ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (AS OF 30 JUNE 1957)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A000300110011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 3, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(as of 30 June 1957)
Submitted by
Intelligence Advisory Committee
September 1957
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CONTENTS
Page
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Summary . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . a o o e ? ? a o a a o
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack . a . a a O a a . . . ? . . 0 a . i
Evaluation and Estimates . . . . . . . . a e . . . . . ii
A. Soviet Bloc . . . . . . . . . . . .
? ? ? ? . ii
B. Non-Bloc Areas .
Collection . . . . o . . . . . . . . . .
Report .
0 o a o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 o a o e e . e o e o o e a
A. Warning of Attack. e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities . . . . . . . e 1
2. The Watch Committee of the IAC . . . . . . . 2
6. Taiwan Strait Coverage . . . . . . ? a a a a .
7. The Arab-Israeli Situation . . . e e e
B. Evaluation and Estimates
a O O O a 0 O O
1. National Intelligence Estimates ? a e . .
2. National Intelligence Surveys . . . . o
3. Military Intelligence . o . . . . . . . ? a . e
4. Political Intelligence. . . . a . a
e e a e o ? o a
5. Economic Intelligence . . e ? . . a e o 0 0
6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. . a a e
7. Geographic Intelligence a. o a 0 a
C. Collection . . . . a . . . .
. o ? e e ? e o 0 0 o
1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives . a a
2. The Foreign Service . . . . . .
o a o. o n a
3. The Service Attache System a a . . . . . . . .
4. Overseas Commands. . a . a
0 a o . . . o o .
4
4
4
4
6
6
9
10
12
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17
17
18
19
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CONTENTS, continued
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25X1 B
Page
5. 22
6. Exchange Visits with the Soviet Bloc . . . . . 22
7. The Foreign Language Publications Program. 23
8. Geographic Intelligence Collection ? . . . . . 24
9. International Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. 0 0 ion . . ? . 0 . . . 25
11. Foreign Radio an a evision Broadcasts. o ? 26
1b
28
28
29
29
D. Coordination . 0 0 0 . o o . 0 0 0 . ? . o . . o . 33
1. Review of National Security Council
Intelligence Directives o . . . ? . . . . . . 33
130 . 0 0 0 . o ? . o . 0 0
14. Coordination of Information Processing . . .
15. Domestic Collection under NSCID No. 7 . . .
16. Clandestine Collection Programs . . . . o . .
NSCID?s Relevant to Activities Covered by
Annual Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
List of National Security Council Intelligence
Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack
The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the
launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are
increasing. This is true particularly because the USSRos growing
strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles,
submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year
to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.
At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range
aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing
indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack.
Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications
would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no
basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indi-
cations would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the
number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800,
the chances of -their producing warning indications would be consider-
ably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably
permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours
before attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.
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Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces
stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week, de-
pending on whether units were at some field-training phase of the
annual training cycle or at home stations.
If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the
USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could
probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during
the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at
which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be
possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.
Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily
on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had
miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance
that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack,
Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for
launching, advance warning of their use would be unlikely.
With respect to the warning problem, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information
to determine how fully and promptly present and potential collection
methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information
essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.
Evaluation and Estimates
With respect to developments in the Soviet Bloc, the struggle
for dominance within the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death
resulted in an increasing exposure to intelligence of the inner
workings of the regime and of the issues which divide the leadership.
The public justifications made by the victorious factions in the suc-
cessive crises since 1953 have enabled intelligence to check its
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information and thus to formulate its views on a sounder footing of
evidence. This does not mean that we are in a very much better
position to predict particular developments in the USSR, such as
the rise or fall of individual personalities, but it does mean that we
can delimit more confidently the range of possible developments on
the Soviet internal scene. Similarly, the relatively greater openness
of discussion in the USSR and the greater accessibility of Soviet
personalities at all levels have given us a better insight into the
motivations and tactics of Soviet foreign policy. However, these gains
are more significant for short-term estimates than for long-term ones.
The Soviet leadership, for example, seems likely to be presented with
difficult choices of policy. Already it must reconsider its economic
policies at a time when military costs and the claims of consumption
are pressing ever harder on the traditional priority given to invest-
ment to sustain a high rate of economic growth. It must reconsider
the shape of its military programs during a period of revolutionary
change in weapons. Relations with the restive Satellites and Com-
munist China have evidently called for redefinition. There is
evidence that the regime has increasing difficulty in retaining the
loyalty of students and intellectuals and needs to provide more
nourishing ideological fare. Such fundamental problems affecting
future developments in the USSR are extremely complex, slow-
moving in their resolution, and do not lend themselves readily to
reliable estimating on the basis of the kinds of evidence ordinarily
available to intelligence.
