POLISH DEFECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000700070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 17, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Releas 000/08/29: CIA-RDP79RQ089OA000700070003-0
.~, O F1 ?AL
A. was close enough to the ruling circles to observe
the developments in M and the USSR that led up to the 25X1X
denigration of Stalin. Here are some examples of the information
concerning the USSR he has given us:
B. He has confirmed reports that, last year, a "confidential"
letter was circulated among?party workers in the Soviet Union and
Satellites, outlining the "errors" committed by Malenkov which led
to his removal as Premier. These "errors" included:
(1) Failure to act wholeheartedly in removing Beria.
(2) Partial moral responsibility for the "Leningrad
Affair"--a trumped-up purge undertaken in 1945-1949,
(3) Favoring policies in Hungary which resulted in a
definite right-wing deviation.
(4) Following a policy of lowering prices without adequately
increasing production--with resulting shortages.
However, the "confidential" party letter did not mention Malenkov's
"lack of experience" as a prime shortcoming (one of the chief reasons
Malenkov himself cited in his resignation statement).
IA&
NSC BRIEFINCx` `' 17 JULY 1956
2&
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 Xwc'00890A000700070003-0
 Approved For Release 200070&PZT"OA-RDP79R0089OA000700070003-0
25X1X
C. has given us information concerning a July 1955
25X1X
"'secret" session of the Soviet Central Committee,
One copy of the
minutes of this "secret" session was sent from Moscow to the
Politburo of the _ party, where only a few high-level party
n r v w v
25X1X
25X1X
entitled by rank to see the document-`bootlegged the minutes by a
officials were permitted to read it. -although not
hi FM ,
A
Appra*eeloFmia ie s 0 9:9GIA-RDJ?7 O Ar ,OQ QQQ700,A~,-
- Politburo member-- -and told "'""",
to prepare instructions for carrying out the Soviet directives.
As recalls the minutes:
(1) Khrushchev started off the session. He stated that
for various reasons, mainly international, the Communist
Parties in the West are not able, at present, to carry out a
revolution. He added that, in th ,s situation, any attempt
by the Communists at a revolution in a Western country would
end in complete destruction of that country's Communist Party
And the loss of cadr which might be more effectively used at
some later and more propitious time.
(2) Khrushchev continued that Soviet international policy
is more elastic than ever, and that it is clear that--if the
USSR has decided on this policy--it has to make some compromises.
He cited Austria as a typical example of a wise compromise. The
USSR lost some bases, but won excellent starting grounds to
show its goodwill without increasing the military potential of
the USSR's enemies. He added that the limit of such compromise
was the unity of the Socialist world--i.e., compromises should
not be allowed in areas where they would weaken the unity of the
Communist countries. Austria did not have a Communist government.
 Approved For Release
29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000700070003-0
(3) Summing up, Khrushchev stated that one problem which
was never properly assessed was nationalism. Several failures
in Soviet relations with the Satellites, both past and present,
resulted from not recognizing these nationalistic feelings.
He said this problem should be'tactfully handled, and stated
that the party is now trying to take nationalism into account.
(4) Finally, Khrushchev read a communique: "Before the
Soviet delegation left for Yugoslavia (May 1955), there was a
meeting of the Party Presidium where this visit was discussed
and opposed only by Molotov. At the same time, Molotov, as
Foreign Minister, obstructed the proposed healing of this
break. In the case of Austria, Molotov disagreed with the
party line concerning withdrawal. Because Molotov stuck to
his opinion, the Presidium decided that this should be presented.
to the central committee plenum."
(5) Molotov spoke next. Although he did not argue directly
against the general thesis of Khrushchev's speech, he attacked
the attitude concerning Austria, Yugoslavia and the Satellites.
The audience felt that Molotov was attacking the Party Presidium.
Molotov's statements were often interrupted by shouts and short
interjections by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan, and the
atmosphere was rather tense. Mikoyan and Bulganin then spoke
in defense of Yhrushchevts thesis, and Khrushchev took the
floor again to sum up.
Approved For Release 2000/08/ P79ROO89OA000700070003-0
 Approved For Release 2000% tIIA-RDP79R0089OA000700070003-0
25X1 X
2.
(6) Finally, this resolution was read to the plenum: "The
Central Committee approves the present policy'of the Politburo
and accepts with pleasure the results of the talks in Belgrade,
regarding them as a big achievement by the leaders of the Party.
The direction to follow:..3n the future policy is to stick to
these directions, which were approved at the present Plenum.
The Central Committee acknowledges with pleasure Molotov's
withdrawal of his previous stand. It considers that all the
high-level activists of the Party should be informed about the
main problems discussed during this secret session of the Plenum,
but only in the form of final resolutions, without mentioning
the polemics with Molotov."
has also provided us valuable information about the
serious ideological discontent concerning future policy and control that
has developed within the Polish Communist Party. This background infor-
mation has proved indispensible for an understanding of current events
in Poland. He explains that a number of influential Polish party members
have been agitating for three years for a more liberal policy for the.
country, and that the position of the "Liberals"'was strengthened by the
revelations of Swiatlo (the former security official who defected in
December 1953), concerning the high-.handed, "anti-democratic" and
"illegal" activities of the Polish security police. Swiatlo's revelations
"added oil to the fire" with respect to liberalization, since they
"compromised the Politburo and revealed the weakness of party control."
Approved For Release 2000/08/29
 Approved For Release 200
25X1X
DP79R00890A000700070003-0
A, After the Soviet repudiation of Stalin, the demands of
this liberal group erupted into a ferment of almost unchecked
cticism of the 'polish regime,.
(1) Wazyk t s poem
, created a great 25X1X
disturbance among the Politburo leadership.
(2) The Politburo called a meeting of the Polish Writers'
Association, and castigated the group for permitting publication
B. This criticism was already under way in 1955, notably in
the form of satirical writings, such as Adam Wazykts Poem for Adults,
which criticized the regime for being "anti-humanist,"
of Wazykts poem but most of the 150-200 persons at the meeting
refused to disavow it.
CO has given us much other interesting background on
Polish Party conflict. In describing the controversy over the
Polishthational Communist", Gomulka, a principal feature of this
internal political turmoil, _ states that Gomulkats 1955 re-
lease from imprisonment came as a result of an independent Warsaw
decision, without Moscow consultation.
25X1X
(1) Contrary to our previous belief, = tells us that 25X1X
the Gomulka affair had become an "almost forgotten" problem
25X1X
within the Polish party.
has also provided extremely detailed reports on the
reorganization of the Polish Ministry of Internal`.Security and the
manner in which the Party reasserted its control over the security
police.
Approved For Release
CIA-RDP79R00890A000700070003-0
 Approved For Release 2000/
RDP79R0 i k4666 i
E. Finally, his information concerning the top leaders of the
Polish regime, their attitudes towards each other, and the inter-
play of forces within the Polish politburo, has also proved
valuable, particularly within the context of developments during
the past several months.
(1) For example, the ouster of Jakub Berman from the
Politburo,` following the appointment of a new party first
secretary, Edward Ochab, was in part dictated by the strong
animosity between the two men. The existence of this animosity
was first learned fr
om
Approved For Release 2000
RDP79R00890A000700070003-0