DI/USAF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-35/1 PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000030006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 29, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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DI/USAF Ci':TRI'-AJTIO'J 11) !JIE-35/1
F it)?ABL DEVELOPMENTS IN I".DOCIII::A THROUGH MID-1952
9Jan52
At,
L. FACTOii3 T. CLU::-Cj'.'G CHI~;SSE CO;I.:Ml.'T POLICY TU ARD I
A. `:''.gat ir, the current militnrv situation in Indochina?
ljl~
1. V7hat is the relative military strength? coa.,oat. effectiveness,
and tactical position of the French -Victc:amese and Viet 1.inh
forces?
Strength and Disposition of French Air Force
As of 15 ;,overller 1,951 the FAEEO had a strength
of 365 aircraft of which 316 were assigned to
tactical. squadrons under three tactical commands:
T=
Noa of Squadrons
Aircraft
Fjrhter
4
83
Light domt:er
1
25
:'hoto aecosmaissance
1
?.2
Observation and Liaison
6
120
Transport
3
-_26
The personnel strength of FAA is as follows:
Officers
524
Enlisted
6,296
6s20f,;, '
^Includes 359 Pilots (Officers and'NCO"s),
C .1u. rust Iz NIn
TS S C
i,ohelity: Hn 70.7
^ contains nothing of CI r a
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(2) The composition and disposition of the tactical
squadrons are as follows.
TACTICAL COL.' 'A::D NORTH - Hanoi
No. of
Unit Tyne Aircraft Aircraft Location
Fighter S'1 1/8 F8F 20 liar Mai-Ilanoi
Transport Sq 2/62 JU-52
Liaison Sq 53 Martinet 6
Penguin 8
Cricket 12 "
I1iller 1
Photo Recon Sq 80 F8F 12 Gia Lam-Hanoi
Art Obs Sq 23 Cricket 24 "
Transport Sq 2/64 C-47 6 n
Fighter Sq 3/6 F8F 20 Cat Hai-Haiphong
Fighter.Sq 1/9 F8F 20
Bomber Sq 1/19 8-26 10
TACTICAL CO'."'A'-D CE"TER - Has
Bomber Sq 1/19 B-26 15 Tourane
Fighter Sq 2/9 (Det) F6F 7
Art Obs Sq 21 Cricket 10
Liaison Sq 54Uartinet 6
Cricket 4
Penguin 4
Transport Sq 1/64 (Dot) JU-52 3 n
Transport Sq 1/64 JU-52 16 Nha Trang
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Unit
Type Aircraft
No. of
Aircraft
Location
Art Obs Sq 22 (Det)
Transport Sq 1/64.
Transport Sq 2/64 (Det)
Cricket
JU-52
C-47
,
2
2
1
Nha Trang
Vientiane
TACTICAL C0,11A:ID SOUTH - Saigon
Fighter Sq 2/9
Transport Sq 2/64
F6F
C-47
Transport Sq 1/64 (Det)
JU-52
Art Obs Sq 22
Liaison Sq 52
Cricket
Martinet
8
C&'icket
12
Penguin
6
Hiller-Heli-
copter
1
The movement of aircraft from one tactical comland to another is
comnon and is determined primarily by the military situation in the
various commands.
b. French Naval Air Am
(1) The shore based French Naval Air Arm in Indochina
comprises a total of 25 aircraft assigned to two patrol squadrons and
one reconnaissance squadron. The composition and disposition of these
units is as follows:
Units
Type A LC No. Aircraft Location
Patrol bomber Sq 8F PB4Y 10 Saigon
Patrol Recon Sq 8S PBY-5A 2 1-Haiphong
1-Saigon
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Units
Recon Sq 98
T A C Nom Aircraft Location
C?4? 1 Saigon
Moranes 4 Haiphong
in the near future, One PB4Y-2 is being cannibalized for
spare parts,
The ,~ rsonnel strength of the French Naval Air Arm is as follows:
Officers 5?
