THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000400060002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 6, 1961
• Content Type: PAPER

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THE APAR-ISPAELI SITUATION
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MAINTENANCE OF BASIC PAPER
The basic paper, "The Arab-Israeli Situation," is under
continuous review to insure currency. Changes or additions
of importance are issued as soon as practicable. The entire
paper will be revised as developments require.
The date of issuance in the upper right hand corner of
a page is also the effective date of the information. Super-
seded pages should be destroyed in accordance with existing
security regulations.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
I. Political page 2
A. The Arab States 2
B. Israel 3
C. Points of Recurrent Dispute 4
1. Arab Refugees 4
2. The Demilitarized or Neutral Zones 6
3. Suez Canal Transit 9
4. Jordan River Development 10
5. The Gulf of Aqaba 10
IV. Military Situation 16
25X6 A. General 16
B. Israel 16
C. Arab States 20
1. United Arab Republic (Egypt) 20
2. Syria 23
3. Jordan 24
4. Iraq 25
5. Lebanon 27
6. Saudi Arabia 28
D. UN Forces 28
SUPPLEMENT: MILITARY EOUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC
General i
UAr. (Egypt) i
Syria iii
Iraq iv
Yemen vi
Selective Armaments Inventory
Strength of Forces Deployed in Vicinity of
Israeli Borders
Total Strength of Arab Armies
United Nations Emergency Force, Egypt
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II Air Forces
III Naval Forces
I Military Disposition
II Arab-Israeli Air Forces
III Naval Deployment
IV United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt
V Iraq Military
VI Palestine Partition Plan
VII Israeli-Syrian Border
VIII Jerusalem
IX Gulf of Aqaba
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
prepared by an
AD HOC WORKING GROUP
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
I? Political
A. The Arab States
Since June 1961 the chief factors affecting the
Arab--Israeli confrontation have been a) the intensified
contest for influence and the question of the power balance
among the various rival Arab leaders, and b) internal dis-
ruptive forces in Iraq and the UAR. The drop in outside
pressures--both Israeli and great-power--on the community
of Arab states has permitted inherent Arab internal divisive
forces again to come to the fore and add to the lack of
effective unity against Israel. This development has both
revived old frictions and created new ones between Egypt,
the kingpin of Arab military and political solidarity against
Israel, and the other Arab states.
Prime Minister Qasim's abrupt assertion of Iraq's
claim to Kuwait in June, together with further Iraqi in-
timations of claims affecting Saudi Arabia's interests,
drove a new wedge between Iraq and the other Arab states,
most of which supported the independence of Kuwait. As a
result of the Arab League's acceptance of Kuwait as a mem-
ber in July 1961 and the dispatch of an Arab League mili-
tary force to Kuwait in September, Arab forces find them-
selves facing each other instead of the Israelis.
Centrifugal forces within two important Arab
states--Iraq and the UAR--also have tended to weaken Arab
capabilities against Israel. Beginning in September, im-
portant units of the Iraqi army were occupied in putting
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down a serious uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan that has been
accompanied by demands for Kurdish autonomy. Although the
backbone of the uprising apparently has been broken, it is
anticipated that guerrilla action against government forces
will continue throughout the winter. More important has
been the weakening of the Arab military front against
Israel brought about by the secession of Syria from the
UAR at the end of September. Although the new Syrian
regime has verbally reiterated its intransigent hostility
toward Israel, it has made no move to translate this into
concrete action. This development underscores again the
fact that the geographical interposition of Israel be-
tween Egypt and the neighboring Arab states constitutes
one of the most effective guarantees not only of Israel's
security, but also of the independence of those states.
The Arabs are aware that the Syrian developments
constitute a setback to their strategic position vis-a-vis
Israel, but nevertheless they have exacerbated this dis-
unity by radio campaigns of mutual recrimination in which
the opposing factions accuse their opponents of "softness"
toward or clandestine collaboration with Israel. At
present, Nasir's radio is attacking the Syrian, Saudi and
Jordanian governments, and their radios are replying in
kind. The Israeli and clandestine French radios meanwhile
continue their anti-Nasir broadcasts. At present most
Arab states feel themselves threatened in the short run
more by each other than by Israel.
The withdrawal of Syria from the UAR has been
welcomed by Israel as a blow to Arab unity, a setback for
Nasser's prestige, and a reduction of his strength. The
military units in Syria and Egypt no longer constitute a
combined force at Nasser's disposal against Israel. In,
Israel's view, however, the benefits thus accruing to
Israel's security situation are accompanied by certain dis-
advantages. The campaign of accusation of softness toward
Israel entered into by Syria and Jordan on the one hand and
Egypt on the other since the Syrian revolt could provoke
more overt demonstrations of defiance toward Israel on the
part of the Arab states concerned and thus could revive
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recently-quiescent problems between Israel and the Arabs.
Israel is concerned also lest it result in a revival of
pro-Nasser subversion in Jordan. Since UAR agents des-
tined for Jordan are likely to cross from Gaza to the
West Bank through Israel, an increase in infiltration from
the Gaza Strip would be likely to bring strong Israeli
countermeasures to curb such traffic.
Israeli diplomatic maneuvers for a solution to
its problem of security vis A vis the Arabs have been re-
flected in Israel's reiteration of its endorsement of a
regional disarmament proposal. Foreign Minister Golda Meir
in an address to the UN General Assembly in October 1961,
suggested that the way to general and complete disarmament
might begin with a pilot project for Middle East disarma-
ment. In so doing, Mrs. Meir reiterated earlier statements
of Israeli government officials calling for Middle East
disarmament and a nonaggression pact between Israel and
the Arabs. Israel is endeavoring to introduce into the UN
a resolution calling for direct negotiations with the
Arabs. These proposals have been put forthemainly for
bargaining purposes, however. Israel's immediate aim of
maintaining military superiority over the Arabs, while a
serious financial burden, continues to be given priority
in planning. The imminent arrival of Mirage III aircraft
from France is evidence of Israel's continuing attempts
to outmatch materiel acquired by the UAR from the Soviets.
C. Points of Recurrent Dispute
1. Arab Refugees
The Palestine refugee problem is a subject
of debate at the current 16th General Assembly which opened
in September 1961. In addition to consideration of the
question of the extension of the mandate of UNRWA (United
Nations Relief and Works Agency) beyond June 30, 1963,
related questions such as proposals for a custodian of
former Arab properties in Israel, the enlargement of the
Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), and the Palestine
entity concept may be raised. In anticipation of this,
a special representative of the PCC, Dr. Joseph E. Johnson,
has met with officials of the governments that are host to
refugees and with Israel to survey the situation, but has
reported that prospects for a solution are not bright.
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The PCC was established by General Assembly re-
solution 194(111) of December 11, 1948 and was charged with
responsibility for facilitating the repatriation, resettle-
ment, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees
and the payment of compensation. The same resolution for-
mulated the principle of the right of the refugees to choose
between repatriation and compensation. The latter position
has been reiterated by succeeding sessions of the General
Assembly and has been supported by the Arabs. UNRWA was
established in accordance with a General Assembly resolution
of December 8, 1949. Its initial purpose was to transform
the program of direct relief into a program of works proj-
ects. This objective has not been realized and UNRWA con-
tinues to provide direct relief--food, shelter, health care,
education and clothing. As of June 1961 the number of
registered refugees living in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
the Gaza Strip had reached 1,151,024.
Israel, which at one time was willing to accept
token repatriation, now opposes the repatriation of the
Arab refugees, a position that on November 6, 1961 was
endorsed by a Knesset vote including opposition parties as
well as those in the government. In Israel's view the only
solution lies in resettlement of the Palestine refugees in
Arab territory. Israel has professed a readiness to
compensate the refugees for their lost properties in Israel.
