US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 386
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 19, 1974
• Content Type: MIN

DOE, DOS & OSD
REVIEWS
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SCC
Session III
A-259
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, June 18-19, 1974
' Soviet Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald
Lt. Col- DeSimone (?oart-time)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)
(part-time)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Capt. Kuznetsov (cart-time)
Capt. Korobchenko (part-time)
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
At 2230 hours on June 18, 1974, Mr. Graybeal received a
telephone call from Mr. Karpov, who stated that the Soviet
Component had just received word from Moscow and would like to
meet with Mr. Graybeal at his convenience. Mr. Graybeal pro-
posed that the meeting be held at the Soviet Mission at 2300
' hours on June 18.
Meeting, June 18, 1974
(2300 to 2345 hours)
Present at the meeting on the US side were: Mr. Graybeal,
Brig. Gen. Georgi, and Col. FitzGerald. The Soviet Component
was represented by Brig. Gen. Ustinov, Mr. Karpov, Mr. Yereskovsky?
and Mr. Marchuk.
Commissioner Ustinov welcomed Graybeal to the Soviet Mission
and said that he 11,9d just received information from Moscow con-
cerning Paragraph 111.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive
Arms, which paragraph he and Graybeal had previously discussed
and which Graybeal had touched upon on June 17.
Ustinov said that he was instructed by Moscow to inform
Graybeal of the Soviet Government's proposed formulation for
Paragraph 111.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.
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He then read and handed to Mr. Graybeal a Working Document of the
Soviet Component containing that formulation (Attachment No. l).
Commissioner Graybeal said that in principle the Soviet-
proposed wording was acceptable to the US Component. He proposed
that the phrase "or destruction" be inserted between the words
"dismantling" and "of replaced submarines" in the first sentence.
He also clarified that the word "plants", which had appeared
in the context of SCC-III negotiations for the firz,t time, was
synonymous with the US-proposed wording--"major shipyards."
General Ustinov agreed that it would be possible to insert
the phrase or destruction" in the document on which the Commis-
sioners were working. He also agreed that the Soviet words for
!!plants" and "shipyards" were synonymous with each other and
equivalent to the US phrase "major shipyards."
Mr. Graybeal then stated that he could agree to the wording
proposed by the Soviet side as amended by him.
General Ustinov said that inasmuch as the US side had agreed
to the above wording for Paragraph 111.2, he had instructions to
inform Graybeal of a second matter. Ustinov had been instructed
by the Soviet Government to initial, here in Geneva, the Protocols
and Procedures'for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems
,and Their Components, so that these documents could be signed in
Moscow during the forthcoming Summit Meeting.
Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov and confirmed his agreement to
Paragraph 111.2 with the minor modifications which Graybeal had
proposed. He added that this agreement to Paragraph 111.2 was
reached with the understanding for the record that the Atlantic
Coast area of the United States included the Gulf Coast area, and
that this is understood by both the Commissioners. He concluded
that he was prepared to initial the four documents as soon as
the typing was completed of the as yet non-conformed portion of
the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures.
General Ustinov proposed that the sides complete the neces-
sary typing at their respective Missions and that the US Component
return to the Soviet Mission at 0130 hours on June 19 to initial
the four documents.
Mr. Graybeal agreed.
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Mr. Karpov stated that, in looking at the sample final
pages for the Protocols which the US Component had furnished
to Mr. Yereskovsky on June 17, he had noticed that the US-
proposed format did not contain a signature block for the
respective Commissioners. He asked whether the US Component
had received instructions from Washington to delete these
signature blocks'.
Mr. Graybeal answered in the negative. He said that the
US side had followed the procedure set by Ambassador Smith and
Minister Semenov when they initialed the text of the "Measures
Agreement" in Helsinki in 1971.
Mr. Karpov stated that, since neither Component apparently
had received instructions from its Government to delete the
signature blocks on the two Protocols, the Soviet Component
wanted to propose that the signature blocks be shown on the
texts which were to be initialed.
Mr. Graybeal agreed, but emphasized that in so doing the
Commissioners would not be prejudging who would actually sign
the documents in Moscow.
General Ustinov agreed, and adjourned the meeting.
Meeting, June 19, 1974
(01)45 to 0315 hours)
At 0145 hours, FitzGerald, accompanied by DeSimone and
Arensburger, met at the Soviet Mission with Yereskovsky,
Kuznetsov, Marchuk, and Korobchenko. They conformed the
English and Russian language versions of the new page 4 of the
Protocols, as well as Paragraphs 111.2, 3, 4, and 5 and Section
IV of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms. At 0215
hours they were joined by the other US and Soviet participants
for the final meeting of the SCC.
Commissioner Ustinov declared the final meeting of SCC-III
open, commenting that it was taking place at a most unusual time
He suggested that he and Graybeal, according to the agreement
between them, proceed with initialing the documents which had
been prepared.
Commissioner Graybeal said he agreed completely with
UstinovFs suggestion.
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Graybea) and Ustinov then initialed the Protocols and
Procedures for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and
their components, and exchanged the appropriate original copies
in English and Russian (Attachments Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5).
Mr. Graybeal then made a prepared statement (Attach-
ment No. 6).
General Ustinov then delivered his prepared statement
(Attachment No. 7).
Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov, and said he shared the views
Ustinov had expressed concerning the work accomplished by the
Deputy Commissioners, Executive Secretaries, interpreters, and
all the members of both Components of the SCC. He added that it
was interesting to note that the success of our work was so
similarly reflected in the statements he and Ustinov had made,
and said he thought this reflected, in turn, the degree of success
we had achieved through direct and frank exchanges at all levels
with an understanding of the views of the other side, an attr:1-
bute which he thought would serve us well in future SCC sessions.
With respect to press releases, he said that he had a copy
of the press release the US side intended to make tomorrow, which
had already been discussed between our Executive Secretaries and
, Deputy Commissioners (Attachment No. 8). It contained no men-
tion of the Procedures or of our work at SCC-III, but simply
noted the closing of this SCC session along with the comment we
normally included concerning the scope and purpose of the SCC.
Graybeal concluded by noting that we intended to tell our press
representative, and he thought the Soviet side would agree, that
we had had a one-hour meeting on June 18 and a two-hour meeting
on June 19, without any reference to the time of day that these
had taken place. In this way we intended to avoid any specula-
tion concerning the nature of these meetings based on the unusual
hours at which they had taken place.
General Ustinov said that the Soviet side's press release
would conform with the description Graybeal had just provided of
the press release the US side intended to make, and also contain
a comment concerning our agreement on the opening date of the
next SCC session.
Mr. Graybeal said he agreed.
General Ustinov asked whether the US side had anything to
add at this closing meeting.
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Mr. Graybeal said he thought not, but he did want to express
his great appreciation to the Soviet side for the timely calling
of our meetings tonight.
General Ustinov said that in that case he personally, along
with Mr. Karpov and all the members of the Soviet Component,
wanted to wish GrAybeal bon voyage and a happy landing in Wash-
ington. He then said thT?With Graybeal's consent, he would like
to declare this final meeting of SCC-III closed, and invite the US
Component to mark the occasion with a glass of champagne.
Attachments:
1. Soviet Working
Procedures
2. Procedures for
English Text
3. Procedures for
Russian Text
4. Procedures for ABM
5. Procedures for ABM
6. Graybel Statement
7. Ustinov Statement
8. Press Release of US
Document on Para. 111.2, Offensive
Strategic Offensive
Strategic Offensive
Arms, US Version,
Arms, US Version,
Systems, US Version, English Text
Systems, US Version, Russian Text
Component of the SCC for June 19, 1974
Drafted by: PDeSimone:bd
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Attachment No. 1
Official Translation
Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
June 18, 1974
Dismantling of replaced submarines shall be
accomplished only at plants (shipyards) which
carry out construction and repair of submarines,
and which are situated on the Northern and
Pacific coasts of the USSR and on the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts of the continental part of the USA.
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Attachment No. 2
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL .
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation
of the Interim Agreement between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
?Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto,
and the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the
Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing
Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing
replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification
thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by that
Interim Agreement, as formulated in the Attachment hereto
which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to ?
systems to be ''replaced and dismantled or destroyed
pursuant to the provisions of the Interim Agreement;*
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines
and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers
shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the
Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable
Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM
launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-
missile submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that
they would be put in a condition that precludes the
possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs,
respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units
dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time
of those units would not be substantially less than the
time required for new construction; and shall preclude
unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;
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4. Dismailtling or destruction procedures shall be
formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based
ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines
and SLBM launchers;
5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction
procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can
be accomplished by national technical means in accordance
with Article V of the Interim Agreement;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance
with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at
land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at
the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement
and the Protocol thereto;
7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type
of launchers on which dismantling-or destruction has
been completed and is in process, and of the number of
launchers used for replacement; and
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8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile
submarines which are under construction simultaneously
shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal ?
construction schedule. A normal, construction schedule
is understood to be one consistent with the past or
present construction practices of each Party.
This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall
enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and
remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement,
and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission
as it deems appropriate.
Done at Moscow on 1974, in two copies,
each in the English and Russian languages, both texts
being equally authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
100
Geneva
June 19, 1974
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ATTACHMENT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
? FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
I. General
1. Within the limits of the levels established for
each Party, ,launchers for land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles ,cICBMs) of older types, deployed prior
to 1964, launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-
powered submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic
missiles on diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers
for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.
2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are:
for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-
powered submarines; for the Soviet Union, missiles of the
type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made
operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since
1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of type.
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3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on
diesel subiaarines may not be used for the replacement
purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms.
4.- Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers
shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning
of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of
any of the actions in Section II below shall, constitute
initiation pf dismantling or destruction of an ICBM
launcher. Initiation of any of the actions in Section III
below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or
destruction of a ballistic-missile submarine or SLBM
launcher.
5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which
such a submarine first, operates under its own power away
from the harbor or port in which the construction or
fitting out of the submarine was performed.
6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of
ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on
submarines, being replaced, shall be given by the Parties
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twice annually at the beginning of regular sessions of
the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting the.
actual status as of he beginning of that session of
the Commission and covering the period since the last
report in the Commission. The notification shall contain:
(a) the number and type of ICBM launchers
(soft or silo ICBM launcher), deployed prior to
1964, and the number of launchers for ballistic
missiles on submarines, on which dismantling or
destruction ha S been completed and is in process;
(b) the number of launchers for ballistic
missiles on replacement submarines which have
begun sea trials; and
(c) the number of ICBM launchers and launchers
for ballistic missiles on submarines, out of the
number dismantled or destroyed, which have been
replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on
modern nuclear-powered submarines.
7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other
information to the notifications if it considers such
information necessary to assure confidence in compliance
with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.
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II. Procedures Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land,
Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers
1. In all cases the following actions shall be
accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a) removal from the launch site of the supply
of missiles and their components, warheads, and
mobile equipment; and
(b) dismantling of fixed Launch equipment,
erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-
handling equipment, associated with the launcher
and located at the launch site, and removal of all
dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch
equipment is understood to be systems, components,
and instruments required to launch a missile.
2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition
to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following
actions shall be performed:
(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the
launch stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and
missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made
unusable by dismantling or destruction;
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(b) ,fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled
and removed from the launch site; and
(c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads
and of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and
thd fuel storage tank foundations may be removed,
and, after six months, the places where they were
located may be covered with earth.
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to
the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following
-actions shall be performed:
(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas
ducting, launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be
dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components
shall be removed from the launch site; and
(b) after the actions provided for in sub-
paragraph (a) above have been accomplished, the
silos shall remain open for a period of six months,
after which they may be filled with earth.
4. : After dismantling or destruction has been
accomplished in accordance with the above procedures,
facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not be
Au)
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used for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs but may,
at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim'
Agreement and the Protocol thereto.
5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM
launchei:s shall be completed no later than four months
after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.
III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of
Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers
Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines and
SLBM Launchers
1. The following procedures, to be performed in
the open, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable
for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile
submarines and SLBM launchers:
(a) scrapping the submarine and its launchers.
Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;
(b) removing the submarine's missile section;
(c)
dismantling of ballistic-missile launchers
on older nuclear-powered submarines on which the
upper parts of missile launch tubes protrude into
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the fairwater may also be accomplished by removing
the missile launch tubes together with the fairwater
and those parts of the outer hull and pressure hull
above the missile section which contain all of the
penetrations for the missile launch tubes.
The pressure hull and outer hull may be
restored by welding into place new sections without
missile launch tube penetrations or missile hatches.
The sail and deck may be modified in such a way
that the submarine remains seaworthy.
2. Dismantling or destruction of replaced
submarines shall be accomplished only at plants
(shipyards) which carry out construction and repairs
of submarines, and which are situated on the Northern
and Pacific coasts of the USSR and on the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts of the continental part of the USA.
3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube
hatches shall be left open throughout the entire
period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-
launching equipment shall be removed.
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4'. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed
no later than Six months after the replacement
submarine begins sea trials.
IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile
Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair
In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is
lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine
may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine
in accordance with the following:
(a) notification of the loss or disablement
shall be made to the other Party in the Standing
Consultative Commission;
(b) the number of launchers on the replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the
total number of launchers to exceed that authorized
in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;
and
(c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine
shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with
Section III of these Procedures.
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Attachment No. 3
Procedures for
Strategic Offensive Arms
Initialed Text
June 19, 1974
CexpeT110
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-mIomirucp 0 yollou xmxVoaVou uuY GCIOL 0 ?umxeaodmeep oiloximocex,.
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0 HOVOW xHxVoaVou ovNeI 0'umxocAT000 14H H UOXHIMOOHIO H
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Approved For Relaase 2004/01/21 : CIA-RbP80T00435A/100406016001-2
3.
8. HOJIMUCTBO HOABOAHRX ZOAOR C 6=114CTMIIOCKUMM paxeTamm,
oAHoBpememio HaX0A1HAMXCH B nocTpaixe M npeAHaaHaueHHialx B
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Approved For Rase 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A1100400010001-2
C ejcpeTrio
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Approved For Rase 2004/01/21 CIA-RDP80T004354(100400010001-2
2.
yHINTOECHM51 NyOKOBOg'yCMHOBHM MEP FIBMICTCH Halla)10 BUDOENCHMH
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,14A CexpeTlio
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Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435,4000400010001-2
SECRET
Attachment No. 4
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of
the Treaty between the United States of America and the
'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the
Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto
have within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for
ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty,
as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes
an integral part of this Protocol,
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
SECRET
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SECRET
-2-
1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to
systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled
or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty;
2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components
shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and
applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction
of ABM systems or their components in excess of the
numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty
shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and
applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM
systems or their components, related to implementation
of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement
of those systems or their components and Article VIII of
the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their
components and facilities associated with those components,
except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a
condition that precludes the possibility of their use for
ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units
dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of
those units would not be substantially less than the time
required for new constluction; and shall preclude
unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;
SECRET
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SECRET
-3-
4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction
procedures shall be formulated separately for above-
ground and silo ABM launchers and ,for ABM radars;
5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction
procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can
be accomplished by national technical means in accordance
with Article XII of the Treaty;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance
with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at
ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of
the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed
Statements; and
7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type
(above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number
of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been
completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM
launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.
SECRET
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SECRET
-4-
This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall
enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and
remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and
may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission
as it deems appropriate.
Done at Moscow on 1974, in two copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being
equally authentic.
Commissioner, . Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
SECRET
Geneva
June 19, 1974
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SECRET
ATTACHMENT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ran=
1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment
shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of
, the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforce-
ments shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris
may be removed and after six months the location covered
with earth.
2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by
dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures
and headworks, and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher
debris may be removed and after six months the silos may
be filled with earth.
3. The dismantling or destruction actions described
in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than
three months after their initiation.
?-11 SECRET
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4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed
ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the
Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems,
and applicable Agreed Statements,
5. Notification of the completion of the activities
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the
Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting
the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session
of the Commission.
II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom
1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall
be cut off.
2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had
commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state
for six months, after which they may be covered with earth.
3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which
only foundations had been completed shall be covered with
earth.
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4. Earth grading f the entire area shall be
accomplished and construction materials removed.
5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be
initiated no later than six months after agreement on
these Procedures.
6. Notification that the above activities have
been completed shall be given in the Standing
Consultative Commission.
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Procedures for
ABM Systems
Initialed Text
June 19, 1974
CORpOTHO
BOCTORHHAR KOHCYLETATEEHAH HONOUR
EPOTOKOI
EPOITAY111, PETYJIMPYMME SAMEHY, ZEMOHTa 14J1 14 YEPTITMEHME
14 YBEADLEHME 0 Ha: ,i1AH CIICTEM EPO M MX KOMHOHEHTCB
B COOTBOTCTBMM C HOZOEOHMHMK M B ocyucuzeHme AoroBopa
movAy COO AMHOHTIMM 111TaTaMM AMC-THEM M 00103OM COBOTCHla Cogmaam-
CTMTIOCHMX PecHy(5Jim1t o6 orpaHmucHmm OPICTOM HpomopaKeTHoa obopc-
HM OT 26 mu 1972 roAa m CorzacoBaHHHx 3aHBAOHO14 B 0B11314 0 3TH1
AoroBopom ynacTBymulme B HOM CTOpOHM, B pamitax ROCTOHHHa HOF-
cpbTaTmiffloM Rommcomm, corylacHAmcip o HpoHeAypax, peryampymmx
3ameHy, AemoHTa yHmlnoaeHme M yBegowleHme 0 HMX, AAH cmcTem
EPO H MX HOMHOHOHTOB, orpaHmqemimx aTmm AoroBoiDom, HaH OHM ccbop?
myampoBaHm B EpmJimiceumm H HacToHNemy EpoToltozy, HoTopoe HBAHOTCH
HeoTlemzemoa KaCTLM 3T0110 EpoToxoza.
CTOpOHM corzacmmin Mae 0 caeAylouva oalmx pymBoAHNIlx
nozoYeHmgx:
I. Epmaraemme EpouAypm HpMMOHHDTCH TOABHO B OTHOMOHMM
OliCTOM HAM MX HOMHOHOHTOB, 3ameHHemmx m Aemomimpyembix 143114 yHmu-
Tomemmx B COOTBOTOTBKM C HOROAOHMHM% ToroBopa;
2. XiodaH 3ameha CMCTOM npo MAM MX HOMHOHOHTOB ocyulecTBaHeT-
CH Ha OCHOBaHMX CTaTIDM YE AoroBopa, a Taime cooTBeTcTumgmx
ComacoBaHmmx 3aHBAOHMg; AemoHTays HAM yHMIITONCOHNO cmcTem RPO mam
KX nomnolleHToB cBepx HOAMI1OCTB mxm BHC paaoHoB, onpeAezcHHmx Ao7
roBopoml. OCrAOCTBAHOTCH Ha OCHOBaHMJA CTaTLH YIE AoroBopa M COOT?,
BOTCTBylONMX COPHaCOBLIHHHX saHaTieHma;
3. HpouAypm AcmoHTaYa MAR yHMT1T0XC0HMH CHOTOM HP) HAM MX HOM?
HOHOHTOBI CBH3aHHHO C ocylAccmucHAem HOAOYSOHMM CTaTBM YE B OT-
1401110111414 3aMOHIA 3TMX CMCTOM MAN MX HOMHOHOHTOB CTaTLX Yffi
CexpeTH 0,
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4
Z-1.0001?00017000V9?1700108dCIU-VI3 1.Z/1.0/1700z aseeletliOd peAcuddv
01110dHOO
ormo uomanloo m nicoNoIodu OJOHMT3V BMWOOMMVOU 'MIGNON 0 J1f140
a manuICIoa md.RYohodH olulonsnwmdu m ro5loIodu 4mImmonil
sEHOWPC EMV tglIMPa0GaUOMOW 'OdU WHtIHthlO
xriHHomrrexoromnd m ImindoamIodu HOEOTGIOg XnaOHOSH OEI0OhMICOH
0 OWHGI n .'ISMHOYaI3Gn00 MMVPIO ct oimuYeoxnH m nHomdomen omH
-olltoLchmHR micmlicemionoY xndoxiox "GH codH plaHnIo raHHomlinHouomVnd
3EI0OhMIC03I 0 H IoxedoamIodu HoaoHnIo.R XHEOHORM (EGIWCGITI NICK
IMIINOGUH) OUMI M 0E10011141W 0 nJATY ?DUI IaulmoVoa4 nueozo
UVoliodu xmfiorEaIomail000 m xnHHoNodaooao wocuoltodou
m flpHouaBee xiciHifea00
-nuaop xmYriaRaIoIoam000 m ndoaodort FCHMHOX0MOM xr&nhodoamIodu OH
'UOIC011 Hint BOUPEOCaTIOUOM 140d0I0 MME0dIOWO/C ou mRaow 'odu 141mY1
XWMHOMTTOHOMOMnd XEMTIM2011 eH mu odu XHMIIMCOM xriaoulnIo nH
HoomfimnIoo 'IsmilmKRd000 'mvIndgVoTiodu HIJIHNOBIrendli 0 mmaIox,ea
-I000 a OJOHMOVOE0dM 'ISMHONGOITIVIMA: HIM nY:rIHonoV owoou *9
faloaodoV Hx ylecrI:6x0 oo mmaIoIoaI000 a mwnaIondo nvimaloon
-mHxa-Ls myinHcurnHomhnH uuodIHom oaoilimiCaIomaal000 clIooHmAleoa mina
-mhouoopo ISMHOP,OIIIMILZ MUM r3AMIOWOY M 'gnome ndRVonodu *g
!odu umnHezo ximulomUmloromitnd umV m Iound
-oamIodu 110a0IMIOR- xmaoHoRH XrIEIreM M XEM1'OCI3H EIC V 0Ma1rOVI0 UOIN
-.alMlikld0C) ISHMOYEMhMHR MYM MMIMOWOYi4 HHoyiee luIRVollodu
!mmiroxoIhmHIC OAGIHONOV a mutdolene ormInVanduooH mom
-MYHOM OMFGI !'GaI0a1COIMOdI0 0,10E0H BYV ooltimVoxpooll cgirioda._woh
cOM'EION 011aUOIUMME M9 amp OH qimlimVo xmIe umHealudoaced (MOH
-dOIEOU BYIt ooNmVoxpooH 'Imoda 0Ii '11WMFOI 10IMUIfalS flIMMVIVO xIcH
-110XMhH1tIC MYM xnHHoaodomionolf umueamidound odoHdoIaou :Jinaimo
-rodo MWMHOOhMHXOI MWHHanHOVITGH IszlionnHoo ailOOMITDNICOE InaM11
-ouo0,00A0E1 xT4moh a xm EMIMa02aYOUOM aIOOMOVIGOa 00nOIGMEHO14
'emlikom000 a crGHOLIMYOE XHIMOrCIFIMOM 'GH 1/1011MXRd000 H9M110110=014
BG.'WHHOE.0000 MIHOROMNOH WHIG H E0XMME0011070 ONCHeI 'a(M
-HOHOUNOH XM :;HM WOIOMO XMIG ONMOV0aHdU IMEMhOl100Q0 4a10a0LIOV
'Z
-Z71.0.001.00017001ETCP00108dCIU-VI3 1.Z/1.0/1700Z esearMa -10d peAcuddV
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3.
Ha nepmo A AeMeTpma AoroBopa9 m HOCTORHHaR HoHoymTaTioHan
ROMMCCIIE mozeT no oBoemy yomoTpeHmm BHOCKM B MAX nunpaBlui.
CopepmeHo 1974 ram ,13 ropue MOCEBO B Aux
anemmapax, HaxtAHM Ha aHrugolcom m pycomm H3Hicax9 npmem
o6a.TemoTa mmexa oAmHalioum omy,
npuoTaBmTexl, HpeAcTaBTATezz
C0eAMHOHHEX ITaTOB COMaa COBOTORMX COUNIVICTIltleCKla
Amepmul Peonybzult
cto
CegpOTHO
EeneBa
mioHn 1974 roAa
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C eicpeTHo
IIPMAUEHOE
ITOCTOHHHAH KOHCMETATMEHAR KOMOCCMH
IIPWEAYP, PEaTIEFA)WE JiEi,i OHTA 1iJil4 YHOWOAEHME M
YBEAOMTIEHE 0 Ha, MH CIACT.& DPO H a X000HEHT0B
ItycHome yoTanoBHm apoTmBonaHeT Ha MCMHT8TOZI?
HNX noamroHax CIBCpX yCTE1r1OB3ICHMEa HOJIHtleCTB
I. Hasemue nycHoBue yoTanoBJcx m OTHOCHIT10005i 1< HNA o6opy-
1loBaH1'ie yAaamoTcH CO CTUTOBLIX MO3MLO/19 a BCH tiacTE cTapToBoiA
nampAHm, saHmmaemaH cTokHoill nycHoBol%1 yoTaHomm H apmaTypoiri,
AemoHTmpyeTcH mam paapyinaeTcH. Mama' cTapToBo2 naolitaAHm
moryT ONTL yAmeHm9 a no MCT01-10MHM inecTm mecHuB TO mecTo
mozeT OHM sacunaHo semzeiri.
2. MaxTHue nycHoBue yoTaHomm npmBoAHTcH B HenpmroAHoe
AaH MCMOAB30B3HME COCTORHMO nyTem AemoHTaaa xam yHMIITCMOHMH
MX 1131zJ3CMHEX KOHCTpyRUMg M OrOZOBROB9 a TaHae nyTem yAaaeHmH
HanpaBaHmmx. 00A0MHM 1113XTHIDIX nycHoBux yeT3HOBO1C moryT 61)1T')
yAa3IeHN2 8 no MCTC110HIAM MOCTI/I mecHueB inaxTu moryT ONTB
sacunaHN semae2.
8. YRa3311H1,13 B nylmax I x 2 meponpmHTmH no AemoHTaay max
yHmuToaeHxm saBepwamTcH He no3xe9 6M uepes Tpm mecHqa C momeH-
Ta xx Hagaza.
4. 0oopyaeH4H9 OTHOCHIAMeCH R AemoHTmpoBaHHum MAM yHm1lToaeH-
1-IUM nycHoBum yoTaHoBRam npoTmBopaHeT Ha MCIIHT3TO3ILHIDIX noamrcHaxs
moryT no yomoTpeHmio CTOpOH mcnoaBaoBancia AaH neaei(19 He npoTx-
Bopellaux TIOACMCHMEM AoroBopa o6 orpaHmeHmx CMCTCM 11130 x cooT-
BOTOTBylORXX COrJriaCOBaHHHX 3mBaelneri.
5. YBeAomaeHme o aaBepifieHmm meponpmETmki npeAycmoTpeHHux
B nyHHTax I m 29 Hp0M3BOAMTCR B nOCTORHHOM KOHCTIBTaTMBH011
HOMMCCHM ABa pan B rOA no OmmtiocKomy COCTORIIMM Ha Hallaxo
porpinpnok cecomm itiommcomx.
CeRp e Tm 4.g. ?
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2.
II. coopyEeHm2 nPo Ha 6aae ManBmoTpom
I. MeTaJmmuecHme cTepxlim apmaTypE sAaHmiA FJIC cpeaamTcia..
2. 3AaHli151 PLC9 7.JI51 KoTopEx 01010 yge HauaTo BosBeAeHme
cTeH, OCTaBZHMTCH HeripmumTumm B mx HeaaBepmeHHom COCTOHHHH
B TOI10HMe MOCTX mecHueB9 nocze uero OHM moryT OHTB 3aCHEaHN
aemeM.
3. Coopyzemi 31fl nycRoBEx yoTaH033c1C9 a Tame 2Aarimi1 PAC9
Ami KoTopmx dEzm saBepmeHE cTpomTeJacTBom JIMIUL WHAaMOHT1,19
3acEnamTcH 3emze1.
4. OCTIOCTBZHOTOR paapaBHmBaHme IIOTIBH Ha Bcem yuacT1ce9
a cTpoyiTeaBHEe maTepmazE yAaJiHmTca.
5. Pa0oTE RO AemoHTagy 1/121/1 yHMIITOY.OHIIM HaTIMHaMTCH HO
nosxel uem uepea III6CTL mecHiwB mocze corzacoBauma HaOTORD,MX
DpoLwAyp.
6. YBeAomzeHme 0 3aBepmeHmm BEmeyKaamillEx meponpmETTAPI
ITOH3BOAHTO5I B BOCT0HHHOP/1 ItolicyaLTaTmBHoill ROMHCOMM.
62'
Coxpern
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Attachment No. 6
STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL
June 19, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, at this final meeting of the
Third Session of the SCC, it is a pleasure to take stock
of where we stand in our assigned responsibilities. With
the initialing of the mutually agreed Procedures Governing
Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification
Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems
and Their Components, we have authenticated two important
completed documents to be signed and enter into force at
the forthcoming Moscow Summit meeting. These documents
represent a noteworthy step. in promoting the objectives
and implementing the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the
Interim Agreement and its Protocol.
2. Working out these mutually agreed procedures was
not an easy task. The issues were complex and the solutions
often difficult to find. However, by perseverance on both
sides and, more importantly, facilitated by direct and
frank exchanges at all levels, we have succeeded in
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formulating the mutually agreed procedures called for
by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its
Protocol. Working out mutually agreed procedures for
dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines
and SLBM launchers posed one of our more difficult problems.
However, with the recent resolution of paragraph 111.2
dealing with the locations where such dismantling or
destruction shall be accomplished, that problem was also
successfully resolved. In connection with the language
of paragraph 111.2, it is understood that the Atlantic
area of the United States includes the Gulf Coast area.
3. Mr. Commissioner and all members of the Soviet
and U.S. SCC Components, I believe that we, both those here
present and all those who have participated in the prepara-
tion of these Procedures over the past three SCC Sessions,
can justifiably take pride in our accomplished work.
II
4. As important as these procedures are, they
represent only one factor in the success of the Standing
Consultative Commission. The SCC is a unique organization;
it is the first of its kind. We have thus been "plowing
new ground" and effectively "learning as we go." In my
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opinion we have come a long way. We have proven the
ability of the SCC to solve complex technical problems
to the mutual interest of both sides. We have developed
a direct and frank exchange of views, including an
understanding of the concerns of the other side, which
can be of utmost importance as the SCC may be called upon
to implement the full scope of its responsibilities as set
forth in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty and Article VI
of the Interim Agreement.
III
5. Mr. Commissioner, we have agreed that the
fourth session of the SCC will convene in Geneva on
September 24, 1974 to discuss the general framework for
detailed procedures for replacement of ABM Systems and
Their Components as called for in Article VII of the
ABM Treaty. The experience we have gained in working
out the procedures we have initialed tonight will be
invaluable in meeting this task. It is recognized that
either side may convene the SCC at an earlier date should
it desire to raise any other matters within the scope
of our assigned responsibilities.
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IV
6. Mr. Commissioner, in summary, the U.S. Component
of the SCC would like to express its appreciation to all
members of the Soviet Component of the SCC for the direct,
frank and businesslike manner in which they have approached
the problems we have faced. The 'manner in which both sides
have conducted these negotiations is conducive to the
further success of the SCC. We have achieved mutually
agreed procedures which both sides can be proud of, not only
for their content but for the precedent they set in estab-
lishing the capabilities and utility of the SCC. In my
opinion, the SCC has contributed, and will continue to
contribute, to reducing possible misunderstandings and
uncertainties that could arise in connection with existing
agreements, and will continue to contribute to continued
overall improved relations between our two great countries.
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Attachment No. 7
COMMISSIONER USTINOV'S STATEMENT
June 19, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
Today we have initialed the Protocols and attached Pro-
cedures, Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction and
Notification Thereof for Strategic Offensive Arms and ABM
Systems, limited by the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty
respectively, with the expectation that the signing of the
initialed documents will take place in Moscow in the course of
the forthcoming Summit Meeting. This successfully completes
a specific phase in the activity of the SCC, established by the
Governments of the U.S. and the USSR to promote the implementa-
tion of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and
Interim Agreement, concluded between our countries.
Today it gives me great pleasure to congratulate you, our
Deputies and all members of the U.S. and Soviet Components of
the SCC on the completion of the responsible task assigned to
us by the Governments of the USSR and U.S.
The work carried out in the course of three sessions has
convincingly demonstrated that, given mutual understanding and
good will, both sides, within the framework of the SCC, can
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successfully carry out tasks related to implementation of the
provisions of the ABM. Treaty and Interim Agreement. We have
no doubts that the SCC, through its activity, makes a useful
contribution to the cause of general ilnprovement in Soviet-
American relations.
Particular note should be made of the businesslike
atmosphere, and the constructiveness and frankness which
marked the just-concluded SCC session and which is becoming
traditional for the SCC. We believe that this has to no
small degree contributed to our success, in spite of the exist-
ence of a number of complex issues, solution of which, as you
know, required considerable effort on both sides.
Extensive and useful work in reaching agreement on
mutually acceptable formulations with respect to questions of
dismantling or destruction and notification thereof has been
carried out by the working groups, headed by General Georgi
and V. P. Karpov. It is precisely due to their constructive
and businesslike cooperation that we were able to reach agree-
ment on procedures for dismantling replaced submarines and
on notification questions.
A special role in our work was played by the Executive
Secretaries and interpreters to whom fell the difficult task
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of editing, translating and preparing .a large number of tex'us
containing proposals of the sides as well as the resulting
documents. I would like to express my gratitude to all
members of the SCC for their fruitful activity at this
session.
The results of our joint work seem to us to be quite
substantial; they lay down a good foundation for further
cooperation of the sides within the framework of SCC.
Both Components of the Commission appa/ently agree that
the Protocols and Procedures worked out in the SCC will, by
their scope and nature, facilitate strict and precise
implementation by the sides of the obligations assumed under
the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, using national tech-
nical means for their verification.
In this connection the Soviet side proceeds from the
premise that in actual implementation of the provisions of the
Protocols and Procedures, governing replacement, dismantling or
destruction for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems,
initialed by us today, both sides will be guided by precisely
those procedures which are set down in the texts of these
documents. The Soviet side also believes that after being
signed, the Protocols and Procedures must retain their confiden-
tial nature and must not be subject to publication.
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With respect to the time for holding the fourth session
of the SCC, we agree to convene it September 24, 1974. We
believe that there is also no disagreement between us with
respect to the agenda for that session -- to discuss the
question of approach to procedures governing the replacement
of ABM systems and their components which is permitted under
Article VII of the ABM Treaty.
In conclusion, Mr. Commissioner, allow me to express once
again my gratitude to you personally, to General Georgi, V. P.
Karpov, and all members of the U.S. and Soviet Components of
the SCC, for the work carried out at the third session.
Thank you for your attention.
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Attachment No. 8
June 19, 1974
PRESS RELEASE
The US-USSR Standing Consulcative Commission met
for one hour on June 18, and held another meeting for
two hours on June 19 to complete its third session in
Geneva. The session began on April 2, 1974. US
Commissioner, Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal and USSR Commissioner,
Mr. G. I. Ustinov agreed to convene the next session of
?the SCC in Geneva later this year on a date to be mutually
agreed between them.
The Standing Consultative Commission was established
by the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the US and
USSR Governments on December 21, 1972, for the purpose of
promoting the implementation of the objectives and
provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement
on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed
in Moscow on May 26, 1972.
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SCC
Session III
A- 257
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, June 17, 1974
US Mission, Geneva
Persons Present
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald
Mr. Arensburger
(Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Commissioner Graybeal opened the meeting by thanking
General Ustinov for coming to the US Mission at such short
notice. He said that since he had called the meeting he
would propose thac. the normal procedure of asking General
Ustinov to speak first be changed and said that he would
take the floor.
Commissioner Ustinov agreed and suggested that
Commissioner Graybeal proceed.
Commissioner Graybeal then gave a prepared statement on
the United States Government desire that the procedures be
signed in Moscow instead of Geneva (see attachment.)
Commissioner Ustinov then thanked Graybeal for sharing
with him the instructions he had received from Washington.
He said that he would report those instructions to Moscow
immediately. Ustinov said that, as Graybealknew, he was
at the present time expecting, literally from "hour to
hour", instructions from Moscow with regard to our future
work, with respect to Paragraph 111.2, and also with respect
to signing the documents the Commissioners are working out.
He said that as soon as he received such instructions, he
would immediately call Graybeal so that they could resolve
the issue which is still unresolved. He concluded that, as
Graybeal would understand, he could, unfortunately, say no
more in regard to the questions which Graybeal had raised
today.
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Commissioner Graybeal thanked Ustinov and proposed
that the meeting be adjourned at this point and that the
Commissioners agree that the next meeting should be held
on call of either Commissioner.
Commissioner Ustinov agreed, commenting that, as he
undeT.T'Ebod it, imporfEET. meetings of the SCC were now
being held on the shores of Lake Geneva.
Commissioner Graybeal agreed and declared the meeting
adjourned.
Attachment: As Stated
SCC:CGFi zGerald:mtf:6/17/74
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STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL
June 17, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, I am under instructions to
inform you that the U.S. Government desires that the
Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or
Destruction, and Notification Thereof for Strategic
Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their Components
be initialed by Commissioners here in Geneva, and
signed at the forthcoming Moscow Summit.
2. At this time, I have no guidance concerning
the U.S. Government's preference regarding who would
sign these procedures in Moscow. I am instructed to
initial the completed procedures no later than Tuesday,
June 18th, if possible, and to return to Washington
Wednesday, June 19, 1974.
3. As you know the Washington review of the JDTs,
preliminarily agreed by Commissioners, June 5, 1974,
has been completed. There are no major problems.
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am prepared to proceed with our work, and to resolve
Para. 111.2 of the procedures for strategic offensive
arms along the lines we have been discussing. With
resolution of this paragraph, we could initial the
documents here in Geneva; this would certify that the
texts are authentic and prepared for final signature
at the forthcoming Moscow Summit.
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SECRiVEXIDIS
SCC
Session III
4- 251
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
? Meeting, June 5, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Pet.) FitzGerald
Cdr. Atkinson
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Burrell
Mr. Arensburger
(Interpreter)
*'Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk
(Interpreter)
Commissioner Ustinov opened the meeting at 12:30 p.m. and
gave the floor to Mr. Graybeal.
Commissioner Graybcal said that before turning to substantive
business he would like to introduce Mr. Lawrence Burrell, whom
the Soviet side had kindly agreed to invite to today's meeting as
well as to the luncheon which was to follow. As the members of
the Soviet Component no doubt knew, Mr. Burrell has worked very
closely with Mr. Krimer and Mr. Arensburgcr on both SALT and SCC
business for several years, and appreciated the opportunity to
attend a meeting.
Graybeal then said that once again, in exchanging two
documents today, we were taking a very important step in con-
nection with working out the procedures called for by the Interim
Agreement and the ABM Treaty. The first document was the Joint
Draft Text, preliminarily agreed by Commissioners as of June 5,
1974, of Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or
Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive
Arms. Graybeal stated that he had been informed that the language
of this document had been conformed, and represented agreement
between Commissioners on the complete document with the exception
of the wording for Para. 111.2 which still needed to be worked
out. The second document, he said, was the Joint Draft Text,
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preliminarily agreed by Commissioners as of June 5, 19721, of
Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction,
and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and their Components.
This document had also been conformed in its Russian and English
versions, and was a complete document.
Graybeal said that at this time he would like to present to
Ustinov the English language texts of the two documents he had
just described (Attachment No. 1 and No. 2).
Commissioner Ustinov, reading from a prepared text, said that
our Executive Secretaries, Col. FitzGerald and Mr. Yereskovsky,
had done a lot of work in a short time'-by preparing the prelimi-
narily agreed texts of the Protocol and Procedures for both
strategic offensive arms and ABM systems. He wanted to express
his great satisfaction with the work that they had done and with
the results achieved. He hoped that within the next few days the
last question which remained unagreed between Commissioners
would be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. Ustinov con-
cluded by stating that he agreed that these Joint Draft Texts
should be considered preliminarily agreed by Commissioners as of
June 5, 1974., and added that they would be sent to Moscow for
review today. He then passed to Graybeal a copy of the Russian
language text of each of the two documents (Attachment No. 3 and
No. )j).
Mr. Graybeal said he fully endorsed Ustinov/s comments with
respect to the work done by our Executive Secretaries. He stated
that he, likewise, would be transmitting the texts to Washington
today for final review prior to signature.
General Ustinov said that since we had planned lunch
together following this meeting, he thought we could probably
adjourn the meeting, which had been very successful and produc-
tive, and turn to the real substantive business of lunch.
Mr. Graybeal agreed.
General Ustinov declared the meeting adjourned at 12:45 p.m.
Attachments:
1. English, JDT of Procedures
June 5, 1974
2. English, JDT of Procedures
3. Russian, JDT of Procedures
June 5, 1974
4. Russian, JDT of Procedures for
for Strategic Offensive Arms,
for ABM Systems, June 5, 1974
for Strategic Offensive Arms,
ABM Systems, June 5, 1974
Drafted by FPDeSimone:bd
Approved by: SNGraybea.
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0.4t4411%1 No.
Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioner'June 5, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR STRNIEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of
the Interim Agreement between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain
Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and
the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the Parties
thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for
strategic offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement,
as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an
integral part of this Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
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r)
1. The attached PPocedures shall apply- only to
systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed
pursuant to the provisions of the Interim Agreement;
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines
and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers
shall be on the basis of Articles III and TV of the
Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable
Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM
launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-
missile submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that
they would be put in a condition that precludes the
possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs,
respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units
dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of
those units would not be substantially less than the time
required for new construction; and shall preclude
unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;
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Dismantling or 'destruction procedures shall be
formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based
ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines
and SLBM launchers;
5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished
by national technical means in accordance with Article V
of the Interim Agreement;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with
the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at land-based
ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion
of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol
thereto;
7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type
of launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been
completed and is in process, and of the number of launchers
used for replacement; and
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8. The number of -.replacement ballistic-missile
submarines which are under construction simultaneous:1y
shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction
schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to
be one consistent with the past or present construction
practices of each Party.
This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter
into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in
force for the duration or the Interim Agreement, and may
be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it
deems appropriate.
Done at Genea on
, in two copies, each in
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally-
authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
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AurTACTIMENT
STANDING CONSULTATI-VE CO,,,/74ISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTIOL.,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
I. General
1. Within the limits of the levels established for each
Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964,
launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered
submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on
diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic
missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.
2. Modern submarine-launched ballistiC missiles are:
for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-
powered submarines; for the Soviet Union, missiles of the
type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made opera-
tional since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and
installed in any submarine, regardless of type.
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;. Launchers for olccr ballistic missiles on diesel
submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes
provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms.
4. Dismantling or destruction;. of replaced launchers
shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning
of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any
of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation
of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation
of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute
initiation of dismantling or destruction of a ballistic-
missile submarine Or SLBM launcher.
5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-
missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine
first operates under its own power away from the harbor or
port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine
was performed.
