(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010041-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: MISC

CONFIDENTIAL
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prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao as transshipment points
for trade with Communist China, (See Tab A for data on Chinese
Communist trade during 1951.)
. b8 Such interdiction would intensify the existing serious
economic strains in Communist China, but would not in itself
force the Chinese Communists to end the Korean war or threaten
the stability of the Chinese Communist regime.
0. The Chinese Communists would be unable to counter such
interdiction effectively, but would probably employ mine war.
fare against the blockading ships and might employ aircraft and
submarines*
d. The USSR would probably endeavor to offset the economic
effects of the embargo and blockade by expanding overland ship.
ments to Communist China. The USSR would probably refuse to
recognize the legality of the blockade. It would probably under.
take to escort Soviet shipping into Port Arthur and Dairen (if
It is the view of the representative of the Director of Naval
ARMY, NAVY, & USAF rev 1).igence that this paragraph should read as followst
completed. "a. A complete interdiction of Communist Chinese seaborne
imports would require both: (1) an effective embargo on ex.
ports and shipping to Communist China by all important non.
Communist trading and maritime countries; and (2) the imposi-
tion of a naval blockade of all Chinese Communist ports,,
including Port Arthur and Da3 ren, the scale of which would
depend upon the effectiveness of (1). A complete interdiction
could also be obtained by a full scale naval blockade. It
would be essential to prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao
as transshipment points for trade with Communist China. (See
Tab A for data on Chinese Communist trade during 1951.)n
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these ports were blockaded), and might undertake to escort
Soviet shipping into other blockaded ports. Interception of
such Soviet shipping might well create incidents? but we be-
lieve it unlikely that the USSR would press such incidents to
a point where there would be serious risk of general war,
a. Large'scale UN ground operations in Korea, combined
with sustained and unrestricted UN air attack on Communist mili-
tary targets in North Korea and Manchuria could seriously impair
the Communist military capability to maintain their position in
Korea.
be Such a course of action might compel the communists to
seek an early armistice. We believe it more likely, however,,)
The view of the representative of DI/USAF is as follows: In
NIR-55 we concluded that "unless the present unrestricted
Communist air build-up .is checked or countered, we believe the
growing power of the Chinese Communist forces, even without
direct commitment of Soviet units., will enable them to deall,
severe damage to the UN forces and may make it impossible for
the UN to conduct general offensive operations except at.pro?
hibitive costa" Action required to check this build-up would
have the purpose of limiting CCAF operations from bases in the
Yalu River area so that Communist air superiority could not be
extended to a point which would threaten the position of UN
forces in the Korean theater. This action would probably be
limited to air operations against aircraft on the Yalu River
bases and would. not necessarily bring about the same consequences
as those envisaged in paragraph 2, above. Inasmuch as neither
Communist control in Manchuria nor targets other than airfields
would be involved, the Communist reaction would be considerably
less than in the case of attacks on all military targets in Man.
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that the Chinese Communists would react by increasing air action
against UN forces, installations, and ships in the Korean area.
c? The USSR would probably react immediately by giving all
possible support short of the commitment of their own ground
forces,,, including the commitment of additional elenants of its
own air defense forces to the air defense of Manchuria and North
Korea,*
d. If the Communists should find that these measures were
proving insufficient to permit them to maintain themselves milico
'tarily in Korea,, they could: (1) withdraw from Korea and continue
by guerrilla attacks to harass the UN occupation; (2) seek an
armistice while still in control of a part of North Korea; or
(3) commit Soviet air forces to combat over UN-held territory
and/or Soviet ground forces to combat against UN forces0 hWe be.
lieve the chances are somewhat better than even that the Comna:nists
would^,seek an armistice which would leave them in control of a
part of North Korea before undertaking either of these other
courses of action.
30 Expansion of the Korean War by Air and Naval Bombardment of
Targets throughout Communist Ch Ina.
a0 Sustained and intensive bombardment of targets throughout
Communist China (including airfields, naval bases and shipyards,
troop concentrations, transportation systems, industrial facilities
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and urban complexes) could seriously reduce Chinese Communist
military power, disrupt the Chinese Communist econonr, and
eventually, jeopardise Communist control over at least some parts
of south and southwest China. (See Tab B on Targets in Com-
munist China,)
b. The Chinese Communists would bring to bear their
maximm air defense capabilities which are substantial in Man-
churia and North China but are slight elsewhere, (See Tab C
on Chinese Communist Air Defensive Capabilities.) The Chinese
Communists would almost certainly seek to counter the US tombard-
meet by offensive air action against UN forces and targets.