A willingness to discuss the refugee problem in advance of
a general peace settlement has also been expressed by Israeli
officials.
The Arabs view the solution of the refugee
question primarily in terms of the refugees' return toy)their
homes in what is now Israeli territory. Negotiation of the
issue is hindered by Arab insistence on Israel's prior agree-
ment to repatriation and by Arab refusal to recognize or
negotiate directly with Israel. The Arab states as well as
individual Arab Palestinians, however, have played an active
role in debating the refugee problem before the UN. The
Palestinian Arab Delegation that has requested recognition
and a hearing before the commissions of the 16th General
Assembly discussing refugees originally consisted of 6 mem-
bers and is led by Emile al-Ghuri, chief lieutenant of
Hajj Amin al-Hasayni, former Mufti of Jerusalem; it claims
to be acknowledged by eleven Arab Governments as representing
the Palestinians. The Egyptians subsequently sent to New York
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their own three-man delegation from Gaza, which joined the
original six despite the apparent Egyptian intention that
the Gaza delegation should work independently.
2. The Demilitarized or Neutral Zones
The General Armistice Agreements (GAA)
signed in 1949 between Israel and the Arab states of.
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria each established a demilitarized
zone, neutral zone or a no-man's-land along or near the
frontier. These areas were created as a temporary solution
designed to facilitate acceptance of the armistice agree-
ments which were themselves regarded by the UN as a fore-
runner of an early permanent peace settlement.
a. Israeli-Syrian Border. The Demilitarized
Zone (DZ) along the Israeli-Syrian border is divided into
three sectors: one southeast of Lake Tiberias, the second
stretching between the northern end of Lake Tiberias to and
around the southern tip of the former Lake Hula (drained by
Israel in 1958), and the third a small area at the northern-
most border point (see Map VII). This DZ has been the scene
of periodic violence since 1951, when Israel began work on the
Hula reclamation project. The conflict revolves around Israel's
attempts to develop and extend its sovereignty in the DZ and
Syria's resistance to these moves. Contrary to the provisions
of the GAA, Israel claims sovereignty over all land in the DZ.
In 1951 the Security Council authorized Israel to resume the
drainage work on non-Arab-owned land in the zone; moreover, the
GAA. did provide for the restoration of civilian life therein.
In compliance with this resolution Israel has confined most of
its activities in connection with the Hula drainage to lands
that are not Arab-owned. As the drainage project has progressed
Israel has established in the reclaimed area close to the border,
but outside the DZ, several settlements that have since become
involved in incidents. The Hula area is still a point of
friction, but its importance as a trouble spot has been reduced
by the fact that major work has been completed and the de-
silting of the canals, the most likely present cause of
incidents, need be done only periodically. .
The DZ area to the southeast of Lake Tiberias
has been the scene of a number of flareups. Basically the
question is Israel's extension of sovereignty over the entire
DZ. Land ownership in the DZ is shared by Arabs and
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Jews, with the land parcels running east and west. Following
the completion of a north-south drainage ditch in 1958, the
Israelis have opposed cultivation by the Arabs of land west
of the ditch. Violence is most apt to occur during planting
and harvesting seasons.
b. Jerusalem. The demilitarized area of
dispute between Israel anc Jordan are Mount Scopus and the
Area between the Lines (ABL) at Government House, both in
Jerusalem. The Mount Scopus neutral zone was established
by an Arab-Jewish Military Commander's Agreement of July 7,
1948, and includes the inactive Jewish institutions of
Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University patrolled by
Israeli police, the Arab village of Al-Isawiyah, and a
Jordanian-occupied area around Augusta Victoria Hospital.
One problem is the delineation of the zone, since the
Agreement did not describe the zone but referred to an
attached map for boundaries (see Map VIII). Another problem
arises from the fact that the Israeli police control the
major access road to the Arab village and periodically
force the villagers to detour off the road and down the
hillside. The population limits of A1-Isawiyah are also a
source of dispute, since the agreement limits the number
of inhabitants to those living in the village when the
agreement was signed and it is not clear as to what their
number was. Israeli patrolling in the Ra's as Sullam or
Gan Shlomit area has also been a source of controversy and
has resulted in exchanges of fire between the patrols and
the Jordanians. From time to time the fortnightly convoy
that rotates the Israeli police complement and brings
supplies has been the cause of friction.
The situation in the Government House Zone
is less complex than that of Mount Scopus. The Government
House is the headquarters of the UNTSO and there are no
problems connected with it. The surrounding area, however,
is occupied by Jordanian Arabs and Israeli Jewish civilians.
The chief problem concerns Israeli attempts to convert a
de facto separation of Arabs and Jews into a boundary be-
twee to he two. In July 1957 the Israelis began preparations
to plant trees along the de facto line thus partitioning the
zone. Tension mounted between srael and Jordan over Israel's
unilateral demarcation efforts and the case was ?referred to
the Security Council. In January 1958 the Council adopted
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a resolution calling on Israel to halt its tree-planting
activities. The tension abated following the Security
Council's action, and while Jordan complained of con-
tinued Israeli aggressions in the area in September 1958
there have been no major incidents in the Government House
DZ recently.
In recent years Israel has alternated its
Independence Day military parade between Tel Aviv, Haifa
and Jerusalem, holding it on the Jewish calendar date
which corresponds to 14 May 1948, when Israel attained
its independence. A dispute arises whenever Jerusalem
is the scene because the presence of tanks and other
heavy equipment ini:the procession violates restrictions
in the.armistice agreement.
c. Al Awja. The Al Awja DZ established
by the Israel-Egypt GAA es to the east of the inter-
national boundary that was drawn between Palestine and
Egypt in 1906. The zone is important for its strategic
location at the only inland route crossing between Egypt
and Palestine and for its water sources in a desert region.
The first armistice violation in the Al Awja DZ to come
to the attention of the UN was the Egyptian complaint in
1950 that the Israelis had expelled the Bedouin living in
the zone into Egyptian territory. By 1951 the MAC had
restored order at least temporarily in the situation.
Serious disturbances again took place in the DZ between
1953 and 1956, beginning with the harassment of Bedouin
in the zone about the end of June 1953. The following
September the Israelis established in the zone the first
of a few kibbutzim which the Egyptians alleged and the UN
later agreed were inhabited by military personnel. By
1955 Israel was in full military occupation of the DZ.
Countering the Egyptian complaints that the Israeli set-
tlements were military camps were Israeli protests that
Egyptians had crossed into the zone and mined the roads,
thereby causing Israeli casualties. Incidents continued
to occur in the zone until the Sinai invasion at the end
of October 1956; there have been no flareups in the zone
since that time.
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3. Suez Canal Transit
On March 13, 1948 Egypt declared a state of
siege to be effective with:the termination of the Palestine
Mandate on May 15 and the procedures for visit and search
of vessels dealing with Israel began to develop. Instructions
were issued to provide for the inspection of ships destined
directly or indirectly for Palestine and their cargoes made
subject to confiscation. A Prize Court was established in
Alexandria on July 8, 1948. A royal decree of 1950 con-
solidated Egyptian regulations on searches and seizure of
contraband in connection with the Palestine hostilities.
In 1953 the list of contraband goods was revised to include
"foodstuffs and all other commodities" likely to strengthen
the Israeli "war potential." Moreover, Egypt contends that
there is a state of belligerency between it and Israel which
was not terminated by the signing of the General Armistice
Agreement.
The denial of Suez Canal transit to Israeli
ships and cargoes has been debated in the Security Council
on four occasions. One resolution, that of September 1,
1951, has been adopted calling on Egypt to cease its block-
ade practices in the Canal. Later Israeli complaints did
not result in the adoption of any resolutions because of
a Soviet veto or threat of veto.
