OIR CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-42: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ALBANIA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GREEK,YUGOSLAV, AND ITALIAN INTEREST AND PRETENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001200030001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

2DP79R01012AO 1 00030001
I Nor,
SECRET
On contribution to N33-42s TTlE CURREI SITUATIOTI IM
AL13AitIA, ;+TTI1 TARTICULAR.R'WI;RETTCE TO t}R`EK YUGMIAV
AND ITALIAN INTER?~STS AND PRETENSIOTIS ' ,
September 25, 1%1
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
OFFICE OF I11TELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DE1:A 8NT OF STATE
SECR" T
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
JJ CIA has no objection to declass
-"'E f contains Information of CIA
Interest that must remain
classified at TS S 0
Authority: HR 73.2
^ ft coatainq not`?in+ of ;;rA tntp~~
Vito 3 ni Ar . fi Reviawer __
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CURR?r'-T 11T ~.;~!`1AL SITUATION
A. Stability of the Regime
1. Popular Discontent and Relations Among the Top Leader-
- ...~.~..~..~.. ~..~.........~.. ..~,...........
SjLij. Evidence exists of widesproad discontent among the Albanian
people, the overwhelming majority of whom are opposed to the pre-
sent Gol uniat regi?:* of ,inner lioxha. The regime maintains itself
in power solely by police-terror and by strict control of all means
of subsistence. The secret police, controlled by the ;sinister of
the Interior Lt. Gen. Mehnet Shehu, has developed a vast net of
local spies who keep close watch over the population. In addition,
the Ministry of Interior has special pursuit battalions, which
operate chiefly in the mountainous areas, Where they track down
isolated active resistance groups and spread terror among the
peasantry. )ther :jeans used by the regino to cow the people into
submission are the village guard, composed of a fear faithful Com-
munist ruffians; agitators from among. the Communist youth organiza-
tion; and formations of the regular army, which is at present
numerically stronger than ever before in the history of modern
Albania. Through all of these means the kloxha regime controls the
situation, and its stabilit; is not likely to be threatened in the
immediate future by an organized internal revolto
Purges of the top leadership of the Albanian Communists have
been extensive since the advent of Communism in late 1944o The
current leadership, composed of General of the Army Enver Hoxha,
Lte den. Eehr-et Shehu, and Major Generals Bedri Spahiu and Hysni
Iaao, appears to be working cohesively, although there is an under-
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current of rivalr;,r for porter between Hoxha and Shehu datin: frm
the war. Hovever, ,''.'sc'ar seems to prefer that Itoxha remain at the
helm because of his popularity among party members and some army
officers; and as long as iioxha enjoys the Kremlin's favor, Shehu's
chances of supplanting his remain slim. It will be recalled that
by early 1948 all of the top leaders except Hoxha had boon shouldered
aside,by foxha's powerful rival, Hoci Soxe. ISoxha handled this
situation so well in.the critical spring and summer of 1948 that he
mastered the threat to his position posed by Xoxe, and later had
him executed. His other rival, Shehu, although a capable military,
man, is undistinguished as a politician.
2. Control of the Police and Armed braes. Although the
rank and file of the Plbanian Army appear to detest the present
re ,L e, most of the officers and o truke are faithful party
members. Above these are VYehrwt Shehu, who has a firm control of
all security forces, and ynver Haaha, who is Commander in Chief and
7 sinister of National Defense. Still higher are the numerous Soviet
MOB and military "experts" who are today the real masters of the
Albanian armed ibroes and security forces.
8. RegI,me's Denend.noe C n Soviet $unnort
20 Extent of Soviet aid. The Soviet Union contributes
both directly and indirectly to the support of the Hoxha regimen
Economic aid, war materiel, and military and technical experts
constitute open, direct Soviet assistance. An estimated 1,000
Soviet military and civilian "experts" now hold key positions in
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the police, military, and civil administrations as well as in the
top echelon of the party bureaus. The i. )ortanc~,. of the economic
aid may be gauged by the fact that without this aid from the USSR
and its satellites tho country's economy would collapso within a
for, months. In spite of Albania's present geoLraphic isolation
from. the other Soviet orbit countries, the Hoxha regime remains
in the Soviet grim largely because of the complete awareness
of the Albanian top leadership that its very existence depends wholly
on moral, political, and economic aid fro:i ;oecow.
