SE : THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN (DRAFT FOR BOARD CONSIDERATION)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060013-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 18, 1951
• Content Type: SE

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I J N C E A G B N C Y
18 October 1951
SUB3EC : SE t THE CURRENOUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
(Draft for Board consideration)
TheeAAssassination of Liaqua~t, Ali Khan
la On 16 October Prune Minister Liaquat Ali Khan
of Pakistan was assassinated by - a man first identified
as a member of a fanatical societyn the Khaksars$ favoring
a "holy war" to obtain Kaahmirbut new officialy
described as an Afghan national motivated in part by
opposition to Liaquat's suppression of agitation for an
autotxwous "t'ushtoonistau" and in part by his cautious
policy on Kashmir, where the assassin reportedly once
fought as an irre u1are The Premiership has been assumed
by the 0ovornor'Oeneral of Pakistani Khwaja Nazimuddina
who has been replaced in his former post by the Minister
of Finance and National EcononW, Qhulam Mohamed.
DOCUMENT ND.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. o
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S(C)
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 10.2
DATE ?4 k ~1 BEVIEWEJi._ 'i8551
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Effect on the Stab3 ,of the Regime
20 There is unlikely to be any immediate threat to
the stability of the regime, The popular reaction to
the murder has been one of shock and revulsion' in cork-
tract to the admixture of apathy and approval in Iran
when Razmara was murdered in March 1951b The Moslem League
group of leaders which Liaquat headed occupies a dominant
position in Pakistani politics,, has maintained a strong
grip on the arnr and on the media for-moulding public
opinion and appears to be dealing efficiently with the
situation, Although there is some danger of disorders
In the traditionally turbulent tribal areas in the North West
Frontier Province from which the assassin came, the
government should be able to contain them, Opposition groups
like the Khaksars are not powerful# and the any conspiracy
of last spring appears to have been effectively crushed,
3e Over a period of time' however, the government
is likely to be less firm and less powerful than it was
under Liaquat, Nazimuddin is a relatively colorless
though capable East Pakistan politician who appears to
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have been chosen as a symbol of national unity and as a
neutral chairman] neither he nor any of his colleagues
appear to possess Liaquat's high degree of personal vigor
and political prestige. The absence of an established
line of auccescion encourages rivalry within the ruling group.,
Finally, despite the initial popular reaction, the successful
use of violence as a political weapon may serve to encourage
the develogaentof extremist elements and demagogic opposition groups,
Effect an the Kashmir Dispute
4o The assassination does not increase the presently
small chance that either Pakistan or India would deliberateby
initiate hostilities over Kashmir at this timed The leaders
of both countries appear genuinely shocked by the assassination
and anxious to avoid trouble# and it is doubtful public
tension would get out of hand.
So There is sc te? danger,, however, that extr nist elements
in Azad (pro-Pakistan) Kashmir might attempt to take advantage
of the situation, Prior to the aasaeeinztiona the leader
of the bellicose dissident element in Azad Kashmir, who
probably has a considerable following among Azad Kashmir
forces, had ' threatened to instigate an attack on the Indian
forces designed to force a general resumption of hostilities
in Kashmir, There is also an outside chance that hotheaded
Pakistani Arsgy officers not arrested in connection with
last spring's conspiracy might take similar action,
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6. Moreover, the Pakistan Goverment will probably
adopt a firmer policy with respect to Kashmir, The pro.
Indian Kashmir regime's Constituent Assembly is now scheduled
to convene 31 October and the Graham report is now
before the UN Security Councils Pakistan's leaders will
soon have to reassess liaquat'e Kashmir policy, which
generally called for vigorous prosecution of Pakistanis
claims but by means short of warn
7o It is conceivable that the shock effect of
Liaquat's assassination, plus Graham's efforts, may lead,
directly or through UN pressure, to a weakening of India's
previous obduracy on Kashmir, It appears far more likely,
however, that India will continue immovable on fundamental
points* In the absence of any conciliatory act by India,
the Pakistan government would be almost certain to
increase its pressure for firm UN action either in the
Security Council or through submission of the issue to
the General. Assembly. Moreover# the patience of,the
Pakistan Government and people in awaiting such action
would be shorter than hitherto. There would be a sub.-
ctantial chance of spnet;hing like a Pakistani, ultimatum
in the UN,,~ and if this approach failed to
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show results, the chance of war, either deliberate or
through army and popular pressure, might become serious*
fact :asp Relations with Afghanistan
8. The identification of the assassin as an Afghan
nationals a point which the Pakistan Government, may be
emphaailing to divert attention from the Icas1mir issue,
will probably create some public pressure for war against
Afghanistan? Pakistan may demand that Afghanistan make
some specified gestures of atonement for the assassination
and renounce further agitation in regard to Pushtoonistan9
Even If Afghanistan proves .unresponsive, however, it is
doubtful that the Pakistan Government would wish to go
to war or that public opinion, never as strong against.
Pakistan's feUawcqusaun state as against India, could
force 'the govern t, with its control over the arty and
public opinion m,.dia, to go to war, Afghanistan,, while
disavowing all responsibility for Liaquatle deaths will
probably attempt to avoid exacerbating the issue, both
because of consciousness of its military weakness visma?via
Pakistan and because of the recent fall from power of the
chief sponsor of tie Pwshtoonistan campaign.
WS-
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Effect on Relations with the West
9. Liaquat!s colleagues, notably Foreign Minister
Mohamed
Sir/Zafrullah Khan and the new Governor-General# shared
his pro.-Western leanings. Under the new stresses they
are likely to face' however, they may well became more
insistent that the Western powers support Pakistan vis-a-vis
India and Afghanistan if they wish to be assured of
Pakistan's close cooperation. Eventually, popular
pressure may force them to take an even cooler attitude
toward the tr7eata
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