c. The USSR would commit additional elements of its own
air defense forces for the air defense of Communist China,
d. if the Communists found that their air defense capabili-
ties were insufficient to defeat the US bombardment, and if they
estimated that the cone:ecpxences listed above were likely to on..
sue, they could commit Soviet air forces to offensive operations
against US forces and bases, or they could begin negotiations to
end hostilities. On balance, we believe that in these circum?
stances the Communists wouldnbegin~negotiations to end hostilities
before committing Soviet air forces to offensive operations against
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US forces and bases. Undoubtedly, Communist terms for an armis-
tice would include Communist control over a part of North
Korea,
1s Expansion of the Korean War by Employment of Nationalist
tart' Forces.
The Chinese Nationalist forces could not be effectively
used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist main
land unless the present US program for equipping and training
these forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were
willing to provide not only logistic support for an invasion
but substantial air and naval support as well, In any event
Nationalist forces are not likely to be ready in sufficient
strength for a large-scale invasion operation before 1953,
(See Tab D for detailed statement of Nationalist capabilities.)
It is the view of the representative of the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2. ,.that the second sentence of paragraph !t, above,
should read as follows: "In any event, Nationalist forces are
not likely to be ready for an invasion operation before mid.
1952," The G..2 representative recommends the addition of
the following sentences at the end of paragraph I: "After a
lesser amount of preparation, the Chinese Nationalists could
be employed effectively in Korea. In such an event, there
would be no undue reaction by the Chinese Communists or the
USSR."
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Sc, Expansion of the Korean War b Utilization of Non-Communist
Guerri la orces e* in China
The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing
the strength of guerrilla forces throughout China imnd these
forces do not now have a significant operational.capability,
(See Tab E for detailed statement of guerrilla capabilities.)
Omen if guerrilla capabilities were developed,: the guerrillas
could be employed effectively only in conjunction with other
courses of action directed against Communist China,
6, Expansion of the Korean War by a Combination of Several
a? An intensification of UN.operations in Korea and an ex-
pansion of the war to include successful tactical and strategic
bombardment of Manchuria and China proper and a successful inter.
diction of Communist China's seaborne imports 'could probably
have the following effects on Communist capabilities: (1) the
Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale
operations in Korea; (2) lines of communication in Communist
China would be disrupted; (3) Communist China would be forces into
virtually complete dependence on the USSR for military supplies and
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other critical imports; (.) Chinese Commmunist capabilities
for large-scale military operations in Southeast Asia would
be eliminated; (5) Communist Chinaas ability to maintain
effective control of the mainland would be progressively reduced*
bo In response to these US courses of action, the USSR
would almost certainly expand its aid to Communist China. This
aid would probably include increasing commitment of Soviet air
defense elements in Communist China and North Korea. If the
Communists found that such measures were proving unsuccessful in
countering the US effort, we believe the Communists would pro-
bably begin negotiations to end hostilities before committing
Soviet air forces to combat over UN-held territory or Soviet
forces to combat against UN ground forces. Undoubtedly the
Communist terms for an armistice would include Communist control
over a part of North Korea. While at every point the USSR would
probably seek to avoid the precipitation of general war, there
would be grave danger that general war might result from action
not intended to produce that result.
It is the view of the representative of the Assistant Chief
of Staff, C.2, that a subparagraph 6c should be added to read
as follows t "Should any or all of tSie foregoing US actions
result in major Soviet commitments in the Far East in support
of the Chinese Communists or otherwise, they would reflect
Soviet capabilities in Western Europeo"
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STRATEGIC BOMBING TARGETS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1., The Chinese Communist Air Force would be the most im-.
portent target in a strategic bombardment of Communist China,
Successful attacks against the airfields on which this force is
deployed could be expected to produce the following resultas
(a) the reduction of CCAF offensive capabilities and elimination
of the immediate threat of a major CCAF counter-air offensive.
