SALT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00294A000300020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OCI NO. 0954/72
22 December 1972
The first round of SALT TWO ended on 2l December
with both sides standing firm on their differing
views of the offensive systems to be included
in further offensive arms limitation agreements.
The Soviets made a particularly strong effort
in the closing days to ensure that the US comes
to the next round prepared to discuss a method
for limiting MIRVs--a subject which the US has
indicated it considers an open one. Soviet
interest in curtailing deployment of bomber carried
ASMs was also evident. There was evidence of
friction among the Soviets, possibly generated by
difficulties in arriving at an acceptable
negotiating position for this round. In expressing
opposition to Limitations on air defenses,
several Soviet delegation members indicated that
China weighs very much on the Soviet mind in this
respect. The two sides signed a memorandum of
understanding establishing the Standing Consultative
Commission called for by the ABM treaty, and agreed
to resume SALT TWO in Geneva on 27 February.
1. The first round of SALT TWO recessed on 21 December
after five weeks. Both sides used the final sessions to
restate their positions--the US urging negotiation of
limits on central systems alone, the Soviets asking for a
treaty which is based on the terms of the interim agreement
and which takes into account other systems which the Soviets
consider to be strategic, such as forward based nuclear
delivery systems.
2. Minister Semenov reiterated Soviet proposals on
FBS in the plenary session on 18 December. These include
the withdrawal of strategic offensive systems and the
dismantling of base.s in third. countries; withdrawal of
SLBM submarines beyond agreed limits and liquidation of
their bases in third countries; withdrawal of attack
carriers beyond agreed limits and the counting of all
carrier based aircraft as strategic; and the withdrawal
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to their national territories of all nuclear delivery
aircraft and any nuclear missiles capable of striking
the other side.
3. Outside of the plenary sessions, however,
the Soviets pressed the matter of qualitative improve-
ment of strategic systems, in a manner obviously
designed to stimulate US consideration between rounds.
Two issues particularly singled out were ASMs and MIRVs
with the latter given particular, urgency. Brezhnev
himself underscored the Soviet position by specifically
endorsing "the establishment of certain limits on...
qualitative improvements in strategic arms" in his
keynote speech on the USSR's 50th anniversary on
21 December.
The Problem of MIRV
Both Grinevsky and Shchukin stressed to
on separate occasions the need to find
solution to the MIRV question. Grinevsky emphasized
the need for both sides to give serious attention to
the issue between rounds, and Shchukin stated strongly
that the most important thing was to begin discussions
on possible limitations regardless of the verification
problems involved. He said that the idea of limitations
through a quota on missile flight tests would not be
acceptable to the Soviet Union since US MIRV systems
are already developed. In a manner suggesting a
coordinated effort, both pointed out that three
possibilities existed: a total MIRV ban, no MIRV
restrictions, or something in between, which both
seemed to favor. Shchukin raised the possibility of
leveling off MIRV deployment without exploiting the full
potential for MIRVing. Grinevsky suggested allowing
MIRVs on some missiles and not on others and, prodded
by 0, acknowledged that he was thinking of some-
thing like permitting MIRVs on SS-lls but not on SS-9s.
5. The substantial problem of verification was
discussed at some length in both cases, but the primary
objectives of the approaches were apparently to make
certain the US was aware of the importance Moscow
attached to the issue and to stimulate US thinking on
possible approaches.
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The ASM Issue
6. Semenov, Grinevsky and Trusov used different
occasions to stress the importance Moscow attaches to
limitations on ASMs. After the 12 December meeting,
Semenov stressed to Smith the great significance of the
ASM issue and alleged that ASM development, testing
and deployment would be destabilizing. On 19 December
Grinevsky played down the Soviet proposal on banning
bombers from carrying nuclear weapons, but he alleged
that the proposal to ban strategic missiles on bombers
was a different story and should be carefully considered.
In discussing the same proposal with Col. FitzGerald,
General Trusov said that it was meant to ban bombers
from carrying ballistic missiles of all types, even if
they had a range of only 10-20 kilometers--an interpre-
tation which would specifically include SRAM. This
interpretation was at variance with one given earlier
by Shchukin, who said the proposal was meant to cover
only long range air carried ballistic missiles.