The only Israel-flag vessel ever to attempt
transiting the Canal was the Bat Galim seized at Suez on
September 28, 1954. While the ship crew was returned
to Israel on January 1, 1955 under the auspices of the MAC,
the ship remains in Egyptian possession.
Egyptian practice with respect to vessels
of neutral flags has varied somewhat, but generally cargo
ships chartered by Israel or by, firms in which Israelis
have part ownership are not allowed to transit the Canal;
moreover, cargoes of Israeli origin or known Israeli des-
tination are liable to be confiscated. Such caroges are
sold at public auction "for the benefit of the Palestine
Arabs," according to Egyptian sources. Moreover, foreign
vessels which have called at Israeli ports are blacklisted,
which means in general that they are refused services and
supplies during their transit of the canal.
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4. Jordan River Development.'
Israel's water development schemes, while
a matter of concern to all the neighboring Arab states,
are a source of potential trouble particularly between
Israel and the Syrian region of the UAR. Arab apprehension
that Israel will attempt to divert the waters of the Jordan
at Jisr Banat Yaqub has caused recurrent tension since 1953,
when the Israelis began work on such a project. Current
information indicates that Israel's water plan will be
developed in three stages ending respectively in 1963,
1966, and 1969. When the last stage is completed water
will be carried from the Jordan River near Jisr Banat Yaqub
to the Negev. In stage I. water will be drawn from Lake
Tiberias through an underground pumping plant at Eshed
Kinnerot (See Map VII), thereby circumventing the UN
Security Council prohibition against drawing water from
the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yaqub. The Arabs are opposed to
all Israeli schemes to improve and develop the country and
have become alarmed at any news or rumor of progress in
Israel's water development plans. They have indicated they
would regard actual diversion of Jordan River water by
Israel as a casus belli, but their attempts to coordinate
plans for such a contingency have not been successful.
Future prospects for such coordination appear especially
unfavorable in view of renewed antagonism among the Arab
States since Syria's withdrawal from the UAR.
5. The Gulf of Aqaba
The Gulf of Aqaba is bordered by Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The Arab littoral states
all maintain that the Gulf is an Arab sea and that theyii
have the right to deny Israel the use of it. In practice,
however, the Arab littoral states have left to Egypt the
initiative in enforcing Arab claims against Israel in this
matter. Thus any conflict over Israeli use of the Gulf of
Aqaba would be primarily between Israel and Egypt.
The Gulf of Aqaba is approximately 100 miles
long and varies in width froth'? to 14 nautical miles (see
Map IX). The western shoreline is that of the Egyptian
Sinai Peninsula, while the eastern shore is Saudi Arabian
territory. Israel and Jordan each border on the northern
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end for only about five miles, but each has a port on its
short strip of coastline. Eilat is Israel's outlet to
East Africa and Asia, while Aqaba is Jordan's only port.
The main channel between the Red Sea and the Gulf is the
Enterprise Passage close to the Egyptian coast. A second
navigable channel is the Grafton Passage to the east of
the Enterprise Passage; it also lies between the Sinai
coast and the island of Tiran, which is 3 or 4 miles from
the Sinai coast. Between Tiran and the Saudi coast the
passage is not navigable for large vessels.
Until the 1956 Israeli invasion of Sinai
and the subsequent posting of UNEF personnel in Sinai at
Sharm al-Shaykh on the Red Sea approach to the Strait of
Tiran, Egypt controlled the entry to the Gulf by means
of shore batteries at Ras Nasrani and military occupation
of Tiran Island, the latter at the behest of Saudi Arabia.
Egypt based its control on two arguments: 1) that the
Strait of Tiran was in Egyptian territorial waters, and
2) that the existence of a state of war with Israel
justified Egypt in exercising belligerent rights with
regard to shipping bound to or from Israel or flying the
Israeli flag. During this period Egyptian policy toward
shipping through the Strait was inconsistent. A few
vessels were visited and searched and some were the
object of warning shots, but no cargoes were confiscated.
Meanwhile, Israel since 1950 had been developing port
facilities at Eilat.
Since 1956, vessels bound for Eilat have
had free access to the Gulf and Israel has rapidly expanded
the port for trade with Africa and Asia. Israel regards
use of the Gulf and access to it as one of the chief fruits
of its Sinai campaign of 1956,,.particularly since the Gulf
provides an alternate route to the Egyptian-controlled Suez
Canal. This is,especially;:.important to Israel because the
Gulf is the avenue through which Israel secures vital oil
supplies from Iran. Israeli spokesmen have repeatedly stated
that the reassertion of Egyptian control over the entrance
to the Gulf would place Israeli access in jeopardy and that
Israel would regard the closure of the Gulf as a casus belli.
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B. UAR (Egypt)
Egypt has initiated a very modest nuclear energy
program--the principal facility is a 2 MW research reactor
of the VVR-S type supplied and installed by the USSR under
the terms of the agreement for cooperation in the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy concluded in July 1956. This
reactor is located at the Atomic Energy Establishment at
Inshass, northeast of Cairo, and went into operation on
27 July 1961. This reactor, however, will not contribute
to a nuclear weapon capability. While consideration is
being given to initiating a nuclear power program, Egypt
will be dependent upon extensive assistance from other
countries for its execution.
C. Iraq
On 17 August 1959, Iraq and the USSR concluded
an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy, and on 17 May 1961, the contract implementing
this agreement was signed. The terms of the contract call
for the Soviet Union to supply a research reactor and a
radiochemistry laboratory for the Tammuz Nuclear Project at
Tuwaitha, near Baghdad. The reactor is to be an IRT-2000,
a swimming pool type reactor having a maximum theranal.,~power
of 200 kilowatts (2 MW), and it is expected to be in opera-
tion by 1963.
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B. UAR (Egypt)
Egypt does not have a native capability to
develop a guided missile delivery system for nuclear
weapons despite its efforts to develop one through con-
tracts with private West German individuals. Under the
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terms of a recently concluded agreement with the Soviet
Union the UAR will receive the TU-16 (Badger) aircraft
which can carry a 10,000 pound payload to a combat radius
of 1650 nautical miles. The Egyptians have IL-28 (Beagle)
subsonic aircraft which can carry a 6,600 pound payload
to a combat radius of some 500 nautical miles.
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IV. Military Situation (See Maps)
A. General
Individually and collectively the armed forces
of the Arab States are inferior in quality to those of Israel,
though superior in total numbers and hardware. (See Chart
II) They trail Israel, in quality and experience of leader-
ship, in the level of general educational and technical back-
ground among the enlisted ranks, in mobilization capability,
and in incentive to fight.
There is no existing joint coigmand and staff
machinery in sufficient state of organization to coordinate
effectively Arab military effort in the event of hostilities
with Israel. Proposals for the creation of a Joint Command
put forward at the Cairo meeting of the Arab League Defense
Council in June 1961 were unproductive because of Lebanese
and Jordanian opposition to points covering finance, leader-
ship and the employment of other Arab forces in Lebanon and
Jordan. Persistent local interests and frictions, particu-
larly between Egypt on the one hand and Jordan and Syria on
the other, preclude the likelihood of a workable joint command
being established in the near future. What limited capabil-
ity the Arabs enjoyed of coordinating operations on two fronts
has been lost with the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian
union.
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B. Israel
1. Ground: The average strength of the Israeli
Army is estimated--a-f-29,500 but varies widely due to call-ups
of reserve units, economic considerations and border tensions.
The 5,000 man quasi-military NAHAL, which forms the first line
of defense on the frontier, is continuing its normal activities.
