NIE-64 (PART I) SUPPLEMENT: SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1954 (FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002100040006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 26, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
c F E OF NLTI?IZAL ESTIMATES
26 1952
SUBJECT s MAI& (Part I) S a SOVIET BLOC CAPA BTLITIES,
TB'RO KID-1 (For ccideratiom by the Board)
TEE FROBI (
To estitaate Soviet B capabilities for political and
military warfare through mad-1954.
CCCLBSIDBS
1.
The Bloc caotiu es to possess a significant quanti-
tative txperlorityr ovair the Western Pam" in forces In being
and In conventional mound said air arammt.
The x.sions in the baslio text of NI. (Part I) are
indicated by the u declined text of this Suppl t.
The Soviet Bloc exists of the M M3, the Enzpean Satel--
l.itets Commaist C,bina t
s a , Ncsrth Korea and
Viet Ebb. The Kz ].in also controls the iat tic a1
Communist manment outside the Bloc countries.
ft^ k i flDQ ITI A i DOC'UMENTNo.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. i
q, ~e?s CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SO
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H 70
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2. T1 Soviet ecanamoy is much better prepared now to sup-
port a major war ofe rt than it was in 190.
3. The por1ncipal emphasis of the recent Bloc military pro-
m bas apparently been upon enlarging the atomic stockpile and
upon Improving Moo defenses, particularly against air attack.
We believe that this emphasis will. continue throughout the period
of this estimate. We also believe that the Bloc military farces
viii not Increase greatly in sine, alb they will impraue
in combat effectiveness.
4. We eat to that the USSR will ba ?.
of 140 -atomic w apoi a (3400 kllotai
M In &a h= ig WAL-W am
St a It i =11kely that the USSR viii be able to develop
and produce a thermonuclear weapimt _bZ m .d-1 ffqWMj, we be-
lieve tha the USSR MM.Sontirme to mak toaa+sd th
wea aced that Meld Wit- .1 n eanoea_n ed g a
clear reach >a talaece In
5. The Soviet forces now stationed in Easter Europe are
in an a4vanced state of readiness for war and an attack with
little or no vsraireg.
6. We estimate that the Moo has the capability to under-
take ? t large--scale oparatia in continental Europee
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the Middle East, and ma's n1 and Asia The Bloc could rapidly
reinforce with Chinese Communist and Soviet forces the 0cm-
=unlot forces now in Korea, and at the s- time undertake an
Invasion of Japan by Soviet foams.
?. The 1 bas the capability of wderttaking sustained
air offensives against the UK9 most of continental Europe, moat
of the Middle East, and Japan, with the intensity of Individual
offensive verging according to the aber of offensives under-
taken a3mn1taneousa]y. It is also capable of undertaking the
delivery of its full stockpile of atomic weapons against targets
In theca areas and against targets in the US and ite overseas
bases.
8. The Bloo air defense organisation ban the capability
for vigorous opposition to an air offensive against the prin-
oipal Soviet centers. gammr, despite marls 3ffipro!v"Mente in
the Bloc air defense system (especially in the USSR, Eastern,
and Manch n ia) , deficiencies win ream throu*wut the
period of this estimate.
9. The USSR has the capability to undertake offensive
'tuarinn patrols and mining operations along most of the worlds s
strategically vital sea laws. The M SR has the capability to
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undertake abort?-haul a ibiaus operations in the saw ad-
jacent to Its own Comte*
10. The Ca nuniate almost oertalniy will not be capable
Of avert roving any non*Caaaiat government either by conati?
tutional pvooeec or by r+erpolatian, e*ept possibly in Mm u.
10%. t e
e t to 9M Of 92 1 719
e t t@ that the will ~nft.Pe Use of
the
biliti,
bob t O
..
to mo Of 29 15M i t A" jall.
amah- not t1eCQ Of tl .
10b. Vo at ediuaate set t 99MM O?a
XUIL12L
a temination of the Korean war ar an ion. of
I~ettlit3j.
it. Bloc capabilities for political warfare will continue
to constitute a serious danger for the non-Communist world
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throughout the period of this estimate. The Com r+ist Partite
in the moist world with an eet3aeated membership of
3,750,000 -w? ere tightly argenized for action and form a world-
We network tmdear Kremlin direction. Tbrough this organization,
the Krsaal3n is able to conduct vmdeing attacks an established
regime, to *Vlc it r tion&t rivalries, to utilize minority
groups and palitiael f6atians, and to eapdt Ilse on econaai1e,
political., and uilitery difficulties. The organizational eftea.
ti ers of the Parties makes tbam far more formidable than their
ni rival size alone indimtes.
