KEY PROBLEMS AFFECTING US EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NEAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000600030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 25, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
KEY PROBLEMS AFFECTING US
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
THE NEAR EAST
Published 25 April 1951
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence. Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 23 April.
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DISTRIBUTION (NIE Series) :
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KEY PROBLEMS AFFECTING US EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN
THE NEAR EAST
THE PROBLEM
To analyze Near Eastern attitudes and conditions which affect US security
interests in that region.*
CONCLUSIONS
1. From the point of view of US security
interests, the Near East must be consid-
ered as an entity. Defense of Western
strategic interests in the region (oil in-
stallations, communications, and strate-
gic air facilities) would require the use of
military bases and the free movement of
defending forces throughout much of the
area. The loss of such countries as
Greece or Iran to the USSR would preju-
dice the defense of the remainder. Soviet
successes anywhere in the region, unless
effectively met by Western counteraction,
would accelerate the trend toward neu-
tralism and might even cause some states
to seek accommodation with the USSR.
2. The four principal conditions which
make the region as a whole vulnerable to
Soviet pressures and impede US-UK ef-
forts to counteract these pressures are:
a. The lack of any positive political co-
hesion. The newly independent Arab
states are generally more intent on assert-
ing their sovereignty and on rivalries
amongst themselves than on furthering
any interests common to the area as a
whole. Even those states most directly
threatened by the USSR-Greece, Turkey,
and Iran-show little disposition to act
in concert amongst themselves, much less
on a regional basis.
b. A general poverty of resources (ex-
cept for oil), economic underdevelopment,
social and political ferment and insta-
bility, and military weakness. Turkey
and, to a lesser extent, Greece are excep-
tions to this generalization, but it applies
with particular force to Iran and the
Arab States.
c. The extreme nationalistic sensitivity
to foreign influence of Iran and the Arab
States. This is anti-Western in effect
since it is a reaction to former British or
French domination and is currently di-
rected against residual British interests.
This anti-Western tendency is aggravated
by Arab hostility toward Zionism and to-
ward what the Arabs believe to be the par-
tiality of the US for Israel. The Near
Eastern states are also anti-Communist
but, except in Greece, Turkey, and Israel,
fear of the USSR tends to be overshadowed
by fear of Western "imperialism." The
inability to distinguish between these
'" The Near East is taken to include Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Libya, and the Arab States.
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fears has contributed to a trend toward
neutralism.
d. The progressive decline in British
ability to defend Western interests in the
Near East, in part a consequence of the
over-all decline in British capabilities, in
part the result of Arab-Iranian determi-
nation to eliminate the vestiges of British
imperialism.
3. The United Kingdom would welcome
increased US support in the region, both
in preserving British base rights and eco-
nomic concessions and in extending fur-
ther aid and commitments to strengthen
the general security of the area. The
British, however, would seek to retain the
senior partnership and controlling voice
in any joint Western program.
4. France, unreconciled to the loss of her
position in the Near East, claims a voice
in any Western program. France, how-
ever, has little to contribute, while French
participation would prove a liability in
view of Arab animosity toward French
imperialism in Syria and North Africa.
5. Most Near Eastern countries would
welcome greater US military and eco-
nomic aid and US commitments to defend
them in case of attack, but they vary on
the conditions under which they would
like to receive this support and on the re-
ciprocal concessions they would grant.
Greece and Turkey strongly desire a for-
mal US security guarantee and would
grant peacetime base rights in return.
Jordan, Libya, and Saudi Arabia would
probably extend further peacetime tran-
sit privileges and base rights in return for
greater aid. The other Arab States and
Israel also desire US-UK aid, but would
be reluctant to allow base and transit
rights on other than a wartime basis.
Iran alone would hesitate to accept any
security arrangement under present cir-
cumstances.
6. In Turkey and Greece, expanded US as-
sistance could be relatively quickly ab-
sorbed and lead to an early increase in
strength. Israel also could be strength-
ened, although its limited population and
size make its military potential much
smaller. However, in view of the deep-
seated weaknesses of the other Near East
countries, in addition to such political
obstacles as their anti-imperialism and
the Arab-Israeli conflict, there are dis-
tinct limitations on how much the US
could accomplish in these countries over
the short run, especially toward increas-
ing local capabilities for defense against
the USSR. Nevertheless, greater US aid
and defense commitments, particularly if
accompanied by parallel political action,
would assist in promoting national sta-
bilities and a more firm pro-Western ori-
entation and, if continued over a period
of years, might materially strengthen the
region as a whole. Moreover, the grant-
ing of further base and transit rights or
maintenance of existing ones in return
for US support would facilitate deploy-
ment of the US and UK forces on whom
the defense of the Near East would largely
depend.
