SPECIAL ESTIMATE THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010011-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 22, 1951
• Content Type: SE

For Release 200610'8/29': CIA-RDP79SO'VO1z A000600010011-1
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.O E
b
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
1-1
r 1
4 J -IF
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
SE-20
22 December 1951 DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
Tn n
^ DECLASSIFIED
AUTHI HR 102
DATEI t o r-6-0 V1 REVIEWERI_O'l85557,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE
MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE
U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REV-
ELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UN-
AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000108/ 0101 1A000600010011-1
CONFlDENTlIITY N
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN
POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION, WITH
RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
SE-20
22 December 1951
Final Copy
The text of the basic estimte is identical with the advance
copy distributed on 17 December. The accompanying TABS
have been added since that distribution.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated with the
Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this
estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee concurred in this estimate on 15 December 1951.
CONFIDEI'!T!Al
'VotV
Approved For Release 2000/08 79S01011A000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000/0
1011 A000600010011-1
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US
COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST
CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain possible US courses of ac-
tion, and (b) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.
ESTIMATE
1. Expansion of the Korean War by Im-
position of a UN Embargo on Shipping
and Exports to Communist China
a. A UN embargo on shipping and exports
to Communist China, if effective, could reduce
Communist Chinese seaborne imports sub-
stantially. However, if exports were permit-
ted to Port Arthur and Dairen, and if exports
from Hong Kong and Macao were not embar-
goed, the effect of the embargo would be
largely nullified. In addition, to avoid large
loopholes, the embargo would have to include
(1) restrictions on exports to non-cooperating
nations of goods which might be transshiped
to Communist China; (2) the cancellation of
charters and the prohibition of the sale of
merchant ships to Soviet Bloc and other non-
cooperating countries; and (3) movement reg-
ulations such as refusal of clearance, black-
listing, and other pressures applied on a
world-wide basis.
b. Although these controls, if effectively im-
plemented, would be sufficient to intensify
the existing serious economic strains in Com-
munist China, their impact would be long
term and would not, in themselves, force the
Chinese Communists to end the Korean war
or threaten the stability of the Chinese Com-
munist regime.
c. It must be expected that the Soviet Bloc
states would not respect this embargo and
that some other states would give only nomi-
nal cooperation. The payment of premiums
by Communist China would stimulate evasion
of the embargo. While it is impossible to
state with precision the importance of these
loopholes, they would serve to diminish the
desired effects of the embargo.
d. The Communists could further partially
overcome the effect of these measures by
employing more of their ships in the China
trade, even though such dislocation of Soviet
Bloc shipping might impose serious problems
for the Soviet Bloc. The USSR would also
endeavor to expand overland shipments to
Communist China.
e. Therefore, a UN embargo on exports and
shipping to Communist China is unlikely, by
itself, to reduce Communist Chinese imports
substantially.
2. Expansion of the Korean War by Naval
Blockade of Communist China
a. Effective interdiction of Communist Chi-
nese seaborne imports would require a naval
blockade (including an embargo) of all Chi-
nese Communist seaports, including Port Ar-
thur and Dairen. It would be essential to
1
Approved For Release 2000/08/ O ~7 101IA000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08f
prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao
as transshipment points for trade with Com-
munist China.
b. Such interdiction would intensify the
existing serious economic strains in Commu-
nist China, but would not in itself force the
Chinese Communists to end the Korean war
or threaten the stability of the Chinese Com-
munist regime.
c. The Chinese Communists would be un-
able to counter such interdiction effectively,
but would probably employ mine warfare
against the blockading ships and might em-
ploy aircraft and submarines.
d. The USSR would endeavor to offset the
economic effects of the embargo and blockade
by expanding overland shipments to Commu-
nist China. The USSR would refuse to recog-
nize the legality of the blockade. It would
probably undertake to escort Soviet shipping
into Port Arthur and Dairen and might un-
dertake to escort Soviet shipping into other
blockaded ports. It might resort to the co-
vert use of submarines and mines against
blockading ships. Enforcement of the block-
ade might well create incidents which would
heighten international tensions, but we be-
lieve the Soviet reaction to such incidents
alone would not result in the USSR initiating
general war.