Interim Measures
7. Perhaps reflecting the wide disparity between
the positions of the two sides on basic issues, the
Soviets have recently muted the interest they expressed
initially in having some interim measures agreed on
prior to a permanent offensive agreement. Grinevsky
raised the issue again, however, in his 19 December
discussion with He specifically suggested
early agreement an on strategic nuclear systems
on territorial seabeds and inland waters--which Semenov
had suggested that both sides consider early in the
talks--and a ban on intercontinental cruise missiles.
Garthoff provided no encouragement on US willingness
to consider these two marginal proposals for an
interim understanding.
Indications of Disagreement on the Soviet Side
8. There have been several unusual references
recently to frictions both on the delegation and in
Moscow by members of the Soviet delegation. On
16 December Semenov expressed his aggravation to
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over the strong US statement the day before
on the FBS issue. He indicated that such polemics only
gave grist to the "hard heads" on his side--whom he
implied existed both on the delegation and in Moscow--
and said he had to "suppress" more polemical drafts
of his own counterstatement.
9. In his conversation with Col. FitzGerald
two days later, Trusov expressed his dislike for diplo-
matic duty, but said that the Soviet military members
of the delegation are disciplined people who follow
their instructions. He added, however, that he could
not say the same of "the diplomats and one or two
other people." Shchukin had earlier commented to
Nitze that there were differences of view on the Soviet
side. He said there were influential people both in the
delegation and at home who did not understand "the
strategic realities."
10. Disagreement has also been apparent in more
subtle ways, such as the obvious lack of enthusiasm
of some Soviet delegation members for some of the
Soviet proposals, particularly the one banning nuclear
armed bombers. In discussing this proposal with
Skoptsov would say only that "there were certain proposals
that the military insisted on."
11. Whether this apparent friction is due to
the unhappiness of some elements in the delegation over
having to put forward a "maximalist" position at this
round, ?or whether it is a result of disagreement in Moscow
over the elements to be included in the Soviet negotiating
package is uncertain. It may well be a combination of
both, but it seems at least to indicate that the present
Soviet proposals were not easily arrived at.
Bombers, Bomber Defenses and the Issue of China
12. The US side has argued strongly against the
Soviet proposal to ban bombers from carrying nuclear
weapons. It has also argued that if bomber armaments
are to be discussed, then bomber defenses must also be
discussed. The Soviets have disputed this and in
doing so have made several not very oblique references
to the consideration of China in Soviet thinking on
bomber defenses.
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13. Shchukin told Nitze and Brown that it was
essential from the Soviet standpoint to have defenses
against bombers "of third countries," which might
attack Soviet population centers with conventional
weapons. He indicated that it might be difficult to
phase out older weapons systems because of "the third
country problem and not just NATO." In discussing
bomber defenses with Col. FitzGerald, Col. Starodubov
also made reference to the third country problem.
14. In the same conversation with FitzGerald,
Col. Budantsev protested that bombers were obsolete
and that the Soviet proposals on them envisaged their
"withering away." In response to FitzGerald's question,
he said the USSR was not deploying a new heavy bomber to
replace the TU-95 and in fact had no plans to deploy
a new heavy bomber.
15. On 21 December, Smith and Semenov signed
the memorandum of understanding establishing the
Standing Consultative Commission, as called`for- by
Article XIII of the ABM treaty. The purpose of the
SCC is to promote the objectives and implementation of
the SALT agreements, including the establishment of
dismantling and destruction procedures where appropriate.
The memorandum provided for each side to be represented
by a commissioner, deputy commissioner, and staff,
and for the two sides to meet no less then two times
per year. The commission is to meet in Geneva but will
also have the flexibility to meet elsewhere.
Distribution:
DCI 1
DDCI 2
DDI 3
DDS&T 4
D/ONE 5
D/OCI 6
D/OSR 7
DCI/SA/SALT 8
Prepared by: OCI/EUR/SRE:
7285/22Dec72
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