INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON A POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF NAVAL VISITS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000100090027-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: January 5, 1956
• Content Type: MF

C-0-P-Y
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Ex 7-7713
5 January 1956
Tl1 ORI NDmj FOR: Deputy Under Secretary of State
SUBJECT . Intelligence Considerations Bearing on a
Possible Exchange of Naval Visits between
the US and the USSR
1. From the standpoint of intelligence collection an exchange of
naval visits with the USSR would probably work to the advantage of the
US. It is almost certain that we would find out much more about the
Soviet navy that we don't ow than the would learn about ours. (The
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25X1 i = it respect to purely naval intelligence,
avy epartment should provide the responsible evaluation; however,
since you have requested CIA's views, I am setting forth below some of
the considerations involving both naval and other intelligence which we
consider relevant.
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2. To derive maximum benefit from an exchange we would have to
consider carefully which types of Soviet ships we would want to see and
which Soviet port we wanted to visit. It is essential to get some kind
of commitment from the Soviets to send the -types of ships that we ask for.
3. It seems likely that for prestige purposes the Soviet squadron
would be headed by one or more T tSverdlov class cruisers whethe we asked
for them or not. Aside
might be new, it does no appear i e y that a great deal of new intel-
ligence could be garnered from the inspection of these ships -- their
technical features are relatively well known as a result of previous visits
to western ports and study by design analysts. This same degree of knowl-
edge exists concerning all Russian surface warships built prior to about
1952. Since that time, however, several classes of surface ships have
appeared about which we do not know enough. The "Tallin" and 1'Kotlin"
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classes of fleet destroyers are important new ships and might provide
the key to whether the Soviets intent to operate surface forces at great
distances from Russian bases. Similarly the "Riga' and "Kola" classes
of escort destroyers are new and might reveal much concerning Soviet
progress in anti-submarine warfare.
4. The Soviets' most important offensive naval arm, of course, is
the submarine force. It is extremely unlikely that a 'IQ", "W", or "Z"
class submarine would make an exchange visit. Vessels of these types
probably would provide the most useful intelligence which could be
gathered from any known Soviet ships. On the remote possibility that
Soviet "friendliness" might go this far, it certainly would be worthwhile
to ask for a new submarine.
7. Though we have not been asked to evaluate the policy considerations
pro and con the suggested exchange of visits, we would call your attention
to the following possible factors motivating the USSR in proposing the
exchange. From an intelligence point of view we believe that the Soviets
would estimate that the exchange would:
(a) Contribute substantially to the Soviet propaganda claims
of desiring "peaceful coexistence" and friendly relations with the US.
(b) Afford the opportunity for the Soviets to publicize to
their people the increasing might of their fleet.
(c) Set the precedent for having Soviet warships operate far
from home waters, thus leading to a peaceful challenge of the dominance
of the seas by the US Navy.
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(d) Given an opportunity for attempting the defection of
one or more American sailors in a Soviet port. This chance would
likely be remote, but if a defection occurred, the Soviets could
reap tremendous propaganda capital.
8. Several of the above considerations can doubtless be argued with
equal logic to work in our favor: for example, the possibility of a
Russian defection, or some lowering of Russian naval morale. 17e could
expect nothing better than a standoff with the Soviets in the field of
exhibiting peaceful intentions unless it were made clear that we were the
ones to initiate the exchange offer.
9. The point seems to remain that throughout the world the US is
generally believed to have possessed the supreme naval power since'Jorld
Tear II and the Russians have never been considered in the same league.
following an exchange of visits by squadrons of comparable size and the
attendant publicity, there would inevitably be some change in this concept.
The Soviets would henceforth be thought of by many people throughout the
world as a naval power to be reckoned with, and one which might some day
rival the US as the foremost naval power in the world. On the other hand,
there would be a considerable loss of prestige and political favor in many
parts of the free world if the USSit publicly offered an exchange of naval
visits and the US rejected the offer.
10. This memorandum does not purport to cover the counterintelligence
and domestic security considerations involved in permitting a soviet
naval contingent to visit the US. It is assumed that the Department will
be competently advised on this score by the Department of Defense and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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ODDI:RAJr.
0
ROBJ E T A CORY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - addressee
1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
1 - W. Park Armstrong
1 - DCI
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2-ODDI
1-ER
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