LDC POSITIONS ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00702A000400040003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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LDC Positions on Technology Transfer Issues
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Judgments
The diversity of issues subsumed under the rubric of technology transfer
for development almost precludes a meaningful summary. Nevertheless, a
review of relevant country factors and stances in the North-South dialogue
does point up a few important themes.
? Individual less developed countries (LDCs) have widely differing
perceptions of what should be included in technology transfer agendas
and substantially different interests in obtaining any given concession.
? Unlike the Common Fund and debt issues, the leading spokesmen on
technology transfer are-and will likely remain---the more advanced
LDCs. In particular, several of the Latin American countries have built
on their well-known versions of the role of the multinational corporation
and strong feelings of national sovereignty to focus one aspect of the
discussion on the fairness of technology costs.
? Most LDCs-little inclined to do battle over technology transfer
issues-have gone along with the G-77 ' positions partly for logrolling
purposes and partly because they see this as yet another device to
increase real resource transfers.
? Many LDCs, especially the poorer and less open, appear not to grasp
the institutional barriers that would mire radical proposals for costless
technology transfer. Such unrealistic demands, broadly supported at
conferences in the interests of bloc unity, tend to mask the greater
sophistication of the higher income LDCs which provide private firms
the incentives needed for innovation.
? There are probably few LDCs with expectations of gaining anything
more substantial than a technology transfer code at the various
' See appendix C for a glossary of terms and acronyms.
ER 78-10569
September 1978
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international meetings of 1978-79. Accomplishing even this will not still
the farfetched rhetoric on technology banks and compensation for
"brain drain," however. With regard to technology transfer, as in other
areas of the North-South dialogue, the G-77 will probe widely and
frequently to see if the developed countries spontaneously suggest some
practical equivalents for the Third World's initial polemic demands.
? By and large, the developed countries are far from resolving how best to
respond to the long list of assorted LDC demands. The United States,
whose positions are only beginning to jell, is nevertheless, probably
better prepared than most developed countries (DCs) on this subject.
ii
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]Key Judgments ........................................................................................ i
Background and Key Features of the Dialogue ...................................... 1
History of Technology Arguments ..................................................... 1
Current G-77 Stance ............................................................................ 2
Key LDC Actors ................................................................................. 3
Developed-Country Attitudes ................................................................ 6
LDC Technology Transfer Matrix .......................................................... 6
Appendixes
A. Technology Transfer Section of the Manila Declaration ............ 29
B. Measuring S&T Development in LDCs ........................................ 35
C. Glossary of Terms and Acronyms ................................................ 39
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This report on LDC positions in regard to international technology
transfer draws on all available sources of information to provide an up-to-date
reference for US policymakers and technicians. It was prepared in recognition
of the diversity of issues and professional interests that will arise in the several
international meetings on technology transfer scheduled for 1978-79. The
core of the analysis is a 94-country matrix on aspects of technological
development and political positions in the North-South exchange on technol-
ogy. For those less concerned with the details of the individual countries, an
overview and a summary table present major features of the history of the
technology transfer discussion and the interests of the key LDC actors.
Few issues in the North-South dialogue between developing countries
and developed countries are murkier than the question of technology transfer
to the less developed countries. This stems from (a) the difficulty of defining
technology transfer; (b) the complexity of the process of technology transfer
and accession; and (c) the differences in the institutions of technology
suppliers and recipients. Further complicating the issue is the tendency of
LDCs to include on the technology transfer agenda items ranging from the
behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs) to international cooperation
in the design of new products. Finally, the vast range of separate topics
involved requires the services of large numbers of specialists from many
different fields, thus increasing the number of technical languages and
concepts to be explored.
It is hoped that this paper will promote a greater understanding of the
differences among the key players, especially with regard to the meetings
scheduled for 1979. At the same time, we recognize that the scope of country
coverage and the dynamics of the conferences themselves increase the
probability of inaccuracies or change in any one country statement. To
maintain the best possible current knowledge of country positions on the
issues of technology transfer, we invite comments and suggestions, now or in
the future.
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LDC Positions on Technology Transfer Issues
Background and Key Features of the Dialogue
The North-South dialogue has moved full
force into what may prove the most complex and
unstructured area for discussions--international
technology transfer. On the broad assertion that
the existing channels for this critical process are
often inadequate or too costly, the LDCs have for
some time been seeking substantial institutional
changes, financial concessions, and suggestions
for other improvements from the developed coun-
tries. Now science and technology (S&T) issues
are center stage in major conferences dedicated
to them, whereas, until recently, they generally
had surfaced as parts of broader reviews of
North-South problems.'
The step-up in the pace of meetings on the
technology transfer theme is apparent from a
glance at the schedule for the next 15 months.
? In August and September 1978 the industri-
alized nations and the LDCs have been par-
ticipating in a UN conference on technical
cooperation among developing countries.
? In October 1978 negotiations will open on an
international code of conduct for the transfer
of technology.
? Extensive preparations are now under way
for the UN Conference on Science and Tech-
nology for Development scheduled for Au-
gust 1979.
? In late 1979 there will be a diplomatic-level
conference to revise the Paris Convention on
Industrial Property (patents, trademarks, and
industrial designs).
2 One continuing example of this sort of inclusion in other
conferences is the deep seabed mining discussion in the Law of the
Sea negotiations.
Most industrialized countries see these confer-
ences as a means to review the diverse elements
involved in scientific and technical cooperation;
many LDCs, however, see them as opportunities
to gain additional financing and concessions on
the technology process itself. The differences of
views between developed-country and develop-
ing-country representatives and among special-
ists from a variety of technical fields suggest the
need for a better initial understanding of the
circumstances that led to the upcoming rounds of
talks.
History of Technology Arguments
Although LDCs have long recognized im-
proved S&T capabilities as a condition for devel-
opment, relatively little political importance was
attached to this issue before the 1970s. (An
extensive inventory of S&T needs of the LDCs
was conducted under UN sponsorship in the
1960s; after completion, it was quietly shelved.)
Technology transfer as a political issue began to
take form at the 1970 conference of nonaligned
nations in Lusaka. Concern with the topic grew
when the Charter of Economic Rights and Du-
ties of States, a brainchild of Mexican President
Echeverria, was proposed in 1972. The final
declaration of the UN General Assembly in 1974
proclaimed the right of every country to benefit
from the advances and developments in science
and technology.
The consolidation of LDC-DC issues into the
context of the North-South dialogue gave the
question of technology transfer a strong push
after 1975. Because of the amorphous nature of
the technology issue, however, decisions among
the LDCs themselves on the subject proved more
difficult than those on such issues as the Com-
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mon Fund or debt. Instead of a relatively few
clear objectives, there tended to be many differ-
ent national goals or concerns that were driven
by factors such as stage of development of the
economy, indigenous technical and scientific ca-
pability, attitude toward the foreign private sec-
tor, and willingness to cooperate in joint ven-
tures. At best, these goals could only be
represented in broad patterns. Some LDCs were
primarily concerned with the acquisition of the
most advanced technology, with costs a sec-
ondary issue. Some were suspicious that high
charges for technology transfer were a mask for
profit remittances unrelated to the transfer and
wanted to reduce this loss of foreign exchange.
Still others saw the simplification and adaptation
of products and processes as the most important
issue and were eager to cooperate in the implied
research. And finally, more than a few LDC
representatives at international meetings had lit-
tle grasp of the basic transfer processes and even
less ability to suggest changes. The result was
often a disordered-and extremely long--list of
subjects for discussion, ranging from control over
MNCs to aspects of technical assistance. LDC
views on a technology agenda jelled somewhat in
1976 when G-77 ministers adopted the Manila
Declaration, a comprehensive statement of LDC
demands on technology transfer and a broad
range of other North-South issues.'
The Current G-77 Stances
North-South negotiations at higher diplomatic
levels have until now centered on commodity
price stabilization, commodity agreements, and
debt relief. The wealthier and more advanced
LDCs, however, have had little interest in such
issues and have supported G-77 positions mainly
for the sake of group solidarity. On S&T issues
the situation is reversed. The high-income LDCs
consider the transfer and acquisition of advanced
technology to be critical for their development,
while most poorer LDCs remain largely bystand-
ers. In return for their earlier advocacy of G-77
positions, the upper tier LDCs now expect sup-
port from the largely indifferent poorer nations
on technology transfer issues.
