SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400260002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 25, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approv oMUMV 000/05/23: CI 443M0GT4W02W56
SOUTH VIETNAM
.I. President Diem,'whose regime has faced no
major crises since the Binh Xuyen gangsters
were driven out of Saigon last spring, has
finally announced date (4 March) for long-
promised assembly elections.
A. First job for 123 assembly members will
be approval of government-drafted
constitution.
B. Delay in setting date for election
(first scheduled for Dec '55) has been
caused by government's careful prepara-
tions, aimed at keeping everything under
control.
1. Control efforts have alienated num-
ber of former pro-government elements,
brought charges of dictatorship
against Diem.
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2. However, Diem justifies tight con-
trols on grounds his government still
at war with Viet Minh.
C. Actual setting of election date is
reflection government's confidence.
II. Security situation, although vastly improved
since last spring, still far from satisfac(tcry
A. Although Binh Xuyen destroyed (and its
boss now refugee in France), combat-
effectiveness of remaining Hoa Hao rebels
(in southwest) has been bucked-up by
Viet Minh aid, guidance.
B. In clash with Hoa Hao on 13 Jan, Viet-
namese army suffered heaviest casualties
in any single action since end of war
(61 killed and missing, c.noluding Bat-
talion commander).
C. Army how has 1- about 3 5, 000 ti troops
deployed against some 4,000 Hoa Hao.
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D. By alliance with Hoa Hao rebels, Viet
Minh manages to fight Diem and at same
time avoid open violation Geneva terms.
III. Viet Minh link with Hoa Hao is only one of
many angles its anti-Diem effort. Recent
25X1X7 report
provides new details
on Viet Minh maneuvers.
A. Report states that, after regroupment
last May, Viet Minh reorganized, gave
special training to wartime sabotage,
subversion units.
B. Moving by sea, large numbers of cadres
from these units now reportedly entering
South Vietnam, equipped with arms and
radio transmitters.
1. One technique--designed to impress
population with omniscience, omni-
presence of Viet Minh--is for cadres
in South to report minor incidents,
suoh',as automobile accidents, by
radio. Then, Radio Hanoi, within
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C. Large Viet Minh center for political
indoctrination reportedly in mountains
northwest of Dalat. 25X1X7
D. Viet Minh have given name ("Mobilization
of Silence") to campaign to win over
population, make alliances with anti-
Diem groups.
E. Finally, report claims positive evidence
of Viet Minh infiltration of all politiaA
parties and newspapers in the south.
IV. Viet Minh effort apparently not tied to any
timetable: Directives to its agents re-
peatedly cite "long-term" nature of struggle,
A. Hanoi violently denounced Diem's March
elections plans as US-inspried plot to
sabotage unification effort. Calls for
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1. Viet Minh similarly denounced last
October's referendum on Bao Dai, but
turnout was good and Diem got 98% of
vote.
B. Absence VM interference last Oct is
indication of Viet Minh's unwillingness
show hand before time ripe.
C. But gradual improvement of Diem's security
services also an important factor.
Even after March elections, Diem will still
face problem of his "inheritance" from Geneva.
--all-Vietnam elections for unification,
called for in July '56.
A. He adamantly refuses to accept commit-
ments made by France at '56 Geneva
conference.
B. French have neither intention nor capa-
bility of meeting these commitments:
Expeditionary Corps down to about
20,000 men.
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11 Diem has asked for complete with-
drawal of Corps, anticipating that
his relations with French government.
will be more difficult if Republican
Front is installed.
2. Such a government in Paris might
complicate matters by new emphasis
on Sainteny mission, diplomatic
pressure for strict adherence to
Geneva terms.
C. But, although future of ICC is cloudly,
even Indians--who chair it--appear to
recognize all-Vietnam elections now
virtually out of question.
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INDONESIA
I. Coalition cabinet in Indonesia., led by
moderate Masjumi Premier Haraha.p, is
presently putting on brave front but its
life-expectancy is poor.
A. President Suka.rno is reportedly intent
on its downfall.
B. Vote of confidence could be called for
at any time.
II. Cabinet's brave front followed withdra.wa.l
of two Moslem parties from coalition
(19 Jan)--action which reduced Government's
nominal majority in la.me-duck
parliament
to 23 seats.
A. Cabinet nonetheless refused to resign.
B. Filled from own ranks those cabinet
vacancies caused by withdrawal of
Nahdla.tul Ulama (NU) and Islamic
League (PSII).
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C. Despite earlier reports that negotia.-
tions with Dutch--issue which sparked
present crisis--would be broken off,
announced that talks will be continued.
III. Masjumi success in staving off immediate
collapse is minor victory, however,
A. Ma.sjumi now well on way to being
isolated from NU, Indonesia's only
other major Moslem party.
B. In consequence, efforts to effect
Masjumi-NU collaboration in new govern-
ment will be considerably more difficult,
C. Masjurni might even find itself excluded
from next cabinet (to be formed after
sea.ting of new parliament, probably
in April).
D. Meanwhile, cabinet's survival depends
on loyalty of numerous small parties in
government coalition, several of which
are unreliable.
E. Moreover, Ma.sjumi itself showing signs
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of rupture.
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IV. Newest evidence of disunity within Ma.sjumi
--more of a. loose federation tha.n unified,
disciplined political party--came on 24 Ja.n
when Ma.s jumi deputy chairman and leader of
conservative wing, Sukima.n,took issue with
party chairman Natsir and told press he re-
garded negotiations with Dutch a. "national
tragedy," opposed their continuation.
A. Such public declaration by Sukiman
lends weight to reports he exploring
prospects for withdrawal from Masjumi,
forming new Moslem federation with NU,
PSII.
Whatever the immediate outco me chances of
eventual Communist pa.rticipa.tion in Indo-
nesian government may be improving.
A. Executive Committee of National Party
(PNI - leader of opposition and
plurality winner in '55 elections) has
reportedly voted for coalition in
future cabinet including NU, PSII and
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B. Possible stumbling-block for leftists
is still unsettled position of NU.
Should this newly important Moslem
group (third in '55 voting) reach some
arrangement with Masjumi, conservative
forces would be strengthened.
1. NU leaders claim they still want
to work with Ma.sjumi; younger
elements in NU reportedly are
concerned over split in Moslem
unity and consequent Communist gains
C. Unless working agreement can be arranged
between NU and Masjumi, however, we can,
expect to see further trend to left
in Indonesia.
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