SOUTH ASIA (INDIA,PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CEYLON)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050025-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050025-4
ONI DECSSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
South Asia India Pakistan M#mAstanit- and C ]lase
Notsv This section aseromes that there will. be neither a
solution nor arned conflict In the Kwbndr dispute,
to There probably be no great change during this
period in the bass e Indian attitude toward the Feat -West con-
Met. On the one hand,, there will probably be inoareasing die-,
illusionment with Comm mist Chine and greater apprehensiveness
over Coeeemanist internal strength and diet activity within Indig.-
(Sow Indiana officials were particularly ooeored at the exhortaa
tions to foreign Comunist parties in Staling s closi speech at
the Moscow Party Congress in O*Wber ;) On than other haaad,, Indian
suspicions regarding Western actions in the course of the Korean
negotiations and in the UN handling of the Kashmir dispute have
largely offset these factors and recent talk of US vAlit ary
support for Pakistan has had,, and would continue to heavee9 adverse
effects in India. ?undanntsl tv the Indians will .till seek to
avoid Involvement in the 'East-West conflict and will work to
prevent that conflict from developing into open warfare. Although
they will be lose likely than foakorly to be lulled by Soviet
Etas "peace" propagundaap they will almost certainly continue to
apply different standards to US aid Soviet aactionso and to
ONI REVIEW COMPLETED
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050025-4
 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050025-4
South Asia, j India Pakistan Af stun and C boas
Note- This section assumes that there will be neither a
solution nor arced conflict in the Kashmir dispute.,
India
I. There will probably be no great change during this
period in the basic Indian attitude toward the Mat-West can-
thict0 On the one hand,, there will probably be increasing dis--
illusion eentt with Communist China and greater apprehensiveness
over Communist internal strength and Soviet activity within India
(Sam Indian of ficianls were particularly concerned at the escho taa-
tions to foreign ComeenMist parties in Staling s closing epeeeI at
the Moir Party Congress in October,.) On the other ha ed9 Indian
s epiciarns regarding Western actions in the course of the Korean
negotiations and in the UN handling of the Kashmir dispute have
A cot
largely cornet these factors and recent talk of US military
support for Pakistean has hadq and would continue to haves adverse
effects in India., Pandamentall y the Indians will still seek to
avoid involvement in the East-West conflict and will work to
prevent that conflict franc developing into open warfare. Although
they will be loss likely than formerly to be lulled by Soviet
Bloc "peace" propagandap they will, almost certainly continue to
apply different standards to US and Soviet aetiona and to