' The text of the technology transfer section of the Manila
Declaration is in appendix A.
The most recent comprehensive statement of
G-77 S&T demands, the Manila Declaration,
puts the LDCs on record as seeking:
? Implementation of policies at the national,
regional, and international levels to strength-
en technological capacities in LDCs.
? Establishment of a legally binding interna-
tional code of conduct for the transfer of
technology, which would bear heavily on the
operations of MNCs.
? Revision of the international patent system to
improve LDC access to proprietary
technology.
? Adoption of policies to stem the outflow of
skilled manpower from LDCs and to compen-
sate them for this "brain drain."
Until now, the LDCs have focused their ener-
gies on the development of a technology transfer
code, one of the first areas to be explored in the
international meetings. They attach great impor-
tance to this element because they feel their
development plans are often thwarted by technol-
ogy choices dictated by the MNCs, the industrial
nations, and international institutions dominated
by the DCs. The code, therefore, represents to
them the most direct means of attacking what is
viewed as a brake on suitable development. Ses-
sions of experts on the topic during 1977-78 have
helped fuel interest, and a stiff LDC resolve will
probably be shown at the related meeting this
October.
In contrast to the specific demands of the G-77
on a technology transfer code (which the LDCs
have been working on since 1975), the developing
nations are less well prepared to cope with the
broader range of the S&T discussions at the
1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology
for Development. The scheduled submissions to
the UN Secretariat of national papers describing
each country's S&T situation and needs are
lagging, and the technical weakness of the dele-
gations representing the LDCs at preparatory
meetings has hindered substantive discussions
with the industrialized nations. Developments at
the UNCSTD, therefore, seem likely to parallel
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this month's UN Conference on Technical Co-
operation Among Developing Countries, with the
major result being little more than a narrowing
of the scope of the now overly ambitious North-
South S&T agenda.
More ominous than this muddling, however, is
the risk that concrete proposals by the developed
countries may only heighten the confusion. Given
the diversity of the S&T interests of the LDCs, a
unified G-77 position beyond broad polemics will
be hard to achieve and sustain at the upcoming
meetings in the face of Group B proposals de-
signed to respond to one or another set of LDC
needs. Ironically, such instability poses a danger
to the industrialized nations, as some Group B
offers made in good faith may be viewed by G-77
actors as calculated attempts to divide the LDCs.
Whatever their technological merit, the offers
could then be spurned by the G-77 leadership for
political reasons. The political risk inherent in
this is that some LDCs will become restless and
perhaps confrontational over the failure to
achieve more rapid progress in exacting changes
in technology transfer processes.
Key LDC Actors
Despite growing attention to transfer of tech-
nology issues, many LDCs have essentially re-
mained spectators in the preparations for the
related international meetings. Only a relative
few have had the technological breadth and
bureaucratic depth to present well-developed ar-
guments. Within this latter group (shown in
table 1), the several larger Latin American
countries--Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mex-
ico, and Venezuela-have been most outspoken
in formulating technology-related demands. The
Brazilians and Mexicans have argued strongly
for the establishment of an internationally bind-
ing technology transfer code. They have been
restrained and flexible, however, compared with
Venezuela, Colombia, and other Andean Pact
nations; for the latter, a more aggressive stance
reflects the desire to bring other countries into
line with the tough standards they already set for
profit remittances, transnational licensing ar-
rangements, and other MNC operations in their
countries. Argentina also holds strong views on
technology issues and is taking a leading role on
the question of technical cooperation among
LDCs.
In Asia, only India, Indonesia, and Malaysia
have been especially active in addressing S&T
matters. Both India and Indonesia lobby for
G-77 proposals, with special emphasis on the
code of conduct. Among the three, Malaysia
takes the most restrained views, consistent with
its policy of actively courting foreign investment.
Throughout this aspect (and most others) of the
North-South dialogue, there is a conspicuous
absence of the several East Asian exporters of
manufactures-Taiwan, South Korea. Singa-
pore, Hong Kong-for whom technology transfer
is, nonetheless, critical. Here the key feature
seems to be mutual discomfort: the East Asians
see better opportunities for gain in distancing
themselves from G-77 polemics; the G-77, in
turn, usually regards them as willing captives of
the existing international order.
The positions of the major OPEC countries on
S &T matters have been less strident than on
other aspects of the North-South dialogue. Alge-
ria has been the most outspoken, actively sup-
porting G-77 demands on the technology transfer
code as well as brain drain controls. The Persian
Gulf states have been quiet on the brain drain
issue, in large part reflecting their status as
major users of skilled foreign labor. More gener-
ally, the Saudis and Iranians have shown only
moderate interest in technology transfer ques-
tions. Iran's main concern, like that of many of
the more advanced LDCs, has been to assure
access to sensitive military and civilian technol-
ogies. This last issue remains key for Brazil,
Argentina, India, and most of the Middle East-
ern countries.
Missing from the list of key actors are the
many small African and other least developed
countries. This, of course, tends to rob the ex-
change of the authenticity that would come from
a greater G-77 effort to shape technology propos-
als for early stages of development. Ostensibly,
the poorest and smallest LDCs are relying on
their bigger and more advanced brothers to look
out for their interests in the wide-ranging discus-
sions. In reality, at least twice during (T-77
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Country Key Concerns
Algeria ..... .... Access to basic and advanced technology
for development of the hydrocarbons
sector (refineries, petrochemicals, LNG
plants, pipelines).
Argentina ...... Oil exploration and development of nu-
clear energy.
Brazil ........ .... Access to advanced industrial technology,
including nuclear power.
Colombia ......... Access to advanced technology for petro-
leum and coal exploration, production,
and processing.
Egypt ................ Seeks to increase inflows of Western tech-
nology by easing restrictions on private
foreign investment; particularly inter-
ested in communications and desert
reclamation techniques.
India ........... .... Access to technology for energy explora-
tion and development; seeks advanced
technology in computers and arma-
ments.
Indonesia .......... Access to minerals, engineering, and agri-
cultural S&T.
Iran .................. Access to modern armaments; nuclear
power plant equipment; petrochemical
industry technology; direct reduction
steel plants; copper refining technol-
ogy.
Iraq .................. Access to a wide range of technology for
petroleum, nuclear power, computers,
petrochemicals, food processing, and
irrigation.
Ivory Coast .... Access to modern production methods in
light industry and commercial agricul-
ture.
Technology to develop agriculture and
water resources; technical training for
the labor force.
Technological cooperation with other
LDCs.
Assurance of fair payments structure for
patents and copyrights.
Wants to avoid foreign control of technol-
ogy; seeks transfer apart from foreign
investment whenever possible.
Watches technology charges and profit
remittances closely.
Seeks to attract increased direct foreign
investment without sacrificing control
over sectoral development.
As a socialist economy, seeks to avoid new
private foreign investment, relying in-
stead on turnkey projects.
Actively supports G-77 demands on tech-
nology transfer code and brain drain
issues.
Actively supports G-77 proposals; host of
August-September 1978 UN TCDC
conference.
G-77 coordinator on technology transfer
code negotiations; generally seeks to
avoid confrontation with Group B
Active on brain drain and technology
transfer code issues; believes G-77 ne-
gotiators are disposed to make too
many early concessions on property
rights.
Active on brain drain and technology
transfer code issues; focuses on removal
of "obstacles" at the international level
to the application of S&T for
development.
Active in formulation of G-77 positions on
technology transfer code, TCDC, and
brain drain; hosts international S&T
conferences.
Actively supports G-77 prosposals.
Has shown only mild interest in technol-
ogy transfer code negotiations.
Supports G-77 positions on technology
transfer code and brain drain issues.
Strong ties to French private sector re-
strain activism in G-77 forums.
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Jamaica ............ Access to foreign minerals and manufac-
turing technology.
Jordan ............. Access to advanced military and basic
and advanced industrial technology.
Kuwait .............. Access to modern production methods in
light industry, petroleum, and petro-
chemicals.
Libya .............. Access to petroleum technology.
Malaysia Access to advanced technology, particu-
larly in extractive industries and energy.
Mexico .............. Seeks assurance that technology costs are
not inflated (to mask profit remit-
tances) or charged against outmoded
equipment/processes; access to ad-
vanced S&T.