In the field of military intelligence, valuable additional informa-
tion was obtained on the Soviet military establishment, including data
on those elements posing the most direct threat to U. S. security in-
terests. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is
adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of
the armed forces of those countries and to discern general trends in
their development. This information, however, remains inadequate
in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for U. S. military
plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the
rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties
in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet
military capabilities. Extensive travel by U. S. Service attaches, as
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well as thorough exploitation of open source materials and defectors
from the Bloc, have resulted in gains in certain categories of military
information despite Bloc security measures. A continued expansion of
clandestine activities is being undertaken to intensify the collection of
military intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Increased attention is
also being given to the development of scientific and technical equip-
ment and methods for overcoming security measures in target areas.
Gains in economic intelligence on the Sino=Soviet Bloc have re-
sulted from a growing return on our effort in research and analysis
over several years and from a continuing increase in published data
within the Bloc, particularly the USSR. Serious deficiencies remain,
however, particularly as related to the. extent, cost, and economic
burden of Bloc military programs. To reduce this deficiency indirect
research techniques have been developed.
There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence
on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, both through research and through information
gained from increased contacts with Soviet nationals. During the past
year, significant information has been obtained on Soviet nuclear
weapons testing, but there is inadequate information on Soviet pro-
duction of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons, Although there
has been a continued improvement in the quality of our guided missile
intelligence information, it is still inadequate to meet our minimum
intelligence requirements. Highest priority continues to be given to
this problem, with special emphasis being placed on technical col-
lection methods.
B. Non-Bloc Areas
The periodic preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and
Special National Intelligence Estimates on Non-Bloc areas, con-
stituting a substantial proportion of all estimates published during the
period, has been directed towards providing a meaningful measure of
probable political, economic, and military developments bearing upon
U. S, security interests. As a result of its continuing program of
current intelligence research and analysis of political, economic, and
military affairs throughout the world the IAC has also been able to
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provide advance intelligence support to policy-makers at all levels
of the government regarding significant trends and events. Support
in depth of both policy-making and policy-executing arms of the
government has continued through the production of basic intelligence
studies including the NIS series.
Collection
The list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again
revised and continued to emphasize SinomSoviet strategy, intentions
or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority
was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense
against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key
U. S. overseas installations. There was intensive exploitation of new
collection opportunities including increased travel in some areas, more
open discussions in the USSR and Satellites, greater availability of
certain types of Soviet Bloc publications, access to
and the general stimulation to collection activities arising from the
Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises Intelligence gains also
resulted from better technical collection techniques and from a general
improvement of.collection capabilities, both overt and clandestine.
Despite these gains, deficiencies continueLto exist in many
fields, particularly with respect to our collection activities directed
against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Increased opportunities for travel in
presently restricted areas, freer access to Bloc personalities or
publications and a general improvement in existing collection and
processing facilities show promise of reducing political and economic
intelligence deficiencies. Further development of our technical col-
lection techniques and expanded clandestine efforts will be necessary
to reduce significantly critical deficiencies in the military and scientific
and technical fields. In any event, factors such as security re-
strictions and rapidly advancing technology will continue to limit our
ability to achieve a significant reduction in our most critical intelli-
gence deficiencies by an early date.
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REPORT
A. Warning of Attack*
1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities
a. The difficul.tCesi' for intelligence in giving warning prior to the
launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are in-
creasing. This is particularly true because the USSR's growing
strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles,
submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year
to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack,
b. At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range
aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing in-
dications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack.
Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications
would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no
basis for judging at ?ghat point the chances of receiving warning indi-
cations would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the
number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800,
the chances of their producing warning indications would be considerably
greater than even. If received, these indications would probably permit
intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours before attacking
aircraft could reach radar warning lines.
c, Warning' :of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet
forces stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week,
depending on whether units were at some field-training phase of the
annual training cycle or at home stations.
The most recent comprehensive review of this problem by the
intelligence community appears in NIE 11-3-57, "Probable
Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US0 " approved by
the IAC on 18 June 1957.
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. d. If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the
USSR's military establishments warning of possible attack could
probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might' during
the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date
at which military preparations would be complete, but it: would always
be possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier
date.
e. Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend, primarily
on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine, plan had
miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus9 there could be no assurance
that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.
f. Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for
launching advance warning of their use would be unlikely.
