SOVIET AID TO AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100012-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 7, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

t-Qr Release 2000 IA-RDP79R00890A000800100012-5
SOVIET AID TO AFGHANISTAN
7 August 1957
I. During their visit to the USSR from 17 August to 4 September, Afghan
King Zahir Shah and Foreign Minister Naim received an elaborate
reception in the USSR, although Soviet press treatment was not as
intensive as that accorded Indian Prime minister Nehru or Burma's U Nu.
A. The principal result of the visit was an agreement that the Soviet
Union would conduct petroleum exploration in northern
Afghanistan, probably under the $100,000,000 credit extended
late in 1955.
B. Failure of a Swedish drilling team to strike oil in commercial
quantities after a year of drilling probably was responsible
for Afghanistan's turning to the USSR.
II. While no new arms agreements were announced during the visit, the
Soviet bloc military program in Afghanistan is making progress.
A. The willingness of the Soviet bloc to supply arms to
Afghanistan during the past year has given the Afghans their
first chance to modernize their armed forces since World War II.
B. Kabul's first arms purchase from the bloc occurred in August 1955
when it purchased $3,000,000 worth of arms from Czechoslovakia.
Later, on 26 August 1956, a major arms agreement with both
Czechoslovakia and the USSR was announced.
C. The most reliable reports received indicate that this agreement
calls for materi&l worth between $25-30,000,000, with payment
in Afghan products to be made over an eight-year period at
three percent interest.
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D. Deliveries are estimated to total about $20,000,000 up to
dune 1957.
E. Deliveries, which have included jet aircraft and tanks, have been
made faster than the Afghan armed forces (44,000 regulars,
20,000 security troops) can absorb. Soviet instructors are
engaged in training Afghan officers and the Russians reportedly
are to assist in the construction of $KXK four military air-
fields as part of an effort to build up Afghan air power.
III. In contrast to the success of the Soviet military aid program, the
bloc economic offensive is encountering difficulties.
A. Dissatisfaction with high prices the USSR is charging for economic
development under the $100,000,000 Soviet credit is causing the
Afghans to explore alternative sources of financing.
B. Construction has begun on only three of the nineteen projects
which the USSR was to construct.
r)u v
C. The Soviet co is are several times greater than the amounts
charged by the West Germans when they surveyed many of these
projects earlier, and the Soviets are asking nearly twice the
German estimate for constructing Kabul airport. About $10,000,000
has already been spent, mostly for surveys and services rather
than construction.
D. Since the Afghans pride themselves on their bargaining skill,
the gradual realization that they are not receiving the better
part of the bargain is apparently galling them.
E. While the Afghans are reluctant to antagonize the USSR--the
sole source of the&r arms--they apparently are delaying
construction work ]OX while seeking other offers and, if these are
me o t projects reserved for the USSR may be
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IV. The expenditures for economic and military development have resulted
in strong inflationary pressures which are causing widespread
resentment chiefly among urban elements.
A. This inflation, plus corruption in his ministry, probably was
the cause of the recent firing and arrest of finance minister
Malik.
B. While Malik had originally pushed for closer ties with the USSR,
he had become more pro-US following his visit to the US late
in 1956 and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution.
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