against US ground, naval., and air forces; (b) the destruction of
air base facilities and installations; (c) high casualties among
trained aviation personnel; (d) the reduction of CCAF air defen-
sive capabilities., and (e) the placing of heavy logistical demands
on the Soviets for replacement of aircraft and related equipment
and possibly for trained personnel,
2, Chinese Communist naval bases and shy are high
priority targets because their neutralization would eliminate
their use by the Soviets for supporting naval operations against
UN forces,
3, Troog concentrations some of which may contain 25,400
to 2(X},000 Chinese Communist troops,, may normally be found in
Communist China,, These are vulnerable to atomic bombing attacks.,
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particularly surprise attacks. Successful attacks on these
troop concentrations would seriously weaken the Chinese Com-
munist Field Forces,
!t. Chinese Communist transportation, particularly its
inadequate railroad transportation systems, is particularly vul-
nerable to systematic air attacks. Successful attacks on the
transportation system could divide China into 'several areas
which could be separately subjected to air interdiction, thus
preventing mutual military and economic support. The Manchurian
rail network, upon which the Chinese Communists roust depend for
such critical imports from the USSR as petroleum, tanks, motor
vehicles, heavy weapons, munitions, aircraft parts,'and possibly
aircraft is singularly vulnerable, If traffic on this rail net-
work was interdicted on a continuing:basis, the capability of
the Communists for continuing the war in Korea would be seriously
impaired,
5. Industrial facilities in Communist China would make
profitable targets for a strategic bombing effort. Destruction
of POL storage facilities and refineries would result in short-
ages of aviation fuels and fuels for surface transportation,
Since the electric power industry serves virtually all the sig.
nificant manufacturing plants in China, plays a major part in
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powering equipment for the extraction of coal from Chinavs
mines, and performs other important military functions such as
lighting transshipment centers along the transportation systems,
its destruction would have a significant deleterious effect on
Communist war making potential. The Chinese Communist munitions,
iron, and steel industries would make profitable targets because
their destruction would increase the strain on the tenuous
supply lines leading to the USSR from Communist China.
6, There are 16 urban complexes in Communist China which
together have a population of over 17,000,000 and contain the
major part of all modern Chinese Communist manufacturing in-
stallations. Their destruction would virtually eliminate Com-
munist Chinese manufacturing plants and would halt? at least
temporarily, rail transportation on all major rail routes, -From
a long range point of view the destruction of these 16 complexes,
would involve the loss of technical and managerial personnel who
could not be easily or quickly replaced. Heavy losses probably
would also be caused to governmental and military personnel.
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1. Present Chinese Cast air defense capabilities are due
directly to Soviet active participation in supplying equipment, operational
procedures, training, and, in many cases, Soviet personnel. In assess-
ing such capabilities, the following factors are pertinent:
(a) F3s~ht er Aircraft. Approximately 525 first-line jet
fighters of the MIG-15 type are located in the Nulcden-Antung area.
of southern l snohuria. Some 225 Jet fighters are located in the
following four strategic areas in China proper: Peiping-Tientain,
Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Canton.
(b) EarlZ Warnixas. A radar defense system has been installed
and set in operation, with the assistance of Soviet radar engineers,
technicians, and advisers, which is believed to give pr cticalr
continuous early-varning coverage from the .nehuiia border s auth
to Canton. A visual system supplements the electronic earrly-
'"4 sys'v`,"'"..
(e) Antiaircraft. In China-Manchuria there is believed to be
over 500 antiaircraft artillery pieces and an equal number of anti-
aircraft automatic weapons. Most pieces are 85 mm., 37 mm. , and
12Q7 mace of Soviet Facture, Reports continue to indicate that
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the total AAA strength is being increased by shipments of Soviet
equipment. Heaviest concentrations are located in the.N den
area, Shanghai, and in the vicinity of Canton. AAA defenses ap-
pear to be employed for the protection of the industrial area,
harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions In the a usica-
tionsr and supply systems. G=-laying radar has been reported in
some areas.
(d) Aircraft Contro'. The Chinese Communists possibly have a
capability for limited ground-controlled interception.
(e) Soviet Influence. The air defense organization of the
Chinese Commmists appears to be patterned after that of the Sovi-
ets. The over-all air defense capabilities of this defense organi-
zation with respect to fighter defense, antiaircraft defense,
early warning, aircraft control, and passive defense measures
probably will continue to increase as long as the Soviets continue
to assist Communist China,
2. The air defense capabilities. of the Chinese Coumunista are ea-
timated to be as follows
(a) In the l4akden--Antung area of southern inchuria, the
Chinese Communists possess a major air defense capability against
daylight bombing missions, At night their air defense capabilities
would be considerably less because of their limited grouted-controlled
interception ability. (See la above.)