3. Limited Expansion of UN Air Opera-
tions in Order to Protect UN Forces in
Korea from the Consequences of the
Growing Communist Air Threat
a. Sustained UN air attacks against Com-
munist aircraft and air bases in Manchuria in
the immediate vicinity of the Yalu River could
seriously impair the Communist capability to
extend their air superiority over larger areas
in Korea and thus to threaten the position
of UN forces in Korea by air attacks.
b. The Chinese Communists would react by
dispersing their aircraft and bringing to bear
their maximum air defense capability. They
would also attempt to increase their air ac-
tion against UN forces, installations, and ships
in the Korean area.
c. The USSR probably would not openly in-
voke the Sino-Soviet Treaty, but would prob-
Approved For Release 2000/08/
1011 A000600010011-1
ably react by committing additional Soviet
forces to the air defense of Manchuria and
North Korea despite the continuing risk of
general war.
4. Further Expansion and Intensification
of UN Military Operations in the
Korean War
a. Sustained and unrestricted UN air at-
tack on Communist military targets in Man-
churia and North Korea, combined with large-
scale UN ground operations in North Korea
could seriously impair the Communist mili-
tary capability to maintain their position in
Korea.
b. We believe that the Chinese Communists
would react initially by attempting to in-
crease air action against UN forces, installa-
tions, and ships in the Korean area.
c. The USSR would probably react imme-
diately by giving support short of commit-
ment of its own ground forces and short of
overt commitment of Soviet air forces to com-
bat over UN held territory, but including the
commitment of additional elements of its own
air forces to action in and over Manchuria
and North Korea.
d. If the Communists should :find that these
measures were proving insufficient to permit
them to maintain themselves militarily in
Korea, the USSR would probably intensify its
aid. This aid might well include the intro-
duction of "volunteer" forces. It might even
include the employment of Soviet forces to
such an extent that a de facto local war be-
tween the US/UN and the USSR would exist
in the Far East. At every stage, however, the
Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep
open the possibility of ending the conflict by
political negotiation if the global interests of
the USSR would be served by disengagement.
5. Expansion of the Korean War by Em-
ployment of Nationalist Military Forces
The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not
be effectively used for offensive action against
the Chinese Communist mainland unless the
present US program for equipping and train-
ing these forces were greatly expanded, and
unless the US were willing to provide not only
p 11 A000600010011-1
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/2
1011 A000600010011-1
logistic support for an invasion but substan-
tial air and naval support as well. Even so,
Chinese Nationalist ground forces could
hardly be ready for an invasion operation be-
fore mid-1952, and Chinese Nationalist Forces
as a whole are not likely to be ready in suffi-
cient strength for a large-scale invasion op-
eration before 1953. Certain small units of
the Chinese Nationalist Army are already
capable of effective employment in small-scale
hit-and-run landing operations. After a lesser
amount of preparation the Chinese National-
ist Army could be employed effectively in
Korea. Certain selected divisions could be
made effective in a relatively short time for
rotational service on the Korean peninsula.
6. Expansion of the Korean War by
Utilization of Non-Communist Guerrilla
Forces Already in China
The Chinese Communists have succeeded
in greatly reducing the strength of guerrilla
forces throughout China and these forces do
not now have a significant operational ca-
pability. Even if guerrilla capabilities were
developed, the guerrillas could be employed ef-
fectively only in conjunction with other
courses of action directed against Communist
China.
7. Expansion of the Korean War by a
Combination of Several Courses of Ac-
tion Considered Above
a. An intensification of UN operations in
Korea and an expansion of the war to include
bombardment of Manchuria and an interdic-
tion of Communist China's seaborne imports,
if successful, would probably have the follow-
ing effects on Communist capabilities: (1)
the Chinese Communists would be unable to
continue large-scale operations in Korea; (2)
lines of communication in Manchuria would
Approved For Release 2000/0872T CIA
be disrupted; (3) Communist China would be
forced into an increased dependence on the
USSR for military supplies and other critical
imports; (4) Chinese Communist capabilities
for military operations in Southeast Asia
would be reduced substantially; and finally
(5) an increase of Soviet commitments in the
Far East would reduce Soviet capabilities
elsewhere.