Current military activities in Israel are directed
toward training with increased emphasis on armor, moderniza-
tion and standardization of weapons. There has been no
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discernible reduction in the level of French support.*
Israel will continue to press for additional arms aid from
the Western World in an effort to offset UAR gains resulting
from Soviet aid.
The Israeli ground forces can maintain internal
security, can defend successfully against simultaneous Arab
attacks on all fronts, can launch limited attacks simulta-
neously on all fronts, or can hold on any three fronts and
mount successfully a major offensive on the fourth. Against
a major power, they could offer effective delaying action.
2. Air; The Israel Defense Force Air Force
(IDFAF) is an effective and capable air force in spite of
limited resources and air facilities. In its combat air-
craft inventory Israel is presently estimated to have 148
jet fighters--10 Vautours (all-weather), 38 Super Mysteres,
55 Mysteres, 19 Meteors (5.all-weather), 26 Ouragans--25 F-51
prop fighters, and 24 Vautour jet light bombers. It is be-
lieved that about 80% of these airdraft are combat ready.
Delivery of the first Mirage III supersonic jet fighters from
France, part of a total order of about 40, is slated to begin
in December 1961. Israel is estimated to have at least a
90-day level of POL stockpiled for emergency use.
*The following table o the percentages of certain Israeli
ground equipment of French origin illustrates the degree
of French assistance:
item
Percentage of
French Origin
Small arms and Mortars
Some
Recoilless weapons
22%
Guided missiles (antitank)
100%
Light artillery
48%
Medium artillery
52%
Special purpose artillery
32%
Light tanks
85%
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Israel, when compared to the UAR, continues to
be at a disadvantage so far as numbers of aircraft and air
facilities are concerned; however, the deficiency ifl numbers
is counter-balanced by the superior quality of the Israeli
air staff, pilots, and technicians. It is estimated that
the IDFAF could defeat the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), if an
effective defense of Israel's air facilities could be main-
tained. The Mirage III's should give the Israelis a dis-
tinct qualitative edge in fighter aircraft, although the
appearance of the MIG-21 in EAF operational units would
narrow the margin appreciably. Despite superiority in pilot
and fighter quality, the Israeli air defense system has
several major weaknesses. Capability to provide an effec-
tive defense against a night or bad-weather attack is poor
because of a shortage of all-weather fighters. The radar
network is vulnerable to jamming tactics and also has diffi-
culty detecting low-level penetrations. In order to prevent
total destruction on the ground in case of a large-scale EAF
attack which the fighters and antiaircraft units are unable
to stop, semi-underground revetments have been constructed
at the three principal Israeli military airfields to provide
some protection against bombing and strafing attacks.
Israeli air defense doctrine also places major emphasis on
using offensive air operations to ease defensive problems.
Offensive capabilities are good; IDFAF pilots are well-
trained to carry out all types of offensive missions, in-
cluding close support of ground forces. About 500 paratroopers
could be dropped in a single operation.
3. Nav ; The Israeli Navy consists of 2 ex-British
destroyers (DD ex-British submarines (SS), 1 patrol escort
(PF), 1 submarine chaser (PC), 11 motor torpedo boats (PT),
one auxiliary (AG), 14 amphibious craft and 3 minor service
craft Most ships are in excellent material condition,=,and are
normally maintained in active operational status. All are
based at Haifa except 3 PT and 6 amphibious t~pes which are
based at Eilat (at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba). Personnel
strength of the Navy is approximately 3,700.
The Israeli Navy is capable of defending the
National coastline against an Arab attack by maintaining a
continuous day and night surface patrol, of maintaining a
submarine surveillance patrol, of providing gunfire support
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for the Israeli Army, of conducting day and night attacks on
single lightly-protected merchant vessels, and of attacking
single, conventional submarines. The Sea Commando Unit of
the Navy is developing a minor amphibious raiding capability.
Training of Commando personnel in unconventional forms of
naval warfare includes sabotage, fast-striking demolition
and assault raids, parachute drops of personnel and "frogman"
equipment, and landing of raiding parties from rubber boats
launched from surface ships and submarines. The Navy is
capable of landing up to 200 naval commandoes as surprise
raiding parties on the coasts of adjoining Arab states while
providing protective gunfire support.
25X6
25X6
hw~
The Israeli Navy is a well-trained and efficient
fighting force;'combat effectiveness is superior to that of
any of the Arab States' navies. Israeli ships and personnel
are maintained in a high state of readiness. Morale and
self-confidence are high; leadership is competent and force-
ful.
Although the Navy lacks modern
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment, ASW training is
being emphasized. Small groups of Israeli personnel receive
submarine and anti-submarine training from the British Navy
at Malta and Israeli ships have participated in anti-submarine
and convoy escort exercises with the French Navy. In event
of hostilities, the Israeli Navy would most likely place
strong reliance on its motor torpedo boats,not only as a
defensive force, but also as an offensive force to be utilized
in conjunction with underwater demolition and landing opera-
tions.
One destroyer has recently been fitted with a helicopter
platform and it is anticipated that the Israeli Navy will
achieve a limited capability to operate helicopters from
destroyers in order to increase its reconnaissance and patrol
capabilities.
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C. Arab States
1. United Arab Republic (Egypt)
a. Ground: The UAR army, a conscript force
numbering approximately 5,000 officers and 79,000 enlisted
men, is the largest Arab army. Mobilization to an estimated
maximum strength of 133,000 would require six months. In
addition to re-equipping with Bloc weapons, the Army has
adopted modified Soviet tactical doctrine and has been
partially reorganized along Soviet lines, significantly in-
creasing organic firepower in the infantry formations. Bloc
assistance in training and the supply of materiel continues.
Training in Egypt is intensive and has reached division level.
Several combined arms exercises have been conducted employing
large forces of all services, but, in general, combat effi-
ciency remains low primarily because of weak senior leader-
ship. Reports of poor morale and antiregime sentiment in
the army have become more numerous since the Syrian coup d"etat
in September. The regime allegedly has arrested, retired
or transferred significant numbers of officers and has rotated
units as a security precaution, further reducing combat effi-
ciency. The army is normally deployed in the Cairo area,
the Canal Zone, and Sinai, leaving outlying desert areas
bordering the Sudan and Libya largely undefended. Sinai forces
number between 12,000 and 15,000 and are deployed defensively
with the heaviest concentrations in the El Arish-Abu Aweigila
area and the Gaza Strip, El Arish is also a National Guard
training center and base where a National Guard unit, possibly
as large as a brigade, has been formed during the past year
25X6 and is being trained
crease in fedayeen activity against Israel has been noted. 25X6
The UAR army is not capable of sustained offensive
ground operations but it could mount.an attack of short dura-
tion by one to two divisions with the possibility of achieving
limited, local, and only temporary success. In the event of a
full-scale Israeli attack, it would lose Sinai, but could
probably contain the attack at the Suez Canal.
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b. Air: The Egyptian combat aircraft
inventory is estima ed to contain 166 jet fighters--40
FARMER/MIG-19's; 96 FRESCO/MIG-17's,30 FAGOT/MIG-15's--
and 46 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Sixteen of the
FRESCO aircraft are equipped for all-weather operations.
It is believed that about 50-60% of these aircraft are
combat ready. The Egyptian air facilities, the most ex-
tensive in the Middle East excluding Turkey, can easily
support the combat aircraft. It is estimated that at
least a 90-days-supply of POL is stockpiled for emergencies.