7. While the USSR would doubtless make
vigorous efforts to counteract expanded
US activity in the Near East, we do not
believe that US defensive guarantees and
the bolstering of local forces would in
themselves cause the USSR to embark on
local military aggression; in fact, a
stronger US commitment to go to war in
event of Soviet attack on the region would
act as a deterrent to local military action
by the USSR. However, if the US (and
UK) proceeded to develop a comprehens-
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ive system of strategic air and other bases,
and to deploy much greater forces in the
area, the USSR might consider this a
growing menace to its security and might
eventually attempt to forestall it by the
threat or use of military force, even at the
risk of general war. Indeed, such a de-
velopment might be one factor influencing
a Soviet resort to general war, although
this decision would undoubtedly be based
on global considerations, not merely on
the situation in the Near East.
DISCUSSION
1. From the point of view of US security in-
terests, the Near Eastern countries constitute
a strategic entity, within which the Persian
Gulf and Iraq oilfields and the Suez Canal are
of major importance to the West. Defense of
these key points would involve the mainte-
nance of US-UK bases and the free movement
of defending forces throughout much of the
area. Moreover, the Near East nations are
strategically interdependent; the loss of such
countries as Greece or Iran to the USSR would
greatly complicate the defense of the remain-
der of the Near East. It would hamper West-
ern support of Turkey in event of war and
would expose the Near East oilfields and their
key transport links. At present, Iran is the
Near Eastern country which is most critically
vulnerable to the USSR.* The loss of Iran
would not only deny Iranian oil to the West
but would increase the vulnerability of the
Suez Canal to Soviet attack through Iraq and
the Levant.
2. Moreover, local Soviet successes anywhere
in the Near East or the development of in-
digenous trends unfavorable to the US might
have a contagious effect on. the attitudes of
the rest of the region. Soviet-Satellite con-
quest of Greece or Iran, unless offset by strong
US counteraction and/or US commitments to
Turkey and other Levant countries, would
powerfully reinforce the trend toward neu-
tralism and might even cause some states to
seek accommodation with the USSR. We have
estimated in NIE-9 that successful Soviet
seizure of Greece in particular might cause
even Turkey, if not firmly backed by the US,
to veer toward neutralism. Soviet successes
in Iran might have strong adverse psychologi-
* NIE-6, "Iran's Position in the East-West Con-
flict," treats the current situation in Iran.
cal effects on Iran's neighbors. The develop-
ment of strong neutralist sentiment in some
Near Eastern countries might have a similar
effect on the policies of the others, especially
among the Arab States. On the other hand,
local Soviet successes might well arouse other
Near Eastern countries besides Greece and
Turkey to a more realistic appreciation of the
Soviet menace and, if met by effective US-UK
countermeasures, might greatly strengthen
the pro-Western orientation of the Near East-
ern states.
Internal Weaknesses of the Area
3. The Near East as a whole is characterized
by a general poverty of resources (except for
oil), economic underdevelopment, social and
political instability, military weakness, and
lack of regional cohesion. These weaknesses
interact to limit the region's power potential
and ability to resist outside pressures; they
make it vulnerable to Soviet penetration and
impede US-UK measures to counter the Soviet
threat.
4. Despite the strategic interdependence of
the Near Eastern countries, the lack of any
positive unity within the region contributes
to the weakness of the Near East and hampers
US-UK efforts to bolster it on a regional basis.
The Near East is politically fragmented, con-
sisting of a relatively heterogeneous collection
of young and immature national states. The
conflict of interests within the region is in fact
more significant than any common ties. Ex-
cept for the border states in close proximity
to the USSR, the Near Eastern countries are
far more concerned with domestic problems,
local rivalries, and the Arab-Israeli conflict
than with the Soviet threat. Even the directly
exposed states-Greece, Turkey, and Iran-
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display little interest in concerting common
policies to meet the Soviet threat. Numerous
intraregional tensions, especially Arab-Israeli
animosity, tend to keep the region divided.