FAQ A T3Na HLOC CAPA3ILITfl
12. The Soviet regiae is rte sly entrenched in pager, and
them is no apparent pa4ospect of its ct ntrol being threetemed or
tea.
13. Soviet control over the Satellites will almost certainly
remain virtually omp1cte. It ensarss the subservience and re-
liability of the gwerrnmaenta, and continued econamie and milituq
o mtributions to the USSR from the Satellite area.
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U. The Chinese Coomvaiet regime bas firm control over
mainland CMr*,and there is little likelihood of its coertroj
being t z'eateaed or shaken by dawstie forces within the period
of this estimate. We believe that Co mmiet China aaepts Ykxwow
l derst~,ip in the inter tiona1 Cammtw.let movement but retains
a caiabilita- for fandependent action and a capability to exert
intltsnoe upon the shaping of Communist policy in the Per Fit.
The character of the current Sino-Soviet relatic i hips will prob.
WAY reosia relatively oonetant throughout the period of this
estimte.
15. The CSR is engaged in a large-ara1e re h and de-
vel op at program. This Includes both pqre end applied resrsrah,
with an emphasis upon applied reseerch in fields of military ap-
pticaticn, especially atomio energy, e166tronics, jet airaraf'ti,
guided missi]res, a s. Ya all of theca fields, Soviet
scientists WA technicziaue have demonstrated a high level of
zofiaicn y. We a time t Jdwl tlSSR
b1e uce
most of the s of
net be~bYa iu aisu~titr.
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15a. The MM has devlwooed a very his ca~abilit3r for
amoral radio transmissions to and fnr~l BF.baIIds.
Soviet as bilities in related eleetrronic fields indicate that
ere now capable of oLIM t for VHF
and UBF bands. now oa bitities constitute a serious threat
to Western Mg:r~ange and ehcrt-raage military radio Qu M.
oatione and navigation systems.
16. The gases national prod wt- of the Bloc has been 1n.?
creasing In the past two Ursa Any cation of its mamma
tulle Is newsaas!ily subject to considerable error, and no mmn.
dal ac mparison can be made with pn'ewur gars for the Bloc an
a whole. Have?er, we estimate that the Bloocs national product
in 1951 vas roughly ?__,_ percent higher than in 1949.
a. The econcn of the USSR had recovered. Its Baer
1eve1 of total production by 194 and had sar! esed that
lvicel by an estimated percent in 1951. We estimate
that the Soviet national. product is increasing at an nnvq 1
rata of 1 percent.
nd ap rs takhII ace .6~1,, (Part I) A_ppeMjo"t
pP ~ ~ ~ P
The estimates in paragraphs 16 and 1? are based on a re~-
e-tion of econcnit, infox ticn by CM.
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be The ocnbined production of the Satellites oonsti-
t app9.mamte q of the Bloc' a national
gradual.
a. The national product of Camiuist China is am-
tramely difficult to estijuate.
the ffi total.
..M9MUM k k2 IM U904" a 29
1?. The output of the Soviet ecanazr does not approach that
of the US econonw, nor does the output of the Moo eoonce pr as a
whole Qompare with that of the NATO states. national
prat in 1951 was about that of the US, and
the cembdned grows national product of the entire Moo vas about
percent that of the NATO ao mtriee. However,
these disparities are being steadily reduced.
18. Traver, comparisons in term of total output of all
types of goods and services are misleading as indicatio s of
relative capacity to produce military equipment in peaoetime.