6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of
ICBM launchers and launchers for balliStic missiles on
submarines, being replaced, shall be given by the Parties
twice annually at the beginning of regular sessions of
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the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting the actual
status as of the beginnirig of that session of the Commission
and covering the period since the last report in the
Commission. The notification shall contain:
(a) the number and type of IC131 launchers (soft or
silo ICBM launcher), deployed prior to 1964, and the number
Of launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, on which
dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in
process;
(b) the number of launchers for ballistic missiles
on replacement submarines which have begun sea trials; and
(c)
the number of ICBM launchers and launchers for
ballistic missiles on submarines, out of the number
dismantled or destroyed, which have been replaced by
launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered
submarines.
7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other
information to the notifications if it considers such infor-
mation necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the
obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.
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Procedures For
nn t]. nr PeT;trlintion of Lard-T,
ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM launchers
cc
1. In all cases the following actions shall be accom-
plished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a)
removal from the launch site of the supply of
missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile
equipment; and
(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting
and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment;
associated with the launcher and located at the launch site,
and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch
site. Launch. equipment is understood to be systems, com-
ponents, and instruments required to launch a missile.
2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to
the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions
shall be performed:
(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch
stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and missile launch
control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling
or destruction;
(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed
from the launch site; and
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(c)
debris of of destroyed areas of launch pads and
of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and bile fuel
storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six
months, the places where they were located may be covered
with earth.
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to
the actions specified in paragraph I, the following actions
shall be performed:
(a)
silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting,
launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be dismantled or
destroyed, and dismantled components shall be removed
from the launch site; and
(b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a)
above have been accomplished, the silos shall remain open for
a period of six months, after which they may be filled with
earth.
4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished
in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining
at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support,
or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties,
be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions
of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.
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b. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM'
launchers shall be completed no later than four months
after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.
III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Pallistic-
__
Missile Submarines and SLED Launchers Replaced by
New Ballistic-issile Submarines and SLT-q1 Launchers
1. The following procedures, to be performed in the
open, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable for
dismantling or destructiom or ballistic-missile submarines
and SLED launchers:
(a) scrapping the submarine and its launchers.
Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;
(b) removing the submarine's missile section;
(c) dismantling of ballistic-missile launchers on
older nuclear-powered submarines on which the upper parts
of missile launch tubes protrude into the fairwater may
also be accomplished by removing the missile launch tubes
together with the fairwater and those parts of the outer
hull and pressure hull above the missile section which
contain all of the penetrations for the missile launch
tubes.
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The pressure pressure hu I ad ouer hull may be restored by
welding into place new sections without missile launch
tube penetrations or missile hatches. The sail and deck
may be modified in such a way that the submarine remains
seaworthy.
/7. Ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher
..;.
dismantling shall be accomplished at major shipyards,
located in designated areas, where ship construction,
fitting out, or major overhaul is carried out2.71
/7. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ballistic-
_
missile submarines, carried out in accordance with the
specified procedures, shall be accomplished In designated
2
areas .7.
3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches
shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling,
and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed,
4. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed no
later than six months after the replacement submarine begins
sea trials.
Proposed by U.S. side.
2 Proposed by Soviet side.
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TV. Procedures for RoT emeni-, of a Ballisticis-,ile
Submarine Lost at Sea, or Disabled Beyond quair
In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine js lost
at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarjne may be
replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance
with the following:
(a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be
made to the other Party in the Standing Consultative
Commission;
(b) the number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-
missile submarine shall not cause the total number of launchers
to exceed that authorized in the Inter in Agreement and the
Protocol thereto; and
(c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall
be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III
of these Procedures.
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J_ Attr.lchent No,
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Draft Text
. Preliminarily AFq:eed
by CommisE7ioners
June 5, 19724
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROYOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICAVION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of
the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Union. of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the
Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto
have within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for
ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty,
as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes
an integral part of this Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
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J. The attached P"rocedures shall apply only to
systems or their componee.ts to be replaced and dismantled
or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty;
2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their c6mponent
shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and
applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction
of ABY systems or their components in excess of the
numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty
shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and
applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM
systems or their components, related to implementation
of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement
of those systems or their components and Article VIII or
the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their
components and facilities associated with those components,
except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a
condition that precludes the possibility of their use for
ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units
dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of
those units would not be substantially less than the time
required for new construction; and shall preclude
unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;
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Replacement and dismantlint: or destruction
procedures shall be formuaatod separately for above-
ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars;
5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction
procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can
be accomplished by national technical means in accordance
with Article X[1 of the Treaty;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance
with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at
ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of
the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed
Statements; and
7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type
(above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number
of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been
completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM
launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.
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This Protocol and t11- attached Procedures shall
enter into force upon sif;nature of this Protocol and
remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and
may be amended by the Standing Consultative CommisSLon
as it deems appropriate.
Done at Geneva on
, in two copies, eac.h
in the: English and Russian languages, both texts being
equally authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
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./.111"PACIMNI1
CONSTIATIVE COMMTSSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING. DISYANTLING OH DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION TLEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
I. Excess APE Launchers at Te s Ranges
? ?
1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment
shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of
the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforce-
ments shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris
may be removed and after six months the location covered
with earth.
2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by
dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures
and headworks, and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher
debris may be removed and after six months the silos may
be filled with earth.
3. The dismantling or destruction actions described
in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than
three months after their initiation.
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CR C
Jacilities associated with dismantled or destro:yed
ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the
Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ARM Systemz,
and applicable Agreed Statements.
5. Notification of the complolion of the activities
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the
Standing Consultative Conmission twice annually reflecting,
the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session
of the Commission.
II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom
1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall
be cut off.
P. Radar buildings for which wall construction had
commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state
for six months, after which they may be covered with earth.
3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which
only foundations had been completed shall be covered with
earth.
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Earth grading Of the entire area shall be
accomplished and construction materials removed.
9. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be
initiated no later than six months after agreement on
these Procedures.
G. Notification that the above activities have
been completed shall be given in the Standing
Consultative Commission.
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Attachment No.
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1-????., ? 2.rocedures for
Strategic Offrnive
Arms)
Joint.Draf-LText
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commisioners
Juno 5, 1974
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-Approved For Rillease 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435M0400010001-2
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cpeAcTBamm B CooTBeTCTBMM Co CTaTI101/1 Y BpemeHHoro coraaffieHma;
6. Hocae AemoHTaaa MEM yHAIITOaeHMH, HpoBezeHtioro B CooTBeT?.
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moryT no yemoTpumm CT0p0H OCHOEL30BaTTDCH AEH Heae, He npoTHBo?
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Approved For Release O4IO1
Dt80T00435A000400010001-2
Approved For Riglease 2004/01/21: CIA-RDP80T00435M150400010001-2
HOHNMaeTCH rpargH, COBMOCTMHIA C npomHoH Ham HHHOMH0c1 npaitTHItOVI
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Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2
Approved For Ratase 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435Q90400010001-2
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TaHme nycHoBHe yoTaHoBlud coDpemeHmix daHETACTDIOCRMX paHeT AM3OHB-
HHX MOABOAHUX aoAoH.
2. CoBpemeHHHmu dalihMCTMTIOCHIAMM paHeTaMm noABoTHEix HOAOH
CIIMTalOTCH: AHH COOAMHOHHEX ITaTOB paHelu, yoTaHoBaeHHHe Ha
BCOX aTOMHHX HOABOAHHX aoAHax, COBOTCH0r0 COD3a paHeTm Toro
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B boema cooTaB Home 1965 roAa, a TaHme 701H o6eirix CTopoH Oaaam-
cTutrecHme paHOTH HOABOAHHX HOAOH, BH0pBLIO npomexime neTHHe monH7
TaHMH HOCHO 1935. rua M yoTaHoBaenHHe Ha amboa noABoAlloa HOANO
HO3aBMCNMO OT ee Tuna.
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HEX noABoAHmx aoAHax He moryT MCHOHL30BaTLCH 7,1151 Heaea sameHH,
npeAyemoTpeHHEx RpoToHmom R BpemeHHomy coraameHum o HeHoTophrx
mepax B odaacTH orpaHugeHuH oTpaTerutiecHux HaeTynaTeJILHHx Boopy-,
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4. AemoriTay JAHM yHuliToYeHme sameHHemmx nyoHoBux yeTaHoBoH
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yHullTemeHmH nycHoBoa yCTaHOBECM MEP HBEHOTCH HatiaA0 BHHOHHOHMH
Approved For Releasg 04 0f2: glATRET80T00435A000400010001-2
Approved For Rase 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435AQ90400010001-2
nioOoro H3 mepo1ipHHT6, yEa3dHHEX HHUO B PasAeJle R. Haquom A(-
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TamH Aocio nycHoBoYI NoTaHoLHO BP HA HBAROTCR HaL13J10 BHTIOAHOHUH
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cBoHm xoAom BHC raBaHH MAN nopTa, TO HpON3BOAH11HCID nocTpoAHa
HAM ocHauleHme noABoAHog AoAHH.
6. YBeAomzeHme o AemoHTaae Him ylirmoaeHum sameHHemmx
nycHoBmx yOTaHOBOE MBP H HyCHOBNX yOTaHOBON OULAKCTITALIOCHMX paHeT
noABoAHmx ioAoH Hp0H3B0AHTOR CT0p0H3MH ABa pasa B roA B HatlaJle
peryAHpHmx ceccmg R0CTOEHB02 N0HC5TABTaTHBH0 HOHMCCHM no qyaRTM-
Ilecimmy COCTOHHMK) Ha Halimo_AaHHog cecci/H, Komi/local sa nepHoA co
Bp0MOHM HomeAHero yBOAOMAOHMR, npeAcTaBaleHHoro B HOMMCCHH. B
yBeAomaeHHH yHasuBamTcH:
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PTAH EaximaH nycHoBaii yoTaHoBEa REP), pasBepHyTmx AO 1964 roAa,
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B cTaAHH OCTAOCTBAOHHR
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noABoAHmx ToAHax, HoTopme HallaJIH mopexoAHme MCHHTaHMR H npeA-
HasHalleHm B HageCTBO 3a1IOHH; H
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OaAAMOTHTIOCHEx paHeT noABoAHmx aoAoH Hs Tann AemoHTHpoBaHHmx
HAM pli1IT0g0HHHX, HoTopme OHAM MCHOAB30BaHH AAR sameHm Ha
nycHoBme yoTaHoBial GaEAHOTIgIOCHMX paHeT coBpemeHHmx aTOMHHX
HOABOAHHX E0A0K.
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yBeAomeHmH Apyromm CBOAOHOHMH, ?cam oHa couTeT, TITO OHH HOOOXO-
AMMH AAR 0000HOLIOHM2 yBepeHHooTH B BHHOAHOHMH HpHHRTHx HO Bpe-
MOHHOMy coraameHmm 06R3aTOALCTB.
CeEpe THO
Approved For Release 10,04i : 0T00435A000400010001-2
Approved For %lime 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A490400010001-2
IL HPOU0,74YPII TCMOHTM!.Zd if1 WIE1112.02CHN2 MyCHOBEX
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HeHTOB, rOJi0BI1EIX uacTefitE HOABEYLCHOPO o0opyAoBaHmH;
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TpaHcnopTHoro odopyAoBaHmH 14 3anpaBolmoro odopyAoBaHHH, CBH3ali?
H0F0 C HyCHOBOtil yoTaHoBHoti m HaxoAHuleroca Ha cTapToBoYi 1-103MIXE
a TaHae yAaaeHme BC0r0 AemonimpoBanHoro odopygoBaHms co cTapTo-
Bog. 1703HEMM. Uo nycHoBm o6opyA0BaHmem HOHMMaMTCH cneTemu,
HOMMOMeHT1 m npH6opm, Heo0xoa14mue 1T npoBeAenzH nycHa paHem.
B OTHOUJOHMIA 1103WANKCHHHX cTapToBmx no3mgmg B Aonoh.HoHme
H meponpHHTHHMI nepeumchemium B nyHHTe 1, OCNTACCTMHIOTCH cheAyn-
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20 meTpoB c genTpom, HaX0A.FIIMMOR Ha cTapToBom cToae, P1 HyHHTH
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11) emHocTo Ana xpaHeHma TonamBa 26MOHTEpy1OTCH M yAahnioTca
co cTapToBok HOeHUM; E
C) 00HOMHPI pa3pywenHux-yqacTicoB CTapTOBEX naoNaAoH P1 HyHETOB
(6yHEep0B) ynpaBaonma nycHom pace, a TaHae truameHTE emHocTe2
Aria xpaHonma TonamBa moryT OHTL yAahenbi, a HO VICTetleHIAM 111eCTM
mecnneB Meca, rAe OHM HaXOAHEMCLI moryT alTE sacmnanu semaett.
S. B OTHOMeHMM WaXTHUX cTapToBux 1103MUVI, B AonohneHide E
meponpmaTmam, nepen4crIeHHbn.i B nyHitTe II OCyNeCTBRHMTCH CaCAT.ORMQ
meponpmaTm:
a) MANTHHO Hpmmm waxT, peaBom 3aWITHHX Hpmm, ra3ooTBo7iHme-
HaHaHM, waxTHme cTaHaHm m 0110A0BEM fflax. emoHTmpyloTca iPi
poliToaamTcH, a ACMOHTMp0BalIMMO HomnoneHm yAaaHmTca co cTapTo-
Bok H03111/1H; 14
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noAnynHTe "a", MeaTEI OCTaBRMTCH OTITHTEMM B TelleHme mecTm meca-7
geB, nocae quo moryT OUT') sacunaHm 3emheM.
Approved For Release 244/61/il,PCIW:ablY80t00435A000400010001-2
g t
Approved For %lease 2004/01/217: CIA-RDP801-0043549;0400010001-2
L!.
4. liocJic ocyucTEReH-1A AemeHTaga Nhu. yHMTITCMOHMH B CooT-
BOTCTBOH C B=eyHa3aHHEmm n.pcuypaim coopygeHmH, ocTammoc.H Ha
eTapToBux nO3HURX MEP, Ho HCnoAh3y10TOH AnH xpaHeHmg, oOczygm-
BaHMH HAM nyCHa MEP HO MOIVT no yemoToeHmm OT0p0H 0CnOAID0B&TL7
CH AUH qe11.021 He npoTmpopellam,mx noaogeHmHm BpemeHHoro coim,laueHmH
Hp0T0HOdia H Hemy.
5. 4emoHTag yHouTogeHme 3aMeH2eMEx nycHoBmx yeTaHoBcH
MEP saBepmaeTcH He no3me, qem gepes LieTmpe mecHa nocAe HaqaYla
mopexoAHmx HCnETaH011 n0ABOX1011 JIOAH04, HpeAHa3HuueHHog B Hal!:eeTBe
BameHm.
M. Epou,oAypm empHTaga ETU' yHmTITon':enmyi no4-J3o4Hyi
zoTols, C ea=icTEliecAmmm.paxeTmn n nveHOMx
yC T Eflio"B Oh; EP -salit.'fflYea"i`f -ffe,71,foTAITamm
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eTHIlecHmmm paHeTamm 0 nyCHOBUX yeTaHOBON EP a npmemEemmmn HBAH-
MTCH CAeAymiHe npouAypu, ocyulecTimHemme no, 0THWThim HeOom,
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a) HpeBpaNeHme B meTaJnioaom nouoAmo2 HUHN H ee IlyCHOBLIX
yCTaHOBOH. flpeBpaNeHme B meTaAJloaom HpuyemaTpmBaeT HaHmTa.711,Hylo
pa3ClopHy;
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0) AemoHTag nycHoBmx rTaHOBOE 6aJUIPICTWIleCH0x paHeT cTapmx
aTOMHba HOABOAHHx ZOAOH, y HoTopmx BepxHme qacTm paHeTHmx nycHo-
BMX maxT Bux0AHT B orpagAeHme maxT, mogeT OCTIeCTBAHTBOH TaHge
nyTem CHRTHH paHeTHmx Ily0HOMIX maxT BmecTe CorpagAeHmem maxT
IC Temm qaCTHME aerHoro H npollHoro HopnycoB HaA paHeTHILJ oTeeHom,
B HoTopmx Hax0AHTCH Bee Bia0AE paHeTHmx nycHoBux maxT.
HpouHm2 Hopnyc H zerHirin Hopnyc moryx MITL BOCCTaHOBAeHH
nvem BBapmBaHmH Homx ceHga, He mmelovix BLIX0A0B paHeTHmx nye-
HO3mX maxT 14 paHeTHmx JIMHOB. OrpagAeHme pybEld m naay0a moryT
MITL moAMOMUTOBaHM TaHmM 06pasOm, T1TOH coxpanumeL mopexuHme.
HauecTBa HoT,BoAHofii noAHm.
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Approved For Release 2004/01%5 ;4CIA-liDP8OT00435A000400010001-2
Approved For Rpilpase 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDF'80T00435/W0400010001-2
komoHTaa HoABoAliu JioAoR C dazHHCTMulOCNIIMM paReTalAd
M MyCHOBNX yc?aIioBoH JF T1J! ppOliaBOAETOF Ha HaxoAHLT4Hxoli B
panomax HpyriHmx Be0,1xlna hOTOWX ocymoTpRseTcH eTpolATelL-
cT-Bo, oonalloHlie MAM Ran-J-JTaKLHEqn pemohT 0yAoB.71
/-2. AemoHTaa HEM yHMII0g0H1d0 aamelmomux HoABoAllux JioAolc
C OWIJINCTIATIOCRMME paHeTamHl'ooyNecTBJmemue B COOTBOTCTBMIT C
nepeqviczeHHumN HpouAypami1,AlpoiA3BoAHTcH B ylcasaHHux panoHax,72
S. flpH apbom via BapEaHTop AemoHTaaa HIONTA nyCHODHY, maxT
OOTalOTCH OTITHTNMM B TelieHme Boer? nepvioAa Aemolaaaa, a paKeT::;"
vi odopyAoBaHJfie AJIH nyoxa palcoT yAazmoT0H.
4. Ji1000e 1i3 yKaaaHHHX Bum? meponpNHTlin 3aBepmeTcH He no3ae,
qem TIOpes mem., mecHuB noue HallaAa mopexoAHux noA-
BoAHon aoAHH, npeAHa3HalleHHon B HaTlecTBe 3ameHu.
1Y. n oHeupm_3apHu,no,ABoAHon uzir,HHHii
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riddHeT B mope mam nohyllaeT noBpeEAeHne, nommllaioNee pemoHT, TO
TaRaH noABoAHaH JioAlca moaeT CIHTL 3ameHeHa Apyron noABoAHon JIOHOn
o 6aEancTmlaecimmrii paReTamm B COOTBOTCTBMX C inmeozeAylomm:
a) ApyraH CTopoHa yBeAomJiHeTcH B HOCTOHHHO HOHOTILTaTMBHOVI
ROMMOCHM 0 rHdelim HRH noBpenueHml;
b) KOHMTIOCTBO HyCHOBEIX yoTaHoBolc Ha noABoxion aoAlte.e, baH-
EMOTHUOICHMK paReTamE, npeAHa3HaTaeHHo4 B HatIOCTBO sameHu, HO
ITMBOAMT H HpeBumeHmo ocluAero HouillecTpa nycicoBux yoTaHoBoH, pa3-
pemeHHoro Bpemomum COPRaDOHMOM I IIIDOTOHOJIOM R Hemy; H
0) noBpeaAeHnaH noABoArlaH aoAxa 0 OaxammilecImmx paiteTamli
AemoliTrApyeTcH HaM yH14laoaaeT0H B COOTBOTCTBMM C Pa3Aeaom M Ha-
oToHmx npolleAyp.
EpeArioaeHme amepmEaHcicon CTOpOHE.
2"
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Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2
LI ,
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Approved For Rase 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T004351404000),#TZ'ul---'
7 4_
Joint Draft Mxt
Preliminarily
?
by C'ammissioliel's
June-T-5, 1974,
TCHCT cop,mocTHoro npoeIcTa,
HHm_upe4cTaBmTenHmm
ig74-f5T,6- -
HOGTO.RHHAh KOHnYIETATEbHAH NOMHCC05
IDJOTOROJI
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COOTBaTCTBHM C 1103107011112MM M B ocyrAecTmeHme AoroBopa
meauv COMSOM COBOTCEMX COITiMaAVICTMOCHMX Jecnynlya m COCAMHOHHE-
MM ETaTamm Amepmim o6 orpaHnoHmm cocTem npoTJABopalloTHo oc5opo-
MU 26 MH 1572 roAa ii COrsda00BahHEIX baHmeHm2 B CRUM C
AoroBopom placTBymue B ECM CTOpOHM9 B pammx 1iOCTOHHHO2 HOHCp1B-
TaTMBHOI1 HOMMCCMH9 corzacmamcB a npoT4o7.wpax9 peryzmpyloz,mx 2a11eHy9
AemoHTax MJIM yHmliToxeHme M yBeAomzeHmo 0 Hmx9 JIH cmcTem 111.)0 m
MX K0mm0HoHT0B9 orpaHmlieHHHx STUN 4oroDopom, Kalc OHM ca)opmyzmpo-
BaHH B Epmzoxemmid H HacTomigmy RpoToxozy9 NoTopoe HBAHOTCH HOOTIOM-
zemok qacTBm aToro ripoToKoza.
-0Topomq corzacmamci, Taxme o czeAymmx 0n4mx pyicoBoTHi4mx
HOROEOHNEX:
1. flpmaaraemue HpolleAypu npmmeHmoTcH TOHBHO B OTHOMaHMM
CHOTOM MIN MX HOMMOHaHT0B9 samememux H AemoHupyembix lux yHmq-
Toaaembix B COOTBOTCTBMX C nuoyseHmHmm AoroBopa;
2. AlodaH sameHa cmcTom 111"0 WIN MX HOMMOHOHTOB ocyNecTioHeTcH
Ha OCHOBaHJAM CTaTLM yn AoroBopa9 a Talace. COOTBeTCTBylONMX
CorzacoBaHHNx saHmeHmN AemoHTax mzm. yHmIlTozeHme cmcTem EPO lox
MX KOMMOHCHTOB cBcpx HOZMIlaCTB BHC pa2oHoB9 onpegezemNx
4oroBopom9 ocyulecTBJIHeTcH Ha OCHOBaHMM CTaTLM YE 4oroBopa N
COOTBaTCTBTOWX CorEacoBaHnix saHmoumM;
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Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2
2.
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SCC
Session. III
A-
us/ussR STANDING GONSULTAIIVE COI'.;MISSION
Keetin June 4
Soviet
Persons Present
Mr. Graybeal
.Bri.g. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) FitzGeraid
=Mr. Anderson
Cdr. Atkinson
Lt. Co-J. DeSimono
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Arensburger
(interpreter)
19721
Geneva
Erl , Gen. Ustinov
Karpov
MT. Yereskevshy
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpre er)
Commissioner Ustinov opened the meeting by welcoming the
U.S. Component, and gave the floor to Mr. Graybeal.
CommissionerCraybeal said that the Working Group on
Notiation, under the able- leadersnip of Deputy Commissioners
Karpov and Georgi, had again- demonstrated our ability to
resolve very complex issues,- Ue said it was his understanding
that agreement had been reached in the Working Group on wor6ng
for the various sections in the two Protocols and Procedures
dealing with notification. The text of those paragraphs had
been conformed by our Executive Secretaries, and he believed
they could be considered "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners."
Graybeal then provided Ustinov with a copy of the English-
language text of those paragraphs (Attachment No. 1).
General Ustinov thanked: Graybeal, and, reading from a pre-
pared text, said that the Working Group under Deputy Commissioners
Georgi and Karpov had completed its assigned task of working out
mutually agreed formulations with respect to notification.
yesterday, June 3, and noted the appropriate four paragraph.
numbers. He said that we should express our gratitude to the
Working Group for the successful completion of its work on the
complex subject of notification, which had appeared to be one
of our most difficult problems. He stated that like Graybeal,
he believed that the formulations presented today could be con-
sidered preliminarily agreed by Commissioners, with the usual
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understanding that either side could introduce changes or
amendments if it were considered necessary. With that, he
handed over to Graybeal a copy of the Ran-language text
(Attachment No. 2).
hr. Graybeal said that he thought .this was a significEn-e
milesLone on the road toward working out the mutually agreed
procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and theTnterim Agreement
and its Protocol. Through the effort's .of the Working Croup, he
said, we have achieved solutions in the net interest of both our
countries.
He concluded by stating that the U.S. side had no further
comments or statements to mske this morning.
General Ustinov said he fully shared Graybeal's opinion that
the work done in the Working Group was a considerable success in
our mutual work; it facilitated to a significant degree success-
ful completion of the procedures for dismantling or destruction
with respect to both strategic offensive arms and ABM systems
and other components.
He said the Soviet side had nothing additional for
this morning's meeting either, and suggested that it be
adjourned and that the Commissioners and their deputies con-
tinue their work in the informal post-meeting atmosphere.
Mr. Grayheal accepted Ustinov's suggestion.
-
General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 11:25 a.m.
Attachments:
1. English-language text of notification paragraphs,
June 4, 1974?
2. Russian-language text of notification paragraphs,
June 4, 1974
Drafted by:FrDeSimone:bd
Approved by:SNG1,:dybeal
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Prr:. Text
jOnari v Agreed by Commiss.lo EY.s
J1170
)flmTFDCA'T.TON
PROC -DURES FOR STIRTTECIC OF=SIVE ARMS
Protocol. Paragraph 7
7. Through timely
qad appropriate procedures, the
Partie shall notify each other of the number and type of
launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been
completed and is in process, and of the number of launchers
used for replacement; and
Procedures, Paragraph 1.6
6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of
ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on
submarines, being replaced, shall be given by the Parties
twice annually at the beginning of regular sessions of
the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting the actual
status as of the beginning of that session of the Commission
and covering the period since the last report in the
Commission. The notification shall contain:
(a) the number and type of ICBM launchers (soft or
silo ICBM launcher), deployed prior to 1964, and the number
of launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, on which
dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in
process;
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,
(b) the number of launche,-s for ballistic missiles
on replacement sulsmarin.el, which have begun sea trials;
(e) the number of :_CB1,1 launchers and launchers for
ballistic missiles on submarines, out of the number
a,
dismantled or destroyed which have been replaced by
launchers for ballistic nissiles on modern nuclear-powered.
submarines.
PROCEDURES FOR ABM SITTEMS AND TLEIR COMPONENTS
Protocol Paragraph 7
7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type
(above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number
of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been
completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM
launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.
Procedures Paragraph I.')
5. Notification of the completion of the activities
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the
Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting
the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session
of the Commission.
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.AJ,,reed
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iFuene 4.,
(N)tification Paragra,
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palcaT noABoAHhix zoAolc Hp0113BOAMTCH CT0p0HaMIA 71Ba pa3a B P07, B
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peryaHpHora 00001414 KolEicomm.
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SCC
Session III
A-240
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, May 28, 1974
. Soviet Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col (Ret.) FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Cdr. Atkinson
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Ustinov welcomed the US Component and opened
the meeting. He then stated that the Working Group which had been
established to consider "naval matters" had completed its work
with respect to reaching agreement on an Agreed Interpretation
of Some Terms Pertaining to the Dismantling of Ballistic-Missile
Submarines and SLBM Launchers. He said this work had been done
in accordance with the provisions of Para. 7 of the SCC Regula-
tions, with the goal of ensuring uniform understanding by both
sides of those terms. The Soviet Component proceeds from the
premise that the document which has been worked out and agreed
upon is an internal SCC document which must be entered into the
record of today's meeting. Ustinov concluded by proposing that
he and Graybeal initial the document, which had been done in two
copies each in the English and Russian languages, both copies
being equally authentic.
Commissioner Graybeal said that he was in complete agreement
with Ustinov's statement. He believed that the work of the
Working Group on the "Agreed Interpretations of Some Terms" had
been a useful exercise, and that in accord with Para. 7 of the
Regulations, it should be entered into the record of SCC pro-
ceedings. He said he was prepared to initial the document.
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The SCC Commissioners initialed the documents and exchanged
them in accord with normal procedures (Attachment No. 1).
Mr. Graybeal, having been given the floor by Ustinov,
delivered his prepared comments on Para. I, Section III of the
offensive Procedures (Attachment No. 2).
General Ustinov said that he fully agreed with the compli-
ment Graybeal had paid to the Chairmen and the members of the
Working Group, and with his evaluation of the work which had
been done, specifically with respect to the agreement achieved
on Para. 1II.1 of the offensive Procedures. He stated that he
also agreed with Graybealls remark that we appeared to be nearing
completion of the work required to accomplish our task in con-
nection with the "naval issues."
On the question of Para. 111.4, he said, we had two formula-
tions on the table--the Soviet proposal of May 10 and the US
proposal of May 17. He hoped that the Soviet side would soon
be able to comment on that US proposal, which was currently being
given most careful consideration.
However, he conCluded, in addition to the problem remaining
in Section III, we had a no less important problem, and in the
Soviet view a more complex one, before us. He said he was
referring to the notification issue, which was reflected in
Para. 7 of both Protocols and in Para. 1.6 and Para. 1.5 of the
offensive Procedures and ABM Procedures respectively. He said
the Soviet side, on May 14, had proposed a formulation for
Para. 6 of the offensive Procedures, and he hoped the US side
would soon be able to comment on this Soviet proposal so that
our work could move forward.
Mr. Graybeal said that he did, indeed, have some comments
to make on that Soviet proposal concerning notification pro-
cedures, and delivered his prepared comments (Attachment No. 3).
He also tabled the US Working Document containing proposed
language for the paragraphs on notification in both sets of
Procedures (Attachment No. )4)
General Ustinov said that the Soviet side had listened with
most careful attention to Graybeal's statement and proposal
with respect to notification, and that they would be studied
most carefully. He said he would like to propose, to accelerate
work on this problem, that we utilize the good experience we
had had in the Working Group on SLBM submarine and launcher
dismantling or destruction, and establish a working group to
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-3-
study notification questions and find mutually acceptable
solutions. By doing so, we could gain time, he said, and he
thought that General Georgi and Mr. Karpov would not decline
to head up such a working group.
Mr. Graybeal stated that he would give careful study to the
proposal to establish a working group, and respond at an early
time. He said that though we certainly recognized the capabil-
ities of our Deputy Commissioners, it was his belief that there
was still some unfinished work with respect to Section III. He
was not certain that we would want to burden Karpov and Georgi
with an additional task; as an alternative, perhaps he,
Graybeal, and Ustinov could sit down and work the notification
problem. In any case, he said, we would be in touch through our
Executive Secretaries concerning Ustinov's proposal.
General Ustinov agreed with that approach, said that the
Soviet side had no additional matters to bring up, and asked
whether the US side had any other business.
Mr. Graybeal said that he had nothing further for this
morning's meeting.
General Ustinov said he thought that the next meeting of
the SCC could be scheduled after the US side had decided upon
its response to his proposal for establishing a working group.
However, should we decide that the next meeting would be an
SCC meeting, that would take place on Friday, May 31.
Mr. Graybeal agreed.
General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 11:50 a.m.
Attachments:
1. Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms Pertaining to the
Dismantling of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM
Launchers, Agreed by Commissioners, May 28, 1974, Geneva
2. Commissioner Graybeal's Comments on Section III, Para. 1
of Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms
3. Commissioner Graybeal's Comments on Notification
4. US Working Document on Notification Procedures
Drafted by. PDeSimone:bd Approved by:SNGray eal
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.SECRET Attachment No. 2.
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - SECTION III,
PARA. 1 OF PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
May 28, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, on May 3, 1974, we established
a Working Group to work out procedures for dismantling or
destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM
launchers and to clarify terminology associated with
these procedures. Today, we have completed agreement
on the terminology and exchanged documents thereon for
the record. I am advised that the Working Group has
made significant progress on resolving the "naval issues"
in Section III.
2. It is my understanding that the Working Group
has effectively reached agreement on Section III, Para. 1.
In this connection, it is recognized that final agreement
on Section III, Para. 1 is contingent upon resolving
Section III, Para. 4 along the lines proposed by the
U.S. side on May 17, 1974.
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3. Mr. Commissioner, Section III, paragraph 1
provides for three alternative procedures from which
each Party may choose for dismantling or destruction
of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers.
Should .either side choose to implement the procedure
in Para. 1(b) calling for the removal of the submarine's
missile section, it is understood that if the missile
section is to be replaced, it will not be replaced by
a new section of similar dimensions; any replacement
section must be significantly shorter in overall length
than the missile section it replaces. Similarly, in
implementing the procedures in Para. 1(c) it is understood
that the dimensions and profile of any modified sail will
be distinguishably different from those of the fairwater
which was removed.
4. Mr. Commissioner, with the positive results
being achieved in the Working Group, we appear to be
nearing agreement on all the "naval issues" reflected
in Section III. When we have reached agreement on Section III
we will also have agreement on Section I, Para. 2, and thus
on all aspects of the procedures for strategic offensive
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arms and for ABM systems and their components "Preliminarily
Agreed by Commissioners," except for those aspects dealing
with notification. I want to compliment the Chairmen and
the Soviet and U.S. members of the Working Group on both
the constructive manner in which they approached the problem
and the results achieved to date.
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ffo C N435/4
ET Attachment No. 2
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - NOTIFICATION
.11.hy 28, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, as a result of a great amount
of work done by both Components of the SCC involving
direct, frank and businesslike discussions at all levels,
we appear to be nearing successful resolution of our
assigned task of working out the mutually agreed procedures
called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement
and its Protocol with the exception of one major area --
namely, notification.
2. Timely notification is recognized by both sides
as a required part of the procedures for replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for
strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their
components. This is reflected in Agreed Statement
to the Interim Agreement.
UK'?
II
3. Mr. Commissioner, I must again make absolutely
clear that the United States considers that certain prior
notification measures would promote the implementation of
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the provisions and objectives of the ABM Treaty and the
Interim Agreement by reducing potential misunderstandings
and uncertainties, would enhance the viability of these
and future arms limitation agreements, and thereby
contribute to continued improved relations between our
two countries. The U.S. side believes that prior notifica-
tion would result in significant benefits at little or no
cost or effort, and at no risk to the security interests
of either side.
4. The Soviet side has not addressed the substance
of the various U.SI proposals; rather, it has continually
stated that any form of prior notification is unacceptable
as a matter of principle. In my view, this has resulted
in disappointing exchanges on the subject of notification,
particularly when compared with the in-depth, direct and
frank exchanges we have had on other subjects. The Soviet
side has not engaged in direct and frank exchanges on the
essence or substance of the various U.S. proposals on
notification.
III
5. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side has carefully
reviewed Soviet statements and proposals involving
notification, including the Soviet proposal of May 14
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for Para. 1.6 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.
In the interest of finding a mutually acceptable solution
to this one remaining issue, today I am tabling a Working
Document of the U.S. SCC Component which fully takes into
account the views and proposals of both sides, and provides
a satisfactory solution to the overall notification problem.
(Read and pass to Commissioner Ustinov Working Document.)
6. Mr. Commissioner, you will note that the new
language for Para. 1.6 incorporates proposals and formulations
previously suggested by each side. Specifically, the U.S.
side has made a major move toward a solution to the notifica-
tion issue by dropping the requirement for reporting on the
number of replacement SLBM launchers on submarines which
have been launched but have not yet begun sea trials. The
U.S. side is willing to make this major change in Para. 1.6(b)
provided the Soviet side accepts in principle the U.S.
approach and proposed language for Para. I.6(a) and for
Para. 7 of the Protocol.
7. You will also note that we have incorporated the
Soviet proposal for Para. I.6(c), although we consider such
reporting unnecessary and somewhat overlapping with that
reporting called for in other portions of Para. 1.6.
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8. You will also note that we have accepted Soviet-
proposed language for Para. 1.5 of the Procedures for ABM
Systems and Their Components.
9. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side has made a
significant move today; one which takes full account of
Soviet views and proposals, and which is designed to provide
a mutually acceptable solution to the one remaining issue.
IV
10. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side has now removed
from its proposed notification procedures all requirements
for notification that could possibly be construed to be
"prior notification." This U.S. proposal provides for a
mutually acceptable solution to the notification issue in
the Procedures we are currently charged with working out.
11. Mr. Commissioner, I fail to understand the reluctance
of the Soviet side to provide in these Procedures for an
exchange of information that would help meet the objectives
of the SCC by reducing misunderstandings and uncertainties.
Although the U.S. side has made this move to facilitate
agreement on the procedures we are charged with working out,
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the United States remains firmly convinced that prior
notification measures are valuable in reducing potential
misunderstandings and uncertainties and in enhancing
the viability of existing and future arms limitation
agreements.
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Attachment No. 4
SECRET
Working Document of
U.S. SCC Component
May 28, 1974
NOTIFICATION
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Protocol, Paragraph 7.
"7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of
launchers on which dismantling or destruction is in process
and the number of replacement launchers; and"
Procedures, Paragraph 1.6.
"6. Notification of replacement and dismantling or
destruction activities shall be given at the beginning of
each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission,
reflecting their status as of the beginning of that session
and covering the period since the last report in the Commis-
sion. The notification shall contain:
(a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964
and for ballistic-missile launchers on older
submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM
launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher)
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on which dismantling or destruction is in
process and the number and type on which
dismantling or destruction action has been
completed since the last report in the
Commission.
(b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the number
on submarines which have begun sea trials
since the last report in the Commission.
(c) The number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, out
of the number on which dismantling or
destruction has been completed, which have
been replaced by launchers for ballistic
missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines
since the last report in the Commission."
PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
Protocol, Paragraph 7
1I7.
Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of
ABM launchers and the number of ABM radars on which dis-
mantling or destruction is in process, and the number of
replacement ABM launchers and ABM radars."
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. -3--
Procedures: Paragraph 1.5
"5. Notification of the completion of the activities
provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in
the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually
reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular
session of the Commission."
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Attachment No L.
Nftw, Geneva Agreed by Commissioners
May 28, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMNISSION
AGREED INTERPRETATION OF SOME TERMS PERTAINING TO THE
DISMANTLING OF BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES AND SLBM LAUNCHERS
To ensure uniform understanding of some terms
to the dismantling of ballistic-missile submarines
launchers..., the Commissioners have agreed that, for
of the provisions of Section III of the Procedures
offensive arms, the terms below shall mean:
1. SAIL - the structure above the outer hull
the bridge, conning tower, and retractable devices
pertaining
and SLBM
the purposes
for strategic
which encloses
(antennas,
periscopes, etc.).
2. FAIRWATER - on submarines on which the upper parts of
the missile launch tubes protrude into the enclosure which is
adjacent to and an extension of the sail, the fairwater is the
structure above the outer hull which immediately encloses the
missile launch tubes.
3. SUPERSTRUCTURE - on submarines on which the upper parts
of the missile launch tubes do not protrude into the fairwater,
the superstructure is the structure above the outer hull which
encloses the missile launch tubes protruding out of the pressure
hull.
4. LAUNCH TUBE - the cylindrical structure which is welded
to the pressure hull and encloses the missile, including the
Nolirmo' complete missile launcher.
frio
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SCC
SCSSION 111
A-230
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENE:VA, SWITZERLAND
DATE: May. 21, 1974
TIME: 1100 - 1240
PLACE: US Nssion, Geneva
SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting, May 21, 1974
USSR
PARTICIPANTS: US
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. R. A. Anderson
Cdr. G. Atkinson
TW. Col. F. P. DeSimon,
Lt. Cdr. R. K. Partin
Mr. P. Afanascnko
(InLerproter)
Mr. V. P. Kerev-
Mr. A. S. Yel(s-ovv
Capt. V. P. Yfl/necsov
Cap?,. Ye. G. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Mr. B. Yu. Marrnuk
(interpreter)
FitzGeraid opened the meeting stating that in the continued
absence of General Georgi he was pleased to welcome Karpov and his
colleagues of the Soviet Component of the Working Group to the
promises of the US Mission. FitzGerald turned the floor over
to Karpov.
Karpov stated he would like to make a few comments regard-
ing Para. I11.1(e) submitted by the US side at the previoup
meeting of the Working Group. He then gave a prepared state-
ment (Attachment No. 1).
FitzGerald stated the US side would take into account
the remarks made by the Soviet side this morning and pay appro-
priate attention to them. He added that on the part of the US
side, he also had some comments to make. FitzGerald then read
his prepared statement (Attachment No. 2).
Karpov stated that he understood FitzGeraldis statement
to be a concise and accurate historical review of the events
which had taken place over the last two weeks. He asked "But
what does it mean in terms of our effort to reach mutually
agreed procedures?"
FitzGerald stated that there was an old Latin saying which
would be appropriate and for which there was a precise counter-
part in Russian--"Repetition is the mother of learning."
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FitzGerald stated that he thought the purpose of this so-called
"historical review" was to indicate that, while both sides had
made some contributions, the US Component feels its contributions
have been more positive and more recent than those of the Soviet
Component as regards reaching, a solution for Section. III.
Karpov responded that his understanding was that the US
side wanted to say- that it had set forth everything and it is up
to the Soviets to decide now. He stated he did not think the
situation is like this. Karpov pointed out that both sides had
tried to introduce changes in its initial drafts and that it
seemed to him we had not exhausted the possibilities for further
negotiation. He stated that he thought the solution of questions
to Section III, particularly Para. 1, should be considered in
the light of both sides searching for mutually acceptable solu-
tions. It was not only up to the Soviet side to make further
decisions; it was also up to the US side. Karpov then gave a
prepared statement (Attachment No. 3) and submitted a new Soviet
proposal to replace the US-proposed subparagraph (e) (Attachment
No. )4)
FitzGerald stated that his preliminary reaction to the
Soviet proposal is that it was a step in the right direction.
Karpov interjected that the Soviet side was moving to meet the
US side "half-way." FitzGerald commented that any time either
.side shows willingness to meet the other half-way, it is a step
in the right direction. He would study the proposal more closely
and discuss it with thq US advisors during a break and Karpov
and he might decide how they would proceed thereafter.
Following a 40-minute break, FitzGerald commented he believed
that the advisors had had time for useful discussion and that the
remaining order of business was to set a time and place for the
next meeting. FitzGerald proposed the next meeting be held at
the Soviet Mission at 1100 hours on Friday, 24 May 1974 and that
it would be a Working Group meeting. Karpov agreed. FitzGerald
commented that the agenda would be as agreed in his private
conversation with Karpov. (Comment: FitzGerald and Karpov
had privately agreed that Friday's meeting would be devoted to
discussion of an agreed formulation for the "H-Class only" para-
graph which will, in the future, be called Para. 111.1(c).
It was also agreed that the Soviet side might also, but not
necessarily, table a counter-proposal for Para. 111.)-!-).
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Meeting adjourned at 1240.
Attachments:
1. Karpov Statement, May 21, 1974
2. Col. FitzGeraldis Comments: Section III of Procedures
for Strategic Offensive Arms
3. Karpov s Second Statement, May 21, 1974
Working Document of the Soviet SCG Component,
Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, Section
III, paragraph 1
DRAVTED BY:
Approved by;
13.WIAin:bd C.G. FitzGerld
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Attachment No.