Nigeria ..... Access to technology for development of
petroleum sector, heavy and light in-
dustry, and agriculture.
Pakistan Access to technology for the energy sec-
tor, including nuclear reprocessing.
Peru ............... Access to technology for mining, agricul-
ture, and light industry.
Philippines ...... Access to basic and advanced industrial
technology to upgrade role of manufac-
turing.
Saudi Arabia .... Access to advanced technology for oil
refining and to develop the petro-
chemical industry.
Sri Lanka Access to technology with favorable em-
ployment effects.
Venezuela Access to technology for petroleum sector
and for its expanding nonpetroleum
industrial sector.
Watches technology charges and profit
remittances closely.
Seeks increased foreign private invest-
ment.
Seeks advanced equipment and techni-
cal/managerial services through in-
creased foreign investment.
Wants to minimize foreign influence in
technology transfers.
Actively seeks foreign investment.
Development of indigenous R&D capa-
bility.
Seeks increased foreign investment as a
channel for technology transfer.
Suspicious of large foreign business en-
terprises.
Elimination of restrictive business prac-
tices that hinder technology transfer.
Seeks to control foreign investment in
accordance with government develop-
ment plan.
Technology to develop agriculture and
water resources.
Seeks to stem losses of skilled manpower
through migration
Seeks controlled increase in foreign in-
vestment as a vehicle for technology
transfer.
Sees technology transfer negotiations as
integral part of NIEO; activism based
more or, political than economic con-
cerns; supports G-77 position partly for
logrolling reasons.
Proposes an international compensatory
facility to aid LDCs suffering from the
brain drain.
Supports G-77 stances on technology
transfer code and brain drain issues.
Seeks technology transfer code to protect
national sovereignty.
Embraces G-77 demands but takes re-
strained stances in discussions and
negotiations.
Formulates and spearheads LDC de-
mands on S&T issues.
Support for G-77 proposals tempered by
desire for private investment.
Supports G-77 proposals for a technology
transfer code.
Supports G-77 prosposals on most S&T
issues; advocacy of G-77 stances has
decreased markedly over the last two
years as external payments problems
have mounted.
Actively supports G-77 proposals although
S&T issues generally do not have high
priority.
Shows some support for G-77 technology
transfer code proposals.
Supports G-77 7 positions on technology
transfer code and brain drain issues.
Plays a leading role in promoting G-77
demands; primary drafter of G-77 reso-
lution on obstacles to application of
S&T for development.
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discussions of the issues the poorer African na-
tions accused the Latin Americans of being too
cautious and of using technology transfer forums
to advance their own national interests. There is,
in fact, nothing at this stage comparable to the
"second window" of the Common Fund to pro-
vide a trading point for group unity on particular
proposals.
A review of country positions on technology
transfer indicates no reason to characterize some
key actors as radicals and others as moderates.
In this field more than others, such a split is
particularly inappropriate. Almost all of the
countries that have made concrete proposals and
which sustain discussions over the means and
costs of technology transfer already have exten-
sive contacts with the private sectors of the
developed nations and recognize some of the
institutional limitations on their absorbing tech-
nology. Various extreme formulations that have
flowed out of the G-77 stance are largely sops to
countries unlikely to be able to participate in
technical discussions should these develop any
real momentum. Recognizing this, the more ad-
vanced or open LDCs have not pressed especially
hard to encourage widespread group participa-
tion on S&T issues through G-77 caucuses such
as those that supported the Common Fund and
debt topics.
what they view as contractual matters between
LDC buyers and private supplying firms. The
same attitude influences the views of developed
countries on adopting a technology transfer code.
The LDCs want such a code to help set interna-
tionally binding regulations on profit remit-
tances, royalty payments, and the like. The
major industrial countries, however, feel that
voluntary codes like that on MNCs adopted by
the OECD in 1976 are the way to handle such
matters. Moreover, they note that even the vo-
luntary OECD code proved difficult to achieve
because of differing views on the proper regula-
tory role of government.
Similarly, LDC technology transfer demands
in the aid context are not susceptible to simple
solutions. As the dialogue takes shape, the great-
er emphasis on the interests of high- and middle-
income LDCs seems to imply a departure from
bilateral programs aimed largely at the poorest.
Difficulty in defining security interests also com-
plicates the responses of the advanced countries.
In particular, the United States has been unwill-
ing-for security reasons- to provide certain
sensitive technologies to the LDCs; and, in some
cases, there is disagreement among developed
countries over what is sensitive. LDC access to
nuclear technology is a particularly thorny issue
that has produced an open rift between the
United States and West Germany.
Developed-Country Attitudes
Thus far, although they have shown consider-
able willingness to participate in discussions, the
developed countries have felt little pressure to
accede to the LDCs' initial S&T demands or
timetables. They typically counter LDC empha-
sis on easier technology supply conditions with
arguments pointing out the need for Third World
countries to remove domestic obstacles to their
development and to identify problem areas likely
to be resolved by the application of science and
technology. As this is done, they argue, the
related needs for cooperation on S&T will natu-
rally emerge and will often yield to existing
technology.
On the questions of appropriate technology
transfer and transfer costs, governments of the
developed countries are hesitant to intervene in
LDC Technology Transfer Matrix
The technology transfer matrix is an attempt
to provide a frame of reference for the major
technology issues in the North-South dialogue.
The matrix provides information for each devel-
oping country on its technological environment,
its perception of its technology needs, and its
support for the various G-77 positions in the
North-South technology conferences. The statis-
tics presented in the matrix are approximations
and are intended mainly to facilitate compari-
sons among countries.
The following information is presented as a
guide to interpretation of the matrix.
The Country column lists countries alphabeti-
cally with 1976 per capita income shown in
parentheses below each entry.
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The Ma,wfacturing Sector column provides
measures of the relative importance of industry
in the country's economy by showing the percent-
age of GNP accounted for by manufacturing
activity, and the number of workers employed in
the manufacturing sector (excluding extractive
industries). Data are for 1976 or the most recent
available year.
The Engineering Products Trade column
shows the total dollar value of the country's
international trade in machinery and transport
equipment--Section 7 of the UN's Standard
International Trade Classification scheme
(SITC). The percentage of the country's total
trade accounted for by such products is shown in
parentheses. Except where noted, data in this
column are for the most recent year reported for
the period 1974-76.
The S&T Development columns contain en-
tries based on composite indexes of S&T attri-
butes and a subjective estimate of net loss or gain
in the migration of scientific personnel (the so-
called brain drain). The letters H, M, and L
stand for high, medium, and low rankings as
compared to other LDCs. The term "scope"
denotes the relative complexity of S&T skills
available anywhere in the country, and "depth"
signifies the extent to which S&T aptitudes are
spread among the population.' India, for exam-
ple, stands high in the scope rankings because of
its advanced S&T personnel and facilities, places
low in the depth rankings because of its wide-
spread illiteracy and low per capita income. and
turns up as a net loser under migration of S&T
personnel.
The Key Technology Concerns column lists
the sorts of technology transfer (or related prob-
lems) that most interest the particular I. DC.
Entries reflect concerns that would drive the
country's S&T policy even in the absence of the
North-South dialogue.
The Stances on G-77 Proposals column, the
primary element of the matrix, presents any and
all information we have about each country's
views on LDC technology transfer proposals,
including its stances on such issues as:
? Enactment of an international code of con-
duct on technology transfers.
? Policies to stem the outflow of skilled man-
power through migration (the brain drain or
reverse transfer of technology issue).
? Increased technical cooperation among devel-
oping countries (TCDC).
? Increased official technical assistance.
See appendix B.
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Technology Transfer Matrix
Engineering Key
Country
(per Capita Economic GNP Products Trade Technology
GNP) System Share Labor Force Imports Exports Scope'Depth 'Migration Concerns
Algeria Socialist economy; foreign approx.
($885) investment unwelcome ex- 10%
cept for projects involving
high technology or export
industries; has used service
contracts to secure skills/
processes from multina-
tional corporations.
Angola Socialist ill niodeili sei;toi. 'less than
($500) 10%
Argentina Market economy with 34%
($1,810) large government produc-
tive enterprises in energy
and transportation; seeks
foreign direct investment
to complement national
investment.
Access to basic and
advanced industrial
technology; technol-
ogy to develop agri-
culture and water
resources; technical
training for the la-
bor force.