The traditional living standards and the eontmIs prevailing
within the Moo enable the Bloc alaten to assign a much smaller
proper ticn of total output to civilian c on, particularly
of scarce materials and goods, than in feasible in Western
ooantries. ?eovear, these living standards and controls also
enable the Bloc to assign a higher proportion of "its military
outlay to production of actual, military and-its s than in feasible
in the Went,
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19. Since the end of World War II, the Moo an a whole
leas devoted a agx& larger proportion of its gross national
product to Military purposes than the West. We believe that
the USSR nav devotes at jq% e rase-fifth of its national product
to military eipendituree. We estimate that the quantity of re-
sources which the USSR will devote to military production in
1952 wilt equal the amount assigned in 1.944, and that a cp
a i d e r a b l v n e a t e r ____t w M l be anenntad to mintm-v - ? -
20. The Soviet eCo' is much better prepared now to
support a moor war effort than it was in 1940 Under continued
cold war conditions., the Bloc clearly has the capability of wo-
panding its industrial base and of increasing military parodue..
tion. The Soviet econow is organized with a view to possible
hoatitities in the near future as well as in the more rote
s'utnree These two ob3eottvss cote to some extent in the al-
l of atton of reaowces a
21. The Kremlin places a high priority upon stockpiling
reserves, not only of military end-its= but of food, capital
equi te, and msterials needed, for maintaining the econoo
under wartise conditions or other emergencies
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22. The Moo could increase its wqartis to the non-
Comm mtet world within the period of this estimate. 11. eatimmate
that ovea a slight increase of trade with the non-Cmunist
world would constitute an important political warfare weapon.
HYAC MxLITARY STREN H
23. The Bloc continues to possess a significant quanti-
tative Superiority over the Western Pourers in forties in being
and in conventional ground and sir armament. We estimate that
the Eloc armed forces, now have:
a. Approttmately 8,750,000 men, of which about
4,450,000 are Soviet; 1,550,000 Satellite; 2,350,000
Chinese Ccwunist; 290,000 Boorth Kmean; and 130,000 Viet
Minh.
b. An actual strength of approately 21,000 air-
craft, including about 6,700 Jett fighters and 900 piston
medium bombers; an authorized strength of about 25,000
For comaent on the nature of the evidence available for
estimates of Bloc armed force strength, see note at the
end of this estimate. Not included in this draft but
same as page 8 in P~ (I).a
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+ roraf, Imlvding about 8,400 jet fighters and 1,150
piste meditm- bombers.
a. A total of at least 164 ca, surface vessels and
361 submarines, Including 103 long-cam tnes.
d. A staokpile of 50 ataiaic weapons (30-200 kiloton
yieda). (This estimate applies to mid-1952, not the date
of pabliastlan for this report. The actual figure me`y be
from half to twice as mater as this estate.)
ea Lerga stocks of cmvemtional weapons and fit.
26. We estimate that the Bloc arm ford by mid-1953
will probably bavo:'
as A 1017 2,1? .WO min, of which about
a lLD.,0 vill be Soviet; IM, Satellite; Z
Chinese Comraist; North Korean; and IN-000 Piet
1/
b. An authorized strength of r 26.000 a3 ra.ft,
inc~lud ling about 10.350 jet fighters, 1,200 piston medium
bin, and possib13r a few jet medium bombersy
These estimtc , taken from W1944 (RAW? I),, Jg3jA Mt.22 g*2=
3~; A nc ? to B-1I, are based cs
information received after the figures in (Part I),
(12 Nmember 1952)
t to press.
The estimate on jet medium bomber production Is based upon the
Soviet technical capability to develop and produce such aircraft.
There is no intelligence available to indicate that such air-
craft are now in production.
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o. A total of apote y 205 major auri'ace
vessels and 408 sul> wines, of which 122 will be loag-
rance tom.
d. A stockpile of 100 ato?ic weapon (30-100 kiloton
yield). (The actual figure may be roan half to twice as
M4' as this eatlmts. )
21a. We eetlmete that the Bloc armed farces by mtd-1954
will probably haves
a. Approxli~Btt 9X00. , of which about
4520,000 will be Soviet; 2.000.000 Sate; Q
Chinese Coe ,ast; 300?000 North Korean; and 130,000 Viet
Minh.
b. An authorized strength of about ZkM alra of t,
including about 13, Set fighters, ; Q piston medium
bombers, and possibyr a few jet medium bombers. "See page 11,
footnote 2.?
c. A total of approximately . major surface vessels
and eubm rines, Including 153 1o e s tapes.
d. A stockpile of stoic weapons (30-100 kiloton
yield). (The actual figure may be from half to twice as
maxV as this estimte.)