2. The Watch Committee of the IAC
a. The Watch Committee has continued its examination of
intelligence information for indications of Soviet /Communist intentions
to initiate hostilities ands as directed by the IAC in February 1956, for
possible indications of a resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Under
this procedure, the Watch Committee, in October 1956, provided
several days" advance warning of the imminent possibility of Israeli-
Egyptian hostilities and 24 hours' specific warning of Israel?s intention
to attack Egypt with French and tacit British support. The critical
developments of October-November 1956 confronted the Watch Com-
mittee with a major test of its alertness and ability to achieve prompt
common evaluations as to Soviet intentions, particularly with refer-
ence to the employment of military force in critical situations. The
National Indications Center (the 24-hour staff of the Watch Committee)
has used the experience gained during the crisis period to refine
further its lists of potential indicators of hostile Sino~Soviet Bloc
intentions.
b. The Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken 'a survey
of sources of warning information to determine how fully and promptly
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present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmission
channels can provide information essential to advance warning of
Sno=Soviet Bloc. hostile action.
3, USAF Indications System
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5. "Crisis Situation" Review by IAC
Under a procedure initiated in the past year, the IAC at its
weekly meetings regularly reviews as a body intelligence and infor-
mation bearing on actual or potential "crisis situations" anywhere
in the world. This has proved to be a valuable stimulant for the
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regular exchange of views, at the highest level in the intelligence
community, on matters of both immediate and long-range intelligence
interest. The new procedure has also assisted in scheduling esti-
mates, and has provided a mechanism for inspiring suggestions and
crystallizing the community viewpoint with respect to matters on which
the Director of Intelligence may brief the National Security Council,
6, Taiwan Strait Coverage
The Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait
Problem, established by the IAC in March 1955 in response to the
President?s desire for coordinated intelligence coverage of this area,
continues to meet regularly, at least once a month. Since early
December 1956 its reports have been prepared on a monthly basis,
except during June 1957 when two reports were issued because of
unusual military activity in the area, The Group also prepared a
special assessment of intelligence related to Chinese Nationalist
intentions in February 1957,
7, The Arab-Israeli Situation
The Ad Hoc IAC Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation,
which was set up in March 1956, assisted in meeting the increased
intelligence requirements arising from the Middle Eastern crisis,
The Group, whose work supplemented that of the Watch Committee
and the individual IAC agencies, issued four complete revisions of
its basic report during the past year,
1, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE?s)
a, Production of NIE?s continued to be guided largely by the
needs of the NSC and related bodies. Of the 57 NIE?s published
during the last year, 35 were related to specific NSC papers or
policy actions,
OPE/CRE
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b. The IAC continued to provide estimates in support of the
reports to the NSC on the "net evaluation" of the capabilities of the
USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental U. S. The main esti-
mates for the 1956 report, keyed to the focal period of mid-1959,
were NIE 11-56, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-19591'' and
NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program." The 1956
report was also supported by NIE 11-4-56, "Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1961." Estimative support for
the net evaluation to be submitted in late 1957 will include SNIE 11-6-57,
"Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in Mid-
1960, " NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Guided Missile Field," NIE 11-2-57, "The Soviet Atomic Energy
Program" and NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet
Attack on the US. ''
C. The work of the Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament was supported by NIE 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons
Production in Fourth Countries--Likelihood and Consequences."
d, A substantial proportion of the NIE's and SNIE's were devoted
principally to problems of the Non-Bloc world. A number of these
were on emergency situations such as those:~in the Middle East and
Eastern Europe.
e, The post-mortem procedure on NIE's continues to be a
valuable method of highlighting intelligence gaps and providing
guidance for future intelligence collection. Pursuant to the recom-
mendation of the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, " for example,
the IAC established an "Ad Hoc Weapons Systems Study Committee.
This Committee is studying methods for evaluating the comparative
effectiveness of competing Soviet weapons systems in order,to assist
in the formulation of national estimates on Soviet military programs.
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2. National Intelligence Surveys (NIS)
a. During the year NIS production essentially fulfilled the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) annual production requirements and brought the
total of the NIS production thus far to over 3, 700 sections, This re-
presents more than 65 percent of the total world coverage, and on the
JCS high priority areas coverage is now over 90 percent complete.
Nearly one-third of the production effort during the year was directed
towards maintenance revision of published NIS sections.
b. A major accomplishment this year has been the comprehensive
revision of the NIS Standard Instructions, and the development of the
NIS Reference Guide to provide for a better understanding and more
effective use of the NIS among the growing body of NIS recipients.
Other noteworthy activities during the year included the production
of the NIS on the Arctic two years ahead of schedule, the attainment
of world-wide NIS Gazetteer coverage on all foreign areas, and the
development by the Defense agencies of formal NIS Control and
Coordination Directives.