2. Military and Political Agreements. Luring the post-
war period 'ibania has concluded mutual assistance parts only with
Yugoslavia (July 1946) 1 and Bulgaria (December 1917). Until June
1913, when Yugoslavia broke with the Cominform, the Albanian
Government was in effect a puppet of L:arehal Titoo The conclusion
of the Albanian-Julgarian mutual assistance treaty was reportedly
originally agreed to by Tito and Bulgarian Prime ?'inister Dirritrov
as a preliminary step toward making Albania eventually a member of
a projected i3alkan federation composed initially of Yugoslavia and
Dulgaria.
Since Albania has not signed any mutual assistance treaties
with the Soviet Union or its present satellites other than Bulgaria,
it is virtually excluded from the postwar alliance system of the
USSR in Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. There have been several
reports since July 1948 that Albania has made unsuccessful overtures
1. Yugoslavia abrogated this pact in UJovembor 1949.
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for the conclusion of open political and military agreements with
the Soviet Union and the other Soviet orbit countries. Probably
because of Albania's geographically isolated position, the Soviet
Union appears to be unwilling at present'to make any political or
military commitments to the iiaxha regime in the form of a mutual
a
assistance pact. Nor has Albania been ,ranted membership in the
Cominform.
Albania has, however, been admitted to the Council for rutual
Economic Assistance and has in the past three years signed several
trade and credit agreements with the Soviet Union and its satellites.
It is probable that most of these trade agreements have contained
clauses for supplying Albania with military materiel. Also, special
ageements$ either verbal or in writing, dealing only with military
matters have perhaps been concluded in the past several years, a1-
though direct evidence of this is not available. All that is known
is that from 1946 Albania has been sent armaments and other supplies
for the Greek guerrillas from the Soviet orbit countries, as well
as military equipment and technical advisers for its own army.
There is reliable information that the Polish-Albanian trade agree-
ment of January 1949 was actually drawn up in t oecow, although
signed in ;.arsaw, and that !eland's major obligation was to supply
-Albania with arms and to transport Czech arms and amannition con-
signed to Albanian ports from Praha across Poland to Gdynia.
C. Resistance to the Regime
1. Resistance groups and yathods of operation. In
addition. to widespread dissatisfSetion among the Albanian people
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toward the Iloxha regime, there has been some overt although pro-
bably not too effective resistance in the past few years. There
is no definite information about specific resistance groups, but
the Tirana authorities have themselves admitted that "diversionist"
elements, chiefly among the peasantry, have often ambushed army
transport conveys and state transport trucks, killed their drivers,
and seized their supplies. In other instances local party and
government officials have been assassinated; on still other occasions
fire has been set to state grain depots and factories, a-rid economic
sabotage, so far the most effective type of resi stance, has begin
committed on the railways, in factoriee;and elsewhere. Men bought
to trials such "diversioniets" have been accused of being members
of Belli K9mbetar or te i, and followers of the northern
tribal chiefs, such as the Kryeziu family, the :'arka (}jonis or
other tribal leaders. Refugees Who have fled Mania, in recent
years have reported the existence of local underground organiza-
tione, such as the "National League of the itountainss" the !' ibsrty,"
the "Call," "Skanderbeg," and "Bashkiad i Kombit," but nothing
definite is known of these organizations. In any event, such
facts as the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tirana in February
1951 and the establishment id the past two years of a large nueabeat?
of cgncentration camps in many parts of Albania indicate the
existence of some open resistance to the Koxha regimes
2. Relationship Among _Resistance Groups. Despite their
common desire to rid Albania of the Communist regime, there does
not appear to be any oooperation among the various resistance
groups and no definite political aims or program in commono
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Indeod, on sevora! Instances some of these groups have vitiated
their work by their attempts to belittle each otheras activities
and political beliefs, The situation is complicated still
further by the fact that agents infiltrated by intelligence agencies
of Ureece and Yugoslavia and parachuted from Italy work at cross
purposes, creating confusion and frustration among indigenous re-
sistance elements and among the population at large. The frictions,
animosities, and jealousies caused by these various agents have
also frequently contributed to their detection and liquidation
by'Shehu's aeosrity pursuit battalions.
