BACKGROUND- -UN 'POLICE' FORCE ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000800010008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 14, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2001
NSC BRIEFING
79R00890A000800010008-0
14 NOVEMBER 1956
BACKGROUND--UN "POLICE" FORCE ISSUES
I. UN members offering troops now total 23. From the Commonwealth--S:
t~1/co~l'
Australia, Canada 'AIndia, New Zealand, Pakistan. From Europe --8:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
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Sweden. From Latin America--3: Braz lean olombia. From Asia--31:
Burma, , Indonesia, Philippines. From Soviet Bloc--2:
Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Independent--1: Yugoslavia.
II. Egyptians and Hammarskjold have agreed on use of 8 of these: troops
from Colombia, Dek, Finland, Norway, Sweden, India, Indonesia
and Yugoslavia.
A. Canadian participation has also been accepted by Egypt "in
principle," but subject to negotiations between Nasr and
Hammarskjold this week in Cairo. Nasr reportedly fears that
Canadian troops' resemblance to British might create incidents.
B. Egypt rejected Pakistani participation because of Pakistan's
Baghdad Pact "rtes. The similar Egyptian objection to Danish
and Norwegian troops, because of NATO ties, was overcome by
Hammarskjold.
C. Hammarskjold has rejected Czech and Rumanian troop offers. He
believes that Indonesian troops will never materialize.
III. Hammarskjold believes that clearance of the Suez Canal is not within
the mandate of the UN force, but subject to negotiation--along with
arrangements for control and operation of the canal--in accordance
with the "six principles" previously developed in UN discussion.
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ii. Hammarskjold is optimistic about getting Egyptian consent for
Danish and Norwegian technicians to clear the canal on a com-
mercial iasis. He has already asked both Danish and tDutch
firm5for estimates.
IV. During weekend back-and-forth, Nasr voiced his particular fear that
UN force in Canal Zone might "violate" Egyptian sovereignty. In
addition to specification of countries which might contribute to
"police" force, Nasr attempted:
A. To establish Egypt's right to say when the UN force must leave,
B. To insist that the UN force have "no function" in the Canal
Zone, once British and French troops withdraw. Hammarskjold
was apparently successful in persuading Nasr to leave question
of these conditions in abeyance.
V. On Tuesday, however, Embassy Cairo reported that Nasr, claiming dis-
agreement with Hammarskjold on "duration of stay" point, had
"requested" UN force delay arrival.
A. Nasr thought Hammarskjold has agreed Monday that Egyptian consent
required on "duration of stay," but discovered UN position this
point still "reserved" in subsequent Hammarskjold memo of
understanding.
B. Nasr has suggested that point be resolved on arrival Hammarskjold
in Cairo (due Thursday).
C, Nasr emphasized to our Ambassador that, as long as this point
unresolved, he could not allow entry of UN forces.
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