Enlisted 758
8153',
**Includes 35 Pilots (Officers and NCO?s),
(2) The carrier based French Naval Air Arm in Indochina
comprises a total of 44 aircraft aboard the CVL Arromanches, of which
16 F6F6a are operational and 16 are in reserve and 6 SD2C's are operational
with 6 reserve, The airgroup personnel complement is 30 Pilots officers
and 310 aircrewmen0 The primary mission of the AB1bJMANCHES is maritime
surveillance, especially coastal, and air support to ground operations,
c, Air Facilities
French air facilities in Indochina are very limited, Only
ten airfields have permanent-surfaced runt;ayso Of these, only the
airfields at Haiphong, Tourane and Saigon are capable of sustained
operation of medium bomber and jet aircraft, In the critical Tonkin
delta area, the French are using three airfields, Bac Mai and Gia Lam.
at Hanoi and Cat Hai at Haiphong. This latter airfield, Cat Bai, has
full facilities as a fighter and light bomber base as dell as the
4
YI
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largest underground fuel capacity in northern Indochina. It is also
here Lt Haiphong that a new airfield, Kion Ana, is near completion,
then completed as planned it will have twin 7,500 foot runways. All
of these highly important French airfields are surrounded by rice
paddies w:ich makes field dispersal and camouflage of aircraft
impossible. They are within range of possible air attacks from
nearby Chinese Communist airfields in Yunnan, Kwangei and Hainan
Island areas. If they should fall into Vietdinh hands, Hue Airfield,
300 miles to the south would be the next good operational field avail-
able to the FAEEO. In central Indochina, the most important airfield
is Tourane with 6,400 foot permanent runways and full facilities.
Tan Sot Nhut Airfield near Saigon is the most important airfield in
southern Indochina, and the home base of the FAEED.
Of the eight auxiliary seaplane stations available to the
French Naval Air Arm in Indochina, Cat Lai. Seaplane Station, six
miles east of Saigon, is the only suitable seaplane landin;; area.
d. Combat Effectiveness.
The FAEEEX) capabilities are excellent in operations of
a tactical ground support type, with no air opposition or effective
enemy AAA fire. It is also very efficient in conducting paratroop
operations and supply by airdrop, transport activities, reconnaissance,
observation and liaison, witl.in the li.d.tations of its equipment. The
French pilots are well ualified to perform tactical support missions
of low-level and dive barbing, rocks cy,and gunnery. FAEEO would be
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relatively ineffective in air defense operations, due to lack of modern
interceptor aircraft, radar defenses and early warning, or fighter
direction equipment.
The colabat effectivenoss of the combined shore and sea based
French Naval. A#.r Arm in ,)erfornin6 its mission of )atrol, reconnaissance,
destruction of enemy shi,,ping, and su,.port to ground operations is
good within the limits of its aircraft and facilities,
e. Strength and Dioiosition of Viet Minh Air Force
(1) The Viet :1nh have no known Force in being, and no
immediate prospect of developing such a Force? `there have been some
reports of training of Viot Lanh pilots being conducted by the Chines-s
Communists at various south China airfields, but this is unconfirmed,
If the Viet Minh ground forces are to have air support during coning
operations against the French/Vietnamese, it would be provided only
by the Chinese Corlmunist Air Force, usin;; either regular units or
"volunteers"?
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Bo ,chat are the capabilities of the Chinese Communists to commit
an increasing volume of air assistance to the Viet LLinh in the
form of advisers, instructors, manpower and materiel?
to Assuming present situation or an intensification of the
fighting in Korea?
The Chinese Communists have committed no known air assistance
to the Viet t:inh in the form of manpower or materials up to the pre
sent time. It is possible that there may be a Levi airfield adviserre
among the some 8000 Chinese Communiat advisers already with Viet lL4nh
units in Indochina, There have also been unconfirmed reports of
training of Viet L!izh pilots being conducted by the Chinese Communists
in the Sino-TMd.n border area, Unless the Chinese Communists decide
to create a Viet Linh Air Forces as the Soviets did with the Chinesse
Communist Air Force itself, there is no need of their committing air
assistance to the Viet i'.inh in the form of advisers, instructors#
manpower and materiel at this time,
2. Assuming an armistice in Korea?
The Chinese Communists,aaauming an armistice in Koreas would
have the capability of beginning the creation of a Viet tinh Air
Force, and providing it with materiel assiatanceo Logistical diffi-
culties and the tine element necessary to create a modern day air
force from scratch would be seriously limiting factors in this course
of action? however?