3. Relationship Between Resistance Groups and tgre
Movements. Lost of the resistance groups in Albania at present
appear to derive their inspiration, and probably their direction,
from the Committee for a Free Albania, an affiliate of the
National Committee for a free Europe, which has its operational
headquarters in hone, although the committee itself has its seat
in low York, there it also publishes its organ, S i ria. So far
the most effective operation of the Committee has been the print-
-ing in Rome and the dropping into Albania of propaganda leaflets.
The reaction to these leaflets appears to have boon great. Evidence
of this is the anciety expressed by the Tirana regime in its
notes of protest to Italy, as well as the numerous Albanian
fugitives who have been inspired by the leaflets to cross into
Greece with the hope of joining the Commmittee in its straggle to
liberate Albania from Communism. It now appears that the Com-
mittee for a Free Albania is considered by the great majority of
the Albanian people as the representative body abroad which is
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offering effoctive resistance to the pro-toscmr regime of unver
lIoxha.
Of the three groups i-Mich compose the Committee --- the
National Agrarian Democratic Party Balls Kombetar headed by
Hasan Dosti, the Legality Party headed by Abas Kupi which works
for the restoration of ex King Zog, and the League of Peasants
and Villagers headed by Said Kryeziu - Balli Kombetar has the
strongest following in southern Albania, the Legality Party in
central and northern Albania, and Kryesiu's group in the most
northern tip of Albania and in the Yugoslav provinces of Kosovo
and iyetohiya, which are occupied largely by Albanians.
In addition to the Committee for a free Albania and its com-
ponent organizations, there is in Italy Blloku Kombetar Independent
made up of Albanians rho cooperated faithfully with Fascist Italy
both before and during the wrar. This group works for the re-
storation of Italian influence in Albania and is said to have the
full support of the Italian Government. Its organ, L'Albanie Libre
is published with funds supplied by the Italian :tavy. Some of
its members have been parachuted by Italian planes into central
and northern Albanias in which areas they have organized active
resistance bands and have encouraged the peasantry to carry on
economic sabotage and other anti-government activities.
The recently created. League of Albanian Political Refugees
in Yugoslavia is composed of Albanians, mostly Communists, vho
have escaped into that country since 1948. It claims to represent
some 5,000 Albanian refugees. in Yugoslavia and to work for an
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independent, free, indivisible, democratic, and republican"
Albania, Actually, this organization was established by the
Belgrade authorities as an instrument for furthering Yugoslav
designs concerning Albania, such as infiltrating agents, spread-
ing pro-Tito and anti- .1axha propaganda, and encouraging other
Albanians to flee into Yugoslavia. Under present circumstances,
the League of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia is in a
position to harrass the Hoxha regime effectively.
In Greece most of the Albanian refugee organizations are
composed of parsons from southern Albania (Northern Epirus).
They are usually called Epiroto societies, and they mark for the
annexation of that area to Greece, whose government has laid
official claim to it. most of the agents infiltrated by the
Greeks Into Albania for propaganda and espionage activities are
Albanian "oslems from the border areas. As a rule, their
activities are designed to spread pro-Greek propaganda among the
:population and-to entice additional refugees into Greece. Their
activities, like those of the agents infiltrated by Yugoslavia
and by Hh Kombetar ~eperxhnt in Rows, are rholly unrelated
to the operations of those agents infiltrated in the rase of the
Committee for a Free Albania. In the past two years all sorts of
agents have swarmed into Albania) each of whom has worked for
the particular organization or state which sent him.
