COMMENTS ON APPENDIX 'A' OF NIE-34

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 6, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Approved For Release 2000108129: CIA-RDP79R01012A001000010009-9
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Comments on Appendix "All of NIE-34
1. Agriculture. "51 per cent of the total Spanish labor force" was a
true estimate in 1930. Today 44-47 per cent would represent a more ac-
curate figure. Olive oil should be listed among Spain's important farm
products. Critical shortages of this edible oil, second only to wheat
in the Spaniards staple diet, have caused real concern to the government
which fears serious repercussions, The expenditure of dollars for soya
and other edible oil imports has prevented Spain from contracting for
its full allocation of US wheat. If by "cereal grains" is meant chiefly
wheat, the figure 500,000 (metric) tons for annual imports appears excessive.
In 1949-50 Spanish wheat production reached the lowest level for the 1945-50
period. 1heat imports in 1949-50 amounted to 399,.333 metric tons.' The 1950-51 wheat
imports requirements were officially listed at 330,000 metric tons. Although
the population of Spain has increased at the rate of 300,000 annually, farm
productivity has fallen 3-6 per cent since 1930, due in great part to the
shift of some farm labor to urban centers.
2. Mining and Metallurgy. The 1950 coal production figure of 11 million
metric tons seems questionable. A total of 11,814,000 metric tons were
dug in 191,9 and, an the basis of the first three quarters of 1950, an
increase of about 4.5 per cent was anticipated over 19LG9. Therefore, the
1950 production should have reached a figure of about 12.5 million metric
tons. Shortages of coking coal have become still more critical with the
tightening of the world coal supply brought on by the Korean war. With
regard to steel production, 1929 was a record-breaking year. The 1950
figure represents a new high since 1929. The official figures for tungsten
ore production in 1950 were 850 metric tons. They do not include the ore
which is smuggled into Portugal now at the rate of 20 tons monthly. Most
Spanish exports of this essential wartime commodity go to Europe, where
the market price is higher than in the US. 1950 mercury production showed
a marked increase over the 1949 figure of 32,262 flasks. (note: One flask
weighs 76 pounds.) 1.3 million metric tons of iron pyrites is the present
annual rate of production which is 14.8 per cent higher than in 1949. The
US received no shipments of this sulphur bearing ore in the first three
quarters of 1950, the principal consumers being Germany, the Netherlands
and the UK, in the order given. Spain produced less copper in 1950 than
in 1949 and to date has not been able to produce sufficient quantities
for its domestic needs. An agreement has been signed irrith Chile -whereby
3,000 metric tons of Chilean copper will be imported annually for three
years. It might be added that Spain's special steels production has been
virtually paralyzed due to shortages of nickel, molybdenum and cobalt.
Minister of Commerce and Industry Suances has sought to obtain quantities
of these strategic minerals for tungsten through barter arrangements,
The special Strategic Minerals Conmittce's policy favors their free exchange
1, and allocation by international agreement. Severe electric powrer shortages
should also be listed as hindering the expansion of Spain's mining and
11 metallurgical industries.
3. Industry. Spanish industry is presently operating at about 50 per cent
of capacity. In 1950, 7,265 million kilowatt-hours of electric power were
produced. General Franco has announced 9 billion kilowatt-hours as the
goal for 1951.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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 it. Railroads. It may be misleading to include the railroads of Portugal
in the general picture of "Iberian" railroads which is given under this
sl,v +?t / heading. Portugal's railroads are in a vastlybetter state of repair
and maintenance than those in Spain in practically every category. The
sentence "The difference in gauge between the French and Spanish railroads
necessitates transfer of goods at the border:' perhaps could be inserted
to good effect before the sentence which begins "A number of narrow-gauge
lines....", 6th line, section 4. Some Export-Import Bank loans have been
granted and others are pending for further electrification, signalling
equipment and steel rails, as well as coal. Instead of "old and in-
adequately maintained rolling stock" (3rd line, p. 4) it might be more
accurate to say "makeshift maintenance of old rolling stock". The Spanish
worker is generally acknowledged to he a keen craftsman if he is given
the proper tools and materials. Not only does Spain have to import railway
equipment, steel, coal, etc., (line 16, p. 4) but is desperately in need
of foreign credits, especially dollars, with which to pay for these things.
The state of deterioration of Spanish railroads points up the almost total
immobility of Spain's ground forces which are woefully deficient in motor
transport. All such considerations, however, could be taken up below
under the appropriate military headings, such as the "defense of the Pyrenees"
which is discussed in Section 6 of Appendix "B".
5. Highways. The deterioration and inadequacy of the Spanish highway
system cannot be described too strongly. The highways of Spain can be
said to be "almost totally inadequate" for modern, "heavily motorized"
military traffic. Spain's lack of financial resources to buy asphalt
and road-building equipment is largely responsible for the failure to
maintain and expand the hi?hway network. Hence, the urgent need for
foreign financial assistance. The shortage of motor vehicles, fuel and
auto parts is acute.
