RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDOCHINA IN 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000400050005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 20, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND
MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST
VICTORY IN INDOCHINA IN 1951
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This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
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dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart-
ment of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
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e. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
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DISTRIBUTION (NIE Series) :
Office of the President
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Atomic Energy Commission
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND
MALAYA TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES
IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST
VICTORY IN INDOCHINA IN 1951
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have given their
concurrence to the estimate. This paper is based on infor-
mation available on 15 March 1951.
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RESISTANCE OF THAILAND, BURMA, AND MALAYA TO
COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST
VICTORY IN INDOCHINA IN 1951
THE PROBLEM
To assess the will and ability of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to resist Communist
political and military pressures or outright invasion in the event of a Communist
victory in Indochina in 1951.
CONCLUSIONS
1. A Viet Minh victory in Indochina in
1951, if accomplished without the inter-
vention of Chinese Communist forces,
would result in increased intimidation
and subversive activity directed against
Thailand and Burma, but it would not
necessarily lead to the early establish-
ment of Communist or Communist-domi-
nated governments in these two countries.
2. A Viet Minh victory in Indochina in
1951, if accomplished through Chinese
Communist military intervention, would
increase the susceptibility of Thailand
and Burma to Communist pressures and
we believe that, in the absence of effective
internal countermeasures and outside
support, these two countries would be
obliged to seek an accommodation with
the Communist powers.
3. Communist domination of Thailand
and Burma, as well as Indochina, would
greatly increase British security problems
in Malaya. We believe that the British
under these circumstances would not be
able to maintain even their present de-
gree of control in Malaya without a very
considerable increase in their military
and economic commitments.
4. It is most unlikely that the Viet Minh,
without Chinese Communist participa-
tion, would attempt to conquer Thailand
and Burma in 1951.
5. If the Chinese Communists, after es-
tablishing control over Indochina, con-
tinued their military advance into Burma
and Thailand, we believe that both those
countries would rapidly fall to the Com-
munists, unless the UN or the Western
Powers interposed their own forces. A
Chinese Communist invasion of Malaya
would be more difficult, but would prob-
ably succeed unless Malaya were greatly
reinforced.
6. It is most improbable that a regional
defense of Southeast Asia could be organ-
ized in time to stop the Chinese Commu-
nists if they followed up the conquest of
Indochina in 1951 with a military advance
into other countries of the area.
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DISCUSSION
7. In the event that the Viet Minh should suc-
ceed in conquering Indochina during 1951
without large-scale intervention by Chinese
Communist forces, the prestige of Ho Chi
Minh would be greatly enhanced throughout
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the defeat of
the French Union forces despite US support
would intensify the feeling of insecurity in the
neighboring countries and facilitate the
spread of Communism in the area.
a. Initially, if the Viet Minh did not demon-
strate the intention, either alone or in collu-
sion with the Chinese Communists, to embark
on further military aggression, the govern-
ments of Burma and Thailand would continue
to oppose Communism internally and would
not align themselves with the Communist
powers. Burma would probably recognize
the Viet Minh Government and attempt to
cultivate friendly relations with it. The Gov-
ernment of Thailand, although it also might
recognize the Viet Minh Government, would
attempt to build up its own defenses against
Communist forces and undoubtedly would re-
quest increased US aid.
b. A Viet Minh victory, nevertheless, would
expose Burma and Thailand to increased sub-
version and intimidation which, in the absence
of effective internal countermeasures (which
they might not be capable of taking) and
outside aid, might well lead to the eventual
overthrow of the present non-Communist gov-
ernments. Under such circumstances, the
British security problem in Malaya would be
greatly magnified.
