IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS DURING 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100040012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 8, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP80ROl441 RO
25M7 TqB
TS No. 100534 A
Security Information Copy Noo
8 Oc ,ber 1953
IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS DURING 1953
25X1BOd1
1. On the basis of information now available
25X1 B0d oft it is concluded that the USSR is
capable of producing air delivery type nuclear weapons with ex-
plosive powers in the range of a few thousand tons of TNT to
approximately one million tons of TNT.
2. Having dertonstr; ted the capability to utilize thermo-
nuclear reactions to increase energy yields from fissionable
materials, the Soviets may direct efforts toward the eventual
modification of the previcusly estimated stockpile of 30 to
100 KT weapons in one or more of the following wawa
a. Increase the number of 30 to 100 KT weapons.
b. Increase the energy yield per weapon in the
stockpile, the number being approximately the same.
c. Produce very high yield weapons (e.g. 500-
1000 KT) by accepting corresponding reductions in the
tot r f weapons in the stockpile,
'5"~d
3. may also indicate an advanced stage,,
but not the culmination, of a thermonuclear program havirg as an
objective the production of weapons yielding n ore than a million
tons of Tr!T in which thermonuclear reactions directly contribute
a substantial amount to the total energy yield. I
mot
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100040012-7