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II. T.$TEnT OF I' ~'R),?STS AND CO.iFLLICTS' I+T ALBANIA OF ITALY, G &
ANT) YUGOSLAVIA
A. Background of Political, 7.conomic, and Strategic Interests
of Albania's Neighbors
1. Imo. Italy has taken a direct and active part in
Albanian affairs since the beginning of this century. It supported
the creation of an independent Albania in 1912 primarily for
strategic reasons, in order that Albania's long Adriatjo coast
line, which at one point at the Strait of Otranto is less than
50 miles from the Italian coast, might not fall into hostile,
particularly Russian, hands. Because of this predominantly stra-
tegic importance of the Albanian coast, Italy occupied the Island
of Saseno in Vlore Bay in October 1914 and two months later
-Italian sailors and infantryman landed at Vloreo In the spring
of 1915 Italy concluded the secret Pact of London with the
Entente Powers, articles 6 and 7 of which gave Italy full sover-
eignty over Vlore and the Island of Saseno, most of the remaining
Albanian territory going to Serbia and Greece. Although Italy
repudiated the clauses of the pact dealing with the partition of
Albania and the Italian commander at 03inokaster in June 191.7
proclaimed the independence of Albania under the protection of
Italy, the Venizeloe-Tittoni Agreement of July 1919 provided spin
for the partition of Albania between Greece and Italy. This
agreement was later vetoed by President Wilson. .
Italian troops remained in Albania until the summer of 1920,
when the Albanians, aided by indecision and confusion in ! e,
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defeated'the Italian garrison in Vioro and forced Italy to
evacuate the Albanian mainland. Italy refused consistently,
however, to cede Albania the Island of Saseno, and during the
interwar period turned it into a strong naval and submarine base.
On rJovember 9, 1921 the -!inbassadors of 'oat Britain, France,
Italy, and Japan, knovm collectively as the Conference of
Ambassadors, signed an agreement in which it was stated, inter
alia that should Albania find it at any time impossible to
maintain intact its territorial integrity the "Govvern?ents of
the British Empire, Dance, Italy, and Japan will instruct their
representatives on the Council of the League of Nations to re-
commend that the restoration of the territorial frontiers of
Albania should be entrusted to Italy....and that any modification
of the frontiers of Albania constitutes a danger for the strategic
safety of Italy." Thus, the then heat Powers gave Italy a
virtual protectorate over Albania. rron this date until the
capitulation of Italy in 1943 Italian influence predominated in
Albania and was manifested by financial loans to Zog's regime,
Italian management of nearly all important Albanians economic
enterprises, and Italian training and equipping of the Albanian
armed forces. By a pact of friendship and security of 1926
with Albania, Italy established a legal basis for its sphere of
influence, which was further strengthened by a 2O-year treaty
of defensive alliance in 1927. Thereafter Albania became for all
practical purposes an Italian colony. In April 1939 liuseolini
finally invaded Albania and united Albania with Italy under the
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Croon of Kin` Victor Tanuol. The folloxrin year ::ussolini
used Albania as the base for an attempted invasion of Greece,
By the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1947, Italy recognized
the independence of Albania, to which it ceded the Island of
Sasenoe It renounced, moreover, all property, rights, concessions,
and interests in Albania which had belonged to the Italian state
or to Italian private institutions, as well as all claims to
special interests or influence in that country.
Soon aftqr the and of World Tar II, Italy sent a mission
to Albania to exanine questions of interest to both cowries,
but the mission was soon asked to leave o It was not until Ltay
19ho that diplomatic relations been the two nations were
reestablished, and later that year ministers were exchanged
between Tirana and Rome*
As defined in statements emanating from the Italian Foreign
Office durin/; the past two years and confirmed by other intelligence,
Italy's policy regarding Albania is directed toward maintaining
that country's independence, seeking its friendship, and restoring
Italyts prewar economic and political influence, In August and
again in October of 19J9, Italian Foreign Office sources emphasised
that continued Albanian independence and territorial integrity
corresponded with Italian interests. An article in the April 30,1951
issue of Ps a Rome foreign policy bimonthly Which is said
often to reflect Italian official views, called ftr revision of
Article 29 of the Italian Peace Treaty of 19147. Terming this
Article "unjust and illegal," especially with reference to Italy's
reparations commitments to Albania, Seri pointed to Albania's
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strategic importance and natural resources and observed that the.