660 870 17 H M
(38) (less
than 1)
(1973)
IN A
(34) (less
than 1)
2,500 810 399 H H
(20) (14)
Access to both basic
and advanced agri-
cultural and light in-
dustrial technology;
seeks help in: oil
production; iron ore,
copper, and dia-
mond mining; rail-
road transportation;
and commercial
farm production
and processing of
coffee and sugar.
Oil exploration; de-
velopment of nucle-
ar energy.
Stances on G-77
Proposals
Actively supports G-
77 demands on tech-
nology transfer code
and brain drain is-
sues.
inactive in interna-
tional technology
transfer discussions.
Activity on S&T is-
sues contrasts with
relative lack of in-
terest in other G-77
demands; seeks tech-
nology transfer code
and development of
measures to deal
with brain drain
problem; host of
Aug.-Sept. 78 UN
Conference on Tech-
nical Cooperation
among Developing
Countries.
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Bahamas
Market economy; actively
seeks new foreign direct
69
16
investment; tax haven.
(4)
(1)
Bahrain Market economy with
($2,000) large government produc-
tive enterprises in the pe-
troleum sector; seeks for-
eign investment to develop
as a regional service and
commercial center.
Bangladesh Market economy with less than
($85) large government enter- 10%
prises in all major indus-
tries; seeks direct foreign
investment and manage-
ment (service) contracts.
Barbados Market economy; seeks approx.
foreign investment; offers 10%
tax and tariff incentives.
NA 393 89 L H +
(40) (26)
1,560 136
(14)
25 39 6
(18) (6)
Seeks technology cost
arrangements-par-
ticularly in the oil
industry-that do
not strain the bal-
ance of payments.
Also seeks assur-
ances that imported
technology will not
displace the local
work force.
Access to industrial/
petroleum technol-
ogy; emphasizes
training indigenous
personnel to replace
foreign workers.
Seeks foreign sup-
port in oil and gas
exploration, fertilizer
production, and oth-
er advanced sectors.
Prefers labor inten-
sive activities where
possible.
NA Access to modern
production methods
in light industries;
also concerned about
technology transfers
that might jeopar-
dize local employ-
ment opportunities.
Limited interest in
issue, but supports
most X77 formula-
tians.
Inactive in interna-
tional S&T confer-
ences.
Supports C-77 tech-
nology transfer code
proposals; seeks in-
creased financial and
technical assistance
for development proj-
ects.
Limited interest in
issue but supports
most G-77 formula-
tions.
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Table 2
Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Country
(Per Capita Economic
GNP) System
Benin
($190)
Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
GNP Labor Force Imports Exports
Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %)
Socialist in modem sector;
less than
117
43
requires that new foreign
investments be joint with
. 10%
(26)
government as minority
shareholder.
Bolivia Market economy with approx. 200
($430) large-scale government 10%
participation in mining
and petroleum; 'I- fo.
eign direct investment
and-in petroleum-ser-
vice. and operation con-
tracts.
Botswana Market economy; sees for- less than
($285) eign investment as a key 10%
factor in its development
plans; actively seeks pri-
vate capital for develop-
ment of minerals, manu-
facturing, and agriculture.
2
(6)
Key
Technology
Scope' Depth Migration P Concerns
L L - Access to basic agri-
61 NA M
(34)
(1972)
cultural and light in-
dustrial technology,
including coffee, co-
coa, and such simple
consumer industries
as match factories,
tire plants, and proc-
essed foods.
M - Petroleum explora-
tion and tin and oth-
er mineral mining
and processing.
Access to basic agri-
cultural and indus-
trial technology; rail-
road transportation
technology; and min-
ing and processing
technology for cop-
per, nickel, and dia-
monds.
r
Stances on G-77
Proposals
Inactive on most
S&T issues; seeks
greater technical as-
sistance.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain.
More concerned with
relations with South
Africa than with C-
77 positions on glo-
bal technology trans-
fer.
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Brazil Primarily free enterprise, 25%
($1,010) but parastatals are impor-
tant in extractive indus-
tries, manufacturing, ship-
ping, and some foreign
trade; welcomes foreign
investment, particularly to
promote transfer of ad-
vanced technology and to
expand exports.
5,340 4,305 957 H H + Access to advanced
(32) (9) industrial technol-
ogy; assurance of
fair payments struc-
ture for patents and
copyrights.
($120) from self-imposed political
isolation; socialist econo-
my; prohibits private for-
eign investment; permits
off-shore oil exploration by
foreign firms.
Burundi Market economy with ele- iess than 48
($105) ments of socialism in mod- 10%
ern sector; very liberal in-
vestment code; seeks
investment in minerals
and agricultural sectors
having export potential.
Oil production tech-
nology, primarily-
but not exclusively-
offshore; marine and
fresh water fishing
modernization and
fish-product process-
ing.
Basic agriculture and
industry, especially
processing for agri-
cultural products,
such as coffee and
tea.
($385) ages private foreign invest-
ment within the guidelines
of the official develop-
ment plan.
(32) (2) ment plan focuses
on agricultural in-
dustries, light con-
sumer goods indus-
tries, and oil pro-
duction.
Plays a leading role
in UNCTAD efforts
on international code
of conduct for tech-
nology transfers; as
G-77 coordinator on
transfer of technol-
ogy code issues,
seeks to develop
stances amenable to
negotiation with
Group B while keep-
ing confrontation
minded LDCs in
check; status as a G-
77 member that
benefits from the
brain drain a poten-
tial source of embar-
rassment vis-a-vis
other LDCs.
Unknown. Burma
only recently began
to talk to IFIs (ABD,
IMF, IBRD) and re-
mains aloof from
most N/S discus-
sions
Supports G-77 ef-
forts for technology
transfer code; seeks
increased technical
assistance.
Has shown some in-
terest in technology
transfer code nego-
tiations.
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Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Country Key
(Per Capita Economic GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
GNP) System Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %) Scope'Depth 'Migration' Concerns
Central Afri- Market economy; prefers 13% NA
can Empire joint ventures that contri-
($170) bute to economic develop-
ment.
Chad
($75)
Market economy! otters less than
tax and customs exemp- 10%
tions for new investments;
prefers joint ventures.
Chile Market economy with ex- 26%
($810) tensive government par-
ticipation in copper min-
ing, other mineral re-
sources, and energy sector;
actively seeks large-scale
foreign investment.
Colombia Market economy; general- 19%
($660) ly favorable toward for-
eign investment, but An-
dean Pact regulations
apply.
cultural and indus-
trial technology, such
as irrigation, food
processing, and food
production; access
to oil extraction and
refining technology.
26 Negl L L - Critical need for ba-
(38) sic agricultural tech-
nology-most rural
production is for
subsistence only; po-
tential for uranium
mining; simple con-
sumer goods indus-
tries including tires,
food processing, and
textiles.
635 439 8 H H + Access to technology
(23) (Negl) for offshore petrole-
um exploration, food
processing industry,
and exploitation of
mineral and timber
resources.
728 583 32 H M
(39) (2)
- Access to advanced
technology for pe-
troleum and coal ex-
ploration, produc-
tion, and processing.
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Stances on G-77
Proposals
Inactive on global
technology transfer
issues.
Seeks increased offi-
cial technical assist-
ance.
Shows greater inter-
est in S&T issues
than in other G-77
proposals; host of
subregional confer-
ence in preparation
for UNCSTD; drop-
ped out of Andean
Pact in 1976 to
avoid Pact restric-
tion on direct for-
eign investment.
Active on brain
drain and technol-
ogy transfer code is-
sues; believes G-77
negotiators are dis-
posed to make too
many early conces-
sions on property
rights.
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Congo State-controlled socialist approx.
($430) economy except for petro- 10%
leum industry, where gov-
ernment participation is
35%.
59 Negl L M NA
(36)
Access to agricultur-
al technology for
coffee, cocoa, palm
products, tobacco,
and groundnuts. Re-
cent departure of
French leaves criti-
cal technology gap
in most state-owned
industries; cement, pot-
ash, sugar refining,
and copper and zinc
mining.
Costa Rica Market economy; encour- 20%
($1,300) ages a wide range of for-
eign investment, especially
those which use local raw
materials.
Dominican Market economy; incen- 18%
Republic tives provided for import
($735) substitution, assembly op-
erations for reexport, and
tourism.