b. The USSR would almost certainly ex-
pand its aid to Communist China in response
to these US courses of action. This aid would
probably include increasing commitment of
Soviet air defense elements in Communist
China and North Korea. If the Communists
found that such measures were proving un-
successful in countering the ITS effort, the
USSR would probably intensify its aid. This
aid might well include the introduction of
"volunteer" forces. It might even include the
employment of Soviet forces to such an extent
that a de facto war between the US/UN and
the USSR would exist in the Far East. At
every stage, however, the Kremlin would
probably endeavor to keep open the possibility
of ending the conflict by political negotiation
if the global interests of the USSR would be
served by disengagement.
c. It is recognized that precise information
on enemy intentions is rarely available and
that enemy counteraction under the various
circumstances here considered cannot be pre-
dicted with complete accuracy. However, all
aspects of the Soviet problem considered, we
believe it unlikely that the USSR will delib-
erately choose to precipitate global war be-
cause of the implementation of the courses
of action examined in this estimate. None-
theless, the possibility of war by miscalcula-
tion cannot be discounted during a period of
high international tension such as would re-
sult.
1011 A000600010011-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/0
1011 A000600010011-1
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNIST CHINA'S SEABORNE TRADE
1. During the last half of 1950 Communist
China's seaborne imports reached record
levels. These imports consisted primarily of
raw cotton, chemicals, crude rubber, petro-
leum products, steel and steel products, metal
manufactures, and pharmaceuticals. At least
three-fourths of these imports passed through
Hong Kong and practically all were carried in
non-Communist registered shipping. Seaborne
imports into Communist China reached even
higher levels during the first half of 1951 and
the composition of these imports did not
change significantly.
2. During the latter half of 1951 there has
been a decline both in seaborne imports into
Communist China and in the tonnage of non-
Communist registered shipping engaged in
trade with Communist China. There are sev-
eral possible reasons for the decline in the sea-
borne trade of Communist China. Among
these are: Western export controls, increased
imports from the Soviet Bloc, institution of
a system of selective buying by the Chinese
Communists and a shortage of foreign ex-
change resulting from heavy imports in 1950
and the first half of 1951. Information now
available does not permit even an approximate
estimate of the relative importance of these
factors.
3. A part of the decline in the tonnage of non-
Communist registered shipping involved in
trade with Communist China has been offset
by the diversion of Communist Bloc shipping
to carrying Communist China's foreign - Fade.
States of the Soviet Bloc are buying or char-
tering additional ships for use in this trade.
Approved For Release 2000/08 RDP79S01011A000600010011-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 PAW
Approved For Release 2000/08/t
11 A000600010011-1
COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN MANCHURIA
1. Present Chinese Communist air defense
capabilities are due directly to Soviet assist-
ance in terms of equipment, operational pro-
cedures, training, and, in many cases, the act-
ive participation of Soviet personnel. In as-
sessing such capabilities, the following factors
are pertinent :
a. Fighter Aircraft. Approximately 525 first-
line jet fighters of the MIG-15 type are located
in the Mukden-Antung area of southern Man-
churia. Approximately 225 additional first-
line jet fighters, which are now located in the
Peiping-Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, and
Canton areas, could be deployed for opera-
tions in the Mukden-Antung area.
b. Early Warning. A radar defense system
has been installed and set in operation, with
the assistance of Soviet radar engineers, tech-
nicians, and advisers, which is believed to give
practically continuous early-warning coverage
from the Manchurian border south to Canton.
A visual system supplements the electronic
early-warning system.
c. Antiaircraft Artillery. Manchurian air
defenses include a substantial number of anti-
aircraft artillery pieces as well as large num-
bers of automatic weapons. The majority of
these are Soviet manufactured 85 mm., 37
mm., and 12.7 mm. pieces. Reports continue
to indicate that the total AAA strength is
being increased by shipments of Soviet equip-
ment. Heaviest concentrations are located
in the Mukden area, Shanghai, and in the vic-
inity of Canton. AAA defenses appear to be
employed for the protection of the industrial
area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major
junctions in the communications and supply
systems. Reports indicate that the AAA de-
fenses include gun-laying radar.
d. Aircraft Control. The Communist air
defense system in Manchuria has the capabil-
ity for limited ground-controlled interception.
2. Communist air defense capabilities in Man-
churia are estimated to be as follows:
a. In the Dairen-Mukden-Antung-Harbin
area of southern and eastern Manchuria, the
Chinese Communists possess a major air de-
fense capability against- daylight bombing
missions. At night their air defense capabil-
ities would be considerably less.
b. Communist air defense capabilities in
southern and eastern Manchuria are such
that considerable losses of US aircraft could
be expected, at least initially, during a cam-
paign of systematic air attacks. Under con-
ditions of prolonged air attack, the ability of
the Chinese Communists to maintain effec-
tiveness would be in direct proportion to the
amount of support which the USSR would
render.