Island of Saseno was only about 50 milas from Otranto, adding
that the age-old Italian policy with regard to the Albanian coast
rested on these two factors of economics and strategy. The
article concluded that these two factors co::_pellod Italy to
follow a policy favorable to the existence of a sovereign and
friendly Albanian
Italy hopes to reestablish its influence in Albania through
the Albanian exile group in Rome organized in the Blloku Kombetar
Independent, whose leaders, as stated above, collaborated closely
with Fascist Italy both before and during World V;ar II. Some of
these hold important positions now in Rome both in the govern-
ment and in high educational institutions.
The present Italian policy regarding Albania is motivated
not only by the hope of gaining, future economic, strategic, and
diplomatic advantages from good relations between the two
countries,, but also by apprehension over the possibility of a
Yugoslav move into Albania in the event of the Hoxha government's
overthrow. In short s Italy definitely does not wish to see any
other power establish a foothold in the area, and prefers the
continuation of the status o to the creation of a power vac n m
into which Yugoslavia, and. possibly Greece, could move. In this
connection Italy is also suspicious of the designs of the British
vis-a-vis Albania. In the interests of maintaining a link with
the Albanian Government, however tenuous, Italy undoubtedly in-
tends to keep its legation in Tirana, in spite of Communist re-
strictionson its activities.
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2, Greece. Greece has never reconciled itself to the
existence of an independent Albania. It opposed the creation of
an Albanian state in 1912 and occupied most of-southern Albania
(which the Greeks call "Northern Epirus") from 1912 to 1916, on
the pretension that it was Greek territory and populated largely
by Greeks, In 1926 the Greek Goverment reluctantly submitted
to the request of the Conference of Ambassadors that Greece and
Yugoslavia accept Albania's frontiers as delimited in 1913; but
Greece never gave up its claim to Northern Epirus, which it
demands on historical, ethnical., strategic, and economic grounds,
Since the beginning of Vorld :jar II Albania has been a
thorn in the Greeks' side, It was from Albania that "ussolinits
forces attacked Greece in October 19110, and it was in Albania
that a large number of Greek Communists took refugee and re-
organized after the Varkiza agreement of February 1945, From
1946 to 1949 Albania .'as the chief base from which the Greek
Coimnuni.st rebels launched their repeated attacks on the Greek
National Array, and became their sanctuary when they were de-
feated by the Greek forces, Even at present groups of Greek
Comuiuxistse trained in Poland and other satellite countries, are
shipped into Albania and thence infiltrated into Greece with the
connivance and support of the Tirana authorities,
In the opinion of Greek officials, the ideal solution to
the Albanian problem would be the partition of that country
between Greece and Yugoslavia. However, they are aware that
such an event is not likely to occur, and for this reason the
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Greek Foreign Office drafted a paper a ftfir years ago in which
it suggested that the best solution to the Albanian problem
would be a union between an "independent" Albania and Greece,
with the King of Greece reigning in both countries.
The Greeks would probably prefer the present regime in
Albania as long as they fear Yugoslav or Italian domination
there and have no Allied assurances that such domination will
not occur, and as long as the lloxha regime does not revive large-scale
support of the iireek guerrillaso
The Greeks can be expected to move into southern Albania
if Albania is ever invaded by Yugoslavia. T3l1tary cooperation
betweep Greece and Yugoslavia for the defense of the area is
possible, but might break down so long as the Greeks suspect
Yu;;os1av intentions with regard to Albania and Aegean '"acedonia.