KARPOV STATEMENT, May 21, 1974
The Soviet SCC Component has carefully studied
the proposal for paragraph 111.1(e) (old designation) of
the strategic offensive arms Procedures, tabled by the
U.S. side at the May 17 Working Group meeting.
Unfortunately, those changes which were introduced
into the text of the May 10, 1974 U.S. proposal on this
very question, do not alter the essence of the U.S.
side's position on the question under discussion. There-
fore, the new wording of the U.S. proposal, just as the
previous wording, cannot be accepted by the Soviet side.
We have already spoken on this subject and would
like to emphasize once again: like the U.S. side, the
Soviet Component of the SCC, in its consideration of
questions pertaining to the scope of dismantling of sub-
marines being replaced, fully takes into account the
provisions of paragraph 3 of the strategic offensive arms
Protocol, agreed by both sides, and is invariably guided
by them.
The Soviet SCC Component is convinced that the
proposals it tabled for paragraph III.1(d) (old designa-
tion) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures are
fully consistent with the criteria set forth in para-
graph 3 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol.
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I must say frankly that we have not heard any
convincing arguments fl.om the U.S. side that could
change our point of view on this question.
At the same time, speaking of the scope of
dismantling activities and the possibilities of using
replaced submarines for purposes not inconsistent with
the Interim Agreement, the U.S. approach to this appears
to us to be academic and divorced from reality, and is
thus inapplicable for solving those specific tasks which
ensue from the provisions of the Interim Agreement with
respect to the replacement of ballistic-missile submarines
of older types by new submarines.
First, the U.S. proposal is overloaded with provisions
which in essence are unrelated to accomplishing the task
of putting SUN launchers on replaced submarines into a
condition that precludes the possibility of-their use for
launching STaMs, formulated in paragraph 3 of the strategic
offensive arms Protocol. This applies, above all, to the
provisions concerning hull liners and frame segments.
I would think that the discussion of these questions
at the previous meeting of the Working Group speaks for
itself.
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Second, both sides proceed from the premise that
after dismantling activities are carried out in
accordance with the agreed procedures, replaced sub-
marines may, at the discretion of the sides, be used
for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement
and the Protocol thereto. But for one side or the other
to have such an opportunity, the replaced submarine must
not simply have its capability of being used for launching
SLBMs removed, but must remain seaworthy. In this respect
the U.S. proposals are unsatisfactory since in fact they
ignore the necessity to realistically take into account
the particular nature of the subject referred to in these
specific procedures.
And although the new wording of item 4 in subpara-
graph (e) does contain some positive movement in the U.S.
sidets position, on the whole it is not satisfactory from
the point of view of what was said above.
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Attachment No.
COL. FITZGERALD'S COMMENTS: SECTION III OF PROCEDURES
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Working Group Meeting
May 21, 1974
1. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, we agreed at the May 17
Working Group meeting to continue our exchange of views
on the alternative proposals for ballistic-missile submarine
and SLBM launcher dismantling. The U.S. side believes
such exchanges are useful.
2. At the SCC meetings on April 30 and May 7,
Commissioner Graybeal set forth the U.S. views regarding
the procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-
missile submarines and SLBM launchers replaced by new
ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers. General
Georgi and I, at Working Group meetings on May 10 and
May 17, respectively, elaborated on the details of the
U.S. proposals, and made some preliminary observations
regarding the Soviet proposal of May 10.
R. FT
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II
3. The U.S. side Continues to believe that the U.S.
proposals in the Strategic Offensive Arms Joint Draft
Text of April 19, 1974, as revised by the U.S. side on
April 30 and May 7 and in the Working Group, provide a
firm basis for agreement on Section III. We are agreed
that the task before us is to work out mutually agreed
procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction
and notification thereof for strategic offensive arms
called for by the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.
There is also complete agreement between us on the funda-
mental point that the procedures for the dismantling or
destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM
launchers must satisfy the agreed criteria contained
in Para. 3 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol.
4. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, in SCC discussions on
Section III of the strategic offensive arms Procedures,
the U.S. side initially proposed three alternative
procedures which we believe fully satisfy these agreed
criteria. The Soviet side initially made one proposal
which, in the U.S. view, did not adequately meet those
criteria. The U.S. side studied the Soviet proposal as
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it was explained during -SCC II, and, in an effort to move
negotiations forward, added a fourth proposal which would
apply to one type of nuclear ballistic-missile submarine.
The U.S. side believes this proposal meets the criteria
the sides have agreed upon, when applied to this one type
of nuclear ballistic-missile submarine.
5. The U.S. side has made continued efforts during
our discussions of Section III to move the negotiations
forward toward the goal of achieving mutually agreed
procedures. As a result of our discussions at SCC II
and this session,'the U.S. side has proposed revised
wording for the U.S. proposal in Para. III.1(e) on April 30,
May 10 and May 17. On May 7, the U.S. side stated it was
prepared to drop the requirements for "predesignated
shipyards" and "agreed shipyards" in Paras. III.1(b),
(c) and (e), if we could reach agreement based on a new approach
for solving this question. After the Soviet side explained
its views and tabled its proposal in response to this new
U.S. initiative, the U.S. side proposed an alternative
Para. 111.4 on May 17 which takes into account the consid-
erations set forth by the Soviet side. In addition, the
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U.S. side withdrew Para. III.1(a)--the sinking option.
Each of these actions has represented positive and
significant movement by the U.S. side toward finding
a solution to the complex problem in Section III.
6. On April 30 the Soviet side tabled a revised
proposal for ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher
dismantling. The U.S. side considered this revision a
step forward in our efforts to reach mutually agreed
procedures for Section III. However, as Commissioner
Graybeal remarked in his statement on May 7, the U.S.
side did not find this proposal acceptable as replacement
for Para. III.1(e) of the April 19, 1974 Joint Draft Text.
III
7. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, at the May 10 Working
Group meeting, General Georgi stated that the U.S. side
would carefully study any Soviet-proposed formulations
to resolve issues remaining in Section III. If the Soviet
side has additional clarifications or modifications to
its May 10 proposal, the U.S. side will give them the
same careful consideration that is being given to that
proposal.
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Attachment No. 3
KARPOVIS SECOND STATEMENT
May 21, 1974
At the last Working Group meeting the U.S. side
expressed a view according to which the main objection to
the Soviet proposal for paragraph III.1(d) is that it is
intended for not one but for various types of submarines.
We also understood the remarks of the U.S. side to mean
that on condition that the Soviet proposal be applied to
only one certain type of submarine, the U.S. side would be
prepared to regard the Soviet proposal for subpara-
graph (d) more favorably.
We remain convinced that the May 10, 197! proposal
of the Soviet SCC Component for subparagraph (d) is
fully consistent with the criteria agreed by as, as well
as with the tasks before us in the matter of working out
adequate procedures.
At the same time, desiring to facilitate achievement
of a mutually acceptable understanding on questions of the
dismantling of submarines being replaced, the Soviet side
is in principle prepared to consider the possibility of
applying the procedures it proposed on May 10, 1974
(subparagraph (d)) to only one type of submarine, namely,
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines of older types.
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We are prepared to consider such a solution on
condition that the U.S. side agree in principle to the
substance of the Soviet proposal regarding the scope of
dismantling of submarines being replaced, and to provisions
*designed to ensure the possibility of using replaced sub-
marines for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim
Agreement.
In the event the sides agree in principle to such a
solution, specific formulations could he discussed further
An order to work them out in detail on a mutually
acceptable basis.'
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Attachment No. 4
Official translation
. _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ .
Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
May 21, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STR4.TEGI_(; OFFENSIVE ARMS
Section III, paragraph 1
(d) Dismantling of ballistic missile launchers on
older nuclear-powered submarines may also be accomplished
by removing, in the open, the missile launch tubes
together. with tne fairwater and those sections of the
outer hull and pressure hull above the missile compart-
ment which contain all of the penetrations for the
missile launch tubes.
The pressure hull and outer hull may be restored
by welding into place new sections without missile launch
tube penetrations or missile hatches. The sail and the
deck may be put in a condition ensuring that the sub-
marine remains seaworthy when used for purposes not
inconsistent with the Interim Agreement.
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SESSION -III
A- 227
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
DATE May 17, 1974
TIME: 1100-1325 Hours
PLACE Soviet Mission
May 17, 1974
USSR
SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting,
PARTICIPANTS: US
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. R. A. Anderson
Cmdr. G. Atkinson
Lt, Col, F. P. DeSimone
Lt. Cmdx;. R. K. Martin
Mr. P. Afanasenko
(Interpreter)
Mr. V. P. Karpov
Mr. A. S. Yereskovsky
Capt.. V. P. Kuznetsov
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
(Interpreter)
Geneva
Karpov opened the meeting of the Working Group and turned
the floor over to FitzGerald.
FitzGerald thanked Karpov. He began by recalling that,
at the last meeting of the working group on 10 May headed by
Georgi and Karpov, Karpov had made a suggestion that the time
for long speeches and repetition of old arguments as such is
over. FitzGerald stated he intended to proceed directly to the
task at hand. He said he would like to submit for the consider-
ation of the Soviet side two working documents of the US SCC
Component which have to do with two paragraphs of-Section III
of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.
FitzGerald handed over the first U.S. document--a revised
proposal for paragraph III.1(e) (Attachment No. 1). He stated
that in looking over the document the Soviet side would see the
U.S. Component had made two changes to our earlier proposal for
that paragraph and without reading the entire document he wanted
to call Karpov's attention to the changes which had been made.
First of all he stated that, inasmuch as we have not had a response
(FitzGerald commented that this was not a criticism of the Soviet
side as it had not yet had a chance to respond) to Graybeal's
proposal of May 14 to delete paragraph III.1(a) the U.S. side
has kept the same paragraph number?i.e., (e). FitzGerald stated
this was also a practical matter?changing the paragraph letters
would confuse people in both Washington and Moscow.
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. FitzGerald continued, that as for the changes which we have
introduced to our earlier document there are two. First, the
term "hull liner" is added within the parenthesis in sub-
paragraph (2). This is done on the basis of discussion within
the FitzGerald/Yereskovsky working group and since we appear
to have a common understanding on these terms, the U.S. side
thought it appropriate to add the term "hull liner" to our
proposal. Second, FitzGerald called the attention of the Soviet
Component of the working group to sub-paragraph ().i-). FitzGerald
stated that, having in mind certain comments and questions
raised by Karpov at the last meeting (May 10) of the working
group, the U.S. side has made a change which we believe goes
a considerable distance to answer the questions asked of General
Georgi.
FitzGerald stated he believed that our naval experts,
Kuznetsov, Atkinson, and Martin, could agree the new wording
in paragraph (4) does much to restore the seaworthiness of the
submarine which. has been dismantled.
FitzGerald asked Karpov if he had any comments or questions
on the revised U.S. proposal for paragraph III.1(e). Karpov
stated that he did have some questions.?
Karpov stated that, first, as far as he understands, the
U.S. side continues to insist that this procedure should be
applicable only to submarines constructed prior to 1965.
FitzGerald responded that fundamentally that is true, adding
that, as General Georgi had pointed out, the procedure set forth
in (e) applies only to one class--for submarines whose missile
launch tubes protrude into the fairwater. FitzGerald stated
Georgi had also indicated that, as far as the specific date is
concerned, it would appear to the U.S. side that, if there could
be a meeting of the minds regarding types of submarines, it
would be a relatively easy problem to reach an agreement regarding
dates.
Karpov stated that in this connection he wanted to invite
attention to the Soviet proposal set forth on May 10. He stated
that in the Soviet proposed procedures for paragraph III.1(d)
the provisions are equally applicable to all types of submarines.
He stated that the point in this respect is that in Section III
the procedures should be alternative procedures applicable to
all types of submarines covered by the Interim Agreement and
Protocol. Karpov pointed out that at the last formal meeting
Graybeal had mentioned that the U.S. proposed procedures were
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alternatives and, at the same time, Graybeal indicated a'
procedure could be formulated for one separate class. Karpov
stated that he didn't quite see the logic of the U.S. proposals.
He said "if we do agree there should be alternative procedures,
then we should also agree that procedures should be applicable
to all types of submarines covered under the Interim Agreement
and Protocol." He added that two of the U.S. proposals are
alternatives; the other is not an alternative but a procedure
for only one type of submarine.
Karpov stated the Soviet side bases its view on the need
to work out procedures for Section III. He said the Soviet
proposal dated May 10 is formulated to cover submarines whose
missile tubes protrude into fairwater and submarines whose
missile tubes protrude into the superstructure. Karpov pointed
out this could be seen in the very first phrase of the Soviet
proposal for paragraph III.1(d).
Karpov stated he wanted to pose a direct question. He
asked "What does the U.S. find unacceptable in this proposal?"
Atkinson stated the answer to that was the same today as the
answer General Georgi gave at the last meeting of the working
group. Karpov responded that he didn't pose that question to
Georgi, so the answer couldn't be the same.
FitzGeraid stated he believed the sides are agreed that two
criteria must be met in any .dismantling or destruction procedure.
These two criteria are well known; they are that the procedures
must be verifiable and that the procedure should preclude a
rapid reactivation time. FitzGerald said the U.S. side has
proposed from the beginning of our discussions three alternative
procedures which we believe fully meet both criteria. He stated
that the Soviet side initially made a proposal which the U.S.
side did not consider adequately met either criteria. However,
in an effort to move negotiations forward, the U.S. side had
made a close study of the Soviet proposal, as explained during
SCO-II, and had added a fourth proposal which the U.S. says can
apply to one class of submarines but to no other. The U.S. side
believes this proposal meets the verification, and reactivation
time criteria which the sides have agreed upon.
Karpov stated that he was in full agreement with the U.S.
side that we do have agreed criteria and that agreed criteria
must be the foundation of the specific procedures. Karpov said,
however, he did not understand why the U.S. proposals met the
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criteria but that the Soviet proposal does not. He asked what
might be the problem with the Soviet proposal--is the problem
that the Soviet proposal would apply both to submarines whose
missile tubes protrude into the fairwater and to those whose
missile tubes do not.
Martin referred to the revised U.S. proposal for paragraph
111.1(e) as tabled today and .stated that if the Soviet side
restored the submarine under this proposal it would be equally
clear to both sides that the submarine could no longer be capable
of carrying ballistic-missile launchers. This is so because
there is a clearly visible area aft of the sail, which we have
been calling fairwater, which is no longer there. Martin stated
that there was not the same assurance with restoration of a
submarine whose "outer hull" :would be restored above the area
where ballistic-missile launchers had protruded into the pressure
hull. Once this was done there could not be the same assurance,
as with the other class, that the submarine would not be capable
of carrying ballistic-missile launchers.
Karpov stated he did not quite see how it affects the problem
of verification and asked what is the difference between the types?
Martin pointed out, for example, that if the Soviet procedure
were followed just the simple matter of counting submarines which
carry ballistic missiles and those which do not would be difficult.
Karpov stated that, if he understood it, on submarines where
missiles do not protrude into the fairwater, the "sail" has
nothing to do with missile launch tubes. What counts, he stated,
is the superstructure and the outline of the superstructure. He
stated it is not clear, when the missile launch tubes, outer hull
and pressure hull have been removed and the submarine is restored
by placing sections without penetrations for missile launch tubes
and decking, why the difference is not detectable by national
technical means. He stated that although he was not a naval expert,
it was his understanding of the problem that he really could not
see any real convincing arguments against the Soviet proposal
which applies to both types of submarines, either from the stand-
point of verification or reactivation time.
Karpov invited the U.S. side's attention again to the
proposal of the Soviet side, tabled May 10. He stated the
Soviet side continues to believe this proposal meets to a full
degree the agreed criteria as well as the purposes and goals
for Section III of the Procedures. He added that, of course,
the Soviet side would yet another time give careful attention
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to the U.S. proposal. Talking frankly, however, he stated he
saw no difference in the proposal tabled today from what was
already tabled before.
Karpov stated he had some questions regarding the revised
U.S. proposal for Para. III.1(e). He stated he did not quite
fully understand FitzGerald's early reference to discussion
with Yereskovsky as a reason for including in sub-paragraph (2)
cf the proposal the term "hull_ liner." Karpov asked what is the
connection between this and the discussion with Yereskovsky.
FitzGerald stated he would attempt to answer Karpov's
question. First, he did not mean to imply that there had been
any agreement between him and Yereskovsky to change wording in
the proposals. He stated the U.S. side felt that given the
substance of the conversations between our naval experts, if
a dismantling or destruction procedure were to be adequate, it
would have to include the term "hull liner." Again, he repeated
he did not intend to imply agreement by Yereskovsky.
To change formulations, Karpov stated that in this respect
he had a question for the American naval experts that is: How
can one remove from a submarine the launch tube and the hull
crown plating without removing the hull liner? Atkinson
responded that all three would come out and, as such, there
should be no problem with including the additional term "hull
liner." Karpov said that he was still not getting an answer to
his question and asked again "Is it possible to remove hull crown
plating and launch tubes without removing the hull liner?
FitzGerald stated, "No, to give you a short direct answer."
Karpov responded that, if that was the case, he did not see the
reason for making up things like this--the main point is that
hull liners are removed. Atkinson repeated that, if that is
the case, then there should be no problem in including the term
"hull liner" in the list of things which are removed.
Karpov stated that the reason we should not include the
term "hull liner" is simple--if we include this then we must
include other things like "port side tube" and "starboard side
tube," etc. Karpov commented that everything can be reduced to
an absurdity.
FitzGerald stated that in his view it was time to go on to
other things which may help to clarify this item. FitzGerald
stated that again he finds himself working backwards, which is a
common feeling with him when dealing with Karpov; he also stated
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that he had the same problem with substance as Karpov as he too
was approaching this as a layman. FitzGerald suggested that,
perhaps when the sides begin discussing ABM radars, he may be
able to participate as a specialist. FitzGerald stated that
for the time being, in all these questions concerning bile pro-
posals of the two sides, he, also must rely on advisors. As
regards which proposal was better, clearly Karpov and he were
getting difference advice from their naval experts. Karpov
stated the Soviet side finds their information better.
FitzGerald stated he wanted to return to Karpov's original
question: that is, what portion of the Soviet proposal is of
concern to the U.S. side--e.g., is it procedures which apply to
all classes? FitzGerald stated that that was the fundamental
issue between us--the Soviet proposal would apply to all classes;?
the U.S. side feels that our proposal, part of which the Soviet
side has incorporated in its proposal, could apply only to classes
with ballistic-missile launchers which protrude into the fairwater.
FitzGerald also commented that there is also the usual difference
in approach--the U.S. side likes details (Karpov commented,
academics."). FitzGerald sUggested that, if we could resolve
the fundamental issue, we could probably resolve the other issues
more readily. He commented that these are technical details and
technicians have a way of reaching agreement as we have already
seen in our discussions of terminology. FitzGerald stated to
Karpov that he hoped this answered his question.
Karpov stated that, in any case, he regarded it as a state-
ment of the U.S. position. In this connection he wanted to ask
a question regarding sub-paragraph ()-i-) of the U.S. proposal for
Para. III.1(e). Karpov read sub-paragraph (4).
Karpov stated that any submarine is designed to have a
certain outline or profile and that in order to change it additional
engineering work must be done and this will require additional
expense--expense possibly beyond that required for dismantling.
He asked "how acute is the need for this procedure in order to
make the submarine unable to carry ballistic missiles?" He added
that, as far as he understood submarine design on this type of
submarine, besides the launch tubes, there might be other items
aft of them that need to be enclosed during restoration--these
items might have nothing to do with launch tubes. He also asked
that, if both sides agree missile launch tubes are removed and
new sections of pressure hull without launch tube penetrations
are welded back in, then it Would seem we would have agreement.
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However, there would have to be an additional enclosure to cover
the area aft of the tubes--otherwise the submarine would look
something like a two-humped dromedary.
FitzGerald asked Karpov toclarify that this equipment aft
of the missile tubes on this type submarine was not related to
launching missiles. Karpov stated that the equipment aft of the
missile launch tubes in the fairwater was not connected with
missile launch tubes.
FitzGerald stated that the U.S.-proposed Para. III.1(e)(4)
is an effort to meet valid considerations which the Soviet side
set forth to General Georgi on May 10. As Georgi had indicated
and as our naval experts have discussed, the question of
restoration of the sail to make the submarine seaworthy is an
engineering question--nevertheless, resolution of the question
must be accomplished within the agreed criteria. Karpov responded'
that that was primarily the reason behind his question. FitzGerald
responded that Para. III.1(e) was an acceptable procedure in our
point of view--if Soviet engineers decided it would hot be possible
to make the submarine seaworthy without extending the sail
completely over the area where the missile tubes had protruded,
then the sides would indeed have a problem resolving this issue.
FitzGerald commented that it was his view that both Soviet and
U.S. naval engineers have vast expertise, knowledge and resource-
fulness and that they should be able to solve the problem in a
way that could meet the agreed criteria.
Karpov suggested the Working Group take a break for refresh-
ments. FitzGerald agreed.
Following the break, FitzGerald began by stating that he
would like to return to the second working document which the
U.S. Component of the SCC wanted to submit to the Soviet side
for its consideration today. The proposal, he stated, was a new
formulation for Para. 111.4 for the Procedures for Strategic
Offensive Arms. Karpov stated that he hoped the U.S. side had
accepted the Soviet formulation. FitzGerald stated that the
U.S. side did not quite accept it, but that we think we have met
Soviet considerations by combining our earlier proposal with the
proposal of the Soviets. He stated we believed we had reached
a formulation close to what the two sides could agree on.
FitzGerald handed over the document to Karpov (Attachment No. 2)
and read the new wording. FitzGerald commented that he would like
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to add that the "designated areas" which the U.S. side has in
mind in the new proposal are those Ustinov had indicated in his
statement of last week. FitzGerald added that, in his view,
the new formulation speaks for itself quite well.
Karpov responded that he was not so sure the specifics speak
for themseives--he had some questions. First, what does the term
"designated areas" signify--does it apply to areas already known
by the sides or is there a requirement to supply additional "areas"
for dismantling or destruction? FitzGerald responded that each
side knew the areas referred to at the present time and at some
time before the Procedures and Protocol are signed by Commissioners,
it would be necessary to reaffirm the areas mentioned by Ustinov
last week. He added that in .the future, if either side or both
were to decide dismantling was to be accomplished in areas other
than those designated, there would be an obligation on the side
making the choice to notify the other side. The side making the
decision to accomplish dismantling in another area would not require
the approval 2f the second side to do Q0, nor could the other side
place any resGrictions on the rirst side.
Karpov stated he had a Second question--what does the term
11
major shipyards" mean? FitzGerald responded that the term means,
in essence, a shipyard which is of such a size as to be capable
of handling, docking and overhauling the type of submarine being
dismantled OT destroyed. Karpov stated that, if the Soviets have
ahipyards where dismantling can be performed and shipyards where
dismantling cannot be performed., ,then we should not be talking
about shipyards where dismantling cannot be performed. FitzGerald
commented that we could attempt to adjust the wording to meet the
desires of the Soviet side; we welcomed new suggestions the Soviet
side might make. Karpov responded that he was still at the stage
of asking questions to get the clear essence?the Soviet proposal
was clear to the Soviet side and does not correspond to the U.S.
proposal.
FitzGerald commented that there was a basic difference
between the two sides--the Soviet side had proposed there be a
choice between shipyards and areas for dismantling. He pointed
out that it was not clear to the U.S. side whether "areas"
involved shipyards as well. Karpov stated he would not attempt
to answer such a question--if there are no shipyards in an area
then dismantling can't be done there. Karpov stated that the
Soviet proposal really speaks for itself--the proposal is that
dismantling be performed at existing shipyards known to both
sides or in designated areas. The U.S. proposal just seemed to
confuse the issue.
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FitzGerald stated he would repeat his earlier statement--that
is the Soviet proposal involved a choice whereby dismantling could
be accomplished in existing shipyards or in designated areas
(Karpov interjected "If we go beyond those areas"). FitzGerald
commented the U.S. side had not understood that and that our
wording makes it clear that other areas are shipyards. DeSimone
commented that there could be confusion between the terms
"shipyards" and "designated areas" in the Soviet-proposed language.
He pointed out it was logical to assume that the other designated
areas are also places where shipyards exist, and therefore the
U.S.-proposed wording provided for the same possibilities as did
the Soviet proposal, but stated things much more precisely. There
could be no question that dismantling would take place in shipyards
known to both sides.
Karpov stated he had a third question. He asked "What do
you mean by the term 'ship construction?'"
FitzGerald said that, if there were doubts as to the meaning
of this expression, the U.S. -side would be happy to add such a
definition to the list of terms he and Yereskovsky were compiling.
He then gave the floor:to Atkinson.
Atkinson answered that if the Soviet side had allowed Capt.
Mazerkin and himself to continue discussions on ship construction
we would now know. Karpov stated he didn't recognize that there
was much disagreement because the subject of ship construction
wasn't discussed. Martin pointed out that in SALT VII in Helsinki,
the term "under construction," as it applied to submarines had
been discussed by Capt. McLean and Admiral Sinetsky. He pointed
out to Karpov that, if there were Soviet concern regarding
definitions in the new U.S. proposed Para. 111.4, he would be
glad to sit down at any time with Kuznetsov and work out coming
to an agreement on what is meant by the terms.
FitzGerald stated that he believed Atkinson could clarify
the term "shipyard." Atkinson stated that a "shipyard" was any
place that has enough depth of water which would handle the tonnage
of an SSBN or larger. Atkinson commented that the wording in the
now U.S. proposal tabled today was an attempt on our part to
broaden the definition as the Soviets had apparently objected to
the term "where ballistic-missile submarines are constructed" in
our earlier formulation. FitzGerald pointed out that the U.S.
side could of course, go back to the term "ballistic-missile
submarines vice "ships"--we had felt this was one of the areas
where the Soviet side had problems and that our new wording here
could solve the problem.
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Karpov stated that his questions were for clarification and
added that now we have more or less an understanding of the U.S,
side's position. He stated he had no other comments on the U.S,
proposals; he wanted to do his homework and refrain from further
comments. He added that, if we do agree to have another Working
Group meeting, the Soviet side may discuss these new proposals
then. Karpov then asked FitzGerald if he had any thoughts
regarding another meeting of the Working Group. FitzGerald stated
he did not--he felt the U.S. side had made two worthwhile contri-
butions. Karpov asked if FitzGerald believed we did not need to
discuss Section III any further. FitzGerald stated that the U.S.
side had in mind that, when the Working Group had been established,
Ustinov had said one or two meetings of the Working Group would be
sufficient to make recommendations to Commissioners. He added,
however, that Karpov had mentioned the Soviet side had homework
to do and suggested that maybe we do need one more meeting.
Karpov stated that it would be agreeable to him to meet on
Tuesday, May 21, to discuss all of these questions. .Karpov stated
that before this meeting ended he had two more items to address--
not in relation to the discussion today but on related subjects.
First, regarding Para. III.1(a) he had been instructed by Ustinov
to accept the U.S. proposal to drop this paragraph. The second,
regarding further discussion of submarine dismantling procedures,
he wanted to come to an agreement on how to proceed with this
question. He stated that, in fact, what we have are two sets
of proposals--those proposed by the U.S. and those proposed by
the Soviet Union. He stated that up to now, for some reason,
our discussions have been limited primarily to the proposals of
the U.S. side. His suggestion was that, at our next meeting, we
should exchange views not only on the U.S. proposal but also on
the Soviet proposal tabled May 10. Karpov urged that the U.S. side
give thought to the Soviet May 10 proposal and added that the fact
the Soviet side has no idea as to what the U.S. objections to the
Soviet proposal are is a major stumbling block. He concluded
stating we can now adjourn the meeting; his understanding being
that we will meet again on Tuesday, the 21st at 11:00 o'clock.
FitzGerald stated that, having in mind a Karpov-FitzGerald
meeting in SCC-II, he trusted this would not be the second longest
adjourn-I'm-1;0f a meeting; however, he would like to address Karpov's
last statements in reverse order. First, FitzGerald thought the
U.S. side had made clear its considerations on the Soviet proposal
for Para. I1I.1(d). He commented that at the moment he could
not think of anything more he could say on the subject, but that
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he would ask Cdrs. Atkinson and Martin to relook at the problem.
He could, however, not prouLse that our views would be new ones.
Second, FitzGerald also wanted to state he was pleased that
Karpov on instructions from Ustinov had accepted the U.S. proposal
to delete Para. 111.1(a).
FitzGerald commented with regard to the meeting of the
Working Group on Tuesday that he would be happy to agree, with
one qualification. That is, the U.S. side is not yet certafp-1
whether Georgi will have returned, and asked if Karpov would not
object to FitzGerald chairing the meeting. Karpov commented he
had "absolutely no objection."
The meeting adjourned at 1325.
Attachments
A/S
SOC:AKMartin:bjg
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.Attachment No
7!, . -
k, g
Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 17, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ABMS ?PROCEDURES
SM.71761711. PARAGRA.P e ?
III.1(e) for nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub-
marines originally constructed prior to 1965
whose ballistic missile launch tubes protrude
into the fairvater, removing the missile launch
tubes in the open as set forth below.
(1) That entire part of the fairwater and
outer hull above the missile compartment of
the submarine shall be removed.
(2)
That section of the missile compartment
pressure hull (hull crown plating, hull
liners-and frame segments) which contains
all of the hull penetrations for the missile
launch tubes, shall be removed.
(3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then
be restored only by welding into place new
sections without launch tube penetrations.
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(4) No fa,irwater :shall be replaced. The
sail may be re.stored? but shall not extend
beyond the former location of the forward
edr,e of the. forward. missile launch tube.
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Attachment No.
Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 17, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 4
IEJ.4. Ballistic-utissile submarine and SLUM
launcher dismantling shall be accomplished at major
shipyards, located in designated areas, wi-1,1,ro shin
construction, fitting out or major overhaul is
carried out.
c.
?.
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SCC
SESSION III
A- 223
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
DATE: May 15, 1974
1500 - 1610
PLACE: US Mission, Geneva
SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting, May 15, 1974
PARTICIPANTS: US USSR
. Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald Mr. A. S. Yereskovsky
Mr. R. A. Anderson Capt. V. P. Kuznetsov
Cdr. G. Atkinson Capt. Ye. G. Korobchenko
Lt. Cdr. R. K. Martin (Military Interpreter)
Mr. P. Afanasenko (Interpreter)
FitzGerald on behalf of the members of the US Component
of the "sub-Working Group" welcomed the members of the Soviet
"sub-Working Group" to the US Mission. FitzGerald then turned
the floor over to Yereskovsky.
Yereskovsky stated that the Soviet side had studied the US
Working Document on ballistic-missile submarine and SLDM launcher
dismantling terminology., He stated that using the Soviet Working
Document as a basis, the Soviet side had prepared a new Working
Document taking into consideration what was contained in the US
Working Document. Yereskovsky tabled the new Soviet Working
Document (Attachment No. 1).
Yereskovsky stated, beginning his explanation of the new
Soviet Working Document, that the Soviet side felt it to be
more appropriate to place the words "Standing Consultative
Commission" at the top of the document. As to the title itself,
he continued, once again the Soviet side asked the US side to
agree to use the original title of the Soviet Working Document,
that is, "Agreed Interpretations of Some Terms Used in Section
III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms." In justi-
fication of this approach Yereskovsky added that we are dealing
not with definitions but with interpretations that should be of
uniform understanding to both sides. Yereskovsky stated the
Soviet side continued to believe that the document should contain
only the three terms which required definition as a result of
"not quite clear understanding" between the sides. He stated
that the Soviet side certainly has appreciation for the work
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of Cdr. Atkinson and Cdr. Martin in compiling the definitions
presented to the Soviet side under the guidance of Col. FitzGerald.
The Soviet view, however, is that we are not working out a dic-
tionary of naval terms and that, if the US side would look at
the three terms in the Soviet document, the Soviet side had kept
much of the wording used by the US side in working out their
definitions for the terms "sail," "fairwater" and "superstructure."
Yereskovsky concluded that it was the Soviet view that the Soviet
document should be acceptable to the American side as it has all
of the terminology required for agreement to Section III of the
Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures. If there are any questions
from the US side, Yereskovsky stated Capt. Kuznetsov would be
prepared to answer them.
FitzGerald thanked Yereskovsky for the new document. He
stated that in taking a quick look at the document which the
Soviet Component today had submitted that he could see there are
a few more switches in method and that there has been movement
toward solving the tasks which the Commissioners assigned us. As
a general observation, FitzGerald noted with satisfaction that
the US and Soviet Components of the SCC seem to have arrived at
a satisfactory "upper right hand corner wording" for SCC Working
Documents. FitzGerald stated he remembered that at the early
meetings of this SCC session the Soviet Component was tabling
documents with the words "Working Document of the Soviet SCC
Component" in the upper right hand corner; the US was tabling
documents with the words "US Working Document" in the upper
right hand corner. Then the US moved to using the Soviet wording;
Soviet side moved to using the US wording. FitzGerald commented
it seems at last we have made some progress in that we have agreed
as to what should appear in the upper right hand corner of our
documents.
Yereskovsky commented that there is one more question we
need to address regarding what might appear in the upper right
hand corner of the document--we need a date and a place of
signature, e.g. Geneva. FitzGerald agreed.
FitzGerald? moving to the substance of the document, stated
that the US side is pleased to notice that the document will be
for internal use in the SCC--this is reflected by the heading
which the Soviet side had used. Also FitzGerald added that he
was happy the Soviet side agreed with us that instead of using
the term "sides" we would use the term "Commissioners" as it is
the Commissioners who would be initialing this document for
internal use. FitzGerald concluded that while we haven't
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carefully had a chance to compare the terminology used, he noted
that Yereskovsky had said that it was approximately the same as
the language used in the US document. Yereskovsky stated, "That
is correct. You will find it almost the same." FitzGerald
responded that he would have to rely on other experts?Martin,
Atkinson and Anderson--for a closer look.
FitzGerald stated that he had noticed that the Soviet side
had adjusted their previous wording in the preamble and asked
Yereskovsky the reasoning behind this as the US side had found
their previous wording to be acceptable.
Yereskovsky stated that the Soviet thought was that perhaps
in the final document we don't need to say "as a result of
discussions held in the Working Group." He stated that the new
preamble states the purpose of the document?the remainder is
unchanged. FitzGerald stated he did not see any difficulty.
Yereskovsky asked if the US side would like to revert to the
original wording the Soviet side had used in the preamble, adding
that the Soviet side considers the new wording a step forward as
it better meets the purpose. FitzGerald stated that it is cor-
rect that we have had more discussions than those on May 7 and
to include that one date really doesn't make sense. He stated
that the US side would review the new wording but didn't see any
major problem. FitzGerald suggested the US side might be inclined
to delete the lead-in to the preamble and suggested it might
start with other words like "the Commissioners have agreed ....
Yereskovsky said the Soviet side welcomed all suggestions the
US side might have.
FitzGerald stated that the remarks he had made were the
initial remarks on the US side on the document--in summary,
he would say the Soviet Working Document tabled today was a
step forward and a clear attempt to bring the needs of the two
sides together. FitzGerald stated he would like to turn the
floor over to Cdr. Atkinson who would make a few remarks on the
purpose of the document as it would serve as a foundation for
future work on the SCC.
Cdr. Atkinson stated that in looking over the document the
US side tabled at the last meeting of the Working Group we find
that of those terms which appear, of which there are nine, five
of these terms appear both in the Soviet proposed procedures
In paragraph III.1(d) and in the US proposal for paragraph III.1(e);
three appear in the US proposal for paragraph III.1(e); one of the
terms appears solely in the Soviet.proposal for paragraph III.1(d).
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Specifically, he stated the term "sail" appears only in the
Soviet proposed procedures; the terms "outer hull," "pressure
hull," proposed
"superstructure" and "launch tube" appear
in both proposed procedures; the terms "hull crown plating" and
"framing" appear in the US tabled procedure. Atkinson stated that
the US Component believed that these agreed interpretations'
should provide a foundation for the procedures in Section III
and should therefore include the complete range of technical
terminology which is used in that section. The reason that the US
side believes this necessary is that the foundation must be strong
enough for the rest of the structure to stand. Not only we in
the SCC need to understand the meaning of the terms, but people
in the US and Soviet governments also need a clear understanding
of the terms in order to make judgments on the procedures pro-
posed. Atkinson concluded, stating that these judgments can only
be made after there is complete understanding of the complete
scope of the detailed procedures tabled by both sides.
Yereskovsky stated that he had one small comment to make
in reply to Cdr. Atkinson; perhaps Capt. Kuznetsov might have
more to add. Yereskovsky stated that we are dealing in Section
III with procedures for ballistic missile submarine and SLBM
launchers dismantling. He stated the Soviet side believes that
for the purpose of arriving at these dismantling procedures it
is not necessary to inClude a complete dictionary of naval termi-
nology beginning with the term "submarines," and including terms
such as "submarine-launched ballistic missile," "missile compart-
ment," "shipyard," etc. The Soviet side saw no need whatsoever
to do this. In those places where there was some uncertainty,
he stated, we think we have found a common interpretation; we
don't need other definitions for the purpose of agreeing to
dismantling procedures if they are clearly understood--it is simply
not dictated by necessity.
Kuznetsov stated that the Soviet side had set forth during
the last meeting of the Working Group the points which support
the Soviet view that nine separate terms do not need to be
defined in the document--the only items needed are terms on
which there was confusion. Kuznetsov stated that he believed
the foundation of the document will be strong, not by having a
large number of terms included, but by including only those
terms which really need clarification for paragraph one of
Section III. He stated nine items will not help to do this--
the three items defined in the Soviet working document today
are all that are needed to address the essence of the problem.
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Yereskovsky stated that with regard to one term--"outer
hull"--there has been no misunderstanding. He also stated
there was no misunderstanding regarding the word "framing."
Everyone understood these terms, he thought.
FitzGerald asked Cdr. Martin whether he had any comments.
Martin began by stating that, as a result of his discussions
with Capt. Kuznetsov over the previous weeks, it was clear to
him that there was no question now within the SCC as to.the
meaning of the terms we are using. He stated that clearly the
three terms which the Soviet side has included in the working
document tabled today are the terms which have caused us the
most trouble. Martin pointed out, however, that others we had
come to agreement on had not always been clearly understood.
He stated that in SCC II Capt. Mazerkin and Cdr. Owens had long
and detailed discussions on the subject of submarine and SLBM
launcher dismantling but there had been no clear agreement between
them on such terms as "sail," "superstructure" and "fairwater."
Martin referred to the example FitzGerald had pointed out at the
last Working Group meeting whereby there had been much confusion
in previous SCC sessions regarding the term "launch tube" and
"launch mount tube." He also pointed out that there had been
confusion regarding the term "outer hull"--for a long time the
US side had not recognized that the "outer hull" is considered
by the Soviets to be "superstructure." He added that our pro-
posal for paragraph III.1(e) had intended that that type
submarine, when dismantled, could be restored--the wording of
our proposal however prohibited the Soviet side from replacing
the outer hull.
Martin commented that he agreed with Yereskovsky that the
SCC is not the place to come to grips with the whole range of
terminology required to discuss limitations on submarines, suggest-
ing that perhaps the SALT Delegations are better prepared to come
to grips with defining terms such as "shipyard" and submarine-
launched ballistic missile." He pointed out that in SALT ONE
the process of agreeing on definitions had been quite a lengthy
process. He recalled his participation in Helsinki during SALT
VII in work on defining the term "ICBM" and also referred to the
working group in SALT ONE which worked on definitions on Article II
of the ABM Treaty. Martin restated his view that there is no
misunderstanding or disagreement regarding the substance of the
terms which the US side had included in our Working Document. He
stated that "nine" is not a magic number--more terms could be
included; some could be dropped, or combined into other defini-
tions. The important point is that the document should be a
complete document; not just one that is half finished. He con-
cluded by stating that he did not understand why, if there is no
disagreement in substance, the Soviet Component could not agree
to include all the terms used in the procedures in Section III in
a document of definitions.
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Yereskovsky had no additional comments to make. Atkinson
asked if he might make some additional remarks. FitzGerald
agreed.
Atkinson stated he would like to address one of the comments
made by Yereskovsky, and to address some additional subject
matter. He began stating it is true that none of the definitions
would be required if two of the US-proposed procedures were
followed--"scrapping the submarine" and "removal of the missile
section." It was however in the context of the US desire to
accommodate initial Soviet proposals for submarine and SLBM
dismantling and destruction that the US side proposed paragraph
III.1(e)--it was then that these technical terms became important
He stated in paragraph III.1(e) the terms "hull crown plating,"
"framing" and "hull liner" are important to the US side and it
must be established if they are to be used along with other
elements of that paragraph. He concluded that as procedures get
more complex, more technical terms appear. In order to have con-
fidence in the procedures it is important that all terms be
defined and included in a common understanding.
FitzGerald stated he had now had time to look at the Soviet
working document and consult with experts on the US side--he
commented that it looked as if the Soviet proposals for the
terms "sail," "fairwater" and "superstructure" were an improve-
ment on the words used in the US proposal of May 13.
Yereskovsky commented that maybe if the US side looks harder
at the Soviet working document we might consider it even better.
FitzGerald stated that in that regard the US Component has a
working document to present to the Soviet side today which may
help to resolve the differences that exist. FitzGerald handed
Yereskovsky the document (Attachment No. 2). FitzGerald pointed.
out after a comment by Yereskovsky regarding the number of terms
in the document that the US side believes we are able to say that
both sides had moved a lot closer together on the meaning of
this document. Regarding the title, FitzGerald stated that the
US side had seen the "crystal clear logic" of the Soviet argu-
ment that we are not coming up with definitions but rather we
are developing interpretations. The US side believes the new
wording is not in fact definitive; rather it is an attempt to
make clear that when the Soviet side says one thing in its pro-
posal it corresponds to the US side's understanding in its pro-
posal. FitzGerald commented, with regard to the three definitions
"sail," "fairwater" and "superstructure," that the wording of
the terms and definitions in both US and Soviet documents are
nearly the same and that he saw no problem in accepting Soviet
definitions for them.
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?
Regarding the fourth term in US Working Document--"part of
the pressure hull"--FitzGerald stated the US side had taken that
term to correspond with US terms based on Kuznetsov/Martin
discussions. He stated we had made no attempt to define "hull
crown plating," "frame" and "hull liners" in our new proposal--
we are merely attempting to equate Soviet and US terminology so
we know this is indeed corresponding terminology. FitzGerald
stated it is to some extent true that Yereskovsky and he could do
the same thing while conforming language of the JDT but that this
would not be beneficial to the people in the US and Moscow.
FitzGerald stated that after listening to Yereskovsky's
statement at the last working group meeting, we also had con-
cluded there- was no confusion in the terms "hull crown plating,"
"framework" and "hull liners." We agreed we did not have to
define them FitzGerald stated the US side feels that when we
use different technical language which equates to the same thing,
the documents should, however,- reflect that the different terms
are in agreement.