The Arab League, the only active regional or-
ganization, is loose and ineffective, held to-
gether by a common antipathy toward Israel,
but prevented by rivalries among the Arab
States themselves from being a genuine unify-
ing force. These local rivalries and the lack
of agreement on common interests impair the
Near East's capabilities for achieving economic
and political stability and increase its vul-
nerability to the USSR. They make difficult,
if not impossible at present, the development
of any broad-based Eastern Mediterranean
pact. However, a potential unifying force
within the region, if it could be properly ex-
ploited, would be the common fear, though
varying in degree, of the USSR.
5. Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece are
the strongpoints of the area, being in general
politically stable, to some degree industrially
developed, and having more or less representa-
tive governments. These countries have rela-
tively well-equipped and trained ground forces
which could put up substantial resistance
against the USSR, although by themselves
they could not long oppose a Soviet attack.
Fear of Soviet and Satellite aggression domi-
nates Greek and Turkish foreign policy and
has led these countries to seek the closest pos-
sible association with the Western Powers.
Israel, a third potential area of strength, has
recently sought a closer US/UK alignment, in
part because of its recognition of the potential
Soviet and Arab threat to its new and hard-
won independence and in part because of its
economic dependence upon the US.
6. The Arab States and Iran, in contrast, are
weak and in most cases unstable, with an
equivocal attitude toward the great power con-
flict. They are economically backward and
undeveloped, except for their one developed
asset, oil, and their economic base for further
development in terms of skills, natural and
human resources, and indigenous capital is
weak. Political and social instability and
ferment is chronic in most countries, which
are characterized by the more or less repres-
sive control by a small ruling class over a pas-
sive and illiterate population. The constant
jockeying of special interests, such as the
army, and the congenital weakness of most
Arab and Iranian governments make revolu-
tions, coups, and assassinations recurrent feat-
ures of political life.
7. The weakness of the Arab States and Iran
lies largely in the fact that they are in a
transitional stage from medieval to modern
social, economic, and political systems; the
pressures to which they are subject in making
this transition and the unequal rate of change
have given rise to serious social, economic,
and political stresses which are a fundamental
cause of the instability of the area. Chief
among these elements has been the rise of a
middle-class intelligentsia and urban proletar-
ist; the former element, which is the standard-
bearer of nationalism, is both idealistic and
emotional in its outlook and, being denied its
place in the sun by the lagging development
of the prevailing political and social order,
tends to develop radical nationalist and often
leftist leanings. Ethnic, religious, and tribal
problems in many countries also create social
tensions, the Kurds and Azerbaijanis, for ex-
ample, being potential separatist groups. Al-
though the local Communist groups are small,
they have a distinct if as yet limited subversive
and sabotage potential, especially the out-
lawed Tudeh Party in Iran, and they are in a
position to capitalize on any indigenous dis-
turbances which may develop.
8. The Iranian and Arab armed forces, aside
from Jordan's small British-trained Arab Le-
gion, are extremely weak. The Egyptian,
Iraqi, and Iranian armies have benefited to
some extent from British or US aid, but they
are far below Western standards, and graft
and corruption are widespread. Their will-
to-resist in event of Soviet invasion is consid-
ered low.
9. The extreme nationalistic sensitivity to for-
eign influence of the Arab States and Iran seri-
ously hinders US-UK efforts to align them
with the West. This sensitivity is anti-West-
ern in effect, since it is a reaction to former
British or French domination and is currently
directed against residual British interests.
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The current difficulties over British oil con-
cessions in Iran and Iraq, Egyptian efforts to
secure British troop withdrawal, and the re-
cent upsurge of Arab feeling over Morocco, all
reflect such nationalistic and anti-colonial at-
titudes. This anti-Western tendency is ag-
gravated by Arab hostility toward Zionism and
toward what the Arabs believe to be the par-
tiality of the US for Israel. Nevertheless, the
development of these nations has been subject
to strong Western influences which are still
potent, and the Arab States and Iran can be
said to remain more or less pro-Western at the
present time.