.The combat capability of the Egyptian Air
Force (EAF) has improved considerably since the 1956 Suez
campaign.. Modernization of the radar network has resulted
in Israeli overflights being detected quickly and aircraft
scrambled and vectored on an intercept course. Higher-
performance fighter aircraft have been added periodically
to the air inventory; 40 FARMER''s were acquired in 1961 and
20 to 40 MIG-21's may enter the inventory in 1962. Despite
these improvements, the air defense system is not capable
of coping with a determined large-scale assault because of
the minimum scramble time available, the lack of a defense
against radar jamming, and the inferior quality of the EAF
personnel as compared with the Israelis. Offensive capabili-
ties against fixed targets such as airfields, military and
industrial installations, and transportation facilities are
fair,. The possible addition of at least 20 BADGER/TU-16 jet
medium bombers in 1962? will bolster offensive striking power
considerably. Even with its present offensive resources,
the EAF has the capability to carry out a damaging surprise
attack against Israel if the EAF staff could plan and initiate
such a move without Israeli detection. About 600-1,000 troops
could be airdropped in a single operation, if adequate
fighter cover could be provided,
c. Nava : The Egyptian Navy consists of 2 ex-
British and 2 ex-Soviet destroyers (DD), 9 ex-Soviet sub-
marines (SS), 6 ex-British patrol escorts (PF), 18 ex-Soviet
motor torpedo boats (PT), 4 ex-Soviet fleet minesweepers (MSF),
4 coastal minesweepers, old (MSCO), 3 miscellaneous auxilia
ries (AG), and several minor service craft. All are active
except 1 SS, 1..PF and 4 MSCO which are in reserve and 1 PF
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undergoing overhaul. All ships are normally based at
Alexandria except 3 to 6 PT based at Port Said which operate
in the Port Said-Suez Canal-Red Sea area. Personnel strength
of the Navy is approximately 7,500.
Operational capabilities have decreased during
the past year and are currently limited to surface ship and
submarine patrols of short duration, motor torpedo boat
operations against enemy surface craft in Egyptian waters,
and small-scale minelaying and minesweeping operations. Only
with immediate outside assistance could the Egyptian Navy hope
to survive a concerted air and naval attack by Israel.
Egyptian ships have deteriorated and their
material condition is, in general, poor. To some extent this
may be due to unavailability of spare parts, especially for
the ex-Soviet ships, but it is primarily due to lack of
maintenance on the part of the Egyptians. Both the destroyers
and the submarines suffer frequent engineering breakdowns and
neither are capable of extended operations. Training has not
progressed beyond the performance of basic exercises of a few
hours' duration. The Navy is handicapped by a shortage of
trained technical personnel, lack of operating experience,
inefficient staff administration, lack of initiative and
coordinated teamwork, haphazard logistic planning, and total
dependence on foreign sources for extensive ship overhauls,
ordnance.,,; spare parts, and electronic, electrical and com-
munications equipment. Another factor contributing to the low
capability estimate of the Navy is the lack of inspiring
leadership and enthusiasm on the part of senior officers and
the resultant low morale and attitude of indifference among
junior personnel.
Egypt has a sizeable stockpile of contact type
mines, depth charges and torpedoes, nearly all of Soviet origin;
some underwater propulsion units and possibly some limpet
mines for use in underwater assault and demolition operations
have been purchased from Italy.
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2. Syria
a. Ground: The Syrian Army numbers
approximately 3,000 ocers.and 51,000 enlisted men.
Mobilization to a top strength of 81,000 would require
6 months. Organized reserves consist of 8 partially equipped
infantry brigades totalling about 26,000 men. The army is
approximately 85-90% equipped with Soviet Bloc arms mostly
of World War II design but including some more modern types.
The infantry and'armored brigades have been reorganized
along Soviet lines during the past three years and Soviet
tactical doctrine has been adopted and tailored to the army's
needs and capabilities. Training of Syrian officers and
technicians in Egypt and the USSR has been suspended following
the September coup d'etat and the status of Soviet Bloc mili-
tary advisors present in Syria since 1956 is now uncertain.
Organization and doctrine emphasize firepower, mechanization,
and mobility, but the army has no sustained offensive capa-
bility. Its deficiencies are derived from a weak, under-
strength, inexperienced, and politically factioned officer
corps; personnel shortages in the more sophisticated military
skills; inadequate training; low maintenance standards; and
inefficient logistical systems. It nurtures an almost fanatical
hatred of Israel and has adopted a pugnacious attitude toward
affairs in the sensitive Israeli border area. It i ou1d:_moi.u t
limited objective attacks employing two or three brigades and
achieve some limited success. The strength and depth of its
defenses on the Israeli border, coupled with favorable terrain,
would provide formidable obstacles to an Israeli attack.
b. Air: Syria has an estimated 50 FRESCO/MIG-17
jet fighters, includ na g 6 equipped for all-weather operations,
and 4 BEAGLE/I.,-28 jet light bombers. Air capabilities, both
defensive and offensive, are poor. Although an EW/GCI net-
work equipped with Polish and Soviet radars exists, defense
of the Damascus area against a sizable Israeli air assault is
believed impossible, largely because of the short reaction
time available to scramble fighters and to intercept an enemy
force whose point of takeoff is less than 100 miles away. As a
consequence of insolvable defensive problems, major stress has
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been given to developing an offensive capability for strikes
against fixed targets such as airfields, military and in-
dustrial installations, and transportation facilities. The
threat of effective Syrian offensive air action against
Israel is considerably negated, however, by the lack of a
significant number of jet light bombers in the air inventory
and by the inability of the Syrians to defend their airfields
against Israeli attacks. The dissolution of the union with
Egypt has also decreased Syrian air capabilities. It is
estimated that Syria has enough POL to conduct air operations
for 30 to 40 days.
c. Navy: The small Syrian Navy is composed
of 3 submarine chasers (SC), 15 motor torpedo boats (PT),
2 fleet minesweepers (MSF), and several minor amphibious and
service craft. Current information is lacking on actual
location and operational status; however, ships are normally
based at Latakia or at Al Mina al Bayda and, with the possible
exception of several PT which may still be in reserve, are
assumed to be active. Personnel strength is approximately
1,000.
The Navy is not capable of defending the
national coastline. It is capable of conducting moderately
effective coastal patrol operations to prevent illegal entry
and smuggling and of very limited minesweeping and motor
torpedo boat operations against surface craft in local waters.
Lack of trained personnel and operating experience reduces
the actual effectiveness of equipment on hand.
3. Jordan
a. Ground: The Jordan Arab Army is currently
engaged in strengthening and modernizing its armed forces with
the help of US-supplied equipment. The total strength of the
regular Army is 36,500; currently 14,000 thereof, supported
by about 9,000 lightly armed National Guardsmen mostly
stationed within border villages, guard Jordan's frontier
with Israel. The remainder of the Army is deployed in East
Jordan, with the largest concentration being near the capital,
Amman.
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As long as the Bedouin remain cohesive and
loyal to King Husayn, the Jordan Arab Army is capable of
maintaining internal security. It is incapable of sus-
tained offensive combat. Defensively, it could probably
contain attacks by any one neighboring Arab Army but could
not defend West Jordan against an Israeli attack for longer
than six to ten days. Because of the concern over possible
Israeli attack and internal security, Jordan cannot provide
significant forces for employment elsewhere.
b. Air: Jordan has. 12 Hawker Hunter and
9 Vampire jet fighters. This air force has virtually no
combat capability with respect to Israel. Jordanian pilots
are well-trained for tactical-type missions and could
effectively support ground forces in suppressing an internal
rebellion.
c. Nav : The Flotilla Force, a component
of the Army, operate0 small naval craft (including two
ex-British assault landing craft (LCA)) on the Dead Sea and
two small aluminum-hulled patrol launches at Aqaba. Combat
capabilities are nonexistent.
4. Iraq
a. Ground: The strength of the Iraqi Army
(excluding the organic a r forces) is about 70,000 organized
into four infantry divisions, and one armored division.