Greece, like Italy and Yugoslavia, is harboring a large
number of Albanian refugees, most of whom have come from southern
Albania and are called "Northern Epirote" by the Greeks. As of
June 1951, there were in Greece 5,673 "Northern Epirota," a
name. applied to Albanian refugees who are members of the Greek
-Orthodox Church and are considered of Greek origin, and 450'
"Albanians," probably meaning Albanian lioslemso The Greek Govern-
went generally does not permit the "Northern Epirots" to emigrate
and does not allow them to become Greek citizens e They are ap-
parently held in reserve in camps along the Albanian border,
especially at ?angina, to be used for any eventuality in Southern
Albania. Some of those in the Yannina a mp are said to be
formed in military units and are probably trained by the Greek Army.
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3e Tosl viao Serbia and rontenegro before :World ;;ar I.
and the !Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the war, were opposed to the
principle of an independent Albania, chiefly for strategic and
economic reasonso ,Serbia submitted to the will of the Great
Powers in 19139 when Albania's boundaries were originally de..
limited, but only after as many Albanians were left under Serbian
domination as were included in the Albanian state. During and
irmediately after %orld war I the Bar be occupied nearly all of
northern Albania, and withdrew in 1921 beyond the 1913 frontier
only after strong pressure was brought to beer by the League of
Nationse Finally in 1926 the Yugoslav Government accepted as
definitive the frontier with Albania as delimited by the Con-
ference of Ambassadors, and since than no Yugoslav Government
has officially advanced any territorial claims on Albanian Aside
from a brief period in 1921-25 when Belgrade assisted Ahmet Bay
Zogu (later King Zog I) to return to Albania and overthrow Bishop
Fan Noli's revolutionary government, Yugoslavia was unable to
exercise any influence in Albania before the outbreak of World
War II because of Italian domination of that country, During
World War II Tito managed to obtain control through Albanian Cant-
muai.ats of the Albanian National Liberation Noveteent, which he
directed through his awn emissaries attached to the headquarters
of the Albanian Army of National ' Liberation. From late 19U4,
when the Albanian Communists assumed control of the country, to
June 19148, Albania was a puppet of l arshal Tito,
While since his break with the Cominfbrm in June 1948 Tito
'has publicly been the champion of Albania's independence, sover~
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eignty, and territorial integrity and has repeatedly condemned
Greek territorial claims on Albania and alleged Greek proposals
that . Yugoslavia and Lavaca partition that country between them-
selves, his actual intentions appear to be the creation in Tirana
.of a pro-Tito, anti-roscow regime and the reversion of Albania
to its dependent status of 19W4-448. It was probably with this
and in view that he created at Prisren in i'.ay 1951 the "League
of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia" with a program for
a "free, democratic, independent, indivisible, and republican
Albania." The League, which also declared itself against the
;:extern-supported Committee for a Free Albania and other Albanian
exiles living in r+estern countries and in Greece, is reported to
be receiving considerable funds from the Yugoslav Government,
was
whose purpose in organizing the League/reportedly the creation
of a well-knit corps of Albanians sympathetic to the Yugoslav
regime, which in the event of a political upheval in Albania
could take power as a govermnent friendly to Tito. The League a
chief function at present appears to be to assist and keep in
touch with some 14,000 Albanian refugees in Yugoslavia, so that
at an advantageous moment they can be assembled and organised,
and to infiltrate agents into Albania for espionage and subversion
dissemination of anti-Aoxha and pro-Tito propaganda, and assistance
to local leaders with pro4ito leanings in escaping to Yugoslavia.