10. In both the Arab States and Iran, there
has been some trend toward neutralism as a
possible avenue of escape from involvement
in the East-West conflict. Although the Arab
States and Iran are all anti-Communist, their
fear of the USSR has tended to be overshad-
owed by fear of Western "imperialism." Dis-
appointed in the US-UK response to their re-
quests for aid and concerned lest the US and
UK do not seriously intend to defend the area,
some of these nations have tended to feel that
their best chance for survival might lie in non-
identification with either side. Iran in par-
ticular has long sought to play off the great
powers against each other as a means of pre-
serving its independence. Despite Iran's acute
fear of the Soviet Union, its internal weakness
and resentment against UK exploitation of
its oil resources have made it adopt an equivo-
cal attitude which hampers Western efforts to
orient Iran toward the West. Since the
Korean episode, the Arab States have shown
a growing realization of Soviet ambitions, but
they have been in general apathetic over pos-
sible Soviet encroachment, and more influ-
enced by anti-colonial and nationalist senti-
ments, by frustration over US neglect of their
aid requirements as compared to those of
Israel, and by resentment over US policy on
Palestine. In the event of further Western
reverses in the East-West struggle, especially
in the Near East, and in the absence of US-UK
counteracting efforts, Near Eastern confidence
in US-UK ability to contain Soviet expansion
would be shaken and the tendency toward
neutralism reinforced. There have been some
indications that the USSR is seeking actively
to encourage this tendency.
Declining British Capabilities in the Near
East
11. Although the UK has long been the domi-
nant Western power in the Near East and has,
by US-UK agreement, primary strategic re-
sponsibility for the area, the progressive de-
cline in British ability to protect Western in-
terests in the region poses a major problem
for the US. In part this decline is a re-
sult of the over-all decline in British capabili-
ties and growing local recognition of British
weakness, and in part a result of the growth of
nationalism and xenophobia in the area.
These factors have been exploited by Soviet
propaganda. The British system of alliances
with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, based on the
concept of Britain as the senior partner pro-
viding arms aid and protection and receiving
in return peacetime base and transit rights, is
becoming increasingly offensive to Iraqi and
especially Egyptian nationalism, and these
countries demand that the alliances be revised.
Egyptian denunciation of the 1936 treaty, or
provision for British troop withdrawal in any
treaty revision, would create a major problem
for the UK, whose Near East defense plans de-
pend upon having a secure base and strategic
reserves in the Suez area. Greek demands
for Cyprus may also prove troublesome in the
future, although they are not a serious prob-
lem now.
12. Because of financial stringencies and the
demands of home defense, NATO, and the Far
East, the UK cannot at present either give
substantial aid to the Near Eastern countries
or station sufficient forces in the area to
achieve any more than initial defense of the
Canal zone in event of war. British plans
contemplate wartime reinforcement of the
Near East from New Zealand, Australia, and
South Africa, as well as the UK, and the UK
also hopes that once the Kashmir issue has
been settled, Pakistan can be persuaded to
participate. The UK is seeking to stimulate
Commonwealth cooperation and aid has been
promised, but progress has been very slow.
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Moreover, in view of the probable time re-
quired to mobilize, train, equip, and transport
sizeable Dominion forces, they would be sub-
stantially delayed in their arrival in event
of war. If the Commonwealth countries could
be induced to prepare for prompt reinforce-
ment of the Near East and perhaps even to
contribute to the peacetime garrison, British
defense capabilities would be materially en-
hanced.
13. As a result of the UK's reduced capabili-
ties, the UK itself would welcome a greater
degree of joint US-UK responsibility, includ-
ing greater US aid to the Near East countries,
stronger US air and naval forces in the area,
and much closer combined planning. The
UK also hopes for US support in preserving
British base rights and economic concessions
in the area. However, the UK would expect
to remain the senior partner in the area, with
command responsibility, and would expect the
US. to heed British recommendations and ad-
vice based on the long British experience in
the Near East. It would also look askance at
any apparent US effort to ease it out of its po-
sition of primacy in the area. Moreover, di-
vergent US and UK views over how to conduct
relations with the Near East countries, such
as the differing US and UK approaches to the
oil problem, might cause friction between the
two.