Soviet equipment has been largely absorbed, resulting in
some improvement in effectiveness.
Logistical limitations and internal security
considerations preclude the commitment of more than 12,000-
15,000 troops to the west for possible action in the Jordan-
Israel-Syria area.
The Army could probably resist invasion by .
Iran or any one of Iraq's Arab neighbors; but against invasion
by large forces of a major power, the Army could offer only
minor harassing action. The Army is capable of maintaining
internal security.
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b. Air: The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) combat
aircraft inventory a.s estimated to consist of 84 jet
fighters--16 FARMER/MIG-19's, 38 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 7 Hawker
Hunters, 10 Venoms, and 8 Vampires--, 14 piston fighter-
bombers, and 16 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Fourteen
of the FRESCO's are equipped for all-weather operations.
The 16 FARMER's were added to the inventory in early 1961. 25X18
25X1 B
25X1 B
The IAF is also contemplating
the purchase of an undisclosed number of MIDGET/UMIG-15
and MAX/YAK-l8 trainers. Soviet instructors and advisers
continue to participate in the domestic training program,
and a number of Iraqi pilots are undergoing flight training
in the Soviet Union.
The IAF is currently capable of attacking
fixed targets such as airfields, military installations,
and transportation facilities. Air defense capabilities
are restricted to the Baghdad, Habbaniya, and Kirkuk areas.
Radar stations are presently operating at Baghdad and
Kirkuk. A school for operators and technicians is being
conducted in Iraq and reportedly has graduated about 50 GCI
controllers. No effective defense.could be organized against
an attack by a major air force. Close support could not
be provided for ground forces because of the lack of joint
training. The IAF could furnish effective support during
any internal disturbance short of civil war, in which event
political factionalism could render the air force ine'fe,ctive.
The 3 CUB/AN-l2's in the IAF inventory are capable of trans-~
porting an estimated 240-255 troops.
c. Navy: The Iraqi River Force, under army
control, is composedooY12 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT),
four obsolete river gunboats (PR), 1 yacht (PY), 2 ex-Soviet
patrol vessels (YP), and 2 ex-Soviet torpedo retrievers (YPT).
All are based at Basra where the PT are employed in tactical
training exercises. Personnel strength is approximately 250.
Three CUB/AN-12 transports and 4 additional HOUND/MI-4
helicopters were delivered to Iraq during June 1961.
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Combat capabilities are currently negligible,
but the PT do represent a potential, but limited, defensive
capability. However, continued foreign assistance is re-
quired to maintain and operate the PT effectively. The PR
could be utilized to assist in maintaining internal security
in southern Iraq, but they have no combat capability.
A number of Iraqi personnel have received
naval training in the USSR and a small number of Soviet
technicians are assisting in the training of Iraqi personnel
at Basra. Despite the Iraqis' dissatisfaction with the
quality of Soviet naval equipment acquired, Iraq will probably
continue to rely on the USSR for training assistance and will
of necessity continue to rely on the USSR for spare parts,
ammunition, torpedoes, and naval electronic equipment.
5. Lebanon
a. Ground: The strength of the Lebanese
ground forces is 10,M; there is a gendarmerie force of
2,800. Given a political decision and orders to do so, the
Army is considered capable of maintaining internal security
and of providing limited defense of land approaches to
Beirut.
b. Air: Lebanon has 6 Hawker Hunters and
8 Vampire jet fighters. The air force has no capability to
engage effectively a foreign aggressor, but does possess a
good capability to assist in quelling internal disturbances.
c. Navy: The small Lebanese Navy, a
specialized componenf the Lebanese Army, has no combat
capabilities. It is capable of conducting fairly effective
coastal patrol operations and naval personnel are adequately
trained to maintain and operate small patrol craft. Personnel
strength is 200.
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6. Saudi Arabia
a. Ground: The total strength of the
regular Saudi Army is 14 600. In addition, there is a
"White Army" of subsidized tribesmen which has an estimated
strength of 16,000 loosely organized into at least twenty
battalion-sized units. The Saudi Arabian armed forces
would be incapable of organized resistance against a
modern army, except for desert harassing operations.
b. Air: The Royal Saudi Air Force:.(RSAF)
has 18 Vampire jet ?ghters, but probably none are flyable.
In addition, there are 11 F-86's, 9 T-33's and 4 T-34's in
Saudi Arabia used for RSAF training, but under the control
of the USAF training mission. The task of advising and
training this air force rests with the U.S
25X6
c. Nav : The Royal Saudi Navy, consisting
of 1 motor gunboat P) and about 80 men, is totally in-
effective. There is no command structure or staff organiza-
tion. A naval base is planned at Dammam but no funds have
been allocated for its construction. Training is conducted
by a US Naval Training Mission at Dammam but facilities are
inadequate and the training program is hampered by the
language problem and the low educational level of the Saudi
trainees. The crew of the PGM, composed principally of
Saudi personnel who have received some basic naval training
in Egypt, is receiving some on-board training.
D. UN Forces: United Nations Emergency Forces on
the Israel-Sinai der continue to act as a buffer between
Israel and the UAR, and have been successful in maintaining
a relatively quiet border.
UNEF strength stands at about 5,159. (See chart
for details). Although border crossings and minor incidents
continue to be reported, the situation along the Gaza and
Sinai frontiers remains relatively quiet. Contributing
nations continue periodic rotation of their troops. The
Swedish battalion which was withdrawn for a special mission
in the Congo has been replaced by other Swedish troops.
25X6
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
SUPPLEMENT
MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC
GENERAL
The Soviet Bloc since 1955, has extended to UAR
(Egypt), Syria, Iraq and Yemen military assistance totalling
well over $1,000,000,000.* In negotiating its arms deals with
these Arab countries, the Bloc has granted large discounts
and has allowed extremely favorable repayment terms.
Under the arms deals, the Bloc has supplied Egypt, Syria
and Iraq--in addition to arms and ammunition--with substan-
tial quantities of communications and electronics equipment,
transport vehicles and other military-related end items.
The Bloc also provides technical assistance to the countries
receiving arms and has made available to their personnel
training facilities within. the Bloc.
This year the Bloc has concluded a new arms agreement
with Iraq which calls for the delivery of such items as
short-range, tactical guided missiles, jet medium bombers
and super-sonic jet fighters. A similar agreement apparently
has also been concluded with Egypt.
UAR (EGYPT)
Egyptian air, army and navy personnel have been and are
being trained in both the use and maintenance of the new
equipment in Soviet Bloc countries. Since 1955, well over
1,500 Egyptian military personnel have received such training
in the Bloc. An estimated 150-200 Soviet Bloc military
technicians and advisors still are active in Egypt, where
they are assisting the Egyptians in-assimilating the Bloc
equipment and in reorganizing the Egyptian Army.
* This figure, in addition to arms, includes the estimated
cost--prior to discounts--of all military related items
supplied by the Bloc.
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The Egyptian orders over the past six years--which now
amount to more than $500g,mi14on?.-have included the following
major items as well as other equipment. Complete and precise
information on deliveries is not available; the following
minimum estimates are, however, considered reasonably
accurate.
Item Holdings
AIR
TU-16 jet bomber _
MIG-21 jet fighter.