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25. It is valikely that the USSR will be able to develop
and produce a tiermo~ucleer weapon by mtd- g k. BMW=, we
bb lie UZI tom Mari?? M go M- .. Z
t I 4 m m 1 I = , ea that .. .~ ?-? c with
26. The over-all effectiveness of Bloc grounds naval,
and air farces will increase by Mjd-.M1 became of progreeeive
modernization and standardization of weapons and equipment, the
intensive training program,, the growth of the Soviet at .c
retcckpile, and the increased combat efficiency of the Satellite
a mieso
27. The armed fames of the USSR a t China, have
remained relatively conntaxit in size tlaroughoaat the past two
yew, while those of the Satellites have gran rapMy. Recent
Bloc military effort has apparently placed principal eMhasiz
upon enlarging the atotdc stockpile and upon improving Bloc do -
feneees, particularly againut air attack. The Bloc has also ampha-
sized improvement of the quality of misting units and developing
and mars hel4ng the military strength of the Satellites.
28. The USSR maintalm a. large air defense ayetsm which
not only includes the forces assigned to the Soviet air defense
13
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ciarganizatian (P Strang) but also has available to it the
active air defense resources of the Angp to .ce1 air foorcesag
and. Naray not otherwise eommitted, as wen as the passive de-
fame reaooresea of the police and civilian organizations, The
Bmwean Satellite and CCem nuns st Chinese air defensesg add to
and are integrated faith the Soviet eyatem, Despite signifi-
cant tss in the air defense system, there wall probably
contimie to be insufficient numbers of trained and ezpesrienced
pilots and cpwratorss, modern radar, heavy AA gzms, and fighters
designed espoci t1cal iy far an-weather interception to provide
defense for all important arenas We estimate that by mid-1954
the numrical strength of the air defense forces will not U-
s, although the effectiveness of the air de~-
fensess will improve tlwough re-equipment and toning,
BLOC Ng-IA~tY CAPABILITIES
I~vIM-1 I
29. We estimte that the Bloc has the capability to
undertake coneurrentc large-scale operations in continental
Europe, the Middle Hasty and mainland Asia. The Bloc c d
rapid31r reinforce with Chinese Caarammist and Soviet forces the
Cyst forces not in Earnas, and at the same time undertake
an invasion of Japan by Soviet forces
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30. The Soviet farces now stationed in FAstem ape
are in an advanced state of readlaw for war and can attack
with little or no warning. However, the Bloc forces in Eastern
Ecurape would almost certainly rewire subcts tial reinforce-
ments in Soviet ground and air forccee before they could
sustain major offensive Operations.
31. The USSR has the capability of tmdmftjcjng, euatained
air offensives against the UK, meet of continental Europe, most
of the Wfidle East, and Japan, with the intensity of individual
offenei varying according to the nwber of -offe 1sivas under-
taken nizmilta iyo It is also capable of undertaing the
del ivary of its i'cbll stockpile of atop 1c weals against targets
in these areas and against targets in the US a its oversew
basses.
32. The Bloc air defense organization has the capability
for vigorous opposition to an air offensive against the prin-
cipal Soviet centers. However, despite marked Impra uts in
the oa air defame system (especially in the USSR, AWM
Pitmo and Manchuria), deficiencies win remain twvugbaut
the Period of this estimte0
33. The Moo has the capability to lmzwh short-haul
anphibiouss and airborne operations in the Baltic and Black
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Sam , along the -nrthern coast of Norway, and in the ncarthern
Japan Sea, and to launch l4M ed amphibious and airborne
aperati a agataut Western Masks,
34. The Soviet mtmmrlm force has the capability to
vndertake offensive ps ols and mivng operations slang mast
of the world's strategically vital sea lanes and, possibly,
simt~l tanaously to launch guided missile attacks against targets
on both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US. The
Soviet Navy, including its air arm, has the capability to lay
artewive mine fields to protect Soviet Satellite, and Chinese
Conmrajst harbors and sea routes, to mine the waters and
harbors of the Baltic, Mack, Narth, and Japan Seas, and to
harass sea routed in these areas.
