Reports of Impending Revolutionary Action Against the Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200040003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GENCY
1 December 1955
NIMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SU13JECT : Reports of impending Aevolutir.)nary Action
Against the Governments of Nicaragua and
Costa Rica
1. For some time there have been reports of an impend-
ing attempt to overthrow the Somoza regime in Nicaragua,
A Nicaraguan official has recently alleged that this attempt
will be initiated. by an incursion from Costa :Rica on 7 Decem-
ber. Meanwhile, the Costa Rican government has begun to
express alarm regarding alleged preparations in Venezuela
for an attack on G,,sta Rica similar to that launched from
Nicaragua in January 1955. reports that such
an attack is being organized in Venezuela, that it will con-
sist of an internal uprising at San Jose in conjunction with
a landing; at 'Puerto Limon, and that it is scheduled for 8
December.
:a This memorandum has been informall coordinated with
DDP/7,,a and OCI , but has not 25X1A9a
been coordinated with the IAC agencies.
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2. It is unlikely that Presidents Somoza, of Nicaragua,
and Perez Jimenez, of Venezuela, will ever be reconciled to
the continued existence of the Figueres?regime in Costa Rica,
President Figueres cordially reciprocates their sentiments,,
but lacks their capabilities. It might be supposed that all
three presidents would be restrained by their experience a
year ago, which involved mortal peril for Figueres, acute
embarrassment for Somoza, and meat chagrin. for Perez Jimenez.
3. President Somoza has dominated Nicaragua for twenty
years, through his control of the Guardia Nacional. Conserva-
tive Nicaraguans desire a change and fear that, if it is not
accomplished soon by conservative elements,, it will be accom-
plished eventually,, with violence, by radicals. The approach-
ing presidential election (November 1956) is a spur to action
to prevent Somoza from perpetuating his regime. There is no
indication, however, that Somoza has lost control of the
Guardia, the source of his power, or that the movement against
him amounts, as yet,, to more than talk. In particular,, there
is no evidence of actual preparations in Costa Rica for an
incursion into Nicaragua on 7 December.
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4. Investigations by Embassy Caracas have tended to
disprove the circumstantial details of Costa Rican alle-
gations regarding hostile preparations in Venezuela, but
nevertheless there is reason to believe that an attack on
the Figueres regirre similar to that of last January is be-
ing organized under the patronage of President Perez Jimenez.
5. The Costa Rican government is now preparing to meet
such an attack. If it should occur, it is likely that the
Costa Rican people would rally in support of Figueres, as
they did in January, and that Costa Rica would demand the
immediate intervention of the Organization of American States,
as before.
6, To contemplate such an operation, President Perez
Jimenez would have to believe that he could prevent effective
intervention by the O.A.S. With Costa Rica alerted, it is
not likely that he could obtain a decision before the O.A.S.
could act. The rationalization given by one source is that
the O.A.S. would hesitate to deal with the President of
Venezuela as summarily as it did with the President of
Nicaragua last January. Perez Jimenez is not a modest man:
this may represent his own opinion.
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7. In this connection, the coincidence between the
alleged date for an attack from Costa Rica on Nicaragua (7
December) and the independently reported date for the attack
on Costa Rica (8 December) may be significant: that is, a
staged attack on Nicaragua may be offered as Justification
for Nicaraguan and Venezuelan support of a real attack on
Costa Rica.
8. It is unlikely that the O.A.S. could be imposed upon
in this manner. Nicaragua and Venezuela mould expect the
sympathy of Cuba, the Dominican Republic;, Guatemala, and Peru,
but not their firm support. On the other hand, Mexico, Ecua-
dor, and Uruguay would probably be outspoken in support of
Figueres. Even last January Venezuela was a minority of one
in support of Nicaragua. Political developments since then,
particularly those in Argentina and Brazil, have been favor-
able for Figueres.
9. In sum:
a.
The Somoza regime in Nicaragua appears to be in
no immediate danEger, although a crisis is likely
during 1956,
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b. Somoza and Perez Jimenez are probably conspiring
to overthrow the Figueres regime in Costa Rica.
It would be an ill-considered and probably un-
successful operation, but their animosity and
capacity for self-delusion could lead them into
c. The Organization of American States probably
could and would intervene as promptly and
effectively as in January 1955.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTZMAES Aga
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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