CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600030008-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 29, 1952
• Content Type: SE

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SECURITY INFORMATION
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COU
_
OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BUR
OR THAILAND
SE -22
29 February 1952
Advance Copy for the NSC
In order to expedite delivery, this estimate is being
given a special preliminary distribution.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S qq'
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
RUTH: HR 10.2
DATE4Z- .~ $t REYIEWER I_018557,
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and 'the joint
Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency
in the preparation of this estimate. All members of
the Intelligence Advisory Committed concurred in this
estimate on 28 February 1952. See, however, footnotes
to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3b,
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 February 1952
CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA, BURMA9 OR
THAILAND
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the consequences of certain possible US
courses of action with respect to an identifiable Chinese
Communist. military intervention* in Indochina, Burma, or
Thailand.
ASSUMPTION
The United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New
Zealand will join the United States in 'warning Communist
China that the five powers will meet Chinese Communist
* The 'term "identifiable Chinese Communist military inter
vention" is intended to cover either an open and, acknowledged
military intervention, or an unacknowledged military intervention
of such a scale and nature that its existence could be demonstrated.
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military intervention in Southeast Asia with military
counteraction. Whether or not the four other powers
will join the US in such a warning is beyond the scope
of this estimate. We are also unable to assess which-
of various conceivable methods of transmitting a warning
would have the greatest deterrent effect,
ESTIMATE
I. THE EFFECT OF A JOINT WARNING AGAINST CHINESE
COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA,
On Communist Intentions
1, We do not believe that a joint warning against an
"identifiable military intervention" by the Chinese Communists
in Southeast Asia would tend to provoke such intervention. If,
however, the Chinese Communists contemplate an early "identi-
fiable military intervention" in Southeast Asia, or if in the
future they should contemplate such an intervention,'a joint
warning by the five powers would tend to deter them.*
2. Even in the absence of a joint formal warning, the
Chinese Communists probably estimate that "identifiable
* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State,
would add the following sentence-. "On the other hand, if
the Communist leaders conclude from Western actions and
statements that the West intends to attack Communist China
regardless of Communist actions in Southeast Asia, the
deterrent effect of a warning would be nullified."
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military intervention" in Southeast Asia would entail
substantial risk of joint military counteraction, and that
such a risk is unwarranted in view of the prospects for
further Communist gains in.'Southeast Asia without such
intervention. ' They may, however, discount this risk,
estilnating'that there, are differences in policy among- the
five powers and that these powers may not be able -or
willing to take timely* and effective military counteraction.
3. The effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent
would depend in large measure on Communist conviction that:
A.
b.
C.
The five powers were not bluffing, and were
united among themselves as to the military
counteraction to be taken.
The five powers were actually capable of
timely and effective military counteraction.*
The counteraction would be directed against
Communist -China itself as well as toward
repelling the Chinese Communist intervention.
4. If the Communists were convinced on the foregoing
points they would have to recognize that intervention in South-
east Asia would bring military counteraction, the probable
* The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
holds the view that the Communists might be seriously con-
cerned over the prospect of delayed military counteraction,
even though they believed that timely counteraction need not
be feared. He therefore believes that the words "timely and"
should be omitted.
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consequences of which would be general hostilities
between Communist- China and the five powers, if not
global war. It is improbable, therefore, that they would
initiate an "identifiable military intervention" in Indo-
china, Burma, or Thailand in the face of a joint warning
by the five powers unless, on the basis of global considera-
tions, they were willing to accept global -war or at least
general hostilities in-the Far East, So far both Communist
China and the USSR have shown a desire to localize the
hostilities in Korea, Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Further-
more, the favorable prospects for the success of present
Communist tactics in Southeast Asia make probable a
continuation of these tactics, unless, because of global
considerations, the USSR and the Chinese Communists
decide to accept grave risk of global war.
5. It is unlikely that additional signatories would
increase the effectiveness of a joint warning. India would
almost certainly refuse to participate in such a warning.
It is improbable that Japan would take such a provocative
step at this time and uncertain whether Thailand would do
so. Few, if any, additional governments-would join in a
formal warning. Even if the Philippines, Japan, and Thailand
did participate, the Communists would discount their adherence
because of the military weakness of these countries and their
existing ties with the West. The Communists would assume
Chinese Nationalist support of the warning, whether or not
explicitly expressed.
