI brings in a number of guest lecturers who
discuss our ethical values and the national purpose. The New Republic, to
my knowledge, has never accused the War Colleges or PSI of propounding dogma.
Why is it assumed the Freedom Academy will go off the deep end?
Is it the use of the expression "operational science?" Our colleges
have professors of political science and offer degrees in political science.
Obviously our colleges do not intend to codify the principles of government
and produce rigid, dogmatic solutions. Why the strained construction here?
Do I sense a double standard?
The Communists have dominated non-military conflict for so long
that many have been conditioned to think of political warfare in Communist
terms, Since the Communists propound and teach dogma, that must be the
function of the Freedom Academy, etc, etc.
The purpose of the Freedom Academy is to develop non-military
conflict in accordance with the requirements and needs of the Free World.
Those who think we cannot do this without aping the Communists have lost
faith in themselves, this country and freedom. And those who are unwilling
to even try are already defeated.
After fighting for a Freedom Academy for ten years the Orlando
Committee is heartened to note that others are now calling attention to the
gap in our training facilities.
The Sprague Committee established by President Eisenhower to
study our information activities abroad included in that part of its report
released by the White House January 9, 1961, this additional recommendation:
"Beyond these steps, there is need to provide high-level
training in the interrelated economic, political, informa-
tional and military aspects of the present world struggle
for more of the top officers of agencies dealing with inter-
national and security affairs, The Committee therefore
recommends that consideration be given to the establish-
ment of a National Security Institute for this purpose under
the National Security Council, which among other things,
would provide concentrated exposure to and study of
Communist ideology, techniques and operations world-wide
as well as our total governmental informational resources
and how best to orchestrate and use them."
The members of the Committee were George V. Allen, Allen Dulles,
Gordon Gray, Karl G. Harr, Jr., John N. Irwin II, C. D. Jackson, Livingston
T. Merchant and Phillip Reed.
While such recommendations are encouraging, there are two serious
weaknesses. First, the training would be limited to top officers of cold war
agencies, so that Requirements 1, and 5 are not met at all. Second, the
research gap is not emphasized and I wonder if the Sprague Committee grasps
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how far we still have to go in researching and developing non-military conflict.
Unless the intent is broader than appears in the report, as released this
proposal would go little further than partiallmeetinngg Requirement
I terms
partially, because the training of top officers
of existing knowledge unless there is a crash effort on the research side.
Further, the report seems to emphasize government informational activities when
it comes to countermeasures, and this is only one part of the spectrum of non-
military conflict.
This recommendation is the type of half measure or quarter measure
which I am fearful the Administration may consider an alternative to the
Freedom Academy. It is too late in the game for such fundamental error.
Dr. Strausz-Hupets group in their sequel to Protracted Conflict have
come out for the Freedom Academy bill. At page 263 of thi~ excellent new
book, A FORWARD STRATEGY FOR AMERICA, they say:
"The United States has established academies to train
men for war and a Foreign Service Institute to train
diplomats. No comparable establishment trains
Americans in the art of psychological warfare. Yet the
need for professional competence in the field of psycho-
political warfare is just as great as that for military
and diplomatic skills. It is in the field of revolutionary
conflict techniques that the Communists hold a decisive
margin of superiority over the Western powers . . . .
Although these methods are studied closely by several
agencies of our government, an Academy of Psycho-
political Studies should be entrusted with training career
specialists."
In an accompanying footnote the authors note, "A major step in
this direction was taken by the United States Senate during the 1960 Special
Session of Congress when it passed, with no recorded opposition, the
Freedom Academy Bill."
Of special interest may be the letter of then Senator Kennedy to
Dr. Blair 0. Rogers of September 9, 1960. Dr. Rogers in a letter to the
New York Times had proposed that a Free University of the West be established
on Ellis Island. In commenting on Dr. Rogerst proposal, Senator Kennedy said:
"You will likewise have read of a bill passed recently
by the Senate proposing a Freedom University for train-
ing our people in techniques for fighting the Cold War.
I feel certain that something will come of this proposal."
Those are heartening words indeed.
If the Administration and Congress will collaborate on the establish-
ment of the Freedom Academy, this can be a turning point in the Cold War. At
long last we will be able to set about systematically to understand and
develop our national capacity for non-military conflict. At long last we can
begin to graduate highly trained and dedicated men and women who will give
their lives to our side in the global struggle between Freedom and Communism.
These graduates can shatter forever the image of America as a complacent,
self-satisfied, status quo power, unwilling to give up its soft ways to
contest the Communists in the villages, the market places, the classrooms, the
labor unions, and wherever else this total struggle is being fought.
The President has called on the American people for sacrifice. What
better sacrifice can the private citizen make than to attend the Freedom
Academy and learn how he can contribute?
Written by Alan G. Grant, Jr., and
submitted by The Orlando Committee
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