B. Possibilities of a 0ompromise
l. Current Conflicts and lutual Suspicionso Ever since
Albania was isolated geographical], from the Cominform countries
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it has become a bone of contention amen" Italy, Greece, and Yugo-
slavia, each of which is att"ting to establish a position from
whi di -it can dor.dnate that country in the event of the overthrow
of the Hoxha regime. For this reason, each has been alert to,
and has expressed sensitiveness over, any move made by either of
the others relative to Albania. The Tugoalave have revived the
charge which they made originally at the Paris Peace Conference
in 19146, to the effect that Greece had privily suggested to them
the partition of Albania between themselves. They have also
given notice that they would object to any unilateral action on
the part of Greece to invade Albania, and have officially pressed dissatisfaction against the alleged dropping by Italian
planes of parachutists and leaflets into Albania,some of which,
including two parachutists, ware inadvertently dropped into Yugo-
slav territory early this year. The Yugoslavs have also waged
in the past several months a propaganda campaign against Italy
relative to Albania, accusing Home of encouraging the Albanian
political exiles in Italy in their campaign for the creation
of an "ethnic Albaniaea that is, an Albania which would include
the Yugoslav provinces of Kosovo and 1etobiya, both populated
dsietly by Albanians.
Greece has ale, shown uneasiness over Ita3,y+s intentions
toward Albania and bas stated officially that it would not
countenance any solution to the Albanian problem in which Greece
was not consulted. At the same time, Rome 9 e recurrent statements
that Italy stands fbr the independence and territorial integrity
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of Albania have been aimed at both Croce arc: Yugoslavia.
2. Areas of Probable 4greement. There appears to be
sufficient ground for a satisfactory solution of the Albanian
pro'slem between Italy and Yugoslavia provided these two countries
arrive at a general agreement between themselves and settle more
important issues, such as that of Trieste. Both countries have
come out officially for the preservation of Albania's independence
and territorial integrity; neither has advanced political or
economic claims on Albania. The area of disagreement is, there-
fore, narrowed dawn to the type of regime that would be acceptable
to Belgrade and Rome in the event of the fall of the Houha govern-
Belgrade may not be expected to aquiesce In 'a new Albanian
regime composed wholly of the ultra-nationalist followers of
Blloko Kombetar Independent, most of whom held high positions in
-- ? uiln~~r~rr Irl~wiir. Kosovo and L;etohiya after those 3uggoslav provinces were annexed
to Albania by Italy in August 1911. They have also cows out
for the reannexation of these provinces and the creation of an
"ethnic" and "greater" Albania at the expense of TuaDalavia. Nor
may Raw be expected to sanction a government in Albania composed
wholly of Yugoslav stooges, 8owevers sufficient pressure from
the Western Powers, the complete isolation of Albanian elements
who are identified too closely rrdth Hem or Belgrade,, and as-
Sea'anoes from the usatern Powers of a sovereign and independent
Albania may induce the Italian W Yugoslav Governments to accept
a new regime at Tirana composed of unaaspromisad and moderate elements.
3EG"EtI;T
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There is no likelihood of a conpromise b3tween ItaLy and
Yugoslavia by a division of spheres of influences in Albania,
as Yugoslavia would not tolerate a resurgence of Italian influence
in the Balkans.
73ecause of its persistent claims to "ZJorthern J pirus,"
Greece would find it more difficult to arrive at an international
understandin,; on the Albanian question. Any now regi-e recognized
by the western i'owors would mean to the Greeks the and of their
claims for "Northern L)piruse" Nor will Greece tolerate a pro..
Tito or 'ro?Italian regime in Albania. The Greeks nill, there-
fore, press for Allied assurances against Yugoslav and Italian
aspirations in Albania. They will also perhaps want to, be in-
formed of British and American plans and intentions concerning
Albania.
J:owever, competent observers of Greek affairs feel that a
Yugoslav assurance on Aegean ?'acedonia and a British promise
of the eventual return of Cyprus to Oreece would probably make
the Greeks more amenable to a solution that mould give Albania
a government truly representative of the Albanian people, inde-
pendent of foreign influences, and friendly to Greece.
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IV. CO1 PLIOTIlG II TERESTS AVT) SECURI'T'Y OF TI! AIWA
probable Attitude of Albania's Noi labors Forward
Now ez me
1. Eeluivior of neiijibors will depend on what
elements succeed loicha's ref-L.ie. In the event of a success-
ful insurrection against the Hoxha regime by Albanian non'
torn rani st elements, Italy. Greece, and Ytrroslavia may not
intervene directly to influence tho successor regirie, but
each may be expected to work feverishly to win to Its side
the leaders of the new government, >>robtubly in the same
inner as they did between 1920 and 192b, with Italy then
winning out becau: a it was the most powerful of the three
.and because it could offer larger amounts of economic and
military assist.-noe.