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CO ''hat are the capabilities of the Chinese Communists to commit
major elements of their regular air forces in Indochina?
1, Assuming present situation or an intensification of the
fighting in i:orea?
a, 'hat air strength could the Chinese Communists commit
to such an invasion? '?hat airfields are available or
could bo made available and supported logistically for
operational use?
The Chinese Comu~unist Air Force is estimated to have
approximately 1700 aircraft available at the present time, including
900 Jot fighters, 250 piston fighters, 160 ground attack, 240 light
bombers, and 150 transport aircraft, The bulk of these aircraft,
especially tho jet fighters, are currently located in Ilorth China and
Manchuria,
Thoro are a fen airfields in Viet 11nh held territory
within Indochina which the Chinese Communist Air Force might use, but
recent air reconnaissance, verified by aerial photographs, show that
no effort has been made by the Viet I'inh to prepare these fields for
operations, This would indicate that utilization of airfields in
south China is the most probable if air operations against Indochina
begin, Twenty-tri airfields exist or could be made available on
short notice within 400 nautical miles of Hanoi, in the Yunnan,
I:wangei and IIainan areas, of sufficient size to be considered by the
CCAF for use in conducting air operations against the Tonkin Delta
area of Indochina. Five of these airfields are class II fields, and
are capable of supporting limited operations of heavy/medium bombers
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and sustained operations of jet tactical support fighters, with run-
ways of 6,000 feet or better. Six clue III fields are potential
heavy/medium bonbor bases and are presently capable of supporting
sustained operations of jet interceptor fighters, with runways al'
5,000 feet or more. The remaining 11 airfields are Class IV fields,
and will support sustained operations of light transports and piston
fighters, with runways of 4,000 feet or better,
It is believed that at present Denning, Liuchou, and
Pal-se are the only three bases from which jet fighters could be
used in support of air operations in the Tonkin area of Indochina.
Because of the range of the 1SI0-15, operations from these bases vtuld
probably be confined to combat air patrol and escort.
At present the CCAF is principally located on fields in
the i anchurian-Porean area, the najority of these within combat range
of "orth Forea. Some of their jet aircraft are being used consistently
against UTI aircraft, It is not believed that the CCAF would logically
pull out rainy of their jet-typo aircraft for any appreciable period
of tine from the 12orean "ar to use in the south against Indochina.
The possible exception to this might be the moving of some jets dawn
to help in air operations against the major trench-Vietnamese airfields
in the Tonkin area. The use of their piston-type aircraft is a dif-
ferent matter. These aircraft are not being used to any extent at
present, and could be moved south without weakening the present CCAF
capability in the Korean area. They could be used for either a
sudden attack or for prolonged operations in the Indochina theatre,
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and would be able to accomplish the mission desired without fear of
FAF,EC jot interception, Due to the lack of air defenses by the
French-Vietnamose, both ground and air, a split of this type would
allow the CCAF to accomplish dual missions effectively, without
weakening their present scale of operations in Korea,
2, Assuming an armistice in Korea, what air strength could the
Chinese Communists commit to such an invasion?
The Chinese Communists are capable of using, for air operations
in Indochina, all or any part of their present air force in being when
released from their Korean mission, subject only to logistical and
air facilities limits in the Indochina-China border area,
D, I:ow would the air capabilities of the Viet Itinh forces be affected
in the next six months if:
1, Chinese Communist air technical and materiel assistance were
maintained at approximately present nature and levels?
There is no Chinese Communist air technical and material
assistance being given to the Viet L:inh at present,
3. Chinese Communists commit major elements of their regular air
forces in Indochina?