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(b) Chinese Communist air defense capabilities for China
proper are considerably less due to a greater area and fewer
available aircraft,. In areas where distance prevents likely i mne-
diate jet air reinforcements, I.e., Shanghai and Canton, the defense
capability of the small jet strengths presently allocated to those
areas is considered negligible as against a major air offensive in
daylight attacks or night missions. In the Peiping-Tientsin and
Tsingtao areas, which are considered mutually supporting, a substan-
tial jet strength of some 150 MIG-15 e s presents a very formidable
defensive capability if sufficient early warning was given to enable
this strength to be used as a single force. The geographic posi-
tion of Tsingtao creates a greater vulnerability to air attack than
does that of Peiping Tientsin, Against a major air attack, however,
the defense capability of some 75 MIG-15'a located at Tsingtao is
considered at least !x"air. Due to Tsingtao's protective position,
however,, the defense c pability . of Peiping Tientsin against a major
air attack is considered to be good to excellent. The defense
capability of those areas is considered negligible against night
attacks of major size. It is believed that a major air offensive
would encounter flak of limited effectiveness over targets in
China proper such as industrial, areas, harbor facilities, airfields,
and major junctions in the co cationa and supply systems.
(c) Air defense capabilities of the Chinese Coss unists,
especially in southern Manchuria, are such that considerable losses
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of US aircraft could be expected, at least initially, during a c am--
paign of systematic air attacks. Under conditions of prolonged air
attack, the ability of the Chinese mists to maintain effective-
ness would be in direct proportion to the amount of support which
the Savieta voul.d continue to render.
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CHIISE NATIONALIST &W FORCES
1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 451,000 personnel
organized into 38 infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 paratroop
group, 3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments, and . 2- independent bat-
talions. The bulk of these forces is disposed on Formosa; some combat
el rents are located on Matsu,. Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands. The
Nationalist Arny has no significant number of trained reserves, and under
present circumstances its mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass
industion of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly
expanded its proposed NDAP. Even in this event, the dependability and
effectiveness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the present
time, the Nationalist' Army is short of some types of ammunition, arms,
and other equipment, and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous
and poorly maintained. Because of these materiel deficiencies, the lack
of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (including the lack
of interservice coordination), the combat effectiveness of the National-
ist Array is poor. After receipt of the proposed US materiel aid and
after training in its use, its effectiveness will be substantially im-
proved.
2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combat groups
possessing 384 tactical aircraft. Of this total, however, only 121 air-
craft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light bombers and
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86 piston fighters predacainantly of World War II design. Because of the
:lack of spare pmts and improper maintenance facilities,, the cruet of-
fectivenesa of this force is very poor. Under conditions of sustained
combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft, its capabilities would
be reduced to a negligible factor in a day or two. In spite of these
difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force is believed to have the '
organizational structure and necessary personnel to absorb and utilize
the additional equi arat necessary to make it an effective force. How-
ever, the present US aid program is not expected to improve the National-
ist Air Force or even maintain its present capabilities,.
3, The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately 150 mis-
cellaneous craft, the largest of which are 7 destroyer-type vessels.
Under opti. conditions mad provided that there were no air or naval
opposition, the Nationalists would be capable of transporting up to. two
divisions in assault by means of orthc ox landing craft and following up
with five or six water-lifted divisions. No amount of logistic support
could imnediatelyr effect a great increase in the effectiveness of the
Nationalist Navy? Training in large-scale operations, command reorgani-
zation., the removal of political intrigues, and other slowly achieved
changes are prerequisites to any major imprteaaent..
4Y It is evident that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist
Armed Forces are exrtnmely- limited. It is estimated that the Chinese
Nationalists are at present incapable, by themselves, of defending
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Taiwan against an all-out assault by the Chinese Comm mist
Forces. After the Nationalist Ground Forces become effec-
tive (possibly caring 1953 under the present US aid program),,
the Nationalists might be able to establish a bridgehead on
the China coast, provided that the US furniphed substantial
air and naval support in addition to logistic support for
the Nationalist invasion forces, If the US program for the
Chinese Nationalists were greatly expanded so as to improve
Nationalists imilitary leadership and provide the materiel and
training needed for existing ground, naval, and air forces plus
such additional manpower as could be recruited on Taiwan, the
Nationalists might be able to establish a bridgehead on the
China coast without further US participation, However, we do
not believe that such a bridgehead could be consolidated and
expanded, unless the US provided tactical air support in addi-
tion to continuing logistic support for the Nationalist forces,
Even under, these circumstances, it is doubtful if the National-
ists could recruit sufficient additional, manpower on the main-
land to enable then to break out of a lodgement and actually
threaten Communist control over large areas of the. mainland.
