OUTLOOK FOR INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000800100008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 21, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For?Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00d6&A668000100008-0
D/AA B/
21 Aug 57
AC)UK FOR INDONESIA
I. In Ii- I sia, Communist strength and influence are expected to continue to
increase during the coming year.
L
A. Significant Communist electoral gains registered, in provincial elections
held in east, central, and west Java during July and August, combined
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with President Sukarno's encouragement of Communist activity, have
given the party new prestige and an improved base from which to work.
II. President Sukarno, meanwhile, is proceeding with the implementation of his
concept of ""guided democracy."
A. In a 17 August independence day speech, he reiterated his contention
that ""political democracy" is not feasible for Indoia but that the
country must still work for ""economic and social democracy."
B. The form of his projected new political system is not yet clear, but all
indications are pointing to something akin to Communism or as described
by Ambassador Allison, "a form of 1itlerian national socialism,"
C. Sukarno is expected increasingly to depend on the support of the
Communists, the only pa to wholeheartedlyendorse his concept, and
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III. Outside Java, the Communists will continue to work hard in the next
year to e xpand their influence in those areas. Although they may make
some progress, they are unlikely to become a to provincial
1V. The extent of current fragmentation in Indonesia tends to be sks
obscured by the gradual day-to-day drift of affairs.
A. There is no doubt, however, that the central government's economic
situation is worsening, and -ii lT,continue to do so as the result of
barter trade 4#r the provinces
revenues to Djakarta.
A
rxl the provinces' refusal to transfer a.
B. In aaoN%w effort o reverse the trend toward economic chaos and
political disintegration, Premier Djuanda is planning a round-table
conference with dissatisfied regional leaders early next month but
prospects for any solid achievemen ~
Regardless of the present intentions of dissident leaders ax~r s
eventual relationshi with Java, they "Iseelp to be steadily ddwi4t
4-4.
Although these leaders are likely to maintain at leastjn of
ties to Java during the next year, complete separation cannot be ruled
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I A Communist seizure of power in Indonesia during the coming year, either
by peaceful or by forceful means, is possible but not probable.
PA", ,....-- r.---~..s
A
B. If the Communists should power, the dissident areas would probably
disassociate themselves from the central government, appeal to the
West for support, and try to aid anti-Communist forces in Java.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000800100008-0