Other Effects
6. A public joint warning would considerably, improve
the morale of the Thai and Vietnamese governments. In Burma
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any encouragement derived from the warning would probably
be offset by fear of involvement in a conflict between the
great powers and by general suspicion of Western "imperialist"
motives.
7. Elsewhere in East and South Asia-the effect
would be mixed. There would be a tendency, notably in
japan and the Philippines, to applaud this new manifesta=
tion of Western determination to check Communist aggres-
sion. On the other hand, the feeling would be widespread,
especially in India and Indonesia, that the warning represented
another instance of Western meddling In Asian affairs in pur-
suit of colonial objectives.
8. The effect of a warning on other countries probably
would not be of major importance. A warning might well
revive the fears in the smaller NATO powers regarding the
dangers of general war or of an overextension of Western
strength in the Far East, but it is unlikely that the basic
attitudes of these countries would be changed.
9. The inclusion in the warning of a threat to use
atomic weapons would produce a widespread and serious
adverse reaction throughout the noon-Communist world.
U. INITIATION OF ACTION IN THE UN AND PROBABLE
UN REACTIONS THERETO
10. If identifiable: Chinese Communist- military ? inter -
vention in Southeast Asia actually took place, the, UN could
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probably be led to adopt dourer-measures similar to those
taken regarding. Korea I the `USA UK, and France advocated
these measures, Action by the Security Council would
certainly be blocked by a Soviet veto, 'but the matter could
then 'be taken to the-General Assembly within twenty-four
hours under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The
General Assembly would probably begin by calling for a .
cease-fire. Were this action to be ignored (as it presumably
would-be), a two-thirds majority- could probably be mustered
for resolutions condemning Communist- China as an aggressor,
recommending military counteraction to repel the aggression,
and setting up a unified military command (though not
necessarily under the 'US) to that end; Most, UN members,
however, because of their fears of a general war, would prob-
ably not be willing to give spec lcc au aiorization, for military
counteraction against Communist China- itself.
11 a Thewillingness of the UN to adopt a stand against
Communist intervention in Southeast Asia would be affected
by the readiness of the victim to appeal to the UN. Indochina
and Thailand would almost certainly be prompt in seeking UN
assistance against Chinese Communist military intervention,
but Burma might fail to make a timely appeal or fail to
support an appeal by another 'UN member,
12 s The degree of 'U ? support for action against Chinese
Communist aggression would hi nge ern various other factors,
A large number of Arab and' As tan countries probably would
abstain if Indochina, which they `regard as a French puppet, were
invaded, The Arab-Asian. reaction might be more,favorable if
the victim were Burma, which has followed a -policy o non-
tnvolvemento. If the five powers took any countermeasures
without 'UN authorization, support of their action would be
considerably lessened,
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PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTION OF
JOINT MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES
Reaction of the Chinese Communist and Soviet Governments*
13. If the Chinese Communists undertook an identifiable
military intervention in Southeast Asia despite a joint warning
against such a move, Chinese Communist planning unquestionably
would have considered the likelihood of Western counteraction
and would have been coordinated with the USSR. It is possible
that such an intervention might be undertaken in the belief
that the warning was a bluff, or at least that the countermeasures
would be confined to the area of the aggression. In this case
the execution of forceful military countermeasures might induce
the Communists to seek a settlement. It appears far more
likely, however, that such an intervention would be'undertaken
in full recognition of the risks involved. Under these circum-
stances, the immediate reaction to such military counteraction
would probably be an attempt to accelerate Chinese Communist
military operations. The Chinese Communists would probably
attempt to extend their operations to other parts of Southeast
Asia and, having already accepted the danger of expanded
hostilities, they might well intensify operations in Korea
and seize Hong Kong and Macao. Highest priority would be
given, however, to the defense of Communist China.
14. Chinese Communist defiance of a joint warning
would almost certainly involve the prior consent of the
USSR. The degree of Soviet aid to Communist China would
depend upon (a) the nature, scope, and degree of:success of
the- Western counteraction, and- (b) the degree to which the
existence of the Peiping regime seemed to be jeopardized.
* SE-20: "The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible
US Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and`
Korea" treats -most of the material discussed in this section
in more detail,
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