Approved For Release 2000/08/2y90fl f{ RA1011A000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000/0
DENTIAL
01011A000600010011-1
CHINESE NATIONALIST ARMED FORCES
1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a
strength of 455,000 personnel organized into 38
infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 para-
troop group, 3 fort commands, 5 independ-
ent regiments, and 2 independent battalions.
The bulk of these forces is disposed on For-
mosa; some combat elements are located on
Matsu, Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands.
The Nationalist Army has no significant num-
ber of trained reserves, and under present cir-
cumstances its mobilization capacity is neg-
ligible. The mass induction of Formosan
youths would not be feasible unless the US
greatly expanded its proposed MDAP. Even
in this event, the dependability and effective-
ness of Formosan troops would be question-
able. At the present time, the Nationalist
Army is short of some types of ammunition,
arms, and other equipment, and the materiel
that is available is heterogeneous and poorly
maintained. Because of these materiel defi-
ciencies, the lack of reserve manpower, and
the poor command structure (including the
lack of interservice coordination), the combat
effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor.
2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists
of 8 combat groups possessing 384 tactical
aircraft. Of this total, however, only 121 air-
craft are serviceable for combat. These con-
sist of 35 light bombers and 86 piston fighters
predominantly of World War II design. Be-
cause of the lack of spare parts and improper
maintenance facilities, the combat effective-
ness of this force is very poor. Under condi-
tions of sustained combat, particularly if
opposed by jet aircraft, its capabilities would
be reduced to a negligable factor in a day or
two. In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese
Nationalist Air Force is believed to have the
organizational structure and necessary per-
sonnel to absorb and utilize the additional
equipment, including jet aircraft, necessary to
make it an effective force.
3. The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of
approximately 150 miscellaneous craft, the
largest of which are 7 destroyer-type vessels.
Under optimum conditions and provided that
there were no air or naval opposition, the Na-
tionalists would be capable of transporting up
to two divisions in assault by means of ortho-
dox landing craft and following up with five
or six divisions lifted by other shipping. While
the Nationalist Navy could not, by itself, effec-
tively blockade the Chinese mainland, it could
give limited support to a blockade.
4. The Chinese Nationalist Forces could not
be effectively used for offensive action against
the Chinese Communist mainland unless the
present US program for equipping and train-
ing these forces were greatly expanded, and
unless the US were willing to provide not only
logistic support for an invasion but sub-
stantial air and naval support as well. Even
so, Chinese Nationalist ground forces could
hardly be ready for an invasion operation be-
fore mid-1952, and Chinese Nationalist Forces
as a whole are not likely to be ready in suffi-
cient strength for a large-scale invasion opera-
tion before 1953. However, certain small units
of the Chinese Nationalist Army are already
capable of effective employment in small-scale
hit-and-run landing operations.
5. In a relatively short time certain selected
divisions of the Chinese Nationalist Army
could be made effective for rotational service
on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese Na-
tionalist Army as a whole could be employed
effectively in Korea after a lesser amount of
preparation than would be required for a
large-scale invasion operation of the Chinese
mainland.
6
Approved For Release 2000/08/99O,CZR~ ,9~p11011A000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/
[011A000600010011-1
ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF ANTI-
COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN CHINA
Their Strength and Location
1. The maximum total number of effective
guerrillas throughout all China which can
with any certainty be said to exist at the pres-
ent time is approximately 175,000. Dormant
or potential guerrillas exist in unknown num-
bers, but the utility of this category is and
probably will remain small pending all-out
war or revolution in China.
2. Active guerrilla forces are located for the
most part in inaccessible areas-mountainous
regions and on Nationalist-held offshore is-
lands. Principal regions of activity continue to
be the Pearl River and Canton area, the
Kwangtung-Fukien border, the Kwangsi-
Kweichow border, Szechwan, the Chekiang
coast, southwestern Yunnan, and scattered
areas in the Mongol and Moslem northwest.