In concluding FitzGerald stated the US side regards the new
US Working Document as an attempt to meet Soviet considerations
expressed in regard to the document which the Commissioners have
assigned us the task of,working out.
Yereskovsky thanked FitzGerald for the working document. He
stated the Soviet side would certainly study it, and asked Fitz-
Gerald if he had any further comments for today's meeting.
FitzGerald responded that he would be glad to answer any questions
the Soviet side had.
Yereskovsky suggested that the formal meeting adjourn--he
would have some questions to ask in private discussion. FitzGerald
agreed.
The meeting was adjourned at 110.
Attachments:
1. Working Document of the Soviet SCC Component, May 15, 1974,
Agreed Interpretations of Some Terms Used in Section III
of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.
2. Working Document of US SCC Component, May 15, 1974,
Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms Used in Section III
of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms
SCC:R rtin:bd
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Attachment No. 1
Official translation
Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
May 15, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
AGREED INTERPRETATIONS OF SOME TERMS
USED IN SECTION III OF THE PROCEDURES
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
To ensure uniform understanding of some terms used
in submarine dismantling procedures, the Commissioners
have agreed that for the purposes of the provisions of
Section III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive
Arms the terms below shall mean:
1. SAIL - the structure above the outer hull
2. FAIRWATER
which encloses the bridge, conning
tower and retractable devices
(antennas, periscopes, etc.).
- on submarines on which the upper parts
of missile launch tubes protrude
into the enclosure which is adjacent
to and is an extension of the sail,
the fairwater is the structure above
the outer hull which immediately
encloses the missile launch tubes.
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2
3. SUPERSTRUCTURE - on submarines on which the upper parts
of missile launch tubes do not
protrude into the fairwater, the
superstructure is the structure above
the outer hull which encloses the
missile launch tubes protruding
through the pressure hull.
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Attachment No. 2
Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 15, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms
Used in Section III of the Procedures
for Strategic Offensive Arms
As a result of discussions held in the SCC working group
on May 7, 1974, the Commissioners have agreed that, for
purposes of the provisions of Section III of the Strategic
Offensive Arms Procedures, the terms below shall mean:
SAIL That structure above the outer hull
which encloses the bridge, conning
tower, antennas, periscope, etc. but
does not enclose the ballistic-missile
launch tubes. ,
FAIRWATER On submarines whose ballistic-missile
section is endbsed by structure adjacent
and integral to the sail, the FAIRWATER
is that structure above the outer hull
which encloses the missile launch tubes.
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2
SUPERSTRUCTURE On submarines whose missile launch
tubes do not protrude into the fairwater,
SUPERSTRUCTURE is the structure which
extends upward from the outer hull above
the water line and houses the portion
of the missile launch tube which extends
above the pressure hull.
PART OF THE Hull crown plating of the
PRESSURE HULL
pressure hull of a ballistic missile
submarine together with all
frame segments and hull liners.
LAUNCH TUBE The cylindrical structure which is an
integral part of the pressure hull and
which immediately encloses the missile,
to include the complete missile launcher,
wiring, piping, and missile launch tube
foundations.
OUTER HULL The external hull of double-hulled submarines
PRESSURE HULL The inner hull of double-hulled submarines;
the external hull of single-hulled submarines.
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SCC
Session-ill
A-219
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, May 14, 1974
US Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Craybeal
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Cdr. Atkinson
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Mr. Long
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Arenbburc,or (Interpreter)
Mr. Afanasenko (Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereshovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Graybeal welcomed Commissioner Ustinov and
the members of the Soviet SCC Component, and opened the meeting.
He explained that, as Ustinov already knew, General Georgi had
been called to Washington on business not connected with the
SCC, and said that we hoped he would rejoin us by the end of
this week. He then gave the floor to Ustinov.
Commissioner Ustinov delivered a prepared statement on
Para. 1.6 of the offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 1),
and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing proposed
language for Para. 1.6 of those Procedures (Attachment No. 2).
Mr. Gravbeal said the _new. Soviet proposal and Ustinov s
statement would be given careful study in the context of
seeking satisfactory solutions to notification issues. Noting
that he would restrict himself to two observations by Way of
preliminary response, he said he agreed with Ustinov that the
problem of limiting accumulation of replacement submarines
had been satisfactorily resolved with the language .we had
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worked out for Para. 8 of the offensive Protocol. However,
this was not related to the notification issue now being dis-
cussed; we are dealing with an entirely different problem,
that of formulating adequate notification provisions to reduce
any possibilities for misunderstanding or uncertainty regarding
activities taking place on either side. . The language proposed
by the U.S. side on May 10 for the second half of Para 6(b)
provides for reporting on the number of launchers on replacement
submarines which had begun Sea trials since the last report
in the. SCC. Together with the first part of. that proposed
Para. 6(b), we consider this to be the minimum required
notification to keep an account of the status of replacement
launchers and the dismantling or destruction of replaced
launchers. A preliminary reading of today's Soviet proposal
reveals that it seems to accept the second half of the U.S.
May 10 proposal, but eliminates the first half of our May 10
proposal, which is also important and focused on a matter
different from the accumulation of SLBM submarines and
launchers.
Secondly, Graybeal continued, as he had indicated in his
May 10 discussion with Ustinov, the notification proposed in
our Para. 6(b) would merely require reporting on two events
after they had already taken place. This, in the view of the
U.S. side, would make an important contribution to reducing
any misunderstanding or uncertainty regarding SLBM submarines
specifically with regard to whether such submarines were new
or replacement submarines.
These were his preliminary reactions and comments, which
he hoped would be useful in working out mutually acceptable
procedures. Graybeal concluded by noting again that he would
forego further comment until such time as the U.S. side had
more carefully studied today's Soviet proposal.
General Ustinov said that the Soviet side had tabled a
new proposal today which, to a significant degree, took
account of both the U.S. May 10 proposal and the views expressed
by the U.S. side on this subject.
Ustinov continued by noting that .Graybeal had said the
U.S. May 10 language concerning notification on launched
submarines dealt with a different problem from the one concerning
accumulation. The problems were perhaps different, but the
essence of the question is one and the same. Therefore, he
would request that Graybeal give careful attention to Ustinov's
own statement this morning, that the Soviet side cannot take
the view that the problems are different.
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If the matter is going to be put in the way the U.S.
side proposes, information could be requested concerning
stages in SLBM submarine construction such as the beginning
of construction, the completion of construction, launch of
the submarine, etc. In the Soviet view this is not required
by the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.
Both sides have agreed that the starting time for dismantling
activities would be the time of the beginning of replacement
submarine sea trials. That point in time was chosen because
the beginning of sea trials is verifiable by national technical
means. Therefore, the Soviet view is that no information is
required concerning replacement submarines which have begun
sea trials, but in spite of that the Soviet side has found
it possible to accept the second half of the U.S.-proposed
Para. 6(b). Therefore, the Soviet side could expect, he
-thought, this constructive step to provide the point of
departure which would help us solve the whole problem of
notification. Ustinov concluded by again expressing the hope
that the U.S. side would give most careful attention to the
new Soviet proposal tabled today.
Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov for his additional remarks,
and said that as he had already indicated, the Soviet proposal
would be given careful study. He felt that additional direct
exchanges such as this always helped to provide clarification
on the positions of the two sides.
He then asked Ustinov if there were anything else he
would like to bring up this morning.
General Ustinov said the Soviet side had nothing further
to discuss at this plenary meeting.
- Mr. Graybeal said considerable progress had been made in
some important areas during this SCC session, but two unresolved
issues--notification and questions having to do with ballistic-
missile submarine dismantling or destruction--were still before
us. It was his understanding that the Working Group we had
established to consider "naval issues" was clarifying termi-
ny and conducting a useful exchange of information. He
thought it desirable for that Working Group to have at least one
more meeting to wind up its activity and enable it to make its
report to Commissioners. He said he would not like to draw
any conclusions concerning Section III of the Procedures until
the Working Group had had at least one more meeting, which
could be held on May 15 or 16.
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He said he would like to make a proposal this morning
designed to facilitate the work of the Working Group and, he
hoped, contribute to a satisfactory solution of all the
issues in Section III. Taking account of past exchanges con-
cerning the U.S.-proposed procedure in Section III.1(a),
concerning sinking of replaced SLBM submarines, and consider-
ing related factors outside the scope of the SCC, such as the
International Convention on Marine Pollution, the U.S. side
proposes dropping the aforementioned alternative procedure for
SLBM submarine dismantling or destruction. .Thus, from the
standpoint of the U.S. three alternative procedures now
remain in Section III - scrapping, removing the submarine's
missile section and not replacing it except with a significantly
shorter section, and the proposal which is now in Para. III.1(e).
General Ustinov said he completely agreed with Graybeal's
assessment of the activity of the Working Group, which was now
basically concentrating on working out agreed terminology in
connection with Section III of the Procedures. He also con-
sidered that work quite useful and thought it could facilitate
mutual understanding. However, the Working Group .has other
questions remaining before it, for instance the new proposals
submitted by the Soviet side on May 10 for Paras. 1(d) and 4
of Section III. Of course, Ustinov said, he hoped the U.S.
side would express its views on these Soviet proposals.
? Ustinov agreed that Graybeal's withdrawal of the U.S.
"sinking" alternative left four alternative dismantling or
destruction procedures as proposals in Section III -- the three
to which Graybeal had referred and the Soviet proposal which
was identified as Para. III.1(d). Naturally, since these
are all valid alternatives one could say that they are all
applicable to any type of submarine. Therefore, Ustinov said
he would like the Working Group, in addition to working on
terminology, to work on the formulations of these proposals.
For its part, the Soviet side was ready to do this work as
soon as the U.S. side is prepared, whether before or after
the return of General Georgi.
Mr. Graybeal said he understood, and agreed except for
one point -- that concerning the applicability of all the
proposed alternative procedures to all classes of submarines.
Graybeal said that as he had indicated, Georgi would
probably not rejoin us before May 17, but the U.S. side is
prepared to proceed in the WorkingGroup. with FitzGerald
substituting for Georgi if there were no objection on the part
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of the head of the Soviet side of the Working Group, Mr. Karpov.
He would leave the questions of time, place, and composition
of the Working Group to FitzGerald and Karpov.
Graybeal concluded that if Ustinov had nothing further,
we should adjourn this meeting, and schedule the next meeting
through our Executive Secretaries after we had had a chance
to see where things stood in the next couple of days.
General Ustinov suggested that perhaps the Working Group
could work on terminology at its next meeting on May 15 or 16,
and then, at the following meeting, work on Section III issues
under the leadership of Karpov and FitzGerald if Georgi had
not yet returned.
Mr. Graybeal said that sounded like an agreeable plan.
General Ustinov agreed, and noted that of course the
Commissioners could meet as well, at any time Graybeal desired.
Mr. Graybeal said, to sum up, that the Working Group would
meet on May 15 or 16, and again on May 17, and that he and
Ustinov could meet at any time in accord with the wishes of
either Commissioner. He then adjourned the meeting.
Attachments:
1. Ustinov Statement on Para. 1.6, offensive arms
Procedures
2. Soviet Working Document
SCC PDeSimone:bd Approved b S. N. Graybeal
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Attachment No. 1
1Ad-in-r8fr.rg?49PW9PRTCP1
? OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
May 14, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
Taking into account past discussions, today I want.
to address the question of notification, specifically,
to consider paragraph 1.6 of the Procedures for
Strategic Offensive Arms in connection with those
proposals for subparagraph (h) which you officially
tabled during our informal discussion of May 10.
The position of the Soviet side and specific
proposals for modified wording of this paragraph were
set forth in our statement of May 7, 1974.
In studying the neW formulation of subparagraph (b),
proposed by the U.S. side, we note that to a certain
degree it takes into account the point of view of the
Soviet side on the question of prior notification
Specifically, deletion of the provision for notification
on the number of ballistic missile launchers on sub-
marines, that will begin sea trials during the next
six-month period, is a step in the right direction.
However, in place of the deleted provision, the
U.S. side included in this subparagraph a provision for
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notification on the number of launchers on submarines
"which have been launched but not yet begun sea trials."
I must say candidly that the U.S. side's tabling
of a proposal on inclusion in the notification informa-
tion on submarines "which have been launched but not
yet begun sea trials" only puzzles the Soviet SCC
Component.
Doesn't it seem to you, Mr. Commissioner, that by
doing so the U.S. Component of the SCC thereby again,
and seemingly- anew, is opening ? a discussion of problems
which have already been the subject of thorough considera-
tion and solved on a mutually acceptable basis? There-
fore I will not repeat those arguments which the Soviet
side presented at the last session of the SCC in connec-
tion with consideration of the U.S. proposal for limiting
to a specific number submarines that have been launched
but have not yet begun sea trials.
I merely want to say that the sides found a solution
at that time. They agreed that the number of replacement
ballistic missile submarines which are under construction
simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with
a normal construction schedule. The concept of a normal
construction schedule was formulated in paragraph 8 of
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the Protocol for strategic offensive arms. Thus the
U.S sidels proposal for limiting to four the number
of ballistic missile submarines concurrently in a
launched status was withdrawn. It would seem that
the issue had been resolved. Now, you are again raising
the same question in essence though in a different
context--the context of notification. Clearly such a
proposal cannot be acceptable to the Soviet side.
The Soviet side also believes it necessary to draw
the attention of the U.S. Component of the SCC to the
fact that with respect to replacement procedures for
ICBMs and ballistic-missile submarines the sides have
agreed to a kind of time criterion, which establishes
that dismantling ,of replaced ICBM and SLBM launchers
must begin not later than the time of the beginning of
sea trials of the replacement submarine.
Therefore, information concerning earlier stages
of construction or fitting out of a replacement sub-
marine is not required; there is no need whatsoever for
it from the point of view of implementing the replace-
ment provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol
thereto.
Mr. Commissioner, at the same time, desiring to
promote progress toward achieving mutually acceptable
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solutions in the area of notification, the Soviet
side accepts your proposal for specifying the number
of ballistic missile launchers on replacement sub-
marines which have begun sea trials during the period
since the last notification.
In this connection the proposals for wording of
paragraph 1.6 of the Procedures for strategic offensive
arms, tabled by us on May 7, could read as follows.
(Paragraph 1.6 is read)
Mr. Commissioner, I hope that this new proposal of
the Soviet side will move us significantly forward in
the matter of resolving the whole notification issue
and will contribute to overall success in our work.
Thank you for your attention.
v
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Official translation
Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
May 14, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Section I, paragraph 6
6. Notification of disMantling or destruction of
ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced
submarines shall be given through the Standing Consulta-
tive Commission twice annually, reflecting the actual
status as of the beginning of each regular session of
the Commission and covering the period since the last
report in the SCC:
(a) on the number of ICBM launchers, deployed
prior to 1964, and SLBM launchers on 'which
dismantling or destruction has been completed;
(b) on the number of ballistic-missile launchers
on replacement submarines which have begun
sea trials;
(c) on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers,
out of the number dismantled or destroyed,
which have been replaced by ballistic-missile
launchers on modern submarines since the last
report.
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A-207
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, May 7, 1974
U.S. Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Cdr. Atkinson
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Mr. Long
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Aronsburger (Interpreter)
Mr. Afanasenko (Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Graybeal welcomed the Soviet Component of the
SCC, and declared the meeting open. He said that the U.S.
Component was sorry to hear that Mr. Karpov was ill, and wished
him a rapid recovery and a speedy return to work. He also
introduced Cdr. Atkinson, who was with us for the first time
today and would be working with us for the remainder of this
SCC Session.
Commissioner Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and said that he
shared those thoughts expressed in Graybealts opening remarks,
and that the Soviet Component was happy to welcome Cdr. Atkinson.
Mr. Graybeal said that in accord with the understanding
discussed by our Executive Secretaries, he would speak first.
He said he had a statement with respect to Section III of the
strategic offensive arms Procedures, delivered his prepared
comments, and handed over a Working Document containing the
language being proposed as paragraph 111.4 (Attachment No. 1).
General Ustinov said that Graybealls statement would be
carefully studied by the Soviet side. By way of preliminary
reaction, he wanted to say that the Soviet Component considered
the proposal it tabled on April 30, on the scope of dismantling
for SLBM submarines, to be quite constructive; it was a significant
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move in the direction of the U.S. side's position. He said
he was sorry that the U.S. Component had not yet found a way
to bring its position closer to that set forth by the Soviet
side on April 30.
He then delivered a prepared statement on shipyards for
SLBM submarine destruction or dismantling (Attachment No. 2),
and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing proposed new
wording for paragraph 111.1 of the strategic offensive arms
Procedures (Attachment No. 3).
Graybeal thanked Ustinov, and said that both the
statement and the proposal would be given careful consideration.
He said he had noted that the Soviet proposal was for paragraph
III.1(e), and asked whether he had properly understood. Was
this proposal being suggested as a subparagraph of paragraph 1,
or as a new added paragraph for Section III? That is, did the
Soviet side intend that it apply to all the alternative dismantling
procedures, or only to one of them?
General Ustinov said that Graybeal had correctly understood
the way the proposal was numbered, but that it could be included
as a new paragraph 4, or as a new paragraph anywhere in Section
III, in the same way that Graybeal had proposed his own new
paragraph for Section III this morning.
Mr. Graybeal said he understood. He then stated that as
he understood the scenario that had been worked out for this
morning's meeting, General Ustinov had another statement he
wished to make at this point.
General Ustinov laughed and said that he thought he would
be out of turn, but quickly added that he was nevertheless
prepared. He delivered a statement on notification (Attachment
No. 4), and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing proposed
language for paragraph 1.6 of the strategic offensive arms
Procedures (Attachment No. 5).
Mr. Graybeal said that the new Soviet proposal and the
statement Ustinov had made in connection with it would both be
very carefully studied. He would postpone any comment on the
specifics of that proposal until he had had a chance to carefully
study the newly proposed language for paragraph 6, and would
restrict his comments this morning to some .general observations.
The U.S. side, Graybeal said, had addressed the question of
notification on numerous occasions, specifically, during this
session, on April 19, April 23, and May 3. As Ustinov had noted
in his statement, there is agreement between us that notification
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is not required for adequate verification of compliance by
national technical means. However, Graybeal continued, as he
had indicated on April 19 and May 3, the utility of notification
is much broader than that, and should be considered on its
own merits. The U.S. side has set forth its views on this
subject, and hopes that they will be taken into account, just
as the Soviet views presented this morning would be taken into
account. He would encourage the Soviet side to carefully study
the U.S. proposal presented today regarding modifications to
Section III of the offensive Procedures. This proposal would
not require any prior notification, predesignation, or designation
of the shipyards to be used for dismantling or destruction unless
yards other than those used for construction of ballistic missile
submarines were used. He wanted to note, in this connection,
that when we referred to shipyards used for construction, we
included fitting out of submarines.
Graybeal said that we have made progress in this SCC
Session, but still have some very difficult and complex issues
before us. He would agree with Ustinov's comment that further
progress toward the mutually agreed procedures we are trying
to work out requires taking into account the views and consider-
ations of both sides. He assured Ustinov again that Soviet views
would be studied by the U.S. side, just as we would ask the
Soviet side to study our views, and we would be returning to
the subject of Section III, as well as to the subject of
notification, at subsequent meetings.
Mr. Graybeal said that the U.S. side agrees with the
proposal Ustinov made at the May 3 meeting, concerning establishment
of a working group to take account of the views of both sides
on Section III, to clarify the terminology used by both sides
in addressing that complex subject so as to be sure that we
understood one another, and to make, if possible, recommendations
on Section III to the SCC Commissioners.
Before adjourning this meeting so that the working group
could begin its own work, Graybeal said, he wanted to note that
the Executive Secretaries had today conformed the Russian and
English texts of Section II of the strategic offensive arms
Procedures, as well as paragraph 1.2 of the ABM Procedures, and
that we could exchange those texts this morning. He added that
this summary of his understanding of where we stand in terms of
the working group schedule and the exchange of texts was not
intended to preclude Ustinov's making further comments on the
substantive issues being discussed. .
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General Ustinov noted that the Soviet side carefully studies
all statements made by the U.S. side at SCC meetings, as well as
those made during informal conversations between Commissioners
after those meetings. He believed that there were two basic
questions remaining to which we must give primary attention
at this point in time; these were the questions of naval matters
and notification. With mutual and careful attention to those
matters, we can make progress, just as we have made progress
and achieved solutions to other questions which were no less
complex or important.
Ustinov, reading from a prepared note, said that the
Executive Secretary of the Soviet SCC Component, Mr. Yereskovsky,
had reported that he and Col. FitzGerald had completed conforming
the texts of Section 11 of the offensive arms Procedures, and
paragraph 1.2 of the ABM Procedures. These could be considered
Joint Texts as of May 7, with the understanding that they are
subject to consideration by Governments and that either side
could propose amendments or changes if they were deemed necessary.
He handed Graybeal the Russian language texts of the referenced
portions of the Joint Draft Texts.
Mr. Graybeal said he agreed with Ustinov's statement
concerning the status of those portions of the documents we
are working on, and said he would like to pass to Ustinov the
English language texts which were to be considered preliminarily
agreed by Commissioners (Attachment No. 6).
He then asked if Ustinov had any further matters to bring
up today.
General Ustinov said he had nothing more for this morning.
Mr. Graybeal suggested that in that case, the next meeting
of the SCC be scheduled based on progress in the working group.
We could keep in touch while monitoring the activity of the
working group, and thus determine an appropriate time for the
next SCC meeting.
General Ustinov agreed, and noted with satisfaction
Graybeal's acceptance of the proposal to establish a working
group which would be headed by Yereskovsky and FitzGerald today.
As he saw it, the task for today's working group meeting would
be to go over the terminology used by both sides in Section III
of the strategic offensive arms Procedures. He said he did not
know whether or not Graybeal agreed, but he thought that in the
future, for example on May 10, the working group could continue
its work under the chairmanship of Mr. Karpov and General Georgi,
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and attempt to find solutions on Section III which were
satisfactory for both sides. Later, taking account of
progress made in the working group, we could set a date for
the next SCC meeting. If the working group was successful
in its work, we could further apply the same approach with
respect to the questions of notification which had been referred
to at today's meeting.
He closed by reminding the U.S. side of its invitation to
lunch at the Soviet Mission tomorrow, May 8, at 1:00 p.m.
Mr. Graybeal agreed that the working group, headed by
FitzGerald and Yereskovsky and with the participation of
advisors directly concerned with naval matters, should go to
work today. He saw no reason why we could not agree to continue
that work on Friday, May 10, under the chairmanship of General
Georgi and Mr. Karpov, and decide on the date of the next SCC
meeting after that. He did not want, however, to comment on,
or prejudge, the desirability of establishing a working group
on notification.
He said the U.S. Component was pleased, as always, to
accept an invitation to lunch from the Soviet Component. He
thought that such occasions were extremely enjoyable and that
the exchanges which took place at them were very useful, but he
was not certain that our waistlines could always tolerate them.
General Ustinov nodded in assent to Graybeal's remarks.
Graybeal declared the meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.
Attachments:
1. Graybeal Comments and U.S. Working Document on Section
III of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures
2. Ustinov Statement on Shipyards for SLBM Submarine
Destruction or Dismantling
3. Soviet Working Document on para 111.1 of Strategic
Offensive Arms Procedures
4. Ustinov Statement on Notification
5. Soviet Working Document on para 1.6 of Strategic Offensive
Arms Procedures
6. Joint Draft Texts, Section II of Offensive Procedures,
and paragraph 1.2, ABM Procedures .
Drafted by FPDeSimone:sbs
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Attachment No. 1
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - SECTION III OF
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
May 7, 1974
I.
1. Mr. Commissioner, at our meeting on April 30,
I set forth U.S.-views regarding the procedures for
dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines
and SLBM launchers replaced by new ballistic-missile
submarines and SLBM launchers. As I stated then, we
believe the U.S. proposals in the JDTs of April 19, 1974,
as revised by the U.S. side on April 30, provide a firm
basis for agreement.
2. I have reviewed.the Soviet statements regarding
procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-
missile submarines and SLBM launchers and am convinced
that the alternative procedures proposed by the U.S.
side should be acceptable to both sides. In my opinion,
the Soviet proposal for Section III, Para.1(d) of April 30,
1974 does not adequately meet the criteria set forth in
Para. 3 of the Protocol. Therefore, it is not an acceptable
substitute for Para. (e).
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3. I believe there is complete agreement between us
on the fundamental point that the procedures for the
dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines
and SLBM launcher S must satisfy the agreed criteria
contained in Para. 3 of the Strategic Offensive Arms
Protocol. The four alternative procedures proposed by
the U.S. side clearly do meet these criteria. Further,
the U.S. side firmly believes that the U.S.-proposed
procedures provide adequate and effective alternatives
for all presently known classes of submarines. The
procedures we have proposed are verifiable by national
technical means, and they are such that reactivation
time of replaced submarines and launchers would not be
substantially less than the time required for new
construction. It is my view that the alternative procedures
proposed by the U.S. side provide for reasonable enonomy
of effort and funds, and permit the possibility of using
the submarines, after dismantling, for purposes not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement
and its Protocol.
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4. Mr. Commissioner, we are agreed that the task
before us is to work out mutually agreed procedures
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and
notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms called
for by the Interim Agreement. Today, in an effort to
move our negotiations forward toward this goal, the U.S.
side is proposing a significant modification to Section III
of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures concerning
ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling.
Specifically, we propose to add a fourth paragraph to
Section III as follows:
(Read and hand over text)
4. "Ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM
launcher dismantling shall be carried
out at those shipyards where ballistic-
missile submarine construction is
accomplished, or at additionally agreed
(or designated) shipyards."
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5. The U.S. side proposes that this sentence become
new Para. 4 in Section ill. With the addition of this
paragraph, the U.S. side is prepared to drop the present
requirement for "predesignated shipyards" and "agreed
shipyards" in Paras. III.1(b) (c) and (e).
6. This new U.S. approach has a precedent in
the SALT negotiations--it parallels Article IV of the
ABM Treaty dealing with ABM test ranges wherein the U.S.
and Soviet Union have agreed on "currently or additionally
agreed test ranges."
IV.
7. Mr. Commissioner, I emphasize again the firm
conviction of the U.S. side that the ballistic-missile
submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling or destruction
procedures proposed by the U.S. side provide a sound
basis for agreement on Section III.
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41 113'
Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 7, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 4
1tBa11istic7missi1e submarine and
SLBM launcher dismantling shall be
carried out at those shipyards where
ballistic-missile submarine construc-
tion is accomplished, or at additionally
agreed (or designated) shipyards."
. ?
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SECRET Attachment No. 2
USTINOV STATEMENT ON SHIPYARDS FOR SLBM SUBMARINE
DISMANTLING
May 7, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
At today's meeting I would also like to address
again the question of shipyards at which submarine
dismantling or destruction will be accomplished.
I have already set forth the position of the Soviet
side on this question and it remains valid. I repeat
again, briefly,its basic elements.
In our view, prior notification on the location of
submarine dismantling or destruction is inadvisable for
the following reasons:
first, in our view, designation of shipyards supplants
the functions of national technical means which are
charged with verifying compliance with the Interim Agree-
ment and the Procedures we are working out;
second, dismantling or destruction of submarines
takes a long time, during which national technical means
of verification are capable, with a high degree of
reliability, of carrying out verification of the progress
of this work. The duration of the process of dismantling
in conjunction with its accomplishment in the open, on
which both sides agree,permits each side to follow the
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progress of the dismantling work with adequate confidence,
wherever it is carried out. This being so, it is our
deep conviction that no additional information on this
question is required. At the same time, taking into
account the position of the U.S. side on this question
and desiring to assure achievement of a mutually
acceptable solution, the Soviet side considers it
possible to propose the following wording for Section III
of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms. (The
wording is read). In order to clarify the meaning of
"dismantling area," I can say that for the United States--
this can be, for example, the Atlantic and Pacific areas,
and for the Soviet Union--the Northern and Pacific areas.
Mr.. Commissioner, we hope that the U.S. Component
of the SCC will carefully study the new, constructive
Soviet proposal aimed at successful accomplishment of
the tasks before us.
This proposal will contribute to purposeful verifica-
tion of the dismantling of ballistic-missile submarines
being replaced, insisted upon by the U.S. side, and at
the same time will make it possible to avoid agreeing
on specific locations of this work, to which the Soviet
side objects as a matter of principle.
Thank you for your attention.
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IIECETT Attachment No. 3
Official translation
Soviet Working Document
May 7, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
paragraph 111.1
(e) Dismantling or destruction of replaced
ballistic-missile submarines, carried out in
accordance with the specified procedures, shall be
accomplished in designated areas.
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SECT:lig Attachment No. 4
USTI NOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION
May 7, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
At today's meeting I will once again address the
notification questions to which a mutually acceptable
solution has not yet been found at the current session,
due to differences between us.
We have repeatedly set forth in detail the position
of the Soviet side on these questions; therefore, there
is no need to address it fully. I merely want to direct
your attention once again to its main provisions of
principle.
The Soviet side is against prior notifications
because, just as the U.S. side, it believes that with
national technical means of verification at the disposal
of both sides, such notifications are not necessary for
verification purposes. In as much as they are not
required for verification, there is no need to include
them in the Procedures.
We believe that for these same reasons, advance
designation of shipyards where dismantling of SLBM
launchers is carried out, should also not be included
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S PC RET
r.
In the Procedures. in its place we have proposed
today the designation of areas for submarine dismantling.
This is a constructive proposal of the Soviet side. It
is aimed at achieving agreement on this question with
account for the proposals of the U.S. side.
Taking into account that in their statements at the
first, second, and current sessions both sides have
emphasized the reliability of national technical means
with respect to questions of verifying /C-ompliance
witg obligations assumed by the sides, we also believe
that it is superfluous to specify in the notifications
the number of launchers by type, since national technical
means can determine with full reliability what types of
launchers are undergoing dismantling.
With regard to the proposals of the U.S. side concern-
ing notification on the number of launchers, dismantling
of which is in process, we believe that such notification
will add nothing to the Procedures but complications
in accounting, and therefore, consider it inadvisable.
In view of the reasons given by me, the Soviet
Component of the Commission remains convinced that
notification must be made at the beginning of each
regular session of the SCC_ on the number of dismantled
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or destroyed ICBM, SLBM, and ABM launchers and radars,
as well as on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers
which have been replaced since the last report.
Such a proposal of the Soviet side should be
regarded as a part of the mutually agreed procedures
being worked out by us. Obviously, in order to make
progress on this question, it is necessary to take into
account the points of view and positions of both sides.
Desiring to promote progress in our negotiations,
today we are proposing for consideration a refined
formulation of paragraph 1.6 of the Procedures for
strategic offensive arms.
(Wording of paragraph 1.6 is read)
Careful study of the text of this formulation will
show you that in subparagraph (a) we have used the word
that
actual," and/the provision contained in subparagraph (b)
is formulated somewhat differently from the way it was
in the previous Soviet proposal.
Mr. Commissioner, this was done with account for
those discussions in the course of which opinions were
expressed about the possibility of situations when, for
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various reasons, the number of replacement launchers
could exceed the number dismantled.
That wording of paragraph 6, which we are now
proposing,makes it more clear that we are speaking of
the actual status with respect to dismantling and
replacement as of the beginning of a regular session
of the SCC. It shows that the number of launchers
replaced can be equal to or less than, but certainly
not greater than, the number of launchers dismantled
or destroyed. We have also taken into account the
common point of view of both sides that the number of
dismantled launchers and the number of replaced launchers
constitute two different categories and therefore are
subject to separate accounting.
Mr. Commissioner, we believe that the new Soviet
wording of paragraph 1.6 of the Procedures for strategic
offensive arms represents a step forward toward resolving
the question of notification procedures. We hope that
the U.S. Component of the Commission will carefully study
this proposal.
Thank you for your attention.
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c T1
Attachment No.
Official translation
Soviet Working Document
May 7, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
paragraph 1.6
6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of
ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on
replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing
Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the
actual status as of the beginning of each regular
session of the Commission and covering the period since
the last report in the SCC:
(a) on the number of ICBM launchers,deployed prior
to 196)4, and SLBM launchers on which dismantling or
destruction has been completed;
(b) on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, out
of the number dismantled or destroyed, which have been
replaced by ballistic-missile launchers on modern sub-
marines since the last report.
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C":7C ET
Attachment No. 6
Joint Draft Text
Section II of Procedures for
Strategic Offensive Arms
Preliminarily Agreed by Commissioners
May 7, 1974
II. Procedures For Dismantling or Destruction of
Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced -135T SLBM Launchers
1. .In all cases the following actions shall be
accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a) removal from the launch site of the supply of
missiles and their components, warheads, and
mobile equipment; and
(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting
and handling equipment, and propellant-handling
equipment, associated with the launcher and
located at the launch site, and removal of all
dismantled equipment from the launch site.
Launch equipment is understood to be systems,
components, and instruments required to launch
a missile.
2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the
actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall
be performed:
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(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch
stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and
missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall
be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;
(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and
removed from the launch site; and
(c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads and
of missile launch control posts (bunkers),
and the fuel storage tank foundations may
be removed, and, after six months, the places
where they were located may be covered with
earth.
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to
the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions
shall be performed:
(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting,
launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be
dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components
shall be removed from the launch site; and
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(b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a)
above have been accomplished, the silo shall
remain open for a period of six months, after
which it may be filled with earth.
4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished
in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining
at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support,
or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties,
be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions
of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.
5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers
shall be completed no later than four months after the
replacement submarine begins sea trials.
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trwg*r
Joint Draft Text
Paragr2lh 1.2 of Procedures
for ABM Systems
Preliminarily Agreed by Commissioners
May 7, 1974
2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by
dismantling or destruction of their above-ground
structures and headworks, and removal of launcher
rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and
after six months the silos may be filled with earth.
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SCC
Session--Ill
A-203
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, May 3, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi:
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Mr. Long
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)
Mr. Afanasenko (Interpreter)
Brig. Ger. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Ustinov declared the meeting open and gave the
floor to Graybeal.
Commissioner Graybeal gave his prepared comments on paragraph
1.2 of the ABM Procedures (Attachment No. 1).
General Ustinov delivered a brief prepared statement on
the same subject, and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing
the formulation for paragraph 1.2 of the ABM Procedures which,
in the view of the Soviet SCC Component, should become "prelim-
inarily agreed by Commissioners" (Attachment No. 2).
Mr. Graybeal said that a quick review of the Soviet Working
Document just handed to him, along with Ustinovts remarks,
indicated that the two sides have preliminary agreement concerning
that paragraph dealing with dismantling or destruction of silo
ABM launchers.
He said he had noted that the Soviet side, apparently based
on the precedent in the draft offensive arms Procedures, had used
the formulation "may" rather than "shall" (be filled with earth)
with respect to the action to be taken six months after the
dismantling or destruction of the launchers. His preliminary
reaction was that the language of the paragraph as it appeared
in the Soviet Working Document could be considered "preliminarily
agreed by Commissioners," including that use of the word "may."
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He added that we should probably task our Executive Secretaries
to conform the English and Russian texts of the language for
paragraph 1.2; though he saw .no major problems, it could be
checked now. He commented that he was happy to see that we had
solved this "and/or" problem much more easily than similar
problems in the early phases of SALT, which Mr. Karpov, in
particular, would appreciate.
Graybeal said he would like to return to a subject which
still remains one of the unresolved issues before us in our
efforts to work out mutually agreed procedures, and present some
considerations on notification. He then delivered his prepared
comments on that subject (Attachment No. 3), and inserted the
comment that he would not repeat all of the arguments and rationale
previously presented by the U.S. side for its proposals.
General Ustinov said that Graybeal's statement would be
studied, and immediately launched into his statement on paragraph
1.2 of the offensive arms Procedures, concerning the definition
of a "modern SLBM" (Attachment No. 4). In connection with that,
he tabled a Soviet Working Document consisting of proposed language
for that paragraph (Attachment No. 5).
Mr. Graybeal said the U.S. side had carefully listened to
Ustinov's remarks, and added that both the statement and the
proposal would be carefully studied.
He had one question, however; to clarify Ustinovls proposal
concerning establishment of a working group, he wanted to know
whether that working group, in Ustinov's view, would discuss
both the proposed language for paragraph 1.2 and the remaining
issues in Section III of the offensive arms Procedures. He had
understood Ustinov's statement in that way, and had further
understood Ustinov to say that he considered it possible to
discuss the possibility of agreeing on the language proposed
today for paragraph 1.2 provided mutually acceptable solutions
are found for Section III.
General Ustinov said that when he proposed establishing a
working group, he had in mind that the respective positions of
the sides on naval matters would be clarified in more detail.
This included Section III and paragraph 1.2; what he also had
in mind was a detailed study of the proposals of both sides on
the questions in those parts of the Joint Draft Text, with a
view to trying to arrive at a common view on them. The Soviet
side felt that General Georgi and Mr. KarDov should be assisted
in their work by the appropriate experts from both Components
of the SCC. He said he further felt that in order to clarify
the matters in question, the working group would probably need
only a meeting or two, after which work on these subjects could
continue in the forum of the entire SOC.
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Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov for-the additional clarification
of his proposal, and said that he understood it. He stated that
he would like a little time to 'think about it and discuss it
with the other members of the U.S. Component, and that he would
respond to the proposal as soon as possible. He indicated that
General Ustinov again had the floor.
General Ustinov said he had no further matters to bring
up today.
Mr. Graybeal said that he, also, had nothing further.
General Ustinov stated that, in that case, we could probably
agree that the next meeting would take place on Tuesday, May 7,
at 11:00 a.m. The decision as to whether it would be a plenary
session of the SCC or a meeting of the working group could be
made after Graybeal had decided whether or not to accept the
proposal to establish a working group.
Mr. Graybeal remarked that the two sides might even decide
to have both kinds of meetings on May 7, and schedule a working
group meeting to follow an SCC meeting on that date.
General Ustinov said that was also possible, and adjourned
the meeting at 11:35 a.m., commenting as he did so that he would
await Graybeal's response concerning the establishment of a
working group.
Attachments:
1, Graybeal Comments on para 1.2 of ABM Procedures
2. Ustinov Statement on para 1.2 of ABM Procedures, and
Soviet Working Document
3. Graybeal Comments on Notification
4. Ustinov Statement on para 1.2 of Offensive Arms Procedures
5. Soviet Working Document on para 1.2 of Offensive Arms
Procedures
Drafted .FPDeSimone:sbs
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COMMISSIONER GRAYBEALJS COMMENTS - PARAGRAPH 1.2. OF
PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
May 3, 1974
I. Mr. Commissioner, the only bracketed portions of
the Joint Draft Texts for the Protocol and Procedures for
ABM Systems and Their Components, other than those related
to notification, are the two words "and" versus "or" in
paragraph 1.2 of the Procedures. The issue, simply stated,
is whether dismantling or destruction of the headworks (if
present) should be mandatory or optional.
2. The U.S. side continues to believe that, where
headworks are present, their dismantling or destruction
should be mandatory. Without such a provision the agreed
reactivation time criterion contained in paragraph 3 of
the Protocol would not be met.
3. We are aware of no reason why a procedure similar
to that preliminarily agreed to for silo ICBM launchers
should not also be applied to those silo ABM launchers
which have headworks.
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4. Nr. Commissioner, the procedures we are discussing
this morning apply to -"Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges."
It is understood that these procedures shall not prejudice
the scope or terms of the procedures to be worked out for
dismantling or destruction and replacement of ABM systems
and their components at operational ABM deployment areas
as provided for in the ABM Treaty.
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"-ta,chment No. 2
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USTTNOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH 1.2 OF ABM PROCEDURES
May 3, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
Today we would. like to express our views concerning
the Procedures governing dismantling or destruction of
ABM systems and their components, specifically, that
part of Section I of this document which concerns the
scope of dismantling or destruction of excess ABM
launchers at test ranges.
We have again carefully studied the proposal tabled
by the U.S. side at SCC-II on paragraph 1.2 of the ABM
Procedures, concerning the scope of measures necessary
for putting silo launchers in a condition that precludes
the possibility of their use for launching ABMs.
We, also, believe that the dismantling of ABM silo
launchers at test ranges can be carried out applying that
scope preliminarily agreed by us on April 30, 1974 for
land-based silo ICBM launchers. Therefore, the Soviet
side proposes the following wording for paragraph 1.2
of the ABM Procedures:
"2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by
dismantling or destruction of their al?ove-ground structures
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and headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-
launcher debris may be removed and after six months
the silos may be filled with earth."
Thank you for your attention.
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Official translatiou
Soviet Working Document
May 3, 1974
ABM PROCEDURES
Section I, paragraph 2
2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable ty
dismantling or destruction of their above-ground
structures and headworks and removal of launcher
rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and
after six months the silos may be filled with earth.
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EC
^ttachment No.
FOT0435A40400010001-2
,ZZD
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - NOTIFICATION
May 3, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, we have carefully studied the
statements you made and we note that you are still studying
the clarifications we Provided to your questions on
notification. But, the two sides still appear to be far
apart on the overall issue of notification in spite of
the efforts made by the U.S. side to facilitate progress
in this area.
2. It remains the U.S. position that certain notification
provisions would promote the objectives of the ABM Treaty
and the Interim Agreement by reducing the possibilities for
uncertainties and misunderstandings and thereby enhance the
viability of these agreements and contribute to continued
improved relations between our two countries. The U.S. side
believes that significant benefits could be achieved at
little or no cost or effort, and at no risk to the security
interests of either side.
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3. Mr. Commissioner, l'would like to reemphasize the
importance the U.S. side attaches to including adequate
notification provisions in the mutually agreed procedures
we are charged with working out in the SCC. Consequently,
I repeat that the U.S. proposals regarding notification should
be considered on their own merit as an integral part of the
mutually agreed procedures we are developing. Progress
requires taking into account the views and concerns of both
sides.
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USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH 1.2 OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE AIMS PROCEDURES
May 3, 197)1
Mr. Commissioner,
At today's meeting I would like to return again
to paragraph 1.2 of the Procedures for strategic
offensive arms.
The Soviet side has already expressed its point of
view on this question on April 19, 1974. Briefly stated,
we believe the addition proposed by the U.S. side to be
superfluous, since the definition of a modern SLBM, as
it applies to the tasks of the procedures which we are
working out, is expressed with adequate completeness
in the agreed portion of the formulation for paragraph 2.
On April 19, 1974 the U.S. side submitted for the
Commission's consideration two modified alternative
versions of wording, supplementing its bracketed proposal
of November 16, 1973, and stated that it considers these
to be preferable.
The Soviet Component of the Commission has carefully
studied these drafts and remains convinced that introduc-
tion of the proposed addition to paragraph 2 will not
add anything new of substance in terms of accomplishing
the tasks steming from the Interim Agreement and the
Protocol thereto.
