ARMY CONTRIBUTION TO GMAIC FOR SIC ESTIMATE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rel, ease 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79R00961AQ00 00090007-5
*Army Declass/Release Instructions On File*
Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Army Contribution to GMAIC
SIC Estimate on Science & Technology
Terms of Reference - Appendix C. Ib, a & c
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
 Approved For Release 200~/0,1Jag GiA.1RDP79R0096 00700090007-5
'kZ1U .
:resent and Future Capabilities in Military Research and Development
1. Air Defense Missiles
a. We have seen the rapid Soviet improvement of their medium
and high altitude air defense capability from the static, dense, and costly
SA-1 complex around Moscow to the highly mobile SA-2 system which
affords medium and high altitude protection to the Soviet field army and
many important cities, industrial complexes and military centers. The
SA-3 low altitude system is currently believed to be in the process of
deployment and it is highly probable that the SA-2 system is undergoing.
capability improvements as this is the normal product improver nt for
any missile system. The Soviets have demonstrated considerable
advancement in the past few years in the air defense field and their
capability in the associated fields of nuclear physics, computers, and
electronics both in manpower and equipment is large and of high calibre.
Future Soviet research in the surface-to-air missile
systems will undoubtedly include extensive and exhaustive exploitation of
exotic fuels and advanced propulsion systems; more accurate guidance
sy-ateme with considerable resistance to electronic countermeasures (EGM)
improved electronic acquisition and fire control systems and techniques;
and, both conventional andunconventional warheads utilizing more sophisticated
fusing systems. The concept of employing and deploying SAM systems with
the Soviet field armies will become increasingly more prominent within
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : C A=RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
he next few years, Evidence indicates that the USSR possesses the
scientific knowledge and technical skills to develop complex and
elaborate systems for advanced missile air defense capability during
the -next 10 years?
C. ABM
The Soviets have recognised that the defense problem of
the 1960 decade is defense against ballistic targets. According to Premier
Khrushchev, the Soviets began developing defenses against ICBMs at the
same time they started developing ICBM's. From the available evidence
they are continuously and systematically developing defenses against
Minuteman, Polaris, Pershing. free rockets and their equivalents. They
have divided the threat spectrum into manageable parts and are developing
just as many systems as it takes to handle each part. Present developments
at Kapustin Yar, Sary Shagan, and on Kamchatka Peninsula suggest that
three or more separate antimissile missile defense systems are under
study.
3. Space Defense
a. The Antisatellite Mission
The view that U. S. space vehicles pose a significant
threat to the USSR is widely held by the Soviets, as evidenced by their
continuing propaganda to the effect that all U. S. space programs are
military.- Since it is obvious that they would like to prevent any satellite
coverage of the USSR, it can be assumed that they are concerned with
developing some means for destroying such vehicles.
Approved For Release 2002/01/9 R00961A000700090007-5
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
V
The general antieatellite mission is zirnply do'-; :d as
the prevention of any military or ideological mission by the enemy
through the utilization of satellites. The accomplishment of t'_h s
may require physical destruction of some satellites, although certain
vehicles may be neutralized by other means. The reconnai s s a r. c e a t :.'
surveillance missions which can be accomplished by ESV?e and whir.:
support any and all military operations, constitute the threats of it.c
present day and are of real concern to the Soviets.
During the time period under consideration ;I. i -?'
U, S. satellites will pose only a general military threat to rh.
Most will be programmed to orbit below 1,000 nautical miles s irc. ca . H
surveillance missions are more easily performed at lower altit z For this reason, and since the U, So ballistic missile threat in t`:.1 i s ti-- -
period will be a very real one,, the Soviets may feel that their r'??:
effort should not be diluted by the concurrent development of an anti -
satellite system. The Soviets do, however, have the option of desi hri-"
their AICBM system so as 'to maximize its antisatellite capabilities.
Evidence on hand to date suggests that this may in fact be the Soviei ao
b. Initial Anti.satellite Sxstem
Events of the past year show that the Soviets will attc n ,t
to destroy objects crossing their territory. It is estimated thce~ "o_w
that the Soviets will try to achieve a limited anti satellite caoabi 11
with the components of the AICBM system. This antimissile
3
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
 Approved For Rele se 2002/01/30 C1A-RbP79R00961A00.0700090007-5
equipment is specally designed for split secondming and the
antimissile missile would have a good likelihood of damaging a
satellite either with conventional or nonconventional warheads. If this
missile is employed with its 350 kiloton warhead it could Intercept
satellites at 200 NM altitude, doing severe damage to a radius of 15 NM
and lesser damage to a radius of 100 NM. With a lighter 25 kiloton
warhead, this missile could intercept satellites up to 300 NM. Such a
limited capability could be achieved in a few months, provided the task
was given top priority, utilizing existing hardware from research and
development sites at Sary Shagan and Uka. Operations would be limited
to the intercept of low orbit satellites sometime after the vehicles first
orbit of the earth.
In addition if the Soviets chose to use nuclear warheads of
large enough yield to offset the inaccuracies in launch timing, the SS-3,
4. or 5 could be utilized to interfere with hostile ESV?s. This, however,
is a less likely approach than the use of an AICBM interceptor.
c. Defensive satellites
The Soviet offensive space capability has been demonstrated
and can be estimated for several years into the future. It is quite clear
that the Soviets can build a defensive satellite just as quickly and just
as complex as an offensive satellite. The space technology is available
and the Soviet government can apply it to either defensive or offensive
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79R00961A000700090007-5
 Approved For Release 2002/01130?. CJA=RpP79ROO961AOQ0700090007-5
If the Soviets decide to build a defensive satellite, this
vehicle will probably have a dual mission. It will assess the threat
which a U. S. satellite represents by effecting a co-orbital interrogation.
Then, if the assessment warrants immediate neutralization the inspector-
interrogator satellite will take appropriate measures (kill, jam, deflect
from orbit, or otherwise neutralize).
In the light of their space accomplishments to date, the
Soviets can conceivably develop an unmanned inspector-interrogator,
satellite by 1963-65 and a manned type after 1965.
The components of equipment at Sary Shagan and Uka may
have the capabilities today which could be employed in the launching and
initial control of such defensive satellites. The type of defensive satellite
being estimated has its complexity in the space vehicle itself not in the
launch and initial control facilities. The basic capability of the USSR to
put large payloads into orbit gives them a head start toward developing
defensive satellites. With a large payload, the defensive satellite can be
less complex.
No evidence has as yet been uncovered which indicates
that the USSR is actually developing a space based defensive system.
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79R00961A000706090007-5