FINLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001300050020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORT

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40
Finland
Qv
1. Finland is a1moat pertain to maintain its positseae of
neutrality in the East-West conflicts and to avoid taking any
action that could be interpreted as assistance to the 'heat,
t the same time
t}ae-otbrr-har-. It is unlikely that `.att de-
any tm*A ap'a
Soviet
land, ro-Soviet
ph
d
is para.
ues not appear to
re lect ade uately the increase
2n There is, howrever8 serious danger tha may in Finland's econo-
ntc ar
thet
ov
d.
S
becorne economically oriented to the USSR by a gradual
process toward the Soviet
B
a
s
lo4 ?i
L#ap
Vile
this yeart s
not neeesearily involving arW' definite change in Finnish polies ratter could be
food products will continue to rectified by
go J USSR & If Western markets for Finnish wood products were?to diminish changing tense,
over a periods the USSR would almost certainly become a major' being economi-
After jcally oriented
napket for? these, iakik e!a -ice re tione deliveries to toward...DSSR"
v were co? ]eted, it was necessary tv find` outlets fir''
tae er-+ '~ the industrial, capacity constructed for Believe repara-
ruiw wax a cvmpie
this purpose-find-e+ratie W 4 This in particularly true o ted in Sep 52
the shipbuilding and metals industrieep and in the case of the
latter any reducticn in activity would have the additional
resa1t of leading to strong internal Commamist gains among the \Is all this
iecessary
alr?ea - heavil
Conmiataist
t
l
i
y
me
a
work
ng unions, HietorioallyS,
Soviet trade' with Finland hay beer lows and there ' ars' tev "Soviet
products needed in Fi,nlarii Thud..;` the above preaeu?es Mipbt not
F.. ni and, howevor can r-e+ac ort
to West such Soviet products as
wheat an r~car.rol sum
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NW4 _-1W
Finland
In Finland Is almost certain to maintain its position of
neutrality in the East-West conflict3 and to avoid taking air
sctlan that could be interpreted as assistance to the Lest.,
it is unlikely that
any Ott ap-
parent absence ofAaggresaiv-eness,t.~ ' Jam'
295-There iss however) serious danger that Finland may
beams ftenoodeal2y oriented to the '8R by a gradual peas
not n**ossari1y Involving arW definite change in Finnish poiicyl F
If Western markets for Finnish wood products were to dbaiaisb
over a periodm the USSR would almost certainly become a =jar
market for these-. In addition- as reparations deliveries to
tt USSR taper off9 the industrial aapaaityy constructed for
this purpose must find outlets., This is particularly true of
the shipbuilding and metals industries, and in the case of the
latter any r?eduatic to activity would have the additional
result of leading-to strong internak Communist gains among the
a2roadyr heavily Communist metal working unions. Historioally~.
S let trade with Finland has been 1 , and there are few Soviet
pWadvots needed in Fianiandn Thusp the above pressures might not
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h0
FE.t~tt
to Finland is almost certain to maintain its position of
neutrality In the East-West conflict, and to avoid taking any
action that could be interpreted as assistance to the Vests
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Finnish attitude
could be indeed to become more pro-Soviet by any Soviet ap-
parent absence of aggressiveness,,
20 There is, however, serious danger that Finland. may
become economically oriented to-the USSR by a gradual process
not necessarily involving any definite change in Finnish policy.
If Western markets for Finnish wood products were to diminish
over a period, the USSR would almost certainly become a major'
market for these.
addition, as reparations deliveries to
(in
the USSR taper off9 the industrial capacity constructed for
tl4s purpose must find outlets. This is particularly true of
tho shipbuilding and metals industries, and in the case of the
latter any reducticm in activity would have the additional
reault of leading-to strong internal.Communiet gains among the
already heavily Communist metal working unions, Historically,;
So iet trade with Finland has been loss and there are few Soviet
products needed in Finland. Thusp the above pressures might not
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I suggest that the portion of paragraph 2 enclosed in parentheses
be reworked as follows: "Furthermore, in case of the shipbuilding
and metal industries, which with the cessation of reparation deliveries
now have their principal commercial markets in the USSR, any reduction
in activity would have the result of leading to strong internal Communist
gains in the metal unions, dominated at present by a slight Social
Democratic majority. Historically, however, Soviet trade with Finland
has been low, and further expansion of trade is limited by the
capacity of the Finnish metals and shipbuilding industries, and by the
limited ability of Finland to consume raw materials and products of
Soviet origin. Thus the above pressures might not cause trade with
the Soviet Bloc /.B_7 to become more than 25 percent of total Finnish
foreign trade."
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5.
cause trade with the USSR to become more than 25 percent of total
Finnish foreign trade.. But even such an increase could have
serpious consequences in creating a dependence upon the USSR,,
And in the specific field of strategic materials A Finland night
well become an Important supplier of much-needed tankers to the
USSR.
1, Internally., the Finnish Communist Party has adopted a
"Pr pular Front" line (in nearly the tree sense) D but its chances
of entering the government still appear small. All major
parties are likely to remain opposed to Communist participations a, / "/ ~
although there is little Likelihood of an official anti'Coa ist
prcgrstna The rain area of potential Commist gains is likely
to be In t4w unions
a4 4A%G -
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5ti
cause trade with the USSR to become more than 25 percent or total
Finnish foreign traded But even such an increase could have
serious consequences in creating a dependence upon the US*
And in the specific field of strategic materials, Finland alight
well become an Important supplier of much-needed' tankers to the
USSR,
3. Internally,, the Finnish Oc mvdat Party has adopted a
"Popular Front" line (in nearly the true sense),, bait its chanaee
of entering the government still appear small. All major
parties are likely to remain opposed to Caist participation,,
7~ aF
although there is 3#ib3e ]likelihood of an official anti=Cz monist.
program,, The main area of potential Communist gains is lik 17
to be in the union,
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cause trade with the USSR( become more tHan 2,5 peraen
Finnish foreign tirade. But even such an increase could have
serious caneequences in creating a dependence upon the USSB0
And in the specific field of strategic materials, Finland might
well become an impoartant supplier of much-needed tankers to the
G_v
Finland has
substantial
trade-clearing
credits with
Soviet Bloc &
deficits with
almost all Wes-
tern trading
partners
3a Internallys the Finnish Communist Party has adopted a
"Popular Front" line (in nearly the true sense)n but its chances
of entering the government still appear small.. All-major
parties are likely to remain opposed to Communist participation,
although there is little likelihood of an official anti-Cnist
program. The main area of potential Ccmeunist gains is likely
to be in the unions..
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