MIG-19 jet fighter,:
MIG-15/17 jet fighter
IL-28 light jet bomber
IL-:14 twin engine transport
Trainer aircraft: Yak-11, Yak-18,
U MIG-15, U IL-28
Helicopter
Radar EW/GCI
Guided Missiles
GROUND
T-34 medium tank
JS-3 heavy tank
100mm SP assault gun SU-100
BTR-152 APC
85mm field gun D-44
122mm gun M 1931/37
122mm howitzer M 1938
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round)
57mm AT gun M 1943
82mm recoilless gun B-10
82mm recoilless gun T-21 "Tarasnice"
12.7mm AA HMG quad-mounted
37mm AA gun M 1939
85mm AA gun
100mm AA gun
82mm mortar
120mm mortar M 1943
Small arms
-- (On order)
-- (On order)
40
126
46
40
79
16
30
-- (On order)
275
60
100
350
75
50
100
32
30
200
200
200-500
60
125-200
75-100
12
500
100
large quantities
ii
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NAVAL
Destroyer
Submarine
Motor torpedo boat
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper
Naval mines, de.)th charges and torpedoes
SYRIA.
2
9 (8 W-class
and 1 M-
class)
18
4
large quantities
Since 1955, Syria has received $200-250,.mil.ion in Bloc
military assistance--most of which was arranged for prior to
the formation of the UAR in 1958. The large-scale arms de-
liveries to Syria in the late summer and early fall of 1958
apparently were under contracts Damascus had concluded with
the Bloc before the union with Egypt. Thereafter, Syria's
arms aid negotiations with the Bloc were conducted by Cairo,
and relatively little additional Bloc equipment was pro-
vided. Thus far, there has been no Bloc arms aid to the
new Syrian government, although negotiations for such assist-
ance may be underway.
About 700 Syrian military personnel have received
training in the Bloc since 1955, but few--if any--are be-
lieved to be undergoing training there at present. As
many as 100 Soviet Bloc arms experts are still believed to
be in Syria.
The following chart provides the available information
and estimates on arms purchases from the Bloc:
Item
Holdings
MIG-17 jet fighter 50
IL-14 6
Helicopter 6
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61S
6 December 1961
GROUND
T-34 medium tank
T-54 medium tank
100mm SP assault gun SU-100
BTR 152 APC
85mm field gun D-44
122mm gun M 1931/37
122mm howitzer M 1938
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round)
57mm AT gun M 1943
82mm recoilless gun B-10
82mm recoilless gun T-21 "Tarasnice"
14.5mm AA HMG ZPU 2 and ZPU 4
37mm AA gun M 1939
57mm AA gun S60
85mm AA gun
100mm AA gun KS 19
82mm mortar
120mm mortar M 1943
Small arms
Trucks
200
85
75
300
40
32
100
24-36
32
100
200-300
300
120
110-150
40
50
17
100-150
100
large quantities
2,800
NAVAL
Motor Torpedo Boat 15
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper 2
Naval mines, torpedoes, depth charges some
IRAQ
25X1 C
25X1 C
In November 1958 Iraq concluded an arms agreement with
the Soviet Union in which the Soviets agreed
Iraq with certain military eaui
and medium tanks,
to provide
Total Bloc arms aid may now amount to about $300
25X1 C
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61S
6 December 1961
There are now in Iraq about 200-250 Soviet military
experts, and additional numbers may arrive later this year.
An estimated 400 Iraqi personnel have undergone training
in the Bloc since 1958.
Item
Holdings
TU-16 Jet m
edium bomber
-- (On order)
MIG-21 jet
fighter
-- (On order)
MIG-19 jet
fighter
16
MIG-15/17 j
et fighter and trainer
40
IL-28 jet l
ight bomber
16
AN-12 heavy
transport
3
AN-2 light
transport
--
Helicopter
16
Radar EW/GC
I
10-12
Surface-to-a
GROUND
ir guided missiles
-- (On order)
T-34 medium
tank
80
T-54 medium
tank
180
100mm SP ass
ault gun SU-100
120
BTR-152 APC
200
BTR-40 APC
90
57mm AT gun
M 1943
23
76mm nit t gun
-howitzer M 1938
12
85mm field g
un D-44
100
100mm field
gun M 1944
60
122mm howitz
er M 1938
69
152mm gun-ho
witzer M 1937
28
82mm rocket
launcher SPG 82
104
132mm rocket
launcher BM-13
24
37mm AA gun
M 1939
268
100mm AA gun KS 19
38
82mm mortar
180
120mm mortar M 1943
76
Trucks and other vehicles
5,200
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/618
6 December 1961
NAVAL
Motor.torpedo boat
12
Patrol vessels
2
Torpedo recovery craft
2
Torpedoes
some
25X1 B
Yemen concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Bl in
1956 At
least we ve sipments.of Soviet Bloc arms arrived in Yemen
by sea beginning-in October.1956,.and it is believed that 25X16
all arms purchased b
Y
f
y
emen
rom the Bloc have been de-
livered. The total value of Soviet Bloc.arms .thus far re-
The Yemenis have no technical competence to operate and
maintain the equipment received and require extensive Soviet
Bloc or other foreign assistance to use it effectively. It.
is estimated that not more than 25 Bloc military technicians
remain in Yemen.
Holdings,
IL-10 Piston ground attack aircraft
28
Piston trainer aircraft
5
Helicopter MI-4
2
IL-14 transports
2
GROUND
T-34 medium tank
.30
.100mm SP assault gun SU-100
61
BTR-40 APC
74
57m, AT gun M. 1943
62
76mm field/AT gun M 1942
73
122mm gun M 1931/37
31.
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937
3
37mm AA gun M 1939
.106
85mm-AA gun
26
AT rocket launcher
10
Small arms.
some
Trucks (including 24 gasoline trucks)
223
vi
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS INVENTORY'
SECRET
25X6
ARMOR
ARTILLERY
OTHER
TANKS
ARTILLERY
Z
ANTI-
TANK
FIELD
ANTIAIRCRAFT
LIGHT
MEDIUM
HEAVY
ANTI-
TANK &
ASSAULT
GUNS
FIELD
MOR
ARMORED
VEHICLES
57-76
MM
75.105
MM
106.155
MM
20.57
MM
75-130
MM
RECOILLESS
WEAPONS
MORTARS
81.120
MM
UAR(EGYPT)
40
354
60
100
350
333
134+
238
478+
123+
1400+
454+
SYRIA
342
135
375
160
40+
200+
439+
67
1500+
477+
IRAQ
36
414
120
460
73
447
129
431
62
307
436
JORDAN
176
33
24
350
80
156
18
104
323
130
LEBANON
40
20
138
18
18
89
12
97
96
SAUDI ARABIA
36
18
114
15
67
6
114
32
1784
438
YEMEN
30
61
74
135
34
106
26
10
TOTAL ARAB
152
1354
60
449
24
1861
796
862+
643+3
1761+
322+
5421+
2031+
ISRAELI
175
457
124
199
1413
385
584
92
914
92
56994
1534
1 Certain obsolete items have been omitted
2 Includes armored cars, personnel and weapons carriers
3 Includes 30 130mm rocket launchers (32 tube) in UAR (Egypt), 32 in Syria, and 24 132mm rocket
launchers (16 tube) in Iraq
4 Includes 850 ss 10 anti tank guided missiles
STRENGTH OF FORCES
DEPLOYED IN VICINITY OF ISRAELI BORDERS
UAR (EGYPT)
SYRIA
JORDAN
LEBANON
TOTAL ARAB
16, 000
16,500
23,000
2,700
58,200
31, 000
45, 000
7, 500
118,500
*Includes irregulars.
UAR(EGYPT) 107,300*
SYRIA 64,200*
IRAQ 74,000*
JORDAN 46,000*
SAUDI ARABIA 14,600
LEBANON 10,500
TOTAL 316,600
*This figure includes quasi-military
personnel on active duty.