35. The Chinese Caunnist and North Kamen capabilities
in Korea have in sed substantially since the beg nnim of
the am stice negotiations. If the present scale of operations
cones, we believe that these capabilities will gradually
AMrove during the period of this eeti ate. C t ground
forces in Kama have a high offensive pots and are capable
of launching a major attack with tittle warnlmg
/ Per a camaete information on this subleet, see N -55/$a
C
IMM 30 July 1952).
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36. Sire the beginning of the Korean war, the Cawamiet
Air Force in China., which is believed to be made up of Chinese
Cammn1mist, Rarth Korean, and Soviet elemental, has been built
up to an iap oacive size. The jet fighter units in the Korean
Mbnchuria Rcrth China area are believed to be prog~ressive7,y
imp roving. The capabilities of the CAS` in China are, and vii].
remain daring the period through mid-1953, largely limited to
the air defense of Borth China, Manohm ia, and North Koz-ea,
undw conditions of good visibility and to limited attacks
against the OW forces in Korea and adjacent water.
Is! l.i. bamNn.' W e believe the CAF in China will continne
to expand gradually during the period of this estimate but
will remain entireiy dependent upon the USSR for aircraft and
equipment, spare parts, and technical supervisions, and almost
entirely dependent upon the USSR for aviation fuel and lubri-
cants.
37. Daring the pu icd of this estimate, Soviet and/or
Chinwe Comenniat feces in Asia will a3met certain]y contimm
to have the capability of conducting the following operations
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a. meting Kong Kong, Macao, Indochlm,
Burial and Thailand if opposed only by the fames
ummat1 in these area.
b. RapMy reiufarefng with Chinese Ccmiit and
Soviet faroes the Cammmtst faoccea nor in Korea, and at
the saw time of vendee taking an invasion of Japan by
Soviet fbroes.
a. Attacking Western shipping in the Pacific by
submarines and mines and by conducting air attacks and
surface raids against Western bases and chipping in the
western: and nm-thern Paaifio.
EUMTS oil BLOC PO CAL WAS'
38. Political warfare plW an untomaly important role
for Communists, who aonaides milftar7 warfare only an acsten icn
of political warfare in their pcreistent campaign to mdm e
the strength of the non-Cc?mmniet waarld. moo political war..
fare techniques include political and econceie preemie, diplo-
Mtie action is the UN and elaewhwe, propaganda and front ae--
tivities, the action of Communist Puttee and Camun st Part
7AA Chinese Ca?ma:mist invasion of Taiwan would almost aertaixtty
fail if US naval asxi air forces remain available to defend
Taiwan.
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co 'a led trade unims outside the Bloc, sabotage, aaqploitation-
of s live and remlutdmarp mavements and of civil me". and
pMehologlcal warfare.
39. The principal ac ass of strength upon which Bloc po-
1itioe1 warfare capabil ties based consist of the Moc's mill
tart' capabilities; the size, power, and aaatsaUZe6 le ip
of the Moo; Commp niat doctrine; and the Com imni st international
wet.
40. We estimate that there are now 20,000,000 Comemmist
Party mmbm in the world, organized into 72 national parties.
! et Plsrtyr memb" live within the Bloc, but about 3,750,000
are scattered throughout the non-Camamtmiat world. fife figures
do not include the --p of the Mont omganizations, trade
un3ons, etc., which the national Cyst Parties influence or
control. The disciplines and fervaar of the Parties make them
far mare effective than their size alone indicates.
41. To servo the interests of the Bloc, the national Cam-
mwcaiae Parties in um-C 1,et countries seek to e3ploit eeo-
nomrio, social, and nationalist grie+venoea, to infiltrate gov-
ernment agencies and Institutions.. to provide espionage agents
and saboteurs, to disaemw1nnte Bloc propasga da, to mobilize mass
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support for Bloc policies, to create preseewe groups to In-
fluenoe leaa policy to the advantages of the Bloc, mad to ID-
filtrate and contra trade uniam and nation . labor -
zatiaaie. Mwy ,.have ehovn pearticnlar eklli in creating and
eant~roll,leg front cr zati o
DI X PO 7 XC L ffan R CAPABU ZT
422. Moo political warfare c pabiliti ee will contIme to
constitute a serrioue danger ttxraUgi cut the p rriod of this est. .-
mate. The Communists and their all,le a viii ratan the aepa-
bility to c3mch t. and ng attacks on established regimae,
to eaploit national rivairSem, to utilize m9 ty Vvups and
splinter political parties, and to capitalize upon econcnio,
politleai, and ardlitary di esul tie s.
