WORLD REACTION TO SOVIET MOON SHOT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100090014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 15, 1959
• Content Type: BRIEF

CON
DIRECTOR'S COPY
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T NBC BRIEFING
15 SeDber 1959
v\ i
WORLD REACTION TO SOVIET MOON SHOT `tN
I. Soviet commentators have linked the USSR's successful moon shot
with the maiden voyage of the atomic icebreaker "Lenin" and
described both as "great Soviet peace achievements" on the eve
of Khrushchev's visit.
A. Pravda has crowed that the "unprecedented successes of the
land of socialism are no accident" but rather "a manifesta-
tion of the undoubted superiority of the socialist system."
B. The newspaper also reported that the latest Soviet rocket
has "shaken" some Americans who see it as a "good augury" of
Khrushchev's visit and "the best possible argument that
human reason can and must prevail in international rela-
tions."
C. TASS has quoted a Soviet scientist as expressing the hope
that Khrushchev's visit will pave the way for Soviet-
American cooperation in space exploration.
D. Soviet scientists on 14 September said that there would
be no territorial claims on the moon arising from the land-
ing of their cosmic rocket.
Ii. Communist China's reaction to the event as seen in Peiping news-
papers from 13-15 September claimed that the achievement is the
"pride not only of the Soviet people, but also of the socialist
camp as a whole," and Chou En-lai has sent Khrushchev!~ con-
gratulatory telegram to this effect.
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A. Chiefs of state of North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer
Mongolia have also sent congratulatory telegrams.
III. Western European press comment has heavily stressed the
event's political significance.
A. Moscow's timing, said the West German paper, Der Mittag
of Dusseldorf, was "like laying a pistol on the table
before conversations begin."
B. Nevertheless, no fears have yet been expressed that the
United States would be impressed into making concessions.
C. On the contrary, a British paper suggested that Khrushchev
would be in a stronger position to offer concessions.
IV. In Latin America the fragmentary comment seen so far focuses
mainly on the magnitude of scientific achievement.
A. As an exception to this general reaction the Chilean
Foreign Minister in a 15 September press conference is quoted
saying scientific advances are good for peace because fear
unites.
B. And in Cuba, Fidel Castro's pro-Communist aide, "Che"
Guevara has argued that Cuba is in danger of being a tar-
get of nuclear weapons because of the US naval base at
Guantanamo. Without mentioning Russia by name, he said, "If
they can hit the moon, they can surely hit us."
V. In Asia and Africa there has been little reaction noted to date.
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A. The UAR press reports the moon shot as a laudable achieve-
ment, but suggests the timing reveals a political motive,
coming as it does just prior to Khrushchev's visit, and
"regrets" the use of science to achieve political ends.
B. Japanese reaction thus far has been limited to scientific
circles which congratulate the USSR on its achievement,
particularly the preciseness of calculations needed to hit
the moon. They call for cooperation between US and USSR in
space technology.
C. Nehru's reaction has been widely quoted by the press. He
F1 Rif'
said that it was great news and later added that "In
old astrology the moon used to affect all human destiny.
Now, obviously things are revised. The poor moon is being
pursued. I hope the moon will survive."
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