French Interest in the Near East
14. Although the French lack the capability
to contribute to the security of the area, and
the anti-colonial sentiment in certain coun-
tries is even more anti-French than anti-Brit-
ish, French interest in the Near East remains
strong. As is evident from French irritation
at being excluded from the recent US-UK
Malta conversations, the French will seek to
be included in any combined plans. French
participation, however, would prove a liability
in view of Arab animosity toward French im-
perialism in Syria and North Africa.
Regional Attitude Toward Greater US
Support
15. As a result of the UK's reduced strength
and influence in the area, the Near East coun-
tries are looking more and more to the US.
Notwithstanding the trend toward neutralism
in some parts of the region, these countries
would welcome greater US (as well as UK)
aid and US security commitments, although
their attitudes vary on the conditioi}s under
which they would like to receive this 'support
and on the reciprocal privileges they would
grant. Almost all these countries are already
receiving US or UK assistance in one form or
another, they recognize it as indispensable to
their own development, and most of them have
already sought increased support.
16. Nevertheless, many Near Eastern countries
will be insistent on particular types of assist-
ance, and sensitive to the conditions under
which it is given. In Iran, the Arab States,
and probably also Israel, national sensibilities,
fear of outside interference, and grandiose
ambitions must all be considered. These
countries want large amounts of aid with as
few strings attached as possible, and will be
quick to react if they consider they are not
receiving equal treatment, particularly in the
case of the Arab States as opposed to Israel.
Moreover, they will seek aid for ambitious eco-
nomic development projects and for strength-
ening their armed forces on big-power lines
that may be well beyond their present capac-
ity. They would tend to resent what they
considered to be US-UK dictation as to the
type of aid they would receive and as to the
complementary domestic measures they were
pressed to undertake.
17. Most Near Eastern countries would also
like a firm US-UK pledge to come to their de-
fense in case of war. Turkey and Greece have
been most persistent in seeking this protec-
tion, but the desire exists in other states as
well. They do not consider the UK system
of alliances or existing US-UK policy state-
ments as sufficient guarantee and would like
a firm and unequivocal commitment, prefer-
ably a unilateral US and UK guarantee of pro-
tection without any commitment on their part.
There is a wide disparity in the probable will-
ingness of various countries to go further and
conclude formal security pacts with the US
and UK. Greece and Turkey would adhere to
any form of security arrangement which em-
bodied a firm US guarantee. Most Arab states
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(and Israel) would probably agree to bilateral
mutual assistance agreements (preferably
supplanting the British system of alliances in
Egypt and Iraq), if these were accompanied
by substantial US-UK aid. However, they
would doubtless insist that, while the US and
UK be committed to come to their assistance,
they not be committed to support the US and
UK in event of hostilities outside the Near
East. If the Near East were not invaded, most
of these countries would prefer to remain be-
nevolently neutral in event of general war.
They would also insist that any bilateral pacts
be on a basis of full equality between the par-
ties, and avoid the objectionable features of
the alliances with the UK. Iran alone would
be hesitant to sign any pact whatsoever under
present circumstances.
18. There is little desire anywhere in the re-
gion for any security arrangement, bilateral
or multilateral, which does not include the
US and/or UK. Although the Arab League
has made some efforts toward creating a loose
security pact, this is directed primarily against
Israel, and is exceedingly weak. The Turks
have shown little interest in closer defense
ties with their neighbors within any frame-
work which would not also include the US.
Although Greece and Turkey, among others,
have raised the question of a Mediterranean
pact with US-UK participation, paralleling
the North Atlantic Treaty, there is also little
regional sentiment for this. It would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to get Israel and the
Arab States to join together, and several na-
tions might be unwilling to extend their com-
mitments beyond their own frontiers. More-
over, the military establishments of most Near
Eastern countries are so weak that a regional
pact would serve little useful purpose. Under
strong US-UK pressure, many Near Eastern
countries might eventually be persuaded to
join in a regional pact, but this seems at best
a long-range possibility.