The employment of major units of the CCAF in air operations
in the Tonkin Delta area of Indochina anytime during the next six
months could practically eliminate the present operational French
Air Force in this area, A successful surprise attack on the Tonkin
Airfields could knock out, it is estimated, approximately 60% of the
French Air Force's operational aircraft in Indochina, including 75%
of their fighter strengths This would remove a major obstruction
to Viet Binh/Chinese Communist ground forces, and allow the issue to
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superiority?
E, that are the present French.Vietnamese capabilities for air
defense against:
1, The Viet 1~"inh alone, assuming a continuance of the present
scale of Chinese communist assistance?
Since the Viet Vinh have no air force, the French-Vietnamese
are not lacking in air defenses against the Viet I_Tinh alone,
2, The Viet Unh alone, assuming the present nature and level
of Chinese Camclunist aid is increased?
So long as the Chinese Communists do not "create" a Viet Umh
Air Force, or provide a "volunteer" air force for their use, the
French-Vietnamese air defense capability against the Viet Minh alone
will not change,
3o The Viet ;;.:inh, with major elements of the CCAF?
It is believed that both the French-Vietnamese ground forces
and the FREED would be relatively ineffective in air defense operations,
The Tonkin area airfields are especially vulnerable to attack, They
are overcrowded with aircraft, there is no adequate radar or early
warning system, AAA defenses are limited, there is insufficient space
for dispersal of aircraft, and installations and aircraft are not
camouflaged, The FA' O aircraft'(FSF and F6F) which would be utilized
as interceptors or-combat air patrol missions are not in condition to
perform such a role, and probably could not stand up against modern
Soviet type fighter aircraft, Through lack of maintenance water in-
jection systems are useless and there is no operable oxygen in the
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aircrafto i'hc F" .M is trained and used primarily in a tactical
ground support role. For theno reasons It is believed that the pre'
sent FALM would be out fought in a short. period of tiros, if engaged
in combat by the Chinese Commtuxist Air Force presently in being*
F, 'that trends in French Vietnamese capabilities to resist Viet I nh-
Chinese Connunist pressure are probable through mid-1952?
to In air material supply (scheduled !DAP aid)-,
ost of the present capability of the FAE'X7 Is due to the
:DAP assistance received during the past years and that remaining to
be delivered during FY 19520 Present :DAP policy provides for the
replacement of aircraft as needed to. maintain the level now reached
by the FAKED in Indochina and to supply all the ammunition and POL
nesdrd for combat operations as required, The question of supplying
the FAE.E? rrlth got fighters is under consideration; there are none
sehodulad for Indochina at present.
G, I.Ihat is the importance of Indochina to the USSR and to Commun:ivt.
China?
14 From the point of vise of dynamic international Communism?
2d From the point of vies of Chines defense?
From the point, of view of dynamic international Communi?m
Indochina is the Ray to control of mainland Southeast Asia, not only
because of its geographic location, but also because it is the princii
pal center of -'esternled aped resistance to the spread of Communism
throughout the areas
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Inasmuch as no nation aspiring to a position of power can
long tolerate the presence of a hostile foreign power on its borders,
the presence of French armed forces near the China-Indochina border
could be said to constitute a potential threat to Communist China.
In reality, however, the only aggressive threat in the area is that
posed by Communist China itself, and the explosive border situation
either would not exist or could at least be settled amicably were it
not for the patently aggressive policies of the Chinese Communist
regimen
H? That mould be the influence on Chinese Communist courses of
action with respect to Indochina of:
le Developments in Lorea?
A continuation of the present air tier in the Korean theater
would probably prevent the Chinese Communists from launching major
air operations against Indochina, It would not, however, prevent
the rodisposition of sufficient aircraft for a damaging surprise
air attack in Indochina.
4o A possible Chinese Communist belief that a more aggressive
course in Indochina might bring UN. or US retaliation,
including an air campaign, against the China mainland?