Ecuador Market economy; natural 17%
($715) resource exploitation and
some basic industries re-
served for public sector in-
vestment.
advanced technol-
ogy; gives conces-
sions to foreign ca-
pital as incentive to
increase technology
inflows.
106 NA L M - Seeks technology
(34) transfer arrange-
ments that do not
strain the balance of
payments; other-
wise, issue has low
priority.
260 273 4 M M NA Access to technology
(40) (Negl) particularly for pe-
troleum exploration
and refining and for
hydroelectric gen-
eration.
Egypt Mixed capitalist-socialist 22% 1,000 1,175 11 H M
($340) economy; since 1973, the (30) (less
government has encour- than 1)
aged and facilitated pri-
vate foreign investment,
especially in export-orient-
ed projects.
Seeks to increase in-
flows of Western
technology by eas-
ing restrictions on
private foreign in-
vestment; particular-
ly interested in com-
munications and de-
sert reclamation
techniques.
Inactive on global
S&T issues.
Generally supports
G-77 positions on
trade and develop-
ment matters. Be-
lieves developed coun-
tries have duty to
give trade and tech-
nological assistance
to the developing
countries. Relatively
inactive on S&T
issues.
Technology transfer
perceived as much
less important issue
than others in N/S
dialogue; will sup-
port broad G-77
formulations.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain issues.
Active on brain
drain and technol-
ogy transfer code is-
sues; helped draft
strong G-77 resolu-
tion on obstacles to
the application of
S&T for develop-
ment.
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Table 2
Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Country Key
(Per Capita Economic GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
GNP) System Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %) Scope 'Depth `Migration E Concerns
El Salvador Market economy; provides 19%
($540) tariff and tax incentives
for foreign investment.
Ethiopia Socialist in modern sector; approx.
($100) nationalized most large 10%
foreign investments in the
mid-1970s.
Fiji Market economy; wel- approx.
($1,000) comes foreign investment; 10%
grants tariff and tax con-
cessions to processing and
manufacturing industries.
Gabon Market economy; actively less than
($3,000) encourages foreign invest- 10%
ment; seeks to diversify
beyond mineral exploita-
tion and timber produc-
tion.
210 158 12 M H
(26) (2)
565 84 10 L L
(28) (4)
Gambia Market economy; wel- less than 5
($200) comes foreign investment 10%
in labor-intensive and ex-
port-oriented industries.
Basic agricultural
and industrial tech-
nology; geothermal
energy.
Access to technology
for agriculture, cof-
fee processing, and
light industry.
54 4 M H NA Access to technology
(20) (2) for expanding and
diversifying agricul-
tural output and ex-
ploiting its major
mineral resourres-
gold and copper.
64 2 L H + Ambitious 1976-80 de-
(41) (1) velopment program
(1973) needs substantial
foreign technology
in all phases of agri-
culture and indus-
try; anxious to ex-
pand local partici-
pation at manageri-
al level, but remains
dependent on French
expertise to keep
modem economy func-
tioning.
7 NA L L NA Basic agricultural
(14) and industrial tech-
nology, particularly
irrigation and light
consumer industries.
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Stances on G-77
Proposals
Supports G-77 tech-
nology transfer code
proposals.
Wants increased of-
ficial technical as-
sistance.
Inactive on global
S&T issues.
Has shown interest in
brain drain issue.
Seeks increased offi-
cial technical as-
sistance.
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Ghana Market economy with approx. 570 198 1 M M
($450) large-scale government 10%
participation in cocoa
marketing; provides incen-
tives for substantial foreign
investments _. petroleum
exploration and produc-
tion, bauxite/alumina, and
deep sea fishing; requires
joint ventures.
Guatemala Market economy; favor- 16% 180 110 8 M M
($685) able attitude toward for- (26) (2)
eign investment; provides (1973)
some tax relief.
Guinea Socialist economy in mod- less than NA
($155) em sector; deals flexibly 10%
with foreign investors;
seeks to expand food pro-
duction, reduce import de-
pendence, and increase ex-
Guyana Market economy with ele- approx.
($525) ments of socialism; govern- 10%
ment policies discourage
foreign investment
28 55 Neg] L H
(22)
Haiti Market economy; provides approx. 312 29 2
($195) tariff and tax incentives 10% (20) (3)
for foreign investment;
seeks increased investment
in agriculture, natural re-
source development, re-
gional diversification, im-
port substitution, and
assembly industries.
Honduras
Market
economy; seeks
15%
75
113
($390)
foreign
speed
investment to
economic develop-
(28)
ment; prefers joint ven-
tures with local majority.
NA L M
Access to technology
in such areas as co-
coa production, pe-
troleum, bauxite, alu-
mina, and light con-
sumer goods.
- Access to technology
for exploitation of
petroleum, copper, and
nickel resources.
NA Particularly anxious
to bring in agricultur-
al technology; mod-
em sector largely
dependent on baux-
ite/alumina indus-
try for which no in-
digenous expertise is
available.
Access to technology
for exploration of
bauxite reserves and
alumina processing.
Agricultural devel-
opment.
Access to technology
for development of
agriculture, forestry,
and electric power
generation and dis-
tribution.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain.
Supports G-77 tech-
nology transfer code
proposals.
Supports G-77 pro-
posals for increased
official technical as-
sistance.
Inactive on interna-
tional S&T issues;
generally supports
C-77 proposals on
other issues.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on brain drain
and increased tech-
nical assistance.
Generally supports
G-77 proposals on
technology transfer
code.
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Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Country
(Per Capita Economic
GNP) System
India Market economy; public
($125) ownership of big new fa-
cilities connected with mo-
derization-steel mills, oil
refineries, armament-
and of railroads, energy
sector, and commerical
banks; highly selective cri-
teria for foreign invest-
ment; seeks projects that
expand exports or result in
technology transfer.
Indonesia Largely free enterprise
($270) economy but includes ma-
jcr government firms in oil
F
or-
d
e.
and domestic tra
Manufacturing Sector
Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
GNP
Labor Force
Imports Exports
Share
(Thousands)
(Million $ and %) Scope ' Depth'Migration
26,520
983
322 H L
(16)
(7)
less than
6,600
2,310
53 H M +
10%
(41)
(less
than 1)
eign investment sought to
supplement domestic ef-
forts; incentives favor
mainly labor-intensive, ex-
port-oriented, and re-
source-processing indus-
tries.
Iran Market economy with approx.
($2,020) large government petrole- 10%
um sector; seeks foreign
investment, particularly in
high technology and ex-
port-oriented enterprises;
requires joint ventures
with local majorities.
Iraq Socialist economy; does approx.
($1,395) not seek new foreign in- 10%
vestment.
2,120 4,990 NA H M +
(43)
156 1,720 Negl H M +
(41)
Key
Technology
Concerns
Energy exploration
and development;
seeks advanced tech-
nology in computers
and armaments, but
with Indian control;
seeks technology trans-
fer apart from foreign
investment whenever
possible.
Easy access to foreign
minerals S&T; seeks
aid in basic agricul-
tural and engineering
S&T; watches technol-
ogy charges and profit
remittances closely.
Nuclear power plant
equipment; petro-
chemical industry
technology; direct
reduction steel plants;
copper refining.
Nuclear power tech-
nology; irrigation;
petrochemicals;
food processing
equipment; comput-
ers.
Stances on G-77
Proposals
Active in formulation
of G-77 positions on
technology transfer
code, TCDC, and
brain drain; helped
draft strong G-77 reso-
lution on obstacles to
the application of S&T
for development; host
for NAM and UNIDO
S&T conferences.
Actively supports LDC
technology transfer
proposals; assigns
them fairly low prior-
ity compared with
Common Fund and
other N/S issues.
Has shown only mild
interest in technol-
ogy transfer code.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain issues.
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Ivory Coast Market economy; actively
($640) seeks direct foreign invest-
ment.
Jamaica Primarily free enterprise
($1,440) economy; some socialist
features; prefers to work
on a joint venture basis
with foreigners; incentives
now provided for labor-
intensive industries that
are export oriented or im-
port substitutive.
16%
130
422
29
(33)
(2)
13%
81
250
3
(22)
(Negl)
Jordan Market economy; provides approx.
($820) tariff and tax incentives 10%
for foreign private invest-
ment.