19. Most Near Eastern countries recognize
that they might be called upon to make some
reciprocal concessions, such as base and tran-
sit rights, in return for greater US-UK sup-
port. But willingness to continue present base
and transit rights or to grant new ones in
peacetime varies among the Near Eastern
countries and would be in part dependent on
the type of US-UK commitment and the
amount of aid. Greece and Turkey would al-
most certainly be willing to allow the US and
UK peacetime bases in return for a security
guarantee. Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq already
allow base rights to the UK, and Saudi Arabia
to the US. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the new
state of Libya would doubtless be willing to
expand these concessions during peacetime in
return for greater aid. However, the other
Arab states, particularly Egypt, have strong
nationalist aversions to the peacetime pres-
ence of foreign troops on their soil, and such
concessions would be difficult to negotiate.
The Egyptians maintain that their own forces,
if suitably strengthened, could initially defend
the Suez base. Israel, too, while probably
willing to allow access to US-UK forces in war-
time, might balk at the presence of peacetime
forces and installations. While all the Near
Eastern countries would feel more secure if
stronger US-UK forces were stationed in the
region, many of them would prefer to see these
forces stationed elsewhere than within their
own frontiers.
Effects of an Expanded US Program in the
Near East
20. An expanded US program for bolstering
the Near East could materially assist in
strengthening the stability and pro-Western
orientation of the area, but there are distinct
limitations on what could reasonably be ac-
complished in the short run. In view of the
fundamental weaknesses of most countries in
the region, in addition to such political ob-
stacles as their anti-imperialism and the Arab-
Israeli conflict, even a broadly conceived US-
UK program including security commitments,
economic aid, and the building up of local de-
fense forces could not decisively increase the
Near East's stability or local defense capabili-
ties over the next few years. The weaknesses
of the Near East are too deep-seated to permit
rapid progress in the short run on an over-all
regional basis, although significant results
could probably be attained in such countries
as Greece, Turkey, and probably Israel, where
the groundwork already exists. It would take
a sustained parallel political effort to over-
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come Arab and Iranian resentment of US-UK
influence and policies and to convert anti-
colonial and neutralist sentiment into a more
cooperative attitude. A long time would also
be required to develop a concept of common
interests within the region that would permit
programs to be undertaken on a regional
rather than largely bilateral basis.
21. Many countries will make ambitious de-
mands for economic aid, but the ability of
these countries to absorb such aid will be lim-
ited by governmental inefficiency and insta-
bility, local graft and corruption, inadequate
technical skills, and the dearth of complement-
ary local capital. US aid would be most effec-
tive if concentrated in the field of agriculture,
but many countries will be equally interested
in early industrialization. However, US aid
accompanied by technical assistance and used
properly by the local governments, could even
in the short run contribute to the pro-Western
orientation of the region, ameliorate those
conditions which underlie local unrest and en-
courage Communism, and lay the groundwork
for progressive economic development over a
period of years.
22. The capacity of the Near Eastern coun-
tries to absorb and effectively utilize large-
scale military aid is also limited by adminis-
trative inefficiency, inadequate officer and
NCO cadres, lack of training, and the absence
of a strong economic base. Greece and Tur-
key as well as Israel are hampered by such dif-
ficulties, although substantially increased
military aid could be expected to materially
improve their local capabilities within a rela-
tively short time. In some Arab states and
Iran these difficulties would be even greater,
and the problem of military graft and political
intrigue would in many cases be acute. Al-
though light arms and training in guerrilla
warfare might be best suited to the capabili-
ties of these forces, they will tend, like the
Iranians, to demand such equipment as jet
planes and tanks. Moreover, they will be
sensitive to the US-UK guidance and techni-
cal assistance required to maximize the effec-
tiveness of the arms aid received. There is
also the risk that the Arab States and Israel
may seek to utilize increased US aid against
each other and the much lesser risk, in the
case of the Arab States, that they might pur-
sue local conflicts among themselves. Never-
theless, in the short run a US-UK aid program
could improve their will and ability to conduct
delaying and harassing actions against a So-
viet attack, and their willingness to cooperate
with US-UK forces.
23. Consequently, we consider that while a
major improvement in the economic condi-
tion, internal stability, and military capabili-
ties of the Near East through US-UK programs
is a long-run proposition, much could be ac-
complished in the near future. Concrete evi-
dences of greater US-UK interest in the region,
including an area-wide military and economic
aid program, particularly if accompanied by
parallel political action, could be expected to
reverse the present trend toward neutralism
in the Arab States (though under present cir-
cumstances probably not in Iran) and mod-
estly increase local capabilities for delaying
action in event of war. Moreover, the addi-
tional base and transit rights which the US
and UK might secure in several countries
would greatly facilitate deployment of the
US and UK forces, upon whom, for the next
few years at least, the defense of the region
would very largely depend.
