SALT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300020003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 13, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Rele` 2001/09/05 r~~~~~P80T00294A00US~0020003-7
SENSITIVE
OCI No. 0953/72
13 December 1972
SALT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow's concern over technological improvements in US
strategic offensive systems has emerged clearly in
recent plenary sessions. The Soviet proposals to date
have been aimed at circumscribing aZZ mayor US moderniza-
tion programs except MIRV, and Soviet delegate Shchukin
raised the MIRV issue at the 8 December mini-plenary.
Most of the Soviet proposals have been concerned with
airborne nuclear systems such as forward and carrier
based aircraft, SRAM, B-1, and nuclear armed B-52s.
This reflects both present and future US superiority
in this area and Moscow's enormous expenditures on air
defense measures. The Soviets have thus set out what
they privately acknowledge to be a maximum negotiating
position. This leaves the two sides far apart, although
there have already been some modest hints that as the
Soviets "clarify" their position the gap will be narrowed
to some extent.
1. To date the Soviets have advanced seven specific
proposals, calling for:
1) the withdrawal of ballistic missile submarines
to agreed limits that are out of range of the other
side, and the simultaneous liquidation of submarine
bases in`thrd countries.
2) the withdrawal to their national territory of all
nuclear delivery aircraft and any missiles with
nuclear warheads whose geographical deployment
enables them to strike targets on the territory of
the other side, and the liquidation of their
corresponding bases in third countries.
a ban on the use of strategic bombers for delivery
of nuclear weapons, including air-to-ground missiles.
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4) a ban on the development, testing, and deployment
of" new types of stxategi.c aircraft, and limiting
the sides to modernization of existing bombers,
but without the rz,ght to convert them into delivery
vehicles for nuclear weapons, including air-to-
ground nude-ar m.iss.iles.
5) a ban on the development, testing, and deployment
of long-range air-to-ground missiles.
6) a ban on developing or testing any type of
strategic offensive weapon that. would increase
the threat of" nuclear war,
7) a ban on the development, testing, and deployment
of intercontinental. cruise missiles or sea-based
cruise missiles specially designed to strike land
targets.
Most of these points were emphasized by Soviet delegates at
the mini-plenaries of 8 a.nd 1.2 December.
2. In addition, Moscow is calling for both sides to
exercise "restx~ai.nt" in areas not limited by agreement,
and not to undertake new major strategic offensive weapons
programs-- which Soviet delegate Pleshakov says would include
Trident, and which Shchu)ci.n says would noi~ include the new
offensive system Moscow is developing for its new silos.
Soviet advisor Karpov emphasized privately on 8 December,
however, that restraint would be mutual anal that details
could be discussed when both sides were agreed that this
was an approach which held some pr?omise.
3. On 8 December, Semenov stressed the importance of
the Soviet proposal for limiting strategic aviation armaments,
and stated that. any sett.:ing of aggregate nr~:mbers must include
US FBS and NATO-allied subma.xlnes. :It was left to General
Trusov to spell out the Soviet-proposed ban on development
and testing of new types of weapons. He stated that
"substantial elements" in the USSR were asking why the US
was implementing such major new programs as accelerated
Trident,B-~., SRAM, SCAD, and others, as well as proceeding
with Poseidon and MM-3 deployment,. He alleged that swift
approval of the largest defense budget in US history at the
time the interim agreement went: into eff"ect was also designed
to upset the strategic balance and gain unilateral advantage.
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4. Apparently concerned that the US would not take a
hint made in private earlier and raise the MIRV issue, the
Soviets had delegate Shchukin bring it up on 8 December.
Shchukin noted that MIRVs had been a response to ABM systems,
and since ABM systems were now limited, it would be useful
to return to the MIRY question. He alleged that the isse
of maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MARVs~ was also germa ne
in this context, and asked for US views.
5. The US side continues to stress that limitation
of the three central systems--ICBMs, ShBMs and heavy
bombers--is the heart of strategic arms limitation and
that other issues are extraneous. The US is pressing
for equal aggregate levels with freedom to mix within
these systems, and for equal missile throw weight, to
be achieved by reductions (mostly So~ret) 3n present throw
weight. A conversation between Garthoff and Soviet delegate
Grinevsky on 8 December-was able to close slightly the wide
gap between the two sides. Grinevsky confirmed Garthoff's
understanding that the Soviet statement of 8 December
proposed that offensive systems other than the central ones
"be taken into account" in the final agreement, but that it
was not necessary to include systems other than the three
central ones in a strategic aggregate,. In other words,
the Soviets seem willing not to make the US acknowledge FBS
specifically in setting aggregates, but merely to "take it
into account" in an agreement on the central systems by
allowing the Soviets a corresponding edge. The problem lies
in reconciling this position with the US demand for equal
aggregate levels in central systems alone.
6. The US side is seeking clarification of the other
Soviet proposals, particularly the extreme one on banning
nuclear armed strategic bombers.
Distribution:
DCI
1
D/ONE
5
DDCI
2
D/OCI
6
DDI
3
D/OSR
7
DDS&T
4
DCI/SA/SALT
8
Prepared by:
OCI/EUR/SRE.
7285/13Dec72
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