C. In summary, this has been a year of solid accomplishment,
characterized by excellent interagency support and coordination, and
reflecting a gradual improvement in collection guidance and acquisition,
better administrative controls, and more efficient interagency pro-
cedureso
d. If present production capabilities are maintained the NIS
program will meet the JCS annual requirement for the next three
years. This would result in 85 percent to 90 percent coverage of
world areas by 30 June 1960, and the revision of one-third of all
published NIS under the maintenance program.
3. Military Intelligence
a. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc
is adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities
of the Armed Forces of those countries and to discern general trends
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in their development. This information, however, remains inadequate
in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for U. S; military
plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the
rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties
in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet
military capabilities,
b. The quality and quantity of certain types of military intelli-
gence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc improved during the past
year. This may be attributed in part to wider travel by U. S. officials
in some areas, observations of Soviet forces in Germany and, par-
ticularly, With respect to
Soviet ground forces, specific improvements were noted in data on the
location ancl.identif~catbon of Soviet divisions and on certain items of
ground equipment. Much tactical information obtained previously was
also confirmed. However, deficiencies continued in categories such
as order of battle on non-divisional units, strength level of units, and
in information relating to the design, characteristics and production of
both conventional and new=type weapons and equipment. Our knowledge
of Soviet naval vessels was improved through increased photographic
coverage of Soviet fleet exercises and through naval visits by elements
of the Soviet fleet to Western European countries, Nevertheless, we
still lack specific information regarding new weapons systems and
related techniques which the Soviets intend to introduce into their navy,
especially their submarine arm. With regard to the air forces of the
Soviet Union, improved collection has in-
creased our knowledge Me types, performance charactersistics,
and production of military and civil aircraft, as well as our informa-
tion on the current organizational structure of the air establishment.
Future projections of Soviet air capabilities continue to be hampered
by the lack of detailed information on aviation research and development
programs as well as on the performance characteristics of new
weapons and equipment that may be introduced,
c, Improvements were registered in certain aspects of intelli-
gence on Satellite ground forces during the past year. Gains occurred
with respect to the Polish Army and on the Hungarian Army prior to
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the revolt. However, the collection effort in Hungary has faced in-
creasing difficulties and little data has been received as yet on the
new Hungarian Army. Intelligence on the 1956 reorganization of the
East German Army was generally adequate except for information on
the High Command. Order of battle data on the Chinese Communist
Army continues to be relatively good although not quite at last year?s
level. However, intelligence on both this Army and the North Korean
Army is inadequate to assure advance warning of impending military
operations. Reliable reporting on Viet Minh military forces continues
to be very limited although collection efforts by the Vietnamese have
improved slightly.
d. Principally due to the stimulus toward greater coverage
25X1 C furnished by the Suez crisis, the quantity, and, in some respects,
the quality, of intelligence on the Middle East have improved during
the past year. Information available is sufficient to support broad
estimates of the military capabilities of these countries. In i ar-
25X1 C
Nevertheless, in varying degrees, order
of battle data on Israel and neighboring Arab states, with the exception.
of Lebanon, remain deficient. Firm and detailed information is
lacking particularly with respect to the identification, composition and
deployment of military units in Egypt and Syria and the quantity and
utilization of Soviet Bloc weapons recently acquired by these countries.
However, capabilities have improved for providing early warning of
the imminence of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states.
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f, Our efforts to overcome deficiencies in military intelligence
continue to be severely restricted by the security measures imposed
by other countries? The factors and conditions which have limited
access to the most critical information continue to be studied in
order to develop more successful collection resources, through both
overt and clandestine means. I4owever, it is not now possible to
predict a significant alleviation of major deficiencies by an early date,
go Substantial improvement in the production of air target
materials has been realized during the period of this report, due
Print r.M11., +... +L.. _ -- , d - _ -
4, Political Intelligence
a? Political intelligence continued to provide policy-makers
throughout the government with both current and basic finished
intelligence to assist in the assessment of foreign situations. For
example, through newly developing procedures in support of the
Operations Coordinating Board, political intelligence is being in-
creasingly utilized in policy development and implementation,
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b. Political intelligence on the USSR and the Satellites has
continued to show some improvement, principally due to factors
such as revelations incident to factional struggles in the USSR, the
appearance of opposition forces in the Satellites and the greater
freedom of diplomatic and other forms of contact which have developed
in the post-Stalin period. With respect to Communist China, political
intelligence remains a major problem and is still highly inadequate for
an assessment of Communist China's motives and possible future
actions.
