The Growth of Communist Political Influence

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010038-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Releaske CIA-RDP79R00904A000200D10038-7
W W.
The kowth SIC ? ( A; i
The first eonaii ion of reads as followss
The current political situation In Ontemaha is
use to W interests. The 4uatemel an C==& Ws
e*eroie~ a political influence far out of proportion
to their small. ioel strength. Their in luence
will probably continue to grow as long as President
Arben$ remains in power.
2. This elusion tins ?alid. under the patronage
of Arbens, Ccmm unist influence in Guatemala has grown. during
the past year and will probably continue to grow. This
growth is not the result of WW innovation, but of a year's
fl her development along lines previously established.
For example s
There has been further development in the or-
ganirastioni of rural workers as a political force under
Conn ist influence and control (as was anticipated in
the sixth conclusion of NIE.84). The Coeoalists have
demonstrated a capability for the rapid mobilisation
and asseth3y of considerable n m-bsrs of these workers
for political demonstrations.
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k. The C icts are p bab] also capable of
mobilizing up to 20,000 of these workers as an armed
militia available to support the regime in an. emergency.
We cannot confirm reports of the existence of such a
Para-militsrr forces but would consider it a logical
development in the circumstances. There is good -won
to believe that the required quantities of =13
era
have been distributed and cached under the control of
Coemmaist agrarian organizers. It is not apparent that
this putative militia has received anpr appreciable mili,-
tarr training. Even without such training, however, a
substantial n n!1ber of rural workers, armed and organized,
evert considerable political and military force.
g. The Coniuuniists have strengthened their control
of the pro-Arles political parties. The Caemunist Hsrtsy
itself is small, but c rypto-Co> miste control. the other
parties in the poro-Arbenz coalition and through them
effectively control the political lit. of the country.
g. There is good reason to believe that . nsdecisions on Guatemalan domestic and foreign policy are
reached, not in the official cabinets but in a kitchen
cabinet composed of form Cats and six pp fists.
SECRET
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would require the active support of a major portion of the
Y?
The eighth conclusion of NXE.-86 reads as follows,
The At p- is the amly organized element in Oustomaia
s of rapid7,y and decisively altering the political
si uticn. Although a quick change of attitudes is
alvarq~s possible, there is no present reason to doubt
the continued 2 oltr of the Army high oomsand and of most
of the Azar to Arbeuz. The AzW under its prey
leaders could not be expected to take revoluticcAmT
AGOOD, Union they bec convinced that their persmnmi
nowity and ing were tb='eateasd by Co?m ni t
infiltration and domination of the Gover ent...
8. We consider the probable action of the At to be
the critical factor in the situation. In modification of the
second sentence of the quoted per, we not. certain
i dfeatic ns of unrest, even of disaffection, among Army officers
which suggest that the precondition for revolutionary action
specified in the third sentence may be approaching fulfillment.
G-2 (Colonel flennig), however, would reaffirm, the second sentence,
stressing the watchful control which Arbenz .maroiees over the
Army ocemaand, the considerations of personal advantage which
bind key officers to the regime, and the disposition of the
rank-sad-file to follow their leaders. This diffo ence is a
matter of emphasis rather than of essential substance. All
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would agree that a revolutionary potential now exists in the
Quatemnl an ArW, but that the Guatemalan Army is not likely
to take spontaneous action against the Arbena regime.
9. The Cots will be concerned to neutralize the
revolutianeycy potential in the Army. With the passage of time
they may succeed In doing so by: (a) a gradual pnwge of dis-
affected officers; (b) subversion of the enlisted del;
(c) a gradual reduction of the military capabilities of the
Army by the govern ent's failure to replace used weapows
equipment, and as itian; and (d) f orther develoocment of a
0 mist.-ootro3led workers' 'a4-l tia as a cotimter.-balancing
force. There are current inaicationa of action along these
several lix:es.
M129- aitign c4'Oka Mal TAM BoW ,
10. The ninth conclusion of ME-84 rem as follows:
....The Governments of El S lvador, Imo, and
Nicaragua... are fearful that the trend in tkiatemela
will lead to Commd at subversion and social. upheaval
in their own territories. They are ly giving
serioro-s consideration to the possib~f effecting
a political change in Guatemala through clandestine
support of revolutionary action there. It is ht 2y
unlikely, howver, that they would or could mount an
open military Intervention in Guatemala.
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11. This oonelusion rwains valid. I'oapeetive 1 mil.i-
taiy aid to tbewe co itries will take tie to become effective
and is not lfoely to alter the situation substantially. To
the extent that it reassures them regarding their security
against ( temnlaa retaliations it m y embolden these countries
to render clandestine support to revolutionary activities in
Guatemala. Open military interVentAon would be a de ubttul advent-
ture at best, all the mare so in view of Latin American sen-
sitivity the sub f eat of intervention as recent des strated
anew at the Caracas Conference.
32. The argent imbroglio between Nicaragua and Costa
Rica has weakened Central American solidarity in relation to
Ouatemsla. If long continued, it may oause costa Rica to look
to Guatemala for support. The approaohimg election in Hone s
presents opportunities for Guaten: San intrigue in that country
and the possibility of an adverse change there.
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