Their Physical Composition and Condition
3. The term "guerrillas" is an elastic one since
these resistance forces are heterogeneous in
nature and vary greatly in composition from
one unit to another. Generally speaking,
guerrillas fall into the following categories:
(a) ex-Nationalist forces, some of whom pro-
fess allegiance, but most of whom owe no al-
legiance, to Taiwan; (b) discontented land-
lords and peasants; (c) bandits; (d) members
of traditional secret societies, and (e) minority
racial and religious groups. The most active
and effective units are those in categories (a)
and (e).
4. Guerrilla forces suffer from a lack of cen-
tral direction and coordination, from a relative
lack of organization, quite often from lack of
knowledge of proper guerrilla warfare tactics,
from serious deficiencies in arms and ammuni-
tion, and, perhaps most importantly, from an
almost total lack of communication facilities.
Approved For Release 2000/08/2,-
01011A000600010011-1
FIDENTIAL
In addition, guerrilla forces suffer from a lack
of adequate food, clothing, and medical
supplies.
Their Motivation and Allegiance
5. No single political program unites or in-
spires the guerrillas. Economic considerations
generally outweigh political, and the basic mo-
tivating force behind guerrilla activity at the
present time is the struggle for existence and
self-preservation.
6. Despite Nationalist and independent
claims, the Chinese guerrillas are likely for
the most part to follow whatever leader and
whatever political group can support and
maintain them.
7. Such organization and centralized direction
as does exist is primarily that now being exer-
cised by Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalist
guerrilla effort, however, remains largely in-
effectual because of the hindrances of internal
Chinese Nationalist politics.
8. Independent elements continue to claim a
substantial guerrilla potential in Kwangsi and
Kwangtung. It is believed that the claims of
one of these elements to sizeable guerrilla
assets in being are valid, but this group does
not have the resources to maintain itself with-
out outside support.
Their Continuing Decline in Strength
and Effectiveness
9. Chinese Communist countermeasures
against dissident elements have been most
successful; and, with the further consolidation
of control by Peiping and the forming by Pei-
ping of an effective anti-guerrilla militia
throughout China, guerrilla strength and ac-
tivity under present circumstances will prob-
ably continue to decline.
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/291 ?Q -1011A000600010011-1
10. The perhaps surprisingly low figure of
only 175,000 guerrillas should not be ascribed
wholly to the successes of the Chinese Com-
munist anti-guerrilla program. This low
figure also reflects more accurate US know-
ledge concerning anti-Communist resistance
in China than was available when earlier es-
timates were prepared.
Their Present Capabilities
11. Anti-Communist guerrillas have at the
present time the capability for:
(a) Sporadic raids;
(b) Occasional sabotage operations;
(c) Raids, feints, and diversions against the
mainland from the Nationalist-held offshore
islands;
(d) Providing intelligence concerning Com-
munist China; and,
(e) Providing a potential nucleus for a re-
sistance movement in mainland China.
12. The guerrillas at the present time do not
have the capability to:
(a) Delay or disrupt the movement from
one front to another of the Chinese Commu-
nist armies;
(b) Seriously interdict Chinese Communist
lines of communications or logistic support;
(c) Attract to their ranks substantial
numbers of defectors from the Communists;
(d) Significantly aid military operations
should a Nationalist invasion be launched in
the near future.
13. Guerrilla capabilities are unlikely to in-
crease without sizeable outside support and a
revitalization of the Chinese Nationalists.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1
M>> -i00 Zo OO>
m )c mOZMCO O;O )O
O-1-4 rb- - 3C) C) - mC)
C-m G)O W C C5:)ZC
mOOD(A-"MM 3r O3
in ZZu)mZZmm mZD Z
Z Z
00 Xr- O-I
I -i
Z mv.xdm - n
~-,
C m
-1 C) -1 C) Z
H Z
3-
m -1 r G) Z1 D
0 0
W ( )
- Z > D -I
-I
mm
OCrnDG)m
r0
70 XI
Z 3N-m
m m C
m 3
m m rn
m
M C)
-1
~-+ W
C) m
m A
D O
-I A
0-4
Z m
-1000) >
i
mm o>
pp O ui
f0 N
D CSI
a
O 0
PI
01
m
O
N
I
W
W
r -
m
0
O
-n
O N
O
z?
U7
m cD Z Z
m . , -n
-+ 03 t
M
O 0
0
z
C
m
z
C)
m
O
m
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79SO1011A000600010011-1