M F. + Access to modern
production methods
in light industry and
commercial agricul-
ture-coffee, cocoa,
and timber.
M M
94 232 21 M M +
(32) (14)
Kenya Market economy; actively 14% 255 278 3 M M ?
($230) encourages private foreign (30) (1)
investment; provides in-
centives for import-substi-
tuting and export-promot-
ing industries.
Kuwait Market economy with Less than 88 1,090 185 M H +
($12,500) large government presence 10% (46) (2)
in petroleum sector; wel-
comes foreign investment
to diversify petroleum-
based economy; uses for-
eign investment as a chan-
nel for advanced foreign
equipment and technical
and managerial services.
Seeks easy access to
foreign minerals/
manufacturing tech-
nology; watches
technology charges
and profit remit-
tances closely.
Access to basic and
advanced industrial
technology, espe-
cially in the fertiliz-
er industry.
Basic technology in
agriculture and in-
dustry, especially
textiles and auto as-
sembly.
Access to modern
production methods
in light industry and
petroleum and pet-
rochemical technol-
ogy.
Strong ties to
French private sec-
tor restrain activism
in C-77 forums.
Advocates formula-
tion of a code of
conduct for technol-
ogy transfer; activ-
ism on issue based
more on political
than economic con-
cerns.
Actively supports C-
77 brain drain posi-
tions; proposed an
international labor
compensatory facili-
ty to aid LDCs suf-
fering losses of
skilled manpower
through migration.
Supports G-77 brain
drain proposals.
Supports C-77 stances
on technology trans-
fer code and brain
drain issues.
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Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Country
:tee;
(Per Capita Economic GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
GNP) System Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %) Scope' Depth `Migration' Concerns
Lebanon Market economy; no new 15%
($400) foreign investments are
being made because of un-
stable conditions in the
south, but foreign invest-
ment is desired.
Lesotho Market economy; seeks to less than
($180) maximize foreign invest- 10%
merit by offering a wide
range of generous invest-
ment incentives.
Liberia Market economy; provides less than 58
($600) tax and tariff incentives 10%
for foreign investment.
Libya Strong state intervention in less than
($5,600) the economy; generally 10%
discourages direct foreign
investment, except on a
highly selective basis in the
crude oil sector; considers
direct foreign investment a
violation of national sover-
eignty and existing policies
call for disinvestment by
foreigners.
312 128 M M
(25) (26)
(1973)
Stances on G-77
Proposals
Fairly high level of Supports G-77 brain
native business and drain proposals.
technical manageri-
al capability; tradi-
tionally good access
to foreign technical
skills (especially in
Europe); most press-
ing new needs will
depend on shape of
reconstruction pro-
grams after peace.
Access to basic agri- Seeks increased offi-
cultural and process- cial technical assis-
ing technology and tance.
advanced diamond
mining technology;
fears blockage by
South African firms
of developments
that would be com-
petitive in the South
African market.
cultural and indus- in technology trans-
trial technology in- fer code.
cluding food proc-
essing, iron mining,
and rubber produc-
tion.
1,218 NA M M NA Wants foreign know- Supports G-77 pro-
(34) how but desires to be posals for a technol-
free of foreign influ- ogy transfer code.
ence; seeks turnkey
projects.
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Madagascar Market economy with ele- approx.
($260) ments of socialism; mildly 10%
interested in joint ventures
for exploitation of mineral
resources.
Malawi Market economy; desires 15%
($125) foreign investment in la-
bor-intensive industry
with import-substitution
capabilities.
26 58 1 L M NA Access to basic agri- Supports G-77 posi-
(21) (Neel) cultural and indus- tions on technology
trial technology. transfer code and
brain drain issues.
29 54 5 L L NA Access to basic agri- Seeks increased offi-
(29) (4) cultural and indus- cial technical as-
trial technology. sistance.
Malaysia Market economy; increasing 16% 480 1,151 239 31 H
($855) government role in econo- (33) (6)
my is aimed toward acquir-
ing larger share of economic
participation by ethnic Ma-
lays; government actively
promotes foreign invest-
ment through tax and ex-
port incentives
Mali Market economy with ele- less than. 84 29 3 L L
($70) ments of socialism; offers 1045 (16) (4)
tax incentives for foreign
investment in selected in-
dustries; requires 10- to
50- percent government
equity.
Mauritania Market economy with ele- 29%
($215) ments of socialism; nation-
alized iron and copper
properties in the mid-
1970s; does not actively
seek foreign investment.
16 36 6 L M
(42) (5)
1]972)
Mauritius Market economy; we]- 15%
($555) comes foreign investment
in export-oriented and la-
bor-intensive industries.
11 73 10
(22) (3)
Access to advanced
technology, particu-
larly in the extractive
industries and to en-
ergy-related technol-
ogy such as LNG and
oil equipment.
Access to basic agri-
cultural and industri-
al technology, such as
irrigation, food pro-
cessing, beef produc-
tion, and small con-
sumer goods assem-
bly.
Access to basic in-
dustrial and agricul-
tural technology,
such as beef produc-
tion and irrigation;
access to iron ore
mining and process-
ing and transporta-
tion technology.
Embraces LDC de-
mands on technol-
ogy transfer code
and brain drain, but
takes restrained
stances in discus-
sions and negotia-
tions.
Seeks increased offi-
cial technical assis-
tance.
Not active on global
S&T issues.
L M NA Access to basic agri- Not active on global
cultural (sugar) and S&T issues.
industrial technol-
ogy.
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Table 2
Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Country Key
Per Capita Economic GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
GNP) System Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %) Scope 'Depth 'Migration 2 Concerns
Mexico Primarily free enterprise 25%
($1,285) economy, but includes
government firms in oil,
commerce, and manufac-
turing/processing; prohib-
its foreign investment in
many industries; permits
direct foreign investment
for import substitution, ex-
port promotion, and devel-
opment of lagging regions;
prefers majority Mexican
ownership.
Morocco Market economy with 13%
($470) dominant public sector; of-
fers tax and credit incen-
tives for tourism and se-
lected industries.
Mozambique Seeks foreign private in- approx.
($250) vestment, but transition 10%
from market economy to
socialism is restraining in-
vestor interest.
3,000 2,245 285 H H +
(37) (10)
750 732 7 M M
(29) (Negl)
Nepal Market economy; encour- less than 100
($95) ages private foreign invest- 10%
ment in tourism.
Seeks assurance that
technology costs are
not inflated (to mask
profit remittances)
or charged against
outmoded equip-
ment/processes; ac-
cess to advanced
S&T; development
of indigenous R&D
capability; govern-
ment must approve
all foreign technol-
ogy transfers.
Access to mining
and processing tech-
nology for phos-
phates.
79 NA M M - Access to basic agri-
(24) cultural and indus-
(1972) trial technology to
improve domestic-
self-sufficiency; ac-
cess to advanced
technology in oil re-
fining, transport,
and mining; fears
exploitation by pri-
vate industry, par-
ticularly by large
multinational corpo-
rations.
NA NA L L NA Would welcome mul-
tilateral official fi-
nancial and technical
support in developing
hydropower resources.
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Stances on G-77
Proposals
Formulates and spear-
heads LDC demands
on S&T issues; helped
draft strong G-77 re-
solution on obstacles
to the application of
S&T to development.
Exhibits interest in C-
77 technology trans-
fer code proposals.
Not active on global
S&T issues.
Seeks increased offi-
cial technical assist-
ance.
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Nicaragua Market economy; govern- 21%
($820) ment regulations and ad-
ministrative practices en-
courage foreign invest-
ment.
Niger Market economy; provides approx.
($105) incentives for foreign in- 10%
vestment in a wide range
of industries.
Nigeria Market economy with gov- less than
($470) ernment participation in 10%
petroleum, steel, banking
and insurance; welcomes
foreign investment that
transfers technology, uses
local raw materials, and
produces import substi-
tutes; requires joint ven-
tures.
North Yernen Market economy; seeks less than
($270) foreign investment for im- 10%
port substitution and as a
source of training for the
labor force.
Oman
($2,875)
al technology to in- S&T issues.
crease exports.
27 27 5 L L - Access to basic agri- Seeks greater offi-
(28) (5) cultural and industral cial technical assis,
technology, such as tance.
irrigation, food pro-
cessing, and beef pro-
duction; access to
uranium mining tech-
nology.
