WHY DOES RATE OF ICBM PRODUCTION FALL OFF IN LATER YEARS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01389R000400130013-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 20, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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BACKUP #4
20 February 1960
WHY DOES RATE OF ICBM PRODUCTION FALL OFIN LATER YEARS?
A. The pace setting factors in this program are
construction of launching facilities, activation and training of
units, and establishment of logistic support.
1. In this year's analysis we concentrated on
these factors, which are represented by missiles
on launcher.
2. Complete new weapon system -- not like
cxr{'
replacing one type of aircraft 4w an established
\OCL,..
vnit with another type.
B. In the low side of our bracket, the number of
ICBMs on launcher increases at a virtually constant rate
(about 9 per month) after peak rate is reached in the latter
part of 1960.
1. A new launcher, with associated facilities,
is activated every 3 or 4 days for about 2 1/2 years.
2. This is a vigorous program, requiring effective
planning, operations, and coordination.
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C. In the high side of our bracket, 13 launchers are
activated per month at peak rate in an early "push", but
in 1962 this rate drops back to about the level of the low side.
D. These schedules are consistent with:
1. Conclusion in the estimate that the Soviet ICBM
program, while not a "crash" program, is designed
to achieve a substantial capability at an early date.
2. Soviets may consider that a rapid ICBM buildup
would give them, in about 1961, a considerable
political, psychological and military advantage.
3. After about that time, increasing hardness of
US fixed bases, Polaris and Minuteman, and warning
and alert capabilities, will bring steep increase in
Soviet ICBM requirements and hence diminishing
return from each additional ICBM of the performance
characteristics we estimate for them.
E. It is true that the figures in the estimate imply a
falling-.off in missile production rates.
1. As the ICBM system matures, fewer missiles
will be needed in inventory to support a given number
on launcher.
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2. In our analysis, we satisfied ourselves that
production of missiles would be sufficient to support
the buildup to about 1961, and then let missile
production for operational purposes vary in
accordance with the launcher activation rates I
described above.
3. Actually, we allowed minimum additional
production of 20 percent for proof testing, major
maintenance, training and attrition, and did not
estimate the number of additional missiles that
might be produced for further R&D or for use in
space program.
F. In the years beyond 1961, we deliberately
rounded the totals so that the on launcher figures would be
a bracket of an even 100 (250-350 in mid-62, 350-450 in
mid-63).
1. This was to give a general idea of where the
majority of the USIB believed the totals might fall
in 1962 and 1963.
2. This more general treatment is in accordance with
our conclusion that the course of the Soviet program
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after about 1961 is subject to many variables and
must be constantly reviewed by intelligence.
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