In the light of estimated current Chinese Communist capabilities,,
the Nationalists could accomplish this result only in conjunction:
with a major US war effort, including at least a US strategic.
bombing campaign and probably the support of US ground forces,
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TAB 9
A00 600010041-8
ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND
CAPABIItlT ES OF Al TI-COr 1IST GBER--
R_IL_L_A ICI .__._......a_
A. THEIR gTRENGTH AND LOCATION
1. The mum total giber of effective guerrillas throughout all
China which can with any certainty be said to exist at the present t
is approximately 175,000, Dormant or potential guerrillas exist in Un-
known numbers, but the utility of this category is and probably will re-
main aaa11 pearling all-out war or revolution in Chi..
2. Active guerrilla forces are located for the most part in inset--
cessible areas - -- mountainous regions and on Iationaliatheld offshore
islands, Priucipal, regions of activity continue to be the Pearl River
and Canton area, the Kwangtung-Fukien border, the Kwangs3 Kweichov border,,
Szechwan, the Cheklang coast, southwestern Yunnan. ,.and scattered areas in
the Mongol and -Abslem northwest.
B. THEIR PHYSICAL COr SITION mCOPITA QN
3. The term "guerrillasff is an elastic oiie since these resistance
forces are heterogeneous in nature and vary greatly in composition from
one unit to another. Generally speaking, guerrillas fall into the follow-
ing categories: (a) ex-National.i.st forces, some of whon profess allegi-
ance, but most of whom owe no allegiance,. to Taiwan; (b) discontented
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landlords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members of traditional secret
societies, and (0) minority racial and religious groape. The most
active and effective wits are those in categories (a) and (e).
4. Guerrilla forces suffer from a total lack of central direction
and coordination, from a relative lack of organization, quite often from
lack of knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics, from serious de-
ficiencies in arms and sncanition, and, perhaps most importantly, from an
almost total lack of cammunjoation facilities. In addition, guerrilla
forces sub 1st on submarginal food, clothing, and medical levels.
C. THEE. IWIVATIOM AND ALLEOIA 7CE
5. Economic considerations generally outweigh political, and the
basic motivating force behind guerrilla activity at the present time is
the struggle for existence and self-preservation.
6. Despite Nationalist and independent clam, the Chinese guer-
rillas are and wi,l.l be allegiant for the most part to whatever leader and
whatever political group can support and maintain them,
7. Such organization and centralized direction as does exist is
primarily that now being exercised by Taiwan; The Chinese Nationalist
guerrilla effort, however, remains largely ineffectual because of the
hindrances of internal Chinese Nationalist politics.
84 Independent elements continue to claim a substantial guerrilla,
potential in Kwangsi and Ewangtungo It-is believed that the claim of
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one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla assets in being are valid,,
but this group does not have the resources to maintain Its assets without
outside support,.
D. THEIR C09 Ili DECLINE I STRENGTH AM EFF'ECTIVENF S
9. Chinese Communist countermeasures against dissident elements
have been most successful; and, with the further consolidation of control
by Peiping and the forming by Peiping of an effective anti--guerrilla
militia throughout Chico, guerrilla strength and activity under present
oiroui tances will probably continue to decline.
10. The perhaps surprisingly low figure of only 175,000 guerrillas
should not be ascribed wholly to the successes of the Chinese Cammiunist
anti-guerrilla program because this figure is the result also of d,
greatly increased and far more accurate US intelligence product concern--
ing anti-Comsmjst resistance in China.
E. THEIR PRESENT' CAP.ABLIT ?'
11. It is unli(_ely that at the present time the guerrillas can ac-
ec nplish any of the following to any significant degree:
(a) Delay or disrupt the movement from one front to another
of the Chinese Chat armies;
(b) Seriously interdict Chinese Communist lines of com2mxnica-
tions.or logistic support;
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(c) Attract to their ranks ax. substantial numbers of defec-
tors from the Ccanmunists;
(d) Significantly abet military operations should a National-
ist invasion be launched in the near future.
12. Anti-Communist guerrillsa mey be judged to have at the present
time the following capabilities s
) Sporadic raids;
(b) Occasional sabotage operations;
(0) Raids, feints, and diversions against the mainland from
the lItionali,st held offshore islaada;
(d) Intelligence source concerning Communist China, and
(e) Potential basis for possible resistance movement in china.
13. Asir hope of increasing present guerrilla capabilities is con-
tingent upon a program of sizeable outside support and upon a revitaliza-
tion of the Chinese Nationalists,,
14, In slm mart', the present outlook for the guerrillas is dim.
They nevertheless represent an asset with considerable potential provided
they can be properly equipped, organized, and directed. If so supported
from outside, anti-Cc=mist guerrillas can form the nucleus of a possi-
ble future resistance movement in China
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