Soviet Reaction to Greater US-UK Activity
in the Near East
24. Since the thwarting of its early postwar
attempts to gain a foothold in Greece and
Iran, the Kremlin has not fully exploited its
capabilities in the area. Because of the very
weakness of the area and of the Western forces
based there, the USSR may have felt that the
region presented little threat to its security
and could be easily conquered in event of war.
Recent Soviet Near Eastern policy has been
confined to promoting internal instability and
intra-regional tensions and reducing Western
influence. Soviet methods have included
propaganda to aggravate nationalist suspicion
of Western motives, expanded trade contacts,
local Communist efforts to cause internal and
intra-regional dissension, and incitement of
minority groups.
25. The USSR would obviously be seriously
concerned over any expanded Western activity
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in the Near East, although it is difficult to
estimate just what form its reaction would
take. Soviet propaganda has already pointed
to the planned expansion of US-UK air bases
as a new step toward encirclement. The USSR
might find it profitable, at least for the present,
to pursue a relatively "soft" policy in an at-
tempt to encourage neutralism, wean the Near
Eastern countries away from the US-UK bloc,
and undercut the Western program. The
Kremlin has recently followed a policy of this
type toward Iran, with apparently substantial
results, and there have been some indications
that it may seek to follow this policy toward
other countries as well. Through expanded
trade contacts, assurances of peaceful Soviet
intentions and simultaneous threats as to the
consequences of westward orientation, the
USSR might play upon the anti-colonialism
and fears of the Near Eastern countries with
some success.
26. On the other hand, the USSR may employ
a series of counterpressures, including threats,
intensified anti-Western propaganda, larger
scale subversive activities, promotion of local
coups or separatist movements, and possibly
even local armed intervention. The Kremlin
might thus hope to intimidate the Near East-
ern countries, offset Western efforts to pro-
mote stability and a pro-Western orientation,
and possibly secure control of key areas. The
underlying weakness and instability in the
Arab States, and particularly the current
crisis in Iran, offer substantial opportunities
for Communist exploitation. The USSR, how-
ever, is probably not able to provoke a success-
ful Communist revolution or separatist move-
ment in any Near Eastern country at this time.
The USSR and its Satellites also pose a con-
tinued military threat to Greece, Turkey, and
Iran, but there is no firm evidence of an early
intention to attack.
27. In the final analysis, the intensity of the
Soviet reaction to expanded US-UK activity
in the Near East would depend largely on the
nature and extent of the US-UK program.
We believe that clear evidence of greater US-
UK determination to support the Near East,
especially a formal US security commitment
to go to war in event of Soviet attack on the
region, would act as a deterrent to local armed
intervention by the USSR. There is reason
to believe that existing US aid and expressions
of interest in Greece, Turkey, and Iran have
already caused the USSR to act with caution.
On the other hand, an extensive US-UK pro-
gram involving greater aid and defense com-
mitments, plus the progressive development of
strategic air and other bases and deployment
of much greater forces in the area, might be
considered by the Kremlin as a growing threat
not only to accomplishment of its objectives
in the Near East but to its security as well.
The Kremlin would probably be extremely
sensitive to the prospective development of
substantial US!-UK strength in such close
proximity to the southern USSR. In these
circumstances, the Kremlin might eventually
feel it necessary to forestall such a develop-
ment by the threat or use of military force in
the area despite the risk of general war. In-
deed such a development might be one factor
influencing a Soviet resort to general war, al-
though this decision would undoubtedly be
based on global considerations, not merely the
situation in the Near East.
--S-E C -R E T---
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
BEY PROBLEMS,-.-AFFECTING US
FORTS TO STRENGTHEN
THE NEAR EAST
Published 25 April 1951
CENTRAL
DOCUMENT NO. _ -1-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS i
A( DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CI SAN 4ED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ?i REVIEWER:
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RET1111N T!1 A1f 1~1VE & tCUR
1 01EDIATELY AFTER USE 6 z-_C
s v Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79RO1012A0006000
Va-OFFIM V
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This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Lsplonage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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