NIE-26

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000600030006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: NIE

SERE
QN? Contributions to fa agraph 1L.A.1
The primary objective of Soviet penetration in the Near East is the
supplanting of Western influence by Communist domination, This is in further-
ance of the general Soviet aim of controlling the entire region, with its
peoples, economic, strategic areas, and natural resources especially petroleum.
In pursuing their objective, the Soviets not only utiJ e t e various Communist
parties in the region but also exploit all dissident elements and other sources
of cleavage.
Small but well organized Communist parties exist legally in Israel and
Cyprus, and illegally in Greece, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Egypt. While
these organizations constitute a netvbrk for subversion, sabotage and espion-
age under the control of an international apparatus, their capabilities are
limited by governmental repression, difficulties of communication throughout
the region, religious convictions, and general lack of political consciousness.
Communist techniques are used to exploit such disruptive factors in the
region ast (1) Arab-Jewish hostility; (2) aspirations and grievances of various
ethnic groups such aw Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Kurds and Cypriot Greeks; (3)
the influence of the Orthodox Church; (4) political groups (such as the Moslem
Brotherhood and the Israeli Mapam Party) which might be inclined to cooperate
with Communism; and (5) the general fear of Soviet armed strength.
In varying degrees, the entire Near East is vulnerable to Soviet
penetration. This vulnerability is due to: (1) poor economic and social
conditions aggravated by population increases; (2) growing labor movements;
(3) corruption within governments; (4) decline of religious influence; and
(5) a tendency to play one foreign power against another.
Soviet capabilities for sabotage of Near Eastern installations affecting
U.S. security interests are considerable, Security measures at these install-
ations., while improving to some extent, are still inadequate. A pattern of
past and proposed sabotage has been reported.
ONI review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79R01012A000600030006-5