2,475 2,536 NA M L + Access to technology Support for G-77
(42) for petroleum extrac- proposals on tech-
tion, refining, and nology transfer code
distribution; heavy in- is tempered by de-
dustry (steel, cement); sire for private in-
light industry (auto vestment; seeks in-
assembly, textiles, creased technical
consumer durables); assistance.
and agriculture (palm
products, food-grains,
coffee, cocoa, rub-
ber).
NA 46 Negl L L - Access to basic tech- Supports G-77 brain
(16) nology to develop drain proposals; seeks
infrastructure and increased official tech-
agriculture and to nical assistance.
train the labor force.
Market economy with gov- less than 56
ernment participation in 10%
petroleum; encourages for-
eign investment for im-
port-substitution and em-
ployment impact.
278 NA L M + Access to foreign Shows interest in G-
(41) minerals/petroleum 77 technology trans-
technology. fer code proposals.
Pakistan Market economy with 21% 3,470 513 15 M M
($170) large public sector; suspi- (24) (1)
cious of large business en-
terprises; favors foreign in-
vestment that brings for-
eign exchange earnings.
Oil and gas produc- Supports G-77 pro-
tion technology; posals for technol-
modernization of ogy transfer code.
textile and fishing
industries; larger
and additional pow-
er plants to meet in-
ereasing energy con-
sumption needs, in-
cluding a nuclear re-
processing plant; im-
proved medical tech-
nology.
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Table 2
Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Country Key
(Per Capita Economic GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
GNP) System Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %) Scope' Depth 'Migration' Concerns
Panama Market economy with 15%
($1,175) large public sector; pro-
vides tax incentives for di-
rect foreign investment.
Papua-New Market economy; seeks 15%
Guinea large-scale foreign invest-
1520` ment for development of
its rich natural resources.
Paraguay Market economy with 16%
($625) large public sector; pro-
vides tax and tariff incen-
tives for foreign invest-
ments that process local
raw materials and promote
exports.
Peru Market economy with ele- 26%
($775) ments of socialism; exten-
sive government bureauc-
racy discourages foreign
investment.
Philippines Market economy with 21%
($385) large public sector in oil
trade and development
projects; seeks foreign in-
vestment in accordance
with government develop-
ment plan.
30 155 NA M H NA Access to technology
(20) for hydroelectric pow-
er and copper explo-
ration.
151 87 13 M M NA Access to mining
(27) (2) technology for de-
veloping copper,
gold, and chromite
resources; light in-
dustry technology
for fish canning and
fklivslky.
150 27 NA L M - Access to basic tech-
(38) nology for agricul-
(1969) tural development
and to advanced
technology for hy-
droelectric projects.
800 522 11 M H
(34) (less
than 1)
1,320 1,198 10 H M
(32) (Negl)
Access to mining
and processing tech-
nology for copper,
zinc, and lead; ac-
cess to basic agricul-
tural and light in-
dustrial technology;
elimination of re-
strictive business
practices that hin-
der technology
transfer.
Access to basic and
advanced industrial
technology; is at-
tempting to upgrade
role of manufactur-
ing industry.
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Stances on G-7
Proposals
Supports G-77 pro-
posals for technol-
ogy transfer code.
Not active on global
S&T issues.
Not active on global
S&T issues.
Supports G-77 pro-
posals on most S&T
issues; advocacy of
G-77 stances has de-
creased markedly
over the last two
years as external
payments problems
have mounted.
Actively supports C-
77 technology trans-
fer code and brain
drain proposals, but
generally does not
give high priority to
S&T issues.
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Qatar Market economy with less than NA
($12,660) large government petrole- 10%
um sector; seeks foreign
investment in the form of
equipment and know-how;
requires joint ventures
with majority local partici-
pation.
Rwanda Market economy with ele- less than 19
($140) ments of socialism; seeks 10%
foreign private investment
for export growth, import-
substitution, and employ-
ment effects.
Saudi Arabia Market economy with less than 210
($7,585) large government petrole- 10%
um sector; seeks foreign
direct investment for in-
dustrialization; requires
joint ventures; provides a
variety of incentives to at-
tract investments incorpo-
rating advanced technol-
ogy.
Senegal Market economy with ele- 13% 80
($385) ments of socialism; seeks
foreign investment for de-
velopment; provides gen-
erous incentives.
210 9 L H + Access to petroleum Not active on global
(51) (17) and petrochemical S&T issues.
technology.
cultural and indus-
trial technology.
1,050 Negi M M + Access to advanced
(37) technology for oil
refining and the pet-
rochemical industry;
basic technology for
development of agri-
culture and water
resources.
184 51 S1 M
(19) (8)
Sierra Leone Market economy; seeks to less than 126 46 NA L M
($215) expand through foreign in- 10% (21)
vestment, particularly in
mining projects.
($2,520) large public sector; offers (26) (25)
incentives for all foreign
investment, particularly
high technology industries
that incregw nro luctivity
Access to basic agri-
cultural and industrial
technology, such as ir-
rigation and food pro-
cessing; access to some
advanced technology,
such as oil refining
and commercial sugar
production.
Access to basic agri-
cultural and indus-
trial technology, es-
pecially iron and
diamond mining.
Government is shift-
ing emphasis to
higher technology
industries; desires
ready access to a
broad range of ad-
vanced technology.
Not active on global
S&T issues.
Shows some support
for G-77 technology
transfer code
proposals.
Supports G-77 tech-
nology transfer code
proposals.
Supports G-77 tech-
nology transfer code
proposals.
Supports LDC pro-
posals, but main-
tains very low
profile role in inter-
national forums.
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Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Country
(Per Capita Economic
GNP) System
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Key
GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
Share (Thousands) (Million $ and %) Scope' Depth 'Migration : Concerns
Somalia Market economy with ele- less than 55 31
($95) ments of socialism; lack of 10% (22)
clear guidelines has dis-
couraged foreign invest-
ment.
South Korea Market economy; gives 24% 1,365 2,386 1,276 H H
($700) priority to foreign invest- (27) tic)
ments in heavy industry,
chemicals, and electronics;
prefers direct investment
to technology licensing ar-
rangements.
South Yemen Principal services and in- less than 52 13 1
($295) dustry nationalized; pri- 10% (6) (1)
vate enterprises limited (1969)
mainly to trade and handi-
crafts.
Sri Lanka Market economy with 13% 590 64 NA M M
($205) large public sector; offers (9)
wide range of incentives to
attract private foreign in-
vestment for export devel-
opment.
Access to technology
for achievement of
self-sufficiency in
food supplies (espe-
cially cereals and
sugar), development
of food processing
industry, transport,
communications, and
export diversification.
Easy access to ad.
.anted foreign tech-
nology and expansion
of the domestic R&D
base; key sectors for
foreign technology
are machinery, ship-
building, electronics,
electric power, met-
als, chemicals, and
textiles; desires to up-
grade technology in
industry, especially
for export.
Basic technology
needed to build in-
frastructure and to
develop import-sub-
stituting light indus-
tries.
Primarily interested
in employment op-
portunities; empha-
sizes official foreign
assistance for irriga-
tion projects and
private investment
in export trade zone.
Stances on G-77
Proposals
Generally supports G-
77 technology trans-
fer code proposals.
Generally maintains
low=key approach
and goes along with
G-77 positions; stance
based more on politi-
cal than economic
concerns.
Generally supports C-
77 position on tech-
nology transfer code;
seeks increased offi-
cial technical assist-
ance.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain issues.
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Sudan Market economy with ele- less than 306 307 4 L L
($235) ments of socialism; pro- 10% (32) (less
vides tax incentives for than 1)
foreign investments pro-
moting development.
Surinam Market economy; offers NA
($1,250) generous tax and tariff
concessions to foreign in-
vestors in labor-intensive
and export-oriented oper-
ations; prefers joint ven-
tures, particularly in ex-
tractive industries.
Swaziland Market economy; courts 13%
($400) foreign private investment
for development of export
industries.
Syria Market economy with ele- 19%
($750) ments of socialism; permits
wholly owned foreign in-
vestment in free zones and
joint ventures in state-con-
trolled industries.
Tanzania Socialist economy in the approx.
($145) modem sector; fears for- 10%
eign domination of the
economy; recent events,
however, indicate some
loosening of restrictions on
investment.