If the Chinese Communists believed that a more aggressive
course in Indochina might bring UN or US retaliation, including an
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air campaign, against the China mainland, they would probably not
attempt a small, scale aggressive move (such as the surprise air
attack envisioned in I. H. l., above) either with or without
a Korean armistice. In these circumstances, the Chinese Commuy
nists probably would not launch any action likely to be construed
as aggression against Indochina until they had available for
immediate employment in China Proper sufficient ground and air
strength to conduct large-scale sustained action in Indochina and
to repel anticipated U11-US retaliatory action against mainland
China. however, the Chinese Communists would probably continue
to furnish the Viet Linh forces with such materiel and advisory
assistance as seemed to be beyond the UN-US capabilities to
detect.
5. A significant improvement in the French-Vietnamese
military and political position in Indochina?
A significant improvement in the French-Vietnamese military
and political position in Indochina would probably have the effect
of increasing Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh forces with
the minimum objective of preventing the complete defeat of the
latter.
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. 1ldlcations of French weakening of will to resist because
of the economic and military strains on metropolitan France.
involved in a long-term and indecisive war in Indochina?
There are some indications of a weakening of the French will to
resist in Indochina, not only because of the continuing economic and
military strains, but also because of a feeling of the futility of
continuing the struggle without the dynamic leadership of DeLattre
in the face of the apparently growing prospect of massive Chinese
Communist intervention. Assuming that this French attitude becomes
a permanent trend, the resultant Chinese Communist course of action
could be either active or passive, dependinc largely upon the timing
dictated by international Communist strategy. The Chinese Communists
could take advantage of the weakening French will to resist and strike
a quick knock-out blow to achieve Communist control of Indochina. On,
the other hand, they might see less reason than ever for major inter-
vention,, in view of the apparently increased Viet Minh capability to
achieve eventual Communist control.
7. Developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia (for example, Burma)
favorable to the Communists.
If the current unstable developments in :burma continue-. unchecked,
that country may well come under actual or effective Communist control
within a year or two with relatively little effort on the part of the
Chinese Communists. Communist control of Burma would virtually isolate
Indochina from the remainder of mainland Southeast Asia and thus greatly
facilitate the ultimate conquest of Indochina. Such a situation would
also place the Cormunists in an extremely favorable position to launch
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a twopronr.d attack on Idochina, from Burma and Communist China,
The actual course of action followed by Comm niat China in these
circumstances should be largely dictated by the requirements of
international Communist strategy,
8. Developments outside of Southeast Asia.
The only type of development outside of Korea, Southeast Asia,
or the Soviet Bloc which could be assumed to have a deterrent effect
on any Chinese Cotununist aggressive plans respecting Indochina is
Western (predominantly US) political imd/or military action which would
convince the Soviet Bloc that further Chinese Communist aggression in
the Far Fast would be met by disastrous counteraction. Conversely,
developments which implied to the Soviet Bloc a lack of Western
determinr.tion to block further Communist aggression would serve as
a green light to the Chinese Communistswwith respect to Indochina.
II0 I:'DICATIONS OF CU :R- NT CHI wSE CO:SUNIST I::r::TIONS "'ITH RE8t'ECT
TO I:!DOCHINA
A. "hat indications may be derived from Communist military
activity in Communist China and within Indochina?
Although there is no reliable intelligence that CCAF unite
have nov.d nearer to Indochina than Canton and Hankow, there are
a number of unconfirmed reports of CCAF activity in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and
Kwacigtung ?rovinces bordering on Indochina, According to these reports,
there have been preparations at Nanning Airfield, beginning at least
as far back as August 1951, which Include runway improvement, provision
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of fuel storage facilities, security precautions, hanger construction, and
storage of aircraft parts, These reports also allege the planned
establishment of a maintenance "factoryl?1 at tlanningathe development
of auxiliary airfields at former airfield locations within 14TIG-15
conbat radius of Tonkin, the establishment of an airfield in the
Paracel Islands, and the arrival of jet aircraft and conventional
bomber aircraft at 1.anning, Other reports state that there has been
an increase in technical and supervisory personnel at airfields in
the Canton area and that engineers have arrived at the border town
of Iangson, Indochina, to establish an airfield for the Viet :Anh
forces,
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