If Iiox7liaf s overthrow is accomplished by purely Albanian
elements who are independent of Albania' a threo nei2,lhbors
but under the direction of the ':extern powers, the activities
of Rome, Athens, and Bolg-:,ade may be expected to be' confined
to political and economic maneuvering to win over the new
government. However, should the leadership of a movement
to oust the Hoxha rof;ime bo controlled by any one of the
neighboring gg;overnments, or by such organizations as tae
League of the Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia,
the Blloku Kombetar Independent in Rome, or the Epirotic
..~~~ ate. ..w.,.,..! r...~. .. , -
societies in Greece, serious friction, although probably.
no actual hostilities, tray arise, leading perhaps to the
occupation of.south,-rn Albania by Creeoe, northern Albania
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%W 140
by Ywyalavia, and Saaeno Island and Vlore Day and its
environs by Italy.
29 Nature of the probable successor retie.
The nature of the new reL;i:.ze .n Albania in the event of
a successful revolt agu'.nat Hoxha will depend on the
elements lead:-.ni; the revolt. A palace revolt, which
under resent c_ z'cu:astunces seems to be the moe t likely
way in which the Stal .nis t group he:.ded by Shehu and
Hoxha might be unseated, could bring about a left-wing
rej;irae composed chiefly of d sCruntled anti-Moscow
Communis i;s and left-wind; arr.;y off] cers. Such a regime
would probabl be patterned at first on that of Tito,
although it would noc,necessarily be t.ed to Tito if it
obta..ned d rest military, political, and, especially
economic support from the US, the UK, and France. In
the long; run such a rec;.:_me would perhaps fall in to the
hands of Albanian intellectuals and professional men,
the country's democrativ elements, most of whom are
currently lanLuishin;_ in prisons and roroed labor and
concentration camps, ass._sted by certain independent
emigre elements who are not at )resent working, wit : r any
,nized exile groups.
of the reoop
Should, however, the Epxha rej,irae be overthrown by
internal and external non-Comriunist elements, the
suocessor regime would in all probability be composed at
the outset chiefly of leading elements that make up the
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Committee for a Free Albania. But in view of the distrust
and ideoloLioal differences ?xistin% amonL these elements,
the stability of such a reE: ?a:,e m grt be short-lived. The
problem would then probably be resol.od by the restoration
of ex-King Zoe; and the formation of a national Government
firmly under his control, composed of all non-Cormiuniat
elements,
Qualified observeve of Albanian affairs are of the
opinion that even thous in the prewar days ZoL' s popularity
was eonf-*.ned to the privileged classes in Albania, his stand
aains ; P$aoigt Italy just prior of its invasion of Albania,
his ouna'atent pro-Alliod policy during the war, and the
vicissitudes and general oppression and economic suffering
of 'the populace under the present Corx:uni.st regi:e have
enhanced his tar ding amonL the people. Under present con-
ditions, Zog would probably receive an almost universal
welcome,)bnly in central Albania, where he had his t;reatcat
following during his: reiLn as kinL, but in other parts of
the country as well, and would be weloo::ed by a large
section of the Albanian Array. Furthermore, he is believed
to be the only-leader who could restrain the various riLht-
winC Groups from embark * ng on mass reprisals against persons
who have, either wiLlinl,ly or by farce, collaborated with
the Corr iunis t reei, a or differ ideoloLioal.ty among; them-
selves, such, for instance, as is the case with the
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followere of the National A{;rari.al Do:aocrc.tio party B a li
Kos star and the i.:esabera of the pro-Italian Biloku_ Kombetar
Independent, Whose antaQ;on szii haz boon urie.,ated sl.ioe
Italy invaded Albania on April '1, 1939. Iaoreovor, Zoe;
would probabli be acceptablo to Italy and (Jreace.
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