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Mr. Commissioner, there is a large group of
questions concerning baLlistic-missile submarines under
consideration by the Commission. It is apparent from
past discussions that achievement of mutually acceptable
solutions to these questions is meeting with rather
considerable difficulties.
It would appear useful to approach solution of
these questions taking into account all aspects of this
matter, especially the fact that both the definition of
a modern SLBM, and resolution of the questions contained
in Section III of the Procedures, ought to be considered
in the context of the provisions of the Interim Agreement
concerning the replacement of weapons, covered by that
agreement, by new ballistic-missile submarines.
Therefore, desiring to facilitate finding mutually
acceptable solutions, and taking into account the
importance which the U.S. side attaches to the addition
to paragraph 1.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive
arms, the Soviet Component of the SCC is prepared, in
principle, to discuss the question of the possibility of
considering the U.S. addition to paragraph 1.2 of the
Procedures for strategic offensive arms, provided mutually
acceptable solutions for Section III of the Procedures
for strategic offensive arms are found.
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In that case, the following wording of the addition
to paragraph 1.2 of the Procedtires, defining a modern
SLBM, could be taken as.a,basis for discussion.
(The wording of paragraph 1.2 is read)
It seems to me that we could establish a working
group,headed by Mr. Georgi and Mr. Karpov, for the
.purpose of a more detailed discussion of these questions.
Thank you for your attention.
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-uacnment No. 5
Official translation
Soviet Working Document
May 3, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Section I, paragraph 2
2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles
are: for the United States, missiles installed in all
nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union,
missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered sub-
marines made operationa3 since 1965; and for both Parties,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested
since 1965 and installed in any submarine regardless of
type.
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SECRLT/FXDIS
US/USSR STPNDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, April 30, 1974
US Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Lt.
Lt.
Mr.
Lt.
Mr.
Mr.
Col. Bartos
Col. DeSimone
Long
Cdr. Martin
Smith
Arensburger (Interpreter)
SCC
Session III
A- 200
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Graybeal declared the meeting open and delivered
a brief prepared statement noting that there appeared to be pre-
liminary agreement by Commissioners on Section II of the
strategic offensive arms Procedures, and provided the Soviet side
with English and Russian texts of the language for that section
which the US side believes is now preliminarily agreed by
Commissioners (Attachment No. 1).
Commissioner Ustinov said the Soviet Component of the
Commission is pleased that we have been able to reach agreement
in principle on one of the most important sections of the
strategic offensive arms Procedures, Section II, which governs
the scope of dismantling on land-based ICBM launchers deployed
prior to 1964. He added that such agreement had become possible
thanks to a constructive approach by both sides towards solving
problems in a spirit of mutual understanding. Ustinov said
he thought the two Executive Secretaries could be charged with
presenting to the Commissioners, sometime next week, the Joint
Draft of the Text of Section II "preliminarily agreed by
Commissioners". It went without saying that this language was
subject to consideration and approval by Governments, and that
either side could propose changes or amendments if they were
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considered necessary. He concluded by expressing hope
that other remaining unagreed issues would be dea).', with just
as quickly and successfully as had been Section
Mr. Graybeal agreed that the English and Russian texts
of the language for Section II should be conformed under the
supervision of the Executive Secretaries. He also noted his
agreement with Ustinov's remarks that, obviously, we could
return to this subject if either Government deemed it necessary,
and that "nothing is agreed until all is agreed."
Graybeal said that he had wanted to lead off at this
morning's meeting because he had thought it useful to respond
to the proposals made by the Soviet side, and the progress
made at the last meeting and during the subsequent conversa-
tion between Commissioners, by tabling the language the US
side considered to be preliminarily agreed at this point.
He concluded by commenting that important work on the
resolution of other issues still remained, and with that returned
the floor to Ustinov.
General Ustinov delivered a prepared statement on
Para. 111.1 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures
(Attachment No. 2) containing a Soviet proposal on submarine
dismantling, and tabled that proposal in the form of a Working
Document (Attachment No. 3).
Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov's statement and. the proposal
he had tabled would be given the most careful study by the US
side. Without commenting further at this time on the new Soviet
proposal, Graybeal said, he would like to set forth US views
regarding Section III of the offensive arms Procedures. He
then delivered his prepared comments on ballistic missile sub-
marine and SLBM launcher dismantling or destruction (Attachment
No. 4)
In presenting his comments, Graybeal noted Ustinov's
mention in his own statement of the need to satisfy the agreed
criteria included in Para. 3 of the offensive arms Protocol.
He tabled a Working Document of the US SCC Component con-
taining new language for subparagraph III.1(e) of the offensive
arms Procedures, noting that it incorporated those changes in
the language of that subparagraph to which he had referred in
his comments (Attachment No. 5).
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Graybeal said that he had no further considerations to
present at this morning's meeting.
General Ustinov said that Graybeal's statement, as well.
as the revised US proposal, would be studied by the Soviet side.
Both sides had tabled proposals for Section III, and we would
have the opportunity to exchange points of view on this subject
in the future. However, he said, he would like to draw atten-
tion again to the proposal the Soviet side had tabled for con-
sideration today. In his view, it was quite constructive, and
acceptable to both sides. He simply wanted to suggest careful
study of that proposal.
Ustinov said he would like to continue with some considera-
tions concerning several issues which had been addressed at
previous meetings, if Graybeal had no objection.
Mr. Graybeal said it was his pleasure to listen to consid-
erations of the Soviet side on any issue which needed further
discussion, in the spirit of direct and frank consideration of
all issues between the two sides. He noted that the US side
always listened very carefully to any remarks made by Ustinov.
General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and delivered a prepared
statement on notification (Attachment No. 6).
Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov's statement would be
carefully studied, and that he would restrict his preliminary
reaction to three points:
First, there is agreement between the sides that prior
notification, or any notification, for that matter, is not
required for verification of compliance with the Interim Agree-
ment and its Protocol or with the Procedures we are working
out. There was one important exception, as had been previously
mentioned by the US side. If either side chooses to implement
the Procedure calling for sinking of a submarine, that would
require some notification to insure adequate verification.
Second, mutual trust and the viability of existing agree-
ments is based on a number of factors, among which one of the
most important is compliance with those agreements by both
sides. Insuring confidence in compliance, by national technical
means, is also an important item.
Third, Graybeal said, in his opinion, one of the important
tasks of the SCC is to promote the implementation of both the
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provisions and and the objectives of the ABM Treaty, the Interim
Agreement and its Protocol, and applicable Agreed Statements.
Any action we can take in the SCC, whether in formulating
mutually agreed procedures or in raising other questions
arising on either side, the clarification of which would be
useful in reducing misunderstandings or uncertainties, would
contribute not only to the viability of those existing agree-
ments, but also to improving relations between our countries,
and improving the climate for possible future agreements.
Therefore, adequate notification procedures, which can be
implemented at no expense to the security interests of either
side while contributing to reducing the possibilities for mis-
understanding and. uncertainty, remained, in his opinion,an
important element of the task before the SCC.
Graybeal said that he would conclude from Ustinov's
statement this morning that some major work still remains to be
done by the SCC.
General Ustinov said that in his statement on notification
this morning, he had addressed the subject of notification as
a whole, proceeding from the position taken by the Soviet side
on that issue as a whole. The problem, however, consists of a
Nftw, number of particulars, one of which Graybeal had addressed
during the April 19 meeting as well as in his remarks in response
to Ustinov's own statement this morning. The specific particular
he had in mind dealt with prior notification of the time and
location of the sinking of a-replaced submarine. However,
Ustinov continued, Graybeal had said nothing regarding those
elements of prior notification which were still part of the
US proposals as reflected in the Joint Draft Texts of
November 16, 1973 and April 19, 1974. He had in mind notifica-
tion concerning shipyards to be used for submarine dismantling,
advance notification concerning submarines which would begin
sea trials during the next six months, and other matters.
Inasmuch as this issue was being dealt with at this morning's
meeting, he would like to continue his comments by addressing
the two particulars he had just mentioned.
He then read prepared statements on predesignation of
shipyards and on prior notification of the commencement of
submarine sea trials (Attachments No. 7 and No. 8).
Following his prepared comments, Ustinov said he had
addressed those two questions in detail in connection with
Graybeal's comments regarding the Soviet position on notifica-
tion, so that the US side would better understand that Soviet
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position. He would like to ask, he said, that the US side
carefully study his considerations, so that we might achieve
progress and success in our work.
Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov for the additional clarifica-
tion concerning notification, and said that we would, obviously,
be returning to this important subject, on which we remained
far from agreement. He said that having listened carefully
to Ustinov's statement, he could only reinforce his own comment
that the SCC still has a great deal of work to do.
General Ustinov interjected that he agreed.
Mr. Graybeal said that the US side would carefully study
all the points Ustinov had made, and subsequently return to
them. He asked whether Ustinov had any other matters to raise
today.
General Ustinov said he thought it was already time to
wind up this meeting.
Mr. Graybeal said he had only a pair of minor items he
would like to mention. He noted the imminent departure of
Lt. Col. Bartos, who would be replaced on the US side by a
Navy man whom some on the Soviet side already knew, Cdr. Atkinson.
He also noted that tomorrow was an important Soviet holiday and,
on behalf of all of the US Component, he wished all of the Soviet
Component a happy May Day.
Graybeal then suggested that the next meeting be scheduled
for 11 a.m. on Friday, May 3, at the Soviet mission, if that
were agreeable.
General Ustinov thanked Craybeal for the holiday greeting,
said that on his own behalf, and on behalf of all the members
of the Soviet Component, he would like to wish Lt. Col Bartos
bon voyage and a pleasant trip to the United States, and added
that the Soviet side would be happy to welcome Cdr. Atkinson
and work with him in the SOC. He concluded by noting his agree-
ment to the proposed schedule for the next meeting.
Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 12:20 p.m.
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Attachments:
1. Graybeal's Statement on Section II, Offensive Arms
Procedures and WorkinE Document, US SCC Component on
Section II, Offensive Arms Procedures
2. Ustinov's Statement on Para. 111.1, Offensive Arms
Procedures
3. Soviet Working Document on Para. III.1(d), Offensive
Arms Procedures
4. Graybeal's Comments on Section III of Offensive Arms
Procedures
5. Working Document of US SCC Component on Para. III.1(e),
Offensive Arms Procedures
6. Ustinov's Statement on Notification
7. Ustinov's Statement on Predesignated Shipyards
8. Ustinov's Statement on Prior Notification of Commence-
ment of Sea Trials
I4
Drafted by: F. P. DeSimone:bd Approved by: S. N. Graybeal
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r8,4
At tachh,ent No.
SCC-III
STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL
April 30, 1974
Mr. Commissioner, on April 26 we had a useful
exchange of views which appears to provide a solution
to our differences in regard to the Procedures for
Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM
Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers. We are in
agreement that the procedures of Section II of the
Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or
Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic
Offensive Arms are interrelated and that each part
should be considered in the light of this relationship.
Therefore, after careful study of the language pro-
posed by the Soviet side at the meeting of April 26,
1974 and modified during our private discussion follow-
ing that meeting, we appear to have preliminary agree-
ment by Commissioners on all of Section II as follows:
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Working Document of
US SCC Component
April 30, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES
II. Procedures For Dismantling or Destruction of
Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced By SLBM Launchers
1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished
in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a) removal from the launch site of the supply of
missiles and their components, warheads, and
mobile equipment; and
(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting
and handling equipment, and propellant-handling
equipment, associated with the launcher and located
at the launch site, and removal of all dismantled
equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment
is understood to be systems, components, and
instruments required to launch a missile.
2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the
actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall
be performed:
(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch
stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and missile
launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable
by dismantling or destruction;
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(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and
removed from the launch site; and
(c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads
and of missile launch control posts
(bunkers), and the fuel storage tank foun-
dations may be removed, and, after six
months, the places where they were located may
be covered with earth.
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to
the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions
shall be performed:
(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting,
launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be
dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components
shall be removed from the launch site; and
(b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a)
above have been accomplished, the silo shall
remain open for a period of six months, after
which it may be filled with earth.
4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished
in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining
at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support
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or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties,
be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions
of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.
5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM
launchers shall be completed no later than four months
after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.
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USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH 111.1
April 30, 1974
Mr: Commissioner,
As we agreed, I want to set forth at this
meeting the point of view of the Soviet side on
paragraph 1 of Section III, Procedures for Dismantling
or Destruction of Ballistic Missile Submarines and
SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic Missile Sub-
marines and SLBM Launchers, on which we have not yet
reached agreement.
In my statement I will specifically address in
greater detail the scope of dismantling, since we have
already spoken on the overall issue of notification.
We have carefully studied the U.S. proposals on this
question, submitted at SCC-II.
In setting forth the position of the Soviet side
on questions of dismantling or destruction of SLBM
launchers and ballistic missile submarines, it is my
aim to resolve the differences between us through a
frank exchange of views. This would permit us to
successfully resolve the problem of working out wording
which is acceptable to both sides.
First of all, we believe that dismantling or
destruction procedures must be acceptable for any
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ballistic missile submarine covered by the Interim
Agreement. Also, as we have already said, the
procedures being worked ouc must not provide for
prior notifications, and verification of compliance
with these procedures must be provided by national
technical means.
Agreed paragraph 4 of the strategic offensive arms
Protocol specifies that dismantling or destruction
procedures shall be formulated separately for ICBM
launchers, as well as SLBM launchers and ballistic
missile submarines. In our opinion, however, such a
formulation in no way means that procedures must be
worked out for some kinds of separate classes of sub-
marines.
In matters of submarine dismantling, it is of
paramount importance that SLBM launcher dismantling
procedures be such that reactivation time of those
units would not be substantially less than the time
required for new construction. The U.S. side, too, has
emphasized this on more than one occasion. In this
connection, in establishing the scope of dismantling,
one should take into account the necessity for
reasonable economy of effort and funds, as well as the
possibility of using the submarines, after dismantling
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3
of launchers, for purposes not inconsistent with
the Interim Agreement, as provided for in para-
graph 6 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol.
Thus, the Soviet side believes that procedures
for dismantling and replacement of ballistic missile
submarines must be applicable to any ballistic missile
submarine covered by the Interim Agreement, and that it
is not advisable, in this connection, to single out
any sorts of individual classes of submarines.
Taking the above into account, the Soviet side
does not see the necessity of wording subparagraph (e)
in the form in which it was proposed by the U.S. side
at SCC-II, and in place of that subparagraph, proposes
a new formulation for subparagraph (d).
"(d) removing, in the open, the missile launch
tubes together with the part of the superstructure or
fairwater and the section of the outer hull and pressure
hull above the missile compartment, with subsequent
welding of new sections without launch-tube penetrations
or missile hatches into the outer hull and pressure
hull. The superstructure and fairwater may be
replaced over the section of the hull of the submarine
from which the launch tubes have been removed."
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Mr. Commissioner, as you can see for yourself,
in this subparagraph, we provide for carrying out such
dismantling measures us would fully preclude the
possibility of using submarines, which are being
replaced, for launching ballistic missiles as well
as the possibility of their rapidly being put into
a condition in which they are usable for launching
such missiles. At the same time, in spite of the
fact that the formulation proposed by the Soviet side
is shorter, it covers the whole set of items which
were proposed by the U.S. side in subparagraph (e).
It can be applied to any ballistic missile submarine
covered by the Interim Agreement.
Also, the measures specified in this formulation
ensure the possibility of using a dismantled submarine
for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agree-
ment.
Mr. Commissioner, we hope that the U.S. side will
carefully study our proposal. With a positive approach
to it on your part, we could reach agreement on this
yet unresolved issue.
Thank you for your attention.
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Attachment No. 3
Official translation
Soviet Working Document
April 30, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Section III, paragraph 1
(d) removing, in the open, the missile launch
tubes together with the part of the superstructure
or fairwater and the section of the outer hull and
pressure hull above the missile compartment, with
subsequent welding of new sections without launch--
tube penetrations or missile hatches into the outer
hull and pressure hull. The superstructure and fair-
water may be replaced over the section of the hull of
the submarine from which the launch tubes have been
removed.
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z41/27
Attachment No. 4
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEALTS COMMENTS - SECTION III OF
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
April 30, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, today I will set forth U.S.
views regarding the procedures for dismantling or
destruction of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM
launchers replaced by new ballistic missile submarines
and SLBM launchers--Section III of the Procedures for
Strategic Offensive Arms.
2. During the period between SCC sessions, the U.S.
side carefully analyzed the five procedures set forth
in the Joint Draft Text of November 16, 1973 and studied
the exchanges which had taken place on this subject
during the first two SCC sessions. We continue to
believe that the alternative procedures proposed by
the U.S. for dismantling or destruction of ballistic
missile submarines and SLBM launchers, which are now in
Section III of the Joint Draft Text of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms Procedures of April 19, 1974, should be
acceptable to both sides.
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3. The U.S. proposed sinking of the submarine with
its launchers in international waters at least 2000
meters in depth. When this procedure or ballistic-
missile submarine destruction is chosen, notification of
the time and location of the planned destruction shall be
given to the other side at least one month prior to the
planned destruction.
4. The U.S. proposed. scrapping the submarine and its
launchers in the open in predesignated shipyards.
5. The U.S. proposed removing the submarine's missile
section in the open in predesignated shipyards. In
implementing the procedure for "removing the submarine's
missile section in the open," it is the U.S. view that if
this submarine is to be used for other purposes then the
missile section must not be replaced by a new section of
similar dimensions. Any replacement hull section must
be significantly shorter in overall length than the
missile section it replaces.
6. During SCC II, after carefully analyzing the Soviet
proposals for procedures for ballistic missile submarine
and SLBM launcher destruction or dismantling, the United
States set forth another alternative procedure (Para. 111.1(e)
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of JDT dated November 16, 1973). This proposal was
made in an effort to bring the views of the two sides
closer together. After further study since our last
session, the U.S. side developed new language which we
believe should make this alternative acceptable to the
Soviet side. Our revised proposal would apply to nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines originally con-
structed prior to 1965 whose ballistic missile launch
tubes protrude into the sail.
7. The U.S. approach to procedures for the dis-
mantling or destruction of ballistic missile submarines
and SLBM launchers is predicated upon the view that they
must be consistent with the agreed criteria contained in
Para. 3 of the Protocol. I believe there is complete
agreement between us on this fundamental point.
8. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side remains convinced
that the four U.S.-proposed procedures provide adequate
and effective alternatives for all presently known
classes of submarines. We believe the U.S. proposals
in the JDT of April 19, 1974, as revised by us today,
provide a firm basis for agreement.
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Attachment No.
Working Document of
US SCC Component
April 30, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 1(e)
III.1(e) for nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub-
marines originally constructed prior to 1965
whose ballistic missile launch tubes protrude
into the sail, removing the missile launch
tubes in the open in predesignated shipyards as
set forth below. The shipyards to be used for
ballistic-missile submarine dismantling shall
be agreed between the Parties.
(1) That entire part of the superstructure
(including the fairwater) and outer hull
above the missile compartment of the
submarine shall be removed.
(2) That section of the missile compartment
pressure hull (hull crown plating and frame
segments) which contains all of the hull
penetrations for the missile launch tubes,
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as well as the missile launch tubes,
shall be removed_
(3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then
be restored only by welding into place new
sections without launch tube penetrations.
(4) No superstructure or fairwater shall be
replaced over the section of the submarine
from which the missile launch tubes have
been removed.
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Attachment NO. 6
USTI NOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION
April 30, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
Since the April 19, 1974 meeting, the Soviet SCC
Component has devoted much attention to study of the
position of the U.S. side on notification issues which
was set forth by you on that date, and those clarifica-
tions which you provided on April 23 in connection
with the questions raised by the Soviet side on this
matter.
We agree with you, Mr. Commissioner, that notifica-
tion is one of the principal unresolved issues. I can
also affirm with satisfaction the agreement of both
sides that prior notification is not necessary for
verifying, by national technical means, compliance with
existing agreements or with the Procedures we are work-
ing out. This spares me the need of again repeating
the basic premise of both sides concerning the
reliability and effectiveness of national technical
means of verification.
At the same time I cannot comprehend the persistence
with which the U.S. side is nonetheless pressing for
the inclusion of elements of prior notification in the
Procedures. You say that this would enhance the
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fl
viability of already concluded agreements and would
contribute to the development of mutual trust
between our countries.
But it is not notification, whether prior or not,
on which viability of Soviet-American agreements and
mutual trust are based. They are based on strict
compliance by the sides with the provisions of these
documents, and the capabilities of the sides to carry
out reliable verification, using their national technical
means of verification, of compliance with the provisions
of these agreements, as well as with the Procedures
we are working out.
The main purpose of notification procedures is
that each side inform the other side through the Stand-
ing Consultative Commission, for the period between
sessions, on the completion of dismantling or destruc-
tion of numbers of ICBM launchers, submarines, and
SLBM launchers, as well as ABM launchers and radars;
and for that same period, on the number of ICBM
launchers and SLBM launchers used by each side for
replacement.
Such a reciprocal exchange of information by the
sides through the SCC would be documentary confirma-
tion of completion of actions in this area for their
official recording in the SCC.
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Precisely this would promote enhancement of
the viability of the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement and would Contribute to the strengthening
of mutual trust between our countries.
Therefore, on the strength of the considerations
set forth by us, the Soviet side does not see a necessity
to replace the functions of national technical means
of verification with any sort of additional functions
of the Commission with respect to prior notification.
Such a solution of the question is unacceptable to us
as a matter of principle.
Mr. Commissioner, with respect to your clarifica-
tions of April 23 on questions of notification, we are
still studying them thoroughly. Today, in a preliminary
manner, it can be said that the notification procedures
proposed by you on launcher dismantling which is in
progress are in our opinion not dictated by necessity,
and only complicate what is already a complicated task
for the SCC.
The Soviet side proposes a solution to the question
of notification, which is simpler and which fully meets
the tasks before us--that notification be made on that
number of ICBM launchers, =1\1 launchers, ABM launchers,
and radars, the dismantling of which has been completed
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by the beginning of 8 regular session, as well as
on the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers
used during that same period for replacement. We
are convinced that such a solution more precisely
reflects the substance of this matter.
Thank you four attention.
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SEk'1ci;91 Attachment No. 7
USTINOV STATEMENT ON :PREDESIGNATION OF SHIPYARDS
April 30, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
1. Prior notification of the location of dismantl-
ing or destruction of submarines is inadvisable and
unnecessary for the following reasons.
First, predesignation of shipyards where submarine
dismantling is carried out, in our opinion, replaces
the functions of national technical means of verification.
Second, paragraph 111.2 of the strategic offensive
arms Procedures, agreed by us at SCC-II, sets the
period of time for submarine dismantling or destruction.
This period covers an extensive increment of time
during which national technical means are capable of
verifying progress in this work with a high degree of
confidence. The lengthy dismantling process and its
implementation in the open permit each side to follow,
with adequate certainty, the course of dismantling
work. Therefore, no additional information or data is
required on such work and the shipyards in which this
work is carried out. Moreover, it is necessary to
take into account that we do not designate the shipyards
where ballistic missile submarines are built; why, then,
designate where we will dismantle them. Incidentally,
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at SCC-II the U.S. side displayed reasonable
flexibility when it withdrew its proposal on specify-
ing coordinates for ICBM and SLBM launchers being
dismantled. Why then did shipyards remain; after all,
these are coordinates too? In our orinion this
question is so clear that it needs no additional
explanation.
In light of the considerations set forth by me,
we believe that the proposal of the U.S. side for
prior designation of shipyards is not advisable and
therefore cannot be accepted.
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Attachment No. 8
USTINOV STATEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF
COMMENCEMENT OF SEA TRIALS
April 30, 1974
2. In subparagraph I.6(b) of the strategic
offensive arms Procedures, the U.S. side proposes
that with respect to SLBM replacement launchers,
notification contain "the number of ballistic missths
which are on submarines that will begin sea trials
during the next six-month period."
Such a formulation cannot be acceptable to the
Soviet side because it plainly contains the principle
of prior notification which we have always opposed.
We believe that such prior notification is not required.
Both sides have agreed that the beginning of sea
trials of a ballistic missile submarine shall be the
date on which such a submarine first operates under
its own power away from the harbor or port in which
the construction or fitting-out of the submarine was
performed. The time of the beginning of sea trials,
which is the basis for timing initiation and comple-
tion of dismantling or destruction Of launchers being.
replaced, can be determined by national technical
means of verification_ This is the substance of the
question with which, it seems to us, both sides were
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in agreement In such a case we cannot understand
why the U.S. side again advances a requirement for
prior notification. We cannot agree to this.
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SCC
Session-ILI
A-190
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, April 26, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Lt. Col. Bartos
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Mr. Long
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Arensburger
(Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Ustinov declared the meeting open and said that
in accord with his prior understanding with Mr. Graybeal he would
take the floor first. He then gave a prepared statement on
paragraph 11.4 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures
(Attachment No. 1).
Ustinov continued by following up with statements on
paragraphs 11.2 and II.3(a) of the strategic offensive arms
Procedures (Attachments No. 2 and No. 3), and tabling two Soviet
Working Documents containing proposed language for those two
paragraphs (Attachment No. 4)
Ustinov concluded by thanking Graybeal for his patience in
hearing out a rather long statement. He said it seemed to him
that the proposals he had made today should constitute mutually
acceptable solutions to all the remaining questions in Section II
of the Procedures, along the lines spoken of at the last meeting,
and that should permit us to remove all of the brackets from
Section II of the Procedures.
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Commissioner Graybeal saLd that General Ustinov's statements
and the specific proposals of the Soviet side would, needless to
say, be given very careful consideration and study. His
preliminary reaction, he confirmed, now that both sides had
set forth their views on Section II, was that we seem to be
moving toward solution of the issues in that section of the
offensive Procedures.
Graybeal said he thought Ustinov would understand that in
view of the statement he had made and the new Soviet proposals he
had tabled, he, Graybeal, would refrain from any prepared statement
or further comment on Section II. Rather, he would carefully study
them, as he had already said, and we would return to the subject
very soon. However, for the purpose of improving our mutual
understanding of the Soviet proposals, he would like to make several
preliminary observations.
The U.S. side, he stated, continued to consider cost and
expense a secondary factor. Though we recognize it as a factor,
it is not nearly as important as working out mutually agreed
procedures which meet the criteria set forth in the offensive
arms Protocol.
Second, as he understood Ustinov's initial statement and
summary remarks, the Soviet side sees a relationship between
paragraph 11.4 and the remainder of the questions in Section II
as set forth previously by the U.S. side.
Third, it would appear that there is agreement in principle
concerning the issues in Section II, with the exception of the
size of the area of the launch pad to be dismantled or destroyed
in the case of soft ICBM sites, and whether or not, in the case
of silo launch sites, launch control bunkers are subject to
dismantling or destruction.
Finally, Graybeal said he believed that our exchange on
paragraph 11.4 had been a constructive one, and he shared the
view that we should be able to reach mutually acceptable solutions
concerning the two remaining issues he had noted.
He concluded by repeating that he would like to reserve
further comment until the statement and proposals of the Soviet
side this morning had been studied.
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General Ustinov Ustinov thanked Graybeal for his comments, and
said he would like to emphasize that in studying the new Soviet
proposals the U.S. side should give attention to that aspect of
the overall issue Ustinov had emphasized again in his statement
today. Specifically, he was referring to the view that these
procedures we are working out should be considered in the light
of a dual requirement -- to put the launchers in a condition
precluding the possibility of their use for launching missiles
while simultaneously realizing maximum economy of expense and
effort, This view of the Soviet side is one of principle. Ustinov
said he thought the U.S. side understood that this is a reciprocal
proposition which was important for the U.S. side also, and that
all proposals on procedures must be considered in the context of
these requirements.
Ustinov concluded by noting that he thought we could rather
quickly remove all of the brackets from Section 11 of the offensive
arms Procedures on the basis of the new specific proposals he had
tabled this morning.
Mr. Graybeal said that he understood Ustinov's comments and
that they would be taken into account, and repeated his comment
with respect to refraining from any further statements today.
General Ustinov said he understood Graybeal's remark to
mean the U.S. side had no further matters to raise today, and
that, in that case, we could close this morning's meeting, which
had been very productive. He proposed that if there were no
objections from the U.S. side, the next meeting be held at
11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, April 30, at the U.S. Mission.
Mr. Graybeal agreed to the proposed schedule.
General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 11:45 a.m.
Attachments:
1. Ustinov Statement,
Paragraph 11.4
2. Ustinov Statement,
Paragraph 11.2
3. Ustinov Statement,
paragraph 11.3(a)
4. Soviet Working Documents, on para 11.2 and 11.3(a)
strategic offensive arms
strategic offensive arms
strategic offensive arms
Procedures,
Procedures,
Procedures,
Drafted by FPDeSimone:sbs
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Attachment No. 1
USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH II .4 OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE PBC PROCEDURES
April 2(-1, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
In my statement today, I would like to address
paragraph 11.4 of tha Procedures for strategic
offensive arms, with respect to which the U.S. side
tabled its new proposal at the last meeting.
I believe that there is no disagreement between
us that the procedures we are working out must, of
course, be in full accord with the provisions of the
Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto, as well
as related Agreed Statements of the sides.
As you know, these documents, as well as para-
graphs 1 and 2 of the draft Protocol for strategic
offensive arms and Section I of the draft Procedures
for strategic offensive arms, strictly establish the
possible framework of dismantling and replacement.
Paragraph 1 of the Protocol for strategic
offensive arms, for example, specifies that the
attached procedures shall apply only to systems to
be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to
the provisions of the aforementioned Interim Agreement.
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Paragraph 1.1 of the Procedures for strategic
offensive arms specifically states that within the
limits of the levels established for each side,
launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deploed prior to
19621, may be replaced by launchers for ballistic
missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.
It is quite clear that since the subject is
replacement of launchers of one type by launchers
of another type, within the limits of established
levels, it is understood that the ICBM launchers of
older types being replaced cannot be reactivated.
One of the purposes of the procedures being worked
out by us is to insure that the ICBM launchers being
replaced be put in a condition that precludes the
possibility of their use for launching ICBMs, and
make impossible their reactivation within a period
of time substantially less than the time required
for new construction. Both Components of the SCC
agree that provisions of this nature must be included
in the Procedures, although their wording has not yet
been completely agreed upon.
At the same time, the Soviet side has repeatedly
called attention to the fact that putting launchers
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which are being replaced in a condition that
precludes the possibility of their use for laonching
ICBMs must be combined with reasonable considerations
of economy of effort and cost. And in any case, we
must not unnecessarily carry the scope of dismantling
activities to such proportions, that such dismantling
activity would require greater expenditures and effort
than the construction of the launchers being dismantled.
At the last meeting, the U.S. Component of the
SCC stressed the importance which it attaches to the
wording which it tabled for paragraph 11.4 of the
Procedures for strategic offensive arms, including
its importance with respect to the scope of dismantling
activities for ICBM launchers being replaced.
We understood the remarks of the U.S. side on
this question to mean that on condition that para-
graph 11.4, as proposed by the U.S. side on April 23,
is in the Procedures, a reduction is possible in
requirements presented until now on the scope of
dismantling activities for ICBM launchers being
replaced, both soft and silo.
Taking into account the above considera'Gions, the
Soviet Component of the SCC continues to see no need
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4
for including in the Procedures paragraph 11.4,
even in it new, refined formulation.
However, desiring to facilitate finding mutually.
acceptable solutions, and taking into account the
importance which the U.S. side attaches to the
inclusion of paragraph 11.4 in the Procedures, the
Soviet Component of the SCC is in principle prepared
to consider the question of its possible inclusion in
the-Procedures, if mutually acceptable solutions are
found on the other issues in Section II of the
Procedures for strategic offensive arms.
As you know, other unagreed provisions remain
in this section besides paragraph 4, in subpara-
graph 2(a) and subparagraph 3(a).
On condition that mutually acceptable wording
is found on these issues, we would be prepared to
agree to the U.S. proposal on paragraph 4, as
formulated by the U.S. Component of the SCC at the
April 23, 1974 meeting.
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SECt,V3 Attachment No. 2
USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH 11.2 OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
April ).6, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
Continuing our discussion of the Procedures
for dismantling or destruction of land-based inter-
continental ballistic missile launchers, being
replaced by SLBM launchers, I intend to address those
additional dismantling measures with respect to soft
launch sites, which, as you know, are covered in
paragraph 11.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive
arms.
In my statement, I would like to set forth the
position of the Soviet side on the substance of the
questions contained in this paragraph, and if possible
attempt to remove the brackets which still remain therein.
As a result of careful study of the Soviet and U.S.
drafts of the text of paragraph 2, contained in the
November 16, 1973 document, we came to the conclusion
that the points of view of the two sides on possible
ways for resolving the question of degree of dismantling
soft launch sites are rather close. This gives rise
to hope for a rapid resolution of existing differences.
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Specifically, Mr. Commissioner, we decided to
propose for your consideration new wording for sub-
paragraph (a) which consists of the following: "areas
of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and
10 meters in diameter, and missile launch control posts
(bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or
destruction."
Thus, we are An agreement, as is proposed by the
U.S. side, that the Procedures indicate the specific
size of the area of the launch pad, which must be
dismantled or destroyed.
In our opinion, the size of the area of the launch
pad which must be dismantled or destroyed could be
limited to an area 10 meters in diameter. This would
fully ensure that the intercontinental ballistic
missile launcher would be put in a condition that
precludes the possibility of its use for launching
missiles and make impossible its reactivation in
substantially less time than the time necessary for
new construction. At the same time such a size for
the area of the launch pad being dismantled or destroyed
would reduce by nine times the amount of dismantling
work as compared to the size of the area to be destroyed
you proposed, 30 meters In diameter, and, consequently,
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3
would considerably reduce the expenditure of funds
and effort we have drawn ynur attention to this
repeatedly.
The Soviet side believes that the new wording
proposed today for subparagraph (a) can provide a
solution acceptable to both sides, and hopes that
the U.S. Component of the SCC will favorably consider
this constructive Soviet proposal.
Thank you for your attention.
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Attachment No. "-),
-
USTTNOV STATEMENT ON SUBPARAGRAPH 11.3(a) OF
STRATEGIC OFFNSIvE ARMS PROCEDURE7,
April 26, 1_974
Mr. Commissioner,
the
for
In my next statement I would like
to address
wording of subparagraph II.3(a) of the Procedures
strategic offensive arms, which governs the
additional dismantling measures for intercontinental
ballistic missile silo launchers.
We believe that on
acceptable solution
basic principles of
Procedures, adopted
of the Protocol for
this matter, too, a mutually
can be found which satisfies the
the dismantling or destruction
by us, set forth in paragraph 3
Strategic offensive arms. At the
same time, the Soviet side's proposal on the necessity
for maximum possible reduction of expenditures
dismantling work would also be satisfied.
I want to propose for your consideration
Soviet wording for subparagraph 3(a).
(Text of subparagraph II.3(a) of
for
new
the Procedures
for strategic offensive arms is read and handed over)
If you, Mr. Commissioner, carefully examine this
wording, you will undoubtedly note that it is almost
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fully identical with the U.S. proposal of November 16,
1973. The only thing missing in the Soviet draft, is
the mention of dismantling or destruction of launch
control posts (bunkers).
In our opinion, and I think the U.S. side will
agree.with this, putting the silo launcher itself into
an unusable condition is governing and most important
in carrying out dismantling or destruction of facilities
at silo launch sites.
The Soviet side believes that the scope of
dismantling work on a silo launcher, carried out in
accordance with the aforementioned subparagraph (a),
makes it completely unusable for launching missiles
and leaves the sides no possibility whatever to
reactivate it in a period of time, less than that
required for new construction. Under these conditions,
launch control posts (bunkers) completely cease to
serve their purpose, especially since the launch
equipment in them must be completely dismantled and
removed from the launch site in accordance with
paragraph 1 of the same Section of the Procedures.
Also, such a resolution of the question of
dismantling or destxuction of silo launchers would
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permit a considerable reduction in expenditures for
dismantling work.
Mr. Commissioner, I hope that the U.S. side will
carefully study the new Soviet proposal tabled today,
which is aimed at reaching mutually acceptable solu-
tions.on matters of dismantling or destruction of, ICBM
launchers deployed prior to 1964 and being replaced
by SLBM launchers.
I would also like to remind you that we look upon
our proposals for subparagraphs II.2(a) and II.3(a)
of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms in the
context of the statement I made earlier concerning
the U.S. proposals on paragraph 4 of the same section.
Thank you for your attention.
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Attachment No.
Official translation
Soviet Working Document
April 26, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Paragraph 11.2
(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the
launch stand and 10 meters in diameter, and missile
launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made
unusable by dismantling or destruction;
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"4.44IF fai.4001
f)
Official translation
Soviet Working Document
April 26, 1974
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Paragraph 11.3
(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas
ducting, launch tubes and silo headworks shall be
dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled components
shall be removed from the launch site;
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Session-Ili
A. 181
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, April 23, 1974
U.S. Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. Anderson
Lt. Col. Bartos
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Mr. Long
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Graybeal welcomed General Ustinov and the
members of the Soviet Component of the SCC, declared the
meeting open, and gave the floor to General Ustinov.
Commissioner Ustinov delivered a prepared statement on
paragraph II.1(b) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures
(Attachment No. 1).
Mr. Graybeal gave the firat part of his prepared comments
on land-based ICBM launcher dismantling or destruction (Sections
I, II, and III of Attachment No. 2), and passed to the Soviet
side a U.S. Working Document containing proposed revised
language for paragraph 11.4 of the offensive arms Procedures
(Attachment No. 3).
General Ustinov said he had listened very carefully to
Graybeal's statement, and wanted to express his satisfaction
that the sides had found a common formulation for paragraph
II.1(b); it seemed that both sides were able to find a common
point of view. As for paragraph 1104, it seemed to him that
before he could speak to that subject the Soviet side would
have to study the new draft which had been presented this
morning. He said the U.S. proposal would be carefully studied,
and a response would be forthcoming at a future meeting.
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General Ustinov continued by saying that keeping our
previous meeting in mind, he would like to try to clarify
several questions in connection with the U.S.-proposed
alternative formulations for the definition of a "modern
SLBM," which had been tabled at that meeting.
He then read a prepared text containing two questions on
the "modern SLBM" definition (Attachment No. 4).
Mr. Graybeal said he would like to give a preliminary
response, which could be amplified at a subsequent meeting,
to assist the Soviet side in understanding the U.S. position.
He said that both alternatives suggested by the U.S. side at
the April 19 meeting used the phrase "first flight-tested" in
place of the "first tested" which was part of the bracketed
language of the offensive JDT, in paragraph 1.2 of the
Procedures. This change had been made as a result of certain
questions raised by the Soviet side -- informally, he thought,
although he would have to check the record of our meetings at
the second session of the SCC to be certain. Since "test" is
very broad in its connotations, and many kinds of tests such
as laboratory tests, drawing board tests and others exist,
and since we are dealing here with procedures which are to
be verified by national technical means, we changed the
formulation so as to clearly distinguish flight testing from
other kinds of testing.
As for the change in the date from 1964 to 1965, Ustinov
would note that the alternative proposed phrases which the
U.S. side had tabled on April 19 were written so as to
become part of paragraph 1.2. With the addition of either
one of those phrases, the paragraph would deal with the
definition of "modern SLBMs" in three parts -- the first
part of the paragraph describes a modern SLBM for the U.S.;
the second part, for the Soviet Union; and the third part,
for both sides. For consistency, since the cutoff date used
in the second part was 1965, we had changed the date in our
proposed additional phrase correspondingly. It is obvious
that we are speaking of new missiles here, and it would seem
appropriate to use such a cutoff date in order to distinguish
the new from the old; this is a well-established precedent
in previous SALT and SCC documents and discussions.
Graybeal said he hoped this preliminary response would
be helpful. He also added that he thought it became clear
from Ustinov's questionb and his own answers that the
alternative proposed additions to paragraph 1.2 which had
been tabled on April 19 were both preferable, in terms of
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their clarity and the consi_stency of the date, to the
third alternative, that is, the bracketed sentence in
the November 16, 1973 and April 19, 1974 JDTs.
General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and said his question
had been intended to get at the essence of the new U.S.
proposals. He noted that from Graybeal's explanation he
understood "first flight-tested" to mean the end of flight
testing.
Mr. Graybeal said he believed the language we had used
had properly expressed our intent; it said "first flight-tested
since 1965.? The meaning here is parallel to the meaning of
"made operational since 1965," which was in the unbracketed
part of the paragraph. That is, the missiles spoken of here
would have begun their flight testing sometime after 1965.
Presumably, if such a missile ever became operational, then
its flight testing would have been completed by that time.
The important point is that flight testing would have begun
after 1965, and this formulation would provide for completing
the definition to include "modern SLBMs" on diesel submarines.
General Ustinov expressed his great appreciation for
the explanation. He said that it would be carefully studied,
just as the Soviet side had been studying the new U.S. proposals,
and that we would be able to return to this question at a
future meeting.
Ustinov said the newly-proposed formulation for
paragraph 11.4 of the offensive arms Procedures would be
just as carefully studied. He added that he wanted to very
frankly say he had intended to present the Soviet viewpoint
on that paragraph today, but since the U.S. side had tabled
a new proposal, he thought it would not be well to speak on
the previous formulation. Therefore, the Soviet side would
study the new proposal and address the subject later.
Mr. Graybeal said that in keeping with the understanding
he and Ustinov had reached on today's agenda, and in the
light of the earlier exchange at this meeting, he would like
to continue with comments and presentation of the U.S. side's
views concerning the subject of ICBMs; specifically, he wanted
to address paragraphs 11.2 and 11.3 of the offensive arms
Procedures. He emphasized that these comments were in the
context of the interrelationship he had previously mentioned
between paragraph 11.4 and the other Paragraphs of Section II.
These comments should be understood in the context of the
importance of that concept in paragraph 11.4 and its relation-
ship to the degree of dismantling and destruction at both
soft and silo ICBM sites.
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Graybeal then gave the remainder of his comments on
procedures for dismantling or destruction of land-based ICBM
launchers (see Attachment No. 2).
General Ustinov said he had listened very carefully to
the U.S. proposals on the various paragraphs of Section II
of the offensive arms Procedures. He wanted to repeat that
everything Graybeal had said today would be carefully studied
by the Soviet side. Several points of contact had become
evident, which could be used to try to find solutions to all
the issues in Section II. Since there were new proposals from
the U.S. side, he would not critique the U.S.-proposed
formulations in the JDT at this time, but would study instead
the new proposals, which pertain to questions of interest to
the Soviet side.
Mr. Graybeal said the U.S. side would like to provide
answers to the questions concerning notification which had
been asked by the Soviet side at the April 19 meeting, and
gave his prepared response to those questions (Attachment
No. 5).
He then said that completed the material he had for
this morning, and asked whether the Soviet side had any
further considerations.
General Ustinov thanked Graybeal for the clarification
on the notification questions, and said it would be carefully
studied and analyzed by the Soviet side.