C. Political intelligence during the past year was characterized
particularly by the unusual demands on resources generated by the
Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. More active Soviet
participation in affairs of the Middle East and the expanding Soviet
"economic offensive" have created continuing burdens. Despite these
growing responsibilities, high-level governmental requests and es-
sential requirements of the intelligence community for political
intelligence have generally been met.
5. Economic Intelligence
a, Economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved
as a result of exploitation of the greater volume of economic data
published by a number of Bloc countries during the year. This has
permitted the filling of important gaps in intelligence, and has pro-
vided a firmer basis for estimates of future economic activity. For
example, one important result has been a downward revision in
estimates of the Soviet population and labor force available to carry
out ambitious economic plans.
b. Serious deficiencies still remain, however, in the avail-
ability of information on some Bloc economic activities, particularly
those related to military production and programs. This latter de-
ficiency has led to the development of indirect research techniques
for estimating the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military
programs. The economic estimates so obtained, while subject to a
substantial margin of error, do provide an independent check on
military estimates derived by conventional means. These economic
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estimates were helpful in arriving at estimates of the size and com-
position of the guided missile, air defense and heavy bomber weapons
systems. Similar techniques are being applied to the economic analysis
of the Soviet nuclear energy program.
c. An increasing volume of reports has been published on
current economic developments in,the Bloc, including special evalua-
tions of developments in Poland and Hungary, and appraisals of the
reorganization of the Soviet economy and its effect on economic capa-
bilities. Economic intelligence has also provided support to the
London disarmament negotiations, the Paris negotiations relating to
controls on trade with Communist. China, the Washington talks on
US-Polish trade and assistance, and consideration of US-Bloc exchange
visits,
d. Interagency coordination of economic research through the
Economic Intelligence Committee of the IAC has continued. Coor-
dinated reports have been issued on Communist China?s trade and
transport, Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in underdeveloped
areas, and other subjects. The current status of economic intelligence
has been reviewed as a guide for programming by the individual agencies.
The EIC prepared a revised statement of "Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives for guidance in economic intelligence col-
lection and production. CIA has arranged to provide annual production
data for certain Soviet industries in support of Air Force targeting
studies, thereby obtaining more efficient utilization of community
resources in this field of research,
e. With respect to economic intelligence on Free World areas,
important shifts in emphasis have occurred. The prolonged crisis in
the Middle East, for example, resulted in greatly increased demands
on intelligence agencies for research on the economic affairs of that
area. As a result of the closing of Suez and the threat to pipelines,
additional research was directed to world-wide petroleum problems.
Special attention has been given to the economic problems of
countries susceptible to Sino-Soviet Bloc economic penetration and
to the inter-relations between economic development and political
factors in these countries.
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f, The economic problems of U. S. allies, including the rela-
tionships of current economic affairs to future military capabilities
and problems relating to trade controls, have been under review.
Studies of the likely nature and effect of a European Common Market
and Free Trade Area were produced to assist the Council on Foreign
Economic Policy in establishing the basic U. S. position regarding
these moves towards. European integration. Some research is being
conducted on problems relating to the nonweapons application of atomic
energy, in anticipation of the formation of regional and international
agencies to foster atomic development,
6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence
a, General. There has been continued improvement in
scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Our understanding
has grown with respect to the quality and quantity of Soviet scientific
manpower and developments in specific fields of basic and applied
science. As a result, we have greater confidence in our estimates
of Soviet technological capabilities. Further significant intelligence
was developed on the Soviet atomic energy program, particularly in
the fields of thermonuclear weapons development and testing and in
the production of fissionable materials. In addition, special studies
were prepared on several aspects of the general problem posed by
possible international agreement for limitations on nuclear tests.
- _
- ---r w.raaw o?Wtld GFW iG
through present collection efforts. In recognition of this continuing
problem, an intensified effort has been made to develop and employ
new, technical means to collect and reduce technological data for use
in scientific intelligence estimates. In addition, the Priority National
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives were revised during
the past year,
b. Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology.
The first National Intelligence Estimate: (ME 11-6-56) devoted
exclusively to this subject was completed during the year. The
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Scientific Estimates Committee, in collaboration with the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee and the Economic Intelligence Committee within their
respective spheres, coordinated the basic studies from which the
estimate was prepared.
25X1 D c, Atomic Energy
New evidence suggests that nuclear weapons
hardware has been issued to at least some operational long-range
25X1 D aircraft units.