8. Large-scale participation of Chinese Com-
munist military forces in a Viet Minh victory
would cause far greater repercussions in
Southeast Asia than a victory by the Viet Minh
alone. It would be interpreted as a success
for Chinese arms rather than a victory for
Indochinese nationalism. Throughout South-
east Asia, where there is already a strong anti-
pathy for the Chinese, it would intensify fears
of Chinese invasion and domination. In view
of the general weakness of the countries in the
area, however, Chinese Communist military
intervention in Indochina would undermine
the will of Thailand and Burma to resist and
would increase the probability that they would
accommodate with the Communist powers.
a. Thailand would probably conclude from
the failure of the US-backed French military
effort that the present type of US aid would
not be sufficient to provide protection. In
these circumstances, the Thai would be likely
to yield to military and political pressure com-
bined with Communist offers of apparently
reasonable political terms in exchange for a
"friendly" government. Initially, the Phibul
regime would probably attempt to counter
Communist pressure by calling for full UN or
US military protection. Should it fail to ob-
tain such protection, the present Thai Gov-
ernment would probably be superseded by one
acceptable to the Communists.
b. Burma would not be likely to yield to ex-
ternal military threats or political pressures.
Within Burma itself, however, there remain
rebel forces potentially capable of overthrow-
ing the government. If the Communists
should secure control of Thailand, with conse-
quent access to the Thai-Burma border, they
would be in a better position to reinforce those
dissident elements. Sufficient outside sup-
port for the dissidents, combined with external
pressures, would make it unlikely that Burma
could retain an anti-Communist government.
9. In Malaya, the British, with some 39,000
regular troops and 100,000 regular and aux-
iliary police, have not succeeded in suppressing
about 5,000 local Communist guerrillas. The
Malays, although forming the bulk of the
present police force and generally supporting
the British out of fear of the Chinese, would
continue to contribute little to the British
military effort if opposition were increased.
The aggressive and economically powerful
Chinese element has generally failed to co-
operate with the British in suppressing the
guerrillas, and a considerable number of them
could be expected to turn against the British
if Malaya were seriously threatened by Com-
munist China. Furthermore, Communist
control over Indochina, Thailand, and Burma
would facilitate transborder aid to the Ma-
layan rebels and deprice Malaya of its essen-
tial rice supply. In these circumstances, the
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opposition to the British would become in-
creasingly unmanageable, and the British
would not be able to maintain even their pres-
ent degree of control in Malaya without a very
considerable increase in their military and
economic commitment.
10. We believe that an attempt to conquer
Thailand or Burma by the Viet Minh without
Chinese Communist participation is most im-
probable in 1951, although border incursions
of northeast Thailand cannot be excluded.
11. If the Chinese Communists, after a victory
in Indochina, continued a military advance
into Burma and Thailand and if the UN or the
Western Powers did not interpose their own
forces, we believe that both these countries
would rapidly fall to the Communists because
they do not possess the military strength to
resist such an invasion. Thailand, perhaps
after a token resistance, would soon install a
government acceptable to the Communists in
the hope of retaining at least a semblance of
autonomy. Burma, if directly attacked,
would probably fight but would soon be de-
feated. A Chinese Communist invasion of
Malaya would be more difficult because of the
terrain and the presence of British military
forces, but it would probably succeed unless
Malaya were greatly reinforced.
12. Present or planned outside military aid
to Burma and Thailand, although it will even-
tually strengthen these countries, will not in
the predictable future enable either of them
to defend itself successfully against a Chinese
Communist attack. Military aid to Burma-
which has been chiefly British-has been of
limited effectiveness owing to lack of Burmese
cooperation, and because it has been largely
expended in the Burmese internal conflict.
The US aid planned for Thailand, when com-
pleted, would help Thailand to maintain in-
ternal security, but would not enable it to do
more than fight a delaying action. against a
Chinese Communist invasion. The Thai,
however, would probably not fight even a de-
laying action unless previously assured of
support by outside military forces.
13. In view of the limited capabilities of the
countries of Southeast Asia and their wide di-
vergencies of interest, it is most improbable
that a regional defense of Southeast Asia could
be organized in time to stop the Chinese Com-
munists, if they followed up the conquest of
Indochina in 1951 with a military advance
into other countries of the area.
S 'JiwT 3
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GBO-S80.-6427
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