As to further comments, he said he would like to repeat
that he would abstain in view of the new proposals presented
today.
Mr. Graybeal said the only question remaining, in that
case, was to schedule the next meeting, and proposed that
it take place on Friday, April 26, at 11:00 a.m. He noted
that it would be at the Soviet Mission, if that were agreeable,
and that be believed we had also already agreed to an informal
meeting in the form of a luncheon at 1:00 p.m. tomorrow,
April 24.
General Ustinov said the schedule for Friday was agreeable,
and that the Soviet side also found tomorrow's schedule very
agreeable,
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Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 12:30 p.m.
Attachments:
1. Ustinov Statement on Offensive Procedures Para II.1(b)
2. Qraybeal Comments on Dismantling or Destruction
Procedures for Land-Based ICBM Launchers
3. U.S. Working Document: Strategic Offensive Arms
Procedures, Para 11.4
4. Ustinov Questions on "Modern SLBM" Definition
5. Graybeal response to Soviet Questions on Notification
Drafted by FPDeSimone:sbs
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Attachment No. 1
USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH II.1(b) OF
PROCEDURES FOR OFFENSIVE ARMS
April 23, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
As you and I agreed, today I will present
comments of the Soviet side regarding the wording
of some of the unagreed paragraphs of Section II of
the Procedures for strategic offensive arms;
specifically, I have in mind, first of all, para-
graph II.1(b) of the Procedures for strategic offensive
arms.
As you know, this paragraph specifies those
measures which shall be carried out in all cases of
dismantling or destruction of land-based ICBM launchers
being replaced by SLBM launchers.
The difference between the formulations of this
paragraph is that the U.S. wording, as set forth in
the November 16, 1973 draft, speaks of the dismantling
of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling
equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, located
at the launch site or associated with it (i.e. with
the launch site), whereas the Soviet draft speaks of
the dismantling of this very same equipment, associated
with the launcher and located at the launch site.
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In view of the vagueness of the U.S. proposal
regarding the aforementioned equipment, it would be
possible, if one 90 desired to include any systems
and components, even if located at a considerable
distance from the launcher, or from the launch site
of an'ICBM launcher, of an older type and unrelated
to the launching of ICBMs deployed prior to 1964.
In this connection, it would be impossible to establish
territorial bounds within which the equipment
dismantling provision will apply, which could lead
to misunderstandings in verification. It seems to
us that this is not in the interests of both sides.
In our view, the Soviet draft of this portion of
paragraph 1(b) provides full clarity on this question.
To begin with, it presupposes the dismantling of equip-
ment associated with the launcher, i.e. that equipment
which is directly involved in preparing and carrying
out the launch of a missile from this launcher. The
dismantling of precisely this equipment is necessary
for putting this launcher in a condition that precludes
the possibility of its use for launching an ICBM.
Moreover, the Soviet draft precisely defines
the territorial bounds within which the dismantling
provision applies, by indicating the equipment
located at the launch site. This facilitates
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verification of dismantling,by national technical
means, since its territorial confines are stric!tly
delineated by the launch site.
Thus, the Soviet draft provides for the dismantling
of all the equipment related to carrying out the
launch of ICBMs, deployed prior to 1964, at a given
launch site.
Therefore, the Soviet draft of subparagraph (b),
as it applies to ICBM launcher equipment, is fully
in accord with paragraph 3 of the Protocol for strategic
offensive arms, agreed by us, which specifies that the
procedures for dismantling or destruction of ICBM
launchers and associated facilities shall insure that
they would be put in a condition that precludes the
possibility of their use for launching ICBMs, shall
insure that reactivation of units dismantled or
destroyed would be detectable by national technical
means and shall be such that reactivation time of
those units would not be substantially less than the
time required for new construction.
Taking into account all that I have said above,
we believe that the Soviet version of the formulation
for subparagraph (b) of November 16, 1973, fully meets
the objectives of the Procedures we are working out.
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Mr. Commissioner, I hope that the U.S. side
will regard orr considerations with full attention.
I think that achievement of mutual understanding on
this question would be in the interests of both sides.
Thank you for your attention.
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Attachment No. 2
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS -- PROCEDURES FOR
DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS
April 23, 1974
I.
1. Mr. Commissioner, today we are exchanging views
on dismantling or destruction procedures for both soft
and silo ICBM launchers.
2. Para. 11.4 sets forth a concept which the U.S.
side continues to believe important. We have carefully
reviewed prior exchanges on this concept, and are prepared
to make some changes in Para. 11.4 which take into account
certain considerations expressed by the Soviet side.
(Read revised Para. 11.4 and pass copy to Soviet side)
3. Mr. Commissioner, you will note from this revision of
Para. 11.4 that we have deleted the phrase or for storage or
support of ICBM - capable launchers." There can be no question
that this paragraph now deals clearly, directly, and only with
ICBMs -- a subject clearly within our assigned responsibilities.
If the USSR does not intend to use replaced ICBM launch sites
for storage, support or launch of 'ICBMs, then there should be
no reason why agreement cannot be reached.
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4. Mr. Commissioner, on November 5, 1073 I reiterated
the view of the U.S. side that there is a direct link
between the solution we reach on this concept and the
scope and extent of dismantling or destruction procedures
for land-based ICBM launch sites which would be acceptable
to the U.S. side. This remains the U.S. view.
5. Mr. Commissioner, keeping in mind my previous
statement regarding the inter-relationship between the
concept in our revised Para. 11.4 and the remaining issues
involving procedures for dismantling or destruction of
land-based ICBMs, I would like to make the following
additional comments.
6. As you correctly noted in your opening statement,
the present bracketed language in Para. II.1(b)
indicates a difference in the scope of dismantling
activities at land-based ICBM launch sites. The U.S.
proposal would include fixed launch equipment, all erecting
and handling equipment, and propellant handling equipment
located at the site or associated with it, whether or not
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specifically located within the site per se. The Soviet
language would deal with the same items but only those
associated with the launcher and located at the launch site.
7. The U.S. side does not see why certain items
directly associated with the specific launch site, even
though not located within the launch site, should not be
dismantled or destroyed. However, Mr. Commissioner, taking
into account Soviet considerations, including those presented
this morning, the U.S. side is prepared to accept the Soviet
language which reads "associated with the launcher and
located at the launch site."
IV.
8. The difference between the U.S. and Soviet approach
to dismantling or destruction of soft ICBM launch sites,
as reflected in Para. II.2(a), involves the extent to which
the launch pads are to be dismantled or destroyed. We are
agreed that dismantling and removal of the launch device alone
are not adequate. In our view an area of the launch pad
centered on the launch stand must be made unusable by
dismantling or destruction. This area must be of sufficient
size to meet the reactivation time criterion. The U.S. side
believes that dismantling or destruction of an area of the
launch pad 30 meters in diameter would meet this criterion.
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9. From my review of past exchanges on this subject,
it is my understanding that the Soviet-proposed language
also includes dismantling or destruction of the locations
where the launch device was emplaced. The Soviet proposal,
however, does not specify the area of the launch pad to be
dismantled or destroyed.
10. I do not believe there is a major difference in
the approaches of the two sides, and thus it should be
possible to find compromise language which meets the
reactivation time criterion as well as the objective of
the procedures of the two sides.
V.
11. The present bracketed language in Para. 11.3
indicates a significant difference in the scope of dismantling
activities at silo launch sites. The U.S. proposal includes
certain actions which the Soviet proposed language does not
require: the dismantling or destruction of silo headworks
and launch control bunkers and filling the silo with earth.
12. The reactivation time agreed to in Para. 3 of the
Protocol also applies to silo launch sites. The U.S. side
continues to believe that silo headworks and launch control
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bunkers should be dismantled or destroyed in order to meet
the reactivation time criterion. The Soviet proposal as
currently worded does not meet this criterion.
in Para. II.3(b)
13. The present U.S. proposed language/requires that
after a period of six months the silo be filled with earth.
The U.S. side is prepared to accept the Soviet language
reading as follows: "After the actions provided in
subparagraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silo
shall remain open for a period of six months, after which
it may be filled with earth."
14. Mr. Commissioner, today the U.S. side has proposed
a comprehensive solution for the four bracketed paragraphs
of the Procedures for dismantling or destruction of land-based
ICBM sites. This movement on our part provides for a
compromise solution which takes into account previously
expressed considerations of the Soviet side, and is designed
to contribute to working out the mutually agreed procedures
we are charged with in the SCC.
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Attachment No. 3
U.S. Working Document
April 23, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSI/E ARMS: PROCEDURES
PARAGRAPH 11.4
"4. After dismantling or destruction has been
accomplished in accordance with the above procedures,
facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not
be used for storage, support or launch of ICBMs but
may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for
purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto."
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Attachment No. 4
USTINOV QUESTIONS ON "MODERN SLBM" DEFINITION
April 23, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
At the last meeting, the U.S. side set forth
two alternative formulations regarding the concept of
a modern SLBM, for an addition to the agreed portion
of paragraph 1.2 of the Procedures for strategic
offensive arms.
The position of the Soviet SCC Component on this
question has already been presented at the last meeting
and remains valid. At the same time, in our study of
these additional formulations, questions arose which
we would ask the U.S. Component of the Commission to
answer if possible.
First of all, what is the difference between the
wording of November 16--"first tested," and the word-
ing used in your new proposals--"first flight-tested."
What is the essence of the difference and what
specifically does the U.S. side mean by these expres-
sions?
Secondly, why is 1964 spoken of in one case,
and 1965 in the second case?
I would be grateful to you, Mr. Commissioner,
if the U.S. Component of the Commission would clarify
these matters for us.
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Attachment No.
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEALIS RESPONSE - QUESTIONS ON NOTIFICATION
April 23, 1974
1. Mr. Commissioner, at the SCC meeting of April 19,
1974, you raised certain questions regarding the manner in
which notification of certain dismantling or destruction
activities would be handled under U.S. proposed procedures
for reporting such activities which are in process and
those which have been completed. You cited specific examples
where with varying intervals between SCC sessions and
different times for, completing dismantling or destruction
activities, some dismantling or destruction actions could
be started and completed between successive SCC sessions,
others could continue in process over the period of two SCC
sessions, and still others could start during one interval
between SCC sessions and be completed in the next. Today
I would like to respond to the questions ?you have raised.
2. The situations you have described could exist;
however, they would be handled easily and simply in the
proposed notification procedures.
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3. Looking at both the US. and the Soviet version
of Paragraph 1.6 of the procedures for strategic offensive
arms, it will be noted that there is agreement that
notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement
activities "shall be given through the SCC twice annually,
reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular
session." The beginning of a SCC session is a fixed point
in time. Likewise, each launcher subject to the notification
is in a precise status at that time, with dismantling or
destruction either in process or completed. No launcher
could be in both categories at the same time.
4. Turning now to your questions:
(a) A launcher on which dismantling or destruction
action was started and completed between
successive SCC sessions would be included
only in the number completed since the last
report in the SCC.
(b) Where a launcher is in process of dismantling
or destruction over two SCC sessions, it would
be included at both sessions in the total number
in process.
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(c) If a launcher is in process of being dismantled
or destroyed at the beginning of one session and
completed prior to the beginning of the next
session, in the first report it would be included
with the number in process and in the second
report with the number completed.
In all cases, the notification would reflect the status
of the launchers as of the beginning of each regular SCC
session when the notification is made.
5. Mr. Commissioner, each notification at the beginning
of a SCC session would include the number of launchers on
which dismantling or destruction was in process at that point
in time and the number of launchers on which dismantling or
destruction had been completed since the last report in the
SCC. We believe that this notification procedure provides
a simple and unambiguous method for providing a twice annual
accounting of the total number of launchers on each side on
which dismantling or destruction has been completed or is in
process. Of course, the cumulative number of launchers on
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which dismantling or destruction has been completed plus
the number in process of dismantling or destruction must
not be less than the number of replacement SLBM launchers
at any time. I hope this explanation satisfactorily
answers the questions raised by the Soviet side.
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SCC
Sessjon-III
A_ 177
US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Meeting, April 19, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr.
Lt.
Lt.
Mr.
Lt.
Mr.
Mr.
Anderson
Col. Bartos
Col. DeSimone
Long -
Cdr. Martin
Smith
Afanasenko
Interpreter)
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mx. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuh (Internreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenho
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Ustinov opened the meeting and said that
before giving the floor to Graybeal he would like to say a
few words. He delivered a brief prepared statement on the
exchange of the JDTs (Attachment No. 1), and passed the
Russian texts to Graybeal (Attachments No. 2 and No. 3).
Commissioner Graybeal said that he was in full agreement
with Ustinov's comments, particularly concerning the usefulness
of the work which had been: done under the supervision of our
Executive Secretaries and Deputy Commissioners, and with
respect to the status of the JDTs. The texts which our
Executive Secretaries had finished conforming yesterday, he
agreed, are to be considered Joint Draft Texts "preliminarily
agreed by Commissioners" as of April 19, 1974, with the same
understanding Ustinov had noted; that is, there may be further
requirements for clarification and editorial work, and also
"nothing is agreed until all is agreed." He then passed to
Ustinov copies of the English language versions of the two
Joint Draft Texts (Attachments No. 4 and No. 5).
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General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and proceeded to
deliver a brief prepared statement concerning the task of
the SCC at this session (Attachment No. 6).
Mr. Graybeal said that the U.S. Component agreed with
Ustinov's remarks, and also considers that completion, to
the extent possible, of work on the substantive issues in
the JDTs to be the principal task at this session of the SCC.
Graybeal continued by noting that he would like to turn
to one of the areas in the JDTs containing bracketed language,
and present some considerations on the subject of notification.
He read his prepared comments on that subject (Attachment No. 7).
General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and said that the
statement of the U.S. Component, to which he had listened
very carefully, would also be very carefully studied. He
continued by delivering his own prepared statement on the
subject of notification (Attachment No. 8), inserting the
following comment between the 6th and 7th paragraphs: "By
way of comment on certain remarks in your statement, we are
speaking here not only of notification concerning the sinking
of submarines, but also of such U.S. proposals during SCC-II
as notification concerning sea trials which will begin
during the next six months, and the predesignation of ship-
yards to be used for dismantling activities."
Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov's comments would be
carefully studied, of course, but that he would like to
make a preliminary remark with respect to their substance.
A careful study, he said, of U.S. and Soviet statements on
this subject indicates that there is agreement that prior
notification is not required for adequate verification of
compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and Interim
Agreement or with the procedures now being worked out in the
SCC. He wanted to suggest again that the notification problem
and the procedures proposed by the U.S. side be considered on
their own merit, and that both sides carefully review the
considerations presented on the subject today with a view
to returning to it at an early date.
General Ustinov said he had no objection to such a
careful study and return to this subject, as the Soviet
side believes it to be one of the most important questions
on which the sides have differing points of view. Noting
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that he would like to continue discussion of this subject
today in order to clarify several points, he turned to a
prepared statement on notification concerning dismantling
and destruction activities in progress (Attachment No. 9)
Following the penultimate paragraph of his statement,
he noted that the additional examples he was referring to
included about ten which Capt. Kuznetsov had worked up "in
his spare time over the past few days."
Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov had raised several
interesting questions, and would probably fully understand
if Graybeal did not attempt to answer them here and now.
He said they would be studied and answered at a subsequent
meeting.
General Ustinov said he had not expected answers today,
and agreed that we should return to this subject at a future
meeting.
Mr. Graybeal said he would like to address another
point which is the subject of differing views, and read
his prepared comments on "modern" SLBMs (Attachment No. 10),
passing to the Soviet side the two additions proposed by
the U.S. side as alternative additions to take the place
of the bracketed language in paragraph 1.2 of the Offensive
Arms Procedures (Attachment No. 11).
In presenting the two proposed variants for addition
to paragraph 1.2, Graybeal said both of them were consistent
with the Interim Agreement and its Protocol, and that either
of them would complete the definition of a "modern SLBM,"
making that definition independent of the type of submarine
on which SLBMs were installed. He concluded by stating that
if the Soviet side felt either or both of the proposed alter-
natives to be inadequate or incorrect, he would strongly urge
that the Soviet side provide its own variant for consideration;
the objective here was to find some way to make the definition
complete and co2rect.
General Ustinov said he understood that Graybeal's state-
ment today meant the U.S. side had now proposed three
alternatives for inclusion in paragraph 1.2; the one which
was bracketed in the Joint Draft Texts and the two which had
been presented today. Graybeal confirmed that to be the case.
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Ustinov continued continued by saying that he would also like to
address the subject of this definition in paragraph 1.2,
and read a prepared statement (Attachment No. 12).
He closed by saying that he had listened attentively
to Graybeal's remarks and the new U.S. proposals, which would
be carefully studied. He requested that the U.S. side take
his own statement of today into consideration in its work on
this subject, and that we return to some detailed work on
the matter at a future meeting.
Mr. Graybeal said the U.S. side would certainly study
Ustinov's considerations very carefully, but that he had to
differ on one point. Ustinov had said that paragraph 1.3
"answered the U.S. question." That paragraph deals with
"older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines." The point
under discussion here is the definition of a "modern SLBM,"
and paragraph 2 deals with missiles installed not on diesel
submarines but on nuclear-powered submarines. Therefore, in
Graybeal's opinion, paragraph 3 is not an adequate substitute
for the U.S.-proposed addition to paragraph 2. He would have
to carefully review Ustinov's remarks, since possibly he had
not understood them in the proper context. He agreed that we
would return to this subject at a future meeting.
General Ustinov asked if the U.S. side had any further
matters to raise this morning.
Mr. Graybeal replied that 'it did not.
General Ustinov said that this morning's meeting, which
had put some questions before us which we must work on, had
been productive and useful. He proposed that the next meeting
be set for Tuesday, April 23, at 11:00 a.m. at the U.S. Mission.
Mr. Graybeal accepted that proposal.
General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 12:30 p.m.
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Attachments:
1. Ustinov Statement on Exchange of JDTs
2. Russian Text, April 19, 1974 JDT Offensive)
3. Russian Text, April 19, 1974 JDT ABM)
4. English Text, April 19, 1974 JDT Offensive)
5. English Text, April 19, 1974 JDT ABM)
6. Ustinov Statement on Task of SCC-III
7. Graybeal Comments on Notification
8. Ustinov Statement on Notification
9. Ustinov Statement on Notification of Dismantling in
Process
10. .Graybeal Comments on "Modern SLBMs"
11. U.S. Working Document -- Offensive Procedures
Paragraph 1.2
12. Ustinov Statement on Definition of "Modern SLBMs"
Drafted :y46FPDeSimone:bjg Approved by: SNG aybeal
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Attachment No. 1
USTINOV STATEMENT ON EXCHANGEOF JOINT DRAFT TEXTS
April 19, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
As reported to me by our Executive Secretary,
Mr. Yereskovsky, he and Col. FitzGerald yesterday
concluded the work of conforming the Russian and
English texts of the Protocols and Procedures,
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction,
and notification thereof, for strategic offensive
arms and ABM systems, preliminarily agreed, reflecting
their state as of April 19, 1974.
We note with pleasure the fruitful activity
in this regard by the Joint Working Group, headed by
?the Executive Secretaries. In our opinion the work
which was carried out is beneficial in all respects.
In this connection, we proceed from the premise that
the texts which were prepared are working texts. They
may be refined by us in the course of completing the
full texts of the Protocols and Procedures and are
subject to review and approval by the Governments.
Allow me to hand to you the Russian Joint Draft
Texts of the Protocols and Procedures. As I understand
can
it, we/consider them preliminarily agreed by Commis-
sioners, reflecting their state as of April 19, 1974.
SECRET
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C e IC peTHO
Attachment No. 2
Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
. by Commissioners
April 19, 1974
TeECT GOBMeCTHOPO npoeHTn,
Hpe4,BapmTeTEo corziacoBaH-
HEi'd iipezeTaB1Tea5Jm14-
7U anpeafi 7177-roAa
EOCTOHHHAH KOHOYIETATTABHAH KOMMCCOH
EPOTOKOH
EPOUT,YPU9 PED-HOPYIME 3AAEHY, EMOHTAI TEN YHTITOIEHHE
N YBEAOJAEHHE 0 Fl 14X, JJ3IH CTPATETNECha HACTYEATEILUX
BOOPY/EHHA
B COOTBeTCTBHH C nozoaeHuHmm H B ouNecTmeHme BpemeHHoro
0011.7131ueHHH meaAy COM3OM COBOTCHFAX CORHaJIHOTHIleCICHX Pecnydzmic
CoeAmHeHHumm OTaTamm AmepmHu o HeHoTopux mepax B 00AacTm orpa-
HHIleHMH cTpaTormtlecHmx HacTynaTezmux BoopyliceHel OT 26 may,'
1972 roAa, flpoToHoza i Hemy, a TaMe CorzacoBaHmix aammeHvffi B
CBH3H C aTHM CorEameHmem placTBymme 3 Hi/IX CTOpOHH, B pamHax
flocToHHHo1I ICOHCyJIBMTEDHOL 1t0MHOCH4 corzacumcB o Hpoguypax,
peryampyrimx aameHy, AemoHTaa HAM yHmtploaeHme H yBeAomzeHme o
HHX, AZH cirpaTermueomx HaCTyllaTeABHIDIX BoopyaeHml OrpRIIHTleHHHX
aTHM BpemeHHHm corAameHmemv HaH OHH oC2opmyzmpoBaHLI B lipmaoeHmu
ic HacTofflAemy EpoToHoAy2 HoTopoe HBAHeTCH HeOTSeMZOMOg IlaCTBM aTO-
DO EpoToHoaa.
CTopoHIA coraacmvin Taxxe 0 caeAymmx odatux pyHoBoAsimx Ho-
I. Epmaraemue EpogegypEl HpHMeHHMTCH ToaBxo B OTHOMeHHH
opeAcTB, aameHHemEx N AemoHTmpyemux mm yHmtnoaaembix B COOTBeT-
CTBHH C HOZOliCeHHHMH BHUICTIOMHHyTOPO BpemeHHoro corzameHmH;
2. RiodaH sameHa HyCHOBEX ynaHoBox meisHoHTmHeHTaarDHHx 0171-
7IMOTHI1eCICHX paHeT (MEP) mam noABoubix JloAoH C 03,31.71HCT1'IlieCICHMH
paHeTamm H nycHoBmx yeTaHODOIC 0171JIHOTHIleCICHX paHeT noABoAHLIx 110-
1ziCK (EP EH) OCyNeCTBAHeTCH Ha OCHOBaHHH CTaTa lii m IY BpemeHHoro.
coraameHmH, EpOTOICOJI3 ICHemy, a TaHae COOTBeTCTByMMX GOP.713C0BaH-
HEX 3aH13.71e1111L;
CeEpeTHO
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2.
3. EpogeAypH AemoHTaall HaH YHHTITOOHHH nycHoBux YCTaHODOE
MEP H OTHOCHUXCH H HHM coopyaeHHVI, a Taluse noxpouba zoAoH
dazucTullecHumu paxeTamH M EYCHODEX ycTaHoBoH BP MI obecneumaloT
nproueuue MX B COCTOHHHO, HOHJIMgaME,00 BO3M0aHOCTB TACTIOAB30BaHHH
MX A.712 nycHop COOTB0TCTB0HHO MEP HJIH BP EH; obecnelmamT Bo3moa-
HOCTL -o6HapyacHHH HOBTOPHOPO pa3BepTupaHHH AemoHTupoBaHHEEK 1/7114
YHMliT0g0HHNX 0AMHHL1 HaU0HaEBHMMH TeXHH110CHHMH cpeAcTBamu; HBJIH-
MTCH TaHHME, .ITO BpemH, HeottcoAumoe AJui ROBTOPHOPO pa3BepTuBaHmH
3THX eAHHHH, He Omo u sHaguTezElio meHLme, gem BpemH, HeodxoAH-
moe AJIH. HOB0r0 cTporisTezEcTDa; a TaHae HCE,711011aMT HeonpaBAaHHNe
saAepAHu B AemoHTage MJIM yHuuToaeHuu;
4. HpoHeAypm AOMOHTaga ULM yHT.AuToaeHuH Oopmyzupy@TcH oTAezi).-
HO AZH HO3aNHIAOHHEX H JIH MaXTHEIX HYCHOBEX ycTaHoBoH MBP HmemHoro
6a3upoBaHuH, a TaHae AJIH noApouNx zoAox c baJmucTullecHumvi paHe-
Tamu H nycHoBmx ycTaHoBoH. BP DA;
5. EpolwAypil 3ameHu AemoHTaaa MTH yHmoaeHHH o6ecneuuBafoT
BOUJOgHOCTID cooTBemByugero HOHTPOZH HaHnoHaaLHumm TeXHHTIOCHMMH
cpeAcTBamu B COOTB0TCTBHM CO CTaTLeg Y BpemeHHoro corzameifirm;
6. Houle AemollTaaa HAH yHullToaeHnH, npoBeAeHHoro B COOTB0T--
CTBHH C npularaemumu flpoguypami/s, coopygeHHH, ocTaloquecH Ha ?Tap-
TOBUX HO3HIAHHX flEP H83emHoro baaupoBaHuH, a Tal00 HOADOAHHO JIOAHM
moryT HO yemoTpeHum CTopoH HcnoIlL3oBaT3cH AJIH Hezeifi, He npoTHBo-
peuaNux HOA0g0HHHM BpemeHmoro corzameHuH VI IIPOTOHOTia H Hemy;
. ? nOCPOACTBOM COOTT0TOTBY1ONTAX npo4eAyp CTOPOHE yBeAomaHloT
APyr Apyra o HoyamecTBe AemoHTupoBaHHmx HaH YHMIITOg0HHEX nycHoLux
.yeTaHoBoH, a TaHg0 0 HOZHIIOCTBO TaHHX nycHoBHx ycTaHoBoH, MCI-1MB-
30BaHHEX AJIH 3aMOHH;
? liocpeAcTBom cpoeppemeHma H COOTB0TCTBYMNHX npoHeAyp
CTOPOHE yBeAomHYHoT Apyr Apyra o E0.71HLIOCTB0 H Tune AemoHTupyemux
TOM yHutiToaaemmx nycHoBux yeTaHopoH2 a TaHae o HozutlecTBe nycHo-
MIX YOTaHOBOH, HpeAHa3HatieHHux B HagOCTBO 3aMOHE; V1.1I
exp e THO
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3.
8. KOJIHtIOCTBO HOABOAHEX TIOADE C 03.71,71HCTHIleCEHMH paHeTamo,
oAHoppemeHHo 1IaX0AHlitHX3H B HO0Tp0V,3 H npeAHasHaueHHIlxB Haue-
cTRe 3aMCHE, 110 6yAeT npeBumaTB HOJIHTleCTB3, coBmecTomoro C Hop-
MUBHIUM rpar2AHom cTpouTeahoTBa. floA HOpMaABHUM rpacDoHom CTp0H-
TO3IBCTI33 110=00TCH rpacimH, CODMOCTHMH2 C npoulaoL'i main HuHemHef4
HpaKTHHCA oTp0HTOJIBCTBR y HaazoL H3 CT0p0H.
HaCTOHIgHVI npOTOKOZ H npozaraemue EpoHeAypm BoTynaloT B cozy
O momeHTa RDAHHCaHHH zaHHoro EpoTomaa M OCTOMTCH B clue Ha ne-
pou AeFOTBoH Bumeynom51HyToro BpemeHHoro coraameHoH, H HOCTOHH-
Hasa KOHC5T7ILT3TUBHaH HOMHCCHH mo-geT no cBoemy yomoTpeHolo DHOCHTB
B HHX nonpaBm.
CoBepmeHo roga B ropue .AeHeBe B AByx 3nem-
naHpax2 HaaAmVi Ha pyccHom o aHraoLcHom H310110X, npollem ?Oa TOECT3
omemT OAHH3E0Byl coay.
ripeAcTaBoTeaB HpeAcTaBuTeaB
COM3a COB3TCHHX CouaalicTuuecHmx COCAHHOHMIX MTaTOB
Pecny6auE Amepomil
HpeAzogeHoe amepoHaHcHoI71 cTopoHLI.
2 ,
npeAaoaeHue COBOTCHOi%1 CTOpOHLI.
Ce Hp e THO
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Celip THO
ILETIA0aEHOE
HOCTORHHAH PI:OHCYZETATIABHA2 HOMOCCOH
11PW7IYPH, PErYHOPYMME 8AMEHY, AEMOHTU 171311/1
YHMKOIEHHE 5TBFOrIIIEHOE 0 HOX, TAJIH CTPATEFOUCHTAX
HA0TYnATE31BMiX BOOPYJEHM
I. 0611tHe
I. AIM sameHH Ha nycHopHe yulaHoBHH dazzHcTmleci-mx paEeT
coBpemeHHHx aTOMHEX 110TBOAMIX zogolt, B npumax ypopHen, joTa-
H013.710HITEX AaH HaaAo171 1i13 CTopoH, moryT VIC110311)30B3TBOH nycEoBHe
yOT3HOBEE MOHOHTHHOHTMBHMX 03JUIVICTKIIOCEDIX paHeT (MEP) HasemHo-
PO 6a3VTOBRIVAH cTapHx TRIM; pasBepHyTHx Ao 1964 roAal nycHoBHe
yOTaHOBICH OWIEVICTIAIIOCINIX paHeT ambhix 3TOMHEIX ROABOAHMC 310A0E, a
TaEae II-yen:311e yOT3HOBEK coBpemeHHHx bazucTwiecmx paHeT AusezB-
MIX 110ABOAHLE .710AOH.
2. CoBpemeHHEmH OaaufeTHIlecHmmH paHeTalm noABoAHHx .710AOH
CIIKTMOTOH: TJUI COOAHHOHHHX 111TaTOB - paEeTH, y0T3110BZOKHNO Ha
Bcex aTOMEUX HoABoAnix IsoAHax, a AJIH CoBeTcHoro Colon. paHeTH
Toro Tuna, EoTopHe ycTaHoBaeHH ria TOMHEX ROADOAHHX zoAltax,
BBOAOHLUX B doeBoiri cocTaB nocHe.1965 roAa. L-B AonozHeime E
sTomy coBpemeHHHmH 032-1,71KOTKII0OHKMK paEeTamH noABoAHHx zoAcE cuu-
TainCH BOO OaxmcTullecHHe paHeTH noABoAHux zoAoH, BllepHe moral-
TaHlible Howie 1964 roAa.2I
S. FlycHoBHe yOT9H0BICH cTapux baJmucTidgecicax paHeT Ha AK3OTIB-
HEX HOABOAliba zwax He moryT NOHOJIL3OBRTBCH gezeR 3RMOHH,
npeAyemoTpeHHEx HpoTommom ic BpemeHHomy corzameHHm o HeHoTopHx
mepax B oGzacTH orpaHnemai cTpaTerullecEux HacTynaTeJIBHHx Boopy-
meHHR.
4. )eMOHTaC 1011/1 yHHT1ToaeHHe sameHRemux IlyCHOBIIX yeTaHoBoH
HaummeTcH Hp 1103AHOO AaTH Hallam mopexoAHHx MOflLITH noABoAHoiL
zoAHH, npeHa3HaeHHoIi B RaTIOCTBO sameHH. Hallazom AemoHTaaa VLETA
yHMTITO:g0IIH5I nycHoBo2 ycliallopHm MEP 71B3IHOTCH iiaaio BLAHOJIHOHHH
CORpOTHO
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2.
moOoro ES meponpviaTa, yEasaHHux HHa0 B paueze E. Hagazom Ae-
moHTaaa EEH yHmuoaenmn noABoAnoci aoAEm c dazJuicTutlecEmmm paEe-
MAN am6o nycEoBofl. YCTaHOBICIA EP 'la HBEHOTCH HallaE0 BEHOEHOHEH
Jnodoro H3 meponprima, yEa3aHHux nue B pa3Ame M.
50 Eaumom mopexoAnux mcnuTanun noABoAHolYi aoAEDI C baZEHOTH-
uecicum14 paEeTamm, npeAHasHatieHnoL B EatiecTBe 3ameHu, HBEHOTCH
AaTa; Eora TaEaa noABoAHasi zoAEa Bneppue coBepman nzaBaHme
CBOHM XOOM BHC raBaHm HEN nopTa, rAe 11100H3B0AHEECB nocTpoEa
HEE ocHameHme noABoAHoL JEAEm.
L76. YBeAomzeHme o npousBeAeHHom AemoHTage IHYCEOBLIX yoTaHo-
BOK MEP H HYCHOBIAX YOTaHOBOR 6a3micTm4ecEmx paEeT 3ameHaewx
noABoAHux zoAoE HPOMBOAHTCH upe3 HOCTOHHHYM hOHCYAJDTUTHDH5710
ROMECCHIO ABa pa3a B roA no COCTOHHEIO Ha Hallam ollepeAHoVi pery-
17IpH0i on= KOMHCCHH* YBeAomzeHme AoTollo coupon') cBeAeHmn 3a
moTeEmee nozyroue 0.EozallecTBe AOMOHTZPOBaHHHX RYCHOBNX yoTaHo-
BOK MEP H damumoTmgecKmx paEeT 3ameHaembix noABoAnux 3I0OJC H EOEH-
116CTB6 TaKEX WHO= YCTaHODOE, HC110EB30BaHHIAX aa 3TOT nepuoA
AHH sameHH Ha nycEoBue Y0T5H0BEE coBpemeHHux noABoAnux mAoEi72
L76. YBeAomneHme o meponpuHmx no AemoHTaay ERE YHTITO:aOHHM
3ameHe ITOMBOAETCH qepes IIKKABa pa3a B roA no COCTOHHEM Ha
Hallam oilepe1l1Hoi(1 pery31HpHol71 COCCHHo B yBeAomzeHum yEasHBamTcH:
a) B OTHOWOHHH RYCROBLIX YCTaHODOE MEP, pa3BepHyTux Ao
1964 roAa, m EYCEOBLIX YOTRHOBOE OBEEECTHIIOCEEX paEeT cTapux noA-
BoAnux TioAoE ROEINOCTBO H Tun nycicoBmx yoTaHoBoE (maxTHan
HYCEOBaH yoTaHoBEa MEP, He3aNumeHHasi HYCEOBaH ycTaHoBEa MEP HEE
nycEoBaH YCTRHODEa EP 12), Ha HOTOPla AemoHTaa HEM yHmtuoaeHme
HaX011HTCH B CTW1E ocyucTmeHun, a TaEoe HOEHIIOCTBO H THH nycEo-
BIAX YCTaHOBOE, Ha EOTOPEX CO BpemeHm noczeAnero yBeAomzeHma,
npeAcTaBzeHHoro B IIKK, meponpvinTun noTomoHTagy MRE yHmuToaeHum
bJJIM 3aBOIDEJOHMo
Ce IC p0THO
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3.
D) B OTHOMOHHH nymmux ycTaHoBoic BP na, npeAHaaHalleHmix
B EallecTBe aameHm,- HX-HOZHIIOCTBO Ha noABoumx 3IoAlcax2 RoTopme
HauHyT mopexoAHme HCEHTaHHH B TelleHEe meAymuro mecTumecITinoro
nepuoAa, a Tace ixhOJIHtleCTBO Ha TIOABOAHHX zoAKax, Hallam=
mopexpAHme HCHETaHHH CO Bpemeind noczeAHero yBeAomzeHuH, npeA-
CTaBHOHHOTO'D EKE . _71
7. KaaAaH CTopoHa moaeT Ha Ao6poBo3IBHog ocHoBe AOHOJIHHTB
YBOAOMZOHHH Apyrumu CBOAOHNHMH, emu oHa COgTOT, 1TO OHM HOOOXO?
AHMH 23151 obecnege= yBepeHHocTu B BEEOZHOHEN npuimmx NO Bpe-
meHHomy corzameHum 06H3aTOJIBCTB.
H. EPOHOILKELLE11-211Taga KJIH-yHHT-ITOgOHHS RYCHOBUX YCTaHODOH MEP
Ha3OMHOPO 0a3Hp0BaHH51,3aMOHHOMMX PYCHOBHMH YCTaHODHaMH EP Tui
I. BO BCOX czyllaHx npu npoBeAeHuu AemoHTaaa HJIVI yHHIIT01C0HHH
BLIEOZHHIOTCH cLeAymNue meponpuHTHH:
a) YAmenue co 'cTapToBog 1103HHHH sanaca paHeT u 170: 1-,:omnoHeH-
TOB, POZOBHUX uacTeg H noABualloro oGopyAoBaHHH;
D) AemoHTaa cTanuoHapHoro nycicoBoro o0opyAoBaHaH, Bcero
noA5emHo-TpaHcnopTHoro 060py7J0BaHHH M aanpaBollHoro obopyAoBaHuH,
L HaxoAHigerocH Ha cTapToBog 11O3HUH JIH(50 CBH3aHHOr0 C HOgji
CCBH3aHHOr0 C nycRoBoVi YCTaHOBROk H HaxwungerocH Ha cTapToBog
7
HO3EIIHH_/2 a Tame yAaxemue Bcero AOMOHTHp0BaHHOTO obopyAoBaHuH
co cTapToBog noauguu. llozi EyORODUM odopyAoBaHmem HOHHMaDTCH CH?
CTOMH, HOMEOHeHTH M npu0opb4 HeobxoAumme A.71H npoBeAeHuH Hycica
paKeTm.
2. B OTHOMOHHH HO3a1MOHHHX CTaPTOBHX noaugug B AonozHeHue H
meponpuHTuHm, nepeuucJiernimm B nyHNTe 12 OCYNOCTUIHMTCH czeAymue
MOpOITVIHTHH:
a) CmecTa YCTaHOBEH nycRoBoro yeTpogcTBa VIJIH cTapTume
nliolAaARu_72 ryllacTicu cTapToBmx nzolqaAox AuameTpom no meHBmeg
mepe B 30 meTpoB c geHTpom, HaX0AHAHMCH Ha cTapToBcm CT0.710_7I
NYHETH (dyHIcepm) ynpaarieHuH nycHom paxeT HpHBOZFITCH B HenpHroA-
Hoe 17J1H HCHOJIB30BaHVI1I COCTOHHHO nyTem AemoHTaaa paapymeHuH;
COICpeTHO
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4.
ID) OMEOCTH AJIH XpaHOHHH TM-MN= AemoHTupymTcH TA yAaamoTcH
co CTapTOBOIIi no3ug4u;
C) OOJIOME MOCT yoTaHoBxm HyCHOBEIX yoTpoiloTB H7H cTapTumx
Haom,aAo, nyHEToB-(byllicepoB) ynpaBzcHuH nycicom paNeT VIC))/HAamen?
TN emicocTek AJIH xpaHeHIAH Tormama moryT OHTB yAmellm, a HO ECTO?
x1OHHH MOCTH mecHgeB mecTa, me OHH HaxoAtimucB, moryT OHTB 3aCE?
naHu semzeci.
3. B OTHOMOHHO MaXTHLIX CTaPTOBTDIX 1103H1W, B AOHOZHOHHO E
meponpusiTuHm, 110p0t1HCAOHHIAM B Hylme I, OCyMOCTBZHMTCFI cmAylo?
mme meponpHHTAH:
a) 3aDAHTHme Epmmu maxT1 pezBom 3aMHTHEX Epum, ra300TBOAHMO
EaHaLIM H maxTHme CTaNaHM COPOZOBEH MaXT, a Tame byHEepm yllpaB?
AOHIVI HyCEOMji AemoHTHpymTcH DIJIMyHIATIT0aMTCH. AemoHTupoBaHHme
HOMHOHOHTH yAmmoTcH co cTapToBoL 1103144HH;
D) Houle HpoBeAeum meponpuHTa, npeAycmoTpeHHmx BMEO B
uouryHxTe "a", maxTa OCTaDHHOTCH OTEIDETOIYI D Teuellue mecTa mecH-
110B, HOMO qero rmcyzeT bETL 3acmnaHa_72 nacmnaeTcHjI 3emzei1.
L-4. Docile ocymecTmeHTAH AemoHTaaa TAJIK yHTITOYOHTAH D COOTBOT?
CTBHH C BumeyEa3aHHmmu HpoguypamTA coopyeHuH, ocTaimuecH Ha
cTapToBmx 11031/14HHX. MEP, He moryT HCHO7IB30BaTBCH Hai IH xpaHeHuH,
odcxy:cuBaHuH HJIH nycxa MEP, TaE H AHH xpaHeHAH HATA obuyauBaHuH
nycliopmx ycTaHoBoH, RoTopme moryT OHM 4CHOZB30BaHM 3IH nyclea
MEP, HO moryT HO ycmoTpemo cTopom TACHOAL30BaTIDCH AJIH Apyrux
geyieR, He HpoTuBopegalAux noaoaeHuHm BpemeHHoro coraamemi u
HpoToxoxa H Hemy0_7I
5. AOMOHTaXC H.7111 yHHIITOYOHHO 3ameHHemmx HyCEOBEX yCTaHOBOE
MEP saBepmaeTcH He no3ge, qem xepea eTmpe mecHga nocJie Hauaaa
mopexoAHmx VICRLITaHel 110ABOAHOL ZOAHH, npeAlia3HalieHHo B EallecTBe
3ameHm.
COEp0 THO
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5
M. Eppneupm AemoHTaaa HJIH yffiluToaeHnH noABoumx JiozoR c bazum?
CTINOCRIAMM parceTamn H IIVCEOBHX yeTaHOBOE EP ER, 3amelmemmx
HOBLIMH HOABOAHEMH JIOAHaMH C OaTIEUCTHUCITall_p2L9TRMH H
IWCEOBHMH yCTaHODHaME B2 ER
I. ri7OH*AemoHTama NJIH yHuuToaeHmH noABoAHmx zoAoR c 0171.71H?
CTHLIOCEHMH paReTamu m HyCEODEX yoTaHoBox EP fIJI npuemaemmmu 5iBJIH-
10TCY1 meAymme npogeAypu2 143 hOTOpHX RaaAaH 143 CTOpOH mozeT AezaTB
Bmdop:
a) saTomieHme noABoAHog HOARH BmecTe c ee nycRopmmu yoTaHoB?
Ramm B meaAyHapoAumx BoAax rzybmHog HO meHee 2000 meTpoB;
norA a m36mpaeTcH 3Ta nponeAypa yHuuToaeHuH noABoAHog zoAEm
bazaucTmuecRumm paReTamz, ApyraH cTopoHa yBeAomzHeTcH o BpemeHu
H mecTe 3an3IaHmpoBaHHoro yHmuToaemu, HO mei-11)meg mepe 3a oAmH
mecHg Ao 3anaaHupoBaHHoro yHIIIITOAOHHH; _71
D.) npeBpalloHme '13 meTamozom HOA OTEpHTEIM HeOom noABoAHog
HOAEH i ee HyCEOBHX yoTaHopoR ("Ha 3apaHee yRa3aHHmx Bep0HxL7I.