Convincing evidence was received that caused us to double
our previous figures for the uranium output of East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The start of major uranium mining activity in
Hungary (interrupted by the revolution) and an expansion in other
Satellites has been noted. The magnitude of the uranium mining
effort within the USSR remains an enigma.
25X1 C
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Soviet announcements indicate a severe cutback in their
originally planned nuclear electric power program for the period
1957-1960, suggesting technical difficulties. Adequate information
on plant locations and the progress of their construction is still
lacking. -Evidence has been received on the construction and char-
acteristics of a nuclear powered icebreaker. We have little evidence
on Soviet efforts to apply nuclear propulsion to submarines, aircraft,
and missiles although open publications continue to express interest
in these developments.
Soviet activity at international conferences on atomic energy
subjects has been at a reduced level during the past fiscal year and
few advances in our knowledge of Soviet atomic energy research have
been made,
25X6
In summary, we have made significant gains in our atomic
energy intelligence, but there remain many critical gaps which re-
quire attention to resolve uncertainties 'about foreign weapons
programs, the implications of a nuclear test moratorium, and
other important problems.
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d, Guided Missiles
Significant information on the Soviet guided missile program
has been obtained in all basic categories during the past year. This
data proved valuable in the production of a new national intelligence
estimate on the Soviet program, In particular, additional data on
developments in the Soviet research and development program con-
tributed to our knowledge of Soviet surface-to-surface guided missiles.
Definite associations were also established between the Soviet guided
missile and atomic energy programs. Advanced technical collection
techniques contributed materially to the progress made in this field',
summary of agreements
minor diffe
,
rences and
recommendations resulting from the joint conference has been sub-
nitted to and approved by the IAC.
Although the information received during the past year has
increased our general knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program,
we still lack specific information regarding the characteristics of
missile systems in existence or under development. There is almost
a complete lack of evidence on Soviet missile production capabilities
and facilities and on operational deployment. Specific evidence is
lacking on Soviet military doctrine pertaining to the current and
future relationship of guided missiles to a balanced military program.
The intelligence community, recognizing. the overriding im-
portance of guided missile intelligence, is continuing energetically
both to strengthen the community approach and to stimulate indi-
vidual action in this field, The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee
(GMIC), the established interagency mechanism, is increasing its
efforts to close existing intelligence gaps. Along these lines, GMIC
recently established a subcommittee to coordinate more effectively
collection guidance,
15
25X1 C
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e, Biological Warfare
The first community-wide estimate (1954) in the field was
revised and updated. The current publication estimates the almost
certain existence of an active Soviet biological warfare program and
.assesses Soviet capabilities in offensive and defensive biological
warfare. Although progress has been made in BW intelligence
through improved analysis of material at hand and through new informa-
tion, little progress has been made in determining the scope and mag-
nitude of the Soviet BW effort, particularly, with respect to offensive
biological warfare,
fo Chemical Warfare
An agreed statement of general conclusions on Soviet offensive
and defensive chemical warfare capabilities was developed on the
working level of the intelligence community. The statement concludes
that the USSR has a well-established and capably-staffed CW research
and development program but points out wide gaps in our knowledge
with respect to the.over-all Soviet CW program,
Electronics
Significant advances were made in almost every category of
intelligence related to Soviet electronics, particularly on radars,
telecommunications, and missile guidance systems. These contribu-
25X1 C
A coordinated study on technical characteristics of Sino-
Soviet Bloc radars was completed and served as a basis for the first
community-wide estimate of their operational capabilities.
25X1 C
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will review, at a working level, significant electronics intelligence
developments occurring since the last conference in April 1956.
7. Geographic Intelligence
a. A new interagency program has been initiated in support of
unconventional warfare planning. Geographic intelligence is con-
tributing to this program by the selection and analysis of areas within
the Sino-Soviet Bloc that fulfill multi-purpose unconventional warfare
requirements,
b. As a consequence of Soviet activities in Antarctica, conducted
in association with the International Geophysical Year Program, at-
tention has been directed to the appraisal of advantages that might be
gained by the USSR from its Antarctic operations, particularly with
respect to its possible territorial aspirations and bipolar geodetic
research as an aid to its long-range guided missile program.
C. Collection
1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives
In accordance with NSCID No. 4 the list of Priority National
Intelligence Objectives was again revised (DCID 4/6). First Priority
Objectives continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions
or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority
was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense
against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key
U. S. overseas installations. These priority objectives provide the
basic guidance for reappraising collection requirements and planning
intelligence production throughout the intelligence community. They
have also furnished a stimulus and framework for the development
of more refined priority objectives in the economic and scientific
and technical fields, as well as in the sphere of international communism.
