CRITICAL AREAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01389R000400130002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 29, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/08/25 : CIA-RDP80MO1389R000400130002-9
29 January 1960
CRITICAL AREAS
France-Algeri
I. European insurgents in Algiers now number 3,000-6,000--
virtually in control of the city.
A, French army, which shares settlers' fear self-determination, has
permitted men and supplies to reach barricade and refused to use
force against insurgents.
B. Withdrawal from Algiers of top military and civilian officials
and radio appeals to loyal Moslems to demonstrate adds explosive
element to picture.
1, Reports that Chief of Staff Ely on secret orders from De
Gaulle has flown to new command post in Algeria,
VIV
II. De Gaulle's room for maneuver is narrowing, The one factor working
for him is his position in metropolitan France.
A, De Gaulle has
1, Overwhelming support of French public opinion
2. Advantage that no prospective leader of comparable
stature available,
III.. De Gaulle to make radio-television address today,
A. Expected to reaffirm his self-determination policy for Algeria.
Reportedly told cabinet he may mix conciliation with firmness.
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C, Rumors persist that De Gaulle may soon fly to Algeria to
take personal commands
IV. Key factor is army.
A. Now questionable whether any statement De Gaulle might
make on government willingness to work for "frenchificationf?
of Algeria would win him necessary army backing.
V. Insurgents threaten to establish independent government in Algeria$
if De Gaulle holds firm.
A. Increasing talk of military coup against Paris, possibly
with Salan or Juin at the head.,
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hope to win army support by elaborat "''ledge
Moslems to ? gp-t'-fir French status.
a. This would imply "? rt-._llingness to induce settlers
to aces commitment short of; romise Algeria
ould remain French,
II. Sino-Indian Border
A. For almost nine years, ChiComs and India have held conflicting
border claims, but recent intensity of dispute stems from the
Tibetan revolt.
1. Alarmed by Peipingts actions in Tibet, New Delhi last
spring looked to security of its northern borders and
moved some frontier outposts closer to disputed McMahon
line.
2. Concurrently, Chinese troops drove into area just north
of line, determined to crush revolt and seal border.
3. on 26 August, Chinese patrol drove an Indian outpost
from position New Delhi considers to be on its side of
line, and border controversy flared into open dispute.
B. ChiCom moves have angered Indian populace, forced Nehru for
first time to face up to threat from Peiping, and made posi-
tion of Indian Communists extremely difficult.
C. Indians and Chinese have increased troop strength near border
but both have told outpost units to stop patrolling, thus
reducing chance of further clashes.
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D, on diplomatic level, dispute remains deadlocked.
1. Latest official statements merely underscore how far apart
Indian and Chinese positions are.
2. Nehru has rejected Chou En-lai's repeated invitations to
meet with him, insisting that Chinese should get out of
Indian territory and accept McMahon line before negotiations
25X1X6 are held.
30
mwa~
after Khrushchev's visit to Delhi in mid-February and the
outcome of the wino-Burmese negotiations can be studied.
Any shift in his position probably won't be firmed up until
Nehru is now
considering meeting with Chou in April or May to try and
break deadlock.
`III,, Middle East
A. Iraqi anti-Communists dissatisfied with Prime Minister Qasim,
but so far have been unable to remove him, Further plotting
likely.
B. Communist domestic position still strong, despite factionalism
within Communist party.
Army remains most important basic element in situation; seems
to be leaning away from Communists.
Externally, Qasim seeking by propaganda and subversion to take
advantage of Nasir's difficulties in Syria, where resentment
of Egyptian domination and three poor crop years have made
UAR a less popular concept.
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1. Nasir not in deep and immediate trouble yet, but has not
solved long-range problem of how to govern Syria; this
could play into Iraq's hands.
E. Jordan's King Husayn supporting Iraqi exiles, including some
pre-revolutionary Iraqi cabinet members. Likely to add to
bitterness and tension in area,
F. Shah of Iran adamant in refusal to broaden recent offer to Soviets
to exclude foreign missile bases, while Khrushchev equally
adamant in demanding exclusion of all foreign military
bases from Iran,
G, The basic causes for dissatisfaction in Iran remain unchanged
despite the Shah's reform attempts and reports of anti-regime
plotting continue to be received.
I V. Laos
A. Laos remains troublesome spot, even though Communist military
dissidence has subsided.
1. New government was formed 7 January followed forced
resignation former old guard Premier Phoui and one week of
rule by five army generals.
2, Cabinetprobably best that could be obtained under present
conditions and, in view balanced composition, should ease
strains between squabbling anti-Communist forces,
a, New Premier (Khou Abhay) is respected elder statesman.
b, Main function of new cabinet will be to prepare for
rational assembly elections later this year.
law,
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3, Communist dissidents retain considerable potential for
guerrilla war of attrition on country wide basis.
4. Although anti-Communist young reformers disclaim any
intention to force radical changes in policy a harder
line toward Communists is possible.
5. A repressive government would stimulate Communists at home
and abroad to take counter measures.
V. Taiwan Strait
A, While Taiwan Strait remains potential trouble spot, tensions
have relaxed since early 159..
1, ChiCom leaders have told foreign visitors recently that
issue would "resolve itself in the course of time."
2, Occasional ChiCom propaganda statement which repeats
"determination to liberate Taiwan" does so in terms of
nebulous future?
In recent months, Communist shelling of offshores has been
moderate--usually less than 100 rounds on the days they fire.
B. ChiNat garrison on offshores has been reduced from 90,000 to
75,000, but defenses augmented with increased artillery and
tanks.
1, Nationalists generally refraining from provocative actions.
2. Barring major uprising on mainland, Nationalists are
expected to live up to their commitments to consult with
US before taking military action against mainland.
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.a s
Berlin
A. While Berlin remains calm today, USSR can bring it to forefront
at any time it wishes to create tension on the international
scene,
Khrushchev has repeated in current speeches his threat to sign
separate peace treaty with East Germany, "with all its
ensuing consequences," but we think he would do this only
if summit talks break down completely and, even the', as a
last resort.
Approved For Release 2001/08/25 : CIA-RDP80MO1389R000400130002-9