SE-17: THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN (DRAFT FOR IAC CONSIDERATION)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060012-6
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 16, 1998
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 18, 1951
Content Type:
SE
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CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060012-6.pdf | 184.77 KB |
Body:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
18 October 1951
SUBJECT: SE-17s THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IN PAKISTAN
(Draft for TAG Consideration)
The Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan
1, On 16 October Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was
assassinated by a man now officially described as an Afghan
national. The Premiership has been assumed by the Governor-
General of Pakistan, Khwaja Paasirsauddi.no
Effect on the Stability of the Regime
2. There is unlikely .to be any immediate threat to the
-stability of the regime. The popular reaction to the nu-der
has been one of shock and revulsion and the assassination
cannot be taken as an indication of widespread opposition to
the government, The group of Mosl+en League leaders which
Liaquat headed occupies a dominant position in Pakistani
politics, has maintained a strong grip on the army and on the
press and radio., and appears to be dealing efficiently with
the situation. Although there is some danger of disorders in
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the traditionally turbulent tribal areas in.the North West
Frontier Province from which the assassin came, the govern.
tent will probably be able to contain them, Opposition groups
are weak. The armor conspiracy of last spring appears to
have been effectively crushed,
Nevertheless, the government is unlikely to provide
as firm leadership as under Liaquat. Idazimuddin is a capable
but relatively colorless Dart Pakistan politicians Who appears
to have been chosen as a symbol of national unity and as a neutral
chairman; neither he nor are, of his colleagues appears to possess
LiaquatGa high degree of personal vigor and. political prestige.
The absence of an established line of succession may encourage
rivalry within the ruling group,
Effect on the Kashmir Dispute*
4
The assassination does not affect our present estimate
that neither Pakistan nor India is likely deliberately to
initiate hostilities over'Kashmir prior to the end of 195.,
Sae NIE, "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute
to the end of 195," published i4 September 1951,
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The leaders of both countries appear genuinely shocked by
the assassination and anxious to avoid trouble, and are pro-
bably capable of preventing public pressure from getting out
of handQ.
5. However, the assassination cornea at a time when
Pakistan?a leaders are obliged to review their Kashmir policy.
The. meeting of the pro-Indian Kashmir Constituent Assembly,
scheduled for 31 October, and the submission of the Graham
report to the UN Security Council make further decisions in-
escapablea In the absence of any conciliatory act by Indiaa
the Pakistan Government would almost certainly exert the utmost
pressure for firm UN action, either in the Security Council
or through submission of the issue to the General Assembly,
If these tactics failed to produce results acceptable to
Pakistan, army and popular pressures for war mould Increase,
Although the leaders of the new government can bpi expected to
follow a policy at least as mmderate as that of Itaguat, it
is possible that lacking his influence and stature they ma
be less able to withstand these pressures,
6, There is a alight chance that extremist elenants in
Azad (pro-Pakistan) Kashmir moor attempt in the near future to
take advantage of the situation and,, by attacking Indian troops,,,
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to bring about a general resumption of hostilities in Kashw
mir0 There' le also a slight chance that some hots-headed
Pakistani arn{y officers might attempt similar action.
Effect on Relations with Afghanistan
7a The official description of the assassin as an
Afghan national may create some popular pressure for war
against Afghanistan. Pakistan may demand that Afghanistan
make atonement for the assassination and renounce further
agitation in regard to Pushtoonistana If Afghanistan proves
unresponsive, the Pakistan Government might countenance bor.
der raids by tribesmen, but it is unlikely that it would
resort to war against Afghanistan,
Effect on Relations with the west
8e The new Prime Minister? the Foreign Minister, Sir
Mohamed 7afrullah Khan, and the new Govvernor~.Genera1, Shulam
Mohanuaed, have all shared Liaquatas pro-western leanings, But
the unsettled state of the Kashmir dispute, plus increasing
anti-Westernism in the Moslem world,, particularly as a result
of the Ang`2o-; ptian crieia, will make it more difficult
Liaquat A1ia s successora to maintain a pro-Western orientatione
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