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2. The Foreign Service
a. The Foreign Service continued to be a major source of overt
intelligence information.
However, the general quality of the reporting remained high, despite
increased consumer demands and budgetary limitations which both
imposed personnel shortages and restricted the travel and representa-
tion funds available. Nevertheless, deficiencies in reporting exist at
a few posts. These are occasioned in part by the increasing demands
on officers' time arising from official and private visitors and special
pressures created by developments such as the Suez or Hungarian
crises. The eleven new posts opened during the past year have already
increased the amount of information provided to the Department. Of
indirect benefit to the over-all foreign intelligence program was the
stimulus to greater coordination provided by a Presidential directive
to all American Diplomatic Missions. In essence, this directive
reiterates the role of the Chief of Mission as the President's personal
representative abroad, and vests with him, as the senior American
governmental representative, responsibility for supervision and
leadership in connection with activities of all U. S. agencies and re-
presentatives affecting relations between the U. S. and the country to
which he is accredited.
b. The standard of the reporting on the Sino-Soviet Bloc re-
mained high, particularly in the light of the difficulties under which
most U. S. missions operated in Moscow and other Soviet Bloc
capitals. Reporting officers continued to be handicapped by inter-
ference with their travel.
c. Over-all reporting on Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was
materially aided by peripheral reporting and information obtained
from friendly foreign ministries. Foreign offices or missions of
these friendly countries, for example, have provided information
to U. S. Embassy officers on political developments in areas such
as Albania and Bulgaria.
25X1 C
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d. Trade fair reporting shed considerable light on Sino-Soviet
Bloc industrial production. Information obtained from visitors to
Sino-Soviet Bloc countries has been a valuable source of economic data.
e. In the Far East, although political reporting on Communist
China in general remains a serious problem, reporting on that area
from the Consulate General at Hong Kong was especially valuable,
particularly the post's excellent analysis of economic and political
developments. Gaps in information on North Vietnam and North Korea
continue. A limited amount of information on North Vietnam is re
ceived from friendly foreign missions or sources in that area. In-
formation received through such exchanges with foreign governments
has been valuable.
f. Reporting from Free World posts, generally speaking,
maintained previous high standards for timeliness and analytical
content. While developments of the past year have stimulated and
improved political reporting in most of the Middle East, they have
also increased the need for more detailed coverage of areas such as
the Arabian Peninsula, Sudan and Israel and have produced additional
impediments to reporting from Egypt and Syria. With respect to
Western Europe, political reporting is generally adequate in quantity
and quality. Political intelligence on Latin America continues to be
relatively good. The volume and general coverage of political
reporting from Africa have steadily improved.
3. The Service Attache System
.~...
a. The Service Attache System continues to N-
M,aj
or
rce
1
l. of intelligence information, particularly military. During the past
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6. Exchange Visits with the Soviet Bloc
a. The IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges has continued to
furnish intelligence advice during the past year in support of the
State Department's handling of exchanges of delegations with the
Soviet Bloc. Planning was active during the summer and fall of
1956, but all activity in this field came to a halt as a result of the
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Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. Subsequently, in April
1957, the President authorized a gradual resumption of exchanges,
and planning activity has once again become substantial. However,
only a limited number of exchanges were completed during the year,
and the principal activity since resumption has consisted of attendance
at conferences in the U. S. and USSR, usually on a firm reciprocal
basis. A total of seven formal government-negotiated exchanges were
carried out with the USSR during FY 1957. There were also a number
of exchanges with the European Satellites.
b. The small volume of exchanges with the USSR and the
reciprocal conferences during the year produced a substantial
quantity of economic and scientific reporting, rated as valuable.
Intelligence obtained from Satellite exchanges has been largely in
the political field.
c. With a view to an expected increase in exchanges, the
Committee on Exchanges has prepared about 20 projects which, in
its judgment, could be carried out with net intelligence advantage to
the U. S. , i. e. , intelligence gain to the U. S. exceeding the sum of
the intelligence and technological gain to the USSR. A number of these
projects are now in active negotiation. A systematic survey and evalu-
ation of the intelligence results of exchanges, conferences, and private
travel to the USSR and the Bloc will be made in the fall of 1957.
7. The Foreign Language Publications Program
The increase .in availability of Soviet Bloc publications, pre-
viously prohibited for export, has continued. One of the highlights
of the period was the increase in military information included in
Soviet and Satellite periodicals, with roving to
be a particularly fruitful source of data on Soviet materiel. The
Soviets have expanded the publication and release of handbooks con-
taining statistical data on whole segments of their economic develop-
ment. These handbooks have been translated for the intelligence
community. There appears to be a determined effort to release
selected Soviet Bloc published source materials on an exchange basis.