6. Standard of Living. The Spanish national income dropped from 25.3 billion
pas t as in 1'-3E723.7 billion in 1949. At first reading the 9 per cent
average drop may appear unusually slight. This is explained by the fact
that industrial production expansion has partially offset the fall in
agricultural production. The whole Spanish economy has been thrown out
of gear in the process. It is doubtful whether the "inflationary forces"
'-n/ are "still fairly successfully repressed" (line 7, P. 7) and if the economic
situation cannot perhaps be described as "chaotic" it is certainly extremely
desperate. The Spanish people appear to have reached the limit of their
, endurance. The recent wave of strikes against the high cost of living--
I
which, on the basis of 1935, has increased 700 per cent while wages have
roof of this
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risen only 350 per centis su
-- In regnr11 to the regimented Spanish business and industrial enterprise,
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Commerce and Industry Suances, may be cited as an example of a state-
controlled industrial combine which competes obviously very unfairly with
private enterprise for allocations of raw materials, foreign exchange
allocations, foreign aid, etc.
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Comments on Appendix "B" of NIE-34
1. The Spanish Ary. On April 13, General Franco ordered the organization
of 5 armore rwhich are to be based on 10 of the existing separate
cavalry regiments for the purpose of "providing larger, highly mobile units,
capable of providing immediate cover at points of danger while smaller,
slower moving units are being redeployed". Whereas the T/ O of a Spanish
infantry division calls for 9,180 officers and men, all such divisions
are actually below normal peacetime strength out of economic necessity.
Furthermore, considerable numbers of recruits are granted furloughs of
indefinite duration in order to conserve rations, etc.
- The figure of 5 million physically fit manpower appears open to doubt.
The per capita food consumption level (2350 calories daily), one of the
lowest in Europe, verges dangerously on mal-nutrition, and must surely
have taken its tool in terms of the physical fitness of Spain's manpower.
Perhaps correlative statistics on the incidence of tuberculosis and the vari-
ous dietary disease in Spain might clarify this point. On the question
of available manpower, the Spaniards claim they could put two million men
in the field under full mobilization. However, the present 488,000 members
of the armed forces together with the 1,200,000 trained reserves add up to
only 1,688,000 experienced military personnel. The mobilization time-table
for Spain which is carried on page 9 unfortunately does not add clarity to
the picture of available Spanish manpower.
Is "combat effectiveness"meant by the "effectiveness and efficiency"
of the average Spanish soldier's training? Lack of standardization might
be mentioned as contributing to the lack of readiness of the Spanish army.
Remarks on army morale and discipline could be made to wind up Section 1.
It might be suggested in passing that, whereas there is apparently no ques-
tion as to the loyalty to Franco and discipline of Spanish troops, morale
may be somewhat less than satisfactory among the junior officers parti-
cularly because of low pay and rising living costs. In this connection,
it might be added that the positive attributes of the Spanish soldier are
his ruggedness and ability to endure extreme hardships, and an intense
partriotism which would strengthen his will to resist an aggressor. Owing
to a lower standard of living since the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish
soldier's ability to bear up under actual combat conditions remains open
to question.
2. The Spanish Air Force. The air force has a total of 994 aircraft,
379 oofwwwhich are assigned to tactical units. It is estimated that present
flying equipment would last only a few days under combat conditions. An
indication of the low state of readiness'-` the air force is the'fact that
until very recently it possessed only two radar sets. The "complete re-
building" of the air force would be a prime necessity since the defensive
capabilities of Spain depend in large measure upon an efficient airforce.
3. The Spanish Navy. The catalogue of Spain's fighting ships is at vari-
ance with the June listings issued by the Department of Defense. For
instance, 4 CL and 1.8 DD is given instead of 3 and 15 respectively. The
Spanish navy could be utilized mainly for anti-submarine warfare and mining
operations. Other factors militating against effective training of crews
are lack of radar and sonar equipment and the need to conserve fuels. It
might be added that the marine corps as presently constituted could be
utilized only for guard and patrol duty.
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4. 8 an-_ ish Air Bases. Strategically speaking, would the Ebro River Valley
and uadalqquiV r River Valley be better locations than the Castilian plateau?
In what condition are the roads and rail facilities servicing the two valley
locations?
5. Spanish Naval Bases. El Ferrol might better be described as on the
extreme northwest ces'f of Spain, and Cadiz on the southwest Atlantic coast.
El Ferrol is equipped to build even BBs although facilities and methods are
antiquated. Plans for the expansion of naval bases and ports would require
immediate US economic and technical assistance for their speedy implementa-
tion. By "(including oil)" (line 4, p. 14) "oil tanks" are obviously meant.
Might not "patrolling" be substituted for "controlling" in line 10, p. 14?
This sentence could end with the phrase "and defending the Spanish littoral."
If Spain's artificial harbors are "excellent" (line 19, p. 14) this
might be mentioned in the preceding sentence.
6. The Pyrenees Defense Line. Since so much is made of the poor condition
of the roads on t h e u pani- s side of the Pyrenees (Appendix "A", p. s, Sect.S)
it might be well to place a little more emphasis on this fact here. It
would appear that the roads in this region need more than "substantial main-
tenance" to withstand the traffic of heavy-duty military equipment.