HpeBpaliteHme B meTauzozom HpeAycmaTpmBaeT RanmTazBHym pa3bopRy;
c) yAmeHme no OTETHTHM 110(50M paReTHoro oTceRa noABoAHog
aoARu CHa 3apaHee yRa3aHHmx BepdAx_7I
CHHTHe HyCEOBHX maxT cpe3Ra BepxHeM uacTu maxT
BMOCTO C HaAcTpogRog HaA HummL72
Ce) AJIH noABoAHmx TioAoR "macca ?H" byAyT npmmeHHTBcH
czeApolAme HpogeAypm: CHHTHO nycRoBmx maxT noA OTEpHTHM HCOOM Ha
3apaHee yRa3aHlimx Beppu:. CTopoHm corxacoBmBamT, Haim Bep0m MC-
110JIL3y1OTCH AJIH AemoHTaaa noABoAHmx zoAoR C OaJIZIACTHgOCEHMTA paRe?
Tamu.
1) ByJAOT CHHTa BCH TlaCTE HaACTpOtiNH (DEJIMI-MH orpaaAeHme
pybRu) m zerRoro Ropuca HaA paReTHum OTCOEOM noABoAHoM mARTA.
2) ByAeT CHHTa Ta uacTB npouHoro Ropnyca paReTHoro OTCCEa
(BepxHHH 00111HDE3. Ropnyca ii CerMOHTLI mnaHroyTa), B ROTOpOk Haxo?
AHTCH BOO BHX0Al1 paReTHmx nycRoBux maxT, a TaRe 0yAyT CHHTH
paReTHme nycRoBme WaXTH.
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Ce pe THo
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8) RpouHmtd hopnyc H aerhmL hopnyc saTem moryT OHTB BOO-
CT3HOB.710H11 JD= nyTem BBapHBaHHH HOBNX COH.WV, HO HM01014HX DM-
x0goB nychopmx maxl.
4) HH HaAcTpoha, 1111 Orpagg0HHO pynim He 0yAyT BoccTaHome-
HU HaATOi1 mo= noADDAHoci auhm, c hoTopel`il Omam CHHTM nycho-
BHO
2. ImOoe H3 yhasanHmx Bmme meponpusiTmn saBepmaeTcH He nose,
uem uepes mecTB mecHgeB nocae Hallam aopexoAHmx monmTaHIC
rIo-
BOHO auhm, npeAHasHaueHHoL B hauecTBe sameHm.
8. Rpm amdom H3 BapmaHToB gemoHTaaa MOM nychoBbix maxT
OCTWOTCH OTHpUTNMH B TeueHme Bcero nepmua AemoHTaaa, a paheTm m
odopmoBaHme gaff nycha paheT yAELTIHMTCH.
IY. EpouTypm sameHm nozBoAHoYi auhm C Oaaamc1111=111_21heTamm,
normOLLILL_Lutg_Egli_noayumBmen noBpeazeHme, mchamuammee
pemeHT
B TOM cayuae, ecam noABuHaH auha c 63,JIJIHCTI/NOCHHMH paheTamm
PHOHOT B mope H.7114 noayuaeT noBpeaAeHme, uchamuammee pOMOHT, TO
TaHaH nououaH auha moaeT bum sameHeHa ApyroP1 noABoAmo
ho2 c daymucTmuechumm paheTamm B COOTBOTCTBHH C HmaecaeAymmum:
a) ApyraH CTopoHa yBOAOMJIHOTCH u0pe8 HocToHHHym hoHeyal.Ta-
THBMyM HOMHCCHIO 0 rubeam HHH noppeaAeHmm;
D) 1c03I1'I4OCTBO nychoBmx ycTaHoBox Ha noABoAHoifi TioAhe c
IIHOTHII0O1NMIA paheTamm, npeAHasHaueHHoM B hauecTBe sameHm, He
npuBoAmT H npeBmmeHmm oOlitero hoamuecTBa nychoBmx yoTaHoBoh, pas-
pemenHoro BpemeHHEm COrAMOHHOM t,I HpOTOHOZOM K Hemy; H
C) noBpeaAeHHaH noABoAHaH auha c baaamoTmuechmmm paheTamm
AemoHTTApyeTcH HAM yHmuToaaeTcH B COOTBOTCTBHH C pasAmom III Ha-
OTOHIAUX HpogeAyp.
CexpeTHo
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ONpOTHO Attachment No. j
Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
April 19, 1974
TOHOT 17,0BMaCTHODU nooeHTal
HPUBcpidTeJaHo corTacoBaH?
Hm
19 aHpeAH 1(4 roAa
1100TOHHAE halCYALTATI/LbriAh. ROMJACCa
EPOTOROL
RP0LI,E4Y1-11, PaYAMPYaltHE 6AmEHY, 4EM0HTAX MR YHMTOIEHME
0 YbEAOMAE110113 U H0X9 AAH COCTEM 11P0 11 A0m2OHEHT0B
B COOTBeTCTBMM C HOHOgaHMRMM M B ocyNecTmeHme AoroBopa
mexAy COM3OM COBaTCHMX COIRWIMCTMIIOCHMX PecHydamx m CoeAmHeHHE?
MM MTaTamm AmepmEm od orpaHmlieHmm cmcTem HpoTmBopaHeTHoDi 000p0?
HU OT 26 maH 1972 roAa m CorzacoBaHHux 3afiB31eHm171 B CBR3M C OTHM
AoroBopom TiacTByloRme B Hem CTOpOHH9 B pammx nOCTOEHHOPA HoHcp1B?
TaTmBHoll Homm0014m9 corzacmJimcip o npol1eAypax9 peryzmpymux sameHy,
AemoHTax maim yHmuozeHme m yBeAomzeHme o Hmx9 AJIH CHCTaM HPO m
Mx HOMHOHaHTOB9 orpaHmeHHIlx aTmm 4oroBopom9 HaH OHM ccDopmyampoBa?
Hm B flpfuroxeHmx IC HacToHi4emy npoToHozy9 HoTopoe HBERaTCH HeoTlem?
zemoM qacTipm aTOTO HpoTomma.
CTopoHu corzacmzmcB Tamice o cHeAymmx odigmx pyHoBoAHIgmx
HozoxeHmHx:
I. Hpmmaraemble ripoileAypm npmmelmmTcH TOEBHO B OTHOWaHNIA cmcTem
MEM MX H0MM0HaHT0B9 eameHHembix m AemoHTmpyembix zum ymmtimicaembix
B COOTBaTCTBMM C MOROACHMHMIA BuineynomHHyToro AoroBopa;
2. XmdaH sameHa cmcTem HPU MEM MX HOMMOHaHTOB ocyNecTmHeTcH
Ha OCHOBaHMX OTaTBM yn BHWOyHOMEHyT0110 AoroBopa9 a Talute COOT?
BeTcTBymux COrEaCOBaHHEX aaHBECHM11; AemoHTax mJim yHmtiToxemme
emcTem HPO OEM MX HOMMOHOHTOB cBcpx HOEMIleCTB MEM BHe pa10HOB
oripeAezeHHBa AoroBopom9 OCyNOCTBEHeTCH HC OCHOBaHMH CTaTBM Yffl
BuineynomHHyToro AoroBopa m COOTBOTCTBylONMX CorzacoBaHHEx samvie?
HAM;
CeEpeTHo
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Z-1?0001.00017000V9?1700108dCIU-VIO 1?Z/1?0/1700z aseeieu JOd peACLICIdV
oxIodx00
21-MxoNee gitV xnximaoeqrsouom 60,311 Wxnxezo xmxxomnemoiromIted
m IomedoamIodu mouxeIoR xmaoHoRu ogIoahmicom o oxmeI e 60ju
Mum? XMHHOMII8HOYOMVed X Ionedoamodu 510a0HOIOIC Xlcla0110,a1 XMH
-HOYOIhMH.g MWM 3uMHHea0dMIH01AJ9V 2E1,10010120H 0 eLTATY J_RdY ornIL
-NoVeaR mxodoI0 Ennodu xmlnolgaIoIagI000 noaIondoog ?L7
X 1,11/1HOWaHUC xmxxegooerao0
-moo m edoaoLloV OLTOLLIHNOILROMEa NEXHOYOUOU xmMehadoamIodu GH
4menn gEV goaimegoearrouom x0doI0 mmxodIooloS OM IRJON 60JU ph
-xeIo xmxxomnemorsomVed XYWIMEOLI ex mrm odu xgmnmeou xmaoIdeIo ex
MOOXIMPIO0 6HMHOE.0000 'imedRitohodu mnrrimeJewmdu o MMEI0I0a
-I000 a oLloxxonaodu 614XHO3EOIhMHR MWM NcezxoNoV oroou ?9
!edoaoLloV oa
-OIRHTPAOHROMME fix pue,10 00 MIDII0I07.I000 a meaIondo MNMHOGh
-MHXGI MNMHqUeNOMHPH grodInom oLloMmRaIoLleamoo alooxxoweoa Imea
-mheupopo YMHWROIhXHR XYX exeldiona vr. rixoNee mdSVanodu *q
!EMU UmnxeIo xmxxomnemolcomVed m IGHedoa
-mIodu NoaoxeIoR xmaollo/Cu xmxIxem m xmxtriGeex girlf oxareno go
-1aRdm2RndocD gmxoNcoIhmxR MYM exeIxonoV M mxnee mdicn4nodT1
1/11/1H931C0IhMHR XYM aweIxonaV
a mHxdollee Gmxxeneduoox miehmlom ocHeI e !eaIoquaImodIo
odoaox grIV oonmVox000x 61m1Gda NOh 69111qMON OHUGIMherIC rip
OWMQ OH 6nJAHMVO xmIe gmmeamIdoaeed osoxdoIaou mat GdPmVoxpoex
6gnoda 0I11 6mm4meI 150 MICM IPIH140 XNHHGAOIhMER MirM xmxxeaod
-riumowoV ummealudegeed otioxdoIaou mneaLoVodo PINMHOGhXHX0I MNHH
-,EfeHOMTIUM IS14HWERdeHp0 (11001-M01120a IMeaMhOUO2Q0 !Ojil XUYOTI a
xm gmxeaoeurouom aI00HA0N20a GoWehorimom 60111-MI000 a6XCH0LT
-MICOM xmxusoIeImuom ex umxoxRd000 NOMHOMIYHOM ee 6umxe3IcCd0oo
NOIM@HOUNON mine H YOXXITIHOOHIO wicHeI e 6a0IHOHOUn0H XX MYM
weIomo xmIe ammonamdu loleamhouoopo 'r,doaoLlo oaaTlxgworigemma
m/c mum? m a0IHOHOHNOH XM MUM NOI0140 XMIC MHGNeE MNHOTiOHIO
JJPII113 NHWKOWOH nammaraIoGMRoo 0 Gmxxeegao 6a0IMGHOHNOH
XX XYM QJJ N0I0M0 HMHOCOIMAHR 141CMeweIxonY mEnnodu .e
Z1?000l?000POONV9Ci700108dCIU-VI3 : IZ/100/1700Z eSeOlkliOd peACLIddV
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3.
nocpeAcTBom cBoeBpemeHHux COOTBeTCTBYMMX npomeAyp
OTOPOHM yBeAommuoT Apyr Apyra o icoultiecTBe h Time (HasemHaH
EJIH maxTHaH) AemoFTmpyemmx 1mm yHmliTozaemux nycKoBux YOTSHOBOH
HpoTmBopaKeT H 0 HozmuecTBe AemoHupyrembix m.um yHmliTolitaemux
paAmozoKanmoHHIlx cTaHumk HP09 a TaRge o ico7mIlecTBe nycHoBux
yoTaHoBoic npoTmBopalceT m paAmoaolcalmoHHux cTaHmma npo, npeAmas-
--, I
HageHllux B HallecTBe 3aM0Hqt/
HacTompig EpoToicoz m npmaraemue HponeAypil BcTynamT B ciuly
momeHTa HOAHHCaHHE AaHHOPO nPOTOKOM OCTaMTCH B crime Ha
nepmoA AenCTBJAH BKMOYHOMHHYTOr0 1JoroBopa9 nOCTOHHHaH HOHOPITD7
TaTmBHaa ROMHCCHE moaiceT 110 cBoemy yomoTpeHmm BHOCHTB B HMX
nonpaBHm.
CoBepmeHo roAa B ropoAe aHeBe B AByx
3icsemnzHpax9 xagAu2 Ha pyccitom m aHmgcicom H3NRaX9 npmgem
oda TeRcTa mmemT oAmHal-coBym cmzy.
HpeAcTaBmTemp npeAcTaBmTezi,
C0103a COBTOICHX COUHaJIHOT11100EMX CO6AMHeHHHX riliTaTOB
Pecnydzmx Amepmxm
n
iipexioaceHme amepmicaHcKok CTOPOnle
2 ripexioaceHme coBeTcHog cTopoHu. ?
Ceicpwa
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CeEpe T HO
HEACIEHHE
MOCTOHHAh KOHCYJILTATM3HAH HOMECCMH
HPOI1E437P, PELOMPYK4ME iOiiTM OAM MMTITMEHME TA
YbEAOMAEHME 0 HEX9 4.11h CMCIEM nPo M MX ii3OMMOHEHTOB
Ie IlycHoBwe_yoTaHomm npoTIABopaKeT Ha MCHNTaTeHLHHX
nozzroHax cBepx yoTaHoBrieHmmx HOHMtleCTB
I. Ha3emnble nycxoBhie yeTaHOBHIA M OTHOCHWeeCH H HIAM obopyAo?
BaHme maammTcH co cTapToBbix no314n11g9 a BCH uacTB cTapToBa HHO?
NaAlcm9 3aHmmaemaH CTOPIHOki nycxoBoR yoTaHorm m ap1aTypon9 AemoH?
TmpyeTcH paspymaeTcH. 001omEm cTapToBord naolqazicm moryT bmTB
YAazeHm, a HO MCTelleHMM MCCTX mecHuB 3T0 mecTo mozeT OETB sacial?
naHo 30MHOPA?
2. thaxTHHe nycHol3He yeTaHoLHm npmBoAHTcH B HenpmroAHoe AHH
MCHO3IID30BaHMF1 COCTOHHHe nyTem AemoHTaxa vunri yHMIITOXCHMH MX Hu-
3eMHNX HoHcTpyRWI gzE72 firi7/ OrOZOBKOB3 a TaExe nyTem yAa?
zeHmH Hanpawmmux. COHOMEM WaXTHHX EyCHOBHX yoTaHoBoic moryT
OHTL yAmeHri9 a HO mcTeuenmm mecTm mecHneB WaXTH sacunamTcH
semzeM.
8. YicasaHHEe B nylucTax IH 2 meponpmHTIAH no AemoHTaay
yHmuToxeHmm 3aBepwamTcH HO no3y,e9 uem uepea TI mecHma c momeH?
Ta mx Hauma.
4. CoopyzeHmH9 OTHOCHWMeCH IC CMOHT14p0BaHHHM MHM yHMtITOgeH?
HEM nycHoBbim yoTaHoBHam npoTmBopaHeT Ha MCHHTaTeHBHLX HO1MT0HaX9
moryT HO ycmoTpeHmm CT0p0H 14CEOH1)30BaTLC5I AHH ne3IePi9 He npoTmBo?
pellaulmx nozoxeHmHm 4oroBopa ob orpaHmlieHmm cmcTem 1120 m COOT?
BeTcTBymmx ComacoBaHHux 3eHi3IeH14M.
5. YBeAomzemme o L73aBepilleH14m meponpmT14Ii9 npeAyomoTpeHlibm
B nyHmTax I m 2 L7npeAyomoTpeHHux B nyHRTax I m 2 meponpmH?
TmHx xax HaxoAHNTAxcH B cTaAmm ocy1gecTB3IeHmE9 TIC m saBepaleHHHA/I
Hp0143BO7MTCH uepe3 nocToHHHym EOHCTIBTaTMBHyM HOMMCCHM ABa pa3a
B roA no COCTOHHMM Ha Hallazo ouepeAllok perpmpHoPi ceccmm tommc?
CHM.
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2/
III. CoopygeHHH nPo Ha (lase Mazi4o2222
I. meTaJuimtlecHme CilepgHT4 apmaTypm sAaHmil PAC cpe3moTcH.
2. 370HKH JJIC9 ATH HOTOpEX dEJI0 ye HauTo BoaBeAeHHe cTeH9
OCTaBIIRMTCH HenpmKpbiThimm B mx HemBepleHHom COCTOHHMM B TetieHme
MCCTM meciieB9 EOCTie tler0 OHM moryT bbITL aachinaHH 3emzei7i.
3. CoopyzelimH AJIH RyCHOBIDIX yoTamoBoK9. 8 TamKe 3CHiiI5i Pac9
AJIH HOTOpEX 61/3IM 3aBepmeHil CTpOTATeEBCTBOM JIMMB WH4ameHT1,19 Ca?
cbinamTcH semzek.
4. OcylqecTmHeTcH paapaBilmBaHme HOIIBEI Ha BOOM yllacme, a
Clip0MTOALHEe maTepmaabi yAaJunoTcsi.
5.. PaboTu HO AemoHTayy MTIM yHMtITOgeHMM HalIMHalOTCH He no3Ke9
gem Ilepes thecm mecHup nocze corzacoBaHm HacTommx HpolleAyp.
6. YBeAomzeHvie o saBeimeHmm yEa3aHnix meponpaumn npoymBo?
AmTcH gepe3 HOCTOHHHyM KoHuaLTaTmBHym HOMMCCM10.
CeEpe TH0
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Attachment No. 4
Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commicsioners
April 19, 1974
*STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the
Interim Agreement between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures
with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements
regarding that Agreement, the Parties thereto have within
the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed
upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or
destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive
arms limited by that Interim Agreement, as formulated in the
Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this
Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines::
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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems
to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the
provisions of the aforementioned Interim Agreement;
?
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines and submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers shall be on the
basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the
Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM
Ntrom, launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-missile
submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that they would be
put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their
use for launching ICBMs or SLBMS, respectively; shall ensure
that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be
detectable by national technical means; shall be such that
reactivation time of those units would not be substantially
less than the time required for new construction; and shall
preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;
4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be
formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM
launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines and
SLBM launchers;
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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by
national technical means in accordance with Article V of the
Interim Agreement;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with
the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at land-based
ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of
the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;
rir. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of
launchers being dismantled or destroyed and the number of
replacement launchers; and71
5. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall
notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed
launchers and the number of such launchers used for replace-
ment; and72
Proposed by U.S. side.
2 Proposed by Soviet side.
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8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines
which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a
number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A
normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent
with the past or present construction practices of each Party.
This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter
into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force
for the duration of the aforementioned Interim Agreement, and
may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it
deems appropriate.
Done at Geneva on
, in two copies, each in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
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r,7eMnD eilr
ATTACHMENT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
I. General
1. Within the limits of the levels established for each
Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964,
launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered
submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on
diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic
missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.
2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are:
for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-
powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of
the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made
operational since 1965. jh addition, all submarine-launched
ballistic missiles first tested after 1964 are modern
-71
submarine-launched ballistic missiles./
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3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel
submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes
provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms.
4. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers
shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning
of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any
of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation
of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation
of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute
initiation of dismantling or destruction of a ballistic-missile
submarine or SLBM launcher.
5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-
missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine
first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port
in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was
performed.
L. Notification of dismantling or destruction and
replacement activities shall be given through the SCC twice
annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each
regular session. The notification shall contain:
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(a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and
for ballistic-missile launchers on older
submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM
-launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher)
on which dismantling or destruction is in process
and the number and type on which dismantling or
destruction action has been completed since the
last report in the SCC.
(b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the number
which are on submarines that will begin sea
trials during the next six-month period, and
the number which are on submarines that have
begun sea trials since the last report in the
Sc
Z.7. Notification of completed dismantling of ICBM launchers
and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be
given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually,
reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session
of the Commission. The notification shall contain information
for the past six months on the number of dismantled ICBM launchers
and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines, as well
as on the number of such launchers replaced by launchers on
Nrawf modern submarines during that period.72
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7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information
to the notifications if it considers such information necessary
to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed
under the Interim Agreement.
II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based
ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers
1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished
in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a)
removal from the launch site of the supply of
missiles and their components, warheads, and
mobile equipment;
(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting
and handling equipment, and propellant-handling
equipment, Located at the launch site or associated
with it71
La-,.ssociated with the launcher and located
-72
at the launch site/ and removal of all dismantled
equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment
is understood to be systems, components, and
instruments required to launch a missile.
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2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the
actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall
be performed:
(a) la-reas of the launch pads centered on the launch
stand and at least 30 meters in diameter/
LThcations of launch device emplacement, or
launch pads and missile launch control posts
(bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling
or destruction;
(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and
removed from the launch site;
.(c) debris of locations of launch devices or launch
pads, of missile launch control posts (bunkers),
and of fuel storage tank foundations may be
removed, and, after six months, the places where
they were located may be covered with earth.
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the
actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall
be performed:
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(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting,
launch tubes ZTilo headworks, and launch control
-71
bunkers/ shall be dismantled or destroyed.
Dismantled components shall be removed from the
launch site;
(b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a)
above have been accomplished, the silo shall
remain open for a period of six months, after
which it Z.Thal171 LEa72 be filled with earth.
5.
After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished
in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining
at ICBM launch sites may not be used either for storage, support
or launch of ICBMs, or for storage or support of ICBM-capable
launchers, but may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for
other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the
-71
Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto./
5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers
shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement
submarine begins sea trials.
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III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-
Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New
Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers
1. The following procedures, from which each Party may
choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of
ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:
(a) sinking of the submarine with its launchers in
international waters of at least 2000 meters
depth. LI-nlhen this procedure for ballistic-missile
submarine destruction is chosen, notification of
the time and location of the planned destruction
shall be given to the other side at least one
month prior to the planned destruction7;
(b) scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the
open LT/1 predesignated shipyards71. Scrapping
shall involve extensive disassembly;
(c) removing the submarine's missile section in the
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open /In predesignated shipyards/ ;
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/Id) removal of the launch tubes or cutting off
the upper part of the tubes together with
the superstructure above themi72
/re)
for "H-Class" submarines the following procedures
will apply: removal of launch tubes in the open
in predesignated shipyards. The shipyards to be
used for ballistic-missile submarine dismantling
shall be agreed between the Parties.
(1) That entire part of the superstructure
(including the fairwater) and outer hull
above the missile compartment of the
submarine will be removed.
(2) That section of the missile compartment
pressure hull (hull crown plating and frame
segments) which contains all of the hull
penetrations for the missile launch tubes,
as well as the missile launch tubes will
be removed.
(3)
The pressure hull and outer hull may then be
restored only by welding into place new
sections without launch tube penetrations.
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(4) No superstructure or fairwater will be
replaced over the section of the submarine
from which the launch tubes have been
remove d.71
2. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed no
later than six months after the replacement submarine begins
sea trials.
3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall
be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and
missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.
IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile Submarine
Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair
In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is lost at
sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be replaced
by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance with the
following:
(a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be
made to the other Party through the Standing
Consultative Commission;
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(b) the number of launchers on the replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause
the total number of launchers to exceed that
(c)
authorized in he Interim Agreement and the
Protocol thereto; and
the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall
be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with
Section III of these Procedures.
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Attachment No.
Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
April 19, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the
Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements
regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the
framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon
procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction,
and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components
limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto
which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems
or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed
pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Treaty;
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2. Any replacement of ABM systems or thei,- components
shall be on the basis of Article VII of the aforementioned
Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or
destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of
the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty
shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the aforementioned
Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems
or their components, related to implementation of the provisions
of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their
components and Article VIII of the aforementioned Treaty, shall
ensure that those systems or their components and facilities
associated with those components, except for facilities at test
ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility
of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation
of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those
units would not be substantially less than the time required
for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays
in dismantling or destruction;
4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall be formulated separately 'for above-ground and silo ABM
launchers and for ABM radars;
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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by
national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the
aforementioned Treaty;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with
the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch
or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be
used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the
aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and
zfT. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the
Parties shall notify each other of the number and type
(above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and the number of
ABM radars being dismantled or destroyed, and the number of
replacement ABM launchers and ABM radars.7a
L7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall
notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed
ABM launchers and ABM radars, and the number of ABM launchers
and ABM radars used for replacement.72?
Proposed by U.S. side.
2 Proposed by Soviet side.
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This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter
into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in
force for the duration of the aforementioned Treaty, and
may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as
it deems appropriate.
Done at Geneva on
, in two copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
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Liv.V I i
ATTACHNENT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES. GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges
1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall
be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch
pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be
dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed
and after six months the location covered with earth.
2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling
or destruction of their above-ground structures 5nd71 1:6Y72
headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris
may be removed and after six months the silos shall be filled
with earth.
3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three
months after their initiation.
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4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed
ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the
Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems,
and applicable Agreed Statements.
5. Notification of the /7,ctivities provided for in
paragraphs 1 and 2 that are in process and that have been
completed71 /7ompletion of the activities provided for in
paragraphs 1 and 272 shall be given through the Standing
Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the status
as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission.
Il. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom
1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be
cut off.
2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had
commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state
for six months after which they may be covered with earth.
3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which
only foundations had been completed shall be covered with
earth.
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21. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished
and construction materials removed.
5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be
initiated no later than six months after agreement on these
Procedures.
6. Notification that the above activities have been
completed shall be given through the Standing Consultative
Commission.
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Attachment No. 6
USTINOV STATEMENT ON TASK OF SCC-III
April 19, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
It should be noted that until now there still
remain a number of provisions of the Protocols and
Procedures for which the Commission has not yet found
mutually acceptable solutions. In our opinion the
next stage of the third session of the SCC must be
the conduct of this most complex and labor-consuming
work. As I understand it, the U.S. Component of the
Commission is also in agreement with this.
I can confirm once again that the Soviet side is
ready to proceed to consideration of those paragraphs
which have not been agreed by us, and to preparation
of complete draft texts of the Protocols and Procedures,
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction,
and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms
and ABM systems, insofar as the U.S. side is ready for
this. In this connection, we proceed from the premise
that completion of this work, if possible, is the
main task of the current session.
Thank you for your attention.
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t.a) ha Ca I Attachment No. I
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS -- NOTIFICATION
April 19, 1974
1. The U.S. side considers notification to be one
of the major unresolved issues. The differences between
the approach of the Soviet side and that of the U.S. side
are reflected by bracketed language in several places in
the JDTs. Although it first appears in para. 7 of the
Protocols, the more specific provisions at issue are
in the detailed procedures.
2. The subject of notification has been addressed
extensively during previous SCC sessions. The U.S. side
has carefully reviewed these eXchanges, and has the
following comments.
3. The Soviet side has maintained that national
technical means of verification are capable of verifying
with complete confidence and reliability compliance by the
sides with the obligations assumed in accordance with the
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement; and that therefore,
there is no need whatsoever to introduce into the
verification process any sort of additional measures,
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including prior notification. Mr. Commissioner, I must
oace again reemphasize that the U.S. position on notification
is that it is not required for adequate verification by
national technical means of compliance with the existing
agreements or with the Procedures we work out, except
in the ease of destruction of submarines by sinking.
4. It has been and remains the U.S. position that
certain prior notification provisions would promote the
objectives of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement in
accordance with Articles XIII and VI, respectively, of
these agreements. 'Specifically, such provisions would:
a. Enhance the viability of the ABM Treaty and
Interim Agreement by reducing possibilities
for uncertainties and misunderstandings.
b. Help develop mutual trust and contribute to
continued improved relations between our two
countries, thereby creating a better climate
for future agreements.
5. The U.S. side considers these to be significant
benefits which could be achieved at little cost or effort
and at no risk. They would not impinge on the security
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interests of either side. Neither would these provisions
cause a loss of flexibility in programming replacement,
destruction or dismantling activities; information given
at one SCC meeting could be amended as necessary at the
next. It is our view that certain prior notification
provisidns would prevent rather than cause misunderstandings.
In my opinion one of the important purposes of objectives
of the SCC is to prevent misunderstandings wherever possible.
6. In prior sessions the Soviet side has
suggested that para. 1.7 of the strategic offensive arms
procedures dealing with voluntary information provides an
adequate opportunity for one side to provide the other
side with advance information if it considers such information
necessary to assure compliance with the obligations assumed
under the Interim Agreement. Para. 1.7 is an unbracketed
paragraph and thus "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners."
The U.S. side continues to agree with the desirability of
this paragraph, but does not agree that this paragraph is
a substitute for certain_prior notification provisions. In
fact para. 7 deals with "compliance with the obligations
assumed under the Interim Agreement" and applies to more than
just the mutually agreed procedures we are working on.
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7. Mr. Commissioner, it is our view that the U.S.
proposals for prior notification should be considered on
their own merit as an integral part of our mutually
agreed procedures. They would thus contribute to promoting
the objectives of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.
Prior notification is not precluded by the ABM Treaty, the
Interim Agreement and its Protocol, or Agreed Statements.
8. The language proposed by the U.S. side in para. 7
of the two Protocols is consistent with the U.S. view on
the desirability of including certain prior notification
provisions in these mutually agreed procedures. The specific
language merely requires the Parties to notify each other
of the number and types of launchers being dismantled or
destroyed and the number of replacement launchers. The first
substantive point regarding prior notification is contained
in para. 1.6 of the procedures for strategic offensive arms.
Notification of the type contained in the U.S. proposed
para. 1.6 reflects the type of notification which would
meet the U.S. objectives I set forth earlier.
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Attachment No. 8
USTINOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION
April 19, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
We have attentively listened to the statement
of the U.S. SCC Component. We will study it carefully.
For my part I would :like to direct your attention to
those considerations which govern the approach of
the Soviet Component of the Commission to notifica-
tion procedures. As you know, these procedures were
not agreed at the second session.
On questions of notification the Soviet side
proceeds from the fundamental joint Soviet-American
documents, which first and foremost are the Treaty
on the Limitation of ADM Systems and the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
Article XII of the aforementioned Treaty and
Article V of the Interim Agreement specify that for
the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with
the provisions of these documents each side shall
use national technical means of verification at its
disposal in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law. In this
connection the sides undertook not to interfere with
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2
the national bechnical means of verification of the
other side which are carrying out their functions,
including not using deliberate concealment measures
which impede verification by national technical
means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty
and Interim Agreement.
Thus, Mr. Commissioner, both sides have directly
and officially recognized the effectiveness and
reliability of national technical means in carrying
out verification. Moreover, we can say with good
reason that the very conclusion in May 1972 of the
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement between the USSR
and the U.S., to a significant degree became possible
because both sides agreed that national technical
means are capable of reliably verifying compliance
of the sides with the terms and provisions of these
Soviet-American documents.
The U.S. Component of the Commission has also
repeatedly emphasized, at the second and at the
current session of the SCC, the effectiveness and
reliability of national technical means of verification.
In connection with the above considerations, the
Soviet side does not see the necessity of substitut-
ing any sort of further additional functions of the
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Commission, for example those having the nature
of prior notification, for the functions of national
technical meanc. of verification.
We believe that with respect to the dismantling
or destruction and replacement procedures for
strategic offensive arms and ABM systems being worked
out by us, national technical means of verification
are capable of reliably verifying dismantling
activities at appropriate ICBM launch sites, shipyards
and ABM test ranges, as well as those arms replacement
activities which may be carried out by the sides in
implementation of the provisions of the Interim
Agreement and the Protocol thereto.
The Soviet side sees the basic function of notifica-
tion through the SCC to be that the sides inform each
other, for the period betvieen sessions, concerning an
accomplished fact--the completion of dismantling or
destruction of numbers of ICBM launchers, submarines
and SLBM launchers, as well as ABM launchers and
radars; and the number of launchers used by each side
for replacement purposes during the same period. Such
reciprocal providing of information by the sides
through the SCC would be documentary confirmation of
completed activity for official recording by the other
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side; that that will promote the implementation of the
objectives and provi.Dions of the AEM Treaty and the
Interim Agreement.
In this connection we do not exclude that each
side may on a voluntary basis add other information
to the notifications, if it considers such information
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the
obligations assumed.
Such are the basic positions of principle on
notification issues to which the Soviet side adheres
in working out the Protocols and Procedures. These
tenets have been reflected in those specific formula-
tions for the corresponding paragraphs of the joint
documents, which were proposed by us during the first
and second sessions and which are bracketed as the
proposals of the Soviet side.
Mr. Commissioner; we hope that the U.S. SCC
Component will once again carefully study our point
of view on notification procedures. It seems to us
that achievement of mutual agreement on this issue
would be in the interests of the entire Commission.
Thank you for your attention.
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Attachment No.
USTINOV STATEMENT ON I NOTIFICATION OF DISMANTLING
IN PROCESS
April 19, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
The proposals of the U.S. side on notification
issue, tabled during the second session of the SCC,
speak of notification regarding ICBM, SLBM and ABM
launchers, the dismantling of which is in process.
Study by the Soviet side during the recess of
such a notification procedure prompted a number of
questions on our part. For example, it is not clear
to us what one side or another would have to do at
the next session about notification of dismantling
of launchers or radars if dismantling thereof, already
begun before the previous session, is not completed
by the beginning of the next session. Will this
require repeated notification or will it not be
necessary to do so?
Based on those time periods which are provided
for the completion of dismantling, such instances are
evidently quite possible. For example, according
to the procedures, dismantling of replaced ICBM
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2
launchers must be completed no later than four
months after the replacement submarine begins sea
trials,
dismantling of SLBM launchers--within six
months, and dismantling actions on ABM launchers at
test ranges--no later than three months after their
At the same time, the experience of the second
and third sessions of the SCC shows that the period
between sessions lasted from 21 to 4i months. Thus,
the duration of dismantling may sometimes overlap the
duration of the period between sessions. Another
variant: dismantling begun before the previous session,
is completed during the period between sessions. How
would one in this instance relate these launchers to
those launchers, dismantling of which was both begun
and completed during the period between sessions? It
would be possible to cite a number of other variants.
We would be thankful to you, Mr. Commissioner,
if you would clarify for us how the U.S. side envisages
practical implementation of such a notification
procedure.
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Attachment No. 10
rs4 Cr?N, F"'
r
p
COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS--MODERN SLBM'S
April 19, 1974
1. The Protocol to the Interim Agreement states:
"The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine,
regardless of type, will be counted against the total
level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."
Paragraph 1.2 is included in the procedures for the
purpose of defining a modern SLUM. Without the inclusion
of an added sentence, of the type proposed by the U.S.
side, the paragraph deals only with modern SLBMs on nuclear-
powered submarines and does not deal with modern SLBMs
on any
submarine,
regardless of type" -- for example,
diesel-powered submarines: Thus in the U.S. view there
is a requirement for an additional sentence to complete
the definition of a modern SLUM.
2. From a review of previous exchanges on this subject,
I do not detect a substantive difference between the two
sides. If I understand the Soviet position correctly
it is basically that it is not necessary to introduce
this additional language. It is the U.S. view that an
additional sentence is necessary to complete the purpose
of this paragraph. By such an addition the modern SLBM
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definition would be complete and any possible misunder-
standing on this point would be eliminated. It would be
clear in the procedures that the term "modern submarine-
launched ballistic missile" applies to newer missiles
regardless of the type of submarine on which they are
deployed;
3. In light of the foregoing and after careful
review of the previous exchanges on this subject, the
U.S. side proposes the following alternative language for
the U.S. proposed additional sentence (read alternatives
and pass copies to Soviet side).
4. The U.S. proposed additional sentence in either
form would apply equally to both sides, is consistent with
Interim Agreement and its
the/ Protocol, and, in the U.S. view, is necessary to complete
the definition of a "modern SLBM."
5. Nr. Commissioner, the U.S. side continues to believe
that an additional sentence is necessary for completeness in
the definition of "modern submarine-launched ballistic
missiles." Taking into account Soviet concerns regarding
the U.S. proposed sentence, we have provided you today with
alternative language, intended to clarify the sentence, which
in our opinion would adequately complete the definition of
modern SLBMs.
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Attachment No. 11
U.S. Working Document
April 19, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES
PARAGRAPH 1.2
?
2. "Modern ... 3965; and for both Parties,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-
tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine
regardless of type."
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0
? c_ ?
U.S. Working Document
April 19, 1974
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES
PARAGRAPH 1.2
2. "Modern ... 1965; and for both Parties,
submarine-launchcd ballistic missiles first flight-
tested since 1965 and installed in diesel
submarines."
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iYctachment No. 12
USTINOV STATEMENT ON DEFINITION OF MODERN SLBM
April 19, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
In my second statement today I would like to
address the question of the definition of modern
SLBMs contained in paragraph 1.2 of the Procedures
for Strategic Offensive Arms.
In paragraph 1.2 there are brackets containing
a proposal of the U.S. side consisting of an addition
to the definition of modern SLBMs. During the recess
the Soviet side carefully studied this wording of
paragraph 2, taking your proposal into account, and
believes that the initial wording, without the U.S.
addition, sufficiently completely defines the concept
of modern SLBMs, applicable to the objectives of the
procedures we are working out.
Furthermore, in accordance with paragraph 1.3
of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms,
agreed by the sides at the second session of the SCC,
use of launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel
submarines for replacement purposes is precluded. In
order to avoid the possibility of circumvention of
the agreement through accumulation of modern SLBMs
on diesel submarines, the sides have also provided
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2
that these missiles will count in the total level
of SLBM launchers established by the Interim Agreement.
Thus, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the
Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, taking into
account the provisions of other earlier agreed
interpretive statements which are presently in force,
define with adequate precision the concept of modern
SLEMs for both sides, and it is not necessary to
introduce any sort of addition into paragraph 2. The
Soviet side proposes to leave the wording of para-
graph 1.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive
Arms as follows: "Modern submarine-launched ballistic
missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed
in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet
Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-
powered submarines made operational since 1965."
Thank you for your attention.
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US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMN1SSI0N
Meeting, April 16, 1974
US Mission, Geneva
Persons Present:
Mr. Graybeal
Brig. Gen. Georgi
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGeraid
Mr. Anderson
Lt. Col. Bartos
Lt. Col. DeSimone
Mr. Long
Lt. Cdr. Martin
Mr. Smith
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)
SCC
Session-III
A-170
Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Mr. Karpov
Mr. Yereskovsky
Col Belyanin
Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Capt. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Commissioner Graybeal opened the meeting at 11:00 a.m., and
said that before giving the floor to General Ustinov he would
like to introduce Mr. Robert Smith, now working on the US Com-
ponent of the SCC in place of Lt. Col. Pettyjohn, who had been
present at our first meeting of this session.
Commissioner Ustinov acknowledged the introduction, and
delivered a prepared statement (Attachment).
Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov and said that the US Component
of the SCC also believed that the work of the Editorial Working
Group, on the nonsubstantive changes designed to make the JDTs
clearer, had been useful and productive and that the JDTs had been
improved. Also he believed doing that work now would save time
as we neared the completion of our assigned task of preparing
mutually acceptable procedures for replacement, dismantling or
destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive
arms and for ABM systems and their components.
He continued by stating that the US SCC Component also
agrees that the texts of the JDTs, which were now in the process
of being conformed, would have the same status as the November 16,
1973 texts; that is, "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners", with
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the appropriate date noted. This set of revised texts would
provide the basis for negotiating the much more important
issues and differences between the sides, now identified by
bracketed language. Graybeal said that he understood Ustinovts
statement concerning the status of these JDTs meant that "nothing
is agreed until all is agreed." As Ustinov had so aptly put it,
our respectie Governments would, of course, also review the docu-
ments prior to their signature and entry into force. It also
went without saying that either side had the option to raise any
question concerning either bracketed or unbracketed language if
it were considered necessary. He hoped, however, that the cur-
rently unbracketed language would have ?clear sailing" henceforth,
and that we could focus our attention on the substantive matters
in the bracketed portions of the JDTs.
Graybeal concluded by noting that the nonsubstantive changes
proposed by each side and accepted by the other had been incor-
porated into the texts which were being conformed by our Executive
Secretaries today. With the assistance of our interpreters and
those others involved, this conforming of the texts could be com-
pleted, we could agree that they were "preliminarily agreed by
Commissioners" as of the date that work was done, and the Russian
and English-language versions could be exchanged.
General Ustinov said he would like to restate his belief
that positive and useful work had been done by the Editorial
Working Group and our Deputy Commissioners; it would help to
provide a basis for working out the final agreed texts of the
Protocols and Procedures. He said. he agreed that our Executive
Secretaries should complete the work of conforming the texts,
preparing them for agreement by Commissioners at the level
noted by Graybeal and for exchange of Russian and English
versions.
Mr. Graybeal said he thought this exchange of texts could
be part of our next SCC meeting.
General Ustinov agreed.
Mr. Graybeal asked if the Soviet Component had any other
matters to take up today.
General Ustinov said the Soviet side had many issues it
would like to raise at future meetings, but not this morning.
Mr. Graybeal said that in that ease, since he also had nothing
further to bring up this morning, he would like to propose that
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our next meeting take place at 11:00 a.m. on April 19, at the
Soviet Mission, for the purpose of initiating substantive dis-
cussion of bracketed language in the ,TDTs.
General Ustinov stated that as he had 'aid at our first
meeting and repeated again today, the Soviet side is ready to go
on with that work. He agreed to the time and place proposed by
Graybeal for, the next meeting.
Mr. Graybeal said he did have one more item of business
which concerned pleasure. The US Component would like to invite
the Soviet Component to lunch in this room on Wednesday, April 24,
at 1:00 p.m.
General Ustinov accepted with gratitude on behalf of the
Soviet Component, and remarked that he had no objection in
principle to lunching at the same table at which we were now
working.
Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 11:35 a.m.
koloev Attachment:
Ustinov Statement
Drafted by: F. P eSimone:bd Approved by: S. N. GraAeal
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USTINOV STATEMENT, April 16, 1974
Mr. Commissioner,
As agreed, today we are holding the second
plenary meeting of the Commission.
The Soviet Component of the Commission has
carefully studied the editorial changes, proposed
by the U.S. side, to the previously agreed provisions
of the Joint Draft Texts of the Protocols and
Procedures governing replacement, dismantling or
destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic
offensive arms and ABM systems, of November 16, 1973.
We believe that the two meetings of the Working
Group headed by the Executive Secretaries and the
meeting of Deputy Commissioner V. P. Karpov and
General Georgi were useful for both sides and were
productive.
We have no objections to the changes introduced
by the U.S. side which are of a purely grammatical
or stylistic nature and which do not change provisions
of principle, flowing from the Interim Agreement and
the ADM Treaty; we agree also to the refinementsof a
legal nature to the texts of the Protocols and
Procedures which do not change the sense of already
agreed basic premises on the structure and format
of the documents.
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In that light we agree to introduce such
corrections into the documents, and specifically:
(a) to indicate more clearly that the procedures
for dismantling or destruction, and notification
thereof, for strategic offensive arms and for ABM
systems and their components are being adopted
pursuant to the provisions and in implementa6ion
of the Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty which is in
force;
(b) to show more clearly that the procedures
for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and
their components are an integral part of the respective
Protocols;
(c) to establish the time of entry into force of
the strategic offensive arms and ABM Protocols and
Procedures, which are to be considered in force upon
signature by us of the respective Protocols.