Scientific and technical open-source foreign literature has proved
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25X1 C
valuable as a source of information for estimating foreign research
and development capabilities and reducing the change of technological
surprise. In order to insure the proper exploitation of this increased
volume for the intelligence community, steps have been taken to
augment the work of current facilities through external contractual
arrangements. The procurement of foreign language publications has
also been made more efficient through an active program of coordina-
tion of requirements in Washington and of collection in the field. The
exchange-of-publications programs of the several member agencies
of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications were
exploited to obtain scarce or otherwise difficult to procure titles.
Special reports on the Chinese Communist press in Peking and book
publication in Mongolia were submitted by USIA. As the reporting
period closed, a paper was in preparation to evaluate the contribution
of foreign publications to intelligence research.
8. Geographic Intelligence Collection
a. Under the coordinated foreign map procurement program,
opportunities in the Free World for acquisition of maps and for geo-
graphic reporting have been increased by reestablishment of a
Geographic Attache position in Buenos Aires and the authorization
of three new Foreign Service Geographic Attache nositinns fn,> Ro;,.,,*
b. Acquisition of special subject maps on areas of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc has trebled during the past year, and an exchange of
nautical charts has been initiated with the USSR. However, prac-
tically no topographic maps on these areas have been collected since
the end of World War II. Little progress was made during the year
in the collection of cartographic and geodetic information on the
Sino-Soviet Bloc urgently required for U. S. missile employment
and other military purposes.
25X1 C
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25X1 D
9. International Communism
The Committee on International Communism, established by the
IAC in January 1956, completed its examination of intelligence pro-
duction and collection in the field of international communism. It
concluded that while both fall far short of the ideal, both are reasonably
close to attainable limits at the present time. The Committee has for-
mulated a system of priorities designed to facilitate collection of
needed intelligence information. It has also agreed upon a new pro-
cedure for the development of coordinated clandestine collection re-
quirements to help fill existing gaps in intelligence on international
communism.
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11. Foreign Radio and Television Broadcasts
a. During the past year the foreign radio monitoring program
continued to provide- significant current intelligence information.
This proved particularly valuable during the Hungarian and Suez crises.
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STATSPEC
c. Television monitoring is expected to increase in importance
with the multiplying of foreign stations and the improvement in
technical facilities. Experiments are being conducted with recording
and photographic equipment for the monitoring of telecasts.
25X1 C
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12. Foreign Materials and Equipment
Requirements in the past year have continued to stress the need
for Soviet Bloc scientific and military devices, rather than for
commercial items, which are more easily obtained. Collection
efforts have therefore been less extensive in the procurement of
consumer goods and more concentrated on weapons and equipment.
25X1 C
25X1 B
14. Coordination of Information Processing
The Ad Hoc Committee on Information Processing agreed on
standards of quality and procedure for many phases of document
handling, and emphasized the importance of compatibility among
IAC document systems. Many important projects have been
initiated by the intelligence community during the past year in the
complex field of document storage, indexing and subject retrieval.
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Most of these seek the development of film and electronic equipment
which will increase processing speeds and assure access to the
very large quantities of documents involved. The Committee has
made special efforts to advise the IAC agencies on developments in
this field,
25X1 C 15. Domestic Collection under NSCID No. 7
The number of information reports collected within the US
concerning the Soviet Bloc increased by 84% during the year.
25X1 C
25X1C Increased travel to and from the Soviet Bloc and
more extensive exploitation of international conferences also contri- 25X1C
25X10 buted to the expansion in the volume of these reports. Reportin on
the Bloc is expected to decrease with the tapering off of
but it is believed that this trend wil e part y
counteracted by the resumption of the US/Soviet exchange program.
25X10
RM va-LucLuM ources continues to
ion on ino- owe oc ports.
25X1 C
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25X1
i, Military Services Activities, Coordination of military ser-
vices activities under DCID 5/1 has continued. During the period
25X1 C
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j. Interagency Source Control Register. The IAC approved the
establishment of an Interagency Source Register. This register is
designed to provide a centralized file of clandestine sources in order
to preclude multiple recruitment of sources and to facilitate the
elimination of "paper mills" and fabricators.
1. Review of National Security Council Intelligence Directives
During the past year the intelligence community took action with
respect to various recommendations by the President?s Board of Con-
sultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. In this connection, the
IAC commenced a comprehensive review of all of the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, and it is anticipated that suggested
revisions of these basic directives will be submitted for NSC approval
early in FY 1958.
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