Access to technology Seeks increased of-
for agricultural ex- ficial technical as-
pansion, mineral re- sistance.
serve exploitation
(iron ore, chromite),
and industrial devel-
opment.
NA 36 NA L H NA Favors technology Assumes a low pro-
(25) improvement main- file on G-77 issues.
(1972) ly in extractive i,nn-
dustries with em-
phasis on methods
transferable to other
domestic industry.
240 481 10 M H
(29; (1)
224 236 NA L L
(33)
cultural and food S&T issues.
processing technol-
ogy to enhance do-
mestic self-sufficien-
cy; and advanced
consumer goods tech-
nology for penetrat-
ing South African
markets (TV assem-
bly, farm tractor pro-
duction).
Access to technology Supports G-77 posi-
for nuclear power tions on technology
development, oil ex- transfer code.
ploration and pro-
duction, and agricul-
tural development.
Access to basic in- Supports G-77 posi-
dustrial and agricul- tion on technology
tural technology transfer code; seeks
with increasing em- increased official
phasis on heavy in- technical assistance.
dustry.
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Technology Transfer Matrix (Continued)
Manufacturing Sector Engineering S&T Development
Products Trade
Countrti
Key
(Per Capita Economic GNP Labor Force Imports Exports Technology
GNP) System Share (Thousands) Million $ and %; Scope 'Depth 'Migration, Concerns
Thailand Market economy; offers 18%
($370) incentives for foreign in-
vestment; uncertain politi-
cal situation discourages
foreign investment.
Togo Market economy with eie- 13%
($215) ments of socialism; offers
incentives for foreign in-
vestment contributing to
economic development.
Trinidad and Market economy; provides 23%
Tobago incentives for foreign in-
($2,365) vestment; seeks joint ven-
tures.
Tunisia Market economy with ele- approx.
($765) ments of socialism; active- 10%
ly seeks foreign investment
in labor-intensive indus-
tries and in industries pro-
cessing raw materials for
export.
1,170 1,140 36
(35) (2)
Access to technology
to expand agricul.
tural and industrial
production, espe-
cially for export; ac-
cess to S&T for hy-
dro-electric and nu-
clear power devel-
opment and explora-
tion of offshore pe-
troleum reserves.
48 1 L M NA Access to basic tech-
(28) (less nology for agricul-
than 1) ture and industry,
including phosphate
mining and cement
production.
245 13 M H - Access to technology
(16) (less for offshore petrole-
than 1) um exploration, re-
fining, and develop-
ment of industries
based on natural
gas.
266 526 10 M H
(34) (1)
($220) public administration and 10%
neglect of the economy
have seriously impeded
both domestic and foreign
investment.
Access to mining
S&T (phosphates,
iron ore), and to
technology for de-
velopment of petro-
leum and agricul-
ture.
Stances on G-77
Proposals
Takes low-key po-
sition on C-77 S&T
proposals; not active
in N/S discussions;
generally supports
G-77 positions on
technology transfer
code and brain drain
Not active on global.
S&T issues.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain issues.
Supports G-77 posi-
tion on technology
transfer code.
Access to basic agri- Seeks increased offi-
cultural and light in- cial technical assist-
dustrial technology. ance.
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United Arab Market economy with less than 40 495
Emirates large public sector; wel- 10% (29)
($9,570) comes foreign investment
for its technology and ex-
pertise; has yet to formu-
late a coherent or consis-
tent policy toward foreign
investment.
Upper Volta Market economy; liberal
($100) investment code provides
incentives for foreign in-
vestment in mineral ex-
ploitation and primary
product processing.
Uruguay Market economy with ele- 23% 345
($1,105) ments of socialism; wel-
comes foreign investment
in export industries based
on domestic raw materials.
15% 150 41
(27)
NA L M + Access to advanced
petroleum S&T and
to technology to aid
in development of
social and economic
infrastructure.
Access to basic agri-
cultural and indus-
trial technology (ir-
rigation, food proc-
essing and tire re-
treading); access to
mining, construc-
tion, and transport
technology for the
Tambao manganese
project.
33 3 M H ? Access to advanced
(18) (approx. industrial technol-
ogy; assurance of a
(1972) fair payments struc-
ture.
Venezuela Market economy with gov- 19% 629 2,793
($2,500) ernment control of basic (48)
natural resources; most
foreign investment limited
to minority equity posi-
tion; seeks foreign invest-
ment as a vehicle for tech-
nology transfer; favors
investments in agriculture,
petrochemicals, and heavy
industry.
Zaire Market economy with less than 711 300
($125) state control of large firms; 10% (32)
generally welcomes for-
eign investment.
Zambia Market economy with ele- 13% 130 329
($400) ments of socialism; seeks (35)
foreign investment for de-
velopment of agriculture
and import substitution;
r=eUuire; juicit ~ eniures.
25 M H + Access to technology
Negl for petroleum sector
(offshore explora-
tion, extraction and
refining of very
heavy oils) and for
its expanding nonpe-
troleum industrial
sector (steel, alumi-
num, hydroelectric
generation).
6 M L
(less
than 1)
Access to basic tech-
nology for agricul-
ture, mining, and in-
dustry; especially
concerned with cop-
per and other miner-
als/metals technol-
ogy.
Not active on global
S&T issues.
Seeks increased offi-
cial technical assist-
ance.
Supports interna-
tional code of con-
duct for technology
transfers; issue has
low priority.
Plays a leading role
in promoting G-77
demands on technol-
ogy transfer; primary
drafter of G-77 reso-
lution on obstacles to
application of S&T
for development.
Supports G-77 posi-
tions on technology
transfer code and
brain drain issues.
NA L M NA Access to technology Not active on global
for import substitu- S&T issues.
tion (tires, shoes,
textiles), develop-
ment of the copper
industry, and expan-
sion of agriculture.
..nyauaa?aavaa.
P Symbols in this column are: +, for net gainer of educated pen le; - for net loser- ? f f It available.
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SECTION OF THE
MANILA DECLARATION
Section Five
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
1. Action to strengthen the technological capacity of developing countries
1. Decisions should be reached at UNCTM.) 1'J for strengthening the
technological capacity of developing countries and thereby reducing their
technological dependence. Developing countries should consider measures for
formulating national policies, regulations anc laws and establishing
appropriate institutional structures at the country level, and expl^re the
main lines of co-operation among; themselves. These measures should be
complemented by a full range of technical assistance activities necessary
for interlinking the measures at the national, sub-regional, regional and
international levels through the formulation of appropriate international
policies. Such assistance requires effective co-operation from the
developed countries, as well as co-ordinated action by international
organizations. In considering these measures, account should be taken
inter alia, of resolution 2 (T) of the Committee on Transfer of Technology
and General :assembly resolution 3507 (XXX).
A. Action by the developing countries
2. The developing countries should give consideration, at the national
level,, to:
(a) Formulation of a technology plan, as an integral part of their
national development plans, as well as the co-ordination of
policies in a number of interrelated areas, including licensing
arrangements, transfer, development and adaptation of technology,
industrial property laws and practices, foreign investments,
research and development;
CONFIDENTIAL 29
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(b) Establishment of Popropriate institutional machinery, including
national centres f,-)r the development and transfer of technology
with urgent attention being paid to defining the r'-)le and functions
of such centres, including the principal linkages which need to
be established with other national bodies or inst_!.tutions;
(c) Elaboration of all necessary measures to ensure optimum
utilization of their qualified manpower resources.
B. Co-operation among developing countries
3. To supplement the national effort, the developing countries should give
consideration at thu sub-regional, regional and inter-regional levels to:
(a) Elaboration of preferential arrangements for-.the development and
transfer of technology among themselves; these preferential
arrangements for co-operation should, inter alia, be consistent
with arrangements involving sub-regional and regional co-operation
and integration;
(b) Establishment of sub-regional and regional centres for the
development and transfer of technology which could serve as
essential links with national centres in developing countries,
and also to implement initiatives such as,:
(i) Exchange of information on technological alternatives
available to developing countries as a means of improving
their negotiating power;
(ii) Institutional arrangements in respect of common technological
research arid training, programmes;
(iii) Assisting national-centres effectively to fulfil their role,
inter alia, in imple;nenting a code of conduct for the
transfer of tcchnolocry and preparing model contracts for
licensing agreements on patents;
(c) Establishment of sub-regional, re