As for some other proposals and formulations of
the U.S. side, we do not see the need to introduce
them into the texts already worked out. As I under-
stand it, the U.S. Component of the Commission has
also agreed with this.
The specific proposals of the Soviet side are
contained in our working document, which we have
given to you, and work on which is being finished up
today by our Executive Secretaries.
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The Soviet side agrees to the changes and
additions introduced, and proposes to consider the
corrected texts of the Protocols and Procedures to
be joint drafts. In this connection it is our under-
standing that our agreement to these texts is
preliminary until final completion of the full texts
of the Protocols and Procedures and their approval
by Governments.
Mr. Commissioner, the Soviet side is prepared
to turn to consideration of other paragraphs of the
Protocols and Procedures, which still remain unagreed.
Thank you for your attention.
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SESSION III
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
DATE April 11, 1974
TIME:
1100 - 1325 Hours
PLACE Soviet Mission, Geneva
SUBJECT: Meeting of Editorial Review Group ?
PARTICIPANTS: US USSR
Brig. Gen. W. F. Georgi
Col. C. G. FitzGerald
LTC F. P. DeSimone
Mr. P. Afanasenko
(Interpreter)
Mr. V. P. Karpov
Mr. A. S. Yereskovsky
Capt. Ye. G. Korobchenko
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
(Interpreter)
Karpov opened the meeting and gave the floor to Georgi, who
said he thought we should proceed according to the plan which
FitzGerald and Iereskovsky had worked out; that is, the Soviet
side could present its responses and reactions to the editorial
changes whie.h had been suggested by the US side for the unbracketed
portions of the November 16, 1973 JDTs. He said this should be
as informal and direct as Karpov wished to make it; the US side
simply wanted to be certain that those suggestions and the Soviet
responses were perfectly clear to both sides.
Karpov, before going through the Soviet Working Document
which had been prepared for today's meeting, made some general
comments as follows:
1. The Soviet side proceeac, from the premise that,
generally speaking, the November 16 JDTs need no corrections
or changes. They express accurately and completely the ideas
and thoughts intended; no fundamental change was needed in that
which was accomplished during the last SCC session and approved
by the Commissioners.
2. Nevertheless, the Soviet side had carefully studied
the "editorial changes" which the US side had suggested for the
agreed portions of those documents, and felt that the two meetings
of this working group which had already been held under the leader-
ship of our Executive Secretaries had been useful. The explanations
and the suggested changes themselves were helpful in making the
approach of the US side clear and in improving the Soviet side's
understanding of that approach.
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3. The SoJiet side does not object to changes for
stylistic and grammatical purposes which do not affect the
Russian language texts; these can be made in the JD2s and
confirmed under the supervision of our Executive Secretaries.
4. In principle, the Soviet side also does not oppose
"polishing" the texts from a legal point of view, keeping in
mind that there should be no changes to the agreed structure
and format of'the documents. For example, it would appear useful
to clearly state in the preambular language that the procedures
we are working out are implementation of the ABM Treaty and the
Interim Agreement, and to clearly set down that each set of
Procedures and its respective Protocol comprise an integral
document, and also to clearly state when these agreed Procedures
enter into force.
5. In other cases, the suggestions and proposals of
the US side raise some doubt, and the Soviet side has formulated
alternative changes. If these are not acceptable, the Soviet
side would prefer to stay with the formulations in the November 16,
Now, 1973 JDTs. This approach, retaining November 16 JDT language,
also applies in some cases where the Soviet side does not consider
the US-proposed changes to be useful, and has made no alternative
Nftw/ proposal.
Karpov then handed over the Soviet working documents
(Attachments No. 1 and No. 2) and proceeded to review all the
proposed editorial changes. Those which were not simply accepted
as they were proposed in the US Working Document of April 5, 1974
are reviewed below, with comments and discussion. For ease of
reference, see Attachment No. 2 to MemCon? SCC Session III, A-160
Strategic Offensive Arms, JDT, Protocol
Preambular Language
1. "And in implementation of -- accepted, but Soviet-
suggested language requires minor change in wording which actually
better articulates the intent of the US-proposed change.
2. Karpov said that H. . . regarding that Agreement . ."
is better than ". . . related Agreed Statements. . ." because it
more closely corresponds to the title agreed upon for those agreed
statements initialed by Ambassador Smith and Minister Semenov on
May 26, 1972. This approach, Karpov said, applies to all cases
where the language of previously agreed documents is used in
Skim/ formulations for the documents now being worked out. In the Soviet
view, this approach is extremely desirable, and should be used
consistently.
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3. ". . hereinafter referred to as the Interim
Agreement . ?"-- The Soviet view is that it is not useful
or necessary to arrive at a contrived way of lumping together
the pertinent documents and referring to them in combination
as "the Interim Agreement," es;ecially when one of them is
already "the Interim Agreement." Listing by their proper names,
as previously agreed, the several documents of various categories
to which we are referring in this Preamble is more direct and
accurate.
4. The Soviet side, based on the need here and the
precedent pointed out by the US side at the April 5, 1974
meeting, proposes to explicitly state that the Procedures are
spelled out in an Attachment which forms an integral part of
the Protocol. This is in accord with the express desire of the
US side that ambiguity on that score be removed. The suggested
change and addition to the last sentence of the preambular
paragraph accomplishes that purpose, in the Soviet view. Georgi
agreed that it appeared to do so, though we would have to review
it once again to be certain. At the same time, he agreed that
if the ". . . hereinafter referred to . . ." phrase was not
adopted, it would be necessary to stay with ". . . that Interim
Agreement . . ."at the end of the preambular paragraph.
Protocol, Numbered Paragraphs
1. Assuming agreement on the principle and implementation
of point 4 above, the "Procedures" would generally be written with
a capital letter, contrary to the US suggestion. The US partici-
pants indicated that was probably acceptable, since the doubt
created by capitalizing "Procedures" should now be completely
removed by the explicit statement of the status of the "attached
procedures" -- that is, Protocol and Procedures constitute one
integral document. Karpov agreed.
2. Reference paragraph 6. Soviet rejection of the
proposed deletion of ". . . provisions of the . . ." was not
discussed as Karpov reviewed the changes. Later in the meeting,
however, the subject was raised by Georgi with a question concerning
the reasons for not accepting that "fix" in the several places
for which it was suggested, including the ABM Protocol. Karpov
said that the working out of these procedures was a precisely
defined task -- the SCC was to do so in order to implement specific
provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. FitzGerald
pointed out that Article XIII of the ABM Treaty charged the SCC
with promoting the implementation of objectives and provisions,
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and reminded Karpov of our previous explanation that simply
referring to "the Interim Agreement" or "the ABM Treaty" in
para. 6 of each Protocol, for example, covered both those
charges. If we included "provisions" in that formulation,
perhaps inclusion of "objectives" as well would be better.
Karpov disagreed, saying that certainly implementing
the objectives of those agreements already in force was an
SCC function, but the task at hand was specifically tied to
certain of their specific provisions. The SCC can be, and
indeed already is, empowered to deal with adding to those
agreements based on changes in the strategic situation and
so forth, but for the time being we still have SALT to do that
job. The SCC, within the broad task of promoting objectives,
is now working out procedures for implementing certain provisions
of those agreements, as directed by our governments when they
signed the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement.
When FitzGerald asked whether or not we were also promoting
their objectives, Karpov replied that of course we were.
FitzGerald then noted that in that case specifically mentioning
"provisions" could be misleading or incomplete. Karpov replied
that on the contrary, it is necessary to keep it clear in these
documents that the SOU is acting in accord with provisions of
agreements in force and not "inventing anything new.
FitzGerald said that it would appear the Soviet side agrees
that everything the SCC does is "promoting the objectives" of
agreements in force. Karpov said that was true, but added that
he saw no need to continually underscore that fact.
3. The wording of the penultimate paragraph to include
the "entry into force" phrase follows the US-proposed format
and retains November 16 JDT language for ". . . attached Pro-
cedures . . ." based on the fix in the preambular language (see
point 4 under "Preambular Language" above).
Strategic Offensive Arms JDT, Procedures
1. The US proposal to combine paras. 1.1 and 1.2, Karpov
said, was not a good one. Since "modern SLBM" is not defined
elsewhere, we should follow "trails already blazed" in formulating
this definition and maintaining paras. 1, 2, and 3 in their
present format. He went through a rather lengthy discussion
indicating that the Soviet side considers this language to be
in the category mentioned above in point 2 under "Preambular
Language." The "trail already blazed" in this case is the
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July 24, 1972 agreed clarification concerning SLBMs, which
Karpov referred to as "that well-known document", and the
Soviet position is that we should avoid reformulating such
an agreed definition.
2. For the same reason as above, Karpoi, said we should
stick with ". . . installed. ." rather than use ". . . deployed
?
. . .II in para. 2. Georgi said that seemed reasonable. (Note:
Contrary to the impression gained on April 9 and noted in A-162
Karpov said during this discussion that he did not have, nor
had he seen, the English-language text of the refereliced "agreed
clarification".)
3. Karpov said, with reference to para. 1.3, that it did
not appear particularly useful to shorthand the title of the
Interim Agreement. This applied also to the other places where
such shortened reference had been proposed, based primarily on
the US-proposed change to the preambular language of the Protocol.
4. See title of Section III. It was agreed to correct the
order of "ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers", to
correspond to the formulation of this title, throughout the
document (specifically in paras. 2, 3, and 4 of the Protocol
and para. 1.4 of the Procedures).
5. Rather than the change proposed by the US side for
para. 111.2, Karpov proposed "any of the foregoing . . ." to
accomplish the same purpose.
6. In para. IV(a), Karpov proposed that since the SCC is
mentioned so few times in these documents, it should be given
due respect by having its name spelled out rather than abbreviated.
Georgi agreed.
7. In para. IV(b)? ". . . the Protocol thereto . . ." should
stay in, based on the discussion and the conclusion concerning
not referring to all the pertinent documents together as "the
Interim Agreement" (see point 3 above under "Preambular Language").
ABM Procedures, Protocol
1. For all US-proposed changes not accepted or revised,
see corresponding discussion above, under Strategic Offensive
ArIas? Protocol.
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Dropping the word "aforementioned" from paras. 1, 2, 3,
5, and 6, as well as the uiinumbered penultimate paragraph was
not accepted based on stanaard practice and on the failure to
adopt the ". . . hereinafter referred to as the ABM Treaty . . ."
in the preambular language.
3. Reference para. 3, Karpov said that although he understood
the US attempt :to improve the language in the second line without
affecting the substance, this formulation had been the subject of
such detailed scrutiny and negotiation perhaps it was better left
alone unless there were some important reason to change it. Since
the US side had clearly said no substance was involved in any of
its proposed changes, it would appear that no such reason existed.
(Note: Karpov quite clearly indicated that it would be difficult
to change this language at this point since, as a Soviet proposal
(SCC-II)? it had been subject to close review and approval in
Moscow.) Georgi and FitzGerald agreed that since the suggested
change had been purely editorial, it was probably all right to
leave the sentence as it was.
4. Reference para. 6. See above discussion of ". . . not
inconsistent with the provisions . . . under "Strategic Offensive
Arms JDT, Protocol", point 2 under "Protocol, Numbered Paragraphs".
5. Reference penultimate paragraph. Corresponding discussion
under Strategic Offensive Arms JDT, Protocol applies.
ABM JDT, Procedures
1. Paragraph 1.4 -- see point 4 in immediately preceding
section above on ". . . not inconsistent with the provisions .
TI
? ? ?
2. Reference para. 11.2, Karpov asked what point in time
"present" indicated, noting that this procedure affected the US
side only and that he was prepared to leave the formulation as it
was in the November 16, 1973 JDT and his question was motivated by
curiosity only. He said perhaps it would be just as well to drop
the word "present", and avoid raising a question. Georgi replied
that seemed like a useful suggestion, and accepted it.
3. Reference para. 11.4, Karpov said he was similarly curious
about the meaning of "the entire area". DeSimone explained that
it had been intended to mean all of the area in which work had been
in progress on the future ABM site, affecting the natural contours
of the terrain, and asked whether the Soviet side wished to propose
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an editorial change to clarify the text. Karpov said that he
appreciated the explanation and that having heard it he thought
no change was required.
4. Reference para. 11.5, Yarpov suggested that ". . . by
the SCC . . ." was unnecessary, since it was clear from the entire
document how the Procedures were being agreed. Georgi said he
thought striking those gords a useful fix which the US side could
accept.
-5. Reference para. 11.6, spell out Standing Consultative
Commission; see above, point 6 under "Strategic Offensive Arms
JDT, Procedures".
Attachments:
1. Soviet SCC Component Working Document, Strategic Offensive
Arms Procedures.
2. Soviet SCC Component Working Document, ABM Procedures
SCC:FP eSimone:bjg
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Attachment No. 1
Official translation
Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
April 11, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCnL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DE8TRUCTION,AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation
of the Interim Agreement between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the
Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements regarding
that Agreement, the Parties thereto have, within the
framework of the Standing Consultative Commission,
agreed upon procedures governing replacement,
or destruction, and notification thereof, for
dismantling
strategic
offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement, as
they are formulated in the Attachment which constitutes
an integral part of this Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following
general guidelines:
1. The attached Procedures shall apply only
to systems to be-replaced and dismantled or destroyed
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pursuant to the pro'risions of the aforementioned
Interim Agreement;
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic-
missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile sub-
marines and submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) launchers shall be on the basis of
Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the
Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for
ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for
ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers
shall ensure that they would be put in a condition
that precludes the possibility of their use for
launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure
that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed
would be detectable by national technical means;
shall be such that reactivation time of these units
would not be substantially less than the time required
for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable
delays in dismantling or destruction;
4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall
be formulated separately for soft and for silo land-
based ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile
submarines and SLBM launchers;
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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction
procedures shall ensure that adequate verification
can be accomplished by national technical means in
accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance
with the attarthed Procedures, facilities remaining
at land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may,
at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim
-Agreement and the Protocol thereto;
Through timely and appropriate procedures,
the Parties shall notify each other of the number and
type of launchers being dismantled or destroyed and
the number of replacement launchers; and71
17. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties
shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or
destroyed launchers and the number of such launchers
used for replacement; and72
8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile
submarines which are under construction simultaneously
shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal
construction schedule. A normal construction schedule
is understood to be one consistent with the past or
present constructiort practices of each Party.
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This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall
enter into forcc upon signature of this Protocol and
remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agree-
ment, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative
Commission as it deems appropriate.
Done at Geneva on , in two copies,
each in the English and Russian languages, both texts
being equally authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America Republics
1. Proposed by U.S. side.
2. Proposed by Soviet side.
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ATTACHMENT
STANDING CONSLTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLTNG OR
DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS
I. General
1. Within the limits of the levels established
for each Party, launchers for land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types,
deployed prior to 1964, launchers for ballistic
missiles on any nuclear-powered submarines, and
launchers for modern ballistic missiles on diesel
submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic
missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.
2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles
are: for the United States, missiles installed in all
nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union,
missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered
submarines made operational since 1965 LIn addition,
all submarine-launched ballistic missiles first
tested after 1964 are modern submarine-launched
ballistic missilesil
3, Launchers for older ballistic missiles on
diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement
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2
purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Prms.
4. Dismantling or destruction of replaced
launchers shall be initiated no later than the date
of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement
submarine. Initiation of any of the actions in
Section II below shall constitute initiation of
dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher.
Initiation of any of the actions in Section III
below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or
a
destruction of/ballistic-missile submarine or
SLBM launcher.
5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on
which such a submarine first operates under its own
power away from the harbor or port in which the
construction or fitting out of the submarine was
performed.
Lb. Notification of dismantling or destruction
and replacement activities shall be given through the
SCC twice annually, reflecting the status as of the
beginning of each regular session. The notification
shall contain:
(a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964
and for ballistic-missile launchers on
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older submarines, the number and type
(silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher,
or SLBM launcher) on which dismanGling
or destruction is in process and the
number and type on which dismantling or
destruction action has been completed
since the last report in the SCC.
(b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the
number which are on submarines that will
begin sea trials during the next six-
month period, and the number which are
on submarines that have begun sea trials
since the last report in the SCC.211
Lb. Notification of completed dismantling of
ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on
replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing
Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the
status as of the beginning of each regular session of
the Commission. The notification shall contain
information for the past six months on the number of
dismantled ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile
launchers on replaced submarines, as well as on the
number of such launchers replaced by launchers on
-72
modern submarines during that period...!
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14
7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add
other information t1/4" the notifications if it considers
such inforthation necessary to assure confidence in
compliance with the obligations assumed unuer the
Interim Agreement.
II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-
Based ICEM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers
1. In all cases the following actions shall be
accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a)
removal from the launch site of the supply
of missiles and their components, warheads,
and mobile equipment;
(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all
erecting and handling equipment, and
propellant-handling equipment, LTocated
at the launch siL:e or associated with it71
associated with the launcher and located
at the launch sitL72 and removal of all
dismantled equipment from the launch site.
Launch equipment is understood to be
systems, components, and instruments
required to launch a missile.
2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition
to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following
actions shall be performed:
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(a) 5reas of the launch pads centered on the
launch stand and at least 30 meters in
, f--
diametea ly Llocations of launch device
emplacement, or launch pads72 and missile
launch control posts (b=kers) shall be
made unusable by dismantling or destruction;
(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled
and removed from the launch site;
(c) debris of locations of launch devices or
launch pads, of missile launch control
posts (bunkers), and of fuel storage tank
foundations may be removed, and, after
six months, the places where they were
located may be covered with earth.
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition
to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following
actions shall be performed:
(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas
ducting, launch tubes Lilo headworks,
-71
and launch control bunkerf/ shall be
dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled
components shall be removed from the
launch site;
(b) after the actions provided for in sub-
paragraph (a) above have been accomplished,
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the silo shall remain open for a period
of six months, after which it LThal171
zr-nag2
be filled with earth;
Z. After dismantling or destruction has been
accomplished in accordance with the above procedures,
facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites may not be
used *either for storage, support or launch of ICBMs,
or for storage or support of ICBM-capable launchers,
but. may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for
other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions
-71
of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.1.7
5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM
launchers shall be completed no later than four months
after tile replacement submarine begins sea trials.
III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of
Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers
Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines
and SLBM Launchers
1. The following procedures, from which each
Party may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or
destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM
launchers:
(a) sinking of the submarine with its launchers
in international waters of at least 2000
meters depth. /When this procedure for
ballistic-missile submarine destruction
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7
is chosen, notification of the time and
location of the planned destruction shall
be given to the other side at least one
month prior to the planned destructiopP;
(b) scrapping the submarine and its launchers
-71
in the open ffri predesignated shipyards/.
Scrapping shall involve extensive
disassembly;
(c) removing the submarine's missile section
in the open LTh predesignabed shipyardf71
/Td) removal of the launch tubes or cutting off
the upper part of the tubes together with
the superstructure above themi72
je) for "H-Class" submarines the following
procedures will apply: removal of launch
tubes in the open in predesignated ship-
yarda. The shipyards to be used for
ballistic-missile submarine dismantling
shall be agreed between the Parties.
(1) That entire part of the superstructure
(including the fairwater) and outer
hull above the missile compartment
of the submarine will be removed.
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(2) That section of the missile compart-
ment pressure hull (hull crown plating
and frame segments) which contains
all of the hull penetrations for the
missile launch tubes, as well as the
missile launch tubes will be removed.
(3) The pressure hull and outer hull may
then be restored only by welaing into
place new sections without launch
tube penetrations.
(4) No superstructure or fairwater will
be replaced over the section of the
submarine from which the launch tubes
have been removed/
2. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed
no later than six months after the replacement sub-
marine begins sea trials.
3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube
hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period
of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching
equipment shall be removed.
IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile
Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair
In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine
is lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a
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submarine may be replaced by another ballistic-
missile submarine in accordance with the following:
(a) notification of the loss or disablement
shal7 be made to the other Party through
the Standing Consultative Commission;
(b) the number of launchers on the replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall not
cause the total number of launchers to
exceed that authorized in the Interim
Agreement and the Protocol thereto;
(c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine
shall be dismantled or destroyed in
accordance with Section III of these
Procedures.
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SCC
SESSION -III ?
A160
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
DATE: April 5, 1974
TIME: 1100 to 1315
PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva
SUBJECT: Meeting of Editorial Review Group
PARTICIPANTS: US USSR
Col. C. G. FitzGerald
LTC F. P. DeSimone
Mr. P. Afanasenko
(Interpreter)
Mr. A. S. Yereskovsky
Capt. Ye. G. Korobchenko
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
(Interpreter)
The Editorial Review Group met for the first time to begin
work on the nonsubstantive changes to the unbracketed portions
of the November 16, 1973 Joint Draft Texts, which the US Com-
ponent of the SCC wanted to propose based on the review of those
texts performed in Washington during the recess between SCC-II
and SCC-III.
FitzGerald explained the background and purposes of the
various changes the US side intended to propose, emphasizing
the same points made by Graybeal to Ustinov when it was decided
to go ahead with this work. He pointed out that it was considered
important that SCC work continue at this time, and said that
doing this "editorial" work now would no doubt save a great deal
of time later on in this SCC session. He explained that the
JDTs had been reviewed by various experts in Washington, includ-
ing legal advisors, and that many comments and suggestions had
been made which were intended to improve the accuracy, com-
pleteness, and clarity of the JDTs. He then reviewed the various
kinds of changes which he intended to suggest. These included
some changes which would put the JDTs into better treaty-type
language; we were already aware of the need for certain of these
when we completed work on the JDTs at the end of SCC-II. Some
changes would affect the English text only, in order to conform
the Russian and English texts more closely. Other changes were
simply intended to improve the English syntax, either from the
legal point of view or for editorial reasons only. FitzGerald
remarked again that the US side considered all of these changes
nonsubstantive, even though in certain cases a change to the
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Russian language text might be required. He wanted to make it
clear again that there was no intenion on the US side to change
the substantive meaning of any of the language which had already
been preliminarily agreed by Commissioners on November 16, 1973.
He also noted that, although we were not yet addressing any
bracketed paragraphs, we had included in the working document
prepared for today's meeting paragraphs which had brackets
within them, in cases where the agreed portions of those para-
graphs, in our view, needed some nonsubstantive revision. He
emphasized to the Soviet participants that any problem whatsoever
they had with our approach on the specific changes we were sug-
gesting should be fully and frankly discussed. The purpose of
this work was to make the JDTs bettor; we wanted to do this in
a spirit of mutual cooperation and not create any new problems.
Yereskovsky indicated that the Soviet side understood all
that FitzGerald had said and that the approach being taken
presented no particular problems.
FitzGerald then provided the Soviet participants with
copies of both the Offensive Arms and ABM JDTs which reflected
all of the US-suggested changes, as well as an unofficial trans-
lation into Russian of both documents (see Attachment No. 1 for
the English lang-iage texts, and Attachment No. 2 for copies of the
November 16, 1973 JDTs with the suggested changes marked in).
The US participants then proceeded to go through the docu-
ments, identifying the proposed changes and explaining the reasons
for them as necessary. Due to the slow nature of this process,
it was decided to work only on the Protocols today, leaving the
Procedures for a follow-on meeting. In general, the Soviet
participants appeared to be intent on simply listening; discussion
across the table was limited to questions and answers for clari-
fication, and some limited discussion of the effect of certain
changes on the text. Korobchenko initiated a good bit of internal
discussion on the Soviet side; Yereskovsky made a point of not
allowing this to become joint discussion, across the table, of
reactions to the US suggestions.
There was, however, some preliminary reaction discernible
on certain points. Specifically, the change in the 5th line of
the preambular language in the Offensive Arms Protocol appeared
to give the Soviets some trouble, apparently based on both a
possible Russian language problem and a possible ambiguity con-
cerning what would be meant when the phrase "the Interim Agree-
ment" was used throughout the document. The US participants
made it clear that the suggested change was designed to improve
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clarity, not reduce it, and that we would be responsive to the
reactions of the Soviet side, including possible alternative
"fixes."
The Soviet participants appeared to have no trouble with
the proposed change in the 7th line of the preambular language
and seemed unopposed to it and other changes which were intended
to make it clear that Protocol and Procedures were a single
document. Nevertheless, the suggested fix to the penultimate
paragraph of the Protocol--concerning amendments--seemed to be
a problem, primarily due to the rendering into Russian, which
might appear to separate the Protocols and Procedures rather than
draw them more closely together into a single document. The
possibilities, of alternative fixes were discussed, including that
of explicitly stating that the Protocol and "attached procedures"
form a single, integral document. The September 30, 1971 Agreement
on Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link was cited
as containing a precedent for such a solution.
Other suggested changes, not noted above, were discussed and
tied to the applicable legal and editorial reasons. Yereskovsky
took copious notes in order to be able to properly consider them
and provide some reaction from the Soviet side as soon as possible.
The next meeting was scheduled for April 9, 1974, at which
time the suggested changes to the Offensive Arms and ABM Procedures
could be discussed.
Attachments:
1. US Working Document
2. JDTs, November 16, 1973
SCC:FPDe imone:bd
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t'os.4
4.??IP
Attachment No. 1
U.S. Working Document
April 5, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
Pursuant to, and in implementation of, the provisions
of the Interim Agreement between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain
Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto,
and the related Agreed Statements, hereinafter referred
to as the Interim Agreement, the Parties thereto have within
the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission
agreed on the attached procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for
strategic offensive arms limited by the Interim Agreement.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
1. The attached procedures shall apply only to systems
to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the
Interim Agreement;
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2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) launchers or submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLIM) launchers and ballistic-missile submarines
shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim
Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed
Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM
launchers and associated facilities and for SLBM launchers
and ballistic-missile submarines shall ensure that they would
be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of
their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall
ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed
would be detectable by national technical means; shall be
such that reactivation time of these units would not be
substantially less than the time required for new construction;
and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or
destruction;
4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be
formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based
ICBM launchers as well as for SLBM launchers and ballistic-
missile submarines;
5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction pro-
cedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be
accomplished by national technical means in accordance with
Article V of the Interim Agreement;
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6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with
the attached procedures, facilities remaining at land-based
ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of
the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent
with the Interim Agreement;
7. (Paragraph 7 is not yet agreed)
8. The number of replacement. ballistic-missile sub-
marines which are under construction simultaneously shall
not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction
schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to
be one consistent with the past or present construction
practices of each Party.
This Protocol, including its Attachment, shall
enter into force upon signature and remain in force for
the duration of the Interim Agreement and may be amended
by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as it deems
appropriate
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Done at Geneva on , in two copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
Commissioner,
United States of
America
SECRET
Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
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Lor
ATTACHMENT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
I. General
1. Within the limits of the levels established for
each Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles.(ICBMs) of older types,deployed prior to 1964,
launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered
submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on
diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic
missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines. Modern
submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United
States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines;
and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type which are
deployed on nuclear-powered submarines made operational since
1965. LTn addition, all submarine-launched ballistic
missiles first tested after 1964 are modern submarine-
1/
launched ballistic missiles.7
2. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel
submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes
provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement.
3. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers
shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning
2_./ Proposed by?the U.S. side.
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of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any
of the actions in Section II below shall constitute
initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher.
Initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall
constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an
SLBM launcher or ballistic-missile submarine.
4. The date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which such
a submarine first operates under its own power away from
the harbor or port in which the construction or fit Ling out
of the submarine was performed.
5. (Paragraph 5 is not yet agreed)
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6. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other
information to the notifications if it considers such
information necessry to assure confidence in compliance
with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.
II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-
Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers
1. In all cases the following actions shall be
accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a) removal from the launch site of the supply of
missiles and their components, war-
heads, and mobile equipment;
(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all
erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-
handling equipment, jocated at the launch
1/
site or associated with it7 iissociated
with the launcher and located at the launch
2/
site7 ? and removal of all dismantled
equipment from the launch site. Launch equip-
ment is understood to be systems, components,
and instruments required to launch a
missile.
(Paragraphs 2-4 are not yet agreed)
-2/ Proposed by the Soviet side.
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5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM
launchers shall be completed no later than four months
after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.
III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-
Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New
Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers
1. The following procedures, from which each Party
may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction
of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:
(Sub-paragraphs (a) - (e) are not yet agreed)
2. Dismantling or destruction actions shall be
completed no later than six months after the replacement
submarine begins sea trials.
3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches
shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling,
and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be
removed.
IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile
Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair
In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is
lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine
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may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine
in accordance with the following:
(a) notification of the loss or disablement shall
be made to the other Party through the SCC;
(b) the number of launchers on the replacement
ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause
the total number of launchers to exceed that
authorized in the Interim Agreement; and
(c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall
be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with
Section III of these Procedures.
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Attachment No. 1
U.S. Working Document
April. 5, 1974
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR
COMPONENTS
Pursuant to, and in implementation of, the provisions
of the Treaty between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the
related 1.greed Statements, hereinafter referred to as the
Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of
the Standing Consultative Commission agreed on the attached
procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction,
and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their com-
ponents limited by the Treaty.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
1. The attached procedures shall apply only to systems
or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed
pursuant to the Treaty;
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3.
SECRET
Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall
be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials
Oa,
of a replacement submarine. initiation of any of the actions
Coc5A.741+4*t
in Section II below shall d-e-rt-54fierfl?tv.-43-11nitiation of
dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher.
initiation
of any of the actions in Section III below shal1n-s+d-e.rcd-te
-Le th]initiation of dismantling or destruction of an SLBM launcherel Qr.
10 rafi sTi(e 146.1.ara'rt e .
dock- of 441 t
4-,E,?3 TheAbeginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-
missile submarine E-5.---t-crrrs-i-ri-e be the date on which such a
submarine first operates under its on power away from the harbor
or port in which the constriction or fitting out of the submarine
was performed.
S.
/Le Notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement
activities shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting
the status as of the beginning of each regular session. The
notification shall contain:
(a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for
ballistic missile launchers on older submarines,
the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM
launcher, or SLBM launcher) on which dismantling or
destruction is in process and the number and type
on which dismantling or destruction action has been
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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction pro-
cedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be
accomplished by national technical means in accordance with
Article XII of the Treaty:
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance
with the attached procedures, facilities remaining
at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of
the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent
with the Treaty; and
(Paragraph 7 is not yet agreed)
This Protocol, including its Attachment, shall
enter into force upon signature and remain in force for
the duration of the Treaty and may be amended by the
Standing Consultative Commission(SCC) as it deems appropriate.
Done at Geneva on , in two copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
Commissioner, Commissioner,
United States of Union of Soviet Socialist
America
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2WMPT
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ATTACHMENT
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges
1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment
shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the
launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements
shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may
be removed and after six months the location covered with
earth.
?2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling
1
or destruction of their above-ground structures 5nd7
2
L7r7 headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-
launcher debris may be removed and after six months the
silos shall be filled with earth.
3. The dismantling or destruction actions described
in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than
three months after their initiation.
4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed
ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of
the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent
with the Treaty.
(Paragraph 5 is not yet agreed)
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I Proposed by the U.S. side.
2 ProDosed by the Soviet side.
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II. ABM Facilities at Matmstrom
1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings
shall be cut off.
2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had
commenced shall be left uncovered in their present un-
completed state for six months after which they may be
covered with earth.
3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for
which only foundations had been completed shall be covered
with earth.
4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accom-
plished and construction materials removed.
5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated
no later than six months after agreement by the SCC on these
procedures.
6. Notification that the above activities have been
completed shall be given through the SCC.
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i t
0 V.
Vt,
fl
crrott
1
ti e
.Attachnient No.
ork(r vti evo
14\--pra S, (974-
[
Joint Draft Te?-?
Prelimin- -1 "c iVreed
by. ni s s loners
>ovember 16, 1973
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
1,2yocor,
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
the
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
)A44%1iiii.eKNAeielAZYCW(014 of,
Pursuant tcee provisions of the Interim Agreement between
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms,
retaleJi
and theegreed Statements
of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto,
cx-cte.r reie-rresi To a s ?fl,k IKte-r-cm
the Partie7'1 Alr-tA.P.K Uott
thereto haveFiwithin the framework-of the Standing Consultative
04,1 +Ike.
Commissiontiagreed-444e?lattachedmprocedures
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction,
notification thereof, for
klAe?
pat] Interim Agreement.
and
strategic offensive arms limited by
The Parties have also agreed Et-e-4.1.441.64?.44the following
general guidelines:
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1. The attachedAcedures shall apply only to systems to
pwruiv-g04.1 itz)
be replaced and dismantled or destroyedEnder the provisions of
the aforementioneTnterim Agreement;
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) launchers or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
launchers and ballistic-missile submarines shall be on the basis
of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol
thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers
and associated facilities and for SLBM launchers and ballistic-
missile submarines shall ensure that they would be put in a
condition that precludes the possibility of their use for
launching.ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that
reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable
by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time
of these units would not be substantially less than the time
required for new constructionEland shall preclude unreasonable
delays in dismantling or destruction;
f4.j Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be ariew4kaTeci
EQ4,ug4i.e.1.1 separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM
launchers as well as for SLBM launchers and ballistic-missile
??????????10
submarines;
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5, . Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by
national technical means in accordance with Article V of the
Interim Agreement;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the
attachedAocedures,F.)facilities remaining at land-based ICBM
launch sites, and
Parlfe-s
be used for Et-ii-e-ipurposes not inconsistent with the
submarines, may, at the discretion of the
Er-e=14434-64:-.4.141 Interim Agreementc:
3
/7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties
shall notify each other of the number and cype of launchers being
dismantled or destroyed and the number of replacement launchers;
?1
and/
/7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall
notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed
launchers and the number of such launchers used for replacement;
and /2
1
Proposed by U.S. side.
2
Proposed by Soviet side.
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8, The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines
which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a
number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal
construction schedule is
past or present
understood to be one consistent with 'file
, e.GA.c.k t06,41:
construction practices ?E?1.--ee.e.it--s-i-e9 .
(iNck?a(p%5 cls tmeziAnAt.
This Protocol
420:fer- (Kir.) force,
shallAremain in Sc9INX,i1J-r
OtoteNd.
force for the duration of the Interim Agreement and may be
(SCC..)
amended by the Standing Consultative CommissionAas it deems
appropriate.
Done at Geneva on
, in two copies, each in
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
Commissioner,
United States of
America
?
Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
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?:;\
11,
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES GOVERNIG REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
I. General
eoct Pa-r
1, Within the limits of the levels established forEpert-lt--s-i-4e3,
0.LiAAcAA. trs
or Clcsm:)
Aland-based intercontinental ballistic&iasilc E-T-C-449---4-s44+4-4w4z,] of
ci-km,4 IP r
older types deployed prior
any nuclear-powered
[1.44;*.e4teAon
on
to 1964A ballistic missilnel
kuusip?c*veArT
submarines, andeodern ballistic missiles
fQuMcr. -fgr
diesel submarines may be replaced byAballistic missiles
' .
?????????Mk
on
modern
nuclear-powered submarines.
Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are&t,44.r-s-t-o-c:d--
,....4,3: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-
powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type
r. KA- Quke
WIA:c.(A curt ct.e.fler..cd old
E4&44-4i nuclear-powered submarinesthi-ch-ill;operatIonal
since 1965. /In addition, all submarine-launched ballistic missiles
first tested after 1964 are modern submarine-launched ballistic
1 ?
missiles./
a.
E-3-] Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines
may not be used for the replacement purposes provided for in the
Protocol to the Interim Agreement
Of4414N:Q?Apuri
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3.
SECRET
-2-
Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall
be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials
of a replacement submarine, FTheI initiation of any of the actions
in Section II below shall jni t i a tion of
dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher.
initiation
CPO etrttt
of any of the actions in Section III below shallEe--tirers444--te
?4?Q--t4tilinitiation of dismantling or destruction of an SLBM launcherncar
100-C,S+t?C.- 14.0Li STA S' (A/orive.
otailt -of 441 e
.411- .] TheAbeginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic?
skoM "..^?????
missile submarine be be the date on which such a
submarine first operates under its oun power away from the harbor
or port in which theY construction or fitting out of the submarine
was perfoLmed.
_
?
/a"( Notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement
activities shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting
the status as of the beginning of each regular session. The
notification shall contain:
(a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for
ballistic missile launchers on older submarines,
the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM
launcher, or SLBM launcher) on which dismantling or
destruction is in process and the number and type
on which dismantling or destruction action has been
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(b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the numbr_lr which are
on submarines that will begin sea trials during the
next six-month period, and the number which are on
submarines that have begUn sea trials since the
last report in the scq,/
c.
/..k Notification of completed dismantling of ICBM launchers
and ballistic missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be
given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually,
reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session
of the Comassion. The notification shall contain information for
the past six months on the number of dismantled ICBM launchers and
ballistic missile launchers on replaced submarines, as well as on
the number of such launchers replaced by launchers on modern
?9
submarines during that periodj
C.
E9EachEidclmay on a voluntary basis add other information
to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to
assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under
the Interim Agreement.
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Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land Based
ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers
aCCOVVIASW
1. In all cases the following actions shall be
carrying out dismantling or destruction:
(a) ....Re6moval from the launch site of the supply of
missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile
equipment;
(b) smantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting
and handling equipment, and propellant-handling
equipment, /located at the leunch site or associated
- ?
with it/a /associated with the launcher and located
?
at the launch site/-2 and removal of all dismantled
equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is
understood to be systems, components, and instruments
required to launch a missile.
2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the
actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be
performed:
(a) /Kreas of the launch pads centered on the launch
?
stand and at least. 30 meters in diameter/?I /Locations
-72
of launch device emplacement, or launch pads/ and
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made unusable by dismantiincy nr
:
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_g_
(b) Fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed
from the launch site;
(c) Debris of locations of launch devices or launch pads,
of missile laUnch control posts (bunkers), and of
fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and,
after six months, the places where they were located
may be covered with earth.
/-?
3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the
actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be
performed:
(a) Silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting,
launch tubes /silo headworks, and launch control
?1
bunkers/ shall be dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled
components shall be removed from the launch site.
(b) After the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a)
above have been accomplished, the silo shall remain
open for a period of six months, after which it
/71a172 be filled with earth.
SECRET
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/4. After dismantling or destruction has be-,:m accomplished
in accordance with the above procedures, facilitie3 remaining at
ICBM launch sites may not be used either for storage, support or
launch of ICBMs, or for storage or support of ICBM-capable launchers,
but may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and
the Protocol theretoj-4
5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers
shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement
submarine begins sea trials,
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III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic?
Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New
Ballistic?Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers
.PMMNIO
Porlj
1. The following procedures, from which each ]may choose,
are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic--missile
submarines and SLBM launchers:
(a) Sinking of the submarine with its launchers in
international waters of at least 2000 meters depth, /When
this procedure for ballistic missile submarine destruction is
chosen, notification of the time and location of the planned
destruction shall be given to the other side at least one
_1
month prior to ,the planned destruction/;
'(b) Scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the
open/in predesignated shipyards/. Scrapping shall involve
extensive disassembly;
(c) Removing the submarine's missile section in the
?1
open/in predesignated shipyards/,
/(d) Removal of the launch tubes or cutting off the
upper part of the tubes together with the superstructure
?2
above them/
SECRET
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For "H-Class" submarines the following procedures will
apply: removal of launch tubes in the open in
predesignated shipyards. The shipyards to be used
for ballistic missile submarine dismantling shall
be agreed between the Parties.
(1)
That entire part of the superstructure (including
the fairwater) and outer hull above the missile
compartment of the submarine will be removed.
(2) That section of the missile compartment pressure
hull (hull crown plating and frame segments) which
contains all of the hull penetrations for the
missile launch tubes, as well as the missile
launch tubes will be removed.
(3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then be
restored only by welding into place new sections
without launch tube penetrations.
(4) No superstructure or fairwater will be replaced
over the section of the submarine from which
the launch tubes have been removed.!
SECRET
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ovotevAt'P or de Yfrwcfkm.
2. 4fthe 'egl.ii-niactions shall beFeem7-1-i-sh73no
later than six months after the replacement submarJne begins
sea trials.
cc, (pv..0 Ivtt.4.
3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches dhall
be left open throughout 'the entire period of dismantling, and
missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.
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IV. Procedures for Re=placement of a Ballistic-Missile Subarino
Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Re_nair
In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine i
lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be
replaced by anothereubmarine in accordance with the following:
(a),NOtification of the loss or disablement shall be made
????????
le ;
to the otherpcii ii SCX.
(b),Zrle number of launchers on the replacement ballisti.;.=.
nwolbrAr cfkmmAc,d,c,,,,rs
missile submarine shall not cause the totale exceed
that authorized in the Interim Agreement.iandEhe
(c)
-Proltorce1-41-e-ret4;1
4h disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be
dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of
these Procedures.
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ti.
Attachment No. 2
U. -S. Woric't, boek.kimtrii
AF?r-( 5 IR*
Joint Dr-A7t Text
Prelimit1"/"Ay;reed
by C _Iss3oners
o
'
ember f6,-1973 j
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMISSION
PROTOCOL
PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS
a44.. (k tirvide"ted0.11.0i01
Pursuant toi\the provisions of the Treaty between the United
States of Nmerica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,
r4x:ttid ker--tA'Aaffive- rtft,rrtai cks
and theAAgreed Statementstre , the Parties
thereto hav9Fiwithin the framework of the Standing Consultative
OK 'Ole
commissionei agreed arrurr;--i-n---t-4a fern] attachedw procedures
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and
notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components
441
limited by
Treaty.
QV%
The Parties have also agreed[H;,e?itilthe following
general guidelines:
1. The attachedrocedures shall aprly only to systems or
pLi./rSI.A.4061
their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyedEsda,r.
:1Treaty;
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2. Any replacement- of ABM systems or their components shall
be on the basis of Article VII of the
Treaty and
applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM
systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside
the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of
Article VIII of theEl-f-o-rentntione7kreaty and applicable Agreed
Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or
ivin.101-evvve.44?..G.1 et.A.rSt.varatit 4,,
their component{ rc1194.ea?to implemLAILaLirTrmeloviciona?el
Article VII regarding replacement of these systems or their
components and Article VIII of theEEtk+41Treat14-3shall
ensure that these systems or their components and facilities
associated with those components (except for facilities at test
ranges) would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility
of their use for AN purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of
units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of these
units would not be substantially less than the time required for
new constructiorEand shall preclude unreasonable delays in
dismantling or destruction;
4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
.1,0,144(44)61
shall beFed-erlseparately for above-ground and silo ABM
launchers and for ABM radars;
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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by
national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the
Ef-e-r*eitt.e4t.t-,i.e**e.djTreaty;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the