43. We estimate that dmring the period of this estimate
the loo viii not have the capability of eatebliak g a Caamuniat
t # ragh conustf tational proses or by revolution, ex,
oeept possibly in Iran.
43s. Wg esananot estimates the eCeets on mmmist c p-
b
st 7 t .
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44. Throughout Western Ehraps, the mist Parties
since 1946 have suffered severe losses both in nbership and
Prestige. Aowerver, the bard acre of the Party has been pre-
served everywhere, and in most countries the Par cant1naec
to influence large numbers of non mints.
45. The capab1lity of Fwtern European Cc un stn to
conduct strikes for political purposes has been sharply re-
duced. Nevertheless, the Commsists retain llmite d osspebil-
itiea to Interfere with defense production.
46. In the event of general war, the Comanist Parties
would constitute a threat in Western Barope, espealally in
Igoe and Italy, where large Ccs raamist Parties and Cc* nist
t-ade union strength are reinfar?ced by won-trained Ommunist,
caul .- .itary organizations. Comunist capabilities for
espionage, industrial sabotage, terrorism, and attacks against
tsa Lion and communications facilities and unitary in-
stallations would be substantial.
47. We believe that Bloc political warfare capabilities
in the diddle East and erica win remain low throughout the
perkd of this eatlanate, e>cept in Iran. The Moo has taken
little positive action in this area, and most of the em isating
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Ciam uniat PWrtiee, vhidh afn x1 , have been towed
undergro wd. ?M i~nie d a rsria d_aFi1 ~~ the
and gMKiSX Of
ib~e ~eden$ aotiong
48. The Bloe aamL In ken_ the_ 15u7ah,}';g~,X,, mew
1.t~.em to the nt
o
on the
ocaati~ra. tae ba~.ieve that T~deh wf.~.a. not be ~a62?
the Deriod of 11
tin giu_090=1 IM MU
zraraeorL to se3e coat of th
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I Af'r3.ee t
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V4W
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i ,w , .. ,,_ 3 T i i p w amok . ana eea~i. oroo
t 8a
48a. If arepent tremds i I,?,a~= n noa~f_irn~ea o .aotrnrl b2Wd
49. It s 4onrla,ws~not=amtisaur
mediate jbM t I n arff gem Anjum eo m . We e3tJ to t bst
the ~'-' 1 U AU ate-iii. m.i0t
ue t ' a+r a9 . If the Cwt Party of India should again
empbasize the role of v olence, its popular -apport would prob-
ab diminish and the go t would almost certainly revive
its earlier repressive measures. anAb{ iU
s are _ test in the northern arm bo d rin the B1-rin -
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49a. It_,,n ar X17 ma'ta~l ad 3autb-, ?~ As aji; 4
12+?e-aal'l ,.v i UL.
25X6A
51. Moo political warfare capabilities vary throughout
? t t Asia. They are greatest in Indochina. The Viet Minh
is a powerful insert of tray and cc'thol, and it retains
considerable nationalist appeal. o The Viet i+ farces, with
C st Chinese advice and military assi? t a.nc e, maintain heavy
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military pressure upon the Xreneh and the Associated States.
We believe that the Viet Minh will retain these capabilities
ttwoughout the period of this estimate.
51a. Z hamo-Ye i4tars a?~~i~+?.. t. 'n.nft
B9LB~1SRhlna 8 C~mSeE eoVm'~E SH IndCCflfpR lLII'fLQ Li1w
ki-I'Aw are subetantiali I MKk aed.. the t at a 4idt
sot necesaet i'!v W MA the p iod. oX-=j.r MVLt&?
52. We eetimate that during the period of this estimate
the Coaenuniet8 will not be able to establish a Cammtmist govern.-
=Mt at gwhere in Latin America either by constitutional process
or by revolut1 ano ' In G teti 1a, the only eowtry in Latin
Amiica where Communists have power within the goveac ant, they
are likely to maintain and may even increeie their influenos.
I n all V C T Latin American countries, the Commmists will retain
a substantial capability for saborsge, for spreading Bloc pacops-
g , and for atiaeplating anti-American sentiment in natiawlist,
intellectual, and organized labor groups.
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