SECRET
UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, EGYPT
(AS OF 31 JULY 1961)
BRAZIL 625
CANADA 936
DENMARK 562
INDIA 1,251
NORWAY 614
SWEDEN 463
YUGOSLAVIA 708
CHART I
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 SECRET
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AIR FORCES
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050 / 61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
FIGHTERS
Jet Piston
BOMBERS
Jet Piston
TRANSPORTS
Jet Piston
OTHER
Jet Piston
TOTAL
TOTAL AF
PERSONNEL
UAR (Egypt)
166
46
46
34
136
428
4500
SYRIA
50
4
7
8
24
93
3000
JORDAN
21
4
3
16
44
1550
SAUDI ARABIA
18*
10
23
51
326
LEBANON
14
4
9
27
727
YEMEN
28
2
7
37
UNK
IRAQ
79
14
16
8
8
78
203
3807
TOTAL ARAB
348
42
66
77
57
293
883
13910
ISRAEL
NAVAL FORCES
4088
DESTROYERS
(DD)
PATROL
VESSELS
(PF PR PC
PY PGM SC)
MOTOR TORPEDO
BOATS (PT)
MINE WARFARE
SHIPS
(MSF, MSCO)
SUBS
(SS)
AMPHIB.
CRAFT
OTHER
TOTAL
NAVAL
PERSONNEL
UAR (Egypt)
4
4(2)
18
4(4)
8(1)
-
9
7,500
SYRIA
-
3
15
2
-
(3)
5
1,000
IRAQ
-
5
12
-
-
-
4
250
LEBANON
-
-
-
-
-
2
4
200
JORDAN
-
-
-
-
-
-
12
300
SAUDI ARABIA
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
80
TOTAL ARAB
4
13(2)
45
6(4)
8(l)
2(3)
34
9,330
ISRAEL
14 4
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
+'I ;il ~l r _
9;1li~J{?l
j
MAP I
z
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
ARAB-ISRAELI AIR FORCES
A PRINCIPAL ARAB AIRFIELDS
A PRINCIPAL ISRAELI AIRFIELDS
IRAQ
79 JET FIGHTERS
16 MIG-19
38 MG-17
7 Hawker Hunters
10 Venoms
8 Vampires
14 PISTON FIGHTERS
16 IL-28 JET LIGHT BOMBERS
JORDAN
21 JET FIGHTERS
12 Hawker Hunters
9 Vampires
ISRAEL
148 JET FIGHTERS
38 Supermystere
55 Mystere
26 Ouragan
19 Meteor
10 Vautour
25 PISTON FIGHTERS
24 JET LIGHT BOMBERS
SY
BOMBER
LEBANON
14 JET FIGHTERS
8 Vampires
6 Hawker Hunters
Tel Ali
Civil Airfield Kfars (.t
Hatzcr AA Ekron
SECRET
__ CYPRUS
t U. K.)
Tabuk
-Tabuk
SAUDI ARABIA
0 Statute Milesn Hurghada \ sperm e}shaikh 18 Vampires
A (I
F? E 15 SEA
35688 12-61 MAP II
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
15 PT '\ ? AI Mina al Bayda
2 MSF .Latakia
5 Small patrol craft
(3) Amphibiouscraft
NAVAL DEPLOYMENT
G) NAVAL BASE
t NAVAL FACILITY
ARAB
ISRAELI
Figures in parentheses indicate inactive
ships (both reserve and those in overhaul)
8 (1) SS
4 DD
12-15 PT
4 (2) PF
4 MSF
(4) MSC (0)
8 amphibious
vessels and 3
service croft
IRAQ
12 PT
4 PR
1 PY
2 YP
2 YPT
SECRET
utlcal Miles
les
Stat a Mi100
Hurghada
30 miles
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
UNEF FORCES (As of 31 July, 1961)
COUNTRY
STRENGTH
FORCE COMPOSITION
~(
1 SWEDEN
BRAZIL
625
1 of Bn (-)
CANADA
936
Sig. Sqd, Tpt Co, Wksp, Hq el, Recon Sqd,
DENMARK
562
Ord unit, (spt trps in Italy)
Hq el, 2 Rifle Co, 20 MP's
NORWAY
DENMARK
r
INDIA
1251
Abn Inf Bn
NORWAY
614
Med Co, Hq el, 1 Rifle Co
YUGOSLAVIA
708
Hq el, 3 Recon Co, 1 Engr Co,
NORWAY
1 Recoilless Co, 1 Sig Co
TEL AVIV
SWEDEN
463
Hq el, 2 Rifle Co
SPT
TRPS
INDIA
?Y GO t..? C/)
ABU AWE ILAALAWJA
CANADA \./?
Yu
EL KL~NTILLA`
UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE
(UNEF)
0 IN EGYPT
Nautical Miles
Statute Miles
0 80
80
J
35690 12.61 MAP IV
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SECRET
Mosul
4(--)19
3 27
79 JE-T RCGH rERS
16 MIG-19
38 MIG-17
7 Hawker Hunters
10 Venoms
8 Vampires
14 PISTON FIGHTERS
16 IL-28 JET LT BOMBERS
IRAQ MILITARY
Ground force unit symbols
* Airfield
Z Naval Facility
Rasht
i. KUWAIT _\ U Yorsian
Gulf
.,NEUIKAL LIJNE 'yi? -
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
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 -''-IE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Approved For Rele a 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79S004 A000400060002-8 2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
Palestine Partition Plan
as accepted by the United
Nations General Assembly
on 29 November 1947 4
mia
0
Arab
Jewish
,,ter Armistice line
T 1949
Tel Aviv'
Jaffal
Gaza `-
StripJ
W I
4 A~ L
Al AcvJa
1..
ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER
Demilitarized zone
Armistice line
A Approximate location of
UN observation post;
designated by numeral
or letter.
? -- s I EP4
SECRET
LEBANON
Agreement of 1949 left unresolved
the political status of the area
within the Demilitarized Zone.
Israel, however, claims sovereignty
over the zone and has assumed
effective control over most of it.
proposed diversion canal
(SEE PAGE 12)
SHED KINNEROTf
(PUMPING STATION UNDER CONSI(I`tUCTION )
UAR
(EGYPT)
JORDAN
UNCLASSIFIED
i1u1f of Agnba ,
A%WW
35692 12-61
There is also a UN OP at
Beit Qatsir "on demand. "
BAN,.
AC
A,&
N (capable of
holding tanks)
Banat Yaqub
Bridge
MAP VII
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 SECRET
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
NEUTRAL ZONE
ISRAELI VERSION
j
JERUSALEM
ARMISTICE LINE
NO MANS LAND
DISPUTED TERRITORY
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4 loon 2000 S000 4000
FEET
MAP VIII
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SE CRL 1
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GULF OF AQABA
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61 S
6 DECEMBER 1961
ISRAEL.
Eilat
J9RDAN
Aqaba
~uanai
CONFIDENTIAL
UAR
(EGYPT)
1Dhahab
Shaikh r'-
Hamid?'
Nabq /
SAUDI
ARABIA
Crofton TIRAN` !~~ SANAFIR
Pu``?~+/? ISLAND ~(` ISLAND
RAS NASRANI *~
ah rm al-Shaikh
19~Ras Muhammad
Enterprise passage Grafton passage
950 feet deep 240 feet deep
EGYPT
Reefs and shallows with
single channel 54 feet deep
\ SAUDI
TIRAN ISLAND / \ ARABIA
MAP IX
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 Approved For Rele&, 2000/05/12: CIA-RDP79S004 00040006000 C ,
---..= SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
203
COPY NO.
DATE 6 December 1961
NO. 2050/61S
THE
ARAB-ISRAELI
SITUATION
THIS IS A WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY AN AD
HOC WORKING GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECRET
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC,
SECS. 793 AND 794,THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION
OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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SECRET
SECRET
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